Condit, Celeste Michelle. 1990. Decoding Abortion Rhetoric. Communicating Social Change

Celeste Michelle Condit
DECODING
ABORTION RHETORIC
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Decoding
Abortion Rhetoric
The Communication
of Social Change
Celeste
M. Condit
Abortion: reproductive control or murder? Guaranteed by a right to choice or
an unthinkable
come
act that
must never be-
acceptable?
The character
of
the
arguments over
abortion has changed in the past quartercentury, as has the average American's
understanding of what abortion is and
whether it is "right" or "wrong." As the
intensity of the debate has escalated, the
discourse has gone beyond logical to
impassioned words, and it now takes in
acts of civil disobedience and violence,
all in the name of persuading others of
the validity of a specific view.

In this balanced study, Celeste Condit
analyzes the ways in which public discourse has brought about changes in
general attitudes toward abortion. The
result
is
a close look at
how
the various
arguments of the opposing sides have

helped shape the development of public
policy
and private
practice.
model
of
and
Her temperate, thorough discussion
of
"Professor Condit's book

scholarly research
is
critical
insight.
both sides of the abortion controversy,

her careful tracing of the historical de-
velopment of issues and positions
to-
gether with her thoughtful treatment of

the
arguments and
make
this 'must'
implications
this topic. Her rhetorical

makes an important contribution
cerned about
analysis
their
reading for anyone con-
'h
Decoding Abortion Rhetoric
DECODING
ABORTION RHETORIC
Communicating
Social
Change
CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

Urbana and Chicago
1990 by the Board of Trustees of the University

Manufactured in the United States of America
C
This book
is
printed on acid-free paper.
Excerpts from Pregnant by Mistake: The Stories

Katrina
of Illinois
Maxtone-Graham. Copyright
Women by
by Katrina Maxtone-Graham.
of Seventeen
1973, 1989
Originally published by Liveright Publishing Corporation. Reprinted

1989, with index
and new introduction, by Remi Books,
rights reserved. Reprinted
New
York. All
bv permission of the author.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Condit, Celeste Michelle, 1956-
Decoding abortion
rhetoric
communicating
social
change
Celeste
Michelle Condit.
p.
cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-252-01647-5
1.
(alk.
paper)
Abortion Moral and ethical aspects.

United States. 3. Pro-life movement
363.4'6 dc20
2.
Pro-choice
United
movement
States.
I.
Title.
89-33469
CIP
for
my
sister,
Deirdre Moira Condit,

at
whose expense I have gained much:

on the loan of your life
little interest
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Preface: The
1
2.
The
Politics of
The Story
The
Abortion Study
Social Force of Rhetoric
1960-65
22
Pro-Life Heritage Tale
Rhetoric and History, 1965-81

4.
Life, Equality,
43
and Choice
Rhetoric and Values, 1965-72

5.
6.
59
Constructing Visions of the Fetus and Freedom

Rhetoric and Image
79
Enacting "Choice"
and the Law, 1973-85
96
Public Rhetoric
7.
Prime-Time Abortion
Rhetoric and Popular Culture, 1973-85
8.
123
Mass Compromise and Minority Violence

Rhetoric and Ideology, 1978-85
9.
xi
of Illegal Abortion
Rhetoric and Narrative,

3.
ix
Public Rhetoric
and
Afterword: The
Private Lives
172
Appendix A:
Appendix
Anonymous
B:
147
"Right to Life?"
199
205
Letter Claiming
Responsibility for Pensacola Clinic
Bombings
Appendix C: Methodological Issues from

Chapter 9
Glossary
Index
225
231
218
220
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Unlike so many books these days, this work was not supported by
foundations or time off from teaching or other outside aid. As a
consequence, the extra effort had to come out of the lives of my
and family. I am, therefore, more than usually

indebted to others for their heroic efforts or heroic tolerance. Most
centrally, my spouse, Loren Bruce Railsback, has not only edited my
work and provided photographs, he has tolerated a cranky, singleminded eccentric as a life partner and discussed these issues beyond
all reasonable expectations (especially for a geologist, who finds our
human traumas rather short-lived and small-scale). I am also indebted
to John Louis Lucaites for his thoughtful "academic" reading of the
manuscript. I owe my sister for providing a "non-academic" reading
along with permanent support and inspiration. I thank my mother
and father for teaching me to care and to argue. I thank Michael
Calvin McGee for inspiring me to write a book on this topic, in this
way. I thank Paula Treichler for helping me to negotiate the mine field
of feminist academic politics. In addition, I want to thank Lawrance
Bernabo for providing the materials that made chapter 7 possible, and
Sally Kenney for her reading of chapter 6.
I must also acknowledge John Lyne and Samuel Becker, members
of my dissertation committee, and Bruce Gronbeck, my adviser.
Chapters 2 and 4 overlap with that dissertation. I express thanks to
friends, colleagues,
the
many
other scholars in the field of rhetorical criticism and com-
munication studies who have provided feedback on portions of this

work, including Elizabeth Nelson, Tom Duncanson, James Hay,
Susan Owen, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Cheris Kramerae, Joe Wenzel,
Larry Grossberg, Dean Hewes, Bernard Brock, Ellen Wartella,
Donovan Ochs and the many others of you whose important suggestions and responses I have woven into this discourse while ungratefully forgetting the sources.
Graham
am
grateful to Katrina
Maxtoneand for
for her permission to use her interviews in chapter 9
her assistance in making sure I have done so accurately. I am indebted

to Cynthia Mitchell for her thoughtful editing.
I also thank the Speech Communication Association for permission
to use material overlapping with my essay 'The Contemporary Abortion Controversy: Stages in the
Argument/
IX
Quarterly Journal of Speech
Acknowledgments
70 (November 1984), 410-24; the Journal of Communication Inquiry for

permission to use material from 'Abortion on Television: The 'System'
and Ideological Production" 11 (Summer 1987), 47-60, that overlaps
with chapter 7; and the Pensacola News-Journal for permission to use
the letter which appears in Appendix B.
Finally, I express my gratitude to all of the women scholars who
have fought so many battles and crafted so many examples for me and
others: they have made this work possible in a dozen hidden ways. In
spite of
its
flaws,
hope
this discourse contributes in
some manner
toward the collective craft of women's scholarship as well as to our

understanding of rhetoric, social systems, and abortion in America.
PREFACE
The
Politics of
Abortion Study
The
practice of abortion has always been politically charged and

morally problematic because abortion allows power over a central
arena of social life; abortion provides the most effective control over
human reproductive labor. Consequently, different historical groups,
differently situated, have held diverse positions on abortion. Passionate disagreement has prevailed, even among women. The first wave
of American feminist social reformers used opposition to abortion as a
reason to support birth control. 1 Even though the second wave of
American feminists evolved a consensus in favor of legalized abortion
as a major component of "reproductive freedom/' they did so only
gradually. In the early years of the second movement, struggles over
abortion were extremely divisive for groups like the National Organization for Women. 2 Even in the seventies and eighties the consensus
was not complete; a small group calling themselves Feminists for Life
continuously seconded a much larger group of homemakers in opposing abortion.
By the 1980s, controversy over abortion had also spread
throughout the academic realm. In the law journals, scholars and
lawyers argued about the fitness of the "privacy" doctrine (see chapter
6). In journals and books in women's studies, academics began extensive explorations of a wide range of issues relating to "mothering" and
work had profound implications for the issue

some cultural feminists suggested that
might be wrong when it involves eliminating
reproduction, and this
of abortion. 3 Simultaneously,
the abortion "choice"
deformed fetuses (disvaluing disabled persons) or females. 4 Feminist

scholars with socialist beliefs indicated that the choices of individual
might be less important than the outcomes for women as a
women
class. 5
To write a book about abortion rhetoric in the midst of such controversial
argument
ous positions
is
may
challenging and, perhaps, risky. Partisans of variresent even the portrayal of their arguments as
xi
xii
" rhetoric, "
for the
deceit/ However,
term has taken on the connotations of "empty

use the word in the academic sense, to mean
persuasion (by argument and other means). Rhetoric is not necessarily bad: arguments can be either sound or unsound; styles of
presentation, either attractive or unattractive. Moreover, rhetoric is
essential to a democracy.
This book's primary goal is not to buttress any particular political
position but to describe the way in which legal and cultural consensus
was molded through the public

partisans. Because
it
interactions
between the various

development and
offers detailed analysis of the
it may be of use or interest to

persons from a wide range of perspectives. To add increased understandings of the shape and depth of a controversy, and of how one's
rhetoric functions, is to gain power to further the argument. The
political issue, nonetheless, returns at a second level. In order to
assess the effects of various persuasive strategies and arguments, I
have often had to assess the kinds of strengths and weaknesses these
rhetorics feature. Partisans tend to be embarrassed as much by having
the strategic elements of their discourse openly identified and labelled
"persuasive " as by having their arguments labelled incomplete. These
assessments on my part, therefore, have unavoidable political im-
functioning of opposing positions,
plications.
Further, despite the traditional canons of objectivity thought necesI do not claim to be a "disinterested" obaware that my choice of this topic as well as the
ways in which I have put the issues together are influenced by my
position as a career woman (not solely a homemaker) who has never
faced an unwanted pregnancy and who has adequate resources to
insure a relatively high degree of control over her fertility. 7 I nonetheless claim academic objectivity for this work, according to a standard
of objectivity that is sounder than that of "disinterest." 8 Because I
address a divided audience of both rhetorical theorists and feminist
scholars, I have not adopted the feminist approach to objectivity
elucidated by Mary O'Brien, who argues that because male schol-
sary for scholarly work,

server. 6
arship
ance
am
fully
one-sided, one-sided female scholarship is needed to balAlthough I would defend that standard as appropriate for
kinds of academic work, in this book I have applied a standard
is
9
it.
many
from the problems raised by the investigation
of dis-
course. This standard proposes that studying meaning-laden
human
that derives
activities requires
pathetic
not detachment from competing sides but full emall positions. In order to understand how a
engagement with
series of public rhetorics functioned to
ought
to try to live fully
shape law and culture, one

logically
in the broad
emotionally and

The
Politics of
Abortion Study
xiii
range of discourses produced on the controversy. Such "recreation of

situations is a standard practice in traditional rhetorical criticism. 10 It
is, further, as Douglas Ehninger has noted, necessarily an enterprise
requiring self-risk. 11 If one authentically engages life-worlds different
from one's own, there is a good chance one's views will be substan,,
tially altered.
In order to present an account of the abortion controversy,
I have
myself in this way, and I have indeed come through this
surprisingly painful process changed. At the least, I am more committed to the need for better public policies on reproductive issues
because I now understand more fully both the crucial role of abortion
in some women's lives and the substantiality of the later-term fetus.
The process of coming to understand the development of the controversy, as opposed to the process of forming one's opinion on its
had
to risk
issues, requires the additional intellectual skill of separating
principle or statement
means
what
as a guide for policy in one's present
context from the impact of that "same" principle, value, story, or
statement in a different historical context. Discourses that one might

not wish to endorse as "equipment for living" today may nonetheless
have served useful
social functions in a different historical context. 12
This entails treating discourse as "rhetoric"

pirically real
historically situated
communicative events which have
rather than treating
words
em-
identifiable effects
as "ideas" or philosophic principles
tran-
scendent statements made about ideals or future policies. That kind of

separation does not negate politics; it may help to manage the tricky
balance between "mere" politics and "mere" scholarship: if humanist
scholarship is inevitably political, it must have a politics that learns.
Academic work on important issues be it foreign policy, international trade, pollution control, or criminology inevitably entails
value judgments and political consequences. Such political dimensions do not negate the worth of such human science but rather
indicate quite clearly
its
potential for
worth
to the
human species.
It is
only in the execution of a particular work that it will become clear

whether the politics of the scholar have been managed to produce
something of interest and value to others who do not necessarily
share those politics or whether the academic has succeeded only in
generating material that will hearten compatriots. I hope I have
achieved the broader standard.
NOTES
1.
This anti-abortion stance was not by any means uniform among early
and birth control advocates. A variety of works deal directly and
feminists
xiv
indirectly with this issue. See Colin Francone, Abortion Freedom:
Worldwide
Movement (London and Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), esp. pp. 6061; Carl Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980), esp. p. 243; Linda Gordon, Woman's Body: Woman's
Right (New York: Grossman, 1976); Carol Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly ConGender in Victorian America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983);
Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle (1959; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
duct: Visions of
Press, 1968).
2. See "NOW Bill of Rights," "Letters to Our Sisters in Social Work," and
"Redstockings Manifesto" in Sisterhood Is Powerful: An Anthology of Writings
from the Women's Liberation Movement, ed. Robin Morgan (New York: Random
House, 1970); also The Boston Women's Health Book Collective, Our Bodies,
Ourselves: A Book By and For Women (New York: Simon and Schuster), pp. 138-
53; "Jane,"
3.
photocopy reprinted from
June-November 1973.
Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experi(New York: W. W. Norton, 1976); Nancy Chodorow, The
Voices,
See, for example, Adrienne Rich,
ence and Institution
Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978);

Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
Germaine Greer, Sex and Destiny: The Politics of Human Fertility (New
Colophon Books, 1984); Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex
(London: Paladine, 1972). The Feminist Dictionary (ed. Cheris Kramarae and
1983);
York: Harper
Paula A. Treichler [London: Pandora Press, 1985]) defines abortion as "termination of pregnancy prior to about twenty weeks gestation," suggesting
another ground of difference in perspectives.

4. Helen B. Holmes and Betty B. Hoskins, "Prenatal and Preconception
Sex Choice Technologies: A Path to Femicide?" in Man-Made Women: How New
Reproductive Technologies Affect Women, ed. Gena Corea et al. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 15-30; Robyn Rowland, "Motherhood,
Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of 'Choice' in Sex Preselection," in
Corea et al., p. 84; Madhu Kishwar, "The Continuing Deficit of Women in
India and the Impact of Amniocentesis," in Corea et al., pp. 30-37; Viola
Roggencamp, "Abortion of a Special Kind: Male Sex Selection in India," in Rita
Arditti, Renate Duelli-Klein and Shelley Minden, eds. Test-Tube Women: What
Future for Motherhood? (London: Pandora Press, 1984), pp. 213-34, but
consider Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Let the Subaltern Speak," in Marxism
and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 271-313; Ann Finger, "Claiming All of Our Bodies: Reproductive Rights and Disabilities," in Arditti,
Duelli-Klein, and Mindern, pp. 281-97.
5. See Rowland; for a recent description of the disagreements among
feminists see Catharine R. Stimpson, "Nancy Reagan Wears a Hat: Feminism
and Its Cultural Consensus," Critical Inquiry 14 (Winter 1988), 223-44.
6. The masculinist version of "objectivity" is revealed, not only in the
originating
documents
of fathers of the scientific revolution like
Bacon and
Descartes (see Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism [Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1986]) but also in textbooks that purport to teach
The
young
scholars
how
Politics of
to practice their trade. Consider, for example, the
nitions of Savoie Lottinville to
must
Abortion Study
young
xv
admoyou
historians: "In historical writing
exercise the severest possible detachment/'
The writer should "imagine
man
'on a peak in Darien,' surveying his episode with the eyes of a

visitor of another land, undisturbed by national interests or fate." Lottinville,
himself a
The Rhetoric of History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 8, 9.

7. The phrase "only a homemaker" has generated an unfortunate confusion. That statement tends to dis value the important work of housekeeping
and child-rearing and to ignore the fact that most career women are also
homemakers. To be a homemaker is important work, but for a person who
has a career outside the home and is a homemaker, those who do not work
outside the home are "only" homemakers, not taking on two different jobs.
See note 6.
O'Brien says: "Feminist theory has to be biased because it is anti-bias.
We have to correct a profound and long-sustained imbalance, and this cannot
be done without jumping rather brutally and without invitation on the end of
the philosophical seesaw which has lingered too long in the rarefied heights
of the complacent taken-for-grantedness of male conceptions of the nature of
8.
9.
man"
(p. 12).
Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, "The Traditional Perspective," in

Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective, ed. Scott and
10.
ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 29-37.

Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations
and Its Uses," Speech Monographs 37 (June 1979), esp. p. 104.
12. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed.
Brock,
1st
11.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
CHAPTER ONE
The
The practice and meaning of abortion in the United States of America

underwent stunning changes between 1960 and 1985. In the previous
century abortions had been done primarily "underground ." The term
itself had been a whisper-word, not to be spoken in polite company
or in public. Beginning in the sixth decade of the twentieth century,
however, major social changes brought abortion within routine institutional medicine, reconfigured its public meanings, and dramatically altered both the private practices of women with regard to
abortion and their relationship to "motherhood." These tumultuous
revisions were negotiated within a heated, continuing public controversy.
The breadth and depth of the impacts of this singular, contested,

and rapid change can hardly be underestimated: the meaning and
practice of abortion
is
central to the reproduction of the
species, to our understandings of gender,
and
human
our life ethics.

Because of its pivotal role in our national and personal lives, scholars
have begun to tie the contemporary controversy over abortion into a
wide range of social forces. 1
This book attempts something different: it examines the path taken
by the developing public discourse that constituted the most visible
element of that controversy. The story told here is not a conventional
history, for histories usually focus on the people and events that
"cause" social changes, relegating public discourse to a supporting
role in the story. 2 In contrast, this account focuses directly on the
American argument about abortion, describing the vast flows of public
discourse that spread across America to shift the meaning of abortion
and of related terms, practices, and laws. Chapter 2 begins the tale in
the early sixties when the persuasive power of a plaintive story about
women's experiences made illegal abortion a public concern for the
first time in many years. This compelling story drew forth powerful
histories (chapter 3), which escalated the controversy to a battle over
to
constitutive values (chapter 4) and dramatic visual images (chapter 5).

The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional issue thereby raised
through modification and legal instantiation of the vocabularies offered by the activists on both sides (chapter 6). The new law and
legitimated public vocabulary were then simultaneously both integrated into the popular culture (chapter 7) and violently rejected by
some groups (chapter 8). In the end, women's lives and stories, which
had generated the controversy, came to reflect and be revised by the
new
public discourse (chapter
9).
To expend effort describing "what people have said" to the extent

this book does is not yet a familiar practice in the intellectual community (those unconcerned about the theoretical support of this
approach may prefer to skip to the beginning of the abortion issue
itself at chapter 2). The prevailing approaches to the study of social
change in America have dismissed the words of social activists as
quickly as has the American "common sense," which dictates that
"actions speak louder than words." 3 After all, individuals may lie to
us, their intentions may be hard to determine from their language,
and they probably do not fully understand their own reasons for
acting. Consequently, scholars have tended to submerge description
and analysis of public discourse, studying instead the "framework of
social forces" behind those words, the actors and events surrounding
the discourse, or the private communication contained in letters and
diaries. 4
changes in American abortion laws have

elements
of
this non-discursive approach. Kristin
shared important
Luker's excellent and important book on the controversy provides a
clear example. In spite of the fact that she directs a great deal of her
own attention to the discursive content of the social change processes,
Luker advances this justification for preferring studies of economic
forces to analysis of the persuasion process: "It is tempting to argue
that the pro-Choice people simply 'persuaded' a great many fellow
Americans to accept their point of view. To some extent, they probably did; certainly the mere fact that they made the abortion issue a
subject for public debate allowed many more people to become familiar with it and to form personal opinions about the merits of their
case. It seems likely, however, that American public opinion was
shaped more significantly by the large-scale social changes going on
The majority
at
the
same
of studies of
time." 5
work
women
activists
provide the
central large-scale force. Consequently, she collapses the
"framework
understanding" that has guided their activism into a
static set of
Luker believes
of
that the
lives of
The
and values devolving from these life issues, ignoring the

discourse as a change agent in itself. 6
Luker's assumptions have been widely shared. Rosalind Pollack
Petchesky's rich analysis of current abortion policies and practices
emphasizes the improved economic position of women as the central
beliefs
causal factor in the recent changes. In doing so, Petchesky omits

serious consideration of the pro-Life argument in defense of the
fetus. 7 Additionally,
she provides no explanation of how American
public discourse arrived at the liberal phrase "right to choice," instead

of her preferred phrase "control of our own bodies," as a justification
Such gaps in explanation suggest that,

however vital the knowledge provided by studies of "social forces"
that do not focus on public discourse, they have not yet provided us
for current abortion practices.
complete understandings.
The other major branch of scholarship about abortion has focused
not on material forces but on abstract ideas, preferring a philosophical, ethical, or moral bent. These articles and books feature explorations of the moral and political concerns involved in ethically sound
abortion policies. They employ history, at most, as a backdrop for
their formulations. 8 As vital as these works are for helping us sort out
where we ought to go in abortion policies and practices, they provide
explanation for how we got where we are.
Explanations of the path through which America has arrived at its
current abortion laws, practices, and understandings must include
the study of discursive forces because only through public discourse
can material realities be expressed and ideas materialized. Public
discourse serves as such a bridge because it is both a concrete material
little
and the bearer of ideas. It becomes, therefore, vital to any

understanding of the evolution of material practices and ethics. Unfortunately, the few studies that have taken serious account of the
discourse of the abortion controversy have lacked methodological sophistication or have taken a static, ahistorical perspective. They have
practice
not, therefore,
argument
produced
explanations of the functioning of the public
9
in the revision of widely shared meanings. For activists as
well as scholars, this limitation
on our understanding
is
a significant
one.
absence of such scholchanges of this nature,

academics have had to develop ways of seeing discourse as an empirical entity operating through multiple voices across the social scale,
rather than as the intentions of individual speakers. Fortunately, most
of the barriers to such an approach are falling. Most centrally, the
There have been serious reasons
for the
arship. In order to chart broad-scale social
maturation of the American school of rhetorical criticism has provided

a way for scholars to avoid examining public discourse solely on the
authors terms for intended meaning. Instead, current approaches
favor studying discourse obliquely, through rhetorical structure. 10 In
addition, a wide range of theoretical work in several fields has begun
to indicate both the importance of ideology and its partial independence from the means of economic production, political demographics, social institutions, and other such super-structural factors. 11
My particular version of these theoretical and methodological orientations are likely to be unfamiliar to many readers, so I wish to
sketch the outlines of a model indicating how public discourse functions in American society. I cannot provide a complete theoretical
argument here, but will merely summarize the position (I include
references to fuller theoretical elaborations). I have provided a glossary for the few technical terms you will need and marked words
appearing in the glossary with an asterisk (e.g., ^narratives) at their
first use or, later, for emphasis.
7
The Force of Rhetoric

Public discourse
is
in Society
constituted of ^rhetoric. That
word
carries negative
connotations that provide a useful reminder: those who speak in

public have their own agendas; they seek to persuade us of something
that is in their interest. However, those negative connotations, and
our tendency to
treat the
phrase "mere rhetoric" as a single, insepara-
ble unit, should not disguise the fact that rhetoric has important social
functions.
The social role of rhetoric is perhaps best indicated through the

Greek root of the term. The verb rheo originally meant "to flow" or "to
gush forth." As the verb became a noun denoting a particular
type of speech, it captured the way in which the flow of meaning is
constituted through persuasive public discourse (i.e., "rhetoric"). As
important because it is
meanings, and all
persons, as social beings, are destined to live in the world through
meaning.
Even those who take a determinist position, declaring every rhetorical statement to be a simple product of a particular condition, recog-
its
the
root suggests, therefore, public rhetoric
most immediate source
is
of the flow of social
nize that the ârticulation of social conditions through rhetoric
is
substantively different artifact than those supposedly primary social
conditions themselves. Large-scale social forces cannot be directly
The Social Force
of Rhetoric
even experienced by governments, politicians, buThey can be dealt with only through understandings of them, which are predominantly carried through a shared
*public vocabulary. Thus, in the abortion controversy, the competing
dealt with or
reaucrats, or individuals.
concerns of professional women, the Catholic church, high-tech businesses seeking well-educated workers, etc., cannot be directly
weighed, or even mathematically calculated, by the people who construct and operate nation-states. They must be addressed through a
complex network of meanings about the role of government, about
what is good for "the people," and about the particular character of
particular situations. The complexities of the production and use of
meanings make it necessary for scholars and politicians alike to add
detailed understandings of rhetorical processes to conventional studies of the underlying social forces to which they are linked.
The full determinist position, however, is probably neither the
most popular position nor the most accurate, and for those who admit
that public discourse may have some independence from its economic
roots, the social force of rhetoric appears even greater. 12 A broad
range of studies have begun to join rhetorical criticism and public
address in taking seriously public and popular discourse. The majority of these studies have been focused on "culture in such a way as to
emphasize the private or sub-cultural responses of individuals, fam13
ilies, or classes.
While these works share important alliances with
my own endeavors, this volume focuses on the *public impact of
political and cultural discourses, rather than upon their direct ramifications in the personal realm, and so the findings and orientations are
quite different.
notably, a study of public, political discourse must be quite
about providing a model of governance that presumes the
possibility of social change through the social process of rhetoric. This
Most
explicit
dominant theories of representative

government. While it would require an entire volume to accurately
trace these theories and their multiple transformations, it is enough
requires the fusion of the three
for present
purposes
to sketch a set of caricatures.
The "conservative" position on representative government proclaims that, through a marketplace of ideas, rational argumentation by
individuals produces policies that serve the general interests of all of
the people. The "liberal" realist replies that, in fact, partisan interest
groups use a range

of general interests.
and
under the guise
of persuasive devices to convince politicians
citizens to enact policies that favor partisan interests
The
denounces even that account, indicapower of elites allows them to circum-
"leftist"
ting that the disproportionate
vent any true clash with other groups, maintaining power directly,
behind a veil of false consciousness.
Each of these positions offers important components of a more
complete account. The conservatives are correct in suggesting that it is
only through the attempt to use rational argumentation to make
government serve the public interest that legitimacy, and hence survival, of this form of government can be maintained. Moreover, I
believe that they are correct, that sometimes that goal is achieved.
However, the liberals offer important correctives. Because the process
of public argumentation is conducted through interest groups, there
is
always the potential for the public interest to be hijacked, via
persuasion, into serving
some
partisan interests. Finally, the
are correct in noting that, in fact, the disproportionate
power
leftists
of
some
groups allows them disproportionate influence in the public discourse and thereby results in a general tendency that favors elites
repeatedly.
comprehensive model
mass-mediated representative governnumber of competing groups seek

to control the available resources and practices to their own advantage. These groups vary in size, influence, and degree of organization, and membership in them overlaps. Some groups and
individuals have incredible and disproportionate power (e.g., the
ruling elites serving as directors of major corporations or the 1 percent
of the populace holding a third of the national wealth, or males as a
class), but they must wield this power by gaining public assent for the
policies and practices they prefer (at least on major issues). 14 This
public assent (active or passive) is achieved through the rhetorical
process, whether deliberative, forensic, or *epideictic.
In public arenas of discourse such as newspapers, magazines, the
floor of Congress, presidential speeches, television programs, or bureaucratic hearings rhetors advance claims on "the nation" couched
in terms of major values, suggesting that particular sentiments, policies, or laws are in the general interest. To the extent that they are
successful at convincing the *public of this potential for general good,
they are able to enact their will. However, the process of convincing
requires not only that a given policy be accepted but also that a given
vocabulary (or set of understandings) be integrated into the public
repertoire. Thus, for example, "protective" legislation for women was
passed by employing and simultaneously strengthening a definition
of all women as weak, vulnerable, and worthy of protection because
"motherhood. 15 These meanings
of their inherent reproductive role
throughout the social formarevised
are reflected, reproduced, and
ment presumes,
of
then, that a large
The Social Force
of Rhetoric
in the
law, in cultural artifacts, in social and

and in individual lives (and that is why "the
personal is political"). Over time, a powerful social group's way of
describing the general interest may become embedded within the
public vocabularies and practices. Future arguments for that group's
interests are then easier to make, because supporting practices and
the * warrants for the arguments are already in place. Even when a
tion at various levels
economic
practices,
lobbied privately rather than debated publicly, this public

meanings exerts influences on the outlines of policies.
Eventually, this rhetorical process might result in a near-monolithic
subject
is
repertoire of
by a few powerful groups. However, at least as this nation has

been constituted, there have always been crucial issues over which
major groups were at odds with each other (e.g., farmers vs. industrialists and unions, importers vs. exporters, slave owners vs. employers of free labor, and, today, multi-nationals and nationals, hightech industry and service industry). 16 This has resulted in continual
disputes about meanings and vocabularies, and these disputes have
kept open possibilities for less powerful, less well-organized groups
to influence the public repertoire of meanings as well.
Hence, terms such as "shared meanings," a "dominant ""ideology,"
or a *hegemony of understandings locate a concrete, identifiable set
of discourses that have identifiable effects because they are shared by
an identifiable public. The characters of ideology and the public,
however, are different from what has often been presupposed. The
dominant ideology, materialized in a wide range of public discourse,
contains conflicting beliefs and values for example, a preference for
individual liberty to accumulate wealth at the cost of others and also a
commitment to equality and even compassion. The distribution of
resources and power is therefore determined both by the relative
dominance of the favored terms of some groups over others and by
the practical application of those terms in particular areas. This mechanism allows the rhetorical process at any given historical instance to
shape and alter public discourse about particular issues in ways that
control
make
it,
in
its
own
right, a creative contributor to the distribution of
power through law, institutions, and social practices. 17

Similarly and crucially, "the public" is not a simple entity, including
the people of the nation equally; it is rather the "articulated element
populace dominated by national politicians, journalists, and
big-business leaders but also including, at lower amplification, organall
of the
groups e.g., women's groups, representaunionized workers. The public thus includes a
wide array of groups and individuals who are simultaneously at odds
ized classes
and
interest
tives of the elderly, or
with each other and in league together against other disempowered or

empowered groups. In practice the public does not necessarily include everyone equally, even though American ideology holds that it
should do so. This is why opinion polls are not accurate indicators of
"public opinion" or predictors of public policy. On numerous issues,
ranging from the Equal Rights Amendment to the Panama Canal to
gun control to aid for the Nicaraguan Contras, the polls show the
beliefs of the populace to be at odds with the dominant meanings
being conveyed in the public realm and with public policies. The
opinion polls count all the people more or less equally, rather than
reproducing the covert weightings that result from access to influence
over public discourse, which is held by powerful agents (the "publicly
articulate agents").
Several factors preserve and sustain the discrepancy between what

the people want
and what the public wants and often
gets. In the first
demands and pleasures of everyday life and the complexities of modern politics impose real limits on the political energies of
the populace. Additionally, legislators and interest groups make real
place, the
attempts to obscure the acts of legislation. Further, access to political

resources (including both information and civic skills) is limited.
Additionally, the relative wealth and satisfaction of a sizable portion of
the populace generates an inertia, and, finally, the force of *epideicencourages
tic
ritualized, patriotic, aesthetic, reassuring discourse
satisfaction
and
passivity regardless of real political conditions. All
these factors are fluid, however, allowing shifts in the groups

constitute the public and in the power of the public itself.
who
which the unorganized and differently empowered *groups or ""classes contest against and with each other for
particular policies and practices through the negotiation of persuasive
meanings. The process is drastically skewed by the superior access to
articulation held by powerful groups and by the encrustations of a
history of such skewing that embeds those distortions in the public
vocabulary. 18 Nonetheless, to describe these distorting forces is not to
describe the public discourse as fully determined by the underlying
Public argument, therefore,
derlying interests
of
is
the process through
rhetorically
sources of power. Rhetoric, as a central and unique node in the social

system, is a process with its own impacts, influences, or consequences. Understanding how rhetoric functions would enable understandings of these discursive inputs on the political system.
Rhetorical processes are, however, tied to social conditions in another
way
not through the links between message sources and their
social conditions
but through the links between audiences and their

The Social Force
of Rhetoric
social experiences. Rhetoric materializes ideas
tion of compelling vocabularies to large
members
change
to
through the distribuof potent audience
numbers
may communicate social

medium that negotiates a
or institutions. Rhetoric therefore
people by using language as a
collective "expression" of social conditions
idea can have force of
own. Only
and
social interests.
No
convincing to a large
number of people will it carry social force and gain materiality. Ideas
can be convincing for two reasons through sheer repetition (historical instantiation by dominant groups in near-complete control of the
communication media) or through effective expression of the conditions of an audience member's world ("effective" here means aesthetically pleasing or pragmatically useful). This will occur on a large scale
only if a large number of individuals share similar social conditions
and/or discursive histories. Hence, ideas come to have social force
when they are persuasive to a large number of individuals. The battle
its
if
that idea
is
between social forces of change and of stability is therefore often a

battle between the high-frequency messages reflective of the interests
of powerful groups and those less-amplified, indigenous codes reflective of the interests of various segments of the populace.
This account allows us to deal with the dominant controversy in
contemporary social theory the characterization of the contents of
public discourse. One school of theorists, led by social critics such as
Jiirgen Habermas and rhetorical theorists such as Douglas Ehninger,
can be read as arguing that public consensus through rational argumentation processes is the necessary end goal of public deliberation
and
that
it is,
ultimately, a largely achievable goal. 19 Political theorists
such as Murray Edelman and social theorists such as Anthony Giddens scoff at such "naive idealism," suggesting that, in seeking to
"universalize" or call
up "condensation symbols,"
public discourse
necessarily seeks to get a particular interest misidentified as a general

interest. 20 Given the account of representative government as a rhe-
former school provides a necessary ideal and the

an equally necessary restraint. Ultimately, because of the social
characteristics of argumentation and persuasion, most discourse must
deal with both dimensions this *double articulation of rhetoric
simultaneously, not with one to the exclusion of the other.
To the extent that rhetoric is a social process undertaken by interest
groups, public rhetoric will always be constituted by spokespersons
torical process, the

latter
for particular interests,
who
recognize that getting those interests
legitimated through public acceptance of their vocabulary is advantageous, even essential, to their interests; they will recognize that
representing their partisan interests as universal
is
an
essential rhe-
10
move. However, they will also always be constrained by the

they must be convincing: they must find "good reasons"
(according to the judgment of their audiences, as based on their social
experiences, influenced by indigenous codings of those experiences)
that demonstrate that, in fact, their partisan interests are in the general
interest. 21 This interplay between particular and general interests
works because, in practice, rhetorically generated "universals" may be
torical
fact that
genuinely in the general interest at the same time that they serve
particular interests. For example, an inter-state trucking system may
be in the national interest and also of disproportionate benefit to
truckers; thus, when trucking lobbyists argue for inter-state highway
funds, they are both universalizing their own interests and also arguing for a general interest.
In practice, private groups often receive a disproportionate advan-
tage from producing public
good
(as
when contractors
are paid exces-
sively for building roads or defense equipment). 22 This
is
especially
governments with largely passive citizenry

who are aroused to protect their interests from the special-interestsupported representatives only in extreme cases. This skewed practice
is, however, theoretically redeemable in each individual case, and this
book focuses on the process by which such redemption may occur.
There remains, however, one further conceptual problem in this
process, and it arises precisely from the dualistic nature of the
likely in representative
internal structure of the rhetorical process.
Whenever audiences
ac-
cept a mis-universalized claim (a claim that overserves an interest

group), there
is
a tendency to suggest that the audience has
duped by "mere
been
persuasion" rather than addressed with rational
argumentation. Of course, this distinction is always politically loaded

(our interests are argued, theirs are falsely addressed). This practice of
political labelling, however, does not invalidate the theoretical utility
and accuracy of the distinction between the persuasive and argumentative elements of rhetoric. Persuasion includes all non-argumentative
tools that might influence an audience to adopt the position advocated
by a speaker emotional arousal, delivery, figures of style (e!g., alliteration, rhythm, or antithesis). These persuasive devices function
through the aestheticization of the association between beliefs, attitudes, or values. In contrast, argument uses such elements of discourse as the "claim," supported by compelling and related evidence
(sometimes called "data" or "ground"), linked by a warranting general
principle. 23 Arguments are constructed by the kind of relationship we
generally think of as "logical inference" or "reasons," but they are not
limited to the propositional logic of philosophers. Instead, they are

The
11
*enthymemes, which require the audience to

participate in the process of linking general principles to particular
better characterized as
instances. 24
Separating association-based persuasion from enthymematically

based argumentation is always difficult, because it depends in part on
one's assumptions about what inferential grounds are being used by
an audience and ultimately upon what one assumes to be the "general
interest" as contrasted with merely partisan smokescreens. However,
in order to understand the process of public rhetoric it is often
essential to make those distinctions, because associational persuasion
and propositional argumentation have different social impacts. The
interplay between persuasion and argumentation reveals the lines of
social force in social decision-making (i.e., meaning-making) processes. Simultaneously, it is the tension between the two possibilities
that helps to put into relief the internal structure of rhetorical discourse.
The
social balance of
power thus often hinges on the aptness
of rhetorical structures for various audiences.
account of the functioning of representative government is

as the process of public argument and persuasion
exerts a force of its own on the underlying social processes that it
articulates. That is, public discourse is an active, change-producing,
transformative process, not merely a passive conveyer belt. Because
rhetorical units affect each other, in part through the consequences of
specific discursive configurations themselves, particular ways of talking (and hence, of understanding and acting) may come into social
being. Specific kinds of forces are exerted by the rhetorical process per
se (e.g., the production of material/ideational compromises) and by
the character of certain kinds of rhetorical units (e.g., the potent but
limited social functions of narratives). Other kinds of forces are exerted by the unique contents of the vocabulary at issue in any parIf
this
correct, rhetoric
ticular contest (e.g., "life" vs. "the fetus" in the abortion controversy).
Charting the changes in the units of discourse that appear in a

controversy across time and relating these changes to the general and
specific forces of rhetoric can produce better explanations of the
processes that operate to bring about the particular forms that social
changes take.
At this point, this model is no more than a hypothesis, and one for
which I have not even provided sustained and detailed theoretical
argument. Unless it can be applied to real historical situations, and
unless the mechanisms via which rhetoric has actually shaped and
transformed particular contests over changing material conditions can
be described, there may be only ideological reasons to prefer it over
12
other theories, especially given the rather extensive theorizing and

evidence compiled by Marxists describing underlying material forces
The following
an analysis of
clear. Through
as in sole control of particular, historical social changes.
study of the abortion controversy,
one
real case in
which the
rhetorical
believe, provides
mechanisms
are
detailed attention to the impact of rhetorical manipulations of the
public vocabulary
upon
that vocabulary,
it
illustrates the role
and
potentialities of rhetoric in the processes of social change.
Method
of Study
In order to study discursive processes in this way, a series of choices
about the proper way to approach a controversy must be made. To

begin with, a set of public discourse must be selected. Ideally, of
course, every utterance by every person occurring in the public space
would be included. Unfortunately, since most public speech is never
recorded, it is too ephemeral to allow that kind of completeness. For
pragmatic reasons, therefore, the core of this study is built around
several large but limited sets of texts. The first four substantive chapters are based on the discourse contained in the complete set of
popular, mass-circulation magazines with articles about abortion, as
indexed by the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature for the period 1960
to 1980. The popular magazines reach large audiences, they are preserved in a complete form, they provide a manageable but large
quantity of discourse, and they are clearly public media which discuss
important political issues. In order to assure that the core sample is
reasonably representative, I have supplemented the magazine articles
with pamphlets, speeches, and newspapers.
Other chapters employ these sets of texts indirectly and add other
texts. Chapter 6 is based on an examination of the legal discourse of
Roe v. Wade and related cases and of the U.S. Congressional debates
about abortion. Chapter 7 is based on the prime-time television portrayals of abortion. Chapter 8 is based on the local media coverage of
the Pensacola abortion clinic bombings.
These
because
sets of discourse are

I
believe that laws
an intentionally "public"
and public
collection,
policies relating to large-scale
social change are most directly derived from the public discourse, not
from private or *in-group rhetoric. 25 As a consequence, this book
does not include or analyze most of the internal discourse of the
Catholic church or fundamentalist sermons nor any of the academic
or other *in-group feminist discourse on abortion. This choice tends
to reproduce something of a disparity: some popular religious jour-
The Social Force of Rhetoric
13
more or less directly reproduce some of the internal discourse of the pro-Life groups, but, as Petchesky has noticed,
"On the level of the public discourse policy, law, media representa-
nals (e.g., America)
the feminist voice on the abortion question was and remains
tions
barely audible/726 Omitting this discourse seems to reproduce the

blanket of silence over these feminisms and to rely on a crude distinc-
between public, or *out-group, rhetoric and *in-group rhetoric. 27

However, the separation between sub-cultures and the dominant
public vocabulary is real, even if not neat and tidy. And since it is not
yet clear how in-group rhetoric directly influences public policy and
public vocabulary, the examination of academic, socialist, and radical
tion
feminist publications, as well as internal religious discourse (sermons
or the Catholic World), will have to constitute another set of studies.
Accounting
dience
is
for the
changes in the discourse
quite a large
enough
reaching the
mass au-
task.
The second methodological issue is the choice of focus for a study

hundreds of documents. This choice is again
that surveys literally
theory-driven.
believe that three "units of discourse" are central to
the persuasiveness
The
first
unit
is
and impact
of public discourse.
a kind of "ultimate term"
special words or phrases
that express the public values that provide the "constitutional"

of a community. 28
mitments
These words or phrases
graphs, and in the United States they include
com-
are called "Ideo-
Life,
Liberty,
and
Unless an act can be justified under such constitutive

allowed but it cannot be defended as a right nor can
a public agency be forced to act on it. Thus, in the abortion controProperty.
values,
it
may be
versy, for
women
revision of
American ideographic
to gain the political right to abortion required a

structure. Moreover, because of the
character of ideographs in the process of persuasion, particular ideographic justifications (Right to Choice) were favored over others
(Reproductive Freedom).
The second
is narrative in form. Narpowerful and important forms in almost all

human collectives. 29 When they are repeated frequently, and begin to
ground action and other beliefs, we call them *myths. Such social
myths are not necessarily true or false. Generally, they tell important
truths but they leave out important ingredients and, hence, distort.
But even though they do not tell the "whole story" no human
language can they are extremely powerful rhetorical devices. 30 In
basic unit of public rhetoric
ratives or "stories" are
the abortion controversy, narratives were the
first
discursive units to
break the icy public silence the refusal to articulate abortion. As the
narratives gained mythic status, they began to generate concrete
14
social changes.
Again, however, narrative units have certain per-
suasive functions, forms,
and
limitations,
and these shaped the
role
of the narratives in the public argument.

Finally, narratives are
constructed of ""characterizations
univer-
salized depictions of important agents, acts, scenes, purposes, or
methods. The term characterization or character-type encompasses the

earlier term stereotype but includes the positive dimensions of these
mass naming processes. Thus, in the abortion controversy the characterization of the scene of illegal abortion as the "back alley"
simplification, but a useful rhetorical simplification for
the problems presented by criminal abortion.
"women" and "motherhood" were
The
was a
summing up
characterizations of
also central to the abortion contro-
versy and, consequently, the peculiar rhetorical nature of charactertypes as a class had important impacts on the path of the controversy.
Given this description of how public argument works, I have
focused on the ideographs, narratives, and character-types used in
the controversy, mapping their appearance and relationships across
time.
have sought to answer two questions.
First,
what new myths,
ideographs, and character-types (or constellations thereof) have been

added to the public vocabulary as the controversy progressed? Second, how do these new terms and constellations result from the
negotiations among the competing terms offered for public use by
opposed groups?
To get
in
its
at this
second
issue,
have had
to
employ an approach
called
various manifestations rhetorical criticism, hermeneutics, semi-
or discourse analysis. Routinely, these methods are employed to

present a critique of a text or to explicate the manner in which it does
its work. I have turned these techniques to a somewhat different
end the production of a *diachronic explanation of the discursive
formation of social changes. This kind of descriptive history requires
the moment of critical analysis because the changes one piece of
discourse cause in other discourse can be understood only if we
dissect the way in which its meanings are constructed argumentatively and persuasively. Such accounts will always contain the politics of the analyst; their accuracy is therefore to be judged not by
adherence to method but by the cogency of the account they ulotics,
timately reconstruct.
Focusing in this way on these units of this important public discourse reveals significant patterns in the way public understandings
of abortion shifted between 1960 and 1985 in the United States. The
argument marched through a series of distinctive steps and stages. At
each stage, new units of discourse were proposed and contested,
The
15
moving the argument forward by creating new understandings. The

process was an additive one; the new vocabulary that emerged at each
stage did not disappear in later stages; it simply became a part of an
ever-expanding account of abortion.
Ultimately this arduous
and
exciting public contest will be revealed
as a negotiated transformation of
women's own
private discourses,
which, perhaps paradoxically, enabled circumscribed but substantial

changes in the experiences of many women.
NOTES
1.
Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: Univer-
James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins

and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 (New York: Oxford Union Press,
1978); Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Women's Choice: The State,
Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1984); Colin Francome, Abortion Freedom (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1984); Connie Paige, The Right to Lifers (New York: Summit Books, 1983);
Henry David, Abortion Research: International Experience (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1974); Linda Gordon, Woman's Body, Woman's Right (New
York: Grossman, 1976); Lawrence Lader, Abortion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); Lawrence Lader, Abortion IT. Making the Revolution (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1973); Roger Miller, Abortion, Baseball and Weed: Economic Issues of Our
Times (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Carl E. Schneider and Maris
Vinovskis, eds., The Law and Politics of Abortion (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1980); Patricia Steinhoff and Milton Diamond, Abortion Politics: The
Hawaii Experience (Honolulu: Union Press of Hawaii, 1977); Kristin Luker,
Taking Chances: Abortion and the Decision Not to Contracept (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1975); Nanette J. Davis, From the Transformation of Abortion
in America (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985).
2. Intellectual historians tend to study "philosophers" rather than public
argument. For example, they might attend to John Locke's notion of "liberty"
rather than to that of Peter Wentworth and Queen Elizabeth. See Michael
Calvin McGee, Edmund Burke's Beautiful Lie: An Exploration of the Relationship
between Rhetoric and Social Theory (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1974).
My work may resemble that suggested by Michel Foucault, but his efforts
focus on static epistemes. I am interested in the process of changing of such
sity of California Press, 1984);
discursive formations.
3.
Platonic philosophy, psychological behaviorism,
empirical sociology,
and
classic
Marxism
are
all
American quantitative
traditions that have dis-
paraged public discourse as an irrelevant or irredeemable process unworthy

of attention. Contemporary culture studies have gradually challenged this
presumption, so that in sizable academic constituencies studies of discourse
on its own grounds are increasingly credible. However, this trend has been so
16
strongly influenced by English and comparative literature that artistic and

entertainment perspectives and texts are privileged. That means content-
oriented studies of public discourses (especially intentionally political ones)

continue to be excluded from the academic canon. Even scholars who have
end up denigrating the impact of

example, attempts to take public
discourse as a serious sociological phenomenon but ends up reducing the
discourse's impact to "status display." See Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and
the American Temperance Movement, 2nd ed. (1963; Urbana: University of Illiattempted to
shift this orientation frequently
Joseph Gusfield,
their object of study.
for
nois Press, 1986).

4.
"Social Forces" are the
feminists,
and
mainstream American
discourse
is
focus, see
McGee, Edmund
5.
prime focus of materialist historians,
sociologists. Attention to actors
central in
Luker, Abortion,
p.
and events and
socialist
to private
history. For a critique of this
Burke's Beautiful Lie.
226.
is all the more disappointing, given

her vivid statements about the "framework of understanding" that was necessary to transform women's actions and beliefs {Abortion, pp. Ill, 120). The
6.
Luker's omission of these factors
problem appears to arise from a mistaken concept of "persuasion." Luker

employs a standard definition that presumes that persuasion only occurs
when an audience is hostile, or at the least, a "tabula rasa." Few tabula rasa
minds exist, and hostile audiences are rarely persuaded. Therefore, persuasion cannot occur. However, recent definitions of persuasion indicate clearly
that audiences are persuaded primarily by appealing to pre-existent "cognitive schemata" (see, for example, Mary John Smith, Persuasion and Human
Action [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1982]). Thus the articulation of latent
potentials among previous beliefs and values is a potent and primary type of
persuasion, and it ties in easily with the social process formulation I am
elucidating here.
7.
Petchesky, Abortion and Women's Choice,
p. 250.
Petchesky appears to
any moral decision is merely an inappropriate ploy by men to

control women. I disagree. Although sometimes moral statements serve such
purposes, I believe morality is an essential social commodity. The task is to
construct a feminized morality. Consequently, we must consider all moral
claims against us seriously. The case is made more fully by Beverly Wildung
Harrison in Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Boston: Beacon
believe that
Press, 1983).
8.
Harrison heprovides a historically grounded analysis, but
it is
not a
diachronic account. Other philosophical and ethal discussions are available in

Judith Jarvis
Thompson, "A
Definition of Abortion,"
and other essays
in The
Problem of Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1973), pp.
121-39; Sidney and Daniel Callahan, eds., Abortion: Understanding Differences
(New
York:
Morality
Human
Plenum
(New
Press, 1984); Daniel Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and
York: Macmillan, 1970);
Norman
Gillespie, "Abortion
and
Rights," Ethics 84 (1974), 237-48; Joseph Margolis, "Abortion," Ethics
The
17
T. Noonan, Jr., The Morality of Abortion: Legal and

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Robert
Perkins, ed., Abortion: Pro and Con (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1974); Norman
St. John-Steva, The Right to Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963);
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "The Ontology of Abortion," Ethics 84 (1974), 21734; Fred M. Frohock, Abortion: A Case Study in Law and Morals (Westport,
84 (1973), 41-61; John

Historical Perspectives
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983). A combination position is indirectly presented through Linda Bird Francke's The Ambivalence of Abortion (New York:
Dell, 1982).
9. An extremely useful preliminary work is provided by Betty
Hyman Rodman, The Abortion Controversy (New York: Columbia
Sarvis
and
University
Press, 1974). See also Marilyn Falik, Ideology and Abortion Policy Politics
(New
York: Praeger, 1983). Barbara Plant provides a fine discourse study for the
period before 1960, Abortion as a Secondary Birth Control Measure: A Functional

Approach (M.A. thesis, University of Windsor, Ontario, 1971). Several other
smaller categories of abortion studies are available various accounts of the
conditions or "facts" of legal and criminalized abortion, along with a small set
of activist
and academic
eds., Abortion:
New
These include many issues of Family PlanLiu, and David Solomon,

Policy Studies (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame
histories.
ning Perspectives as well as
Edward Manier, William
Directions for
University Press, 1973); Harold Rosen, Therapeutic Abortion (New York: Julian
Press, 1954); Alan F. Guttmacher, ed., The Case for Legalized Abortion (Berkeley:
Diablo Press, 1967); Garret Hardin, Stalking the Wild Taboo (Los Altos, Calif.:
William Kaufmann, 1973); James Reed, From Private Vice to Public Virtue (New
York: Basic Books, 1978); Carl Reiterman, ed., Abortion and the Unwanted Child
(New
German
York: Springer, 1971);
Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities,
Arguments (New York: Corpus Books, 1970); Andrew H. Merton,

Enemies of Choice: The Right to Life Movement and Its Threat to Abortion (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1981); Michael Gorman, Abortion in the Early Church (New York:
and
the
Paulist Press, 1982).

10.
Contemporary
Brock and Robert

troit:
Wayne
rhetorical criticism
L. Scott,
Methods
is
summarized
Criticism of Oral Rhetoric
(New
2nd
Bernard
L.
ed., rev. (De-
James R. Andrews, The
State University Press, 1980); see also
Practice of Rhetorical Criticism
in part in
of Rhetorical Criticism,
York: Macmillan, 1983); Carroll C. Arnold,
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles
E. Merrill, 1974).
fine
on the structure
provided by David
recent example of a full-length rhetorical analysis that focuses

or units of rhetoric in important social discourse
Zarefsky, President Johnson's
War on
is
Poverty: Rhetoric and History (University,
Press, 1986). See also Ernest Bormann, The Force

American Dream (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1985). See also recent issues of the Quarterly Journal of Speech
Ala.: University of
Alabama
of Fantasy: Restoring the
and
Central States Speech Journal
11.
For scholars with disparate politics
who
are converging
on
this view,
see Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1948); Paula A. Treichler's bibliography, "Language,
Feminism, Theory:
18
Entering Decade Three/' in
Women and Language
Definitions Do: Childbirth, Cultural Crisis,
Discourse/' in Paradigm Dialogues

ies,
ed. B. Dervin et
al.
II:
10: 1, 5-37, and her "What

and the Challenge to Medical
Research Exemplars in Communication Stud-
(Beverly Hills: Sage, in press); Louis Althusser, Lenin
and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1971);
Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narration as a Socially Symbolic Act
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981); Stuart Hall, "The Problem of
Ideology Marxism without Guarantees," and "On Postmodernism," interview, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, and Lawrence Grossberg, "History, Politics,
and Postmodernism: Stuart Hall and Cultural Studies," all in Journal of Com-
munication Inquiry 10
and Paul
(Summer
1986); Stuart Hall,
Willis, Culture, Media, Language:
Dorothy Hobson, R. Lowe,
Working Papers
in Cultural Studies,
1977-79 (London: Hutchinson, 1980); special issue, entitled "Ideology/

Power," of the Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 7 (Winter/Spring
1983); Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaelogy of the Human Sciences
(New
York: Vintage Books, 1973); Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the
Political
Economy of the Sign (St. Louis, Mo.: Telos Press, 1981); Raymond Williams,
Marxism and Literature (1977; rpt. Oxford: Oxford Union Press, 1985); JeanFrancois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition:
Bennington and
B.
Report on Knowledge, trans. G.
Massumi (Minneapolis: University
1984); Falik, Ideology and Abortion Policy Politics.
am
of
Minnesota Press,
not arguing complete
independence of discourse from material factors; I believe discourse is a

material factor itself and that it is tied into the social structure as a material
practice. However, I do not believe that it is solely a material practice. I
believe, to borrow Kenneth Burke's term, that discourse has "substance"
both ideational and material elements. Kenneth Burke, Grammar of Motives
I also recognize the
implied in recent criticism of the role of critics in analysis. A reply
is available in Celeste Michelle Condit, "The Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy,"
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 6, no. 2 (1989), 103-22.
(Berkeley: University of California Press edition, 1969).
difficulties
12. See note 11. Scholars in American public address, organized in the
Speech Communication Association, have long held this perspective; their
work
best represented in the Quarterly Journal of Speech.

For example, Janice Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy,
and Popular Literature (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984);
Ien Ang, Watching "Dallas": Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination, trans.
is
13.
Delia Couling (London: Methuen, 1985); John Fiske, Television Culture

(London and New York: Methuen, 1987); David Morley, Family Television
(London: Comedia, 1986); Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning
(London and
New York:
Methuen,
of Style
1979).
14. See, for example, Michael Calvin McGee, "The Rhetorical Process in
Eighteenth-Century England," in Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition, ed. Walter
R. Fisher (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1974), pp. 99-121.
15. This is a concrete enactment of the "duality of structure" discussed in
Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1979); see also Celeste Michelle Condit, "Crafting Virtue:
The
The Rhetorical Foundations
19
of Public Morality," Quarterly Journal of Speech 73
(February 1987), 79-97.

16. Annals of America (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1968).
17. Condit, "Crafting Virtue."
The history of skewing explains the need for Jiirgen Habermas's corAnglo-American theories of "free speech" through his formulation
of the "ideal speech situation." The theory provides a useful political guide,
even though his arguments about a "legitimation crisis" are faulty because of
18.
rection of
his failure to account for the ability of rhetoric to re- vivify shared values.
Compare Communication and
the Evolution of Society (Boston:
Beacon Press,
1979) to Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

19.
Habermas, Communication; Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method:

Its Limits, and Its Uses," Communication Monographs 37 (June 1979),
Nature,
101-10.
Its
20.
Giddens; Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses
of Politics
(Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1964), Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago:
Markham,
Language (New York: Academic Press, 1975).

21. On "good reasons" see Karl Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good
Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech 49 (October 1963), 239-49, and Walter
Fisher, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech 64
(December 1978), 376-84.
1971), Political
22. Jesse Jackson, in
Democratic presidential primary debates, nationally
and summer 1987. Jackson

repeatedly insisted that groups that get disproportionate gains from protelevised, 15 January 1984, 23 February 1984,
grams
be required to give back something additional

should
have been required to increase commitments to minorities or workers in
"in the public interest"
in return (e.g., that Chrysler, in return for federal financial assistance,
general).
borrowed from what is widely called the "Toulmin

model separates arguments into three major
parts the claim (or the "point" or "policy" of an argument), the data or
ground (the support for the claim often "evidence"), and the warrant (the
principle that links claim and ground). See Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), and Stephen
Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New
23. This formulation is
model
of argumentation." This
York: Macmillan, 1979).

24.
On
the
enthymeme, see Lloyd
Thomas M. Conley, "The Enthymeme

(May
Bitzer,
"Aristotle's
(December
visited," Quarterly Journal of Speech 45
Enthymeme
1959), 399-408,
Rebut also
in Perspective," Quarterly Journal of
between
and reason, see Jesse Delia, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive
Theory, and the Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned
Speech 70
1984), 168-74. For a discussion of the relationship
propositional logics
Discourse," Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970), pp. 140-48. Further discussion is contained in Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its
Limits, and Its Uses," Communication Monographs 37 (June 1979), 101-10; Mills
and Hugh G.
Petrie,
"The Role of Logic
in Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech
20
54 (October 1968), 260-67;
"Toulmin on Argument:
Wayne
Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger,
An Interpretation and
Application," Quarterly Journal
46 (February 1960), 44-53; Jimmie D. Trent, "Toulmin Model of

Argument: An Examination and Extension," Quarterly Journal of Speech 54
(October 1968), 252-59.
of Speech
Chapter 6 should indicate the manner in which public discourse beof the discourse of law more fully, providing a defense of
this position. See also Condit, "TV Articulates Abortion."
26. Petchesky, p. 131. I think Petchesky overdraws the case because liberal
feminism is amply represented through Ms. magazine and many other
sources. However, the current battle for hegemonic definition of "feminism"
in the academy is working feverishly to "write out" liberal feminism from the
"accepted" corpus. See, for example, H. Leslie Steeves, "Feminist Theories
and Media Studies," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 4 (June 1987), 9525.
comes the substrate
135.
27. The dynamics of the balance between in-group and public rhetoric are
discussed in Herbert Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A
Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech 56
(1970), 1-11.
28.
The
original formulation of this
is
contained in McGee, "The 'Ide-
My own revisions to the theory are developed in "The Universaliz-
ograph.' "
ing Influence of Public Argumentation," Communication Monographs 54 (March
keeping with the tradition established by American printed

I demarcate ideographs by capitalizing them.
29. A celebration of the importance of narrative forms is widespread in
several contemporary academic disciplines. See Jameson; W. J. T. Mitchell,
ed., On Narrative (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); Lance W. Bennett
and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981); Seymour Chatman, Story
and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1978); esp. Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the
Representation of Reality," in Mitchell. In rhetorical criticism the debate about
narrative is contained in Walter R. Fisher, Human Communication as Narration:
Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1987), and replies by Barbara Warnick, "The Narrative Paradigm: Another Story," Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (May 1987), 172-81; John
Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit, "Reconstructing Narrative Theory: A Functional Perspective," and Michael Calvin McGee and John S.
Nelson, "Narrative Reason in Public Argument," both in Journal of Communica1987), 1-18. In
oratory of the colonial and post-Revolutionary period,
tion,
special issue
on "Homo Narrans," 35 (Autumn
1985), 90-108.
and
by Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity, 4th ed. (1933; 4th printing,
Lakeville, Conn.: The Institute of General Semantics, 1958); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil
30.
similar point has
been reached with
different vocabularies
intents
Blackwell,
1963);
Jacques
Derrida,
Of
Grammatology,
trans.
Gayatri
The Social Force

Chakravorty Spivak (1967;
of Rhetoric
21
Johns Hopkins University Press,

(Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1979). See also Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987); Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
1976);
rpt. Baltimore:
Umberto Eco, A Theory
of Semiotics
CHAPTER TWO
The Story
of Illegal Abortion
Rhetoric and Narrative
1960-65
Conventional wisdom has it that in 1973 the Supreme Court of the

United States suddenly, unilaterally, and completely legalized abortion, bringing about a state of affairs unprecedented in the nation's
history. 1 This is far from an accurate account. Until well after the Civil
War, most abortions had been legal in this nation. 2 Even between 1870
and 1950, as many as 30,000 abortions were done "legally" each year
in the nation's hospitals. 3
formed outside the
Many more
hospitals. 4
By
"criminal" abortions
were per-
1971, well before the high court's
Wade, the trickle of legal abortions had become a

legal abortions were being done in the
country each year. 5 The primary impact of the national, judicial decision in 1973 was the homogenization of accessibility to abortion
through the elimination of the crazy-quilt patterns of disparate state
laws. 6 That was an impact of great consequence for many women's
lives. It was not, however, a wholesale revolution in law or practice.
The revolutionary importance of the Court's decision rested instead in its character as a national symbolic act. The Roe v. Wade case
officially legitimated a new set of snared meanings, which had been
argued into place in the decade before the Court's decision. The
transformation of the public meanings associated with "abortion"
began with the public construction of a powerful "story of illegal
abortion," itself made possible by crucial events of the 1950s.
decision in Roe
torrent
v.
as many as 600,000
The
Fifties
toward legalization of abortion began in the fifties,

who had been in legal control of abortion
decisions for the previous eighty years, began to feel discomfort with
the responsibilities and consequences of this power. 7 Doctors re-
The major
when
shift
the physicians,
22
Rhetoric and Narrative, 1960-65
23
ported widespread concern about both the legal ambiguities surrounding the procedure and the traumatic health consequences to
their patients, who were apparently choosing to risk illegal abortions
numbers. 8 In the
fifties, the number of professional conand discussions on the topic of abortion grew, and
the doctors turned over control of abortion choices to hospital committees to protect themselves from the variety of conflicting forces
that had made the power to control abortion problematic. 9 The committee system and the professional discourse, however, could address
in large
ferences, books,
only the professional problems of the physicians, not the larger social
problems that had generated their discomfort. Consequently, the
professional solutions rapidly proved inadequate. In 1959 the American Law Institute (ALI) formulated a "model law" to broaden the permissions for abortion from "risk to mother's life" to committee-approved
cases of rape, incest, fetal deformity, and threats to the pregnant
woman's health. 10 Gradually, doctors and other reformers began to
seek a broader audience in support of legal changes. 11
There was, however, a second group very concerned with abortion
law and practice the hundreds of thousands of American women
affected in a variety of ways by abortion policies. It is impossible to tell
these women's stories fully. Their voices were largely absent from the
professional and public realms, their cases too disparate to provide a
single collective voice. Moreover, many of their concerns about childbearing and raising were not yet fully articulated, encapsulated in a
"
disease that had no name." Ultimately, however, the actions and
passions of women in their private lives created the public controversy: women forced doctors into uncomfortable quandaries; women
turned up in hospitals suffering from illegal abortions; women, unable yet to articulate a legitimate public voice, nonetheless gradually
forced the full discussion of the long-quiescent issue of abortion.
The Sixties
the sixties quietly dawned, therefore, the actions of women forced
hand off the "abortion problem" from the professional realm to the public arena. For the public to deal with the
As
the professionals to
problem, however, required that the issue be ârticulated in public,

and that was no small matter. A near-century of silence had seen the
buildup of a coating of taboos about sex and motherhood that had
coded "abortion" as a subject that should not be articulated. In order
to breach the silencing wall, a special discursive form was needed
form that could weave a compelling understanding of the abortion
The Story
24
of Illegal Abortion
problem without engaging the powerful value sets that surrounded it.
The rhetorical form suited to that task was "narrative.
A series of " exposes," the most dramatic of which was carried in the
Saturday Evening Post beginning in
7
of 1961, provided the first
by
The articles brought the abortion problem
rhetorical volley
tion "racket/
May
vividly portraying the horrors of the illegal aborto public
by constructing a distinctive "tale of illegal abortion." 12 Instead

of advocating change in the laws, the earliest of these magazine essays
merely recounted, in lively and lurid detail, the variety of problems
generated by the abortion "underworld." Sexual restraint and better
legal enforcement were the primary remedies halfheartedly sugnotice
gested for these horrors.

Although the exposes themselves did not advocate new laws, by
raising the issue they breached a floodgate, prompting a torrent of
increasingly strident articles, many by female reporters. This second
stream of coverage narrowed the focus to the women involved in
illegal abortion, gradually recasting the issue from a general problem
of law enforcement to a problem for women, deriving from the law
itself. Public advocates began increasingly to argue for reform of
existing abortion laws along the lines of the American Law Institute's
model. Rapidly, flowing from a reservoir of the experiences of real
women, an argument was

The
joined.
which formed the dominant support

argument, was widely reproduced. Magazines, speakers, and
newspapers began to describe the experiences of women who faced
unwanted pregnancies or sought illegal abortions, elaborating upon
the methods, purposes, scenes, and characters involved. 13 Statistics
delineated the scale of the problem, but narratives conveyed the
nature of the human suffering and its moral status. One fairly typical
version of the tale was reported by Muriel Davidson.
"tale of illegal abortion,"
for this
At exactly 2:09 A.M., July 6, 1963, Mary O., aged 25, arrived at the
emergency entrance of Kings County Hospital in Brooklyn, accompanied by her husband. Dr. Harvey Cohen, obstetrical resident in
charge of admission, saw at once that she was in shock. He helped her
to a chair, got her quavery signature on an admittance form, and
proceeded to take the history of her illness. The mother of four children, ranging in age from eight months to six years, Mary O. told him
she believed she was about two months pregnant. She said that the day
before she had slipped and fallen in the bathroom, and had begun to
bleed profusely. Thirty hours later, at exactly 8:09 A.M., Mary O. was
dead.
Mrs. O. had not fallen in her bathroom. Rather, someone
attempting an amateur abortion had killed her by injecting a caustic
.
solution into her
womb. 14
25
Mary's story was joined by the abortion stories of many other

repeated. These narratives provided a direct and
women, widely
stout rhetorical bridge, translating the private experiences of individ-
women
an argument for social change. They did not, how"women's true stories as change-bearing
ever, merely
discourse the stories could not be simply expressive; they had to be
ual
into
,/
represent the
change. Thus the public narwas a strategic adaptation of women's experiences; the reporters
shaped and selected the narratives in particular ways. To be persuasive to the dominant audience, the stories had to use rather than
confront the beliefs and social conditions in the existing American
repertoire. The abortion story did so by respecting the crucial values
and "characterizations of the culture while redefining the act of abortion itself. To understand the intended and unintended social conpersuasive, capable of instigating social
rative
sequences of
this rhetorical process requires a detailed
the story's persuasive structure

ods,
and the scenes
in
its
examination of
heroines, their purposes, meth-
which they were portrayed.
The Tale of Illegal Abortion

The women
in these dramatic horror stories were painted sympathetMarguerite Clark, for example, referred to the "wan nervous
girl [who] could only see one way out of her dilemma." 15 The description of Mary O., above, emphasized her motherhood and the support
of her husband. Later, Sherri Finkbine, whose special case is analyzed
below, was favorably portrayed as "a healthy and happily married
Arizona woman, mother of four" and host of Romper Room. 16 To be
broadly successful in challenging existing beliefs (at least in contemporary America, the locale on which we focus), rhetorical narratives
must produce personal involvement and emotional arousal of a large
audience. For a broad public to feel sorry for the agent and angry with
the forces that bring her suffering, the character depicted must be
"good," or, at the least, unable to control her own destiny.
The rhetorical quality of "goodness," however, is determined by
ically.
Even when challengsome

of those values and attitudes. In the early sixties, "motherhood" was
the definition of goodness for women. Ironically, this meant that
rhetorical narratives defending the ability to postpone or forego motherhood relied heavily on positive images of mothers. The blissful
marital status of women seeking abortion was therefore often men-
pre-existing categories in the social vocabulary.
ing existing attitudes and values, a rhetorical effort must rely on
tioned.
The Story
26
of Illegal Abortion
In addition to displaying goodness, however, to be persuasive the
had to be ordinary people individuthe public could identify. Identification not only
strengthens emotional appeal but is also particularly necessary for
attitude change. Audiences are more likely to act on a social issue if
they perceive their own interests as threatened if they see themselves
or others like them as vulnerable to the problematic social situation.
characters in the social narrative
als
with
whom
Furthermore,
social
strength
more
when a large number

makes such numerical
action can be justified only
of individuals are threatened. "Ordinariness"
plausible.
For persuasiveness and consistency, the purposes of these good,

ordinary women in seeking an abortion had to be as culturally potent
as possible. Rhetorical narratives cannot explore subtle cases but, to
gain the assent of a broad spectrum, must emphasize the strongest
possible examples, based on the most widely shared valuations.
Hence, the women of these stories were emotionally ill (had threatened suicide), had been raped, or were young girls of fourteen or
fifteen who had been seduced by older men (even their fathers) and
deserted. 17 Even those cases that referred to socio-economic reasons
for abortions portrayed the most drastic possible instances of destitution women who were "unwilling and unable to face the future with
another mouth to feed." 18 Combinations of purposes were even more
compelling, as in the case of a "mother of five children who recently
has been operated on for cancer" or the "psychotic woman unable to
care for the children she already has." 19 In each case, the purpose
cited avoided challenging the key values held by the public at the
time, generally by portraying the woman as a helpless victim. She was
making a choice not against motherhood but against situations which
themselves violated the idealized image of motherhood.
In harmony with the desperate depictions of the women involved,
the portrayals of the actual methods for completing illegal abortions
were often literally sickening. In contrast to what were described
tersely as "safe and simple" legal operations in which the doctor
simply "scrapes the products of conception out of the uterus," 20 the
popular magazines graphically described the instruments of illegal
abortions: "bizarre items doctors have found include turkey quills,
and even
bandages," as well as "the most favored 'instrument of the
amateur" "a straightened out wire coat hanger inserted into a
catheter" used for a "pack job." 21
These catalogues of instruments were often accompanied by dismal
knitting needles, hairpins, rattail combs, plastic bottles
elastic
One story of a young woman who

had had an engineering student abort her recounted that
descriptions of entire abortions.
27
he bought an ordinary flashlight, removed the batteries and cut the

bottom off with a can opener. He used the flashlight as a speculum
.... through this 'speculum' he pushed a catheter into which he had
threaded a wire. He then forced air through the contraption, which,
unknown to him, had penetrated a blood vessel in the girl's womb. An
air bubble entered the blood stream and in seconds reached her brain.
Today this young woman is totally paralyzed. 22
Other
grisly
methods
solutions into the
falling
wombalso
down
stairs or injecting caustic
were frequently described,
soap
utilizing
One such story told of an aborwho thought he did not have all the fetal matter out and ended
the most shocking details possible.

tionist
up
pulling out a
woman's
intestines. 23
These descriptions of the methods used
in illegal abortions
great impact to the negative response to such abortions sought
added
by the
*pro-reform authors. The mere description of blood and violence to

human bodies tends to generate an immediate emotional and physiological repugnance
a negative response easily transferred to illegal
abortion per se because these particular methods were unique to the
illegal procedures. 24 Methods or "agencies" often provide a powerful
rhetorical element for change because they may carry strong emotional force without threatening core values, *myths, or characteriza-
tions.
As Kenneth Burke has noted,

must suit each other, and
tained
the container
and the thing con-
the advocates of reform generally
provided a suitable scene for the grotesque agency they had described. 25 The "back alley" has become the common term for the
illegal abortion scene, but detailed depictions of dirty kitchens (some
even with photographs) or back car seats were also plentiful in this
period. 26 In addition, the connotations of the "underworld" and racketeers were developed in stories of women meeting strangers on
street corners or in front of sleazy hotels, to be blindfolded and driven
to temporary, hidden destinations. Direct references to other "rackets"
such as prostitution and gambling were also included. 27 Such loath-
some scenes
are often available for characterizing illegal activities.
Consequently, the social activist usually has a fund of evil and repulsive elements upon which to draw when building transitional
narratives. These rhetorical tactics "work" because the good agent is
vividly depicted as in opposition to such evil and, hence, threatened
by it. The tension between a good agent and an evil scene provides a
powerful incentive to alter the scene.
The tale of illegal abortion, then, was emotionally compelling
because of the basic structure it fit. It told the story of a good, ordinary
person faced by social (not natural) circumstances that led her into evil
The Story
28
of Illegal Abortion
scenes and self-destruction, magnified by gory details of the methods

and scenes she was required to face. The story was socially effective
because it spoke to the real experiences and needs of an increasingly
powerful constituency (*wage-laboring women), and it was well designed to utilize the pre-existent values of a larger segment of the
entire public audience.
The repetition and restatement of any such story bearing strong

emotional force may create a *mythic commonplace. Social *myths are
often deprecated as imprecise or false, but such an evaluation is itself
Although inevitably partial, social myths also
and preserve important truths and portray them
a half- true distortion.
generally capture
with emotional intensity. Achieving these functions requires extensive public exposure under the right circumstances, so that a broad
public hears and responds to the tale. In the abortion controversy, this
mythicizing process was crystallized by the public portrayal of the
abortion chosen by Sherri Finkbine in 1962. 28
Sherri Finkbine's Story
emphasized, was the host of the children's

program Romper Room in Phoenix, Arizona. She had four
children and seemed to exemplify the happy ideal of American
womanhood. When she became pregnant for a fifth time, however,
Sherri, the public narrative
television
her discomfort led her to take tranquilizers. After her supply ran out,
she borrowed some of her husband's. But this was 1962; her husband
had been abroad; and his tranquilizers contained pure thalidomide.
When Sherri later heard warnings about thalidomide, she anxiously
consulted her doctor. He confirmed that she had indeed taken the
dangerous substance; her child had a 50 percent chance of bearing the
terrible thalidomide deformities
nonexistent arms, twisted legs,
and a grossly deformed

and the pictures of
thalidomide babies convinced the Finkbines that he was correct.
The tragedy seemed on its way to a quiet conclusion after a hospital
abortion was approved by committee, but Sherri made a crucial decision. She called the newspaper to tell her story as a warning to other
women. Although her name was not contained in the original
coverage, the publicity spread rapidly. The hospital was threatened
with legal suits by Catholics and other religious persons who argued
flaps of skin for
hands and
feet,
or paralysis
head. The doctor recommended an
abortion,
human life. Since Arizona law

allowed abortion only for the protection of the mother's life, the
hospital had some grounds for concern. Other abortions similar to
that abortion constituted the taking of a
29
had been performed in hospitals on the grounds

problem pregnancies, by causing psychological de-stabilization,
threatened the mother's health and life. All such abortions remained
Sherri Finkbine's
that
legally questionable,
however.
The hospital therefore
filed suit,
hoping
judgment
dodged the issue and
name was revealed. Since her
for a declaratory
in favor of the abortion, but the judiciary
refused to rule. Meanwhile, Sherri's

pregnancy was rapidly reaching a time
when even
legal abortion
would carry health hazards and fearing that the publicity would keep
all other American hospitals from providing her an abortion, she
decided to seek an abortion abroad. When Japan proved to require
too much red tape, she flew to Sweden to seek approval from a
complex committee system there. The hospital abortion was granted.

In Sweden, a deformed fetus was scraped from the womb of this "allAmerican" woman.
Sherri Finkbine's story was important to the mythicizing of the
illegal abortion drama because it provided a near-perfect example of
human being who

spoke and wrote about her experiences. Sherri fit the description of
the "good woman" demanded as the agent of a persuasive drama at
this site in American history. She was a family woman who loved
children and surrounded herself with them even in her work. She
wanted to bear another child (and did so two years later). Her purpose
in seeking an abortion had been brought about by accident, not
intent; she was not seeking to avoid the responsibilities of sex or
pregnancy but had been trapped by fate into taking an evil medication
that destroyed the health of her child. Her abortion clearly did not
attack the key social symbols of "family" or "motherhood." Finally,
perhaps ironically, Sherri insisted that her act be a legal one. She
refused the agency of illegal abortion and thus uniquely represented
the possibility of a good/legal abortion. Sherri's story also earned
sympathy because she seemed to be a pawn of the professionals the
the abortion tale personified in a singular, real
courts
and hospitals and churches,
fighting over her pregnancy.
Sherri Finkbine's tragedy thus provided a perfect vehicle for challenging the status quo in the most narrow (and hence most persuasive) possible way, attacking only criminal abortion, not families,
healthy fetuses, children, or mothering. Even given the tight way in
which this narrative's persuasiveness was structured, however, the
narrative would be effective only if the new social conditions that
shaped the narrative were broadly distributed. A German measles
epidemic that threatened the fetuses of many women expanded the
"generality" of the problem in one way, but the larger set of conditions
The Story of
30
leading
many
Illegal
Abortion
parents to desire to control their childbearing gave
it
even larger substance. For millions of Americans, Sherri's "perfect

story" mythicized the illegal abortion drama by providing a shared,
real case
exemplifying their experiences in their store of conventional
knowledge. Not everyone shared the myth, however.

For those who have no positive contact with the conditions underlying a new social myth, no depiction of the agent will seem adequately good, because the pre-existent belief system will interpret the
choices made as evil ones. Thus, ^Catholics and others wrote passionately
condemning
illegal
abortion
not share the
They respond
or otherwise)
is
life
Sherri Finkbine's choice,
and
still
today the story of
frequently and vehemently refuted by those
conditions and beliefs of wage-laboring
who do
women. 29
life (deformed
mothers ought never to deny
suffer from illegal abortion thereby
that adoptions are preferable, that each

is
worthy miracle,
motherhood, or that women

what they deserve.
who
that
get
The persuasiveness
of social narratives thus
depends upon the
National newsmagazines portrayed Sherri Finkbine as a caring mother.

Photo from the Associated Press

tale's structure,
social
power
the pervasiveness of the conditions, and the relative
the success of the
and
political
to
new
belief
was
also important because Sherri
system carried by the narrative. Hence,
was a middlemiddle class, attempting to adhere

ideology, Sherri Finkbine forced middle America to look at itself
the Finkbine case

to its
Those with the power ecopropagate their narratives will aid
of the affected groups.
nomic, positional, or
class
31
woman. As
its
member
of the
abortion policies.
In the abortion controversy, therefore, rhetorical narratives pro-
vided a unique transitional device between old belief systems and

new social conditions. Because they focus on the plight of worthy
individual human beings and therefore use relatively de-politicized
language with a lower agonistic charge, narratives can restructure
parts of dominant belief sets to suggest new conditions without
having to come in direct conflict with the politicized public vocabulary.
Here discourse and material conditions are
closely linked; indi-
new
vidually generated personal narratives express the

the lives of a social group
conditions of
and thereby persuade more members
of that
group and of the public to adapt, as a collective, to those conditions.

Thus through the rhetorical device of very carefully constructed narrative forms, new groups are able to circumvent the dominant vocabulary to allow " their case" to be heard.
Narrative Tensions
Such
Old Beliefs
vs.
New
transitional narrative structures contain their
we have
had
Conditions
own
problems. As
images of motherhood to argue for a choice against specific instances of motherhood.

Moreover, the narratives were limited to cases in which the purpose
for the abortion was dramatic and, hence, most acceptable within the
reigning ideology. The needs or desires of the majority of women who
sought abortion were thereby masked, or at least not articulated,
because of these persuasive conditions. These problems arose precisely because of the tension and contradictions between old beliefs
seen, the abortion narratives
to use
and new conditions.

According to most prominent narrative theorists, this should not
present a problem at all. Levi-Strauss's widely accepted theory indicates that myths "contain" and help express social contradictions in
ways that allow dominant groups enhanced control. Fredric Jameson
has extended this function of "contradiction-suppression" to narratives in general. 30 The discourse of the abortion controversy, however, suggests this is not true for sociopolitical narratives. 31 Instead,
The Story
32
as a sociopolitical tale
is
of Illegal Abortion
continually retold, the contradictions be-
tween new conditions and old

evident, eventually forcing
beliefs may become more and more

some modifications in beliefs or condi-
tions.
The contradictions revealed by the retellings of the abortion narwere, indeed, legion. The mythic images, deriving from direct
rative
experiences with
illegal abortions,
the previous ideology or well

belief
system
to
be
were not yet either separated from

into a complete new
enough integrated
fully consistent.
The most blatant contradictions occurred in the depictions of the

agents involved both the women having abortions and the men
(most frequently they were men) performing the abortions. The narrators of the story of illegal abortion appeared unable to decide which
women most often sought illegal abortions. Some authors would
dramatically and vividly depict the victims of abortion as young,

unmarried women, while others might note, almost in conscious
married women more

wanton teenager
not the naive girl in the big
city
but the young (between 21 and 25 years) married woman is
most likely to undergo an abortion," they warned. 32 Some characrefutation, that illegal abortion really affected
frequently: "not the

.
terizes contradicted not only each other but themselves.
*pro-
might describe two or three "typical cases" of young

victims, often having already declared that such cases were not typical
reform
article
at all. 33
By
their explicit attention to the issue, the advocates signalled
the importance of portraying a consistent and appropriate agent for
generating a rhetorically compelling story. However, because of the

place of the narrative in the social structure, they constructed contradictions instead of consistency.
These inconsistencies and contradictions arose in the first place not

because the story was "wrong" or "false" but because of an inherent
problem in change-seeking discourse: it must bridge old beliefs and
new social conditions, which are themselves inevitably inconsistent.
In the first place, the reigning public vocabulary rhetorically "preferred" abortions for unmarried women, because the "myth of motherhood" had become so idealized that bearing children outside of
sound marriages was viewed as seriously negative. 34 Simultaneously,
however, if abortion itself were to be a "good" act, it had to be
undertaken by "good" women; and given the terms of the dominant
vocabulary, only mothers fully qualified in that category. The inconsistencies in the reigning ideology thus generated rhetorical pulls in
two opposite directions. 35 These were reinforced by the fact that
33
abortion was apparently shifting from a practice of married women

who had families in place to unmarried women who did not (at that
wish to create new families. 36

the dominant ideology did not fit the existing
time, in those conditions)
In the second place,
as is evidenced in the additional tensions that

surfaced in depictions of the "purposes" of these ambiguously porsocial conditions,
women. The mythic tale of illegal abortion addressed an audience that thought in terms of the "old" belief set, and responded
best to stories that generated sympathy for the unfortunates who,
through no fault of their own, were forced into an abortion. The
entrenched public vocabulary held that only married women should
trayed
have
wife
sex, and if sex in marriage resulted in pregnancy, then every

would want to carry through that pregnancy to enact or re-enact
Women were held generally responsible for
the joys of motherhood. 37
their pregnancies; only youth,
rape, or catastrophe could excuse

them. For rhetorical effect, the pro-reform depictions were aligned
with these catastrophic cases.
This persuasive structure of motives, however, contradicted the
real and quite different motivating force that generated the uncountathe desire to control one's family,
ble thousands of illegal abortions
life-style, and economic status through abortion. 38 The force of this
discrepancy between the conditions generating the expressions and
the limitations of the ideology within which they could be expressed
was bound to be manifested. 39 Yet, because the women's liberation
ideology had not been widely and fully articulated in public, there
were no salient arguments readily available to express this need in the
form of a demand, and no public advocates able to express the
political needs of women. Therefore, until the later sixties, the reality
remained only a footnote incongruously juxtaposed to the myth built
by the arguers
to express
it.
40
second, striking contradiction existed in the reform advocates'

On the one hand, abortionists were described as "hacks" and "incompetents." They were men who "lead
disorganized lives numerous divorces, alcoholism, drifting from job
to job and place to place. Police sometimes find pornographic literdescriptions of abortionists.
ature in their possession.
Sometimes abortionists have sexual
tions with their patients before aborting them." 41
rela-
And
they were
performed an abortion
unrepentant: "One abortionist, while on trial,

during a noon recess." 42 These general lists of negative characteristics
were also assembled into composites of the "typical" abortionist.
According to Muriel Davidson, "An example of the type of person
The Story of
34
Illegal
Abortion
who becomes an amateur abortionist is Hugh M. Pheaster, a surgicaltool salesman who was arrested in Santa Ana, California, last March
on charges
of
bank robbery and auto
theft." 43
Contradicting these portraits, the reformers emphasized elsewhere

"90% of all the illegal abortions are performed by physicians using sterile procedures." 44 Sympathetic character sketches described "a genial, graying family doctor who had served them [the
community] for thirty years
founder of the Grove Public Library,
former city councilman and the PTA's choice for Father of the Year in
that, in fact,
I960." 45
This contradiction in the depiction of the abortionists developed

distinctive difference between the types of abortionists available to different classes. Upper-middle-class women were often able
to get safe abortions from competent physicians. At the least, they
could travel to Cuba, Mexico, and Puerto Rico for abortions that might
not have been completely legal but may have been fairly routine.
More frequently, perhaps, their close contact with their private physicians allowed them to get abortions locally as well. Poorer or younger
women, with less cash to offer and less chance for close contact with
physicians, turned to the abortionist quacks. 46
This contradiction could not be explained in the dominant public
vocabulary of the time, and the vocabulary of "discrimination," which
resolved the inconsistency, did not become available until later in the
decade. In the meantime, the emotional power of the narrative set up
a problem of public meaning, and the tensions within the narratives
exacerbated the uncertainty, thereby generating the energy for discursive change and the discursive conditions for that change.
from the
Summation
American abortion controand crucial role in
communicating the social conditions facing a group of women. Since
no collective can respond directly to changes in social conditions,
public rhetoric in the form of narrative was essential. As Kristin Luker
so clearly reports, we tend to explain our personal contacts with
changed social conditions in terms of personal failures or through
belief systems derived from previous conditions. 47 A rhetorical narIn the early years of the contemporary
versy, rhetorical narratives played
an
initiatory
however, allows, first, a large audience to identify with a

human being in a particular case and, second, the causes
and effects in the case to be clearly specified as social ones, beyond
rative,
particular
the control of individuals.
35
women, because they were transferable

myths, thus translated widely shared private experiences
into a public concern by expressing those experiences through the
dominant vocabulary, albeit with a new "point" to the story. Careful
manipulations of language (i.e., "rhetoric") in opportune social condiStories about individual
into social
tions thus materialized a
new
set of discourses in the public realm.
Such myths, however, necessarily contained contradictions because they embodied competing social forces. "New" interests had to
use the old ""public vocabulary to express their demands, and that
vocabulary was loaded against them. That tension was a creative one,
crucial for moving public understandings forward toward new vocabulary and policies that would provide articulations consistent with
the new social conditions faced by a wide variety of women.
Some of the limitations of the narratives nonetheless had long-term
consequences, which arose from both the logical limitations of narrative as a form and the social limitations of narrative as a persuasive
process. In general, there may not be a direct link between the
emotion we feel for one suffering individual and the social policy
advocated alongside the narrative. What policy
is
appropriate to
al-
problems of illegal abortion? Reform? Repeal? Mandatory

birth control? Abstinence crusades? More than individual narratives
are needed to answer that question. In the opposite direction, narratives may restrict, inappropriately, the laws designed to alleviate the
leviate the
conditions that the stories express. Persuasive narratives always present the most extreme cases with the most noble purposes. The
dominant ideology strictly limits which narratives can be perceived as

persuasive, which purposes and agents perceived as pitiable. Hence,
social narratives are not likely to describe fully the social conditions
they bring to public thought and discussion. In the abortion case, the
problem of thousands of mutilations and deaths from illegal abortions
was not resolvable by legal changes that allowed abortions for the few
rhetorically compelling cases of rape, fetal deformity, or maternal
survival. However, the more limited legal changes formalized by the
American Law Institute's "model code" were those most widely discussed, and passed, in the early period. The rhetorical conditions that
would make abortion a matter of "socially good excuses" rather than a
consequence of the wishes and desires of women (their "reproductive
freedom") were therefore established in the first public telling of the

women's narratives themselves.
Another long-term limitation of the "tale of illegal abortion" was its
focus on the abortion problem as faced by the white middle class.
Sherri Finkbine's story was only the most visible of the versions of the
The Story
36
of Illegal Abortion
which defined the problem primarily in white and middle-class

terms. Because the dominant audience was largely constituted of the
middle and upper class, these cases were most likely to be persuasive
tale
in the public realm. This
meant, however, that the often quite
ferent problems of other groups of
women were
dif-
not articulated.
In contrast to recent claims that narrative thought can provide us

with a complete "paradigm/ the narratives in the abortion controversy provided incomplete discussions. 48 They did not fully communicate the beliefs, values, and conditions which generated them. They
provided grounds and fuel to generate an argument but did not point
us fully toward precise social claims. The rhetorical narratives about
abortion activated and crystallized the potential for new frameworks
of meaning and evaluation, but they constituted only a first move in
the complex endeavor of communicating social change. Chapter 4 will
describe the second stage of the argument, but first we must attend to
the response immediate opposition. They were rapidly answered in
kind by a pro-Life heritage tale, the dynamics of which also shaped
the path of the discursive change.
7
NOTES
unique action of the Supreme Court is made, not
It is, however, prevalent
in *pro-Choice advocacy as well. See, for example, the pro-Life advocacy of
lohn T. Noonan, "Right to Life: Raw Judicial Power," National Review, 2 March
1973, pp. 260-64, and John Willke, "A Matter of Life," public lecture at the
University of Illinois, Urbana, 6 February 1987. For pro-Choice advocacy, see,
for example, Faye Wattleton, "A Matter of Choice," public lecture, University
of Illinois, Urbana, 4 February 1987; John Irving, mailing from National
Abortion Rights Action League, Summer 1987. The "conventional wisdom" is
also evident in the newsmagazines for example, "America's Abortion Dilemma," Newsweek, 14 January 1985, p. 20.
1.
The claim
to the
surprisingly, in a
wide
variety of *pro-Life advocacy.
2.
In
common
law, abortion
point, the exact legal status
is
was
clearly legal until ^quickening. After that
unclear (whether
it
was
legal for the
women but
not for an abortionist, or to what degree of severity that act was punished, has
not fully been established). See, for example, James C. Mohr, Abortion
America: The Origins and Evolution of National
Oxford Union Press, 1978).
Policy,
in
1800-1900 (New York:
These abortions were done on various grounds relating to the "life" of

As the strictly physical indications for such abortions declined,
the psychological indications increased (e.g., the threat of suicide). These
abortions might have been challenged as not fitting the letter or spirit of the
law, but they were not. Hence, until the sixties the consensus by doctors and
others was that they were legal. Calculation of the number of abortions, even
3.
the mother.

those performed in hospitals and nominally legal,
Many
abortions
may have been
37
is difficult
in this period.
recorded as "dilation and curettage'' rather
than as abortion. However, Lawrence Lader describes the number of hospital

abortions per year as declining from 30,000 to 8,000; Lawrence Lader, Abortion
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 24; see also Nanette J. Davis, From
Crime to Choice: The Transformation of Abortion in America (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood
Press, 1985), chapter 4.
see "Abortions
4.
on the
On
the shift in "indications" for abortion,
Increase," America, 25
September 1965,
p. 31.
number of illegal abortions is even more difficult than

number of legal abortions. Nonetheless, even the lowest
Calculation of the
calculation of the
data-based estimates leave us with significant numbers of illegal abortions.

cited in the popular press were generally 200,000 to two million
The ranges
on studies extrapolating from a variety of small sample

Kinsey data. See, for example, Marguerite Clark,
"Abortion Racket, What Should Be Done?" Newsweek, 15 August 1960, pp. 5052. One of the sturdier estimates seems to me based on the calculation that
there were 350,000 admissions to hospitals for "incomplete" abortions. Although this number may under-represent illegal abortions by failing to count
some "incompletes" labeled as other procedures and illegal abortions that did
not result in medical problems, it provides a minimum marker indicating with
annually, based
studies, including the
reasonable certainty a significant
number
of illegal abortions in this period.
See F. Von Moschzisker, ed., "Abortion Comes Out of the Shadows," Life, 27
February 1970, pp. 20-29. This figure is further substantiated by the noticeable drop in maternal mortality after New York legalized abortion. There,
maternal mortality (which had been falling steadily earlier), dropped as much
as 50 percent, changing from a yearly improvement rate of .02 deaths fewer
per 1,000 live births to .03 fewer deaths per 1,000 live births per year. Given a
simultaneous large-scale decrease in the number of
live births (also attribut-
able to legalized abortion), this led to a considerable decline in actual
mor-
See "Abortion: Rhetoric and Reality," Christian Century, 21 July 1971, and
Vital Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service), for 1965 through 1972.
tality.
5.
See Lawrence Lader, Abortion
II:
Making
the Revolution (Boston:
Beacon
Press, 1973), pp. 166-67; Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, "Abortion
Surveillance:
tion in the
Annual Survey," reported
United
February 1981),
in Stanley
Henshaw
et al., "Abor-
States, 1978-1979," Family Planning Perspectives 13 (January/
p. 7;
States since the 1973
Edward Weinstock et al., "Legal Abortions in the United

Supreme Court Decisions," Family Planning Perspectives 1
(January/February 1975), pp. 23-45.

6. Because abortion was available only in some states, some women who
wanted legal abortions had to travel to other states. In addition, the lack of
medical coverage made abortion expensive and, hence, not available to all
women. Although
legalization by the Court did not eliminate these variations

problems still present formidable barriers to rural and poor women), it
did improve the homogeneity. This entire claim runs contrary to Judith
Blake's argument that the Supreme Court "outran" public opinion. Blake,
(access
38
The Story
of Illegal Abortion
however, conflates "public opinion" with popular opinion polls, a move I

argued to be fallacious (see chapter 1). More specifically, I suggest that the
Court moved in the same direction as public opinion and was constrained from
"enacting" popular opinion precisely because of the character of legal principle (see chapters 6 and 8). Compare Judith Blake, "The Abortion Decisions:
Judicial Review and Public Opinion," in Abortion: New Directions for Policy
Studies, ed. Edward Manier, William Liu, and David Solomon (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 51-81, to Eric M. Ulsaner
and Ronald E. Weber, "Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Policies in the
Nation and States: Changes and Stability after the Roe and Doe Decisions," in
The Law and Politics of Abortion, ed. Carl E. Schneider and Maris A. Vinovskis
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1980), pp. 206-23. I deal with the poll data in
detail in a later chapter.
7. The current emphasis on the role of the doctors in controlling abortion
law in the United States since the 1800s is over-stated. Although the physicians clearly have been major players, a variety of other factors have been
involved as well. The fact that the physicians have been influential is well
documented by Mohr for the early period and for the fifties by Davis and by
Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984). See chapter 6, notes 14, 15.
8. The range of forces impinging on doctors has yet to be fully elaborated.
Petchesky argues that the numbers of illegal abortions had increased because
women's improved economic position encouraged them to delay or control
childbearing independently of male support. This may have resulted in
greater demand for legal abortions, which doctors were unable to cope with
given the rigid ideological prescription against abortions for such reasons.
Another factor was the change in the presumption of "motherhood" for all
women at all times. In addition, the decreasing "covering" grounds for legal
abortions may have been a component, further enhanced by the fact that
doctors were less used to "loosing" young patients in this era. See Rosalind
Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Women's Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Boston, Mass.: Longman/Northeastern University Press,
1984), and Celeste Condit Railsback, "The Contemporary American Abortion
Controversy: A Case Study in Public Argumentation" (Ph.D. diss., University
of Iowa, 1982), chapter 3. The reports of the doctors' feelings about these forces
are quite clear, both in testimony of activists and in polls. See Bernard N.
Nathanson with Richard N. Ostling, Aborting America (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1979); Anthony J. Mandy, "Reflections of a Gynecologist," in
Therapeutic Abortion, ed. Harold Rosen (New York: Julian Press, 1954); Herbert
L. Packer and Ralph J. Campbell, "Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law
and Medicine," in The Case for Legalized Abortion Now, ed. Alan F. Guttmacher
(Berkeley, Calif.: Diablo Press, 1967), p. 150. The fact that the doctors were
primarily concerned about controlling their own problems rather than about
the freedom of women to make choices is poignantly suggested by the aboutface of Nathanson. Nathanson was an active worker for reform laws, but
when women gained
full
control through abortion
39
on request, he switched
to
the "pro-Life" position.
See Betty Sarvis and Hyman Rodman, The Abortion Controversy (New
Columbia University Press, 1974).
10. The abortion section was approved as part of the draft in May 1959, but
the code was not approved as a whole until 1962. See Anthony Lewis, "Legal
Abortions Proposed in Code," New York Times; 22 May 1959, p. 15, and
Anthony Lewis, "Model Penal Code is Approved by the American Law
9.
York:
New York Times, 25 May 1962, p. 1.

Doctors appear to have been major players in changing state laws, but
their relative prominence varies by state. Compare Luker's account of California's legal process to Patricia G. Steinhoff and Milton Diamond, Abortion
Politics: The Hawaii Experience (Honolulu: Union Press of Hawaii, 1977), or
Segar C. Jain and Laurel F. Gooch, Georgia Abortion Act 1968 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1972), and by the same authors and press,
California Abortion Act 1967 (1969) and North Carolina Abortion Law 1967 (1969).
According to descriptions in the popular magazines of the time, physicians
tended to be pro-reform rather than pro-Choice.
12. John Bartlow Martin^ "Abortion," Saturday Evening Post, 20 May 1961,
pp. 19-21; see also Marguerite Clark, "Abortion Racket, What Should Be
Done?" Newsweek, 15 August 1960, pp. 50-52. These early articles reflected
the "dominant ideology" quite fully; they argued against abortion to "avoid
Institute,"
11.
the responsibility of motherhood"
and against "abortion on demand." The
"shroud of silence" that had engulfed abortion practices was explicitly recognized by those who broke it e.g., Walter Goodman, "Abortion and Sterilization: The Search for Answers," Redbook, October 1965, p. 70; America, 25
March
13.
1961, p. 811.
These
five
elements form the
five options for *character-types.
derived the units from Kenneth Burke's pentad. See
A Grammar
of
have
Motives
(1945; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

14.
Muriel Davidson, "The Deadly Favor," Ladies Home
Journal,
November
1963, p. 53.
15.
Marguerite Clark, "Abortion Racket, What Should Be Done?" News-
week, 15
August
1960, pp. 50-52.
"Abortion and the Law," Time, 3 August 1962, p. 30.

17. For example, Clark; James Ridgeway, "One Million Abortions,"
16.
New
February 1963, pp. 14-17; "Why Did You Do It? France's Biggest
Postwar Mass Abortion Trial," Newsweek, 10 June 1963, p. 54.
18. Clark, p. 51; Alan F. Guttmacher, "Law That Doctors Often Break,"
Reader's Digest, January 1960, pp. 51-54.
Republic, 9
19.
Ibid.
20. Martin; "Abortion Facts
Safer," Science
21.
News
Letter,
Davidson, pp. 53-54.
22. Ibid.
Reported,"
March
p. 86;
1963, p. 134.
Faye Marley, "Legal Abortion
The Story
40
of Illegal Abortion
23. Martin, p. 21.
24. Theodor Adorno notes the basic moral substantiveness of such

physio-emotional responses. Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press,
1979), pp. 351, 365.
25.
Burke,
p. 3.
Martin, pp. 19-20; Walter Goodman, "Abortion and Sterilization: The

Search for the Answers," Redbook, October 1965, pp. 70-71; Jack Starr, "Grow26.
ing Tragedy of Illegal Abortion," Look, 19 October 1962, pp. 52-53.

27. Martin, pp. 19-20; Lader, Abortion, pp. 65-66.
28.
Material
on Sherri Finkbine
is
obtained from the Arizona Republic and
other newspapers published throughout the nation in July and August of

1962, along with a wide variety of material provided in magazine accounts in
and rhetorical narratives in books by advocates later. I am concerned here not with what "really happened" in the Finkbine case but with
how it was portrayed in the public press.
29. Kristin Luker establishes the link of activists and their beliefs to their
life conditions. Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984). There must be a large, fairly well-organized constituency to get a "voice" heard. This does not mean that such an argument
will "win" the legal and cultural battles. "Winning" requires the ability to
convince the uninvolved, the ambivalent, or the politically powerful.
30. Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," in Myth: A
Symposium, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1958), pp. 81-106, and Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative
as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 79the period
88.
See John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit, "Reconstructing

A Functional Perspective," Journal of Communication 36, no.
4 (Autumn 1986), 90-108, in which we argue that, since not all discourse
31.
Narrative Theory:
functions to entertain, error frequently occurs
extended
32.
when
literary
models are
to other discourse forms.
"Abortion Racket:
What Should Be Done?" Newsweek,
pp. 50-52; Clark, p. 51; "Abortion: Precept
and
15
August
1960,
Practice," Time, 13 July 1962, p.
52.
33. Ibid.;
Goodman,
pp. 70-71.
The ideological tension and the potential for contradiction in the "cult
of motherhood" is suggested in Petchesky, chapters 1 and 2, esp. p. 75. She
notes that the myth prescribed motherhood as a high ideal for women's lives
and that it prescribed a limited number of children, so that they would get an
ideal upbringing. The growth of the argument that unwanted pregnancies
produced "unwanted children" and that this was seriously undesirable was
34.
an outgrowth of
this ideological tension.
discuss this issue in chapter
9.
The reformers seemed to recognize that they were dealing with an

ideology that was inconsistent. They routinely cited the "hypocrisy" and
inconsistency of the existing legal situation. Alan F. Guttmacher was one of
the most active physicians seeking reform. See, for example, "Law That
35.
41
Doctors Often Break," Reader's Digest, January I960, pp. 51-54; 'Abortion,
Legal and Illegal/' Time, 25 December 1964.
36. See Petchesky and "Abortions on the Increase," America, 25 September
1965, p. 31.
To document the full and precise characteristics of the public vocabuwould require a full-length work. The discourse, however, gives many
indications of the prevalent beliefs and assumptions. For example, Richard P.
Vaughan suggested of any woman who aborted that "the immature side of
37.
lary
her nature rebels against the prospect of being a mother," but at another level
she craves "the experience of fulfillment and creativity that accompanies
motherhood," in "Psychotherapeutic Abortion: Bill under Consideration in

California," America, 16 October 1965, pp. 436-38. See also "Abortion by Consent?" Christian Century, 1 February 1967, p. 132, which seems to view abortion as only a temporary whim. The dramatic "fetus talking to its mother"
draw on these stereotypes as well. "Slaughter of the Innocent," trans.

Chrobot, America, 2 June 1962, p. 39. In addition, the contrast between
articles about women who desperately want children but miscarry and the
women who desperately want abortions speaks to the tensions here.
articles
L.
F.
38. See Walter Goodman, "Abortion and Sterilization: The Search for the
Answers," Redbook, October 1965, pp. 70-71; "Abortion Sought Abroad,"
Science News Letter, 24 July 1965, p. 63; Harold Rosen, "Abortion: Questions
and Answers," Today's Health, April 1965, pp. 24-25; "Abortion: Legal and
Illegal," Time, 25 December 1964, p. 53; James Ridgeway, "One Million Abortions," New Republic, 9 February 1963, pp. 14-17; Alan Guttmacher, ed., The
Now (Berkeley, Calif.: Diablo Press, 1967), pp. 52-53.

To the extent that the force derived from an adequately powerful
"constituency," it would get a voice, but that voice was bound to manifest the
contradictions because of the requirement to "be persuasive" that is, to
address the public on their terms, not the group's own.
40. This is, of course, a reflexive relationship; the abortion conditions
helped to establish the narratives and then used the ideology once it was
developed. There was no smooth and simple time-line because different
groups received or communicated the ideology or parts of it at different times.
Even in later periods, the full belief set (including the narrative) had to be
Case for Legalized Abortion
39.
continually articulated.
41.
Martin,
42.
Ibid.
43.
Davidson,
p. 52.
p. 55.
44. Estimates in the
popular magazines ranged from "many"
to 75 to 90
News Letter, 24 July 1965; Andre E.

Good," Commonweal, 30 June 1967, pp.
percent. "Abortion Facts Reported," Science
Hellegers,
"Law and the
Common
See also Paul H. Gebhard, Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde

E. Martin, and Cornelia V. Christenson, Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion (New
York: Harper Brothers, 1958), chapter 8.
45. "Doc Henrie's Farewell," Newsweek, 30 July 1962, pp. 22ff.
46. The facts of availabilitv are difficult to document, but the public dis-
418ff;
Ridgeway,
p. 14.
The Story
42
of Illegal Abortion
course held these distinctions to be true, and they are persuasive, given the
economic structure. In specific, anecdotes of the "foreign options" are routinely mentioned, but I have been unable to locate any estimates of the
numbers
of these abortions. See
Gebhard
et al.;
Goodman,
p.
71; Lader,
Abortion, pp. 56-57; Davidson, p. 54; Linda Bird Francke, The Ambivalence of
Abortion (New York: Dell, 1982); Kristin Luker, "Abortion and the Meaning of
Autobiographical Statement," in Abortion: Understanding Differences, ed.

Sidney Callahan and Daniel Callahan (New York: Plenum Press, 1984), p. 26.
47. Describing the "conversions" of understandings of pro-Choice activists, Luker notes, "These people, who later became so active in changing
abortion laws, had considerable personal experience with illegal abortion in
one way or another and had seen or suffered the experiences of the illegality
Life:
of abortion, yet
....
48.
none
of
them was
directly 'radicalized'
by the experience
itself
they did not question the legitimacy of the laws," p. 107.
Walter Fisher, "Narration as a
Human Communication
Paradigm: The
Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs 51
(1984), 1-22.
CHAPTER THREE
The
Pro-Life Heritage Tale

Rhetoric and History
1965-85
As
the sixties matured, the vivid story of illegal abortion garnered

support for change in abortion policies. Popular coverage of the issue
in the national media grew, various bills were considered in state
legislatures, organizations formed across the nation, and in 1965 the
American Medical Association's Committee on Human Reproduction
voted to support the ALI's reform "model code." 1 The dramatic reform
narrative had begun to chip away at what seemed to be the American
heritage a largely inarticulate sense that abortion was "wrong/'
When such cultural "presumptions are attacked, supporters of the
status quo re-tell the "story of our past" in order to re-invigorate the
giving it enough force to combat the new tales. This is

what the pro-Life rhetors hurried to do. The move to restore
a heritage is, however, a risky one. In transferring the heritage from
the realm of background feelings into explicit statement, all of the
related assumptions and grounds upon which the heritage has rested
once again come into public view. Serious gaps, power moves, contradictions, or other weaknesses will be exposed either in the direct
content of the story or in the rhetorical tactics through which the
narrative is constructed. Such weaknesses may reveal the heritage as
illegitimate, giving opponents further grounds for demanding reconstruction. The pro-Life heritage tale was widely persuasive, but its
argument contained gaps serious enough to leave it stalemated
against the reform narrative that had forced its retelling.
""heritage,
precisely
A Pro-Life Human History

History offers resistance to change in two forms. 2
encrustations
riel
it
leaves
habits,
First,
the material
institutions, distributions,
offer a concrete, physical recalcitrance that
43
makes
and matereal work
The Pro-Life Heritage
44
Tale
necessary to re-form them. In addition, however, verbal reconstructions of the past ""hegemonic histories place the weight of a unified
humanity against "new" actions by identifying who "we" are and
thus, what it is that we should do. Since we "are" what we have always
"done," we violate our true selves if we act in ways that are different.
In order to carry such authority, however, "heritage tales" must be
constituted by only one collective, and this collective must have
operated with a near unanimous voice.
Faced by the challenge to old meanings, habits, and actions, the
pro-Life rhetors sought to construct such a preservationist narrative.
As the massive anthropological collections of George Devereux have
established, however, and as was evident in the pro-Life rhetors' own
histories, there have been a wide variety of human collectives, holding a variety of positions on abortion. 3 Therefore, in order to unify
this cacophony into a unified chorus, skilled rhetorical effort had to be
brought to bear.
The chief means by which this unification was accomplished was
the narration, by many advocates, of a selective and coherent account
portraying a specific strand of white, Western, Christian history as
the authoritative
and
legitimate
American
heritage.
The
pro-Life ad-
vocates described how, throughout the Western tradition, abortion
had been written and spoken against by important institutional and

moral authorities. Although disagreements had occurred in the past,
they indicated that there had been a clear path of "moral improvement" through history prohibitions against abortion had become
more and more restrictive through time, as humankind became in-
creasingly aware of the fact that abortion represented the killing of a
human
being.
and consequences of
on the most widely cited version of it
the historical account produced by John Noonan. 4 Although
Noonan's history of the past was not the earliest one, it reflected most
versions of the tale, it was quoted repeatedly in public speeches across
the nation by prominent activists like John Willke and Basil Ucldo, and
5
it was also referred to frequently in the written pro-Life histories.
In order to explore the rhetorical structure
this heritage tale,
will focus
In order to portray the diverse voices of history as bearing a single
Noonan carefully framed his argube frequently quoted "An Almost

Absolute Value in History." As we shall see, since Noonan could not
truthfully claim that opposition to abortion had always been an "absolute value" or gain the same rhetorical force from the claim that it was
"a widely held value," he used the near-oxymoron "almost absolute."
opposed
ments with a title
authority
to abortion,
that
was
to

Rhetoric and History,
1965-85
45
he used the ambiguous term value (as opposed to practice,

or even belief). Finally, he omitted a subject,
refusing to identify just what had been an almost absolute value. His
title set up and balanced the rhetorical force and the plausibility of the
history he would recount.
Having established an authoritative tone, Noonan described the
practices of different groups or eras and indicated how each era or
group fit into the general historical frame. Thus, he indicated that if
the Greco-Romans had allowed abortion it was merely because they
were products of a "culture generally distinguished by its indifference
to fetal and early life" (p. 7). Their error was soon corrected when "the
Christians proposed a rule which was certain, comprehensive, and
absolute" (p. 7). Similarly, if certain historical writers had not agreed
that abortion was the taking of a human life, then, Noonan's ^framing
suggested, at least they agreed that it was a sin against marriage or a
failure of love (pp. 22-23). Even when components of the narrative
itself appeared to indicate that there was less agreement than the
overarching frame of the title would claim, Noonan reassured the
reader that at least there was a "development" toward such an absoIn addition,
law,
religious precept,
lute valuation (pp. 36, 38, 46).
This framing process required the use of multiple themes, related

but ambiguous. No simple singular theme " abortion has always
been treated as murder" or "abortion has always been outlawed"

was true. No broader theme e.g., "abortion was always problematic"
would have adequate rhetorical force. If no single theme could
successfully capture all of the events of the human past and simultaneously indicate narrowly and forcefully that abortion should be
outlawed and treated as murder, then the rhetor could employ multiple themes to create a frame that at least gave the general impression
of universal condemnation.
For example, in discussing early Christian attitudes toward abortion, Noonan described the opposition to abortion as based upon its
identity with murder (he cited Augustine, p. 16, and St. John
Chrysostom, p. 17). When he came to Gratian, however, he had to
admit that this influential figure believed that "abortion was homicide
only when the fetus was formed" (p. 20). Consequently, Noonan had
to shift grounds. He was, however, well prepared for the swerve.
Rather than defining abortion as sin because it was murder, he had
framed the intervening section by saying abortion was a transgression
of the Christian commandment to "love" and a violation of marriage
and the sexual function. He could therefore, regardless of Gratian's
technical disagreement on timing, continue to frame the history as
46
Tale
bearing "an almost absolute value" by concluding that "all the writers
agree that abortion was a violation of the love owed to one's neighbor"
(p. 18).
This
is
a stunning rhetorical move.
The
issue of
murder was,
of
course, the issue of universal concern; public law might well forbid
murder, but it would find itself in profound difficulty if it punished

our many failures to make grave sacrifices for love of other human
beings. Murder, the motive of public concern, did not provide "an
almost absolute" definition of abortion in the human past. Consequently, to gain the accurate and unified force of a heritage he used
the theme of "love," but to gain the force of proscription he simply
cited "murder" in as many paragraphs as possible and then ended the
chapter with a discussion of abortion as the taking of human life,
thereby implying that fetal life had been the "absolute value" of
interest
all
along.
By shifting back and forth between these themes murder vs. love
and sacrifice pro-Lifers like Noonan framed the "history of abortion"
in such a way as to gain both the technical grounds for saying abortion
has always (within the tradition that counts) been opposed (on
grounds of love) and also the stronger connotations that gave the
reader a sense that abortion had always been equated with the
heinous crime of murder.

The use of multiple themes under a guiding ambiguous frame,
such as "an almost absolute value," thereby created the sense of a
compelling, unified, authoritative history. 6 At this point, it might be
tempting to disregard this history as one which seduces with shifting
themes rather than proving with solid grounds. This rejection would
be premature, for all heritages are built through the process of framing and very few can be built without such shifts. After all, Noonan's
history proves (at least to my satisfaction) that an identifiable Western
heritage has found abortion to be a failure of love for others and that
many found it to be a crime close to homicide. The key questions in
tracing social consequences become: even if the "themes" are not
univocal, might not the "frame" as a whole be legitimate, and is it not
persuasive for the American audience?
One test will move us toward answers to both these questions.
Given egalitarian American ideology, as well as some of the most
sophisticated social theory our species has developed, a "legitimate"
set of frames would be one derived from widely based political and
moral authorities who represent the experiences and interests of all
members of the community. 7 In contrast, illegitimate frames those
47
be subject to effective argumentative challenge feature the

"teachings" of only one partisan group in the community (thereby
likely to
getting us to act in their interest
by passing
off " their heritage
77
as
"ours").
To determine whether frames are grounded in wide or narrow

one need only look at a simple rhetorical tactic the parmade by the rhetor. The most important of
"differentiations"
ticular
such separation devices is the polarization of persons and parties into
two opposed streams the good and the evil. The rhetor will indicate
that the "good" and "wise" have all sided together in history to
support her or his heritage-tale; the evil or foolish have been opposed. An examination of the groups which show up as the "heroes"
interests,
or the "villains" gives an empirically verifiable
whose
and concrete
list
of
being promoted.
Often the separation of "good" and "bad" takes place through the
device of "scapegoating." Noonan did not have to resort to that
extreme in order to establish a dominant, credible "heritage." Instead,
he used the theme of "development" to show how earlier components
of our heritage were incorporated, but "surpassed" by later elements.
For example, by implying a sense of "moral progress" Noonan was
able to dismiss the troubling fact that the Greco-Roman world did not
perceive abortion as murder. He simply indicated that
heritage
is
was in this culture generally distinguished by its indifference to fetal

and early life that the Christian teaching developed; it was in opposition
and conflict with the values reflected in popular behavior that the
Christian word was enunciated. Where some wise men had raised
voices in defense of early life so that the question was in the air and yet
not authoritatively decided, where even the wise presented hesitant
and divided counsel, where other authorities defended abortion, the
Christians proposed a rule which was certain, comprehensive, and
it
absolute.
(P. 7)
Noonan accomplished
a double purpose here. Without completely
Greco-Roman
heritage, he denied legitimacy to the

example of permissiveness toward abortions granted by the GrecoRoman world and he replaced the authority of that world in favor of
the ""Catholics. Noonan thereby simultaneously dismissed competing
interpretations of abortion and increased the hegemonic influence of
denigrating the
Only the Catholic tradition (and its offspring,

which transcended the previous tradition in
goodness and knowledge, would count as a "true history" by which
we should know and evaluate ourselves. Other events and practices
the Catholic heritage.
Christianity in general),
48
Tale
that had occurred in human history were not applicable because they
were divided and because even in such cultures, the "wise" spoke up
on the
"right" side.
In almost
all
of
Noonan's
differentiations
between good and bad
streams of human history, the Catholics are on the good side and
almost all others non-Christians, early Western thinkers, many nonCatholic Christians are to be disregarded. Where "wise" or credible
individuals had disagreed with Noonan's "heritage," however, the
clean alignment of good and evil was imperiled. He handled these
cases by careful labeling. Thus, wise Aristotle, who argued that the
fetus undergoes a progressive development toward a rational soul
and advocated eugenic abortion, was gently treated. Noonan said that
Aristotle's proposal evinced "remarkable caution" for his day and that if
we combined some of what Aristotle said with other of his political
and biological prescriptions, this "might have permitted only con-
traception"
(p. 5).
Aristotle, therefore,
moved
the tradition in the right
direction.
The
last alternative
and
was simple omission. Noonan
the pro-Life historians used to distinguish
eliminate "outsiders" from the heritage
did not mention the practices of the Chinese, the Africans, the Polynesians, or even the Saxons or Goths. Simply by speaking of only one
set of authorities, Noonan constructed an authoritative historical
heritage and brought it to bear against abortion. Mere ^presence or
social "volume" thus constitutes a crucial rhetorical element.
By paying attention to the rhetorical tactic of differentiation, therefore, we can quite easily and factually locate the underlying interest
groups served by Noonan's "heritage." His was not only a "Western"
history but also predominantly a Catholic heritage. Quite simply and
visibly the authorities and witnesses he cited favorably were overwhelmingly Catholic (not to mention white, male, and often celibate).
Others were dismissed as naive, evil, or at least cautious for an "early"
period. At best, this tradition could be stretched to being a "Christian" one, but that Christianity clearly leaned on a narrow set of
doctrines and was fundamentally influenced by a vision of Catholicism as the historical center-post of Western Christianity. 8 All other
tributaries to the American heritage
the Saxon and Norman pagans,
the ancient Greek and Roman polytheists, the Africans and native
Americans, and many more were simply "written out" of this tale.
This history was not, therefore, a universal history of all of the
American people and the nation's past. Although Catholicism is certainly one major current in the American heritage, it is not the only
one. The claim of Noonan's heritage to present an authoritative argu-
on the grounds
49
all Americans was, theresoon note the consequences of this weakness

in the development of the public argument.
A second question remains. In spite of its argumentative weaknesses, would this be a convincing history for the American public?
Given that the broad outline of the narrative is so similar to our typical
secondary school account of "Western Civilization" it begins with
merit
fore, unjustified.
of the shared past of
will
the Greeks, progresses to the
Romans, then
to the Catholic church,
and then to the Protestants the question is urgent. To answer it, one
must assess the role of Catholicism in America.
America has been strongly and, in general, legitimately influenced
by Catholicism. That influence has arisen from the role of the Catholic
church in Western history, from the active involvement in the nation
of the nearly one quarter of the population who are Catholics, and
from the advantages of a large, hierarchical, tax-exempt institution in
America. Because of this diverse ideological and material power base,
a Catholic-based heritage tale might be widely persuasive in America
today. The test is its ability, by its persuasive form and contents, to tap
into the broader Protestant presumptions. This we can discover by
examining another set of the uses of "history" by pro-Life historians.
The Lessons of History

The Protestant
pro-Life historians generally did not recite the Catholic
heritage tale at
worked
to place
much
length. Instead, Protestant pro-Life advocates
Roe
Wade within a strand of "evil" in history one

Americans had always been able to overcome.
v.
of a series of trials that
Like the construction of a positive "heritage," this device functioned

collecting a set of historical events and framing them under themes
by
that could
be identified with the issue in question. Because the mean-
ing of history arises from the intertwining of theme and event, and
because the dimension of evil is a powerful magnifier, this was a
forceful technique. 9
The pro-Life historians applied this tactic by building analogies

between slavery, the holocaust, and abortion. In the comparison of
abortion and slavery, President Reagan was likened to a modern-day
Lincoln freeing the "unborn slaves." The introduction to Abortion and
the Conscience of the Nation, the book that contains Reagan's pro-Life
essay, noted cleverly, but none-too-bashfully, "Surely all must agree
that Mr. Reagan's testament is an historic document, instantly memorable
if
only because
against Slavery." 10
it
evokes the moral passion of Abraham Lincoln
The Pro-life Heritage Tale
50
Scott and Roe v. Wade were

and historically plotted, Reagan recounted key
"events" of American history, portraying them as the enactment of
principles. His story was clearly aimed at establishing that Americans
had always believed in and acted in accordance with the principle of
"the sanctity of life." In part, Reagan's history of America ran as
To establish a history in which Dred
thematically linked
follows:
America was founded by men and women who shared a vision of

and every individual.
We fought a terrible war to
guarantee that one category of mankind black people in America
could not be denied the inalienable rights with which their Creator
endowed them. The great champion of the sanctity of all human life in
the value of each
day Abraham Lincoln, gave us his assessment of the Declaration's

Independence] purpose. ... As a nation today, we have not rejected
that
[of
the sanctity of
human
life.
(Pp. 27-28)
And earlier Reagan had noted that "this is not the first time our
country has been divided by a Supreme Court decision that denied
the value of certain human lives. The Dred Scott decision of 1857 was
not overturned in a day, or a year, or even a decade" (p. 19).
It is important to recognize that the relationship of theme to
event derives less from historically accurate accounting than from a
plausible, rhetorically constructed sense of the meaning of America's
heritage. Professional historians have suggested, for example, that
Lincoln's prime concern was with the sanctity of the Union and that he
was quite willing
to sacrifice
many human
lives for that. 11 Further,
proponents of slavery did not usually argue that slaves were not
human beings and might be killed at will (even if the laws ultimately
permitted that indirectly). Thus, Reagan's theme was not accurately
and logically linked with the event.
Nonetheless, Reagan's linkage was largely convincing because it
was plausible. It provided a nominally appropriate chronological account featuring identifiable similarities (Supreme Court decisions
were made) and a theme true of both events (they concern issues of
human life). Given that our popular heritage had rewritten Lincoln's
goal as a concern with the humanity of blacks and the inhumanity of
slavery, the equating of abortion with slavery and Roe v. Wade with
Dred Scott was believable. Consequently, the two events appeared as
a single line of "villainy" to be overcome by Americans. As a result of
this linkage, abortion was not only "written out" of the American
heritage, it elicited the same kind of passionate hatred stirred by a
long-past Civil War. The effect is even more vivid in the comparison of
abortion to the holocaust.
51
The comparison of abortion clinics to "Nazi ovens" was a commonplace of the pro-Life rhetoric between 1960 and 1985. Its uses
included both simple allusions and detailed examinations. In all cases,
the fundamental link was made through the theme of "the sanctity of
human
life." Since the Nazis did not value human life, they killed
innocent humans. The abortionist was similarly accused of failing to
value the "sanctity" of human life and therefore killing innocent
humans. In the fullest illustrations, the advocates examined the
purported underlying causes. For example, Surgeon General Everett
Koop recounted how "medicine under dictatorship" began with a
simple Hegelian bent toward utility, gradually shifted toward the
unethical experimental use of "marginally useful" humans, and then
extended to the killing of more and more groups. 12 Koop compared
this "utilitarianism" to the underlying "quality-of-life ethic" that he
believed dominated the "abortion mentality."
Once again, the analogy was established by the fact that both
events could be "constructed" to fit similar themes or to work for
similar purposes. Historically, the Nazis had not necessarily been
viewed as killing Jews for the sake of "efficiency" or "utility" (but
rather for "purity"), but the popular cultural belief in the efficiency of
fascism made the "utility" link seem plausible. This analogy was
compelling because the American audience most powerfully dreaded
another Nazi era. Moreover, the key discursive links were made
directly through the acts of destruction. Nazis conducted mass executions, and abortions could be metaphorically identified as mass executions^
both supposedly "executed" for purposes of "convenience" or
"utility." The full force of the horrors of the Third Reich were thus
brought down against abortion.

At this point, we can assess how the Protestant "negative" heritage
was entangled with Noonan's "positive" heritage. The non-Catholic
works touted,
explicitly
and
precisely, a Christian set of values as the
life and opposed non-Christian values

(such as efficiency, lack of "sanctity"). The end terms of both the
Protestant and Catholic "heritage tales" were, in other words, the
same (i.e., "life"). Most of the means terms were the same as well, and
guardian of the "sanctity" of
same enemies. These shared

and many shared events, made it easy for Noonan's Catholic
heritage tale to "cross over" into the larger controversy to become a
public account. In fact, this apparently occurred on a fairly broad
scale. Even though feminist scholarly accounts overwhelmingly discounted this heritage, even many pro-Choice activists were caught up
in and retold parts of Noonan's tale. 13
these terms were allied against the

values,
52
Tale
Although Noonan's history harbored fundamental weaknesses as

an argument about our national heritage, his Catholic-based heritage
//
,/
and the negative heritages of other pro-Life rhetors gained

some public credence because the values they promoted were shared
by many Americans and the historical linkages they suggested were
plausible and emotionally potent ones. These convincing historical
tale
narratives provided a forceful response to the "tale of illegal abor-
check the move toward social change. As a

were served, but only
because those interests meshed fairly well with the values embraced
in the broader social history.
tion/' thereby helping to
result, the particular interests of the Catholics
Re-Forming History
The public success
of the pro-Life heritage tale does not, however, tell

range of social effects of the historical narrative.
While the pro-Life history was likely to be broadly persuasive, its
logical ambiguities or partisan elements were glaring enough to allow
opposing partisans to feel justified in their attacks upon it. In the eyes
of an astute opposition, the evident partisanship of the tale destroyed
its legitimacy. Unless a history identifies "us" accurately, it loses its
authority to limit our actions. Audiences are restrained by the link
between their identity and their past actions only to the extent that
they feel a history presents a true and essential shared identity. The
pro-Life tale lost its ability to control the opposition activists because it
was unable to claim a universal "we"; the reform partisans easily saw
us about the
full
themselves as excluded or marginalized in this history. Even though

the reformers adopted fragments of the tale, the history's partisanship precluded it from carrying sufficient authority to restrain the
reformers' arguments or actions.
They responded by
firing
away
at
the weaknesses in the heritage tale in two ways.
The first attack on the heritage tale was the widely repeated, vehement argument that the Catholics should "not impose [their] morality
on others." 14 Various pro-reform authors argued that the Catholic
church was the primary supporter of criminalization of abortion and
that their support was grounded in religious dogma. In the United
States of America, they noted, religious freedom was guaranteed, and
so the Catholic effort was unconstitutional. It is impossible to tell how
much of this argument was
generated simply by the vivid presence of
the Catholics as a special-interest religious denomination. In the early

stages of the controversy the Catholics were undeniably the
visible anti-abortion group. Catholic journals
produced almost
most
all
of

the pro-Life advocacy in the popular magazines. In

lic
representatives
provided
much
including nuns,
53
some
priests, bishops,
states
Catho-
and doctors
of the legislative testimony against abortion reform
laws. Pro-Life rallies featured religious signs
and slogans, and the
buses of Catholic schools were used to transport school children and

others to rallies and to legislative chambers. In addition, religious
vocabulary constantly crept into the discourse. Pro-Life advocates
regularly referred to the "sanctity" or "sacredness" of fetal life and
inadvertently included other religious language, ranging from "rest
his soul" to public prayers to
answering "Amens."
mere presence has been the cause

the "imposing morality" issue and that this constitutes bigotry, or
Catholics have charged that their
of
the denial of their rights to participate in the governing process. 15
It
seems equally likely, however, that the "don't-impose-your-morality"

argument was a response to the attempt of the Catholics to rewrite
American history as a Catholic heritage. Such a reaction to an opposition's hegemonic persuasion cannot be easily labelled "bigotry."
In any case, the argument against "imposing morality" had important force throughout the controversy. It was crucial for the selfmotivation of the reformers, because it allowed them to feel reassured
that they were fighting against special interests, not against the genuine, universal value of "life" that those special interests professed. 16
Moreover, the argument had discursive consequences for the content

of the
new public vocabulary: by featuring
"imposition" and "force" as

up the discursive condi-
negative values, the pro-reform advocates set

tions that
would make the opposite value
later stages of
The most
"choice"
attractive in
the controversy.
and intense effort of the reform advocates in

response to the heritage tale, however, was a different one. They
attacked the concept that there had been any unified heritage in the
human past. Reformers emphasized the multitude of human abortion
practices in various societies and denied the unifying themes postulated by the dominant group's "history." The sheer variety of human
events provided a wide set of positions, laws, and practices from the
human past that included a broader range of groups than those
described by Noonan. 17 Moreover, they did not need to be highly
skilled rhetors: they did not have to construct a complex frame; they
had only to juxtapose the simple statement that "there is no universal
historical theme" to create the sense of variety at which they strove.
Thus in an early and influential article presenting a "Historical
Background," Lester Kinsolving began with a theme indicating that
direct
the pro-Life heritage arose from a limited partisan
"dogma"
that
was
The Pro-life Heritage
54
itself
inconsistent.
He argued
current teaching, and that
Tale
that the pro-Life position "is rather a
has been specifically denied by no fewer
it
than three of the Roman church's most prominent saints and by two
18 Kinsolving's narrative
its popes/'
ran in part like this:
of
Both Albertus Magnus and his pupil St. Thomas Aquinas held that
each soul is directly created by God and is infused into the embryo not
at the point of conception but when the embryo is sufficiently formed to
receive it. In the fourth century St. Gregory of Nyssa maintained that
the soul was infused into the body at the moment of conception, but in
the 12th century St. Anselm disagreed with this contention. Previously,
Tertullian and Apollinaris had introduced traducianism. ... In 1588
Pope Sixtus V, in his bull Effraenatum, reversed his predecessor by
defining all abortions as homicide. Within three years, however, this
declaration was reversed.
Not only have saints and popes disagreed with the concept of life as beginning at conception, but many
non-Christians as well.
.
Kinsolving's procedure was simply the reverse of Noonan's.
Where
Noonan focused on
the broadest possible value, Kinsolving recounted the past discussions of the narrow issue of "when life begins." Where Noonan carefully distinguished among motives and
practices
and
and
laws, Kinsolving simply listed the different positions
actions. Since the genre of discourse
we
call
"history" leads the
audience to expect that the story will be as coherent as possible, the

lack of framing and inter-relating leads the audience to read "juxtaposition" as "unmotivated differences." This denies history a theme
and, hence, its authority.
Kinsolving and Lawrence Lader, an important journalist activist,
also applied personalization to deny history any authority. 19 Noonan
always spoke of institutional groups vested with power and authority for example, the "decision by Roman congregations, teaching by popes, affirmation by pope and general council" (p. 46) or he
referred to "causists"
and "canonical
authority." In contrast, the re-
an individual, or Sixtus,
harboring a personal crusade, had written and made decisions. Thus,
Lader described Sixtus V as having "set out vehemently to cleanse the
Renaissance Church, even making adultery in Rome a hanging offense" (p. 79), and he labeled Basil an "extremist" (p. 77).
Labeling the participants in history negatively and personalizing
their motives challenged or destroyed the mystique of an absolute,
form rhetors spoke
of personalities: Basil, as
and guiding history. Instead, the audience members simply

were introduced to individuals working on their own non-generalizacertain,

ble
and questionable
behalf.
On
55
a broader scale, the motives of his-
tory could be challenged as a whole. Lader argued that our
most
had been guided only by "Christian philosophy" (p. 75)
a religious and therefore illegitimate motive for public American conduct. He also asserted an even less appealing motive, claiming that a
callous concern for raw human power to supply capitalist industry
was the motive for banning abortion (pp. 81, 83). The sanctity of "life"
was merely the protection of an adequate number of "lives" for creating wealth. Finally, he claimed that the opposition's goal was simply
part of the "long struggle to suppress [sexual] sin by legislation" (p.
recent past
90).
By
human
purposes, the challengers painted a nonimage of the history of the

hegemonic past one hundred years and thereby denied its legitimacy.
Instead, they focused on a broader history in which "most societies
before the Catholic Church included abortion in their basic framework
of government and morality" (Lader, p. 75). They described the "history" of abortion practices as widely variable and individually influenced.
Instead of providing a comforting heritage to replace the pro-Life
tale, this Pro-reform history offered an "anti-history." As such it was
unstable. Its only common theme was diversity and individual
motivation, which were not persuasive grounds for motivating individuals to collective action. It did, however, preserve room for the
reform activists to continue their own argument and, eventually, for
feminist academics to produce a countering history. 20
investigating
universal, questionably motivated
Summary
Early in the abortion controversy the pro-Life rhetors rallied to the
challenge constituted through the story of illegal abortion by reconstructing a heritage tale in which abortion was always abhorred.
This partisan tale skillfully conflated opposition to abortion on

grounds of love and sacrifice with opposition to abortion on grounds
murder, covertly promoting the Catholic/Christian heritage as the

America. In spite of such imbalances the heritage tale
had some substantial success because it was close enough to the
center of dominant American discursive traditions to be absorbed into
the larger "American tale" told by non-Catholic Christian rhetors such
as Reagan and Koop. Since this heritage was publicly plausible, it
provided a successful and forceful justification for pro-Life activists. It
of
sole heritage of
56
helped to
select
become involved
and motivate
Tale
to activism those
in the pro-Life
who were
likely to
the religious and
argument
"tradi-
Americans. 21
This mutually reinforcing spiral of predisposed actors and pro-Life
rhetoric was not, however, the sole effect of the historical narratives.
The heritage they constructed contained enough evidence of their
partisanship to be easily dismantled by those with different partisan
identities. The reformers were successful, to their own satisfaction, in
tional"
destroying the rhetorical force of this heritage for their
own
potential
membership. Even though their members absorbed some fragments

of the tale and even though they could not immediately provide a
counter-heritage that would be forcefully persuasive for the public,
they could effectively loose themselves from the authority of a dominant heritage they perceived as partial and non-inclusive.
The sum of these two forces (1) a pro-Life heritage effective for
pro-Lifers and some portion of the broad public, yet (2) partisan
enough to de-legitimize it for potential reform activists and their
combined to insure that the argument would continue and
allies
escalate. Moreover, the heritage tale had consolidated disparate traditions only by appealing to an underlying, shared constitutive base of
values. These values provided the grounds by which the narrative
stalemate would be moved to a different level of argument.
NOTES
1.
For discussions of these early activities see Lawrence Lader, Abortion
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), esp. p. 145,
Making
and Lawrence Lader, Abortion
Beacon Press,
1973). Lader has a decided

pro-reform slant, but as an activist/writer of the period he provides much
useful information. See also Betty Sarvis and Hyman Rodman, The Abortion
Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), in which they
provide a list of the dates and types of bills passed in state legislatures. See
also Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University
II:
the Revolution (Boston:
of California Press, 1984), chapter 5.
Because histories suggest that things "be done as they always have been
done," they exert a profoundly conservative force upon public discourse.
Nonetheless, the historical is probably pragmatically necessary, in some
form, for human collectivities. Histories can be painted as more or less
2.
demanding or multiplicitous and enabling.

George Devereux, "A Typological Study of Abortion in 350 Primitive,
Ancient and Pre-Industrial Societies," in Therapeutic Abortion, ed. Harold
Rosen (New York: Julian Press, 1954), pp. 97-152, and idem., A Study of
univocal and
3.
Abortion in Primitive Societies, rev. ed. (1955;

sities Press, 1976).
New
York: International Univer-
John
4.
Noonan,
T.
Jr.,
57
"An Almost Absolute Value in History," in The
Morality of Abortion, ed. John T. Noonan, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1970). Noonan weaves portions of this history into his other works:
Contraception (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966) and
Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies
Noonan
5.
the nation
(New
Private
York: Free Press, 1979).
himself has presented this history in public lectures around

University of Iowa Law School, 7 February 1982; Basile
e.g.,
Uddo, public lectures at Tulane University and Loyola University, February

1985 and 21 March 1985; John Willke, public speech, University of Illinois,
Urbana, 4 February 1986. Harrison also notes
literature."
its
Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right
"widespread use in scholarly

to
Choose: Toward a
New
Ethic
Beacon Press, 1983), p. 290, note 9. She also notes strong

the other major historical works. See, for example, John Conn-
of Abortion (Boston:
similarities in
ery, Abortion:
The Development
of the
Roman
Catholic Perspective (Chicago:
Loyola
University Press, 1977); Roger John Huser, The Crime of Abortion in Canon Law
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1980).
Harrison provides historical grounds, in addition to these discursive

They are predicated both on historical
6.
ones, for dismissing Noonan's history.

criteria
and on recognition of feminist claims against the dominant
historical
practice.
7. The work of Jiirgen Habermas prescribing the "ideal speech situation"
seems to me to reflect a pragmatic critique pointing to the way in which
American aspirations toward the maxim "all persons are created equal" might
be operationalized. Both of these sources provide foundations for this test of

legitimacy. See Jiirgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society,
trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976).
8. Harrison emphasizes that this was also an extremely limited and partial
rendition of the Catholic heritage itself, with its own anti-feminine bias at
root. She argues that abortion was only rarely discussed in the tradition, and
when it was proscribed,
it was prohibited on grounds that non-procreative sex

murder, rather than as a specific response to fetal life.
9. The description of history as combining theme and event is common to
historians at several points in the political spectrum. Compare Savoie Lottin-
was
itself
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976),

and Hay den White, "The Value of Narrativity in the
Representation of Reality," in On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980). A middle perspective is presented by Paul
ville,
The Rhetoric
of History
esp. pp. 4, 43, 51,
Ricoeur, The Reality of the Historical Past (Milwaukee: Marquette University

Press, 1984).
10.
Ronald Reagan, Abortion and
Thomas Nelson,
11.
the Conscience of the Nation (Nashville:
1984), pp. 9-10.
For a discussion of the competing interpretations of Lincoln's motiva-
see D. E. Fehrenbacher, The Changing Image of Lincoln in American

Historiography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), esp. p. 22.
tions,
12.
13.
Reagan.
See chapter
2,
note
1.
In depicting legal abortion
many media
charts
58
and even
Tale
scholarly charts tend to begin with 1973 (see, e.g., issues of Family
Planning Perspectives). Feminists also accepted Roe
v.
Wade
as a lone event that
marked a radical break from previous American practices and values. They
began their charts and graphs of "legal abortion" in 1973 or referred to that as
the time when "abortion was made legal."
14. For example, Jack Starr, Look, 11 July 1967, pp. 67-69, or idem., Look, 19
October 1965, pp. 158ff.
15. Catholic responses were strong
e.g., America, 25 February 1967, p.
273, or Richard John Neuhaus, "The Dangerous Assumption," Commonweal,
30 June 1967, p. 409.
16. These replies normally charged that Catholics were inconsistent in
their defense of life
e.g., Lester Kinsolving, "What about Therapeutic Abor-
tion?" Christian Century, 13

17.
Devereux.
18.
Kinsolving.
19.
May
1964, pp. 632-35.
Lader, Abortion.
still incomplete, but see Harrison, Luker, and

Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality,
and Reproductive Freedom (Boston: Longman/Northeastern University Press,
20.
These histories are
1984).
21.
For an examination of the social class and conditions of the
see Luker.
activists,
CHAPTER FOUR
Life, Equality,
and Choice
Rhetoric and Values

1965-72
The story
of illegal abortion and the tale of American heritage, both

narrated in the early part of the contemporary abortion controversy,
were emotionally compelling. They generated concern and disagree-
ment about the practice of abortion in the nation. The narratives,

however, provided an incomplete rhetoric. Since America's public
vocabulary is largely constituted through *myths, it can be powerfully
stirred by stories, but the national life cannot be "re-Constituted"
solely through a change in narratives. 1 In order to present a demand
for social action in legal or constitutional terms, narratives must be
fitted to the broad network of ^constitutive public values called "ideographs." If the political right of women to "control their own bodies"
was to be recognized, giving them "equality" with men, then the key
terms of the nation's Constitution would have to be re-deployed.
Between 1965 and 1972 a contest over this value framework was
played out, centering on three different ideographs Life, Equality,
and Choice.
The Defense against Change

Throughout the abortion controversy, the major constitutive value
grounding the anti-abortion position was Life. 2 Although the term
itself was constant, an examination of the development of its usages
indicates that, in order to enhance its persuasiveness, it was applied
in an increasingly precise sense as the controversy developed.
In the early sixties the argument about Life had been presented as
though it were an undisputed statement of fact. The pro-Life advocates apparently assumed that the public shared the belief that a fetus
was a human being and that aborting it was murder, for they usually
made the claim without producing any support for it. They also
59
60
Life, Equality,
and Choice
assumed
that preservation of life was of such preeminence that it

automatically preempted conflicting values and interests. Hence,
when faced with the emotionally powerful tale of illegal abortion, the
pro-Life rhetors responded that the alternatives to illegal abortion
were adoption, charity, and chastity. Rather than repudiating the
existing value sets, such suggestions produced alternative solutions
consistent with the existing îdeology.
These advocates were soon shocked to find that such statements

beliefs were inadequate to preserve and protect the values and
practices that had previously reigned. By the late sixties, many states
were enacting reforms in abortion laws. In 1967 Colorado, North Car-
and
olina,
and
California
all
modified their statutes more or less after the
American Law Institute's Model

Code. In the same year the Clergy Consultation Service was formed
a major event with both practical and symbolic effects. This group
overcame harassment and fear of prosecution to develop a nationwide
network of abortion counseling and referral services. The agency did
more than provide relatively safe abortions to a few thousand women;
it also had a significant impact in modifying the symbolic morality of
abortion. When clergy of several denominations became actively involved in finding safe abortions for women, it became tremendously
more difficult to frame abortion as an immoral act.
Although the pro-reform group suffered some failures in this period (in 1969 a major reform bill was defeated in New York), most of
their efforts brought continuing success. In 1969 the California Supreme Court overturned that state's previous, restrictive law on
grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague, and Washington D.C/s
law was overturned by Judge Gesell on even more comprehensive
grounds. Additionally, Kansas, Delaware, Arkansas, New Mexico,
and Oregon were added to the reform state roster. 3
In response to these reforms, the pro-Life forces hurried to expand
their argument. The character of their response was dictated by the
nature of the losses they were experiencing. At this poinjt, central
values of "motherhood" and "family" were not being directly attacked,
weakened, or replaced. The *ALI model and most of the laws being
enacted did not recognize the reproductive freedom of women; the
laws allowed abortion only by approval of a committee and only for
reasons that did not challenge the myth of idealized "motherhood
rape, incest, fetal deformity, health of the pregnant woman. Consequently, the pro-Life rhetors did not need to respond by defending
limited reforms suggested in the
the value of procreation
and the
sanctity of
motherhood
the reasons
61
they had historically advanced against abortion throughout Western

sought a continued ban on all abortions, by
emphasizing that the humanity and Right to Life of the fetus was
history. 4 Instead, they
paramount
in all cases. 5
From the late sixties onward, the major

movement was therefore expended in
rhetorical effort of the pro-Life
and amplifying the verbal linkages between the terms

and Life.
The concrete term fetus and the abstract value of Life were woven
constructing
fetus
together primarily through a frequent recitation of the claim that the

had discovered that the fetus was a human
authority of "science"
being from the time of conception. "Science," "biology," and "genetics" were repeatedly quoted, as when Brendon Brown claimed that
"according to the new science of molecular biology, this [zygote] is a
human being with all the gene structure of the fully grown." 6
The references to the authority of science were supported by widespread use of graphic material proofs pictures of aborted fetuses,
often sickeningly mangled. The consensus seems to be that in Michigan a major change in public opinion was eventually brought about
by these visual materials, which portrayed the fetus not as a "blob of
tissue" but, in the later stages of gestation, as a "baby." 7
Thousands of
were distributed, and television ads as well as billboards focused on the human-like features of the physical appearance
of the fetus. Most Americans had had no idea what a fetus looked like
at any stage of development. Once they saw the late-stage fetus, it
was more plausible to characterize the fetus as a human person and
much more difficult to dismiss the relevance of Life (the image of the
picture packets
is more fully discussed in the next chapter). Thus, visual display

and supporting scientific argument worked together to characterize
fetus
the fetus as a
human
being.
The authenticity of the defense of Life by these groups has been

challenged by feminist scholars and pro-Choice activists. They argue
that, historically, Western civilization, including Christian theology,
has enunciated little explicit concern with protecting fetal life. Additionally, they point out that many powerful supporters of the pro-Life
vocabulary do not consistently support the Right to Life in issues such
as the death penalty. Hence, the feminists suggest, the pro-Life movement's defense of the term is ungenuine. 8
This attack is imprecise and inadequate because it reflects an incomplete understanding of this abstract but important term. Life is
indeed an important constituting value for this nation. Moreover, the
term
Life is
genuinely defended
by the pro-Life movement. However,
62
Life, Equality,
there
is
and Choice
between the liberal formulation of the rhetoric of the

and the conservative pro-natalism which is the underly-
a fissure
Right to Life
ing motive for defending
Life.
In defending the sanctity of
life,
pro-Life rhetors are centrally
motivated by pro-natalism. In the past, this support of ^maximal

human reproduction was accomplished by the strict linkage of
women's sexuality to procreation. In the sixties that link no longer
worked: although motherhood was still a strong positive value in the
culture, non-procreative sexuality was no longer as strongly negative
for women. Therefore, the advocates of maximal procreation had to
defend an increase in the number of lives more directly. 9 They did so
by promoting the "sanctity of human life." However, the

dominant public vocabulary at the time made the religious, conservative focus on sacredness and sheer quantity of life suspect or
even illegitimate and therefore not adequately persuasive. The proinitially
Life rhetors consequently modified their favored terms to adapt to the

process of public persuasion. "Sanctity of human life," rooted in a
conservative concern for pro-natalism, was translated into the liberal
individual discourse of a basic human right the Right to Life.
In spite of the adoption of the liberal formulation, the pro-Life
movement's basic pro-natalist purpose for promoting the rhetoric has
been clearly articulated, especially by the most conservative of the
pro-Life politicians. On national television, for example, Republican
presidential hopeful Pat Robertson replied to a question about the
abortion issue with the following rationale:
We've got a true genetic problem in these United States of a magnitude beyond what we can conceive of Pete mentioned it the fact that
by the year 2020 we're going to be running out of workers. There won't
be enough to support the retirees. And, as a matter of fact, by the year
2000 we will have aborted 40 million children in this country. Their
work product by the year 2020 will amount to 1.4 trillion dollars; the
taxes from them would amount to 350 billion; and they could insure the
fiscal stability of the social security system, which is going to be near
bankrupt by the year 2015. We've got to do something about it. And of
course I personally favor a paramount human life amendment, but I've
said something else: as president I would guarantee a veto of any
appropriations measure which included one dime of funding for
planned parenthood. 10
As
others
Life
Robertson's statement
makes
clear,
and
similar
arguments advanced by
the constitutive value Life, as used by the pro-
movement, most fundamentally
prefers the conservative cause of
"pro-natalism," not the liberal-individual concern with "rights."
The
63
promotion of Life by these rhetors is therefore genuine, even if the

concern with individual Rights to Life is not.
This complex relationship between the argument, the rhetors, and
the persuasive moves they adopted had a similarly complex impact on
the public process of social change. At the persuasive level, it greatly
augmented the
argument for the general

exacerbated the tensions between the proLife and pro-Choice advocates. The pro-Choice advocates were frusattractiveness of the pro-Life
public. Simultaneously,
trated
by the
it
feeling that the pro-Life
movement was
ing" the public in order to profit themselves
at
lying
the costs of
and "dup-
women. At
the same time, the rhetoric gave the pro-Life movement grounds for
even greater self-righteousness. Focusing on the fetus allowed them
to sidestep the possibility that, in asking women to sacrifice themselves for reproduction, they were asking women, directly and unfairly, to serve the society more than men did.
At the argumentative level, this liberal framing of the issue moved
the contest away from the explicit competition of interests between
the underlying power groups involved ""wage-laboring women vs.
Christian capitalist males. Instead, the public argument became
focused on the contest of rights between women and fetuses. In the
long term, this new focus had a major impact because it demanded a
different set of refuting arguments from the pro-Choice movement
(an argument against fetal rights, which was not widely addressed for
many
years). In the short term, the
individual
demanded and generated
new focus on the rights of

a new type of argument by
the
the
pro-reform opposition.
Equality
The pro-Life argument rested the case against abortion on the constitutional Right to Life of an individual fetus. The movement to this
ideographic level of argument necessitated a response from the reform group on an equally fundamental level. They could have denied
the linkage of fetus and Life. As a rule, however, this was not their
primary reply. Instead, to counter the weight of these claims and to
resolve the contradictions generated within their
developed their
own
own
narrative, they
ideographic argument.
In this period the right of
all
citizens to Equality, frequently articu-
formed the anchor for the

The appropriateness of Equality arose
from the unique way in which it "explained" the contradictions in the
tale of illegal abortion. Although the question of whether civil rights
lated as opposition to "discrimination,"
claim to a right to abortion.
64
Life, Equality,
and Choice
were advancing in the sixties is controversial, it is obvious that

Equality was becoming more salient at this time. Many people,
whether they approved of desegregation or busing or other concrete
changes, still held that people should be treated ''equally/' 11 This
really
on Equality had a stunning impact on the abortion

became a salient negative form of the
ideograph, the inconsistencies in the tale of illegal abortion were
public emphasis
issue.
As
"discrimination"
instantly explained.
Did the story of illegal abortion contradict itself, indicating that

sometimes women received safe illegal abortions and other times they
did not? Socioeconomic disparity an unjustified discrimination
explained why: different classes of women received different kinds of
abortions. Were abortionists depicted sometimes as congenial family
doctors, other times as dangerous "mechanics"? Again, socioeconomic disparity unjustifiable ''discrimination'' explained why. Reform advocates argued that the existing laws discriminated against the
poor, who were often racial minorities. Because abortion was illegal,
poor women were forced to risk their lives in dangerous abortions,
while rich women could circumvent the law to get safe abortions
anyway. A legal system that caused one group of women to risk their
//
,,
because they lacked money violated the belief in Justice. 12 Thus,

Equality provided a socially viable warrant for the elimination of
existing abortion laws on grounds of existing public commitments (to
Justice). This grounding in constitutive values had previously been
lives
lacking.
The claim to Equality had another important basis. In the sixties

various feminist groups were active in the abortion movement. Their
argument that women should have a right to control their own

was not widely reported in the public press. 13 By employing
the term Equality as central to the meanings surrounding abortion, the
bodies
reform rhetors created a way for the feminist discourse to be introduced (i.e., newly understood) in the public vocabulary. Equality
could be described as balancing the Property rights of the individual
woman over her own body and the universal Justice served by society's interest in the fetus, or the "just rights" due to an "unborn
child." Gradually,
from
this point, portions of the feminist discourse,
although rarely identified as such, began to be articulated in the

public space.
The shift from a narratively based argument (a story) to an ideographic argument based on Equality had one other radical consequence: it turned the desire for an end to illegal abortions into a
constitutional demand for the repeal of all abortion laws. A change of
65
was necessarily tied to a change in argument. *ALI-type

reform laws had been reasonable when the justification for changes in
abortion law relied primarily on poignant stories of pregnant women
who had been raped, were mentally unstable, or were in poor health.
When the primary justification changed from these narrative-based
policy goals
arguments
to the constitutional value of Equality, mere reform of laws

permit abortions in "hard cases" was logically inadequate. Such
reform would not eliminate discrimination. The resultant demand for
virtually complete repeal of abortion laws represented the major
feature of the argumentation in the closing years of the decade, and it
brought about temporary success in the legislatures. At the turn of
the decade Alaska, Hawaii, and New York adopted virtual repeal
laws. Soon over 200,000 abortions were performed in New York in a
single year, as women came from all over the country to seek "safe
to
and
legal" abortions. 14
The Challenge to Equality, 1971-72

neared their end, legal abortion was apparently a new
support and instantiation in the laws
and funding mechanisms of the society. The appearance of momentum or inevitable progress was misleading, however. The contest
had only begun. As the argument entered the seventies, the shift
from the ideologically minor argument for reform laws to the major
demand for Equality and repeal laws brought vigor to the anti-abor-
As the
sixties
social practice gaining increasing
tion reaction.
A massive campaign to revoke the still-young "repeal" bill passed

both the house and senate in New York. Only a veto from Governor
stalled a return to criminal abortion. The reactionary trend also included the massive defeats of referenda on proposed
repeal laws in Michigan and North Dakota; Connecticut responded to
Nelson Rockefeller
judicial
censure of
its
lature rejected
by rewording and
and the Pennsylvania legis-
restrictive abortion statute
reinstituting another restrictive statute;
reform or repeal. 15
Even the courts participated in this counter-tide. In 1971 the Supreme Court overturned the Gesell ruling the decision from the
federal court in Washington, D.C., that had held most restrictive
abortion statutes to be unconstitutionally vague. The High Court
concluded that a physician would know reasonably well when a
woman's life or health was endangered by pregnancy, and therefore
the statutes were not vague. 16
Several reasons account for this apparently radical and rapid
66
Life, Equality,
change
and Choice
mood. First, the anti-abortion forces had become

and organized, and their support had begun to extend
in public
well financed
beyond the Catholic church
to include other powerful religious

groups. 17 Additionally, pro-reform forces seemed to have been quiescent either because they were focusing their efforts on the courts or
because they were content with the previous successes that allowed
most middle-class women to travel to New York for a legal abortion. 18
were reflected in and summed up by the nature

and its limitations.
The regulative term Equality had served to promote abortion from
an emotional regret lacking any legitimate stake in the legal realm to a
All of these "causes"
of the discourse at the time,
contest of " rights/' That upped the ante. Concomitantly, however,

because the argument was based merely on a Regulative ideograph, it
could negotiate only between existing power interests, representing
the new interests only indirectly. This limitation became visible in the
dominant group's responses to the rhetoric of discrimination.
One of the most frequent responses to the claim that abortion laws
should be eliminated because they "discriminated" was to deny the
force of the regulator, Equality. Pro-Life advocates indicated that if the
laws "discriminated" they did so not by any legal feature, and hence
legal Justice was preserved. That is, they suggested that the law did
not allow rich women abortions. If some groups were able to violate
the law because of their resources, that was no concern of the law
itself. In one instance of such a response, Mary Fisk answered the
discrimination issue in a letter to America, asking, "When do we base
our moral judgments on the economic convenience of an issue?" 19 R.
M. Byrn similarly argued that we cannot "make the vices and evasions of some of the rich the norm for our public policy." 20 Essentially,
the fact that discrimination in abortion arose from Property rights
granted by the law made the law impotent in attempts to redress the
discrimination. Indeed, any other premise would have invalidated a
great many laws, perhaps even the basis of the legal structure, as a
balance of Justice and Property itself.
Some advocates took this claim even further by reversing the term.
They argued that the law favored the poor: it kept them from being
"immoral." Too bad the rich could not be similarly controlled, they
lamented. Rep. Henry Hyde, for example, in applying this claim to
his proposed ban on funding, said that "it is the unborn children of
the middle class and the rich who are discriminated against by this
21
legislation because we have no way to limit their abortions."
Thus, those who had access to Property, if it were legally attained,
were accepted as being outside the control of law and morality. In

67
other words, the ^dominant elites could not be restrained by the

reigning ideology, for it was, at base, their voice. These responses
weakness of a regulative term such as discrimination as an

argumentative ground of a new coalition of interests. Because a regulative term mediates between end terms, any end term has more
force than does any mediator. The end terms, of course, serve entrenched interests.
The same fact was revealed in another refuting argument used by
Pro-Life rhetors. Advocates often responded to the appeal for allowing abortion in "hard cases" with analyses denying the legitimacy of
the various justifications offered by the ALI-type laws for abortions
22 Pro-Life
persuaders argued that in
rape, deformity, and economics.
a rape case two wrongs did not make a right. The evil of a rape could
only be compounded by the taking of an innocent fetal life. They
insisted that deformity was not an adequate cause for the sentence of
death and that monetary concerns also were inadequate to justify
murder by abortion. Each of these arguments, variegated as they
might seem, depended on the original ideograph Life. The fetus was
equivalent to a full human person. Its substantive "rights" could not be
traded for a regulative norm. In the end, given the Constitution of the
United States and its current interpretation, the force of Equality was
inadequate to overcome either the Property rights of the state or the
claimed just rights of the fetus (as a full human being).
reveal the
The Right to Choice

Equality thus gained a hearing for abortion as a
right,
but the reg-
term was ultimately unable to defend that right against the

rights of instantiated groups. Moreover, the uses to which the constitutive value were put were fundamentally indirect in their articulation of women's needs or desires. After all, women did not desire
simply to be equal with each other. If that were the case, then Hyde's
reversal would have been fully adequate as a response to the discrimination issue: an effective abortion ban would have been "non-discrimiulative
the tale of illegal abortion demanded more

fundamentally grounded values; Equality and Freedom were to be
combined in a new demand for a Right to Choice.
natory." Instead,
Even
in the earliest stages of the controversy, for
some
activists the
freedoms, or choices of women were at issue. Although these

voices did not become the most audible ones until the seventies, a
public rhetoric gradually developed which framed the controversy as
a "woman's Choice." Recent feminist scholarship has been highly
rights,
68
Life, Equality,
and Choice
Choice, on the ground that it can be interpreted as a

permitting only political rights, not recognizing economic realities. 23 Such a version of Choice would fail to recognize that
most women do not have the economic freedom to make real choices,
and so the larger concept of Reproductive Freedom is suggested for
the feminist demand. While I have no reason to prefer or oppose
either label, I suggest that this argument fundamentally misunderstands both the character of ideographs and public discourse, and the
development of the term Choice.
On the first count, in a liberal political system any constitutive
value can be interpreted in a liberal manner as a political, not economic, right. Reproductive Freedom can be interpreted like our "freedom to travel" allowed, but not supported. The term choice is no
more open to such processes of interpretation than any other. It is
precisely the effort to control the meanings of ideographs that form
long-term power struggles. Various battles in the courts and Congress
have played a major role in shaping these meanings (see chapter 6).
However, these negotiations do not deny the potency of the novel
ability to gain articulation of women's interests in the public realm
wary
of the
term
liberal rhetoric
with the rise of Choice. 24

On the second count the term Choice, as a contestant for ideographic representation of women's needs in the polity, is particularly
fascinating because it was so concretely indigenous to women's experiences. "Choice" was a direct articulation of material demands faced
by women in two ways. In the first place, it arose rather directly from
the early discourse by and about women on abortion. In the early
narratives about illegal abortion, the stories told that women faced
these horrific conditions precisely because they felt that they had "no
choice." Throughout the controversy the term was frequently employed by real women, expressing their own personal needs. The
demand for Freedom to Choose was a key component of the development of liberation for these women. The ordinary women who employed this language were expressing simultaneously discovering
and elaborating those things which were fundamentally necessary
for them to experience equality with men and freedom as human
agents (whatever contemporary academic feminists think of those
goals). 25 The promotion of "choice" to ideographic status thus represents a uniquely direct and powerful expression by women of their
own political needs in a particular time and place (for evidence, see
chapter 9). Those needs of these women had evolved from real and
pressing changes in the public vocabulary describing women's biological choices and in the range of their occupational choices which had
developed following World War II.
that occurred
69
Biological Choice: The Birth Control Pill
The idea
women's biological conand thereby increased their "choices" seems

obvious enough. The claim, however, has become ideologically controversial. The uniqueness of the pill has been denied by many feminists who do not like the fact that (1) the pill is controlled by the male
medical establishment, (2) it entails risks to women who use it, and
(3) it threatens to turn a complex social change into a merely technical
matter. 26 If we strip away such ideologically based objections, however, the arguments advanced to deny the importance of the pill seem
that the birth control pill increased
trol of their fertility
misdirected.
primary objection to the
choices"
is
pill's
importance in providing "new
that reasonably reliable birth control alternatives (the di-
aphragm and condom) were available long before

detractors suggest that the need for contraceptives
the
pill.
The
pill's
allow the continuance of careers) generated the technology, rather than the technology generating the desire for Freedom.
Perhaps, however, the rhetorical features of the birth control pill,
rather than
its
(to
technical merits, are the causal agents.
Two
different
rhetorical features indicate the real significance of the birth control
the pill is more effective than the condom and diaphragm.

While, indeed, the earlier methods were "highly effective," the pill
pill. First,
claimed to offer more.
Any
reasonably effective birth control device

will bear and usually
to space them out. Nonetheless, such measures do not promise to
allow one nearly certain choice over when one would have the exact
number of children one wanted. The birth control pill, with its marketed effectiveness rate of 99 percent plus, produced the image of
complete control (via publicly acceptable means). No longer were
one's children to be spaced according to when birth control measures
failed. Instead, fertility could be turned on and off at will. Although in
practice the birth control pill did not deliver that level of effectiveness,
the promise of that kind of control was enough to revolutionize the
allows one to reduce the
number of children one
expectations regarding female fertility 27
Of even greater importance, however, was the manner in which the

must be used. The birth control pill shifts the locus of control
completely to the woman. The condom and withdrawal are clearly
male-controlled contraception. Even the use of a diaphragm requires
varying degrees of male cooperation, and, as Andrea Dworkin and
Catherine Mackinnon have revealed, male control of the sex act is not
confined to those instances we have classically defined as rape. 28 Only
if a woman wore a diaphragm at all times would she be protected
pill
70
Life, Equality,
and Choice
from impregnation against her will, and that option was not medically
viable. Abortion, of course, might have offered the sense of complete
control at an historically earlier point, but abortion was not initially
publicly acceptable for a variety of substantial reasons. It was perceived
not as a preventative but as an after-the-fact treatment. It also entailed
immediate and dramatic physical risk to women. 29 Therefore, abortion did not, initially, provide a clean and forceful model of biological
choice. By separating contraception and sex in time, the birth control
pill provided a round-the-clock preventative. Individual women thus
wrested virtually complete control of procreation, not only from biology but, perhaps more importantly, from individual men. In a crucial
way, therefore, the
pill
appear as a biological
made
the social
and physical
demand for control or "choice"

Only when the domi-
possibility.
nant public vocabulary recognized that women had biological choices

could they persuasively demand social Choice.
Occupational Choices: Working
Women
and from
women's Choice proceeded from changes
in the social images of women's occupational choices. The Gallup
polls extending back before World War II indicate that the application
of political Equality to women in concrete ways has a long history in
America. The claim that women should receive equal pay for equal
work was supported by 78 percent of the people as early as 1942 and
by 87 percent in 1954. 30 Other ideals of equality also grew between
the forties and the eighties. In 1949 the number of people who said
they would vote for a qualified woman as president (52 percent)
nearly equalled those who would not while the same year 54 percent
approved of a specific woman becoming a minister. 31
Although Americans may, long ago, have begun to apply Equality
in a way that included women, the percentages of Americans supportIn addition to wresting procreative choices from biology
individual men, the rise of
ing such Equality certainly increased steadily across time. In .1937, for
example, only 34 percent of those polled claimed they would vote for
a qualified female for president. In 1945 the position remained a
minority one, but a plurality agreed to a woman on the Supreme
Court and in other "responsible" government posts. By 1955, 52
percent indicated they would vote for a woman for president, and by
1967 this had increased to 54 percent. By 1971, 66 percent indicated
they could support a woman as president. Overall, the trend changed
slowly between 1937 and 1967. Between 1967 and 1971, as the pre32
vious attitudes were consolidated, the trend accelerated more rapidly.
71
The general inclusion of women in the constitutive value Equality

was thus virtually completed by the early seventies. Change on this
ideographic level was accompanied by one important change in the
concrete images or *character-types of women the declining importance of women's role as "mothers" and an increasing importance in
their role as
waged workers.
In 1936 only 18 percent of those polled
thought that it was acceptable for a married woman to work if her

husband could support her. Gradually that opinion changed, so that
by 1976 a substantial majority 68 percent approved of such married women working. 33 This trend matched a steady increase in the
number of women, including married women, working, which
reached a high in 1977, when three-quarters of all married women
had worked. 34
Complementing this change was an altered perception of the ideal
family size. Even before the "baby boom" period after World War II,
34 percent of the populace had wanted a family of four or more
children. That figure grew to 49 percent in 1945. 35 A slight reduction
occurred after that, but the largest reduction did not happen until the
period from 1968 to 1971. In 1968, 41 percent of the respondents still
wanted four or more children. By 1971 that percentage plummeted to
19 percent. Those who thought two children ideal reached 49 percent
by
1978. 36
The period between 1940 and 1980 therefore brought major

changes in the expectations about women's social roles as "mothers."
Because of smaller families and other changes in household duties,
the job of mothering was not to be a full-time, lifetime occupation for
most women. Because of an increasing willingness to allow married
women to work and an increasing acceptance of women as potential
workers, even in areas such as high government posts, women could
use this "other time" as waged workers. Changes in public attitudes
thus brought women to the seventies ready for and expectant of new
occupational
choices.
These conditions crystallized the issue of abortion and produced

the constitutive rhetoric of Right to Choice. Abortion represented the
final and most complete control over childbearing and the consequent availability of "choices" other than mothering, but because it
was employed after pregnancy, it was socially more complex than
other means of control. That complexity made it the best grounds for
defenders of the status quo, and they therefore made it the issue that
carried the central public argument about maternity choices.
The rhetoric of denouncing outside control of a woman's fertility

was sounded in many different keys. Some advocates of Choice as-
72
Life, Equality,
and Choice
women had literally been an "oppressed" group

"compulsory motherhood is a form of slavery." 37 Gloria
Steinem argued that "women's bodies are society's most basic means
of production. We produce the workers and the soldiers of the patriarchy." 38 Other attacks were less assertive, noting simply that "there
are women who after two children are begging 'please let me live a life
now.'" 39 Contrary to rightist and anti-feminist propaganda the arguments did not usually condemn pregnancy and motherhood. By
implication, however, they did challenge its preeminence in the hierarchy of values. Motherhood was no longer assumed to be more
important than any other concern or activity of women, and thus it
became reasonable to suggest that "some women can't afford to raise
another child, some don't want to bear a child out of wedlock and
serted forcefully that
and
that
some don't want
to interrupt their careers." 40
further, to note that
of
and emotional
all bliss,
It
became
that
it
possible,
entailed "great
stress." 41 This re-designation of
motherhood
one among many choices may have appeared to "lower" the status
motherhood, but only for those who viewed the other choices
physical
as
pregnancy was not
negatively.
Indirectly, then, the demand for Choice presented major challenges to the dominant ideology and interests. It suggested that
women
be treated as free agents, capable of making "choices" about

work lives, and their families. These choices came,
primarily, from the men who had held the choices and the exclusive
rights to jobs. Consequently, by publicly articulating the material
demands of women as a claim for rights, the Right to Choice suggested a profound reconstitution of the American people and their
rights and powers. Women were no longer to be subject to biological
predispositions or male whim; they were to be free agents with their
own Liberties. The demand was a radical one, and the competition of
interests set in motion a major ideological retaliation that did not
their fertility, their
blossom
until the eighties.
Summary
During the late sixties and early seventies the argument about abortion began to involve the fundamental value commitments of the
society. The pro-Life advocates broadened and strengthened their
demand for Life, narrowing it to an individualist focus on the Right to
Life of the fetus. The pro-reform movement, which had expressed the
story of women's trials by illegal abortion, became a "pro-Choice"
movement, after the demand for Equality (among women) evolved
into a
demand
for a Right to
articulating the experience of
Choice (taken from men), directly
many women who, with
and personal freedoms, had begun
ical, social,
73
to see
greater biolog-
room
in their
motherhood.
At this point, the fundamental logical and argumentative grounds
of the controversy were established. The controversy would move in
two directions. One path would be the legal adjudication of the
competing claims to rights (chapter 6). The other path was the crucial
development of a discourse much less abstract than ideographs in the
popular arena. In the broad popular realm concrete ""images would be
the most potent factors in determining the ultimate public vocabulary
adopted for the practice of abortion. In this contest, the images
indigenous to a rhetoric of Choice were far overmatched by the
depictions of the fetus as a human being, ever more vividly developed
over the next two decades.
lives for "choices" in addition to
NOTES
am
no way trying
to deny the importance of narrative forms in

importance has been widely and richly documented
(see chapter 1, note 32). I nonetheless maintain that human beings are
complex enough to be simultaneously wrapped in stories and also controlled
and influenced profoundly by other discursive forms, including ideographs,
maxims (or principles ) and characterizations. Consequently, to take narrative as the entire paradigm for human communication is to make a reductionist error. I would therefore wish to add dimensions to Walter Fisher's
account of public moral argument, Human Communication as Narration: Toward
a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action (Columbia: University of South Car1.
human
in
societies. This
//
,,
olina Press, 1987).

I agree with John Lucaites that it is useful to set ideographs off with
>. In technical writing addressed primarily to others in my field I use
2.
<
my audience here includes those from

such technical precision aesthetically displeasing, I have
denote ideographs by capitalizing them. This follows the
these markings. However, because

other fields
who find
chosen instead
to
American colonial and post-Revolutionary period. See John Louis Lucaites, "Flexibility and Consistency in Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Whiggism: A Case Study of the Rhetorical Dimensions
tradition of the printed oratory of the
of Legitimacy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1984), p. 48, note 71.

3.
All of these events are covered in the popular press of the period.
summary is
Lawrence Lader, Abortion (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1966), p. 145, and idem., Abortion IT Making the Revolution (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 109-15. A list of the legislation can be found in Betty
Sarvis and Hyman Rodman, The Abortion Controversy (New York: Columbia
quick
available in
University Press, 1974).
74
Life, Equality,
and Choice
4. Beverly Wildung Harrison emphasizes this as the primary reason employed against abortion in the Catholic church through history See Our Right
to Choose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983). It was also visible in the struggle in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both in a direct form and in nativist
fears about the balance of procreation in ethnic groups; see James C. Mohr,
Abortion in America (New York: Oxford Union Press, 1978).
5. I believe the feminist account, which attributes the entire contemporary
controversy to desires for continued male control of procreation, is unable to
account for this obstinacy. With the ALI-style laws men had found a way to
maintain their control of abortion, while still allowing some "exceptions." I

one has to take seriously the more universal concern
with Life claimed by the Catholic church and others. In other words, we
cannot simply dismiss the concern with the fetus as inauthentic. I argue
below, however, that this concern with the fetus comes not from a standard
individualist defense of rights but from a theocratic desire to increase the
believe that at this point
number
6.
of lives.
Brendon
F.
Brown, "Criminal Abortion,"
Vital Speeches, 1
July 1970, pp.
"Now
Generation Churchmen and the Unborn,"

Christianity Today, 29 January 1971, p. 38; Virgil C. Blum, "Public Policy Making: Why the Churches Strike Out," America, 6 March 1971, pp. 224-28; Rev.
James Fisher, letter to the editor, National Review, 9 February 1971, p. 116.
7. Russel Kirk, "The Sudden Death of Feticide," National Review, 22 December 1972, p. 1407; "Twisted Logic: Propositions to Legalize Abortion,"
Christianity Today, 22 December 1972, pp. 24-25. The arguments of these
conservatives are supported by the silence of the pro-Choice advocates on this
loss. Especially note Lader's studied avoidance of the issue.
8. See Harrison and, by implication, Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion
and Women's Choice (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1984). Note also
the attacks on the Catholics as being "inconsistent" in their defense of Life:
Jean A. Miller, letter to the editor, Commonweal, 14 April 1972, pp. 131, 151;
"Anti- Abortion Campaign," Time, 29 March 1971, p. 73. Most pro-Choice
advocates indicate their denial of the authenticity of this argument by employing the "don't impose your morality on me" maxim and by omitting refutation
of the argument.
9. Pro-Life rhetors continually inveigh against the "quality of life" ethic.
They do not, to my knowledge, admit to holding the opposing "quantity of
life" ethic, but it is an apt term. They base their argument on the quantitative
biblical injunction to "go forth and multiply"; the rigorous proscriptions
against birth control and non-procreative sexuality further communicate this
ethic. These values are grounded in sectarian interests in propagation of one's
549-53; Harold B. Kuhn,
own
clan (in part, as opposed to others). In addition, the link to capitalism's

need for ever-increasing numbers of producers and consumers to preserve
and increase capitalist profits (cited by Lader, chapter 2) should not be
discounted. The opposition between capitalism and feminism in their current
configurations thus has an even more material base than has previously been
recognized by feminist scholars (although it has been recognized by some
feminist activists; see, e.g., Steinem, below).

10.
My
75
from videotape of The Firing Line, broadcast 28 Ocargument advanced by John Willke, "A Matter of
transcription
tober 1987. See a similar
Urbana, 6 February 1987

advances the argument, directing it to "those who might
be interested," but attempts to distance himself from it, apparently sensing
Life," public lecture at the University of Illinois,
(interestingly, Willke
its
problematic contents).
(who
It is
ironic that the
argument forced the
pro-natalists
are intrinsically theocratic) to adopt a liberal individualist ethic, while
the Court system
back upon the
fell
interest" to restrain the
women
from
statist
standard of "compelling state
their individualism (see chapter
6).
Various Gallup polls indicate the salience of the term and the increasing openness toward Equality. A shift in attitudes relating to the desirability of
black neighbors to whites, for example, can be traced in the period. From 1958
11.
primary position changes on Equality occurred in the South.

were also changes of as much as 10 percent in the
North. George H. Gallup, Public Opinion: 1935-1971 (New York: Random
House, 1972), pp. 1572-73, 1824, 1941. See also Milton Rokeach, "Change and
Stability in American Value Systems, 1968-71," Public Opinion Quarterly 38,
to 1963, the
From 1963
no. 2
12.
to 1965, there
(Summer
1973), 222-38.
Because of
its
role in the
Anglo-American
tradition, Equality
was
Anglo-American
his-
discursively suited to regulate this type of conflict. In
has generally, although not always or necessarily, served as a

"regulative ideograph, balancing among other more ^substantive ideographs.
See Michael Calvin McGee, "An Essay on the Flip Side of Privacy," Argument
tory, Equality
Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed.

and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech
Communication Association, 1983), pp. 105-15. While the Right to Life was
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution's "Bill of Rights" (Fifth Amendment),
Equality was not recognized as a basic human right until the Fourteenth
Amendment passed in 1868. Even then, it guaranteed only "equal protection
of the laws," not substantive Equality. Therefore, in the Constitution, and in
the broad American tradition, Equality was a means to protect other substantive rights (specifically Life, Liberty, and Property). Equality or identity of
interests and treatments has not generally been seen as an important end in
itself. Indeed, in a discourse community that values "individuals," such
identity is often vigorously denounced. However, Equality has been necessary to balance two other end values Justice and Property rights. Absolute
an absolute generalizability
Justice would require exact identity of treatment
of all rights. The concept of unique, non-generalizable Property rights, howin Transition: Proceedings of the Third
David Zarefsky, Malcolm O.
Sillars,
with such a concept. Equality of opportunity, or of

The regulative term
Equality was peculiarly appropriate as a mediator in the early abortion conflict
because of its extraordinary salience and its fit with the contradictions in the
ever, inherently conflicts
political right, is cited to regulate the resulting disputes.
tale of illegal abortion.
Kenneth
L. Karst,
"Why Equality Matters,"
Georgia
Law
Review 17, no. 2 (Winter 1983), 245-89.

13. An example of the non-serious attention given to the feminist argument is available in John Bartlow Martin, Saturday Evening Post, 20 May 1961,
pp. 19 21ff. Martin includes, in the same sentence, the statement that "no one
76
Life, Equality,
and Choice
has proposed to repeal the abortion laws outright" and that feminists "assert
the right of a woman to decide whether to continue a pregnancy." The poor
coverage of the feminists represents a distinct ideological bias of the press in
contrast to their frequent citation of reform physicians
church
14.
and anti-abortion
officials.
Lader, Abortion
II,
pp. 166-67.
See note 7 and Lawrence Lader, "Guide to Abortion Laws in the

United States," Redbook, June 1971, pp. 51-58.
16. "Supreme Court and Abortion," America, 1 May 1971, p. 433; "Abortion
15.
Newsweek, 3 May 1971, p. 115.

There was still overwhelming Catholic participation, but there had
been a conscious attempt to de-Catholicize the movement. See Fred C.
Shapiro, "Right to Life Has a Message for New York State Legislators," New
York Times Magazine, 20 August 1972, pp. 10-11. An interview with a Right-toBattle,"
17.
Life official set 1970 as the date of secularization (p. 34).
By the
eighties the
support of the fundamentalist religions had clearly established the movement

as religious, but non-denominational.
18. Lader, Abortion II, pp. 194-200. Jimmye Kimmey, executive director of
the Association for the Study of Abortion, made this claim, cited in Lawrence
Massett, "Abortion Legislation:
Fundamental Challenge,"
Science
News, 17
"Veto for Abortion, Maryland," Newsweek, 8 June 1979,

pp. 51-52. Another way to describe the reversion is as a normal stage in a
social change process in which two sides are roughly balanced. The side that
January 1979, pp.
75;
first enjoys a temporary advantage, but once the opposition responds, territory may be traded repeatedly.
19. Letter to the editor, America, 21 February 1976, p. 141.
20. R. M. Byrn, "Confronting Objections to an Anti- Abortion Amendment," America, 19 June 1976, p. 529.
21. Hyde was addressing the funding issue specifically. See "New Limits
on Abortion," Time, 19 December 1977, p. 12.
22. "Abortion and the Law," America, 25 March 1961, p. 811; Robert M.
Byrn, "The Future of America," America, 9 December 1967, p. 712; "Desperate
Dilemma of Abortion," Time, 13 October 1967, pp. 32-33; Andre E. Hellegers,
"Law and the Common Good," Commonweal, 30 June 1967, pp. 418ff.
23. For example, Petchesky, Harrison.
24. This conflict concretely exemplifies the tension between feminism and
socialism. See Michelle Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist
Feminist Analysis (1980; rpt. London: Verson, 1985).
25. It has been suggested to me that the term reproductive freedom was more
organizes
"women's movement." In part, this depends on

movement. My focus here is on the voices
in the public controversy. The term reproductive freedom was developed by
activist and academic feminists, working largely outside the public arena,
who, on greater theoretical reflection, noted two things. First, that the Right
to Choose abortion was intimately tied in with other procreative rights.
"Reproductive freedom" encompassed these other rights and did so in a way
original
and
who we
define as constituting that
central to the
77
focus of
make the more controversial issue of abortion the rhetorical

women's agenda. Second, that the women who first articulated the
demand
for abortion
less likely to
sufficient.
The
tended
fact that
to
these
be middle class and, hence, economically
women were
rights (because of their greater access to the
the
first articulators
mechanisms
self-
of abortion
of articulation in the
system) has tended to frame the issue as one of political rights rather
than economics. These women had less need for the economic support so
crucial to other women and therefore tended not to articulate this component
of women's needs. We should be careful to separate, however, the stories and
lives of "ordinary" women from the theoretical reflections of academics and
the more intensely developed discourse worlds of activists. Active feminists
will have a different "recollection" of what the path of the abortion controversy was like, because their recollections are shaped by discourse arenas
other than the public space.
26. For example, James Reed, From Private Vice to Public Virtue (New York:
social
Basic Books, 1978), pp. 99-100, 110, 120, and Linda Gordon, Woman's Body,
Women's Right (New York: Grossman, 1976), pp. 39-45; Petchesky, p. 171.
27.
Susan M. Scrimshaw,
"Women and the
Family Planning Perspectives 13, no. 6
Pill:
From Panacea
(November/December
to Catalyst,"
1981), 254-62.
28. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Disclosures on Life and

Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Andrea Dworkin,
Right-Wing Women (New York: Coward-McCann, 1983).
29. No definitive arguments can be made about the relative safety of
abortion before the period of hygienic surgery. However, claims that abortion
has always been safe seem to fly in the face of the apparent morbidity of illegal
abortion in the mid-twentieth century.
believe that the claim that safe
abortion techniques have always been available
is
relatively true
if
we consider
the higher morbidity associated with childbearing in earlier periods, but not
comparison
medical standards. See Harrison, chapter 6.

for "equal pay for equal work" can be
viewed either as a regulative ideal or as a substantive one. It does not promise
the substance of pay or a job, but only that if those things are given, then
equal pay should be provided. In a reasonably full-employment economy,
true in
to current
30. Gallup, pp. 322, 1240.
that
would mean
The claim
a substantive payoff.
The debate over "comparable worth"

is in need of clarification for that
suggests that the term "for equal work"

substantive ideal to be achieved.
31.
32.
Gallup, pp. 861-62, 837.

Gallup, pp. 67, 548, 1315, 2189, 2319.
33. Gallup,
Gallup, Public Opinion 1972-1977
39; George H.
p.
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1978), p. 702.
34. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, "Antiabortion, Antifeminism, and the Rise
of the New Right," Feminist Studies 7 (Summer 1981), 233-34.
1935-1971, pp. 43, 524.

Gallup, 1935-1971, pp. 2168-69; Gallup, 1978, p. 268.
37. James W. Prescott and Douglas Wallace, "Abortion and the Right to
35. Gallup,
36.
Life,"
Humanist, July-August 1978,
p.
24; Ellen Willis, "Abortion Backlash:
78
Life, Equality,
Women
38.
Lose," Rolling Stone, 3
and Choice
November
1977,
p. 65.
Gloria Steinem, "Update: Abortion Alert/' Ms.,
November
1977, p.
118.
39. Norma Rosen, "Between Guilt and Gratification: Abortion Doctors
Reveal Their Feelings," New York Times Magazine, 17 April 1977, p. 71;
Steinem, "Update," p. 188.
40. "They Made the Choice," Newsweek, 5 June 1978, p. 40.
41. Linda Birde Francke, quoted by Elaine Fein, "The Facts About Abor-
tion," Harper's Bazaar,
May
1980, p. 76; Willis, p. 66.
CHAPTER
FIVE
Constructing Visions
of the Fetus and Freedom
Rhetoric and Image
The pictures a baby-like fetus, a smiling fetus, a fetus that sucks its
thumb. Butchered fetuses bloody mounds of human tissue, hacked
arms, mangled legs, crushed skulls. Without these compelling and
brutal photographs the American abortion controversy probably
would not continue. But the photographs have been widely dissemi-
nated throughout the country passed through church pews, tucked

under windshield wipers, flashed on screens in public meetings.
Moreover, the photographs and films have gained such public presence precisely because the fetus has an important substantiality that
can be photographed. The meaning constructed from those pictures
and that substance was not, however, a simple matter of natural fact.
The complex rhetorical tactics that generated a meaningful image of
the fetus also generated complex social impacts.
The Power of the Pro-Life Images

The first task is to establish that these fetal pictures are persuasive. For
some readers this may seem rather obvious a "merely academic"
argument but scholars and activists alike have argued that these
pictures are not convincing. Kristen Luker provides the most impor-
tant dismissal of their impact, claiming that "our interviews show that
with rare exceptions these presentations, including the slide shows,
were persuasive only to people who had sought them out because
they were already troubled or concerned about abortion." 1 There are
several responses to this claim, based as it is on an overly simplistic
model
of public persuasion.
Consider
first
that
Luker did a
79
relatively small
number
of inter-
80
views
(212).
The
fact that there were rare exceptions,
even within
this
important. Advertisers have learned that their ability

to persuade only a small percentage of their audience can make them
millions of dollars. Similarly, political contests are often won and lost
small sample,
is
over a percentage point or two. In mass persuasion, "rare" success in

bringing about absolute change of opinion is the norm, but it is
frequently sufficient.
More important, perhaps, Luker's interviews were of activists,
the group most likely to be unaffected by such persuasion. Pro-choice
advocates have a well-developed ideology to protect themselves from

the force of these images. According to Luker's definition, pro-Life
activists cannot be persuaded because they are "already 'primed" for
7
The far more numerous uncommitted persons whom

Luker did not interview are more likely to be swayed by potent
images. Moreover, even the dismissal of the claim that pro-Life activists were persuaded is inappropriate. Although such persuasion does
not change pro-Life advocates and supporters from a completely
hostile to a supportive position, it does justify, integrate, and activate
their beliefs. The images intensify commitment, motivate the believers to work for the cause, and give them reason to believe that they
can persuade others. When pro-Life rhetors talk about why they
believe as they do, the role of the photographs and films becomes
quite clear. Without these pictures, pro-Life advocates would have
only an abstract argument about the importance of chromosomes in
determining human life or a religious argument about the "soul," and
the message.
neither of those options could sustain the righteous
fire of
the public
movement.
My own
experience in attending
many
these images confirms that the pictures do
members
public presentations of
move some uncommitted
of audiences. Certainly, there is a fairly wide range of

responses from viewers. Some young people just moan, "Oh, gross,"
and turn away from the images, shutting them out. Others question
their authenticity. A few actively deconstruct the images, building a
cognitive defense against them.
A substantial group of people, however, sit quietly, visibly stunned
by what they have seen. In lobbies and coffeehouses they speak in
subdued voices about what these images must mean. The impact
muffles the certainty of those with pro-Choice leanings and increases
the uncertainty of those who are ambivalent, making them even more
concerned about the inadequacy of unilateral "pro-Choice" or "proLife" positions.
Rhetoric and Image
Images
in
81
Public Persuasion
and the responses to them are dismissed as

duping,
inappropriate to responsible public arguan
ment. However, that critique misinterprets the role of visual images in
public argument. Images may either replace narratives or summarize
narratives visually (the pro-life images did the former, the pro-Choice
images, the latter). Like narratives, visual images provide concrete
enactments of abstract values and thereby allow a different kind of
understanding of the meaning and impact of an ideographic claim
about public life. They help "envision" the material impacts of abstract
policy commitments. Images therefore provide a useful form of
grounding for the acceptance of an argument. They, like any other
form of argument, however, are subject to analysis of the accuracy of
the claims they make.
Visual forms of persuasion present special problems of analysis.
Visual images seduce our attention and demand our assent in a
peculiar and gripping fashion. Many audiences are leery of verbal
constructions, which only "represent" reality, but because we humans
tend to trust our own senses, we take what we see to be true. Therefore, our trust in what we see gives visual images particular rhetorical
Frequently, such pictures

unfair irrational
potency.
More
"sophisticated" audiences, of course, have learned that pic-
that cameras and motion pictures systematically

world in transferring it to the photograph or film.
This allows a small space for the rhetorical. There is, however, a
larger, more thoroughly concealed space for rhetoric in the presentation of images. It is in the translation of visual images into verbal
meanings that the rhetoric of images operates most powerfully.
Because visual images are inexplicit (one picture is potentially a
thousand different words), an image can function in an argument only
if its meaning is actively focused. This focusing is accomplished
through the classic means of "figures of speech" rhetorical tropes
(e.g., ""metaphor, ^synecdoche, and ""hyperbole). As the ancient Greek
tures regularly
lie,
distort the material
rhetoricians recognized, the operation of these rhetorical tropes has a
powerful poetic dimension that makes it difficult for audiences to

decode carefully the arguments they are receiving. 2 The speed, aesthetic appeal, and audience participation necessary to the production
and understanding of tropes grant skilled speakers a special power to
enchant audiences into accepting a rhetor's visual argument uncritically. Because arguments based on images are completely depen-
82
dent on tropes, they are open to the dual possibility of persuasive

potency and argumentative inaccuracy.
Pro-Life rhetors made extensive figurative use of photographs to
construct an image of "the fetus" that
protection of fetuses as
human
would authorize the
legal
babies. In the early period of the
controversy advocates brought pickled fetuses in jars to legislative

hearings. In the middle period packets of photographs presented the
image. In the later period the photographs were more widely dissemi-
nated in mass media and on billboards and joined by films, such as

The Silent Scream and Eclipse of Reason, as well as by thousands of lapel
pins sporting tiny feet.
The impact of these images has been twofold. On the one hand,
the pictures were widely persuasive in the popular realm. They account,
believe, for the public fervor of the pro-Life activists, for the
timidity of liberal Congressional representatives,
and
for the rarity of
pro-Choice arguments directed at denying the Right to Life of a fetus.

On the other hand, they were also argumentatively imprecise; they
did not fully prove the claims of the pro-Life advocates. Consequently,
the legal system, attuned to deductive argument, rejected their claims
at the same time that the public force grew. This bifurcated impact of
the pro-Life images can be established and explained by examining
the operation of the basic tropes that translated these visual images
into public arguments.
Metonymy
The persuasiveness of the pro-Life pictures, films, and pins arose first
from a metonymic reduction. Metonymy is the figure of speech in
which a technical, precise, or denotative name for some class of things
is replaced by a different name that stresses a quality, attribute, or
connotative image (e.g., instead of the "territory of the United States"
one might refer to the "land under the striped flag of freedom"). In
metonymic translations of visual images into verbal statements there
is, of course, no precise name for the complex chaos of the visual
image. Therefore, the process is necessarily one of reduction the
creation of a simple label or name for a whole entity from visible
attributes or associations. In the abortion case the wide variety of
beings that constitute developing unborn human life-forms the
blastocyst, embryo, fetus, viable baby were reduced to a single
through the creation of a single vision of the "unborn baby."

examination of the available public images indicates that a
unified image of the fetus as an "unborn baby" was constructed for
entity
An
Rhetoric and Image
83
public understanding primarily by widespread dissemination of pictures of a fetus in the third or late second trimester. In the pictures the
was largely independent of its placenta and umbilical cord. The

photographs featured no blood or placental tissue to turn stomachs
queasy, and they focused on head and feet, for reasons which will
become more clear. This image of the fetus was projected through a
relatively sparse collection of photographs (perhaps a half dozen or so
were repeatedly reused). A beautiful picture of a nineteen-week fetus
was the most widely disseminated version. 3 When pictures of
younger fetuses appeared, they were either prominently labeled
"baby," surrounded by older fetuses and by babies, or accompanied
by text that attributed baby-like features to them (e.g., thumb-suckfetus
ing, heartbeat, brain activity).
The metonymic reduction of the wide variety of developing human

forms into a single entity "the fetus as an unborn baby" was a
crucial rhetorical move. Instead of producing a clear, static image,
multiple images of blastocyst/embryo/fetus at different stages would
have emphasized development as a process. The pro-Life rhetors,
however, wanted the American public to respond to the fetus as if it
were one single distinct entity a human baby; therefore, they
worked to generate a single image of the fetus.
Even if developing humans at all stages were reduced to a single
rhetorical image, the meaning conveyed by that image would not
have been sufficient to support the pro-Life persuasive claim unless it
was also metaphorically interpreted as essentially identical with a full
human being.
This layer of meaning was added metaphorically.
Metaphor
The metaphor is the most basic of tropes because it is founded on the
most basic of logics. It defines an identity: "A is B" (or "see A as B").
Pictures and films, at the most fundamental level, make a metaphoric
assertion: "This
group
of lines
is
me at my graduation," we
and
say,
proudly displaying a
we automatically metaphorize
make larger metaphoric leaps in
squiggles. Because
in interpreting pictures,
it is
easy to
employment of pictures in arguments. The pro-Life images that

functioned by means of such metaphors included "The fetus IS a
human" and its corollary, "Abortion IS murder." However, these metaphors, drawn from the pictures of the nineteen-week-old fetus and
of the body parts of aborted fetuses, did not function through a
simple artless presentation. The pro-Life rhetors employed the rhetorical tactics of ^selection, ^continuity, and ""commentary to focus
the
their
meaning.
5^
O
O
>
WD
en
v-
05
85
Rhetoric and Image
made potent the most important visual trope for

argument that the fetus IS a human being. In order to
defend the single image of the fetus as equivalent to "a human being,"
later-term fetuses were most prevalent. A two-week-old fetus does
not look like a human being and so could not be used as the center of a
visual argument. The visual metaphor can reveal only visual qualities,
not intellect, chromosome content, creativity, or "potential" of any
kind. If we were to show naive viewers pictures of two-week-old
fetuses and similarly aged fetal monkeys, they would not know the
difference. The visual argument, therefore, is utterly dependent on a
highly rhetorical * selection. Not only was a single image of "the fetus"
generated, but that image was carefully selected to maximize the
similarities between "fetus" and "human being."
These selections were so crucial to the visual rhetoric that without
them, the pro-Life visual argument could not have been made; noneCareful selection
the pro-Life
theless, the principle of selection
does not provide a complete
ac-
was also crucial for the visual rhetoric of abortion, and

"continuity was one of its most important elements. 4 In the relatively
rare instances where two-week fetuses were presented, for example,
they were generally preceded by a series of later-term fetuses. ProLife rhetors consciously specified that slide shows should start with a
baby and work backward in development to establish the continuity
of the life forms. Only in this way could the indistinguishable embryo
be "seen" as a human.
The response to the image of the fetus also depended on a cultural
count. Context
context. Americans, like
many
human
groups, have learned to

be relatively flexible readers of images. Even our children's dolls the
"Cabbage Patch Kids," for example have taught us to read "humanity" or "personality" into a broad range of images. In a culture where
even the bright look in a dog's eye can be interpreted as "personality,"
it is not surprising that the public was able to read fetal pictures as
human beings. Our code for what is visually human is very broad.
Skillful selection and contextualization were vital influences on the
creation of this rhetorical image of "the fetus," but the most important
influence was simply that of verbal commentary. Without verbal commentary, pictures DO NOT ARGUE propositions. An image may
suggest "this looks like x," but the assertion of identity, that "this IS
x," must be verbally supplied. In terms of argument theory, a picture
provides the substance for a ground, but the precise ground must be
made verbally explicit and a claim must be supplied for the rhetor to
control the process of inference. It is not surprising, therefore, that a
great variety of commentary surrounded the presentation of the imother
86
age of the
fetus.
One popular picture's label indicated that "when they
between a woman and her doctor

they're forgetting someone/' Another said "living 14-week unborn
tell
you
that abortion
is
a matter just
womb," another "intra-uterine battered child," another

done on this baby at 10 weeks." 5 The image was
almost always explicitly labeled as a "baby." This repeated naming was
child in the
"suction abortion
crucial, gradually or swiftly
"fetus"
strengthening the public association of
with "baby."
Such captions were the most
routine:
that labels a fetal picture a "baby."
greater tool
More
it is
not a subtle rhetorical art

rhetors used an even
skillful
"identification" to encourage audiences to see the

6
"human" but as the same as one's self. One caption,

example, informed its viewer that "this is what your feet looked
like when you were only 10 weeks old. Perfectly formed? Yes! You
even had fingerprints then." Another caption on a fourth-month fetus
read, "Your face took on facial expressions similar to, yet distinct from
those of your parents and of your grandparents .... You squirmed or
fluttered about
you grew and grew until you became half as tall as
you would be at birth." Personification here worked most effectively.
The fetus was not only a person; it was you.
fetus not only as
for
The meaning
of even the least human-looking pictures was conthrough artful labeling. A greatly magnified cluster of cells at
week one was named the "ball of life"; a two-week-old, in a picture
that resembled the surface of the moon, was labeled "the new individual 'nesting' in the soft lining of the womb"; and an eleven-week fetus
in an alien-looking placenta was compared to an "astronaut." Thus,
once the image had been established, in the right context, with
continuity and powerful commentary, even a visually dissimilar image could become part of the image of "the fetus as unborn baby."
The most stunning example of the force of commentary, however,
trolled
came
in the film version, The Silent Scream. This highly controversial
attacked and defended on national television claimed to include a real-time "sound picture" of the abortion of a twelve-week-old
fetus. Pro-Choice advocates made many criticisms of the accuracy of
the film, but the most important group of comments all centered on
the fact that, although the pro-Life movement touted the images of
the film as most convincing, the commentary of the film really made
the argument.
Most basically, the ultrasound image is so vague that without
commentary many viewers would not have had the faintest idea what
they were watching (as has been the case in my classes where I have
film
shown students
just the ultrasound image,
without the sound or
87
Rhetoric and Image
prior commentary).
Moreover, even
It is
when
often very hard to see the fetus in this image.
the wispy "clouds
on
a radar screen" can be
visualized as a fetus, the fetus does not appear as dramatically
human. The resolution of the image is simply too poor to make a

forceful argument in itself.
The commentary, however, artfully tells the viewer what to see.
Before the abortion begins, the narrator, Dr. Bernard Nathanson,
instructs the audience in the proper emotional reaction to the film.
He
recounts the story of an attending physician and assistant who, after

seeing the ultrasound, refused to perform abortions again. The audience is thereby provided credible models who suggest the film is
convincing and that they too should be shocked at the death they will
soon see. Having been helped to feel, the auditors are next helped to
see. Nathanson holds up a series of model dolls to help them visualize
what the fetus looks like. He holds one of these against the ultrasound
screen and traces the outline of the fetus in comparison so that
viewers can "see" the fetus. As the abortion begins, Nathanson repeatedly tells the audience what the fetus is "doing." He uses terms
saying, for example,
that assume feeling and intelligence in the fetus
that the "child definitely feels its sanctuary is being invaded" or that
the
"it senses mortal danger." As the abortion is performed, we
audience may have flashes in which we can actually see the shape of
the fetus, primarily through context and continuity that is, the
three-dimensional movement allows us greater perception. But we
cannot tell what is really happening; we only know that there is a lot
more movement once the abortion begins (allegedly, the film is
changed from slow time to real time). Nathanson, however, continually instructs us in what is happening and points out the abortion
instruments on the screen. In the end, we are even given a demonstration of the use of forceps to "crush the skull, "since the ultrasound
does not depict that element of this abortion.

Simply stated, if The Silent Scream had really been silent, it would
have had no rhetorical impact. The majority of audiences could not
have interpreted the film on their own, let alone read it as the violent
human baby. Once the commentary is provided,

we almost unavoidably experience the full emotional impact
of what we have "seen."
murder
of a small
however,
Visual images work metaphorically, but the production of those

metaphors is dependent on the verbal rhetoric which explicitly classifies components of the image. "Clouds" on an ultrasound become a
"fetus," and we suffer with the fetus as we are told that what we watch
is
human
death struggle. Less extremely,
we
see pictures of a
88
nineteen-week fetus and are told that this means that "a fetus is a
human person from conception." Our eyes indeed do not lie, but they
also do not construct precise claim-bearing meanings without the
words that provide interpretations.
Synecdoche
Through metonymy the pro-Life images produced a singular "fetus"

and through metaphor persuaded Americans to see this fetus as a
human baby. The third visual trope that constructed rhetorical images the synecdoche strengthened this connection, ironically by
using even more incomplete visual information. Synecdoches encourage us to substitute the image of the part of an item for the whole of
another, concluding that PART A = A = B. The more the rhetoric of a
visual image must use partial similarities to claim "identity." the more
will
synecdoche be a useful device.
One of the most popular images
movement was that

between two adult
fingers. The image appeared thousands of times in slide programs, on
posters at rallies, and most recently on lapel pins. This image functioned to charm audiences even more fully than did the picture of the
nineteen- week fetus. Many viewers responded to pictures of the fetal
feet with loving "oohs" and "aahs." How could feet captivate and
of the pro-Life
of the feet of a ten-week-old fetus, held gently
mean
so much?
This image was most persuasive because of
ture.
An
accurate, full
associated with adult
picture of a
human
young
beings
its
synecdochic struc-
fetus includes features not
the placenta and the umbilical

Photo and caption from
Willke, Abortion Questions
Answers, Hayes Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio.
&
Used with permission.
This is what your feet looked like when you

were only 10 weeks old. Perfectly formed? Yes!
You even had fingerprints then.
Rhetoric and Image
89
six- week fetus, even a "tail." With these and its unand head, off-balance and poorly formed, a young fetus
looks like a wretched creature, bloody and undernourished. Such
"negatives" and "variances" weigh heavily against the "A is B" formulation. Fetal feet, however, are very close to baby feet in shape. The
cord and, in a
gainly face
identity of the part
human
is crucial.
Our
visual logic "recognizes" such feet
and we synecdochically expand the unseen

picture to see a full "small human." Thus, the synecdoche tightened
the identity between fetus and adult by eliminating all those components that reveal the differences between the two, focusing on one
as "small
feet"
stunning similarity.
The same synecdochic technique was evident in the less frequently
used picture of the face of a fetus with one eye partially open. It
functioned most powerfully, as well, in the images of butchered
single,
These pictures featured the recognizable arms and legs of

pile of blood and tissue. Audiences could, synecdochically, reconstruct from this visual evidence the death-through-
fetuses.
fetuses
amid a
dismemberment
of a
human
being.
synecdoche was also employed more subtly in the most

widely disseminated pro-Life pictures. The image of the nineteenweek old fetus mass-distributed in national magazines did not reveal
the non-human features of the fetus. The picture was cropped to cut
Finally,
off the
lower portion of the fetus,
its
and its
more complete pic-
umbilical cord, placenta,
distorted torso. Notably, this image, not other
tures, was chosen for mass distribution in the early period, when the
meaning of the fetus was first being established. Thus, the pro-Life
image of the fetus relied heavily on the constructive capabilities of the
synecdoche to erase differences and feature similarities, tightening
the claim that "the fetus
is
human
person."
Other Tropes and Their Logic

The images featured by the pro-Life activists also functioned rhetorically by means of other tropes. Abortion was compared to euthanasia,
infanticide, and the end of the entire human race. Similarly, pictures
of slaves and of wagons of slaughtered Jewish prisoners from concentration camps were paired with photographs of slaughtered
fetuses. The comparisons were striking, relying on metonymic association: "a society that does not care for one form of human life does
not care for others." Replace "Jews" with "pre-born babies" and audiences could "see" the holocaust being replayed, even to the gaunt
limbs and deformity of the human shape entailed by death. In con-
90
trast,
the
metonymy which compared
as a visual rhetorical image.
fetuses to slaves in cages failed
The placenta
is
hardly a cage, and the
slaves chained together generally lived, at least a while.
Although
"emancipation" and "freedom" of the slaves made a good verbal

comparison, the visual elements were not strong enough to make the
metonymy-by-image effective.
The pro-Life rhetoric also employed the trope "hyperbole" overstatement to great force. The images of fetuses, sometimes in "real"
dimensions only one-half inch, two inches, or even five inches
long were magnified on slides to hundreds of times their real size,
giving the fetus an enormous "presence" that granted it greater "substance" than it actually has. Very immature fetuses were, in this
manner, visually equated with babies by being magnified to the size
and substantiality of babies.
Many visual tropes thus delicately constructed the meanings of the
pro-Life images. Ultimately, each of the tropes that translated a visual
image into a verbal claim functioned on
a tropic logic,
whose
roots are
all other logics, resting on substitution, association,

and amplification. We are left, then, with a very logical question
complex mathematics in non-numerical form: what is the substance of
the visual argument presented by the "image of the fetus" and what is
very similar to
the remainder?
image of
nineteen-week fetus
used by pro-Life rhetors,
this photo shows the prodIn contrast to the
the
ucts of conception at eight
menstrual weeks' gestation (weight 16 grams).
The drawing
of the
em-
bryo indicates its approximate appearance and size.

Photo 1989 by Warren
Martin Hern
lira
Rhetoric and Image
As
indicated at the outset,
91
believe that the pictures argue
of the fetus. The piles of tissue,

and arms, state directly to me that this creature has substance
like me. It engages my empathy. The awesome photograph of
forcefully for the substance
and value
the legs
and
is
the twenty-four-week-old fetus
tells
me
that this
is
a creature that
should be preserved. The troubling film of an eight- week-old fetus

responding repeatedly to the prick of a pin tells me that there is life
there. The proof of the substance of the fetus and its similarity to
myself is strong. It should be included in any final evaluation of
Appendix A).
The analysis of tropes also suggests that the pro-Life rhetoric works
hard to obscure the differences between me and these developing,
incomplete human forms. And this factor must also be included in
any final evaluation of abortion. Ultimately, if I sift out the particular
abortion (see
rhetorical tactics of the pro-Life rhetors
their overstatement via

and look
the
metonymies, metaphors, and synecdoches

tures of fetuses, in
major
differences as
all
their completeness,
well as
similarities.
at all
pic-
recognize that there are
know, therefore,
that a fetus
has substantial value and that a fetus is not, at all stages, substantially
the same as me. This creature shares my identity far more at twentyfour weeks than at eight or two. And so, at least on the basis of the
visual evidence which constitutes the mainstay of this pro-Life persuasion,
realize that
humanity
is
indeed something a fetus grows
into only gradually.
conclude, therefore, that the pro-Life pictures bring us a weighty

grounds and that those grounds substantiate the claim that
fetuses are important and valuable and ought to be protected whenever it is possible to do so without treading on greater values. HowI
set of
ever,
also conclude that the pro-Life rhetoric attempts to construct a
singular image that
identifies this
fetuses with that of a full
grounds
that
is
value for
human
baby.
a false construction;
by
all
blastocysts/embryos/
On
their
the pro-Lifers'
own
own
criterion (ap-
pearance), stages matter. Hence, abortion should be viewed as a dif-
weeks than at twenty-four (for other criticism see

Appendix A, "A Right to Life?"). The pro-Life image of the fetus thus
offered the American public powerful persuasion, argumentative substance, and overstatement.
The dualistic limitations and substance of the pro-Life rhetoric of
image are perhaps most powerfully summed up in their most technically advanced film, The Eclipse of Reason. The film uses laproscopy
ferent matter at four
to allow its audiences to
in utero.
It
later
view various parts of a second-trimester fetus

of bloody fetal tissue
this same
shows chunks
92
being ripped from between the legs
of a woman. The impact of

but
the
film
ultimately cannot knit those
these images is substantial,
two images fully into one vivid picture of the killing of a human-like
fetus
profound visual metaphor when the substantiality of the

fetal dependence on her for survival separate
the synecdochic images of the human-like creature growing inside her
from the mounds of tissue, dead, outside.
being.
It is
woman's body and the
Images of Freedom
The
pro-Life rhetors' considerable persuasive success in constructing
human being, who should be

protected by a law banning abortions, was not matched by the three
major images used by the pro-Choice rhetors, largely because the prothe image of the fetus as a complete
Choice images merely summarized arguments, rather than grounding

them. The pro-Choice images recalled or made vivid the narrative of
illegal abortion but generally did not add any additional argumentative grounds of their own. Their persuasive force rested on their
ability to speak the narrative of illegal abortion in abbreviated form
where the longer narrative could not be told (for example, on posters).
A coat hanger, often dripping blood, may have been the image
most universally employed by pro-Choice advocates. This "summarizing image represented the horrid means and consequences of the
illegal abortions that occur when legal abortion is banned. The image
had limited persuasive impacts, primarily because the hanger even
with its drops of blood was not, of itself, a tremendously moving
The coat hanger provided the

most frequently used visual
image in the pro-Choice movement.
Rhetoric and Image
93
Although the sketches of blood might have carried

was far weaker than the photographic
images of bloody mangled fetuses.
The persuasive impact of the hanger image rested elsewhere. It
reminded the audience of what it already knew, repeating the argument rather than adding to it. For the coat hanger to move an audience against abortion, the audience must have already been told the
complex narrative of illegal abortion. The summarizing image therefore worked for a narrow audience of the already committed.
A second pro-Choice image that attempted to use the force of
visual representation pictured a dead woman, sprawled naked, face
down on the floor in a stark room, her legs spread open on a pool of
blood. Occasionally distributed, the picture appeared in Ms. magazine and on a few pamphlets; I have never seen a slide projection of it
at a public lecture. Although the picture could generate strong emotional repulsion
perhaps stronger than the pictures of massacred
fetuses it shared the weaknesses of the coat-hanger image. The
rhetorical point of the picture depended on an extensive narrative
indicating why the woman was there, the victim of a back-alley
abortion. If the audience did not come with a complete understanding
of the story of illegal abortion, the ragged emotional force of the
image may not have functioned to the intended end. As a narrative
depiction, it lacked the strong metaphorical character that would have
allowed the woman in the picture to be concisely characterized. Moreover, because of the complexity of the relationship between the picture and its grounds, the repulsiveness of the picture could be easily
redirected against the woman herself. Audience members could define their repugnance at the picture as being the fault of the woman,
rather than of the laws. She could be placed as one who "deserved"
what she got, whereas no one could blame the fetus. This second proChoice image again provided no new argument of its own, and it was
likely to carry persuasive force only for those who were already
convinced of the basic soundness of the argument.
The last popular image of the pro-Choice movement worked differently and may have carried some force for non-activists. It was a
visual depiction.
some
repulsive force, even that
symbolic characterization the presentation of the Statue of Liberty. A

pro-Choice pamphlet read, "There are no pictures in this pamphlet,
because you can't take a picture of liberty." Although there was no
"picture" of Liberty, the Statue of Liberty filled in as a potent symbol
and was displayed on a large quantity of pro-Choice literature. The
as a woman, a symbol of the downtrodden, and a symbol of

Freedom, Liberty, and homeembodied the ideal American represtatue
94
sentation of Choice or Reproductive Freedom. The symbol did not

carry the force of the "seeing is believing" variety, as would a pictorial
image, but it replaced that veracity with the force garnered from a
powerful cultural icon. Through this association, the pro-Choice

movement gained its strongest visual image. The image may even
have added some indirect argumentative grounds. By associating the
pro-Choice cause with a widely celebrated icon, it suggested that
women, too, should enjoy the Liberty to which most audience members believe themselves to be committed. Further, the symbol required little explanation; hence, its simple association of Freedom of
Choice with American values probably carried some weight, even if
that weight was more diffuse than the immediate sensory force of the
pro-Life image.
Conclusions
American abortion controversy the pro-Life images were more powerfully persuasive than the pro-Choice images.
That persuasive power derived ultimately from the real material substance of unborn human beings as well as from the rhetors skill with
tropes. Persuasive force and argumentative probity must be distinguished from each other because they each had a different impact
In the contemporary
on the development of the public meanings of "abortion." The persuasive force of the image of the fetus, towering over the meager proChoice images, would powerfully influence the popular consciousness, eventually establishing elements of the pro-Life vocabulary deeply within popular culture
and within the
lives of polarized
subcultures (see chapters 7 and 8). Ultimately, for some, it would

justify the move to violence. In the meantime, however, the legal field
would be vitally important, and legal tribunals were most influenced
by the argumentative dimensions of the discourse. In the arguments

before the Supreme Court, the argumentative weaknesses of the
major pro-Life persuasive grounds would be determinative for American law.
NOTES
1.
Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1984), p. 150.

2.
See Jacqueline de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric
in
Ancient Greece (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), and, for example, Aristotle's Rhetoric
and Poetics. The inter-relationships he draws between these two forms of
Rhetoric and Image
95
discourse are often interesting. See also Cicero's De Oratore or Quintilian's

is also found in Denise M. Bostdorff,
Burkean Approach to the Form and Attitude
of Political Cartoons," Quarterly journal of Speech 73, no. 1 (February 1987), 4359; however, I formulated this version of the approach independently in two
versions of an earlier paper: "The Image of the Fetus: Lessons in the Rhetoric
of Visual Text," presented at the Central States Speech Association conference, April 1986, and at the Speech Communication Association Seminar
on Televised Text and Rhetorical Analysis, Denver, November 7, 1985.
3. The version of the image I have included is a black-and-white photograph of a billboard bearing the picture (taken by Loren Bruce Railsback).
Another version of the image was published in a full-page advertisement in
Institutes.
This tropal theory of images
"Making Light
of
James Watt:
Time, 16 January 1984, p. 56.

4.
Martha Solomon, "Redemptive Rhetoric: The Continuity Motif
in the
Rhetoric of Right to Life," Central States Speech Journal 31 (1980), 52-62.

5. Pamphlets include Life or Death (Hayes Publishing Company, 6304
Hamilton Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio 45224); Gary Bergel, When You Were Formed in
Secret (1984; Intercessors for America, P.O. Box 1289, Elyria, Ohio 44036); John
Lippis, The Challenge to Be "Pro-Life" (1982; National Right to Life Educational
Trust Fund, 419 7th Street N.W., Suite 402, Washington, D.C. 20004); "Abortion:
Box
Attitudes for Action," The Last Days
7,
no. 5 (Last
Days
Ministries, P.O.
40, Lindale, Texas); Life Cycle, special school ed. (1984; National Right to
Life Educational Trust Fund);
Company.
6. Kenneth Burke,
and other
"Identification," in
materials from
Hayes Publishing
Rhetoric of Motives (1950; rpt.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 19-29.
CHAPTER
SIX
Enacting "Choice"
Public Rhetoric and the Law
new
1973-85
women's interests in
waged-labor, childbearing, and abortion had developed through
public argumentation. New values, narratives, and images had been
given presence before the American populace. Simultaneously, opponents of this new vocabulary had elaborated and amplified a set of
competing terms in order to preserve traditional values and power
By 1973
public vocabulary articulating
arrangements.
Once such competing vocabularies are developed, advocates frequently move the discussion into the domain of the law in order to
place the coercive power of the state behind their vocabularies and,
hence, their interests. State legislatures across the nation had haphazardly begun the formal process of adjudicating between the vocabularies of Choice and Life to produce a legitimated set of terms by which
public action would be guided. Whenever competing fundamental
interests extend to constitutional values, however, they almost inevitably
come before
the nation's highest judicial authority.
v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton

brought the abortion issue before the Supreme Court of the United
States of America. 1 The Court's decision then embroiled the national
Congress directly in the public negotiation process. In these two legal
arenas, the public meaning of Choice was dramatically reshaped and
In the early seventies the cases of Roe
the character of fetal Life restricted.
Decoding Judicial Rhetoric

The public import
of the
Supreme
Court's decisions in the landmark
abortion cases has generally been poorly understood. Like many

other important decisions, they have been approached primarily
through the
artificially
narrow lens
96
of legal scholarship. In contrast,
Public Rhetoric and the
my
Law
97
is neither some legalistic standard that Roe either meets or

nor the sufficiency of the decision in terms of its effects. 3
Instead, I seek to describe the way in which the Supreme Court, as
one locus of public discussion, processed the public vocabulary with
which it was confronted. On these grounds the Roe decision appears
as a reasonable and predictable product of four factors: (1) the balance
of the public arguments, (2) the need for integration with the existing
legal structure, (3) the comparative legal skills of the competing lawyers, (4) the political views of womanhood held by the justices.
In order to explore the process of constructing abortion law, we
need to understand the law, not as an isolated and privileged professional field, but as an interface between the state and the public.
Because the law must be able to control the public behavior of govern-
focus
2
fails
ment
officials
and
private individuals, legal discourse occurs, neces-
However, the
conducted
Moreover, legal
discourse carries a kind of direct, *performative power open to very
few other genres of public address. 4 It marshals the coercive power of
the state behind certain vocabularies instead of others. The law, for
example, takes the private Property (tax money) of citizens for the
service of Public Defense, and it demands "affirmative action" and
prohibits "discrimination," both in the service of Equal Opportunity.
The public arena of the law therefore combines the intersection of
the general public and the state specialist, the public vocabulary and
sarily,
largely
in a public space.
by
legal debate is
specialists in a specialized vocabulary.
technical legal discourse, the universal value

est.
The character
itself is
and the partisan
inter-
complex. The legal vocabulary

limited, being most extensively elaborated in procedural areas
of this relationship
is
(e.g., "justiciability," "stare decisis," "strict scrutiny"). It relies
on the
propositions and key terms contained in the Constitution, in statutes,

and in prior decisions. It is also accountable to the îdeographs en-
shrined in the nation's constituting documents (most frequently, Liband Life). Legal discourse, however, translates these
constituting values into more manageable sub-categories that more
closely specify the character of the rights to be protected (religion is
protected under the "establishment clause" and the "free exercise
clause," while abortion comes to be protected by "privacy," a subcomponent of the broader class of Liberty). This elaborate set of
procedural terms, sub-categories, and propositions helps to make
legal discourse proceed in the semi-deductive manner associated with
what Fisher calls "the rational world paradigm." Appellate legal communication thereby reduces its formal, explicit dependence on the
narrative form that is so central to the rest of public address. 5 Conseerty, Property,
Enacting "Choice"
98
quently,
it is
able to operate with proportionately less explicit atten-
tion to the social

this
*myths central
to
most
political
communication.
It is
narrow, deductive, technically framed component of legal prac-
tice that legal
scholars privilege.
The law, however, cannot escape the ^characterizations and images

mass public communication. Because the law must make its abstract principles control concrete agents and actions, it must articulate
bridges between ideographs and the characterizations that represent
those concrete entities. As a consequence, narratives become impliof
cated in legal decisions through the back door; the choice of characterization favors the myths constituted through a particular set of
""character-types. To understand how the Court processed the public
vocabulary about abortion therefore requires an accounting of the
interaction between the legal and ideographic principles and the more
popularly based characterizations.
Roe
In the case of Roe
v.
v.
Wade
Wade a poor and unmarried pregnant
woman
challenged a Texas law that proscribed all abortions except those

undertaken to save a pregnant woman's life. 6 Roe's skillful attorneys,
led by Sarah Weddington, argued in December of 1971 and in the reargument of October 1972 that such state laws violated the fundamental liberties of women
especially their right to privacy. With substantially less skill two assistant attorneys general argued the case for
Texas. Robert Flowers and Jay Floyd directed most of their arguments
to procedural matters, insisting that the case was speculative and
moot, and therefore not justiciable. In addition, they argued that the
state legislature was the appropriate locus for such decision-making
and
that the state
protection of the
had
life
a valid constitutional
the
purpose in the law
of the fetus.
On 22 January 1973 the Court decided that the Texas law, and
reform laws such as the Georgia law that had been challenged in the
companion case, were unconstitutional. The decision, authored by
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, carefully outlined the constitutional
boundaries for state abortion laws. It specified that states could not
limit abortions performed in the first trimester of pregnancy, except to
require that they be performed by licensed health providers. It permitted regulation of abortion in the second trimester only to protect
the health of the pregnant woman. The Court ruled that the state
could outlaw abortion in the last trimester, except in cases where the
life and health of the pregnant woman would be threatened. The
Law
99
decision, Doe v. Bolton, defined "health" very broadly. The

seven justices arrived at this position through four crucial rhetorical
moves.
companion
Justiciability: Procedure
and Practice
and most
argument was about the power of the Court to decide the issue
at all. Previously, pregnancy and abortion generally had been presumed to be matters that were not justiciable because pregnancies
were always completed before the cases could finish the lengthy
appeals process. Somewhere in the middle of court actions, such
women complainants lost their standing, because the case became
"moot." The Court noted that "the usual rule in federal cases is that an
actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review" (p. 125). The Court, however, allowed the case to come to trial
for two absolutely inter-dependent reasons, one legalistic and the
In shifting the public discourse into the legal arena, the first
pivotal
other related to the public discourse.
The
component
legal
of the ruling arose
majority of the justices had
come
from the
fact that
the
to recognize a class of disputes that
modified the requirement for a case to present an "actual controThey found that, like some other special kinds of cases, pregnancy "truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading review " (p.
125). Therefore, the issue was not exactly "moot." As a class action, it
presented a type of ongoing actual controversy to the Court.
versy."
The decision
to classify the case in this
manner was influenced by

The
the majority's larger sense of the issue's fundamental importance.
who explicitly argued that the case did not involve

fundamental issues, easily described minor technical reasons for refusing to hear the case. 7 The oral argument reveals, however, that the
other justices accepted the claim the female attorneys forcefully put
dissenting judges,
before
that Roe and the
them
class
she represented had
plausible claim to a fundamental constitutional right
and
at least
that this
8 Sarah Wedit incumbent upon the Court to consider the issue.

dington argued for the appellants that
made
pregnancy
woman
to a
aspects of her
life.
It
disrupts her employment.
And we
feel that,
is
of
perhaps one of the most determinative
And
it
It
disrupts her education.
often disrupts her entire family
because of the impact on the
woman,
It
life.
this certainly
any rights which are fundamental is a matter

such fundamental and basic concern to the woman involved
in as far as there are
which
is
disrupts her body.
Enacting "Choice"
100
that she
should be allowed to make the choice as to whether to continue
or to terminate her pregnancy. 9
In this form the claim drawn from the briefs, directly repeating
the prior public discourse of the pro-Choice movement, and amplified
through its presentation by a female attorney was persuasive to the
majority,
fact that
even though
it
was not yet framed
in legal terms. 10
The very
women had successfully voiced a compelling argument in the
public realm
made it difficult (although not impossible) for the justices
deny a "hearing" in the courtroom as well. This did not guarantee

that the women would win their case, but the public voice encouraged
to
the justices to allow the next step to be taken
legal
framing of the
issue.
The procedural matter of accepting the case had breathtaking consequences: it allowed women to bring pregnancy (perhaps our single
most important issue as women) into the judicial process in a definitive way. Clearly, fetuses could not bring such cases, and adults had
been routinely denied the right to bring such cases for fetuses who
were not eventually born. 11 Thus, by merely hearing the case, the
Court granted women a crucial form of social power and standing that
the fetuses could not have. The material reality that a pregnant
woman could plead before a court of law, while a fetus could not,
became a legal reality in America as well. This basic fact may well have
been the single most important factor in the outcome of the case. In
admitting this women's issue to legal review, the Court conceded that
it would alter some indeterminate part of its vocabulary to deal with
the unique concerns of this now-publicly vocal group.
History and Precedent
Once
the Court had agreed to hear the women's complaint, the

second issue it faced was to explain why it had not done so previously
(in other words, to explain why prior precedent and legal vocabulary
were not sufficient here). This is a serious and continuing rhetorical
dilemma for the Supreme Court on those important occasions when it
is forced to act in new arenas. In this case, as in others, the Court
could quite accurately have found itself to have been derelict, or it
could have described the evolution of birth control technology and
new substantive right. Neither of

within the bounds of permissible judicial reasongiving because they imply that the Court is not dealing infallibly with
timeless truths. 12 That implication would challenge the ethos of the
Court. In order to manage this public relations problem, Blackmun
women's careerism
these alternatives
fit
as creating a
created a historical narrative
showing
Law
101
that the constitutional principle
at stake had always existed but that the constitutionality of previous

laws had been dependent on a set of blocking conditions that no
longer pertained. Empirical conditions having changed, the law
might legitimately return to its root principles.

Blackmun's history strove toward objectivity by disregarding the
historical narratives of both pro-Choice and pro-Life public advocates
(pro-Life rhetors had focused on religious authorities; pro-Choice
advocates had recounted human practices). Instead, Blackmun, a
lawyer with long-standing connections with the medical research
establishment, turned to the codified legal and medical history.
Blackmun focused not on the religious attitudes toward or actual
practices of abortion but rather on the laws surrounding it. This
history began with the Hippocratic Oath, proceeded to the English
Common Law, to Statute Law, and then to more recent American
legal precedent. The choice was appropriate to, and perhaps required
of, a legal decision, and it just as clearly shaped the outcome. With
two crucial exceptions, this legal history was one that had allowed
abortion.
Blackmun disposed of the oldest exception, the Hippocratic Oath,

by noting that it was the opinion of a small, somewhat eccentric
religious group (the Pythagoreans), not an endorsed code drawing
from a wide public consensus. Because it belonged to a "particular
interest group/ the discourse lacked objectivity and, therefore, legitimacy. The oath may have been symbolically potent, but it was not
7
legally
important or binding.
difficult, that dispensation was relatively easy

compared to the task of dismissing the second exception the most
recent one hundred years of American statute law. As Texas's lawyer
suggested in oral argument, this last hundred years could be seen as a
culmination of moral and even legal history. 13 In some senses this
might have been the expected legal interpretation: the use of a vast
body of recent precedent would seem fairly crucial to a judgment of
While symbolically
//
,,
These were, however, only state statutes, not necessarily binding

on the national, Constitutional Court. The Court held, moreover, that
the primary reason for the enactment of these state statutes had been
the protection of the life and health of pregnant women from the early
and unsafe surgical techniques for abortion. Since abortion was now
reasonably safe, especially early in pregnancy, the state no longer had
any compelling interest for maintaining these rights-abridging laws.
The rhetorical wedge provided by this historical accounting has
come under sustained attack on two counts. On the one hand, it
law.
102
Enacting "Choice"
deviates from a standard judicial style because

narrative.
Such
it
features historical
attacks ignore the rhetorical fact that in constitutional
must address simultaneously an attentive

employ narrative to address
public and
the public (protecting the Court's ethos) does not make it impossible
also to carefully and legitimately deal with the legal issues. A more
serious attack on the "medicalization" of abortion that ensued from
this approach is the claim that such emphasis on physicians and
health detracts from the central issue of women's Choice. 14 Such a
charge also ignores the rhetorical situation and the place of the medicontroversies the Court
a technical legal doctrine. To
cal issues in the
argument.
The medical issues were not central to the legal doctrine of Choice
but rather were related to the conditions taken to be previously impinging upon the women's right. This is evident in the fact that the
medicalization content has gradually withered away, leaving the
much more substantive part of the decision to stand. 15 Indeed, the
Court sought to overturn these precedents with this rhetorical device
of historical narrative only because it found that women had a fundamental right that both prevented intrusion upon their lives by the
state governments and justified the interference of the federal judiciary in state law. This was the heart of the contest.
Freedom of Choice
The Roe decision and its subsequent elaborations and clarifications
involved one of the most difficult problematics that arise for the
judiciary. The Court was required to adjudicate a claim of competing
fundamental rights for which there were no clear right-granting precedents. Neither the Right to Life of the fetus, developed as a claim by
the pro-Life movement and supported by states' attorneys, nor the
Right to Choice of women, articulated through the women's movement and urged in Court by the women's attorneys, had ever been
explicitly incorporated into the legal discourse. The Court was asked
if either of these claims, developed in the broader
realm of public discourse, had constitutional legitimacy, and if so,
what their relationship to each other would be.
This position made it impossible for the judges to work exclusively
from precedent and statute, as conservative legal theory holds they
should. According to these legal theories, judges should strive to
operate in a closed legal vocabulary where nothing new need gain
status. However, this conservative premise is rendered incompetent
in cases in which the judges must operate from the Constitution's
to decide here
Law
103
Ninth and Fourteenth amendments. These amendments dictate that

there are fundamental individual rights, not all of which have been
previously enumerated, that a state can disregard only in extreme
cases. 16 In such instances, the Supreme Court walks a careful line
between the limiting constraints of precedent and statute legisand fundamental rights constitutionally establatively established
lished.
Although it is occasionally contested, one of the techniques the

"
Court has adopted for this balancing act is the doctrine of scrutiny/'
The Court may invalidate state laws under two carefully proscribed
conditions. 17 First, the Supreme Court may declare unconstitutional
any law that violates a fundamental right, unless the state has a
"compelling interest" in overriding that right. In cases of fundamental rights, the Court employs "strict judicial scrutiny," relying on its
own judgment not that of legislative bodies to assess the validity of
the violation of individual rights. Second, the Supreme Court may
declare unconstitutional laws that violate less fundamental rights only
where there is no "rational state purpose" motivating the law. These
latter cases allow the Court a less active role in scrutinizing the
soundness of legislative decisions. Roe therefore involved assessment
not only of the nature of the competing rights involved but also of
how fundamental they were. If fundamental rights were involved, the
Court was required to protect them from the assaults of state legislatures; if the rights were less fundamental or nonexistent, the Court
was required
to
uphold
state law.
For reasons we will explore shortly, the majority of the Court

decided that the pro-Choice vocabulary was constitutionally legiti-
mate
that women indeed have a fundamental Right
to Choose. Blackrepeatedly employed the precise vocabulary from the proChoice discourse, citing a "fundamental right to choose" (pp. 122,
129, 153) and "freedom to choose." However, since the Right to
Choose had been a public term, not yet a legal one, Blackmun had to
legitimize this right by demonstrating its linkage to legal vocabulary.
Had sexism and the legal tendency to subdivide and over-categorize
not dominated legal thought, Blackmun might simply have described
this right as a clear instance of the right to Liberty. Instead, because
the Court subconsciously continued to see pregnancy as in some way
mun
from and derivative of sexual practices, it employed the

subsidiary terminology of "right to privacy," which had most recently
different
been articulated in regard to another issue concerning procreative

freedom birth control. 18
The Court's use of the privacy doctrine has been attacked from both
104
Enacting "Choice"
and the Right. Socialist feminist scholars and lawyers have

argued that privacy is undesirable as a key term to protect women's
rights for two reasons. First, these opponents charge that the privacy
doctrine creates a space, especially around the "family," in which
women cannot be protected from abusive patriarchs (in a variety of
ways). 19 However, nowhere in the Roe text did the Court place privacy
in the hands of the patriarchal family; it clearly placed it in the
woman's hands. 20 Second, feminists argue that the privacy doctrine
entailed later decisions in which financial resources for abortion were
denied because the state has no responsibility to support "private"
the Left
decisions financially. 21
The text of Roe itself again contradicts this

argument. All of the Court's descriptions of the need for a Right to
Choice indicated that the Court saw this as a substantive right. Moreover, in the Harris v. McRae case, so important to the funding issues, it
was not the doctrine
of privacy that led to the Court's decision against
protecting funding. Instead,
was
it
precisely the Court's interpretation
of the discrimination doctrine (which the socialist feminists generally

prefer) that allowed the
Court
on the grounds that

Thus the Congress and
to avoid the issue
classification." 22
poverty was not a "suspect

later arguments, not Roe, defined Choice in this manner. 23
The legal bridge provided by "privacy" has also been attacked by
pro-Life forces. This attack is one of political convenience rather than
true legal principle, and it is distressing that pro-Life advocates would
be willing to sacrifice a basic liberty simply because it provided part of
the bridge to abortion rights. The persuasiveness of their claim rests
on the fact that the Court's rhetorical task of collection of a large

group of previously identified rights and a set of unenumerated but
widely cherished rights into a single category labeled "privacy" was
executed with something less than eloquence. However, as the Court
solely
pointed out in Griswold v. Connecticut (381 US 479, 1965), privacy,

although newly named, was hardly a new right. It had always been
fundamental to the American "way of life." The Court's recognition of a "fundamental right to privacy" was based in part on the
example of several constitutional amendments that explicitly proclearly
tected specific types of privacy (for example, the Fourth

right to "be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
Third
Amendment
which
soldiers cannot
expression,
Amendment
and
effects," the
home a private domain in

First Amendment right to self-
right to have one's
be quartered, the
and other
rights of "privacy
right to privacy in marriage
Most important, the Court
and
and repose," including the
birth control cited in Griswold). 24
traced the right directly from the explicit
constitutional assertion that the intent of the entire
form
of govern-
Law
ment was
105
to protect the "liberties" of all citizens {Roe, p. 152,
and
later
elaborated by Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion, pp. 210-13).

Given the assumption of an individualist government, for both men
and women, the maintenance of "zones of privacy" is absolutely
essential to maintaining Liberty
state.
The anomaly
been forced
to
make
the rights of individuals against the
rests in the fact that the
Telling evidence of the breadth of legal

right
is
Court has never before
these rights explicit.
consensus on the privacy
close at hand. In Roe both the amicus brief of the National Right
to Life Committee and the attorneys for the state of Texas appeared to
recognize the woman's right to privacy. 25 Thus the opposition to this
right on the grounds that it was new seems to be little more than a
retroactive smokescreen aimed at public persuasion rather than legal
argument.
Pro-Life activists could, nonetheless,
still
argue that the "right to
privacy" did not include a right to abortion a position that continues

to be disputed. However, even the legal consensus that "privacy"
does provide the legal and rhetorical bridge for "choice" in abortion
became ever more complete as the Court began to clarify its decisions
in this area. By 1985 the smaller but more entrenched Court majority
articulated the private Right to Choose as an instance of the larger
term liberty in clear and eloquent form. In the case of Thornburgh vs.
American College
of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (54
USLW
4618), the
decision read:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a

promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept
That promise extends to
largely beyond the reach of government.
.
women
men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and
autonomy, than a woman's decision with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any
other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of
as well as to
the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to
all. (P.
4625)
by the time of this 1985 decision, even the dissenting

had come to accept not only the existence of the privacy right
but also its application to abortion. Justice White (with Rehnquist)
noted, "I can certainly agree with the proposition which I deem
indisputable that a woman's ability to choose an abortion is a species
Crucially,
justices
of 'liberty' that is subject to the general protections of the
Clause"
(p.
4629).
Due
Process
White and Rehnquist's primary objection was sim-
106
Enacting "Choice"
ply that the right was not fundamental enough to allow the Court to
censure the decisions of the state legislature. White continued, "I
cannot agree, however, that this liberty is so 'fundamental' that restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the most minimal
judicial scrutiny" (pp. 4629-30). The dissenters indicated, in general,
that they thought the Court had overstepped its bounds because
the Right to Choose, although a constitutional right, was not

adequately fundamental to allow the judiciary to protect it from the
"reasonable" decision-making processes of legislatures.
How does one decide how fundamental a right might be? It is at
this point that the characterizations from the public argument are
embedded
in a
most
point that
crucial
and
inevitable
manner in the
law,
and it is
we can
see the nontechnical motives that led the

jurists to a legal doctrine legitimating Choice through privacy.
at this
whether or not a right was fundamental, Justice

which were "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" might be considered fundamental. His dissent
indicated that "it seems apparent to me that a free, egalitarian and
democratic society does not presuppose any particular rules or set of
rules with respect to abortion" (p. 4630, my emphasis). The question
thus became, what kind of human needs are essential and must be
met to produce a world that is free, egalitarian, and democratic? This
ultimately depended on the mythic views of women and motherhood
held by the justices on both sides of this issue.
In Roe v. Wade, the dissenters described abortion and motherhood
precisely within the characterizations used by the pro-Life movement.
They employed the pro-Life descriptions of the reasons for abortion
"convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother" (p. 222). They
hinted that perhaps abortion statutes might credibly require that
abortion be allowed for the life or health of the mother but that any other
cause would not be fundamental. In other words, only a woman's
survival and health, not the conduct of her life, presented fundamental
Freedoms.
The most apparent reason for this is that the conservative judges
also shared the pro-Life movement's general assumption that *motherhood was the essential definition of "womanhood." 26 Indeed, they
In determining
White held
that only those rights
repudiated abortion choices for all the reasons that represented a challenge to the traditional characterization of motherhood.
Specifically, they opposed abortions for "convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy,
etc." (Roe, p. 221, my emphasis). Only if one conceives of motherhood
as essential to "womanhood" is it possible to classify family planning
explicitly
Law
107
Only if one cannot imagine women as other than

mothers is the right to reject children because one dislikes them not a
fundamental right of an individual woman. It is not accidental that the
dissenters preferred the term mother to the term pregnant woman,
which was employed more frequently by the majority. In sum, the
dissenters continued to understand women and their goals as primarily devoted to childbearing. Hence, issues of timing or "dislike of
children" were inadequate or inconceivable reasons for women to
choose the course of their own lives. 27
The majority, operating from a different characterization of
women, believed that, for an egalitarian society, the right of women to
Choose was indeed fundamental. The fact that the United States had
not allowed legal abortion in the last hundred years did not deny its
necessity. After all, the United States had not allowed Equality for
women in those years. An egalitarian government, by the majority's
definition, then, could not have "ordered liberty" without recognizing
the fundamental importance of this choice for the conduct of women's
as unessential.
lives.
The
role of basic characterizations
view as
it
indicated
had been
was
acceptance of the broad
its
as essential to this majority
to the minority view.
The majority repeatedly
new
re-characterizations of
women
that expanded their choices beyond motherhood. Drawing

from the larger social discourse directly and through the appellant's
gave official recognition to the fact that

be "distressful," saying that "maternity, or
briefs, the majority's decision
pregnancy could in
fact
additional offspring
may
future. Psychological
force upon the woman a distressful life and

harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care" (p. 153). Issues of "illegitimacy" and
the problem of "unwanted children" were also listed. Directly, then,
the view that
motherhood was
either
incumbent on, or necessarily
women was
denied in the legal system by the majority in

the Roe decision. Once the system recognized that women had reasons for choice, the Right to Choice was virtually inevitable, if we
have a Constitution that protects the rights of human beings to make
positive for,
the significant decisions in their
own
lives.
The first half of the dispute over abortion was the question of
whether women had a fundamental right to Freedom of Choice. The
legal parties
agreed that there existed a right to privacy that covered
They disagreed over how fundamental that right was. Since

this decision rested on basic characterizations of women, the final
decision was inevitably a consequence of the political positions on
womanhood held by the justices who happened to be in the majority.
abortion.
108
Enacting "Choice"
This was not, as critics of the decision would have it, a matter of
but rather a social necessity. The justices on both sides
rested
ultimately
their decisions on the concrete level of characterization because in order to be effective legal discourse must always rest
ultimately on public characterizations of the people its rules will
constrain. To understand a justice's characterization of the so-
judicial error,
ciopolitical
world
is
therefore as essential as to understand her or his
legal philosophy.
The second
was also a matter of

between the public and legal vocabularies and it was of equal importance. Even having admitted the right
of women's Choice, the Court's decision might have been dramatically
different if the Court had also constructed a legal right of the fetus to
half of the judicial issue of abortion
characterizations negotiated
Life.
Right to Life?
The attorneys
for the state of Texas argued both that the fetus had a
Right to Life that outweighed the woman's right to privacy and that
the state had a valid interest in protecting the life or potential life of
the fetus. 28 The centrality of this issue for the Court was evident in the
oral arguments. The justices asked attorneys for both sides if the
status of the fetus was the determining issue. They queried Weddington, "If it were established that an unborn fetus is a person, with
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, you would have almost
an impossible case here, would you not?" and she replied, "I would
difficult case." 29
To Flowers, the question was, "Do you

over for you? You've lost your case, then, if the fetus
or the embryo is not a person? Is that it?" to which the attorney
replied, "Yes, sir, I would say so." 30
That the Court believed the personhood of the fetus to be a pivotal
issue was also explicitly stated in Blackmun's decision. He argued that
"if this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case,
of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment" (p. 157).
The manner in which this issue was decided was initiated in the
briefs and heightened in the oral arguments. The justices began,
quite appropriately, with legal precedent. They asked the attorney for
Texas, "Do you know of any case, anywhere, that's held that an
unborn fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment?" and Flowers responded, "No, sir. We can only go back
have a very
think the case
to
is
what the framers
of
our Constitution had in mind." 31 The justices

Law
109
immediately turned to the Constitution, to point out that the Constitution referred, in its only explicit reference, to persons "born" in the
United States. After that point they noted that if a fetus were legally a
person the Texas statutes along with those of most other states
would be inconsistent, because they did not treat abortion as murder
nor punish the pregnant woman for inducing abortion. 32 Moreover,
the justices suggested that the precedent established by these statutes
clearly indicated that the fetus had never been treated legally as a
person. 33 The attorneys for Texas offered no response to any of these
substantive points.
If the justices had confined themselves strictly to this logical, legal
framing of the issue, Texas would have lost immediately. Instead, they
gave the appellees the opportunity to characterize the fetus as a
"human person," based on evidence from other realms. Here, too, the
pro-Life attorneys replied weakly. To begin with, the justices asked
Flowers how they ought to decide the issue. He suggested medical
criteria, but, crucially, by his own admission he was unable to provide
a medical source that clearly described a fetus as a human person
from conception. 34 He then suggested that the issue was reasonably
one for the Supreme Court, but when he was trapped by the judges
into admitting that the precedent of the law did not establish the fetus
as a person, he returned to the claim that the matter was appropriately
one for the state legislatures, not the Courts. Here the justices again
caught him in a contradiction when he admitted that if the fetus were
a person, then the state legislatures would not have a right to decide
to take its life
thus framing the issue squarely as a constitutional one
that only the Supreme Court could decide. 35
In the process of oral argument, therefore, three things became
clear: (1) that the only thing that could possibly outweigh a woman's
Right to Choice would be another person with an independent and
more fundamental Right to Life, (2) that the status of the fetus was
clearly a constitutional issue which the Court had the necessity of
deciding, and (3) that to label a fetus a person entailed legal and
logical inconsistencies the law could not tolerate, absent a well-argued
reason external to the law for doing so.
The issues broached in oral argument were faithfully enshrined in
the final decision. Most important, Blackmun noted that the legal
meaning of person does not include a fetus. Utilizing an argument
presented in an amicus brief, he carefully cited each use of the word
person in the Constitution and concluded that "in nearly all these
instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible
110
Enacting "Choice"
pre-natal application"
citizen
was defined
(p.
157).
For example, he emphasized that a
as a person born (or later naturalized) in the U.S.
He
suggested further that if the law really held the fetus to be a

person state laws such as that of Texas would be self-contradictory
because they allowed abortion in order to save the pregnant woman's
life and did not prosecute as murderers women who obtained abortions (pp. 157-58). Given the technical requirements of the law, such
open and evident
self-contradiction was impermissible, and so neither the Court nor the state could find a fetus to be equivalent to a
person. Similarly, he indicated that most state laws at the time proif the child was eventually born (or in
some cases where the fetus was viable at the time of injury). Strict
tected the rights of fetuses only
adherence to deductive logic and legal precedent led the Court to

deny that a fetus was legally a person and had a Right to Life.
Significantly, the dissenting justices did not challenge this framing.
In direct contrast to the public criticism of the Roe decision, the
dissenting justices did not argue that a fetus was a person and/or had
was one for

major argument
a Right to Life. In fact, in order to maintain that the matter
the point
state legislatures
that constituted their
they could not have maintained that either the fetus or the
woman
had fundamental rights at stake. Legally, therefore, the pro-Life

movement was in an untenable position. Their only hope was to get
the Court to decide the issue of the status of the fetus on non-legal
grounds.
The final decision gave clear consideration to the broader social

argument about the personhood of the fetus. However, Blackmun's
decision was constrained by the particular relationship between the
law and public discourse. First he responded to the technical medical
argument, elaborated fully in briefs, that the science of biology had
irrefutably established the fetus as a
human
person. Consistent with
the development of the issue in oral argument and with his medical
background and research, he indicated that medical criteria did not, in

fact, establish that a fetus was a human being from the instant of
conception, and that, instead, coming to be a human being was a
process.
He
cited
"new embryological
data that purport to indicate
an event" (p. 162).

grounds of medicine did not, therefore, provide definitional grounds for the law to treat the fetus as a person. Consequently,
the potential life of the fetus was to be integrated into the decision,
that conception is a 'process' over time, rather than
The
technical
but only to the extent that a fetus represented a substance of value,

not a full person with a fundamental right.
Blackmun
also
responded
to the public
component
of the pro-Life
Public Rhetoric
and
the
Law
111
definitional argument. Essentially, he argued that public persuasion

could only influence a judicial decision when there was real consensus (and the difference between the decisions made in Plessy v.
Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education suggests the longer-term pattern of the role of public consensus in background characterizations).
Blackmun pointed out that there was no consensus about when life
began in the broader, non-legal sense. He deferred the issue, saying,
"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer. It should be sufficient to
note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive
and difficult question" (pp. 159-60).
In other words, the Supreme Court refused to legislate an empirical
meaning to unsettled social definitions; Blackmun recognized that the
judiciary could not legislate a factual meaning for controversial public
terms. Only if there were consensus about a term could the social
meaning produce a dramatic alteration of the legal meaning, overturning the presumption of precedent or other substantiated rights.
The Court decision in Roe v. Wade thus accepted the pro-Choice
movement's claims and integrated their key terms into the legal discourse, establishing that a woman's "right to privacy" protected the
Choice of abortion. The Court rejected the feebly argued pro-Life claim
that a fetus, from the moment of conception, had a Right to Life that
would override the woman's right. The Court arrived at this position
because of the particular constellation of public characterizations and
legal precedent and the relative skill with which these had been
presented. The coercive power of the state was therefore shifted from
women and their interests.

The policy consequences of this decision were a bit more complex
than a simple win for the pro-Choice faction, however. Because of the
substantive value of the fetus, the Court backed off from acknowledging an absolute right to abortion. As with any personal right (including life, free speech, religion, etc.), the Court holds the comthe pro-natalists to the
munitarian or statist position that compelling state interests might

overrule these rights. The justices found that the reproductive Free-
dom
of
health
women was
and
pro-Life
limited by state interests in protecting women's

borrowing the residual argumentative grounds of the
movement
the
"potential
life" of
the fetus after
it
was
viable.
The
limits
on abortion derived from the health issues were, prion empirical medical criteria, as interpreted by the
marily, decided
112
Enacting "Choice"
judges. Given the relative safety of abortions
at different
stages of
pregnancy, states were authorized to exert different degrees of control

in the first, second, and third trimesters. The limits on abortion
deriving from the state's interest in the "potential life" of the fetus
were decided to be compelling only after the fetus was viable. Consequently, the states
were
free to restrict abortion in the third trimester,
woman's
and health (broadly defined).

compromise from
the strongest substantive arguments offered by both sides. The value
of the fetus (as it became materially more substantial in the later stages
of development) and women's Liberty (through the "freedom of
choice") were both conserved. The compromise was unique. It did not
specify what purposes for abortion would be acceptable nor place
control of abortions in outside committees, as other Western countries
had done; instead, it reflected the liberal American tradition, recogexcept
at
the cost of the
life
In the end, therefore, the Court constructed a
women as individuals with rights
that could not be violated for

extreme cases.
Historically, this liberal individualism was probably essential to
allow women a right to abortion in America. Otherwise, as the dissenters and opposing attorneys directly argued, the state interest in
encouraging women to engage in the un-waged, extremely demanding effort of childbirth would simply override most reasons for abor-
nizing
"the
good
tion.
And
of the
this
community" except
was
precisely the
in
argument used
in the decisions
denying protection of funding for abortions: states could conceivably

have a "rational purpose" in pro-natalism. Nonetheless, this kind of
individualism exacts a clear price. Acceptance of the premise that the
independent and unique existence of each individual entails the need
for that individual to be the center of personal choice-making can be
construed to mean that individuals are also economically responsible
for all such choices. This component of traditional American liberalism also was employed to shape the meanings of the new abortion
vocabularies, but this time the narrowing occurred in the national
legislature.
The Congress Restrains "Choices"
White and Rehnquisfs reaction was strong so strong as to call the

decision "an exercise of raw judicial power" (p. 222) that of the proLife public was nearly apocalyptic. The Court's decision was, however, only one component of the "legal integration" of the pro-Choice
and pro-Life vocabularies into the legal system. If we focus solely on
If
the Court decision,
course gained
much
we
Law
113
are likely to conclude that the pro-Life dis-
less public sanction
than
it
actually did.
In comparison to the considerations of the legislature, the decisions

of the Supreme Court are appealingly simple. Legislative decisions
never offer any single rationale for their mandates only dozens of
votes and policies, committee hearings, and hours of discussions.
Legislative intent
is,
therefore,
even more
because of this complexity and
difficult to interpret.
How-
because of the sheer

increase in the "representativeness" of the legislature, and because
legislatures deal more with pocketbooks than with rights, legislative
ever,
variability,
more clearly the negotiation and compromise

situations in which competing interests work to influence
decisions reveal far
inherent in
the law.
The most notable abortion issue that faced the Congress was the
"Hyde Amendment," which in various forms bedeviled the national
legislature, especially between 1976 and 1978. 36 The amendment and
its relatives went through a plethora of wording options and breadths
and were attached to a wide range of options, seeking to limit public
funding of abortions as stringently as possible. Most centrally, the
amendment
birth.
The
cut off Medicaid funding for abortions but not for child-
strictest
versions included
all
abortions. Other versions
made exceptions for the life of the woman, rape, or health. Such
amendments included or accompanied restrictions against federal
and Indian reservations, for
and in federal medical plans. In each
case, the arguments were similar, and revealing.
On the "pro-funding" side, four major types of arguments were
advanced. 37 First, the bills' opponents insisted the measure, would
force poor women into illegal abortion, which would result in carnage. Second, they protested that the measure was "discriminatory"
and violated the "equal protection" clause, because it prevented poor
women from enjoying a constitutional right to abortion while allowing affluent women to do so. Third, they stressed the various social
spending
for abortions
on
military bases
foreign service officers abroad,
costs of the limitation, including the economics of supporting welfare

instead of abortion, and the costs in human suffering of "unwanted
children" and "unwanting" teenage mothers. Finally, they addressed
the procedural impropriety of using a funding rider in this
manner
and, early on, of flaunting the Courts. In short, the pro-funding

legislators presented a microcosm of the discourse developed in the
pro-Choice movement, complete with truncated narration of the tale
of the horrors of illegal abortion, the ^regulative ideograph "discrimi-
114
Enacting "Choice"
and the ^substantive ideograph Right to Choice. The proChoice legislators simply asserted that their previously elaborated
grounds (accepted by the Supreme Court) covered this area as well.
They lost this argument resoundingly and repeatedly; federal funding
nation,"
for abortions
was
drastically curtailed.
The discourse of the pro-Life advocates offers two arguments that

might justify or explain the defeats. The first argument, heard repeatedly,
life
held simply that abortion represented the killing of an innocent
and hence was
we
"the issue
to exist." 38
intolerable.
Some members
of
Congress urged that
face in this debate is the right of defenseless
The sponsor
of the
funding
human
life
Henry Hyde, was

was the Congress's
restrictions,
frequently supported in his insistence that this
opportunity to limit the number of "killings." For these
legislators,
abortion was clearly and painfully immoral and ought to be prohibited.
argument was vigorously and init was not directly the

the voting. During the same time period the
In spite of the fact that this

sistently repeated, there
is
reason to believe
determining factor in
Congress was considering the issue of a Constitutional amendment to
prohibit abortion. This measure never received majority support in
the House or Senate (nor in the public opinion polls). 39 The general
lack of enthusiasm for the constitutional measure in the face of grand
enthusiasm for the funding limitation suggests that legislators were
attempting to "split the difference." They were seeking to negotiate
by making compromises that would recognize

and incorporate some of the interests of both constituencies. The
discursive manner in which these interests and vocabularies were
negotiated came from the second major argument of the congresthe two vocabularies
sional pro-Life coalition.
The fervency, frequency, and persuasiveness of the Right-to-Life

argument indicated that the pro-Life vocabulary and interests had to
be dealt with in some manner. The discursive grounds on which the
pro-Life interests were allowed to claim the funding limitations as a
concession owed them, however, was a careful manipulation of the
pro-Choice ideology against itself. The anti-funding advocates insisted that if abortion were a matter of individual conscience, and if
there were no consensus about the beginning point of human life,
then the Congress had no business forcing taxpayers whose consciences compelled them to oppose abortion into paying for the abortions of others. Mrs. Lloyd of Tennessee said that
"it is
discrimination
kind against any taxpayer who opposes abortion to force

that individual to finance an act toward which he or she has a deep
of the worst
to tax to collect
115
Congress has no business using its

funds for this purpose." 40 Two years earlier,
personal, moral aversion.
power
Law
Mr. Paul had said:
to
Civil libertarians must oppose tax dollars for abortion if they choose
be consistent. The use of tax dollars for abortion flaunts the first
amendment
protection of religious liberty
"Do not use the
The advice
give to the pro-
devout religious
beliefs against abortion to carry out this procedure. This is like waving a
red flag in front of a bull and providing an incentive for the antiabortionists to organize and rally with great strength/' 41
abortionists
is
dollar of citizens with
The advocates further backed their claims by indicating that, to this

point in American law, medical procedures were not themselves
treated as an inherent right and that the government had always
picked and chosen various coverages. Medicaid, Rep. Obey pointed
out, did not pay for dental work; it need not pay for abortions. 42 The
argument was extended to indicate that government did not and
could not pay for every right it allowed: poor women could not
exercise
all
the "vices" of the rich. 43
issue, of course, received some rebuttal. Pro-funding legisargued that anarchy would result if constituents could choose,
individually, to refuse to support specific government programs by
withholding their taxes (especially in wartime). The pro-Life group
was not, however, positing an individual right to refuse to pay taxes.
They were arguing for a strong, impassioned minority, and they were
holding their opponents to argumentative consistency: if the issue
was one of personal conscience, by definition, then it was a matter in
which everyone ought to be able to act only according to conscience.
Essentially, therefore, the issue seems to have come down to Mr.
Kindness's conclusion that "governments are, in the first place, established in order that we may live together peaceably without imposing
upon one another. And yet we are confronted with the question today
of whether the Government should tax dollars and pay for an act
which is particularly offensive to many people from whom those
taxes are taken. These people cannot, as a result, have a respect for
that government." 44 The vocabulary of Choice was thus turned back
The
lators
against
itself
as a limiting condition.
Legal Conclusions
Over the next fifteen years the Supreme Court and state and national
legislatures were to entertain a wide variety of subsidiary issues
116
Enacting "Choice"
related to regulation of
and support
established was fairly consistent.
for abortion. 45
Many
The pattern they
state legislatures
attempted
repeatedly to limit abortion rights and to discourage abortion through
"nuisance" requirements demanding pro-natalist counseling for

contemplating abortion, physician reporting requirements,
parental and spousal consent requirements, emergency equipment
requirements, and so forth. The state and national legislatures by and
large also worked to cut off all conceivable funding of public abortions. The Court overturned virtually all of the nuisance requirements
(except certain consent measures) but supported the funding limita-
women
tions.
The result was a redefinition of the Right to Choice. The pro-Choice

vocabulary was adopted as a legitimate component of the national
repertoire; the coercive power of the state was no longer to be employed to prevent women's choices. The women's vocabulary of
"choice," however, was translated from a substantive demand for real
choices in one's life to a permissive liberal demand to prevent active
government interference in whatever choices one might economically,
socially, and personally have. 46
As a matter of political philosophy, we could describe the transformation of the women's vocabulary as the inevitable result of the
limitations of liberal discourse that bases its demand for change on
individual rights. We could place the liberal component as inherent
either in the vocabulary of Choice or in the social system into which it
was integrated. We would thereby describe either the pro-Choice
movement or the social system as inherently incapable of providing
substantive (instead of permissive) rights. Such an internal problematic is not simply a matter of "liberalism," however, for in whatever
manner a woman's demand to "control her own body" is framed, to
do so requires resources, and those resources must come either from
her own efforts ("individualism") or from the efforts of others ("socialism") who, in good conscience, might well object to being involved in her actions. The substantive demand for real choices for
women that had been granted legal standing by the Court was
trimmed back by the legislature to a simple permission because of the
continuing disagreements about the standing of abortion.
As a matter of communication theory, the transformation takes
on a different character. In public discourse, one must appeal to
some form of majority or consensus group of "others" who constitute
the social system. Where one is successful, one's vocabulary will be
and
However, where there are competing discourses
integrated into the public discourse, and thereby one's actions

interests enabled.

Law
117
and powerful segment of the

which one's discourse is integrated into or
"translated into" the public repertoire will be seriously constrained by
the opposing discourse and interests. The result may well be a compromise of the sort evident both in Roe v. Wade and in the actions of
the legislatures and popular referenda. 47 Consequently, in order to
see one's vocabulary and interests fully enacted, one must not only
that also gain legitimacy with a sizable
populace, the
way
in
persuade the public of the appropriateness of one's own terms but

also refute or respond to the terms of the opposition. This is not
always done by movement rhetors, and in some cases it cannot be
done.
On
this account,
it
was not primarily
not the "essential liberalism"
a philosophical deficiency
of the vocabulary of Choice or even of
was limiting. Rather, it was the existence of

competing interest groups and a sparse and largely ineffective refutation of their discourse that resulted in a "compromising" of the proChoice movement's full goals. As a consequence, the vocabularies of
both Life and Choice became partially entrenched in the law, although
in different ways and covering different territories.
This compromise, articulated in the formal realm of legal discourse,
was tightly interwoven with the compromises worked out in the less
formal mass discourse. In chapter 7 I trace the extension of the legal
compromise to the cultural realm by examining prime-time television's portrayals of abortion. In chapter 8 I will describe the even more
dire consequences of the failure to respond to the pro-Life discourse
which occurred with the production of minority violence to replace
the social system that
the State's coercion.
NOTES
v. Wade 410 US. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton 410 US 179 (1973).
The decision is defended by Philip B. Heymann and Douglas E. Barzelay, "The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics/' Boston University
Law Review 53 (1973), 765-84. The initial reactions on the right are summarized and cited by Basile J. Uddo, "A Wink from the Bench: The Federal
Courts and Abortion," Tulane Law Review 53 (1979), 398-464. The language of
some of these reviews is far from confined to legal scholarship. Robert Byrn,
1.
Roe
2.
However, the central pretext

argument concerns legal ways of reasoning. See "An American Tragedy:
The Supreme Court on Abortion," Fordham Law Review 41 (1973), 807. Additional critical defenses are contained in Sylvia A. Law, "Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132 (1984), 955; Laurence H. Tribe, "The Supreme Court 1972 Term; Forword: Toward a Model of
for example, states the issues quite emotionally.
of his
118
Enacting "Choice"
Roles in the
Due
(later partially
Process of Life and Law," Harvard Law Review 87 (1973),
repudiated); Donald H. Regan, "Rewriting Roe
v.
Wade,"
Michigan Law Review 77, no. 7 (1979), 1569, and other articles, same volume.
3. Feminists have recently mounted serious attacks on the adequacy of
"privacy" for providing women with substantive life choices. This issue is
dealt with more fully below, but see Ruth Bader Ginsberg, "Some Thoughts
on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade," North Carolina Law

Review 63 (January 1985), 375-86; Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, "Introduction:
Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and GyneWomen's Rights Law Reporter 9 (1986), 3-6; "Privacy or Sex DiscrimiMust There Be a Choice?" Harvard Women's Law Journal 4
(Spring 1981), ix-xvi. An additional series of pivotal articles are compiled in
the citations in Susan Frelich Appleton, "Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's Role in 'Private' Reproductive
Decisions," Washington University Law Quarterly 63 (1985), 183-236.
4. An extensive body of research is developing on the different rules of
cologists,"
nation Doctrine:
rationalist
and sound argument
in different fields of discourse (e.g., law,
religion). See the work by Stephen

Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1958), and several essays by a variety of authors in Proceedings of the Summer
Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981) and in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer
Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1983), and see Josina M. Makau, "The Supreme Court and Reasonableness," Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984), 381, and W. Lance Bennett and
Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment
in American Culture (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981), and
Chaim Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel,
science, business,
ethics,
Toulmin, The Uses
of
politics,
1980).
5.
This claim does not deny that the discourse in criminal
trials
and
civil
understood by juries through narrative frames (e.g., Bennett and

Feldman). The claim does indicate that the legal structure has attempted to
replace such narrative rationality with conventional propositional rationality
for its professionals
appellate judges. The argument does not violate the
claim of several theorists that narrative form is pervasive and essential to
human understanding; it merely indicates the efforts of various, "elite" or
"expert" groups to subordinate that form. Compare to Walter Fisher, Human
Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987).
6. Roe's complaint was joined by a physician and a married couple, but
their cases were not ruled to have standing and be justiciable.
7. Rehnquist argued that the stage of Roe's pregnancy was unclear and
that this resulted in an overbroad ruling. 35 L Ed 2d 147, p. 197.
8. Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Law Edition, vol. 75, ed. Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper
(Arlington, Va.: University Publications of America, 1975).
cases
is
Landmark,
9.
Law
119
arguments.
p. 787, oral
The judges called this statement "eloquent" (Landmark, p. 788). Although they originally denied the legal importance of this argument, suggest10.
ing that she get to "Constitutional" issues
(p.
788),
they were clearly
later
influenced by this explanation of the cruciality of the issue. None of the

judges, even the dissenting judges, directly challenged these claims, either
during oral argument or in the written decisions and responses. However,

the conservative judges did not accept these claims as 'fundamental,' even
though they accepted them as existent. See below.
11. The Roe decision elaborates some of the case law here, p. 161. The
appellee's briefs and their amici attempted to portray the situation differently,
but they generally do not make the distinction between the rights of the fetus
at the time of injury, inheritance, etc., and the rights of the fetus contingent
on its eventual birth or the parental rights in the fetus, but see "State Protection of Future 'Persons'" Connecticut Law Review 18 (Winter 1986), 429-58.
12. First, the admission of serious, sustained, perhaps sexist, error is
particularly difficult for a Court that sees itself as a last arbiter of major
conflicts. Second, even those who are not strict constructionists find it difficult to believe that new fundamental rights can be created. At best, the
is made that the rights had not previously been contested. It is
important to remember, in this regard, that the rights articulated in the Bill of
Rights and elsewhere are not equivalent to the only fundamental rights the
framers and ratifiers intended to protect. They are, rather, the particular
argument
rights that
were
directly
under
assault at the time.
The
right to privacy
was not
every framer's plantation was his castle. No

one asked Thomas Jefferson for a urine sample. In contrast, from contemporary perspectives, the provision against quartering troops in the home
represents a right no more fundamental than the privacy rights in the bedroom, but the founders were not concerned about birth control infringements, and so the former, perhaps less fundamental, right was explicitly
enumerated while the latter was left unarticulated but arguably protected by
the Ninth Amendment, which declares, "The Enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
a major concern in the age
when
retained by the people."

13. See chapter 3, and also John T. Noonan, Jr., "An Almost Absolute
Value in History," in The Morality of Abortion, ed. John T. Noonan, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). In oral arguments, see Landmark, pp.
800-801.
14. Compare Appleton to Andrea Asaro, "The Judicial Portrayal of the
Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of
Medical Discretion," Harvard Women's Law Journal 6 (Spring 1983), 51-102.
15. Asaro describes the shift and Appleton admits to it on p. 188.
16. This interpretation of the Ninth Amendment is vigorously resisted by
conservatives who claim, among other things, that the intent of the framers
was
to limit this to states' rights.
omission of any
Given the
explicit states' rights
clarity of the
amendment and
its
language, the intent of a few isolated
120
Enacting ''Choice"
framers is irrelevant. The large number of persons responsible for ratifying the
document would have interpreted without these special intentions but in
terms of the clear language it presented then as now. This framing of the issue
terms of public discourse is related to the legal framing of the issue in terms
of "strict constructionism." The "strict constructionist" holds the former
premise preventing the judiciary from adding anything "new" to the constitution hence avoiding legislative-type action. However, given that the Ninth
in
Amendment
explicitly indicates that
there are other constitutionally protected
Court must safegaurd, even though they are not expressly

elaborated in the document itself, a strict construction position should not be
taken, as it so often has been by White and Rehnquist, to mean that no other
rights may be protected as fundamental. This move is predicated on their
political conservativism, rather than their judicial conservativism, because
they argue that any right that has not previously been recognized must not be
fundamental. The alternative, of course, is that there can be fundamental
rights that have not been previously challenged by an ever-more-intrusive
government, or that new rights can become more fundamental in changed
social circumstances, or
as in the case of Brown v. Board of Education
that
the Court previously was wrong.
17. There is a middle tier applied to discrimination cases, which I do not
discuss here because of its tangential relevance. See Makau, "The Supreme
Courts." As with all the legal doctrines discussed here, this one is, of course,
rights that the
not uncontested.
v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965);
438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia 388 US 1.
19. See Petchesky; Appleton.
20. The extent to which the Court has not placed privacy in the familial
context is evident in Meera Werth, "Spousal Notification and the Right of
Privacy," Chicago Kent Law Review 59 (Fall 1983), 1129-51. Additionally, it is
18.
Key decisions include Griswold
Eisenstadt
v.
Baird 405
US
made a progressive move by eliminating pawhich controlled issues of sexuality and abortion without much explicit legal sanction and replacing them with more equitable
privacy rights granted independently to women and men. Furthermore, the
reverse case of Chinese law, in which women do not have a "zone of privacy"
surrounding their bodies and therefore can be literally invaded by the state,
suggests the need to achieve women's liberation from familial (and economic)
constraints in ways other than by discarding privacy. On the Chinese problem see Ann S. Anagnost, "Magical Practice, Birth Policy and Women's Health
arguable that the Court has
triarchal family rights
in Post-Mao China," public lecture, University of Illinois, Urbana, fall 1988;

John S. Aird, "Coercion in Family Planning," Congress of the U.S., Joint
Economic Committee, China's Economy Looks toward the Year 2000 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 21 May 1986), 184-221, or, most accessibly,
Julian L. Simon, "China's 'Voluntary' Population Initiative," Wall Street Journal,
29 February 1988, p. 19. 1 believe that the underlying animus of these attacks is
a basic displeasure with private property which I do not share. The utility of
the privacy argument on the international scene is argued by Aaron E.
Public Rhetoric
and
the
Law
111
Michel, "Abortion and International Law: The Status and Possible Extension
of Women's Right to Privacy/' Journal of Family Law 20 (January 1982), 241-61.
Appleton; Petchesky.
role of the equal protection/discrimination pitfall is made evident
in Larry P. Boyd, "The Hyde Amendment: New Implications for Equal Protection Claims," Baylor Law Review 33 (Spring 1981), 295-306. On the positive role
21.
22.
The
of equal protection in the Court's decision see Tribe, p. 3.

23. Ginsberg admits that, to this point, the Court has not ruled in other
equal protection cases in a fashion that would lead to the desired outcomes if
equal protection were the primary grounds and that the Court has moved to
fundamental for
argument; Ginsberg, pp. 376-79.
establish the right as
women
through the current
line of
24. Roe, p. 152.

25. In oral
arguments (Landmark,
ing against the Ninth

that the
woman
weighed by the
Amendment
p.
823) Flowers accepts that he
is
"balanc-
He
does not argue

does not have those rights but merely that they are out-
right to
26.
See Ginsberg.
27.
Another
life
rights of the mother."
of the fetus.
alternative is that the justices admitted the importance of this
women
but took an extreme statist position that would, on analogy,

have required them to uphold state laws prescribing occupations, housing, or
travel undertaken by men.
right to
28.
Landmark, pp. 821, 823, 802, 803.
p. 817. She had earlier been asked a similar question and

evaded it by focusing the issue on the specific context of the way the case had
been framed (p. 813).
30. Landmark, p. 822, re-argument. A similar line of questioning was pursued on argument, p. 803.
31. Landmark, p. 819. On original argument, see also Floyd, p. 803.
29.
Landmark,
32. Landmark, pp. 819-20.
The Court asked, "Mr. Flowers, doesn't the fact that so many of the
do provide for exceptional situations in which an
abortion may be performed and presumably these date back a great number
33.
state abortion statutes
of years, following Mr. Justice Stewart's
comment
suggest that the absolute
proposition that a fetus from the time of conception
is
a person, just
is at
least
against the weight of historical legal approach to the question?" Flowers

replied, "Yes,
sir, I
would
think, possibly, that that
would
indicate that."
He
then went on to argue for the suggestion that the states just never properly
considered the issue. Landmark, p. 828.
34. The Court's query comes at Landmark, p. 818. The medical discussions
are on re-argument, pp. 826 and 827, on initial argument, pp. 804-5.
35. Landmark, p. 827.
36. For a summary of the legislative history see Peg O'Hara, "Congress
and the Hyde Amendment,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 April
1980, pp. 1038-39. See also Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics, and the Courts: Roe
v. Wade and Its Aftermath, rev. ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
122
37.
Enacting "Choice"
See, for example, Congressional Record: House, 95th Congress, 2d ses-
June 1978, pp. 17258-270, or 10 August 1976, pp. 26781-792 (hereRecord will be abbreviated CR). The first full-scale debate
on an abortion rider was in 1974. See CR: Senate, June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-695.
After Senate Judiciary Commitee Hearings on Abortion in 1974 and 1975,
there was an open debate on the Hatch Amendment (SJ Res 3) in the 98th
Congress, 1st session, March and April, 1983, and on the Helms position, 28
April 1976, SJ Res 178.
38. Rep. Oberstar, CR, 13 June 1978, p. 17261.
39. In brief, the polls indicated that most people made distinctions about
the appropriateness of an abortion based upon the time in the pregnancy and
sion, 13
after, Congressional
the reasons for the abortion. Earlier abortions and more serious reasons
generated more support for legalization. A large majority strongly opposed a
constitutional amendment to ban all abortions except to save the pregnant
woman's life. For more detail on the polls, see chapter 8.
40. Rep. Lloyd, CR, 13 June 1978, p. 17261.
41. Rep. Paul, CR, 10 August 1976, p. 26787.
42. Rep. Obey, CR, 12 October 1978, p. 3692.
43. Ibid.
44.
Rep. Kindness, CR, 10 August 1976,
45.
See Rubin.
p.
26787.
pro-Choice advocates have not presented much evidence

funding restrictions have had any significant impact by reducing
the use of the abortion option. Using figures for the first year after the Hyde
Amendment was enacted, Frohock argues that 94 percent of the Medicaideligible women wanting abortions were able to fund them through other
sources (p. 24). However, according to Nanette J. Davis this may have meant
seventeen deaths from illegal abortions resorted to because funding was not
available between 1975 and 1979 (From Crime to Choice [Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1985]). Arguably, as long as the economic system is provid46.
As
yet, the
that these
ing for the execution of these rights for the overwhelming majority of
women
through indirect means, it will not be forced to confront the provision of

services through direct means. I specify the persons at interest here as wagelaboring women, because this is the group that consciously shares the
"choice" vocabulary, according to studies of activists in the
movement by
Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984). Marilyn Falik, Ideology and Abortion Politics (New York:
Praeger, 1983),
p. 124,
reported that 100 percent of pro-Choice activists in her
sample were employed outside the home, while 70 percent of the married,
female anti-abortion activists indicated "housewife/mother" as their occupation (88 percent were married).
47. By and large, state referenda have not tended to support the pro-Life
vocabulary.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Prime-Time Abortion
Rhetoric and Popular Culture
1973-85
Legal fenceposts can establish only the outer limits within which
social practices are conducted. The understanding of abortion as an
the social norms about abortion would

actual practice in real lives
be negotiated in the more fluid and multiplicitous realm of ^culture. In
America, in the last half of the twentieth century, prime-time network
television has been the most widely accessed cultural medium. As
David Thorburn has argued, television is the contemporary medium
of "consensus narrative," 1 the primary source of "shared stories" that
explain "life as an American" to those holding the dominant vision in
the culture as well as to a large
in
some way. 2 An examination
essential to
cal,
outside that dominant vision
of prime-time television
understanding the ways in which public,
discourse
aries of
number
made
everyday
therefore
is
explicitly politi-
the crucial transition into the cultural vocabul-
life.
Historically, the political-cultural discursive
work done
in
network
prime-time depictions of abortion practices followed, rather than led,

the public argument and legal change; almost all of the episodes
dealing with abortion occurred after Roe v. Wade, and most of them
were not aired until 1984-85. 4 Consequently, the programs visibly
reveal the influences of the public argument. However, television
reworked those discourses in line with the medium's own characteristics to
produce a unique compromise
of its
own.
Creating an Abortion Culture
The
that
earliest televised depictions of abortion

is,
Maude
most
rhetorical.
in 1973 relied
on
were most single-sided
Episodes of the Defenders in 1962 and of
relatively strong cases for abortion. In the case
123
124
Prime-Time Abortion
of the Defenders a doctor
sought abortion to
of the
most
crusaded for legalized abortion and a
woman
rid herself of a rapist's child, thus presenting
rhetorically compelling cases possible. In
one
Maude the cen-
was old enough to make pregnancy plausibly undesirand she was assertive enough to convey the message of
her life and experiences powerfully. Mimicking the early public story
of illegal abortion, these early programs most clearly participated in a
rather explicit argument for change.
tral
character
able for her,
This apparent stridency resulted

economic sanctions by opponents of
in direct political retaliation

liberalized abortion laws. In the
all three of the original sponsors pulled out of

program,
and
the
Catholic magazine America urged its readers to
the
write the replacement sponsor with their comments. 6 In the Maude
case, a decade later, the Catholic opposition was even more fully
organized. Time magazine noted that "Roman Catholics were mounting an intensive and remarkably successful campaign" against the
program. 7 Thirty-eight CBS stations canceled the episode, moved the
segment, or provided response time. 8
The particular charges made against the program were of consequence. Right-to-Life advocates specifically labeled Maude's decision a "convenience abortion" and bemoaned that it "preached
individual selfishness." 9 By drawing particular attention to the reasons
for Maude's abortion by condemning her motives rather than abortion per se
they inadvertently created ground for negotiation. In the
future, television would not back off from televising abortion but
rather would portray the motives for it in more careful and compli-
case of the Defenders,
cated fashion.
This early conflict over televised abortion reveals
itself as
even
more patently rhetorical and political when we consider the fact that
the Maude episode grew out of a prize offered by the Population
Institution (a Methodist-linked organization) for television
programs
with population matters. 10 Direct political and rhetorical

input into the content of television programs through economic
means becomes quite clear on both sides of the issue. At this early
stage economics, sanctions, and discourse generated by different
political interest groups clearly shaped the admission of abortion into
that dealt
American mass
These direct,
culture.
visible,
and vehement sanctions should not be taken
as the sole causal agents affecting the absorption of the political
arguments into the cultural medium. The direct economic sanctions

were merely signs of the broader economic and political pressures
acting on television programmers. Television is always somewhat
responsive to the political tastes and concerns of
The
diences.
particular
way
in
which
ticular portrait of a cultural practice
125
its
potential au-
television responds
the pargiven ^presence for the national
viewing audience depends upon several key characteristics of the

medium. These characteristics and their consequences become visible
when we look closely at the range of abortion practices presented on
television.
The Prime-Time Practice of Abortion

Three distinctly different types of entertainment programs focused on
abortion. 11
problem
The
first set
in the plot
of
programs featuring abortion
as a central
addressed the relationship of legal and medical
professionals to legal abortion. "Liberal" doctor
and
police
affirmed the necessity for professionals to adhere to the
programs
laws by
new
providing support for abortion practices. 12 Episodes of Hill Street

Blues, Cagney and Lacey, and St. Elsewhere fell in this "pro-Choice"
category.
A second set of programs, primarily family series, constituted what

programs. In these episodes central
female characters found themselves with "unwanted pregnancies,"
discussed abortion, decided against it, and yet were saved from the
consequences of carrying the pregnancy to term by miscarriages or by
the discovery that they were not pregnant after all. This "anti-aborI
shall call the "false-pregnancy"
tion" formula was included in episodes of Call to Glory, Webster,

Magruder and Loud, Dallas, and Family.
In a final category of "pro-abortion" programs, central female
characters actually decided to have abortions and explicitly or implicitly went through with them. Spenser for Hire, Maude, Defenders,
Buffalo Bill, part of the Cagney and Lacey subplot, and a second St.
Elsewhere dealt with abortion in this manner.
Prime-time television thus offered three apparently contradictory
on abortion. This diversity was increased by the fact that, in

each of the program types, different characters were assigned to recite
different portions of both the pro-Life and pro-Choice arguments in
positions
some detail. At first glance, therefore, the integration of the public

discourse into the cultural realm seems nothing more than a virtually
unaltered transference of the public disagreement into the cultural
The words of the movement advocates were funneled into the
mouths and their values and worldviews were funneled
the characters' actions. Entertainment programming appears to
realm.
characters'
into
have allowed
its
audiences to "take sides" in the controversy, selecting
126
Prime-Time Abortion
pro-Choice, pro-abortion, or pro-family positions. Actually, however,

through cautious assignment of roles and arguments the three program types cooperated, if inadvertently, to produce a much more
integrated and shared set of interpretations of acceptable abortion in
American culture. The outlines of this cultural portrayal emerges
through detailed exploration of each of the program types.
Professional Choices
In the "professional regulation" programs of the eighties program-
mers dealt with the underlying political struggle in several ways.

Cagney and Lacey, St. Elsewhere, and Hill Street Blues all featured doctors
and law enforcement officials counteracting the effects of extra-legal
violence directed against legal abortion practices. Regardless of the
dictates of their personal consciences, the doctors
and lawyers were
forced to take a stand in support of the law. Detective Sergeant Chris
Cagney, in spite of her Catholic background, protected and assisted

an indigent woman who sought an abortion and tracked down and
confronted an abortion clinic bomber. The St. Elsewhere team provided an abortion to a mentally retarded woman, featured an abortion
by the girlfriend of an internist, and treated the victims of an abortion
clinic bomber. The Hill Street crew dealt with an abortion clinic
demonstration in which a pro-Life activist caused the death of a fetus
by violently shoving its mother.
Each of these cases presented the issues as contested and controversial; particular characters who clearly represented different interest groups argued about them. In two lengthy scenes, Cagney and
Lacey argued out the issue of "choice," and in another Cagney reargued the issue with her recalcitrant Catholic father. These disputes
were clearly phrased in terms of the interests and beliefs of "women"
vs. "the church." This episode provides a clear example of the particular way prime-time television positioned these vocabularies for
private lives.
The key points
of the pro-Life
argument
in the Cagney and Lacey
one woman and

one man. Early in the program the pro-Life position was articulated
by Arlene Crenshaw, the leader of the local pro-Life group. As
Cagney and Lacey attempted to restrain a picket line so that women
could pass through into the clinic, Crenshaw accused Cagney, "How
can you help murder unborn babies?" She continued, "Sergeant,
human beings are being murdered here every day. ... If you were in
episode were presented by two minor characters
127
Nazi Germany and you saw lives being taken by the thousands,
wouldn't you do everything in your power to stop that?"
Throughout the program, Arlene was portrayed in a basically inoffensive manner. 13 She was firm and sincere, if a bit " straight-laced"
or severe.
life
Her argument
was presented
that
abortion was the taking of
human
publicly, as a matter of reasonable conviction.
It
was, however, indirectly contrasted with the argument offered by the

male pro-Life character Cagney's father. Playing pool in a bar one
evening, Cagney and her father had a conversation in which he urged
her to ask to get relieved from the case because the "big boys" downtown Irish Catholics would not look favorably on the investigation.
father:
makes me sick anyway. I mean, when an

used to be a dirty word. Just because the times
have changed doesn't change anything, you know. It's still a
This whole thing
abortionist
mortal
sin.
Cagney: Are you so sure of that?

father:
Chrissy, that
taught and
is
it's
way I was taught. It's the way you were

way I believe. People a lot smarter than me
the
the
have spent a lot of time figuring this thing out.

Cagney: Yeah, what if I was pregnant and I didn't want to marry the
guy? Or he was married and I couldn't and I didn't want to
raise the baby by myself?
father:
We
we
we'd figure something out. You know. Adoption
your brother. Something.
Cagney: Well, what if I didn't want to?
father:
Hey, what are you asking me these questions for? It's not a
man's problem, you know. Sheee
.I'm sorry
that's not
what I meant. What I meant was.
Boy, this is some
conversation for somebody who once wanted to be a nun. But
it's not going to happen, so please. It's your shot.
.
This "private" conversation gave voice to the assumptions of the

pro-Choice worldview about the private motivations of the pro-Life
movement that it was a religious (Catholic) matter and a matter of
male vs. female. 14 In thus re-articulating the arguments the cultural
program retained the pro-Life group's ûniversalized argument based
on Life but revised it by portraying it as dependent on private motivations. The pro-Life position thus retained the moral ground, but that
morality was recast from universal to religious and private. The ramifications of that portrayal should become evident shortly.
This episode of Cagney and Lacey also presented a series of characand articulating specific components of the pro-Choice
ters enacting
Prime-Time Abortion
128
discourse. "Mrs. Herrera" initiated the contact between the detectives
by requesting assistance from the police to get through

the picket line. She was apparently of Latin American descent, and
she expressed a highly rhetoricized motivation for seeking an abortion. In the police car with Cagney and Lacey she answered a question about her husband, saying, "He's on disability.
They can't
make me have this baby. I see my friends my age. They have babies.
They can't work. They can't go to school. The only thing they can do
is watch TV all day." Mary Beth then asked her, "Will your husband be
able to go back to work?" and Mrs. Herrera replied, "Who knows
when. I don't want to be on welfare. I want to finish business school."
Mrs. Herrera thus represented and articulated the economic
motivation for abortion for lower-class women. Through this means
the program enacted and restated a major component of the proChoice position. However, the program also transformed that argument into a "pro-abortion" rather than "pro-Choice" position in two
ways. First, because Mrs. Herrera was a temporary, secondary
character, she was put in the position of justifying her abortion to the
representatives of the social order (the detectives). The dialogue provided the middle-class auditors an economic reason (welfare costs) for
and the
clinic
supporting abortions for the poor rather than for supporting choices
poor women per se. In addition, through negation the dialogue built the assumption that women whose husbands could support them did not need or should not have abortions. The
dramatization thus limited the appropriate realm for Choice in a
second way.
This limiting of Choice was reinforced by the male physician from
the abortion clinic, who gave two "speeches" on abortion. In his first
contact with the detectives he angrily ranted: "They're so worried
about the unborn. What about the babies that are already here? Do
you think those people were picketing City Hall when day-care funding was cut?" He then turned to Detective Mary Beth Lacey, asking,
for the
"What month
are
you
in?
Lacey: Fifth.
Dr.:
That's wonderful.
Lacey: Yeah.
Dr.
You got a ring on your finger. You got a good paying job.
the women who come in here aren't so lucky.
A lot of
In re-articulating the consistency challenge to the pro-Life
ment, the doctor once again raised the issue of the
move-
social costs of
129
who had
only marginal economic

as the opposite of a
woman seeking abortion, thereby again identifying a type of woman
who should not seek an abortion. Both of these topics framed the
issue as a matter of support for specific types of abortions, rather than
as a matter of support for the principle of women's Choice.
giving birth to children for parents
self-sufficiency. He also described
The
Mary Beth
doctor's articulation of the "pro-abortion" position
was par-
powerful because of the authority physicians carry (in both

social and dramatic life). Unlike Mrs. Herrera, who "justified" her
ticularly
abortion to the detectives, the doctor lectured the detectives, some-
what
righteously. This authority
was
crucial, as
he defined even the
pro-Choice rationale for the pro-abortion position, not as a matter of

morality or principle but as a matter of sympathy and social necessity.
had been bombed, he met Cagney and Lacey in the

some of these records. We had twelve-year-olds children who came here pregnant.
Now what brand of compassion forces a child hell, anyone to go
through an unwanted pregnancy?"
After his clinic
rubble and commented: "You just look through
Cagney: Well, apparently there are people who disagree with you.
Well, that's hard to see when you're standing in my shoes. It
wasn't that long ago that I'd see women who had literally
mutilated themselves. They were that desperate.
Dr.:
The
doctor, replicating the physicians role in the entire abortion
controversy, here presented himself as an expert witness giving
first-
hand testimony. He did not propose that the Right to Choice was a
matter of principle. Instead, he described Choice as a pragmatic
necessity, given the fact that women would otherwise mutilate themselves, leaving doctors to deal with the messy consequences. This
would prove to be a consequential acquiescence to the pro-Life claim
to
own
the higher moral ground.
The physician, Mrs. Herrera, Cagney's father, and Arlene

Crenshaw articulated and modified the public argument on abortion
in the cultural realm by embodying the lived positions of those who
might inhabit particular social conditions. Each of these characters
was, however, placed in opposition to the main characters. The physician, as a male, occupied a suspect category in this pro-women
program, and he lectured the detectives as if they were the opposition. Cagney's father enacted a similar male, authority-figure opposition to Cagney. Mrs. Herrera and Arlene Crenshaw both confronted
the detectives
making demands upon them
in their "line of duty."
Prime-Time Abortion
130
Cagney and Lacey were
therefore positioned against these characters
to provide a "resolution" of the social conflict. This occurred in
two
separate encounters.
The most dramatic of the pro-Choice discourses in the episode was

the retelling of the tale of illegal abortion by the visibly pregnant
detective, Mary Beth Lacey. One night in bed with her husband,
Harvey, Mary Beth reflected on the day's events
Mrs. Herrera.
Lacey:
I'm the luckiest lady
and the boys.
the clinic, assisting
my health back. I got you

me. [She then contrasts her
alive. I've got
new
got
at
life
in
position to that of Mrs. Herrera.]
Lacey:
what birth control's for. People shouldn't have kids if

they can't take care of them.
Who knows what she was dreaming would happen. I mean,
it's easy to judge when it's somebody else you're talking
about. It's different when it's you that's pregnant and you've
Harvey:
It's
Lacey:
Harvey:
move on.
He was a bum, Mary Beth. Any guy that would
you. Make you go through that by yourself.
Lacey:
Harvey:
You did what you had
Lacey:
Well,
Harvey:
That's
got
nowhere
to turn.
Mary
a long time ago,
Beth.
It's
over.
[Long pause]
was nineteen years old, Harvey. I thought he was the man of

my dreams. For him it was a little experiment and then time
to
couldn't
tell
anybody. Not even
not stand by
my mother.
to do.
wasn't going to bring a kid into this world without a

never knowing your father. [Mary
father. That's too hard,
Beth had been raised without her deserting
Harvey:
father.]
know, babe.
snuck around
like a criminal. Got some guy's name. SomeI

body said he'd been a medic in the army.
Harvey: It's OK.
Lacey:
And one Sunday afternoon I went to where he lived in the
Bronx this little room over a grocery. In the corner was a
table and he pointed to it and he said, "Lie down!" like I was a
Lacey:
dog.
No better
than a dog, Harv.
Harvey:
OK, Mary
Lacey:
And you know I almost let him do it to me.
Beth.
thought about
it.
You
.
said
it.
stood there and
There's people that want us to go back
to that, Harv.
never be that way again.

be exactly like that. The only reason I could walk away was
'cause the money I saved for second semester. I made a choice
right there. Take that money and go to Puerto Rico. Have it
Harvey:
It'll
Lacey:
It'll

131
done.
My college money. How many women do you
think he butchered on that table, Harv, huh?
.
Mary Beth
not only recounted a personalized

she also provided the deepest
version
defense of the pro-Choice position the inability to judge others and
the consequent requirement that they be allowed to make their own
choices. She also recognized that a system that disallows Choice
In this dialogue,
of the tale of illegal abortion,
economic disparities between women. In providing

argument, however, Mary Beth was concerned not with a particular moral argument about the intrinsic desirability of Choice as a
moral fact but rather with the desirability of permissive laws. She did
not define abortion as a right or as a moral action available to women
on principle; instead, she simply refused to pass moral judgment on
other women. Like the public positions articulated by Mrs. Herrera
and the physician, her point of view did not contest the moral ground
claimed by anti-abortionists. Moreover, she described, once again,
the situation in which a woman would not want to have an abortion
if she were married with good financial support.
intensifies the
this
Lacey's personal,
and
clearly private, position
on abortion was not
an adequate resolution to the public conflict, but it did set up the

grounds for compromise. Throughout the program Lacey was positioned as the pro-Choice advocate; Cagney, in contrast, was placed as
the pivotal figure uncertain about abortion, reluctant to help Mrs.
Herrera, willing to listen to Arlene Crenshaw. It was therefore Lacey's
confrontation with Cagney and their shared discourse that con-
structed a "resolution." That event took place in the half-public, halfprivate space of the
women's
Mary Beth
locker room.
finally con-
fronted Chris's reluctance:

Lacey:
woman is
own body.
Chris, the
her
entitled to
make up her own mind about
Cagney: Mary Beth, please don't lecture me.
live
what you're
talking
about.
Lacey:
Pardon?
Cagney:
Lacey:
[with sarcasm] Oh,
was raised
Catholic. This
Cagney:
[softly]
Lacey:
Women like Mrs.

to
Cagney:
Lacey:
is
a hard
one
for
me.
see.
No, you don't.
make
their
Herrera are wrong. They don't have a right
own
decisions.
didn't say that. But there are other choices besides abortion.
No one
should
tell
Mrs. Herrera to have a child she doesn't
want.
Cagney:
[very softly] You're right,
Mary
Beth.
am
pro-Choice. You
Prime-Time Abortion
132
never lived my life any other way. But that doesn't

I'm also pro-Life.
So you're on everybody's side? You have to take a stand on
this one, Christine. Otherwise you're walking a fence.
[very softly] O.K., I'm walking a fence.
How would you feel if you were raped and you got pregnant?
know.
I've
mean I'm
Lacey:
Cagney:
Lacey:
Cagney: Oh,
don't know;
it
would depend on the
guy.
Ahh!
Lacey:
Cagney: Well, please, that
OK,
Lacey:
is
the most stupid thing you ever asked me.
forget about rape victims
let's
women carrying around
and teenage
severely damaged children.
girls
and
[Italic
type
represents talking over each other. ]
Cagney:
don't forget.
do not forget anyone.
What if it were you, Christine? A thirty-eight-year-old woman

having to conspire with her doctor to commit a crime. That's
humiliating, and what if they changed the law back and you
don't have a choice any more?
Cagney: Then stop. I'd hate it. All right? I'm just trying to tell you my
Lacey:
feelings, [softly]
Abortion
Lacey:
Cagney: Well,
My
Lacey:
tell
belly
is
that to
is
know when
don't
not murder.
my
your
It's
it's
murder.
not even a person yet.
belly.
business.
Same
as Mrs. Herrera's belly
is
her
business.
Cagney:
OK, Mary Beth? For the

no one should take away anyone's right to make their
own choices about anything. But this one feels wrong. Let's
don't want to argue anymore,
record,
stop.
Really, abortion
Lacey:
is
wrong but
birth control isn't?
You do use
birth control, Christine?
Cagney:
[softly
and
regretfully]
Nobody's
perfect.
complex negotiation of meaning. The two women

between public and private perspectives. They
employ the key terms of the movement Choice and murder but they
end up relating them in a specific and unique way. Mary Beth chalThis dialogue
jump back and
is
forth
lenges Cagney to avoid "walking the fence"

a resolution of the terms
answer
is
to
and the
that
is,
to
come up with
public/private dilemma. Cagney's
support public Choice but to suggest that the private
The resolution is
Cagney admits the difficulty
decision ought to be against abortion as a moral sin.
deepened by the
of living
up
birth control analogy:
to one's
own moral
prescriptions, let alone the problem-
enacting those moral prescriptions into law.

In Cagney and Lacey, therefore, the public argument was translated
into the cultural realm in two ways. First, characters enacted the life
atic of
conditions alleged by the public dialogue to be lived by real people in

"real life"
133
the woman who had an abortion as a teenager, the doctor
who
ity woman who lacks the resources
Catholic who makes the issue one
treated victims of illegal abortion, the financially destitute minor-
and even the male

and abstraction while
to raise a child,
of tradition
denying himself contact with the experiences of the female world.

Second, these characters spoke the discourse of the social movement
activists, but they did so in a carefully narrowed and re-personalized
fashion. Through these two mechanisms, the program gave meaning
to "abortion" and the surrounding vocabularies in private conditions
rather than as general social abstractions.
This double assimilation gave access to meanings of the new public
vocabulary that could be directly appropriated in everyday life. In
doing so, however, it encouraged a particular, circumscribed cultural
meaning for the practice of abortion, supporting legal Choice as a
pragmatic necessity but defining abortion as a morally undesirable
act. Abortions were "justified" only in a particular range of conditions where a woman was too young or too old, unmarried, or
financially destitute. The prime-time interpretation thus provided a
resolution fully consonant with Roe v. Wade: individuals shall make
their own moral choices. However, it endorsed only a limited range of
such choices and accepted the pro-Life position that the practice of
abortion
is
morally problematic.
The construction
meaning
was
The program, like pro-Choice
was boycotted by Catholics and the Right-to-Life
of the
of abortion in this depiction
not, of course, universally persuasive.
programs before it,

movement. However, the definition of the practice of abortion created
in this program was consonant with those in the other programs in
the category and in the other program types. The uniformity of
depiction created the presence of a
tion in televised
American
somewhat
singular vision of abor-
culture. This largely
uncontested pres-
ence, over the long term, carried persuasive impact.
Although generally
less artistic, less sensitive,
and
less
profound,
the other programs in the professional genre similarly constructed a
permissive, but limited, definition of abortion. Hill Street Blues' outcast female public
defender gleefully based the defense of a pro-Life
who had caused a miscarriage on the claim that the fetus was
not a living human person. Her definition, however, was rejected and
activist
constrained both by the

professional
woman
more moderate responses of the acceptable

and by the willingness of the
(Joyce Davenport)
male to accede to legal penalties rather than betray

by accepting the heretical defense for private
protection. The right to "impose your morality on others" was again
pro-Life, religious
his public principles
Prime-Time Abortion
134
denied (violence to prevent abortion was chastised and legal abortion

supported), but moral strength was portrayed as resting on the proLife ground.
The St. Elsewhere episode likewise supported this proscribed meaning of abortion. It featured vigorous argument from a male (Jack) that
abortion is wrong. There were relatively lengthy discussions in the
doctors' lounge, airing many pro-Choice and pro-Life claims. In these
discussions the interests of pregnant women were explicitly defended
by female doctors-to-be and young career women in opposition to
Jack's masculine defense of the fetus's rights. In the end, the mentally
impaired woman lacking both choice and moral judgment was
aborted by a medical establishment that defined the operation as a
morally regrettable necessity. Another episode of St. Elsewhere similarly negotiated the discourse on abortion through a plot focused on a
fanatic pro-Lifer threatening the hospital with violence.
As a whole, the professional programs produced a fairly narrow
range of portrayals in which professionals supported legal Choice but
regarded abortion itself as morally undesirable neither an "easy
choice" nor a replacement for birth control and positively inappropriate for happily married women. Perhaps it is not surprising that the
constraints of the liberal professional/personal programs tended to
produce fairly similar transformations of the public discourse, resulting in a fairly unified enactment of abortion across different episodes
and programs. However, in the other two categories of prime-time
programs, very different struggles and portrayals produced similar
outcomes.
False Choices/False Pregnancies

In the "false pregnancy" programs, central female characters dis-
covered themselves to be pregnant against their wishes. Their

dominant reasons for not wanting a child centered on the desire for a
career or a life of "one's own" factors described as "convenience" by
pro-Life advocates (Dallas, focusing
on
Down's Syndrome
fetus,
provided the only exception). The episode of Call to Glory provides a

typical example. Vanessa Sarnouk was in college, studying electronics. She had just been offered a job about which she was excited,
if frightened, when she discovered she was pregnant. She was
crushed but terrified to admit that she did not want the child. When
an older female family member asked her "What about school? What
about your job?" Vanessa refused to answer. A female friend finally
135
forced her to confront the issue, rather than merely going along with
the inevitability of pregnancy:
Yeah, but do you want
Friend:
it?
Vanessa: Rainer's very happy.

Rainer's not pregnant. His
Friend:
bit.
I
life isn't going to change one tiny

Doesn't that make any difference to you? [pause]
that choice. Three years ago. ... It wasn't a dirty back
Yours
made
room.
It
is.
was
modern
ican doctors ...
clinic.
Right across the border. Amer-
didn't feel too great about
anybody ever does. But
it.
don't think
went ahead with the
life
I'd
planned.
Vanessa: I don't want to hear about this.
Friend:
You have the right to make that choice.
Vanessa: [angry look]
restroom of a pizza parlor, the friend came in to find an

Vanessa sobbed to her, with anger and
going to have this baby. I'm going to love this baby. It's
Later, at the
agitated, crying Vanessa.
despair:
Tm
all right.
I'm
all
right."
Like Vanessa, the other
women
in these "false
pregnancy" pro-
grams were portrayed as giving up

than an abortion. Their explicit discourse reaffirmed
the value of motherhood and family over career. This explicit rationale
and "choice" was, however, in each case revealed as inauthentic; after
making the anti-abortion choice each of these women had a miscarriage or discovered that she was not really pregnant at all. The women
then expressed great regret and even guilt, simultaneously tying their
career for family, deciding to have
a child rather
own motivations back into the decision process.

said to her husband,
"I
didn't
want
it.
It
Vanessa, for example,
must have known."

and the underlying
programs the dramatic structure

polworked together to constrain very tightly the
cultural enactment of the practice of abortion. The specific "characters" that inhabit television have a restricted range of probable actions
open to them, limited by the nature of the mass audience and their
politics and life experiences. 15 The identity given modern female
characters in these television programs was incompatible with returning to (or assuming) motherhood if it meant sacrifice of career. Consequently, even though the scriptwriters overtly affirmed the choice of
motherhood, they subsequently negated that choice by relieving the
In these
itics
of television series
women
of
its
character-destroying consequences.
These programs reached this conclusion because of problems of

They were unable to provide an answer to the
narrative coherence.
136
Prime-Time Abortion
problematic presented by abortion because they were faced with the

fundamental abortion problem: although women's lives include alternatives to pregnancy, women's biology presents the difficult-to-control fact of pregnancy. Specifically, the women of the programs lived
late-twentieth-century lives, with careers and other-than-maternal interests. To bear the children (whether to become mothers or to adopt
out the children) would have destroyed their character types, which
were fundamental to the coherence of the plot and the series identity
for the mass audience. These same constraints also prohibited these
family-oriented women from having abortions. The dramatic resolution fit the persuasive limitations of the situation, defined by the limits
authorized by the competing special-interest groups, but it did not
provide complete role-models successfully blending traditional values
with contemporary life patterns.

Additionally, even these "family" programs could not directly present the central discourse of the pro-Life movement itself. Because
television uses narrative form focused on individuals while the proLife public argument focused on ideographs, social heritage, fetal
images, and scientific discourses, television entertainment programming could not present a dramatic enactment of the pro-Life claim.
The best it could do was to shift the discursive ground back to
"family" (a focus the movement itself had generally avoided because
of
its
anti-feminist
and
pro-natalist overtones).
Like the pro-Choice programs, therefore, the family programs did

not represent the discourse of a single side of the controversy as a
pure enactment of the practice and meaning of abortion. In the proLife
programs characters could endorse the pro-Life discourse

and choose explicitly against abortion, but they could not
"family"
of
act
on those discursive motivations. Once again, refusal of abortion by

married women was portrayed as the moral choice, but once again,
the need to permit abortion (or at least its effects) was enacted.
Moreover, to get to this enactment, the family programs had to
endorse the concept of women's Choice in the first place. In all cases,
it was the women who made the decision whether to continue the
pregnancy. This was, indeed, a mixed introduction to the practice. It
depicted moral disapproval of abortion, support for the concept of
women's Choice, and endorsement of family but no authentic

native such as resources for and commitment to child-raising.
alter-
Pro-Abortion?
The same range

different
of meanings emerged yet again through slightly

images in the last of the program types. Five programs
featured
137
women having abortions. As indicated
above, the Maude and

were early and more rhetorical, but in the three
Hire, St. Elsewhere, and the subplot of Cagney and
Defenders episodes
cases of Spenser for

Lacey abortion was not introduced in a simple pro-abortion fashion. In
women's reasons
these programs, the
for
choosing abortion
the "acceptable" range charted out in the "false pregnancy"
fell
into
and "pro-
Choice" programs. The Spenser for Hire episode illustrates the texture
of these programs. Spenser's girlfriend, Susan, discovered that she
was pregnant, and they discussed it during a walk in the park [I have
underlined the explicit discourse from the political controversy]:
Susan:
Saying
is
out loud makes it sound so selfish, but dammit, this

worst time for this to have happened.
it
just the
Do you
Spenser: Worst time?
think there'd ever be a perfect time,
is that what we are talking about here?

and I know you too well to think that your motives
would ever be selfish.
[He goes on to interpret her reluctance as a fear that he would not be able to be a good father.
She denies that and continues.]
Suse?
Convenience,
love you,
Susan:
What I'm
really talking
about
is
my
independence. All
life
I've
depended on someone. First my parents, then Frank. I'm

finally at a point where I can stand on my own and feel some
control over my own life
make decisions based on what I want
If I have a baby now I'll lose that. So maybe it is selfish.
Spenser: Susan, I understand about independence. About people
making decisions. About being controlled or forced. But this
decision
is
not yours alone.
...
sibility here.
has a right to
Susan:
What
if I
want
it.
It's
mine, too. I've got a respon-
I'm prepared for
it.
This baby
live.
don't think
it's
a baby yet?
What
if I
think there
is still
choice?
They continued walking and arguing:

Susan:
You're very lucky to be so sure. 'Cause the only thing

right
now
is
that
know
love you.
harmony in the world comes from

us knowing we're independent creatures? [no answer] If it
Spenser: So you think the ultimate
were
Susan:
If I
Spenser:
my decision,
do,
couldn't do
it.
what about us?
don't know.
In the end, Spenser brought her flowers at the hospital to begin the
process of healing the relationship. The discourse of this "pro-abortion" program, however, clearly did not frame abortion as a practice
simply in terms of the public pro-Choice arguments. It articulated
both sides of the issue at several levels, including the Right to Life vs.
Prime-Time Abortion
138
"control of my life" and Choice. Additionally, the characterization of

motivations as "selfish" was explored with the characters cooperating to accept the pro-Life label here. Moreover, the abstract moral
premise of the pro-Life attack that the pro-Choice position recogno higher value than the individual also was presented with
greater presence than its opposite. In the end, the choice occurred,
the character enacted the pro-Choice position, but only in the face of
its definition as a highly problematic personal and moral action. The
"convenience" abortion was thereby defined and derogated even as it
nizes
was enacted.
The portrayal of abortion as an act entailing moral guilt and personal regret pervaded the "pro-abortion" programs. The episode of
St. Elsewhere deepened this coloration of abortion by displaying the
actions of a woman after an abortion. In this episode Jack's girlfriend,
Clancey, managed to fend off his sexual fondling in the doctor's
lounge long enough to inform him that "the rabbit died." She told him
of her intent to have an abortion and the reasons for it:
Clancey: I'm not going to have
lives.
There's
it.
...
no room
in
I'm not being callous about this

lot of
just
thought. You've got to trust
Clancey,
kid right now.
practical. I've
me
here, Jack.
given
It
it
makes
have to get to class. Bye.

think what you're doing is wrong.
perfect sense.
Jack:
don't want to complicate our
my life for a
After the abortion she returned to him, crying.

Clancey:
love
you and someday
now wasn't
when is?
just that
Jack:
Well,
would
like to
have your baby.
the right time. That's
It's
all.
Clancey: Jack, I'm so unhappy.

That's a natural post-operative depression.
Jack:
Clancey: No.
was unhappy before the abortion
'cause, for all
my
talk
about being in control, I'm not as grown-up as I thought.

didn't take precautions to keep from getting pregnant.
Jack:
Well, that's as
much my responsibility
Clancey: The problem with making choices
them. Hold me,
Jack.
need
to
is
as yours.
that
you have
to live
with
be held.
programs the depiction of the practice of abortion was tightly constrained. Abortion emerged as a practice which, because it was morally problematic, entailed personal
regret and moral guilt and should be avoided through birth control. It
was sanctioned only when it did not conflict with the values of family
and motherhood for the unmarried or those in otherwise seriously
Thus even
in the pro-abortion
139
problematic situations. In none of these cases, nor to my knowledge

any television program in this time period, did a woman in a
"family situation" (that is, married, with a husband who could support
in
and of normal childbearing age, say twenty to thirty-five) abort a

healthy fetus. 16 Lacey talked about an abortion she had as a teenager,
unmarried and with little economic support. She defended that right
but did so even as she was pregnant with a child she very much
wanted. Spenser's girlfriend was also unmarried, as was Clancey in
her,
and the mentally retarded woman in a separate St.

While both Jack and Spenser offered to marry the
women with whom they were involved, marriage-only-to-bear-achild was disparaged as wrong in itself. Additionally, even these
apparently "pro-abortion" episodes included vigorous argument
against abortion and in favor of having and dealing with the baby.
Even in the strongest cases, therefore, the mass cultural medium of
television admitted abortion only as an ambiguous and constrained
practice. Legal permission was not translated into unmitigated
cultural sanction, and abortion certainly was not endorsed as a casual
method of birth control. Although the three different types of aborSt.
Elsewhere
Elsewhere episode.
tion episodes presented abortion practices in noticeably different

ways, in the end they constructed a relatively unified depiction of the
practice of abortion in American mainstream culture. Simply stated,
abortion in the world of network prime-time television was a woman's
choice but morally undesirable, especially as a practice for women in
financially secure traditional marriages. The positive worth of abortion as an act to achieve specific goals for specific women was portrayed but overlaid with a set of evaluations that described abortion as
an action to be avoided wherever possible.
The televised boundaries around the practice of abortion were, in
many ways, very much in tune with the larger non-televised cultural
practices. Eighty percent of abortions are by unmarried women, and
in the television series the percentage was very similar. 17 In addition,
most of the reasons given for considering abortion related to the
woman's life-style her career and educational goals, her existing
family, and so on rather than to rape or fetal deformity. This too was
American abortion practices, and that similarity was

unlike the discourse of the larger public argument.
representative of
In addition to being representative of cultural practices in some

ways, the programs also strove mightily to remain within dominant
cultural values. Most of the episodes explicitly highlighted the values
of childbearing, family, and mothering in the face of the potential
threat to these values abortion represents. It was the happily pregnant
Prime-Time Abortion
140
Lacey who defended abortion rights, not the "stiH"-unmarried

Cagney. Spenser for Hire featured a subplot of two orphaned children
that Spenser and his girlfriend cared for lovingly. Magruder and Loud
included a side-plot showing their love and care for a young child, as
well as one emphasizing the dangers of a bad marriage. Webster's
mom reaffirmed her love for him, even as she fretted over whether to
go through with her pregnancy. The "false pregnancy" programs all
all these cases
involved were very supportive of bringing the pregnancy to
term. The cultural practice of abortion was in this way hemmed in by
other values and practices.
The abortion practice was also, however, defined by omissions.
The networks created an image of abortion that addressed a presumed dominant audience. Although one-third of all abortions are
done on teenagers, there was no enactment of the practice of abortion
for teenagers. Similarly, the programs did not portray the questions
abortion brings for minority women. Mrs. Herrera, the only minority
person seeking abortion, remained a secondary character who served
as an excuse for Cagney and Lacey's involvement rather than a person
whose real life experiences, within her own culture and situation,
were framed and explored in any detail.
The characteristics of television and the mass audience it addresses
were, once again, influential here. Programs directed at teenagers
(largely science fiction, action programs, and situation comedies) are
not "appropriate" for dealing with a controversial issue like abortion.
Moreover, the methods of dealing with teen pregnancy are still too
controversial for extended address. Similarly, the medium is not
much involved in attracting small minority cultures as audiences, and
so the problem of abortion for minority women could gain no space
for a hearing.
There were many other important omissions as well. In general,
although the programs presented the major claims of each side, they
did not articulate the grounds supporting those claims. They did not
include visual images of aborted fetuses, philosophical or scientific
arguments about the status of the fetus, or even coverage of the
experience of having an abortion. The programs did not generally
depict either adoption or contraception as alternatives.
As a whole, television focused more closely on the purposes of
representative individual women and the stories of their lives than
had the political discourse. The compromise on abortion framed in
strongly affirmed the value of children. In addition, in

the
men
the cultural
differences
medium
therefore featured significant similarities to
from the compromises reached
and
in the political realm. Like
141
the Supreme Court, the cultural compromise placed the decision for
abortion in the private realm. Unlike the Court, it made an explicit
moral evaluation of the practice. Like the popular opinion (analyzed
in the next chapter), the television
abortion an
tions.
programs made the reason
for
important factor in determining the acceptability of abor-
Unlike the popular opinion, the programs ignored the stage of

and preferred instead the nature of the
the development of the fetus

relationships
between men and women.

Conclusion
In absorbing the public
ated by Roe
v.
argument and the new
legal formation gener-
Wade, prime-time television generated a limited range
of portrayals of the cultural practice of abortion.
The
particular charac-
prime-time network television its narratives, its genres,

and the economics of its audiences shaped the elements of the
public discourse that would be included and the manner in which
they would be combined. Ultimately, television portrayed a compromise of both vocabularies, but the practical, cultural compromise was
teristics of
somewhat
different
from the
legal-political one.
Television's depiction of a culture of abortion therefore
was
of great
consequence. As the public argument moved from the distant realm

of politics into the realm of people's lives, this pervasive cultural
medium helped to translate the abstractions of political discourse into
terms of real life practices. It did so by enacting abortion in ways that
showed clear signs of both pro-Choice and pro-Life influences. It was
a compromise generated by the fact that a new discourse (the language of Choice) had been accepted without direct refutation of the
old governing terms (the discourse of pro-Life).
The generation of such compromises is of great importance for
social and moral theory. The development and general acceptance of a
compromise position on the abortion issue controverts the claims
of
such as Alasdair Maclntyre, who label such issues

"incommensurable." 18 These conservatives have joined the ranks of
the leftists in suggesting that we live in an age in which public
discourse cannot produce satisfactory political decisions. The case of
social pessimists
abortion refutes this claim. For the majority, the social practice of
abortion generated by the prime-time portrayal was perhaps not optimal,
but
it
was
at least satisfactory.
however, upon the rational

character of the compromise. There is, of course, no way to defend
the compromise solely from the principles of either the pro-Choice or
The issue
for the conservatives hinges,
142
Prime-Time Abortion
the pro-Life
movement. The
televisual enactment
abandoned
or
transformed the principle of Choice and the claim to a Right to Life for
The various components of the compromise were not arand therefore, it would be difficult
to justify its particular elements argumentatively. The compromise
was, however, both discursively and rationally generated. The discursive form was narrative and the rationale was that of a response to the
material realities of the audience's lives. It was a working compromise,
the fetus.
rived at through "argumentation,"
a pragmatic resolution rather than a philosophical one. Perhaps that
suggests more clearly than anything the limits of philosophy for

governing or understanding public life.
Not all persons living in the nation accepted either the legal or
cultural compromises reached by the dominant culture. The lack of
decisive refutation encouraged activist adherents to pure forms of
older vocabularies. When they found their vocabulary displaced and
modified by new laws and new cultural enactments, these activists
(seeking their
the
own
version of philosophical purity)
moved
to restore
potency of their words. Given the increasingly stabilized
full
public discourse, their failure to understand reasons against their

position,
political
and their own distance from the dominant discourses of the

and cultural realm, they shifted the attack from rhetoric to
violence.
NOTES
1. David Thorburn, 'Television as an Aesthetic Medium/' Critical Studies
Mass Communication 4 (June 1987), 161-74; however, I disagree with Thorburn's argument for a primary emphasis on the aesthetic dimensions of these
in
narratives.
2. Thorburn's view is often taken to be in opposition to the current
arguments in favor of the "polysemic" qualities of television. I do not believe
this is an accurate opposition. It is simply the case that, in most cultures,
consensual narratives have always served primarily the dominant coalitions.
Theories of consensuality in public narratives are similarly not destroyed by
the fact that there might be a certain range of different and somewhat incom-
patible narratives within the
consensual narrative to do
medium. Absolute identity is not essential for a

social work. Compare to John Fiske, "Televi-
its
sion: Polysemy and Popularity," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 3 (December 1986), pp. 391-408, or David Morley, The "Nationwide" Audience
(London: British Film
Institute, 1980).
between change-bearing public argument and entertainment television has not yet been adequately accounted for in theory or in
current methods. Dissecting a single program, describing a genre, or even
3.
The
relationship

charting a particular strip of viewing cannot reveal the
medium, processes
way
143
in
which
televi-
changes or public
arguments. Nor would a resort to a closed theoretical explanation about the
"means of production" in the television industry tell us how this process
occurred at the discursive level (though it might illuminate why). Instead, the
entire range of programs concerning a given political issue must be analyzed
as a set. Given the quantity and disorder surrounding the medium, I cannot
claim to have examined all the regular television episodes that featured
abortion practices. However, the set of programs discussed herein at least
provides a sample of adequate depth and breadth to insure that all of the
major trends and forces are represented. A bibliography of television studies
is available in Caren J. Demming and Bruce E. Gronbeck, The (Not Quite)
sion, as a central cultural
specific legal
Comprehensive Bibliography of Broadcast Criticism (Iowa City: University of Iowa,

1985), disseminated to Television Conference participants. The classic collection of critical essays
ed.
(New
is
Horace Newcomb,
ed., Television: The Critical View,
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). See also Arthur
2nd
Asa
Berger, Media Analysis Techniques (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Robert Ruther-
ford Smith, Beyond the Wasteland, rev. ed. (Annandale, Va.:
SCA,
1980);
Horace Newcomb, "Prime Time as a Cultural Forum," paper presented at the

68th Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Louisville,
Ky.,
November
4-7, 1982.
And
see, especially, recent issues of Critical Studies
Mass Communication. For a study that does an excellent job of following an

issue through the mass news media, see Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored"
War: The Media and Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). I am
deeply indebted to Lawrance Bernabo for his work in collecting videotapes of
various prime-time television programs that depicted abortion. The programs
I have personally viewed include one episode each of Cagney and Lacey, Spenser
for Hire, Dallas, Magruder and Loud, Call to Glory, Webster, Hill Street Blues, and
Family, along with three episodes of St. Elsewhere (actually, two episodes
dealing with one abortion story line and two episodes dealing with separate
story lines). In addition I have received plot summaries for Maude, Defenders,
Buffalo Bill and a third episode of St. Elsewhere. I have information that early
episodes of the following programs also covered abortion, although I have not
been able to find further information on them: The Bold Ones, Marcus Welby,
M.D., and A Brand New Life. Apparently, the latter two were "pro-Life" and
the former was more "pro-Choice." Other programs, including an episode of
Mike and Jack, featured unplanned pregnancies (which ended in miscarriages)
in
but did not explicitly discuss abortion. Choices, a prime-time made-for-tele vision movie, also fits the descriptions I use here; however, because it is not a
serial, I have not directly included it in the analysis.
4. Revised characterizations of women in television programming may
have actually led to legal changes and made the public argument more
compatible with the pro-Choice position. However, I have no proof that this was
the case, and much further empirical examination of characterizations of
women in this pre-1970 era would have to be done. Most role studies postdate this period.
144
Prime-Time Abortion
See John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit, "Reconstructing

A Functional Perspective, " Journal of Communication 36
(1986), 90-108. Lucaites and Condit indicate that there are three functions for
5.
Narrative Theory:
narrative (rhetorical, dialectical,
and
poetical
i.e.,
"entertainment").
They
suggest "one-sidedness" as one of the distinctive formal characteristics of

narratives that primarily serve the rhetorical function.
May
6.
"CBS on Abortion," America,
7.
"That's Entertainment," Time, 27
generated
at
the rerun of
1962, pp. 193-94.
August 1973, p. 630. The furor was

the program. The reports indicated that earlier
programs had dealt less sympathetically with abortion, including, in 1970-71,

The Bold Ones and anti-abortion programs on A Brand New Life and Marcus
Welby.
8.
Robert R. Beusse and Russell Shaw, "Maude's Abortion: Spontaneous

November 1973, pp. 324-26.
Beusse and Shaw.
or Induced?" America, 3
9.
10.
Ibid.
sometimes argued
that, because audiences do not all interpret

same fashion, it is useless to try to describe themes that are
preferred by programming; audiences can make what they will of program
11.
It is
programs
in the
content (see
dience
Fisk).
Indeed,
members might react
we cannot
specify precisely
to a text, for the reasons given.
how
different au-
We can,
however,
and we can do so in an
empirically verifiable manner by noting what has been left out what is not
depicted. Moreover, I believe that it has not yet been established that the
reading of dominant audiences is unpredictable or that their readings are not
important for social processes, regardless of what some non-standard reading
practices might produce. See Celeste Michelle Condit, "The Rhetorical Limits
of Polysemy," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 6, no. 2 (forthcoming).
Related arguments are developed by Philip Wander in "Cultural Criticism," in
Handbook of Political Communication, ed. Dan D. Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981), pp. 497-528, and Wander, "The Third Persona: An
describe the limits a discourse attempts to impose,
Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory," Central States Speech Journal 35, no. 4
(Winter 1984), 197-216. I suggest that, rather than analyzing the specific
"persuasiveness" of a given piece of discourse, when we look at any unified
message constructed across a powerful medium, we should be concerned

about its mere *presence. Sheer presence exerts important kinds of social
forces, regardless of how persuaded individual audience members are by a
specific discourse.
MTM-related either direct products of this

and other staff who got major
experience through MTM productions. MTM has been noted for its clear
"liberal" orientation. See Jane Feuer, "MTM Enterprises: An Overview," and
"The MTM Style," in MTM: "Quality Television," ed. Jane Feuer, Paul Kerr, and
Tise Vahimagi (London: BFI, 1984), esp. p. 22.
13. In a study of the reactions of a pro-Life and a pro-Choice leader to this
program, the pro-Life activist identified Crenshaw as the most positive
12.
These programs are
company
all
or products of producer/writers

character in the program.
The pro-Choice
activist identified
145
her as somewhat
negative. Both respondents identified their reaction as based primarily
upon
what she stood for, but they also cited some of the character details I note.
14. The material in this book, along with many others, suggests both that
the pro-Choice advocates routinely insinuated that these were the real
motives of the pro-Life rhetors, and that, for a large group of pro-Life rhetors,
these motives were in fact important. See, for example, Fred M. Frohock,
Abortion: A Case Study in Law and Morals (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1983).
15.
Here the
direct sanctions of special-interest
groups merge with the
persuasive dimensions of mass-mediated narratives.

generally seek narrative coherence.
They
try to
TV
writer/producers
produce programs within
which the actions of "sympathetic characters" make sense to the mass audience. Given the existing repertoire of the "public consciousness," certain
actions do not make sense (cops refusing to enforce legal abortion or career
women giving up "outside lives" to have "second families"). Given the public
arguments of competing interest groups, other actions destroy the "sympathy" with a character (e.g., because abortion has been characterized as a
"selfish" act, Call to Glory's apple-pie-loving
mom cannot choose
it,
although
Maude can). The interaction of these direct sanctions and indirect

demands of narrative probability (which themselves interact with the public
acerbic
arguments produced by the special
interest groups) produces a particular

range of definitions for abortion practices. Narrative probability is thus one of
the most vivid and direct links between the realm of public arguments
(politics) and that of cultural enactments.
This concept of persuasion and probability may, at first blush, sound rather
like the old industry claim to "give the people what they want" or to simply
reflect the culture, but it is not that. For, indeed, the cultural media are
required to participate in an active
way
in creating a cultural definition that
and accepts the boundaries placed by the special interest groups. It is

not simply what the public wants that the culture industry produces. It is what
the public will accept from the limited repertoire allowed by the special
enacts
interest groups. Polls, in fact, indicate that the public has a great deal of
ambivalence on the issue and might find a broader range of enactments
plausible.
The persuasive boundaries
of the public vocabulary, related as they are to
particular interest groups, set the limits of
what the mass
cultural
media can
how they can enact but they have active complicity
"say" about abortion
it
The desire for maximal economic payoffs encourages

them to participate within the boundaries, but participate actively they do.
They could try alternate definitions of abortion, or resist depictions of abortion altogether. They choose, however, to perpetuate the game by complicitly
constructing the cultural images that make vivid and legitimate the compromises possible from interest group struggles.
16. Programs outside the time frame of this study pushed the boundaries
of acceptable abortion somewhat further. A later St. Elsewhere featured a
in the construction.
Prime-Time Abortion
146
which a woman chooses abortion because of a potential defect in a

episode of Heartbeats presented an abortion of two out of four
fertility-drug-induced quadruplets in order to safeguard the health of the two
program
fetus.
in
An
survivors.
17. Melinda Beck, Diane Weathers, John McCormick, David T. Friendly,
Pamela Abramson, Mary Bruno, 'America's Abortion Dilemma," Newsweek,
14 January 1985, p. 24.
18.
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue:
Ind.: University of
Notre
Dame
Study
Press, 1981).
in
Moral Theory (Notre Dame,
CHAPTER EIGHT
Mass Compromise and Minority Violence

Rhetoric and Ideology
1978-85
When
the history of this period
pickets or letter- writers
who
written, it won't be the

be the heroes.
It's
is
will
going to be the bombers.
John Burt, founder

"Our
Father's
House" 1
As the
eighties lumbered into view, America's ideologically mature

controversy over abortion moved into a complex new stage resolute
schizophrenia. The populace gradually began to integrate the new
and practices of legalized abortion into a unique

compromise within the 'American way of life." Given the continued
presence of the powerful image of the fetus, however, this routinization of compromise simultaneously spurred activists to polarization
and violence. Both the mass compromise and the violence were, in
part, consequences of the particular formation taken by the new
laws, rhetorics,
discourse about abortion.
The Populace Compromises

Determining whether the compromises enacted in the American legal
and cultural establishments between 1973 and 1985 truly represented
popular opinions about abortion cannot be done with great precision.
The sole tool for answering such a query is opinion polling, and such
surveys have been criticized on a wide variety of grounds. 2 They may
tend to "construct," rather than reflect, public opinion; they must
always rely on slanted questions; and they tend to over-homogenize
the variety of opinions held by the wide range of any populace.
Although these objections to polling data can never be fully overcome, they can be somewhat mitigated. No single question can tell us
147
Mass Compromise and Minority
148
Violence
the shape of public opinion, and digital (favor/oppose) polls can tell
us only about crude forced-choice majorities. If, however, we ask a
wide range of questions, not in some supposedly neutral vocabulary
but alternately in the vocabularies of both sides of a controversy, we
can gradually get a reading of the contours of public sentiments. The
outcomes will be much more like a rugged curve than simple digital
majorities and minorities. Examining a wide range of polls gives a
surprisingly consistent picture of popular opinion on the new range
and vocabularies.
During the seventies and eighties the actual changes in ^popular
opinion about abortion were relatively slight, indicating that the actions of the Court and the cultural establishment had little impact on
the development of arguments in the *public realm. Nonetheless, to
of abortion practices
the best of our ability to ascertain, the personal or private opinions of

the majority of Americans seemed consonant with the resolutions
adopted in their laws and mass culture. The popular opinion included
a wide range of beliefs, but by and large these attitudes incorporated
elements of both the pro-Choice and pro-Life rhetorics. This compromise is delineated in three different outcomes of a wide range of
popular opinion
As
polls.
early as 1972, 64 percent of those polled
abortion should be a decision between a
on the statement
"woman and
that
her physician"
and agreed with the pro-Choice group's argument for Privacy and
Choice in several different polls and forms. 3 At the same time, however, more than half of those polled felt that life began before viability
and more than 85 percent felt that life began before birth. 4 Even if
"person" were substituted for "human being," more than two-thirds
believed that the fetus was a person before birth; more than half,
before viability. 5 The public thus accepted the major grounds of both
pro-Choice and pro-Life advocates: women should have the Choice to
control their
own
bodies, and fetuses were persons well before birth.
The incorporation
of the
tendency of those polled
competing values was also evident in the

between permissible and
to differentiate
impermissible motives and stages for abortion. The majority of the

populace accepted neither the claim that all abortions should be
permissible nor the claim that no abortions should be permissible
(although around 20 percent of the populace endorsed each of these
two polar options for almost two decades). 6 Instead, the majority of
Americans cautiously judged that abortion was acceptable only if the
purposes carried enough weight. Thus, abortion to save the pregnant
woman's life got 77 percent support in 1965 (as it did in 1978). Apparently the populace compared adult life to nascent life and found the
woman's
life
to
be the
first
149
concern. 7 Similarly, in 1965, 54 percent
supported the abortion of a potentially deformed child but only 45

percent did so in 1977, reflecting the changing values surrounding
deformity in the culture and an increased acceptance of individuals
with handicaps. 8 Also, in 1978, 65 percent felt that abortion should be
permitted in cases of rape or incest, due perhaps to the stressful
nature of such pregnancies or to the fact that the women could not be
held "responsible" for becoming pregnant. 9 In 1978 support for abortions to prevent severe damage to physical health (54 percent approved) and to protect mental health (42 percent approved) reached a
high-water mark. But still only 16 percent supported abortion for

economic reasons, reflecting a reluctance to balance life against
money. 10 By weighing the purposes for abortion, Americans thus
negotiated a range of compromises between the pro-Life claim that
the fetus's Right to Life was absolute and the pro-Choice claim that the
woman's Right to Choice was all-inclusive.
In addition to considering the motives for abortion, the polls indicated that the populace was also extremely sensitive to the stage of
fetal development. The rhetoric of "absolute Right to Choose" called
for a Right to Choose abortion at any stage of fetal development. The
rhetoric of "absolute Right to Life" prohibited abortion at any stage.
The populace, in contrast to both of these views, judged the correctness of abortions based on the fetus's development. For example,
in 1978 willingness to choose the pregnant woman's life over that of
the fetus dropped from 77 percent in the first trimester to 60 percent
in the third trimester. Willingness to permit abortion for rape or incest
dropped from 65 percent in the first trimester to 38 percent in the
second and only 24 percent in the final trimester, and so on for each
category of motives and stages. 11 The populace showed more concern
for the Life of the fetus as the fetus grew closer and closer to full term.
Thereby, they rejected the pro-Choice tendency to ignore the fetus
and the pro-Life tendency to fail to make developmental distinctions.

If we examine the wide range of polls available, we have fairly good
grounds for concluding that American popular opinion on abortion
covered a fairly wide range, with no single position holding complete
dominance. Between the late sixties and mid-eighties there were only
slight variations from a general curve. Around 20 percent tended to
want to ban all abortions and around 20 percent tended to want to
permit all abortions; the other 60 percent would have permitted only
some abortions, but they did not have much consensus about exactly
which abortions, varying their decision by stage of fetal development
and by the motive for the abortion.
150
Violence
Perhaps because the populace was sensitive to

positions, the polls also
seem
this
wide variety
of
to indicate that (at least until 1985)
Americans had reached one other compromise of a very fundamental

sort. Pollees tended to separate what they thought they would do
personally in an abortion situation from what they thought the law
should be about abortion. In 1978, for example, only 24 percent polled
would have recommended abortion to a hypothetical fifteen-year-old

daughter, even though polls near that time showed that less than a
fifth of
and
the populace disapproved of legal abortion in
all
circumstances
opposed a constitutional
That result was not much different
a later poll reported that 75 percent
amendment to
prohibit abortion. 12
from the 1972 NBC-TV poll of New Yorkers which, in the face of
reasonably strong support for legalized abortion, showed only 34
percent of the women claiming they would have an abortion in case of
an unwanted pregnancy, while 50 percent indicated they would bear
and raise the child and 7 percent claimed they would put it up for
adoption. 13 Thus, Americans seemed, continually, to make a distinction between their personal dislike of abortion, their personal actions
with regard to abortion, and their willingness to allow it to be legal.
This distinction between public law and private morality parallels
the compromises constructed in both the legal and cultural realms. It
suggests, once again, the unique character of discourse as a carrier
and
arbiter of conflicts
among
different interest
groups (including
genders, ethnic groups, and economic enterprises). Any one individual's experience of life might make either the pro-Life or the proChoice vocabulary personally descriptive, expressive, or advantageous. According to both Kristin Luker and Marilyn Falik, most
activists on each side of the controversy found themselves in this
position: 14 unmarried professional women without children constituted the majority of pro-Choice activists, while married housewife-mothers tended to constitute the pro-Life activists. However, for
a large number of other individuals, the material experiences and
advantages of a particular vocabulary were not overwhelming. In
such cases the "majority" either find utility in both vocabularies and
therefore integrate them or they judge the issues more abstractly on
the arguments, images, and ideographs themselves and, again, integrate them. The discursive realm thus adds considerable complexity
to simple models that describe all social change primarily in terms of
unidimensional economic or demographic shifts.

The 'American attitude" in the seventies and the first half of the
eighties thus held abortion to be a more or less acceptable choice
depending on one's
situation, motives,
and the stage
of
development
151
Mass opinion seemed to indicate that abortion might

perhaps even in the majority of cases, be a morally wrong
choice. Certainly in almost all these cases contraception or, for some,
abstinence, would have been morally preferred. But the populace also
seemed to accept that the guilt was a private one, because the decision
had to be a private one. Indeed, the state could neither know enough
about each case to make rational and informed decisions nor legislate
the woman's own morality. Hence, the public law permitted the
of the fetus.
often,
private
woman
to decide.
Polarization to Violence: Pro-Life?
Not all Americans accepted this compromise. In fact, the more the
mass consensus accepting abortion seemed to solidify, the more frustrated and active became the minority of those who accepted the
unalloyed pro-Life discourse. For them, the image of the unborn child
continued to dominate the meaning of abortion. Gradually,
throughout the eighties increasing percentages of these pro-Life activists began to shift away from the sanctioned American method of
adjudicating disputes through persuasion toward the methods of
coercion, law-breaking,
The
first
and
violence.
step toward coercive action was the rise of picketing of
abortion clinics and legal buildings such as the
Supreme Court
sustained and widespread effort in the eighties. All across the

country, in small and large cities, on virtually any day of the year, at
least one picketer could usually be found in front of any medical
fairly
facility
responsible for a large
number of abortions. While most promeans to persuade the women who
Life activists preferred non-violent
have an abortion, many were perfectly

an abortion instead. 15 In
some instances this picketing escalated to pushing and shoving, resulting in assault charges a minimal act of violence but a crucial step
nonetheless. 16 Finally, the picketing frequently led to harassment of
women who had abortions and of clinic personnel. They were tele-
walked past
their lines not to
willing to intimidate
them
into not having
phoned
late at
night or had placards stuck on their lawn; here coerbecame the clear goal. In some cases, clinics
cion through intimidation
were closed through coercion. 17
The picketing of clinics gradually escalated into two other related

one non-coercive but illegal, the other both dramatically
coercive and illegal. In the eighties civil disobedience was increasingly
used to gain public attention. Picketers would intentionally trespass
(entering abortion clinics or the Supreme Court building) in order to
strategies,
01
oo
c
*>^
o
6
O
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00
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153
be arrested and to make news. The use of such non-violent civil

disobedience is widely viewed as legitimate as long as protesters are
willing to serve their sentences, but the move nonetheless polarizes.
The other strategy, the use of "mock" abortion clinics, was more covert
and therefore more
sinister.
up offices that advertised as abortion clinics.

came
to
the
When women
clinics asking for abortions, they were not
told that the clinic was a pro-Life propaganda center. Instead, they
were pressured to observe pro-Life films and look at pro-Life materials. Of course, the basic strategy here included a persuasive element, but when one coerces someone to read one's persuasion, one is
Pro-Life activists set
coercing nonetheless. In Texas, the proprietors of one such "clinic"

were tried and convicted, but the strategy was not eliminated. 18
This catalogue of coercive, violent, and illegal pro-Life activities

and activism of pro-Lifers in the eighties.
reflected the intensity
Although troubling, it is hardly an exceptional list for any social

movement. It is the bombing and burning of abortion clinics that most
definitively put the protest "over the line" from public persuasion to
violent coercion. In order to understand the move to violence, a
detailed exploration of a clinic bombing will be useful.
The Gideon Project
On 25 December 1984 bombs exploded at three facilities that provided

No one was hurt, but a half-million
abortions in Pensacola, Florida.
damage was
The local newspaper coverage

between the majority and the
minority who had been moved to violence. The Pensacola papers
portrayed the "average" uninvolved citizens of Pensacola as concurring with Robert Cronemeyer, who said, "Yes, it's terrorism and
no, there is no justification." 19 A series of virtually unanimous quotations from "people off the street" suggested that the general public
was overwhelmingly opposed to such political violence. Quotations
from pro-Choice activists reinforced these sentiments. The physicians
who operated the clinics and the representatives of N.O.W. emphasized that the bombings would not stop abortions and re-emphasized
the rights of women and their need for abortions. 20
The majority of the public pro-Life discourse appearing in the news
media also opposed the bombings. The dominant initial response was
summed up in the newspaper headline, "Church leaders condemn
Christmas-morning violence." Mainline churches, especially the
Catholics, were depicted as in opposition to the bombing. Catholic
dollars
worth
of
inflicted.
of the incident reflected clearly the split
154
In Pensacola, Florida, pro-Life activities
bombings. Photos by Gary McCracken
Violence
ranged from demonstrations
to

155
Bishop Symons was quoted as saying, 'These people have nothing to

We
do with our effort for the dignity or respect for human life.
have ways, under our Constitution, to express our views, and there
are other ways than using violence." 21 His comments were seconded
by other religious and pro-Life leaders. These mainline activist rhetors, involved in trying to persuade Americans that abortion was
wrong, felt their credibility was damaged by violence.
There was, however, at least a subsidiary current of support for the
bombers in this ocean of opposition. Near the end of this first article,
and increasingly in later articles, a more tolerant position toward the
bombings by a different group of pro-Life activists was heard. A
substantial group of fundamentalists had long stirred and manned a
visible pro-Life activism in Pensacola
an activism that often bordered
upon coercion. 22 These idealogues saw the bombing in a different
light. The Reverend David Shofner of the West Pensacola Baptist
Church admitted that bombing was not God's way but went on to say,
.
"Bombings and fire will certainly stop it [abortion].

Picketing
You
might
stop
one
or
two
girls
every
now
and
then
or help
doesn't.
them change their minds [by picketing], but certainly there won't be
any babies killed in these three clinics for a while." He was joined by
John Burt, a man the newspapers described as a religious leader,
reformed KKK member, and anti-abortionist, who was quoted as
saying, "If there is an element of our society that does that, and no
one is hurt, I'm glad the killing [of babies] has stopped." 23
This supportive community had created the violent mentality
adopted by four young people under twenty-one years of age
Jimmy and Kathryn Simmons, Mathew Goldsby, and his fiancee,
Kaye Wiggins. Taking as their model the biblical story of Gideon, an
intensely faithful religious character who served God by destroying
the shrine of the false god Baal under cover of night, they undertook
the bombings they called "the Gideon Project." Kathryn and Kaye
were convicted of conspiracy, and Jimmy and Mathew were each
convicted of conspiracy to build a bomb and three counts of making a
bomb and of damaging a building with a bomb.
The trial of these four would-be heroes presents us, as it did the
jury, with a serious question: why would four young American Christians turn to bombing in their own land? There are both material and
discursive answers. To begin with the material factors, the story is one
of four all-too-typical young people. As their defense attorney suggested, precisely their "ordinariness" and "virtues," not their vices,
would get them convicted. 24 The four high school graduates were
working-class kids with typically troubled backgrounds. Goldsby had
.
156
Violence
grown up without a father. Simmons's father had died when Jimmy

was eighteen, and his family had "disassembled," sending Jimmy,
small and thin, to a Marine boot camp whose training he did not
complete. Wiggins had been traumatized by watching her older
brother drown when she was nine, her parents had divorced, and her
church had recently dissolved. Kathryn Simmons had married to
escape an extremely rigid family who had kept her away from outsiders, refusing even to let her play with other children. 25
These young adults faced the difficulty of growing up in a rapidly
changing South, in which an invasion of Yankees and modernization
was challenging the traditional value systems. These young workingclass adults dealt
and
with these regional problems, their class problems,

problems through religion and a fantasy of the
their personal
"knights of the round table." 26
When
their religious affiliation ex-
posed them to intensive pro-Life discourse, they believed that they

heard God's voice telling them, under the "Code of Chivalry," to act.
The dimension of direct action was important. The bombings were
originally designed not simply as a "publicity stunt" (a rhetorical
motivation) but as an attempt at direct, effective, local action (a coercive motivation). The bombers and their partners were not trying just
to draw attention to the issue, for they had had little involvement in
public discourse on the issue previously. Goldsby had described
picketing and such public persuasion as "not his bag." 27 Instead, they
bombing would stop local abortions immediately

As Jimmy Simmons said, "If one baby lives out of all of
then it's worth it." 28 In his confession Goldsby told the ATF
believed that the
and
this,
directly.
and that "if he spent the

he saved one life, then it was worth what he
had done." 29 Consequently, when Wiggins felt that "they haven't
made the people stop abortions," she also concluded that "there was
no good purpose for the bombings." 30 Although later, after they
noted the national attention the bombings garnered, they expressed
satisfaction with the attention the bombings directed to the issue, the
local particular action was itself one primary motivation for them. On
these grounds their local action was at least partially effective; one of
the bombing victims, Dr. William Permenter, announced he would
discontinue performing abortions. 31
The major belief that drove the quartet to this direct local action
against particular abortions was, as any examination of the periphery
of the pro-Life movement would have predicted, the conviction that
agents that they did
rest of his life in
it
"to stop abortions,"
jail, if
God opposed abortion as murder and that God had told them to act to
end
abortions.
As Kaye Wiggins
said,
the group thought of the

bombings
bomb
as "a gift to Jesus
on
157
his birthday/' 32 God's
command
to
Jimmy Simmons's words "just hit us

almost like a supernatural knowledge came to us and built [the
bombs]." 33 Goldsby agreed, telling the ATF agents that "he and God
the abortion clinics, in
carried out the bombings." 34 In the
trial,
Wiggins reasserted the
"He felt like ... it was God's will for Jimmy and he to do that,"
she said. "He did feel like God played a big part in it." 35
The source of this conviction (if not of the final claim that God had
spoken to them) was the evident Christianity within which the four
defined their universe. The Christian devotion of each of these young
adults was the central topic of all those who gave a public appraisal of
the quartet. As the Rev. James Courtney, who had known Goldsby for
years, said, "He was such a nice young man, a real Christian and a
very quiet fellow." 36 Wiggins's mother reinforced that description,
emphasizing, "He's an exceptionally fine Christian boy. ... In fact, I
don't ever remember him missing a church service. He's not just a
Sunday Christian, he's an everyday Christian." 37 Similar comments
were made about the others. A former high school teacher described
claim:
Wiggins as "a very genuine person with strong Christian convictions." 38 Simmons's mother-in-law said of him, "He's a good strong
Christian and, my, he loves his Jesus." 39
The
living force of this Christianity ran deep:
it
was evident
reactions, not only of the four but also of their mothers.

ard, Kathy's mother,
know anything
ilarly,
now
my
it
by saying,
lot of
"I
don't
prayer." 40 Sim-
"whatever happens
I'm conwas, for these families, the locus of action

was not surprising that "He" was the source of the
God." 41
causality;
decision to
reporter's queries
except she needs a
Rhoda Goldsby averred
tented in
and
answered a
right
in the
Ruby Men-
that
God
bomb.
In addition to the general orientation Christianity provided, their

Christian contacts that they developed both at church and at home
shaped their anti-abortion perspective. Through church groups they

viewed anti-abortion movies such as "Assignment Abortion," which
one psychiatrist described as crucial to Jimmy's anti-abortion bombing. They also received vivid anti-abortion pamphlets through these
sources.
Thus in both the particular sense of a "command from God" to

bomb abortion clinics and in the general sense of an understanding of
a world in which God was a central and coercive authority, the Gideon
quartet was ideologically motivated by Christianity. Labeling themselves the "Protectors of the Code," they spoke this motivation clearly
and proudly.
All Christianity, however, does not simply
and
inevita-
158
bly lead to violence.
focused their
The
It
was
a particular
Violence
brand
of Christianity that
efforts.
were those generwith the ^traditional family. As Simmons told the ATF,
basic values in their version of Christianity
ally associated
was love for 'God, my country, my family that's

of the dominant features of this Christian, patriotic,
familial value set was a view of women as subordinate and passive,
primarily designed for child-rearing. Not surprisingly, Goldsby's favorite song was "I've Never Been to Me," a top-forty, "easy-listening"
tune that told the story of a woman who had lived an exciting life but
felt lost because she had never had a baby.
In part, this component of the ideology was made vivid through
the group's fantasy of the "code of chivalry," which portrayed women
as "damsels in distress" and men as "knights in shining armor." As
Kathryn Simmons put it, when asked about her role in the bombing,
his "motivation
about
it.'
" 42
One
It's white knights. We're not allowed.

"Women are not allowed.
We're the damsels in distress." 43 Similarly, Wiggins emphasized that
Kaye could cry about the bombings, but Goldsby couldn't because he
had to provide strength and support because "he was a knight of the
.
Round Table." 44
As the attorneys pointed
out, however, this
Round
Table imagery
firmly grounded in the Bible. Attorney Kasun said that her

Simmons, had merely "believed St. Paul when he said, 'Submit
"
unto your husband as unto the Lord.' 45 Attorney Shimik emphasized of Wiggins that "she merely remained loyal to Goldsby as the
was
itself
client,
Bible requires." 46
The ideology and values from which the foursome acted were
and anti-feminist. This ideology was, in its pure
clearly Christian
form, the underlying ideology of the Right-to-Life movement as a

whole. Such a hierarchical, authoritarian, coercion-focused, and militarist
discourse
is
a partial pre-condition of violence. Yet,
most
of the
spokespersons for the movement in Pensacola repudiated the

violence, even though they shared the ideology. Ideological content
may enable, but it is not a sufficient cause of violence. Additional
official
discursive conditions were required to activate this coercive ideology.
Two
separate factors, each manifesting a similar problem
at a dif-
were instrumental in the transformation of four young

Gideon quartet. Both at the public level and in the
private discourse of the youths, the pro-Life discourse had moved
beyond persuasion or rhetoric to a closed ideological discourse. By
the 1980s the bombers and their partners, along with many other
activists, had become ideologues concerned with enacting and enforcferent level,
Christians into the
159
ing their/God's beliefs rather than persuaders seeking to convince

others that those beliefs were true. That discursive closure, that rejection of persuasion as the
the crucial link in the
On
fundamental mode
move
of
human
influence,
was
to violence.
move away from rhetoric, toward closed

by the rise of a new dominant discursive
strategy the widespread use of the argument of "over- weighing."
The rhetorical tactic of over-weighing is a basic comparison strategy.
With it, rhetors attempt to show that the values and interests on their
side carry more weight than those of the opposition. The strategy
became widespread for two reasons.
First, the Right-to-Life movement in the eighties became increasingly disillusioned; it had failed to alter the permissive legal
policies enacted in the previous decade. While public opinion polls
registered some slight changes and state and local activities produced
some results, apparently the national political movement had stalled. 47
A constitutional amendment did not seem plausible; the Supreme
Court reaffirmed and strengthened its Roe v. Wade decision; voters in
several states rejected referenda limiting abortions; and the Congress
showed willingness only to modify related bills (e.g., Family Planning
legislation), not to change fundamental law. The movement's central
objective
making abortion illegal seemed unattainable through
current means. Since the values of their opposition had, to some
significant extent, been accepted, their primary persuasion could no
the public level, the
ideology,
was
facilitated
longer be directed toward disallowing the opposition's discourse or

toward developing their own values but instead had to show how
their values were more important than those of the opposition
over-
weighing them.
Second, in general the strategy of over-weighing becomes widespread when two well-developed ideologies clash without making
any significant attempt to refute points of disagreement. At such a
point late in a public argument, seasoned movement advocates are
well aware that the audience is familiar with the strong points in the
opposition's case. If they are also unwilling to adopt a compromise
position that takes into account those strong points, then "overweighing" the claim that one's values outweigh those of the opposition and so necessitate a complete sacrifice of the opposing values is
virtually the only strategy open. The abortion controversy in the
eighties increasingly presented precisely such a case refutation had
been lacking and the activists on both sides were unwilling to settle
for compromise.
Hence, in this stage Right-to-Life activists argued that Life was
160
Violence
more important than Choice. Some
activists indicated, for example,

precedence over property or state rights,
so does the right to life of an unborn infant take precedence over
proprietary rights of a woman over her own body." 48 Similarly, Haven
Gow echoed the signs of many picketers, proclaiming that a woman
should not be " 'free to choose' to kill." 49 Others noted that "a woman
has the right to control her own body
but not at the price of
another life." 50 Pro-Life rhetors similarly over-weighed the claim presented by the "abortion tale" by drawing on the testimony of one
woman who, after having an abortion from which the fetus lived for a
short while, concluded that "nothing is worth the hell of abortion." 51
that "just as civil rights take
Ultimately, the political compromise between public and private

views was also directly attacked by the over-weighing strategy. ProLife advocates noted that "the left repeatedly insists that those opposed to abortions are free to have them or not, which is to miss the
whole point of the conflict, namely, their belief that the life of another
party
is at
stake." 52
The over-weighing strategy was the dominant new discursive force

and early eighties. It was, as I have suggested, a
predictable strategy, given both the stage of the controversy and the
American political system, which relies on partisan activists. Such a
strategy, however, also harbors some serious dangers.
Those who choose to over-weigh rather than to seek compromise
write off any competing claims and move into a uni-dimensional
understanding of the world unbounded by other restraining principles, terms, and factors. Once a set of activists decides that the
opposition's values are outweighed by its own, and can therefore be
totally ignored, they can easily depict opponents as devil figures and
supporters as saints. One's own grounds become the sole values;
therefore, any means are justified to secure those ends. The dominance of the over-weighing strategy was thus the necessary rhetorical
component which led pro-Life activists away from the sanctioned
American method of persuasion and toward coercion, law-breaking,
and violence.
It was in this general social context, supportive of closed perspecin the late seventies
Pensacola conspirators found themselves. Kaye, Jimmy,

Mathew, and Kathy were exposed to a minority group discourse
which suggested that (1) the opposition had no argument and were
merely resisting God with sheer power and (2) the value of the group
(fetal Life) outweighed major constraining values (e.g., Law, Property,
tives, that the
or peace). An understanding of the world in which the resort to

violence was a reasonable option was therefore ready to hand. It
161
their personal experience of
required, however, an additional factor

discursive closure
to generate the final step
toward violence.
Essentially, the quartet refused to participate in discourse outside

their
own
others.
into a
closed set. They did not picket or counsel or argue with

They maintained a closed communication circuit which turned
fantasy world. Speaking only together, without any external
constraining discourses, they built for each other an ideology in

which God literally called them to violence.
The underlying claim that supports this interpretation is that a
communication process closed and directed only to like-minded individuals results in dramatically different consequences
(i.e.,
a higher
potential for violence) than does open, persuasive discourse directed
depends on a finding of empirical

between ideological discourse and persuasive discourse.
The case of the Pensacola bombings provides a unique opportunity to
compare the products of two such processes.
at
a disparate audience. That claim
differences
Two days after the bombing the Pensacola News-Journal received,

and published, an anonymous letter claiming credit for the bombings
(full text in Appendix B). Dramatically different from the discourse
produced by the bombers themselves, the letter claimed that the
bombing was done by a woman, primarily because after having an
abortion late in pregnancy she had later discovered that this meant
she had killed her child. The letter's author emphatically denied a
religious background, saying, "It was not because of religious fanaticism ... I don't even go to church/753 Finally, the letter claimed that
the purpose of the bombing was to help women, "to prevent any
more lives from being ruined/' as much as to "put an end to the
murder of babies." It also provided a legal justification for bombing
itself,
saying that
force,
even deadly
"it is
a well-established principal
of justice that
[sic]
force, is justified in order to save innocent lives
if
necessary."
As
rhetoric, the letter
was not much more
skilled
ideologically based justifications of the bombers.

at justification
were too blatant and harsh
to
The
than were the

attempts
letter's
be truly convincing. The
not simply a matter of naive vs. skilled

persuasion. Several contrasts between the discourse of the letter and
of the bombers mark the difference as one of rhetoric vs. ideology.
First, where the bombers relied on their Christianity and the comdifference here, therefore,
mand from God
is
as justification, the letter-writer vigorously denied
religious motivation.
The denial
of religious motivation
is
common
topos among the national advocates of the pro-Life movement. Prominent Catholic and fundamentalist leaders, such as John C. Willke or
162
John Noonan, spend a great deal of
Violence
deny that their cause is a

would mark their discourse as
effort to
religious one, for that religious cast
partisan rather than universal. 54
The persuader emphasizes publicly

shared values and grounds, avoiding the taint of partisanship. The
ideologue, confident in the total Tightness of her or his beliefs, emphasizes those partisan values, ignorant of, or hostile to, an audience
that does not share them.
The letter's author and the bombers also differed visibly in their
gendering of the agents of change. The letter claimed to be from a
woman and claimed the bombing to be the act of women. Although
no woman had previously been charged with any of the many clinic
bombings in America, such a move was rhetorically apt, for it confounded the pro-Choice claim to represent a "woman's movement/' It
denied or submerged the largely unpopular pro-Life characterization
of women as confined to the "soft" role of mother and hence incapable
of forceful action. In contrast, where the letter spoke with a female
voice, the bombers acted with a male hand. They did not allow the
women to be directly involved, and they made public justification
based on the subordination of women.
In addition to these central, ideologically based differences, the
ideologue and the rhetor focused on distinctly different kinds of
abortion. The letter-writer, like most pro-Life advocates, focused on
where the pro-Life case was most persuasive. 55

The bombers opposed all abortion; they bombed clinics that, almost
late-term abortions,
exclusively,
Finally,
performed
first
trimester abortions.
the letter-writer recognized that "she"
had broken the
public compact against violence. Therefore, she carefully justified her
from a shared public legal tenet and on the basis of the prevention of greater violence. The Gideon quartet was sensitive to this
public compact only after they realized the public stir they had created. Even then, it was not until the very end of their trial that they
produced a public, legal justification. Until that point they relied on
action
the force of God's
command
to overrule the public compact.
In almost every point the letter-writer sought a persuasive ground,
shaping the discourse to what appeared most
likely to
be credible to
the public audience. This resulted in a dramatically different discourse

from that produced by the ideologues, who explained their action
completely from their
own
ideology, largely ignoring the potentially
different beliefs of the audience.
The implications of these different contents are dramatic. The persuasive discourse offered several potential grounds for compromise.
163
By emphasizing late-term abortions it created the possibility to negotidevelopment. It acknowledged the importance of the
interests of women and the condition of their lives in making such
ate over stage of
decisions.
And
it
recognized the inappropriateness of religious belief
ground for shared public action. The ideological discourse of the

real bombers offered no such grounds, assuming that, since compromise or persuasive victory were impossible, violence was the only
as a
alternative to alienation.
The discursive conditions
that enabled the clinic
bombings were,
therefore, partially the result of a shift to a strategy of over-weighing

in the public discourse, along
with the particular closed form of

discourse used by the bombers themselves. On both levels, the agents
refused the possibility of interaction of beliefs and values
refused
the mutuality of persuasion. 56 In the largest sense, this problem
is
generated by the otherwise desirable American tolerance toward religious groups. In particular circumstances, American courts have
ruled that religious groups can be exempted from American laws that
force them to share in the public discourse (for example, permitting
special, non-accredited schools for religious sects). The courts allow
groups their ideological discourse. This mandate of tolerance has
generally been relatively unproblematic because those seeking exemption from the public discourse have not, in turn, tried to influence the
larger society. In closing off influence from outside, they have also
repudiated the right to attempt to influence the outside world. When
a group seeks to influence the outside world but refuses to be open to
persuasion itself, however, the rights to free speech and religious
belief become distinctly more problematic. If this combination of
cultural isolationism and political imperialism continues, increasing
violence is a probable result. It may be important to insist that free
speech is only possible when it is open speech, constituted by a twoway flow of ideas and argumentation.
This is more or less what the jury in the Gideon case found, as it
faced the task of dealing with the ideological discourse and its violent
consequences. The defense lawyers tried very hard to put abortion on
57 They relied heavily on a presentatrial in place of their defendants.
tion of the Christian ideology of the defendants as a legitimate motivation for their behavior. The jury found them guilty but assessed very
light sentences. The jury's decision seems to have been highly sympathetic to the motives of the group, but, in the end, the representatives
of the American people insisted on the necessity of argumentation
and persuasion
as the
mechanism
to enact
even the best of goals.
164
Violence
Pro-Choice?
In the eighties an extremist minority of the pro-Life group put them-
and moved to
was grounded, however, in the rhetorical
strategies of the mainstream pro-Life movement (the tactic of "overweighing"). Although it did not share the move to violence, the proChoice movement of the period shared the over-weighing tactic and
selves outside of the public process of persuasion
violence. Their position
the tendency toward discursive closure.
The pro-Choice group in the eighties continued to insist on the

adoption of their vocabulary and their vocabulary alone. Facing rhetorical conditions that virtually mirrored those of the pro-Life rhetors,
pro-Choice activists also moved to a rhetorical strategy of over-weighing. Lance Morrow, for example, claimed that "the risks of making
abortion too easily available are outweighed by the risks of making it
too difficult or impossible to obtain." 58 Similarly, Mary and Scott Reed
argued that their value-weighing process led them to this conclusion:
"We believe that abortions are abhorrent, but feel the liberation of
America's poor has higher priority." 59 The most typical version of this
strategy was the chant, often appearing on posters, that "A Woman's
Life Is a
Human
Life."
Because the law allowed most abortions as a legal option, for the
pro-Choice advocates the over-weighing strategy did not lead to
bombings or to other acts of overt coercion. The basic ideological

grounding in Choice probably also prevented the move to coercion
where it might have been appropriate (in seeking to force doctors and
nurses to provide abortion services). The weighing strategy was,
however, accompanied by a form of ideological closure similar to that
of the pro-Life movement. Until about 1985 many pro-Choice advocates systematically refused to engage the arguments of the Right-toLife movement. In public speeches, debates, and articles, they did not
address the violence being done to the fetus and they only rarely
refuted the argument that the fetus is a human person. Instead, when
pushed on this issue, they argued that everyone has a right to decide.
The deferral to the individual's right to decide was ideologically
consistent with the full position of the pro-Choice group, but it was
not an adequate public argument. The pro-Life analogies to slavery or
murder, even though logically imprecise, had broad persuasiveness.
Individuals in the American community have not generally been
given the right to decide whether they are hurting someone else by
their actions (with the contestable exceptions of parental care of chil-
dren and spouse abuse). This has been a community responsibility. To
make
165
would require both justification far more

had been given and destruction of the near consensus
that a fetus was a human person at least by viability.
Because the public pro-Choice discourse did not adequately answer
the fetus a special case
detailed than
the major concerns of pro-Lifers, pro-Choice activists appeared to

shut off the dialogue. In the eighties that appearance lent increasing
was nothing more

such circumstances, the resort to
plausibility to the claim that the issue of abortion
than a matter of power
politics. In
violence was far easier to justify.
The pro-Choice advocates' use

also risked the loss of important
power
At pro-Life
of polarization as a strategy of
ground
in the long run.
meetings the speakers were frequently challenged by pro-Choice

activists: 'Are you saying we should ban all abortions? What about
rape or incest?" Indeed, the rape case was compelling for most hearers. But such a pattern of challenges, based solely on extreme cases,
endangered the larger
case.
They produced the
discursive climate for
laws that would ban all abortions except in cases of rape or incest and
to save the pregnant woman's life. Such pro-Choice rhetorics may
have been constructing the conditions of their own eventual defeat.
The same problem existed with the other major rhetorical move of
the later period "Speak Outs," in which victims of back-alley abortions or abortion prohibitions gave testimonials in favor of abortion. A
central strategy of pro-Choice advocates in this late stage, the Speak
Out sought to "replace" the image of the fetus with the image of
needy women. 60 This move to "over-weighing" at the visual level
all of the available grounds for

and policy-making. As chapter 5 indicated, because the image of the "innocent" fetus was far more potent than that of the
woman as victim (if for no other reason than the complexity of the
tale), such a move was likely to be a rhetorical failure.
Finally, by relying on available legal power and the over- weighing
strategy instead of extending the argument to stave off the opposi-
similarly cut off consideration of
decision
pro-Choice movement risked allowing its discourse

become "wrong." It endangered its ability to deal with a series of
issues and challenges that might require self-modification to preserve
tion, the national
to
the internal consistency of feminism. Recent objections to the large-
from the power to determine fetal

abort females selectively, rest on a more complex under-
scale female feticide,
sex
and
to
which
arises
standing of the status of the fetus than the ideological rigidity the proChoice movement has hitherto allowed. 61 These cases are similar to
the challenges brought by disabled feminists on behalf of "deformed"
fetuses. 62 Even when it is not an invitation to violence, closing off
166
dialogue
choices. "
Violence
is always a move away from the ability to make "best

Thus the polarizing moves of the pro-Choice discourse were
also of serious concern.
Summary
Between 1980 and 1985, the American discourse on abortion settled
into two distinct and very different tracks. The mass public opinion
began to work out and live a compromise that integrated the values
and argumentative grounds presented by both sides of the issue.
However, the activists on each side continued their insistence on the
dominance of their own ideology in pure form.
These dual tracks were partly engendered by the form taken by
persuasive processes in America. In national debate activists usually
partisan groups that have a fervent ideological commit-
come from
ment or a
large
economic stake
in a polar
outcome
of the issue.
Therefore, the primary speakers on any issue are generally unwilling

to listen to the other side or to reach caring
are
tempted
compromises, and they
to turn to coercion to gain their ends. Fortunately, in
many
instances the political and cultural process eventually takes the

decision-making out of the hands of activists and places it in the
hands of a larger audience with more diffuse interests. Moreover, in
the best cases the act of persuading also requires activists to abandon
their own narrow views of the world, to address the audience in its
own terms, and often to learn in the process (as was the case when
American Catholics defense of Life led them to reconsider their
position on capital punishment). Thus the persuasive process makes
possible "good" decisions that articulate the widest possible range of
7
and values.
By 1985 the contemporary American abortion controversy had
traveled a path long and difficult for all its sincere, caring, hardworking participants. The movement had begun with the stories of
women; it now found itself with an uneasy truce in which the public
accepted grounds from both groups. The peace was marked by occasional violence on one side and closed-minded hostility on both sides.
In the public realm, tactical changes and small battles would continue.
interests
Perhaps, in the long term, changes in technology or perspective
would bring more major realignments. For women, in their private

lives, however, the discourse had reached a stasis of great potential
consequence. To put the public discourse process into perspective, I
conclude with a consideration of the inter-relationships between the
path of public discourse and the private lives of women.
167
NOTES
John Burt, quoted by Jon Nordheimer, "Bombing Case Offers a Stark
Abortion Conflicts," New York Times, 18 January 1985, p. A12.
2. The major argument against public opinion polling is that it artificially
creates a singular "public opinion" that does not really exist except in the
answers to the poll itself (thus, it is not a valid indicator of any external
1.
Look
at
construct). This occurs because polls force people to
particular policies or beliefs that they

tion)
might be able
to
make
choices
among
hold (even in contradic-
simultaneously and, by forcing them to articulate opinions, actually
where none existed previously.

George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll:
create opinions
3.
Public
Opinion,
1972-1977
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1978), p. 54; Judith Blake, "The
Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion," in Abortion: New
Directions for Policy Studies, ed. Edward Manier, William Liu, and David
Solomon, p. 65. Other polls included in this survey are all published Gallup
Polls during the period of this study, along with various Harris, U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, and AP/NBC News
polls. See "Rallies Mark Court Ruling on Abortions," Des Moines Register, 23
January 1982, pp. 1, 6A; Eric M. Ulsaner and Ronald E. Weber, "Public
Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Policies in the Nation and States: Changes
and Stability after the Roe and Doe Decisions," in The Law and Politics of
Abortion, ed. Carl E. Schneider and Maris A. Vinovskis (Lexington, Mass.: D.
C. Heath, 1980); Gerald Lipson and Dianne Wolman, "Polling Americans on
Birth Control and Population," Family Planning Perspectives 4 (January 1972),
39-42; Richard J. Neuhaus, "Figures and Fetuses: Findings of New York TV
Surveys," Commonweal, 24 November 1972, pp. 175-78; "American Adults'
Approval of Legal Abortion Has Remained Virtually Unchanged since 1972,"
Family Planning Perspectives 17, no. 4 (July/August 1985), p. 181; "Newsweek
Poll: Divisions and Growing Doubts," Newsweek, 14 January 1985, p. 22.
4.
Gallup,
5.
Blake,
6.
See Gallup or "Newsweek
p. 54;
Blake,
p. 65.
p. 65.
Poll:
Divisions and
week, 14 January 1985, p. 22.

7. Gallup, Public Opinion, 1935-1971
(New
York:
Growing Doubts," News-
Random House,
1972), p.
3 (the first poll does not specify trimesters, the second poll specifies
first
trimester).
8.
Ibid.
Gallup, Public Opinion, 1978, p. 33. See also "Newsweek Poll,"

indicated that in 1985, 58 percent of the respondents favored "a ban
abortions except in the case of rape, incest or when the mother's
9.
endangered"
(p.
22).
The idea
that
women
which
on all
life
is
are held responsible for their
by the fact that this poll reports that substanbanning most abortions, even though they
realize that this would cause many women to be harmed in illegal abortions
and many more unwanted children. The key fact is that 62 percent of the
pregnancies
tial
is
further reflected
majorities of people favor
168
Violence
would mean that "people would practice

Only 26 percent thought that such a revision would also
public also believed that such a ban

better birth control."
improve the "moral tone"

10.
in America.
In 1965 only 18 percent supported abortion
support another child
Gallup, Public Opinion, 1978,

11.
the parents could not
if
financially. Gallup, Public Opinion,
1935-1971,
p.
1985;
p. 33.
Blake, pp. 62-64; Gallup, Public Opinion, 1978, p. 33. This trend is even
obstetricians and gynecologists. A poll of the
more pronounced among
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists shows that, since 1971,

there has been overwhelming support for legalized abortion but that this has
been clearly divided between purposes and fetal stage of development. In
1985, 91 percent supported abortion for fetal abnormality in the
mester, 84 percent beyond; 93 percent supported
it
for rape
and
first tri-
incest
(first
beyond; 94 percent for physical health (first trimester),

75 percent beyond; 83 percent for mental health (first trimester), 56 percent
beyond; 71 percent for financial difficulty (first trimester), 36 percent beyond;
75 percent personal choice (first trimester), 36 percent beyond. See "ACOG
Poll: Ob-Gyns' Support for Abortion Unchanged since 1971," Family Planning
trimester), 68 percent
Perspectives 17, no. 6

12.
Mark
(November/December
1985), p. 2.
Gallup, Public Opinion, 1978, pp. 29, 33. AP/NBC News poll, "Rallies
Court Ruling on Abortions," Des Moines Register, p. 1 and esp. 6A, col 4.
13.
Neuhaus,
14.
See Kristin Luker, Abortion and
p. 176.
Motherhood (Berkeley:
the Politics of
University of California Press, 1984), and Marilyn Falik, Ideology and Abortion
Policy Politics (New York: Praeger, 1983).
15.
Joseph Scheidler
is
probably the most noted advocate of
means necessary" philosophy. For example, he

public lecture at the University of
Illinois,
this
"any
reflected this attitude in his
Urbana, 7 October 1986, and in

to Stop Abortion (Lake Bluff, 111.:
other publications, including Closed: 99 Ways
Regnery Books,
16.
1985).
For example, an off-duty police officer was convicted of shoving two
women at an abortion clinic picketing. The conviction was later overturned by

a judge
Upset
17.
18.
and was being appealed
in Officer's Case,"
New
at this writing. See, for
York Times, 18
See Scheidler.
E.g., "Conviction on Abortion Ads,"
December
New
example, "Conviction
1985,
II,
2:1.
York Times, 8 October 1986,
1,
16:1.
"We Asked You,"
Pensacola News, 26 December 1985, p. 1A. This

taken from several issues of the Pensacola News, the
Pensacola Journal, the Pensacola News-Journal, other national papers and national magazines, as well as discussions with reporters. Henceforth, only
direct quotations will be cited, since most of the material is readily accessible
in the Pensacola papers and is repeated several times in various papers.
20. Dave Goodwin, "Victims: This Won't Stop Anything," Pensacola Jour19.
account as a whole
nal,
is
26 December 1984,
tives of
N.O.W.
p.
1A, quoted victims of the bombings and representa-

21.
169
Cindy West, "Church Leaders Condemn Christmas-Morning VioDecember 1986, p. 5A.
lence/' Pensacola Journal, 26

22.
Journal,
"A Chronology: Local Anti- Abortionists Protest Frequently," Pensacola

26 December 1984, p. 4A.
23. West and Dave Goodwin, "Pro-Life: Anti- Abortionists Frown on

Bombs, But Not Unhappy," Pensacola Journal, 26 December 1986, p. 2A.
24. The attorney, T. Patrick Monaghan, called them "four outstanding
young people," and everyone interviewed by the press agreed they were
devout and hard-working, clean-cut kids. The attorney also said, "We're
going to be looking at young people whose virtues have gotten them into this
courtroom, not their vices." Ginny Graybiel, "Trial Focuses on Conflict: God's
Law vs. Man's Law," Pensacola News, 17 April 1985, p.lOA.
25. Barbara Janesh, "Psychiatrist: Defendants Obsessed," Pensacola NewsJournal, 21 April 1985, p.
26.
Ginny
3A.
Graybiel, "Goldsby Fiancee Says She'll Stand
by Her Man,"
Pensacola News-Journal, 1 January 1985, p. 1A.
Chris Cooper, "Guilty," Pensacola News, 24 April 1985, p. 3A.

Cooper, "Witnesses: Goldsby Told Agents He Wasn't Insane,"
Pensacola News, 18 April 1985, .p. 1.
27.
28. Chris
29.
Chris Cooper, "Goldsby Appears Scared and Strangely Detached,"
December 1985, p. 2A.

by Her Man," p. 2A.
31. "Reaction," Pensacola Journal, 31 December 1984, p. 4A.
32. Chris Cooper, "Suspect's Fiancee: Clinic Bombings A Gift to Jesus,'"
Pensacola News, 3 January 1985, p. 1A. The ideological treatment of the women
Pensacola News, 31
30.
is
Graybiel, "Stand
interesting here, given that Wiggins herself
is
a "suspect," yet she takes
status only as a fiancee.

33.
Cooper, "Witnesses."
34. Pensacola Journal, 18 April 1985, p.
14A.
4A.
35.
Chris Cooper,
36.
"Agents: Suspect Admits Bombings," Pensacola News, 31
"Trial," Pensacola Journal,
20 April 1986,
p.
December
1986, p. 2A.
37.
Craig Pittman and Dave Goodwin, "Pro-Life Leaders Say Heat's Off,"
December 1985, p. 1A.
Pensacola Journal, 31
Tom
Hall, "Shocked Exclamations Follow Women's Arrests," Pensacola

January 1985, p. 1A.
39. Chris Cooper, "Suspect's Friends Shocked at Arrest," Pensacola News, 2
January 1985, p. 1A.
40. Hall, "Shocked," p. 3A.
38.
Journal, 3
41. Pensacola Journal, 16 April 1985, p.
1.
Jon Nordheimer, "Bombing Case Offers," p. A12.

43. "Judge Reassessed Bombing," Pensacola Journal, 19 April 1985, p. 14A.
44. Craig Pittman, "Aftershock," Pensacola News-Journal, 6 January 1985, p.
2A.
45. Chris Cooper, "Guilty: Four Convicted in Clinic Bombings," Pensacola
42.
News, 24 April 1985,
p.
3A.
170
46.
Barbara Janesh, "Jury Deliberates

p. 12A.
Violence
Bomb Case Today/'
Pensacola Journal,
24 April 1985,
47. The Newsweek poll reveals a slight shift in public opinion toward the
pro-Choice position between 1981 and 1983 and then back toward the pro-Life
position between 1983 and 1985. The percentage saying that abortion should
be illegal in all circumstances was, in 1981, 21 percent; in 1983, 16 percent; and
in 1985, 21 percent. The percentage saying abortion should be legal in only
some circumstances was, in 1981, 52 percent; in 1983, 58 percent; and in 1985,
55 percent. The percentage saying abortion should be legal in all circumstances was, in 1981, 23 percent; in 1983, 23 percent; and in 1985, 21 percent.
It has been claimed that the finding that 58 percent favored a law to make
abortion illegal except in cases of rape, incest, or endangerment of the
mother's life reflected a major shift in momentum, but this is not the case.
That precise question was not asked previously, and similar results could be
compiled in many previous years from the polls which asked people under
which conditions they would favor legalized abortion.
48. Thomas A. Prentice, "Letters from Readers," Progressive, December
1980, p. 37.
49. Haven Bradford Gow, "Abortion and the Abuse of the English Language," Mademoiselle, July 1979, p. 39.
50. Andrew Hacker, "Of Two Minds about Abortion," Harpers, September
1979, p. 16.
51.
Milton Rockmore, "Are You Sorry You
Had an
Abortion?" Good House-
keeping, July 1977, p. 163.

52.
"Abortion, Religion
and
Political Life,"
Commonweal, 2 February 1979,
p. 37.
53.
"Letter," Pensacola Journal, 28
December
1984, p.
1.
example, John C. Willke, head of the National Right to Life Committee, public lecture, University of Illinois, Urbana, 6 February 1987; John
Noonan, public lecture, University of Iowa School of Law, 1981.
55. Consider the polls cited above, but also consider the strong emphasis
on late-term abortions by the Right-to-Life advocates e.g., Noonan, lecture,
54. For
University of Iowa, and
"ACOG
56. For a discussion of the
note 12."
mutuality of persuasion see Douglas Ehninger,

Its Uses," Communica-
Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and

Monographs 37 (June 1970), 101-10, and "Validity
"Argument
tion
Poll,
as
as
Moral Obligation,"
Southern States Speech Journal 33 (Spring 1968), 215-22.

57. For a discussion of the discourse in the trial itself, see Celeste Michelle
Condit, "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Pensacola Abortion Clinic Bombings,"
paper presented at the Speech Communication Association National Con-
ference, Boston,
58.
August
59.
November
1987.
Lance Morrow, "Of Abortion and the Unfairness of
Life," Time,
1977, p. 49.
Mary and
Scott Reed, "Letters
from Readers,"
Progressive,
December
1980, p. 37.
60.
Nanette Falkenberg, executive director of National Abortion Rights

Coalition, said, "I
wanted
to find a
way
think of abortion, what they see in their
to treat the issue so that
mind
171
when
people
but the face

of someone they know, someone who is not a murderer," quoted in Dudley
Clendinen, "Abortion Choice Defended in Capital," New York Times, 22 May
1985, p. A18.
61. Viola Roggencamp, "Abortion of a Special Kind: Male Sex Selection in
India," in Test-Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood, ed. Rita Arditti, Renate
Duelli-Klein, Shelley Minden (London, Boston: Pandora Press, 1984).
62.
Anne
Finger, "Claiming All of
Disabilities," in Arditti, Duelli-Klein,
Our
is
not a
fetal picture
Bodies: Reproductive Rights
and Minden, pp. 281-97.
and
CHAPTER NINE
Public Rhetoric
and
Private Lives
The manner in which Americans spoke in the public space about

abortion changed markedly between 1960 and 1985. They expressed
new interests and thus enabled new laws and cultural practices.
Although these new words and ways were not universally endorsed,
nor were women's interests fully represented, a new public consensus arose.
In important ways the meaning we impute to this consensus depends upon the impact this flooding torrent of public discourse had
on the actions and thoughts of real persons. Surely, such verbal
hurricanes disturb even "individuals" huddled inside their private
dwellings and cultural enclaves, out of the main currents of the public
gale. As yet, however, there have been virtually no attempts to illuminate the precise relationships between such public discourse and
private life. Having discarded "hypodermic needle" models and "limited effects" denials as oversimplifications, we are left without theories of the verbal
commerce between
single work could
public
and
private realms. 1
No
such a void in our understanding. In order to

place the American controversy into a concrete perspective, however,
this concluding chapter provides a preliminary exploration of the
ways in which changes in public talk and private lives were related to
each other.
fill
How
to
Compare Public and Private?
comparing public discourse and private lives is

the fact that, by definition, any attempt to bring the "private" into the
realm of scholarly discourse tampers with the very character of "privateness." Consequently, access to private discourse and private lives
not only is difficult to obtain but also is never available to academic
analysis in a "pure" form. (Appendix C explores these methodological
The major
difficulty in
172
Public Rhetoric and Private Lives
more
issues
fully.)
Scholars are
left
173
with severely limited sources of
"data.*
Despite such limitations, a few collections of texts from private

individuals can provide
some
some private lives. In

Maxtone-Graham has provided a set
supply the grounds for useful compartial access to
the abortion controversy Katrina

of personal narratives that
Her book, Pregnant by Mistake, includes edited transcripts of

women talking about what they did when
they found themselves with "unwanted pregnancies" and why they
acted as they did. 2 Most of the women had abortions, but some had
children whom they put up for adoption, and a few kept "unwanted
parisons.
interviews with seventeen
children."
Some
of the
women,
at different
times in their
lives,
took
more than one of these options. The women, interviewed by Maxtone-Graham between February 1971 and October 1972, came from
varying income levels, age groups, and ethnic backgrounds. Although they cannot be fully representative of the experience of all
women, their stories certainly provide an initial wide slice for our
edification.
In analyzing these discourses,
compared those portions
transcripts that dealt directly with childbearing decisions to
mass-circulation magazine articles that
made
a direct
of the
all
the
argument
in
favor of reforming or repealing abortion laws (as indexed in the

Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature) for the years 1960-61, 1964-65,
and 1970-71. To use these two discourse sets to explore the interaction of public and private requires first an extended comparison of
their character.
Potent Differences
Purposes, Characters, and Moral Principles
The broad outline
of the public
and
private discourses shared
some
common
grounds. Most important, for both, "the woman's story"

was a key component. These stories, however, conveyed different
textures of meaning. The public accounts, especially in the early
period, told of women who experienced dangerous or deadly illegal
abortions or
who bore
children into horrid circumstances. The public

and they defined
narratives sought to arouse horror or sympathy,
these
ing
women's experiences as "representative" through accompanyThe magazine articles then discussed reasons for and
statistics.
new abortion laws, generally expressing preferences for "reform." During the discussions the "opponents" and "supporters" of
abortion were clearly characterized. The supporters of more lenient
against
174
laws were depicted as the heroic figures: doctors, lawyers, and ecumenical clergy dominated their ranks. The villains were Roman Catholics,
conservatives,
men, and "hypocrites,"
all
living in
an archaic
value structure.
The
who
private discourse
told their
own
was
less sure-footed.
The seventeen women

began with a
stories in Pregnant by Mistake usually
discussion of their birth control practices or their life situation at the

time of their pregnancy. Next they talked about their discovery of
pregnancies they had not planned. Gradually, they wove an explana-
The framework of these

accounts was formed by life situations, personal goals, and beliefs.
Emotions, incidents, and responses filled out the shell.
Each woman described the experience of seeking an abortion and
the abortion itself whether it was legal, clean, and safe or illegal,
dirty, and dangerous. About half these women then generalized from
their feelings, universalizing their experience to others, suggesting
that abortion, though it was to be avoided through birth control when
possible, was a needed, regrettable, last resort. Even though they
were not skilled verbal artists, their stories emerge through the interviews as full human dramas. As a result, typical readers of this book
would probably come to feel that they understood the real and often
tragic feelings and needs of these struggling human beings. Such
"understanding" bridged occasionally on "identification" with the
women a sense of being their friend or wanting to help. This was a
tion of their reasons for choosing abortion.
far different feeling
from the distant "sympathy" created by the public
discourse. These different textures were created primarily through
the portrayal of the purposes, characters,
and moral
principles of the
women.
Private Purposes
In Pregnant by Mistake, the fifteen
women's
stories that included abor-
tion decisions featured widely varying circumstances
and therefore
described abortions undertaken for a variety of purposes. 3 Some of

the women had chosen abortion because they were destitute, some
because the males involved coerced them into it, and one because her
first child was severely asthmatic, tottering between life and death. In
general, however, the women based their choices on a constellation of
factors subsumable under the term life-style rather than on a single
cause. The women described themselves as living in an aggregate of
conditions that made having a child what they repeatedly called
Public Rhetoric
and Private Lives
175
They stated simply and forcefully that they did not

"want" another child in one woman's terms "at any cost" (343). In
the interviews the accumulated detail of their life circumstances
helped to make the "wants" of these women appear important and
credible. While a pro-Life advocate reading the stories might still have
asked these women to "make the sacrifice for the baby," it is difficult
to imagine someone telling Catherine that she is acting for "mere
convenience" after she responds to the possibility of keeping the child
by exclaiming: "No, absolutely ridiculous! I was already supporting
five kids! You're out of your bloody mind! I was working full time and
going to school and conducting my political life; I slept four hours a
night, sometimes three" (293). Similarly, it is hard to call Sandy's
decision a "whim" when she tells us that "abortion, in my case, saved
my life as my life is. It left me so that I could still communicate with
my family. I could still have a job. It didn't totally destroy everything I
was" (132).
As with Sandy and Catherine, most of these women's purposes
were not of the stereotypically "forgivable" type rape, incest, eugenics, life- or health-threatening conditions. Nonetheless, the
women's purposes came to have force through their individual complexity and reality. In addition to the weight of detail that constitutes
"real lives," that reality was created through the characters of the
"impossible."
women.
Private Characters
Readers of these stories would come to know the character of these
women through a variety of means. Powerfully, the women told of
their goals in life and the moral principles they lived by. They recounted a good bit of their lives' histories, and, not surprisingly, such
were troubled and trying, full of the difficulties and tragwhich all human beings must face. In addition, each woman
revealed her character through the manner in which she spoke the
words she chose, the grammar she employed, and the topics she
selected. In each case, for different reasons, typical readers would
probably have judged that the narrator's character made moral condemnation inapplicable.
histories
edies
One
set of
women
explicitly
represented themselves as morally
They argued that they responsibly used birth control and

that they had made a prior consistent decision about abortion, unaffected by the emotions of the moment. These women matched a
"correct."
176
general sense of "moral entities" acting in a moral way. Even if they

did not live up to a particular reader's moral principles, most readers
would be hard-pressed
moral intentions.
themselves as psychologically incompetent, labeling themselves "messed up." Their language
and their traumatic personal histories made such self-analysis credible. Consequently, readers might come to feel that berating these
women for immorality would be a futile exercise.
Although the last set of women did not plead incompetence, they
appeared young or naive and incapable of assessing their world in a
way that made traditional categories of morality functional. Again,
then, the typical reader would be most likely to judge them not as
morally deficient but as simply unequipped to live by standards of
morality that depend heavily upon rational assessment and the ability
Another
set of the
to challenge their
women characterized
to take personal responsibility.
Although the characterizations might not have invited approval, in

Maxtone-Graham's interviews the complex, detailed, tangled discourse about private abortion decisions would lead a typical reader to
understanding, sympathy, or pity rather than hostile moral judgment. At the least, the women's decisions were expressed in such a
way that they appeared to have been based on vivid and forceful
conditions in their lives, as well as upon a sense of what was "best"
that included both others (a moral component) and their own "wants"
(an individual component). The case is quite different in the public
discourse.
Public Characters and Purposes

stories of the seventeen women took an entire book to tell.
Moreover, a reader would have to get well through Pregnant by Mistake
to absorb enough detail about the women's lives to sense the force,
The
and vividness of the "real life" this discourse expressed.

mass media's stories representing aLl women's
experiences often averaged less than two hundred lines. These brief
accounts simply could not convey to a mass audience the same variety
with any force. Consequently, reporters and public advocates recomplexity,
In stark contrast, the
sorted to an alternative rhetorical device: they selected for portrayal

stories of women whose purposes for seeking abortion were
culturally
most persuasive
victims
of rape, incest, eugenics,
and
extreme youth. 4 Such cases could, in the briefest number of words,

convey the forcefulness of the problems facing women who chose
abortion.
177
The same reduction of private complexity to narrow public forms

occurred with regard to "character." Where readers of the private
interviews came to know their subjects through a variety of means
that gave reality and force to their individual and flawed characters,
the publicly presented women were reduced to mere roles and forms.
In the early period, a
few adjectives, a few of the women's
own
statements, and a few indications about their behaviors told the

reader something of the women, but even here their character was
the situation in which they found themessentially their "purpose"
selves. In one version of the Sherri Finkbine story, she was "a healthy
and happily married Arizona woman, mother of four children
Romper Room [who feared that her fifth child] might be
star of
hideously deformed as a result of her [unknowingly] taking the sleeping pill thalidomide." 5 As the years went by, magazines and newspapers eliminated even these adjectives, statements, and behaviors.
The women became nothing more than their purposes, built from
their situations: "A married woman has six children, all that the
parents can possibly support; another child would impair the family's
stability. ... A woman on the brink of menopause feels that at her
age she cannot care adequately for the expected child. ... A young
." 6
pregnant as the result of incest or rape.
In the most extreme cases even these hasty depictions of purpose
disappeared into accounts of "getting the abortion." 7 The multiple,
demanding realities of women's lives were thus lost in the translation
to public justification. The public discourse did not take into account
the full range and complexity of individuals' lived experiences. The
serious consequence of this omission can be found in the public moral
code constructed from this discourse a morality distinctly and importantly different from the moral code the women constructed for
girl is
themselves.
Moral Principles
In their private discourse the
Graham used moral

One
women
interviewed by Maxtoneand they applied a
principles to different extents,
variety of rules.
threefold. First,
moral criteria most frequently applied was

in order to have moral grounds for an abortion, they
set of
indicated, you should use birth control as a
first line of prevention.
Betsey,
I was
example, justified her decision by
using contraceptives, and that it was a contraceptive failure" (64).
Second, the women indicated that you should be consistent about your
decisions and values. They had decided, before finding themselves preg-
for
noting that "I also felt that
178
would have an abortion in case of unwanted pregnancy. Carole emphasized the importance of such consistency as a
sign of sincerity, concluding " whatever your reasons might be. I don't
think that anyone's reasons really need to be questioned. If someone
is really sincere in wanting an abortion" (100). Finally, the women
nant, that they
indicated that you should consider the
encompassing a broad range
interests of all those
around you,
should be weighed against

noted that "your whole life
of factors that
each other. Several times the
women
situation plays a big, big part" (7) or that "there
were many
factors"
Carole indicated the ways she finally balanced these interests,

saying, "So I just feel that it's better for me, and it's better for the
(232).
and better for my husband" (104).

Another group of women presented an alternative, quite different,
moral set. Rather than assuming that any abortion must be justified as
children,
a "special case," they indicated that having a child required justifica-
They argued that it would be "fair" to bring a child into the world
only under certain conditions. Most centrally, you must provide a loving, stable environment. Alex, for example, insisted, "Kids should be
desired. ... A child should be wanted and brought into an emotional
climate
that can accept him and wants him" (189). Acting othertion.
wise, indicated Samantha,
"it's
really unfair to the child" (36).
Apply-
own
pregnancy, Annie suggested that it took

"courage" to surmount her own fears and feelings in order to live up
to this morality. She said, "I'm pregnant now, but, my God, will I
bring a child into the world simply because I'm afraid of having to face
my feelings? No, we are too strong. We love each other too much. Our
children. The whole philosophy of: we affirm life; and so, therefore,
we cannot treat it in such a shabby way as to say we are not strong
ing these rules to her
enough
to have an abortion" (121).

This moral principle that children should only be born wanted,
that unwanted pregnancies should not be brought to term was also
extended to cover adoption. Catherine, for example, insisted that "you
have no right to do that to another human being. I don't think you

have any right at all to create a human being and give it away" (292).
Allison expressed a similar view: "There are very real reasons for a
woman not to keep a child, but then she shouldn't have had it! She
should have had an abortion" (86).
The most abstract of these moral statements consciously disapproved
of the alternate morality expressed by "the society." Samantha challenged the correctness of the dominant public morality, saying, "People like me shouldn't be made to go through undiluted hell. Because
of a
FLUKE
that's
happened"
(47).
Louise also consciously challenged
the existing view: "I'm not a prude,
and I do
179
believe in abortions.
Okay, some people call it murder. But I think that there's a lot of
murder going on in young girls who have nowhere else to turn; and
who perhaps ruin their lives by going through with a pregnancy, or
by having an illegal abortion in which they're butchered" (327). Antonia concurred: "It really bothers me how they feel you can force
someone to go through with it; and even worse, you know, to have
unmarried girls go through with it and then give it up for adoption.
How how can you be so cruel?" (31).
From such challenges to the existing moral system, the women
drew an alternative moral principle. Having concluded that the options of "forcing someone to go through with it are cruel," Antonia
constructed the moral principle, "having an abortion should be the
woman's choice" (31). In Annie's version, "People ought to be in
control of their own bodies ... we all have to work toward allowing
people to do what they know they must do. ." (120).
Thus, the women applied varying moral systems. Some provided a
under which abortion was "permissible" and indimet those criteria. Others described an
alternate moral system in which abortion was morally the best option,
rather than one in which abortion must be "excused." Whether finding moral grounds to "excuse" an abortion, or elaborating a system in
which abortion was a moral "necessity," most of the women applied
moral principles and gave a good bit of attention to these maxims.
This is a somewhat different finding from the popularly publicized
set of conditions
cated
how
their decisions
claims of Carol Gilligan,
on the
who
argues that
men make
basis of principles or fixed rules (of
moral decisions
"justice"), while women
decide on a more diffuse morality of "care," which requires more

complex moral "weighing" processes. 8 Instead, this analysis suggests
may have simply
accepted male definitions of what count

operate on moral principles, but (at least
in the area of abortion) they are different principles than those used
by men because women tend to have different interests on abortion
that Gilligan
as moral principles.
Women
issues.
Men's employment of "rules" appears to be a simple process of

"applying principles," rather than the more complex endeavor of
"weighing," only because the male "rule-system" has become the
dominant public rule-system. Men therefore do not have to negotiate
between their own interests and the public moral system, because
these two sets are largely identical. Male moral decision-making
therefore has the appearance of being neater and cleaner more
purely rule-governed.
180
Women,
in contrast, must work harder in their justification prothey

cess:
must both account for these dominant rules and make a case
for their
own
rules
and
interests. Therefore, their
decision-making
not because they "lack principles" or use an
appears more complex
inherently different process of moral valuation but because their rhetorical position imposes a particular way of talking about their moral
principles.
Most women
face
two
rhetorical exigencies that differ
from
those of most men.
As American
women must
society
and public discourse have been
constituted,
own
moral principles as they apply them

because these principles and the female interests they represent have
not become publicly accepted maxims. (This condition may be changing rapidly: many of my young female students today seem to have
no trouble with a quick and easy citation of the maxim "It's my body,
isn't it"). Secondly, women must then negotiate between "their" prinjustify their
and the dominant principles. No wonder their discourse looks

complex and entails complicated "weighings." The "different" sound
of women's "voice," however, may result not from any inherent
ciples
characteristic of
for
responding
women
(neither nurturance nor a peculiar capacity
and principles) but from their current, historin American society

a position shaped by the
to rules
ically specific situation
dominance of alien male principles, the absence of public endorsement of female principles, and women's need to negotiate among
these in articulating their moral justifications.
Foundations of Morality
To this point
public
and
in Experience
have described the dramatically different ways in which
private discourse portrayed
women's
"character"
and "pur-
I also have shown that women constructed and applied clear

moral principles to justify their abortion decisions. Finally, I have
suggested that male/public moral principles are fundamentally at
odds with those of the women. By exploring the foundations of these
principles in their supporting rhetoric, we can see the way in which
the exclusion of the women's voice and the consequent exclusion of
their interests founded the differences between public/male moral
poses."
discourse on abortion and the private/female stories. That will provide

the last preliminary to an exploration of the interaction of these two
realms.
As we have
seen, the
women
in this
sample held themselves
knew about and had access to
responsible for a pregnancy only
if
birth control but did not use
when having
it
they
sexual intercourse. In
181
moral rule held that women were

"excused" from pregnancy only if they were not "responsible" for
having intercourse or if the outcome of the pregnancy might be
socially undesirable (as in deformities threatened by measles). An
article in Christian Century in 1961 provides a typical example when it
concludes that the laws should be restructured but only so as not to
"compel the bearing of children conceived through rape, incest and
contrast, in the public discourse the
by minor or mentally incompetent girls." 9 The authors were equally clear that the decision process was not to rest with
the women or be addressed to their interests. They directly excluded
the pregnant women from the decision-making process, saying "the
limits of legalized abortion should be drawn by the mutual agreement
of the law, medicine and the church"
no mention of the women. 10 In
fact, women's views were dismissed as "whims" and expressly ruled
out as grounds. 11 The institutions sought to retain control, unshared
with individual women, to set the legal and moral rules. The institutional rules dictated that once a woman knowingly acquiesced to sex
irresponsibility
(and hence, to marriage), she accepted the responsibility of bearing

raising any healthy child (because she admitted the possibility
that birth control would fail, or simply that intercourse could result in
conception). Because she "voluntarily" took the risk, she was held to
be morally bound to give up all her own interests in favor of the
and
potential child.
because it was perceived as in the public interest for women to bear and caringly raise
children (so that society might perpetuate itself). Consequently, society had an incentive to count each sex act as in some way voluntary
(the strong force of sexual drive in women was routinely discounted,
and manifestations of it were branded as signs of deviance and evil).
Supporting this, the value of the fetus was understood in an abstract
These moral weightings arose, most
basically,
manner. Fetuses were classified in a digital fashion as either sacred or

disposable on grounds of their "soul," "potential," "genetic structure," or "personhood." Because women's interests were partially
different from these abstract systemic concerns, the women's articulations of principles concerning sexuality and the fetus were different.
Sexuality
women must live with their own biological nature that is,
own sexuality. As a consequence, most of the women in Pregnant
Individual
their
saw sex as an inevitability of life. While each sex act might

have been more or less voluntary, having sex throughout life was not
by Mistake
182
generally voluntary. People had sex much like they ate; each meal
might be voluntary, but eating was not. The women viewed lifelong
abstinence as an unrealistic expectation. When Samantha got pregnant with an IUD implanted in her, she explained: "I hadn't even
made a mistake. And I felt it was very unfair that it should happen to
me.
And I think I felt the whole world was kicking me in the teeth
for something that I really had nothing to do with. But short of
abstinence, this is something of a chance you take" (38).
Antonia, a married woman, reported a similar response: "I used to
be pretty rigid in my thinking, until it happened to me. And I realize
.
how
easy
it is
to get pregnant, even for
who
people
are very careful
and knowledgeable" (24). From these women's perspectives, they

necessarily had sex, and sex necessarily meant the possibility of
pregnancy. Consequently, they developed a moral maxim holding
themselves accountable only for doing everything possible to avoid
pregnancy while having sex.
Children
The women could excuse themselves from the consequences of their

inherent sexuality because they did not value the fetus and future
children as absolutely or exclusively as did the public vocabulary.
With only one exception, all of the women emphatically stated that
they loved and valued children, and loved the children they had.
However, they also emphasized that children made extreme demands
against their
own limited
resources. Jean said,
"I
know personally,
me
for
not to have more than two children. I

can give just so much. I feel I've reached my limit" (281). Antonia felt
similarly: "They tell you you're so selfish when you don't want a
myself, that
child. Well,
it's
better for
God,
let
them
try
it!
Even
you want them
if
it's still
a lot of
work. I mean, it takes a lot out of you even if you willingly do it" (31).
Thus, the women described a limit to the number of children who
could be rewarding and desirable, and they noted the many limiting
conditions in individual lives that could make children "not wanted."
The Fetus
The women thus balanced the
ideal of children
and the
real pleasures
needs and demands. They balanced the implicit "rights" or interests of the fetus in a similar manner.
In the first place, many of the women denied that a fetus constituted a
of children against other personal
"life"
similar to that of their children.
fetus in terms of
accord with
its
some
They did not
characterize the
definitional ideal or principle but rather in
material characteristics.
One woman
defined the fetus
183
between a sperm and an egg" (Annie, 125). Another

group of women referred to its physical appearance. Patti noted that "I
just saw a pan full of blood with this little blob in it" (198), while
Catherine commented that "we conjure up this little thing that you're
holding in your arms with its blue eyes and its little face. This is not
what you're dealing with, when you're talking about an eight-week
pregnancy. ... I, I talk a great deal about the physical development
of this creature. Very vividly, in terms of where it is, week after week"
as "a collision
(301).
women
Yet another group of

their relationships
with
it
its
characterized the fetus in terms of
material effect. Carole said:
"I
didn't
consider it a life, that it was a mistake. And it wouldn't be a life until

the baby was born" (96). Allison also emphasized the importance of
making the
"I really don't have

pregnant that there's any
kind of reality about a 'human being' inside of her. I think that she
makes it real if she so chooses. I mean I see pregnancy very much as a
purely physical state, that's not unrelated to any other physical state.
Growing something inside of you it's no different than a plant, you
know. And I really feel that the thing that makes it real is the choice to
the relationship in
strong feelings that
when
characterization:
woman
is first
have the child"
(85).
For most of the
women,
time was a crucial variable in the definiwould begin to define itself; its materiality
would become substantial enough to force a relationship. Louise recalled that "I had an abortion before I was quite six weeks pregnant. I
had no feeling for the child. I could have never waited until the fourth
month or so when the child was kicking. I would already have started
tion. After time, the fetus
to
have feeling
of time:
for the child" (327).
"We had nothing
Antonia also cited the importance
against abortion as long as
it
was done
early
(5). Less sure of herself, Samantha also saw time as a relevant criterion: "I was very fortunate. I think I may have been eight
maybe just eight weeks pregnant. So I was very lucky. I mean, you
!"
know, it's probably not really very pregnant at all. [Laughs] Well
(39). The seriousness of these distinctions about time for the women
is most evident in Allison's testimony: "He [the abortionist] kept
saying, 'you're much more than eight weeks pregnant, you must have
just had a false period, you must have just been spotting,' et cetera.
And that was really one of the worst that was the only time that
I really had any sense of 'an abortion' in the sense of killing an
enough"
embryo" (73).
The women thus characterized the fetus in terms of its real historical and material being, as manifested in its relations to other beings.
184
They did not generally
characterize it in the abstract terms of the

public discourse, such as genetic structure, personhood, or soul. In
fact, they resisted abstract hypotheticals. When asked if she felt guilty
about the fact that, if she had had the chance, she might have aborted
her first child, Carole answered: "She's she's really terrific. And it
would be a shame if if rather than being Jenny, she were an abortion. But then again, the second one is fine and terrific; and so I could
have had her, probably, again. You know, like right now, if I were just
getting married now. So, you know, it's a hard thing to talk about, 'If
everything were different.' It's just hypothetical" (107).
Even the women who accepted the personhood of the fetus relied
on a direct material base in defining its status. Sandy said, "It's a
human being
that baby, or that young fetus, or whatever it was,
was having a tremendous effect on my body. I mean, there it was,
growing" (150). Even when pushed to use more abstract criteria,
Sandy tried to make them concrete: "This had all the genes and all the
potential of being like us. Not just 'potential' [she struggled against
it was going to be" (150-51).

The women thus defined the fetus in terms
abstraction],
of their material experi-
ence of it, rather than through the abstractions of the public realm.
This material orientation helped them to avoid the digital "yes/no" of
the abstract public categories and permitted them to judge the fetus
against themselves. It is important to note that whether they viewed
the fetus as fully human or less than that, each of the women weighed
it as of lesser value than her own life. Betsey concluded that "I do
was a child there. And I, you know, I'm sorryl I didn't

want to
.to kill it. And I think I did. But I I also you know, I can't
honestly say I regret it at all" (54). Speaking from the same position,
Sandy explained further: "I mean, I'm sorry, I'm not going to sacrifice
my life for someone I don't even know. And that was the one thing
believe there
.
that
did
feel
most strongly
somebody
after the abortion: that
did save
my life,
with different feelings

about the status of the fetus, concurred in the final judgment: "I just
feel that my life is more important to me right now" (96).
This stark difference between the women's weighing of the fetus
by
sacrificing
else's" (151). Carole,
from the different meanings

possible for the public term mother's life and the private experience of
my life. Because the public term mother's life had to cover so many
women, it could only be reduced to the common denominator of
physical survival. However, the women's version of the term my life
meant identity the "everything I was." Although for the women,
this was necessarily a higher and more differentiated concern, from a
and
that of the public discourse arose
185
woman's life was just an abstracweighed against the equal abstraction of the fetus. To the
extent that women were categorized essentially as childbearers, the
weighting was necessarily tilted in favor of the fetus. In the dominant
male or
institutional perspective, the
tion to be
it did not make sense for the women to reject this

hence, any refusal to bear a child could only be seen as
secondary, a "whim" or temporary "convenience." Women who rejected this role were *selfish because they did not serve the interests of
view, therefore,
primary
role;
would wish them to do.

Thus though the public and private discourses shared the common
denominator of "women's stories" as their core and focused on similar
issues, they were divided by crucial differences. The public characterizations of the pregnant women and their purposes were simple
and gathered under a narrow heading of socially acceptable grounds,
defined by a morality alienated from women's interests and perspectives. The private characterizations were intricate and complex, because they had to counter the public principles and express interests
based on understandings of sexuality, the fetus, and children
grounded in the material experiences of women's real lives.
These variations probably resulted both from a permanent and
general difference in the nature of public and private discourse and
from the fact that the public discourse was essentially âle-dominated, while the women's private discourse revealed in MaxtoneGraham's interviews was less so. Public discourse, because it appeals
to vaster audiences and interests, may always speak through an
abstract, indirect vocabulary, isolated to some extent from material
experiences. The distance between that public vocabulary and the
private terms of the women seems to have been lengthened by the
overwhelming lack of inclusion of female experiences in the existing
others as others
moral
set.
women themselves were part of the

women would be only instruments for others in the
Until the concerns of
social vocabulary,
social system.
Private Lives Influence Public Discourse
was precisely the public assimilation of the women's vocabulary that

created the conditions for reducing the differences between the public
and private realms. Careful examination suggests that untidy and
It
The pubexpanded women's

"choices" in the public realm, while pruning and shaping the
"women's discourse" that pushed the public revision.
interesting interactions occurred in the assimilation process.

lic
inclusion of
women's
stories simultaneously
186
The clearest example of the process by which women's discourse

was simultaneously included in and altered by the public discourse is
the change in the use of the word want The term was translated from
an expression of the desires of individual women into "unwanted
children/' a social concern, and then into Choice a matter of
women's rights.
"What I want" was the phrase most frequently used, by the individual women in Pregnant by Mistake and in other interviews, to describe
the warrant behind their private decisions. While terms such as freedom and J had to also often appeared, want provided the most central
.
why the women chose to have abortions performed.

Antonia, for example, said, It would just have changed my life completely; and not the way I wanted it ... we [she and her husband]
were just not willing" (7). Even the weighing of values was done
through a lens of what the pregnant woman wanted. Samantha argued
that "I wanted the child" in a biological way, but "on a purely intellectual level, I didn't want the child, didn't want to have it, didn't want to
keep it" (36). In the private discourse, personal want was the most
pervasive claim, and it seemed to sum up other terms when they were
used.
As the public discourse opened to women's voices in the period
1960-61, the magazine articles discussed the "wants" of individual
women. In contrast to the women's own discourse, however, in the
public realm the term did not carry great force. Instead of presenting
the woman's "wants" as sufficient justification in themselves, the
authors added other social-moral terms. Initially, want did not seem to
be a comfortable or successful social defense of the act of abortion, so
its use was relatively infrequent. The use of the root term want in the
public discourse increased fairly substantially across time. In 1964-65
the term appeared more frequently and in 1970-71 more consistently
(see Appendix C). The growth in frequency, however, was coupled
with a crucial transformation process. The term want was transformed
into a concern with "unwanted children."
The raw power of acting women provided the material ground for
social change. Women's willingness to seek abortion "at any cost" (in
acting without "care about the danger I was in"
Ellie's words, 343)
forced society to
(Allison, 70), risking death for what they "wanted"
allow them to express their interests. The contemporary revision of
American law and culture related to abortion, therefore, was a direct
consequence of women's interests a fact directly traceable in the discourse trail. 12 Ultimately, however, to be persuasive in the public
realm, the women's vocabulary their ways of seeing the issues and
explanation
187
speaking about them had to be transformed. The women's term

want was able to enter the social vocabulary and to exert public force
only when transformed so that it indicated its impact on others. An
individual desire "I didn't want any more children" became a
"Unwanted" children, the articles

made clear, were not socially desirable. The magazines described how
such children would be abused, delinquent, ill-educated, and disorderly. Such life-styles negated the social functions for which society
had bound women to motherhood (of a traditional sort); such pregnancies were not socially productive (and it was progressive "productivity, " not mere reproduction, that was socially preferred). In addition, being "unwanted" was a serious enough condition (given the
dependency of human infants) that the term even weighed against
the presumed desire of the fetus for its own life. Women were thus
threat to a well-integrated society.
able to
make
their "wants" count, in large part because their
wants
influenced other social goals and the wants of other social beings.
The expression of women's "wants" as a means for the society to

avoid "unwanted children" was not, however, the last step in the
Had
been, adoption would have provided an adequate

The society and the fetus could have insured their
interests by requiring a woman to bear the child and give it to
someone who did "want" it. Women, however, resolutely resisted
adoption, proclaiming adamantly that it presented the worst possible
experience. "Oh God," said Allison, herself an adoptee, "I couldn't
even consider doing that!" (84). Betsey agreed, "I don't think I could
do that" (53). This response, however, lacked compelling social interprocess.
it
public solution.
est
and was not frequently heard
in the public discourse. In
the concern about "overpopulation" provided a
its
place,
social justification that
quieted the demand for women to continue to produce children.

The "Zero Population Growth" movement made possible the transformation of "unwanted children" into "Choice" by counteracting the
force of pro-natalism. 13
The movement
deflated the social desirability
women
producing children they did not want by eliminating the

presumption that the society wanted those children, even if their
mothers did not. In so doing, it challenged the social grounds on
which women's choices had historically been sacrificed. By suggesting the negative consequences of too much "motherhood," the overpopulation rhetoric helped to free women from exclusive assignment
of
and thereby created a new

range of Choices granted to male workers in a (partially) "free enterprise" economy.
Thus as women's discourse was included in the public vocabulary,
to the category of reproductive laborers
opportunity to claim the
full
188
was modified by other forces: individual wants became social

movement from a woman's desire to "fulfill her wants"
by "making her own choices" to an ideographic "Right to Choose" or
"Freedom of Choice" was also pruned and transformed in another
way. As the private discourse reveals, the public persuasion was
directly derived from the articulated demands of real women, both
the poor and the rich, the intellectually gifted and the mentally weak.
This women's discourse was, in an important sense, a classless,
it
Choices. The
movement of "women as a whole." In the

process of transforming this general demand into a successful public
vocabulary, however, the needs of particular groups of women
especially the poor were pruned out of the discourse.
raceless, undifferentiated
The
desire of
all
women
for greater
power
to
fill
their individual
wants was cut back to the political option for those already holding
economic power to be allowed to make their choices legally.
In part, the translation of this generally shared want to economically limited Choice occurred because the American social system
and its vocabulary protected only political rights, not economic desires, and hence it did not protect the poor in general (in any of their
sub-classifications
e.g., teenagers, stigmatized ethnic groups, the
mentally handicapped). In practice, middle-class women were in the
position to articulate their private vocabulary as a public one; poor
women were not. Because the "articulate" class's primary limits on
their choices were not economic, but legal, their primary arguments
were directed at the single factor that prevented their wants from
being realized the coercive power of the state.
The arrival of the term Choice as a representative of women's interests was therefore a complex event. To say that the rhetoric of Choice
was merely a middle-class movement would be too simplistic an
assessment. The vocabulary of Choice was rooted in the words and
"wants" of women across economic
the wants of
women
lines;
however, the transference of

was incomplete. That
into public discourse
incompleteness emphasizes the impact of the process of public persuasion a process which allowed women to articulate their interests,
but only through the interests and vocabulary of others, and with the
help and limiting influence of other powerful discourses. This same
consequential, transformational process was evident in a second cru-
component of the women's discourse the women's narratives

whole. The women's stories became publicly powerful enough
cial
as
to
generate public value change only through translation into the

stories of other more powerful groups.
Between 1960 and 1961 the primary narrative in the public dislife
189
course was, at least in outline, the private "women's story." By 196465 this public version of the women's story was truncated and parreplaced by a "physicians' story." By 1970-71 an even broader
"social story" was most frequently produced in the public realm. A
clear set of percentages indicates this change (see Appendix C). In
tially
1960-61 about 50 percent of the discourse in the popular magazines

consisted of narratives, primarily about women and the illegal abor-
About 11.5 percent of that discourse consisted of

supporting the generalization of these narratives. In 1964-65
these percentages dropped to about 31 and 8 percent respectively. By
1970-71 the numbers were 16 and 7 percent. As the "stories" of
tions they faced.
statistics
women began
to take
up
less space, the
number
of "histories" (the
and the focus shifted to legal structure and social institutions (the term law was used 81 times in 1960-61,
108 times in 1964-65, and 172 times in 1970-71; see Appendix C on
statistics). The change was not merely a replacement but rather a
social story) gradually increased
gradual translation of meanings.

The women's story, so prominent in 1960-61, generated the "physicians' story," most prominent in 1964-65. Physicians were among
the major leaders of the reform laws. As chapter 2 indicated, they
reported that they participated in the debate because they felt trapped
between the women's stories and the pre-existing social set defined by
the law ("no abortions except to save the woman's life"). Doctors
tended to see "woman's life" in a broadening sense that included
more than physical being. Alan Guttmacher argued that "a doctor's
primary interest must be in preserving life. But is it only the physical
life which is to be protected? Or should we also take into consideration the mental and emotional life and health of a patient?" 14 The
doctors' sense of
duty thus clashed with the
Additionally, the doctors
saw
that
law.
women's
lives
were threatened
women
with legal/safe
a fact the
abortions,
unsafe
illegal
turned
to
women
the
or
repair
women
the
save
doctors often faced when they tried to
a
admissions
hospital
damage (to the extent of perhaps 350,000
15
itself,
values
and
year).
Here, the law contradicted the doctors' own
because it made explicit protection for "women's lives" but did not
allow operations that would, in effect, save many women's lives
(considering incomplete abortions ranged from a third to a half of
maternal deaths at the time). 16 Guttmacher protested that "many
highly-thought-of hospitals place themselves and their doctors in
jeopardy of prosecution many times each year. It is, I feel, unfair for
doctors and hospitals to be asked to do this. But what are the alter-
by the physicians'
abortions; the
inability to provide these
190
natives? To refuse therapeutic abortion to the
who
recently has been operated
on
mother
for cancer?
To
of five children
reject the applica-
woman unable to care for the children she already

Many women denied therapeutic abortions turn to illegal abor-
tion of a psychotic
has?
." 17 It
was more than a coincidence that the first constitulaw were based on its "vagueness" about what
constituted a threat to "women's lives."
The women's life stories thus compelled the doctors to tell their
own story in the public arena, demanding social attention to their
individual needs and desires. The effect of these linking stories told
by the doctors was additive that is, the political and social power of
the doctors was added to the force of the women. But it was also
multiplicative, for the doctors were more powerful economically, politically, and socially; their rights and privileges were already inscribed in the laws and vocabulary of the land. 18 They were therefore
able to help construct and expedite a third level of stories the "social
tionists.
tional challenges to the
histories" that told of legal abortion as a social good.
This third level of stories had a complete and variegated ^dramatic

The social purposes for legal abortion included "no un-
structure.
wanted children," "women's lives," basic "rights," and even direct

reduction of poverty. The terms conveying these social purposes
came to include Freedom, Right to Privacy, "right to control one's own
body," and Right to Choose (in 1970-71 each of these terms occurred
much more frequently, and the term right occurred thirty-four times,
whereas it was virtually nonexistent earlier). The agency of "legal"
abortion as a safe, cost-effective measure was directly contrasted to
unsafe, expensive illegal abortion (and this component came directly
from the women's stories). The scene was a world of overpopulation
and expensive social programs and a country in which individuals
had certain rights. The agents were needy persons. The act was fundamentally a political one, removed from moral issues. Through a threestep translation, therefore, the women's narrative, like the vocabulary
of want/Choice, was able to infiltrate the public vocabulary ajnd force
change, but only in modified form and indirectly, through its impact
on other vocabularies.
Public Discourse Impacts Private Lives
To this point, the comparison of public and private discourses has
suggested serious tensions between public and private depictions of
abortion and indicated the translative devices through which
women's talk was restructured to provide the foundation of a new
public vocabulary that authorized abortion.
course developed, however,
it
had
As
191
this
new
a reciprocal impact
public dis-
on
private
lives.
impact we must examine private discourse of difhave chosen another set of "almost private" discourse^
a set of "stories" about abortion told in People magazine in
1984. 19 The set is highly impure because it has been intrusively edited
To analyze
this
ferent periods.
by the reporters, and

telling
it
contains stories of activists
who know they are
such stories for rhetorical purposes. Nonetheless,
it
gives us
and guides.
Basically, the stories from 1984 are very similar to the earlier private
discourse reported by Maxtone-Graham. Because of their public focus
and their activist backgrounds, they are more compact and contain
more explicit mention of key terms from both sides of the movement
("affirming Life," "Right to Choose"). They also feature greater diversity (the stories of 1985 include opponents of abortion) and a greater
tendency to take into account the lessons of the pro-Life movement.
Otherwise, they are very similar to the women's narratives of Pregnant
by Mistake, told between 1971 and 1972. That is, the basic explanations
of purpose and the revelations of character are roughly the same.
some
indicators
This similarity suggests that perhaps the key to the influence of

upon private is not exclusively one of vocabulary.
That is, the private discourse was perhaps such a fundamental base of
the pro-Choice vocabulary that little new content was added to private
talk by the appearance of sustained public discourse supporting aborpublic discourse
At the most, the prominent public arguments provided a greater

a change of "my choice" and "my wants" to "my Right to
Choose." This is not to say that the public discourse had no impact,
tion.
certainty
however. For that impact,
we
return to the discourse of Pregnant by
Mistake.
Several of the women interviewed by Maxtone-Graham had earlier

borne "unwanted children" and had either kept them or put them up
for adoption. The "second time around," however, these women
chose abortion, and generally they indicated that they would rather
have aborted the first time. Each explained that she had not done so,
however, because she had not known of the option. Alex, for example, bore the child of her first unwanted pregnancy because, she said,
so unknown
"I figured that this was the only way out. Abortion was
however,
indicated,
She
matter"
(165).
to me, that I did not pursue the
and
pregnancy
a
not
do
would
I
again.
that "I would do an abortion
again" (191). Alex's experience suggests that the

public discourse about abortion may have only made minor changes
give the child
up
192
in the way women made their fertility decisions, or discussed them,

but it provided a new option both by making safe abortion more
generally available, 20 and by making the option known to more
women. Given the fact that the number of births to unmarried women
decreased markedly after abortion was legalized, these stories are
probably reasonably typical. 21
The vital importance of public discourse for creating some places
where legalized abortions were available and for informing more
women about them was evident in the women's private discourse.
There was a distinct class of "fence-sitters" women who weren't
willing to risk illegal or unsafe abortion, even though they didn't
really want another child. Antonia indicated the link between safety
and legality, and its importance: 'Illegal. Yes. Well, it wasn't legal in
But at least he was a doctor. ... I was really scared,
most cases.
you know, I was really scared about an illegal set-up. ... I could not
afford to risk getting hurt or getting killed. ... If that was the choice,
you know I would certainly not endanger my life" (8). Lynn concurred. She had gone to seek an illegal abortion, but had changed her
mind because the abortionist "was the most filthy little woman you
have ever seen in your life" (240).
Legality was also directly entwined with knowing about abortion
and seriously considering it as an option. Some women did not hear
about abortion because it was illegal. Carole indicated, "I think that if
if I were eighteen now, and pregnant, I would have an abortion. But
then there was just no question of it, because it was illegal. Well, that
was five years ago and I don't know where it was legal" (106).
The most powerful facet of having the "public discourse" include
group's private discourse
may be
that
it
helps the discourse to reach
more women, informing them about more options and giving them
the opportunity to express themselves about those options. Even if
the basic forms of expression do not change (the stories of reasons for
offering a child for adoption are very similar to abortion stories), the
outcome is markedly different. As Lynn pointed out, carrying a

pregnancy to term is different from abortion, "because those months
[of carrying the child] were very destructive to me. Very destructive. I
haven't really ever thought about this clearly, but uh (pause). That
was the end of my trust in people" (263-64). Spreading a public
discourse, even when it is derived from some of a class's own private
discourse, thus can
make
This does not deny

cates
and the
illegal
women
the
a major difference in private lives.

fact,
pointed out by both pro-Choice advo-
in their private stories, that
many women had
abortions before abortion was legal; they just didn't articulate

their experiences.
It
193
indicates, however, that different channels of
and information are available in different private lives.

Where public discourse on a subject is lacking, fewer women will
attitudes
have access to the discourse core because not
all channels of private

discourse carry that core perspective. Public discourse simply adds
one more source from which women can gain an additional vocabu-
lary of potential use in their lives. "Persuasion," then,
is not solely a
process of changing closed minds but is also the addition of possibilities. Public discourse thus enriches the perspectives or informa-
members of a subgroup by better distributing the

more of the potential users of that knowledge.
discourse might also change private lives by confronting
tion available to
knowledge
Public
women
to
with opposing perspectives, providing incentive for

modify their actions in the face of new interests or to
account for their refusal to modify. The private discourse in 1971-72
and the "mixed" discourse of 1985 (in increased measure) show an
effort to respond both to diffuse public sentiment and to the increasingly well-articulated public discourse opposing abortion. In the
1971-72 period, for example, Annie and Louise both expressed their
response to the claim that abortion opposed Life. Louise noted the
arguments they faced, saying that other people insinuated "that for us
to be able to do this we must just be the worst people possible, and
have no feelings. And it's just really the opposite. We feel very you
know we have very strong feelings. We do care, we are concerned.
We don't want to be considered murderers in any way. Because we're
not. We're pacifists
by every standard" (334). Annie described how
she confronted such arguments and began to articulate a response: "I
started to talk a lot about my two children. About how much getting
And
pregnant and being pregnant with them had meant to me.
the next thing that became so obvious to me was the utter respect that
I do have for human life" (118).
The existence of the public controversy thus exposed more women
not only to their own vocabulary but also to a more articulate version
of the values and interests opposing them. It thereby encouraged the
women to develop their own understandings in more detail and
perhaps to modify those understandings as well. If we do not see
more actual modification of the decisions, it may well be because the
pro-Life discourse had held sway for so long that little additional
information was added.
Despite its importance, the public discourse should not be viewed
as a magic key that instantly gives access to knowledge on both sides
to all members. The women's private discourse of 1971-72 occurred
them
directly
either to
194
during acrimonious public discussion about abortion, and

crucial factor
public talk.
the
it
reveals a
differential permeability of private discourse to
The women
of
many
of these stories
had much contact
with the public discourse, others had virtually none. Some of the
women interviewed by Maxtone-Graham used a large amount of
the public vocabulary ("rights/' "control of one's own body," and
"Choice"), and they referred to the public controversy; others used it
very little. Women who were facing abortion decisions thus responded to the public discourse in a variety of ways. They may have
been exposed to more or less of it, and they may have absorbed and
used more or less of it. Both the strength of the women's own explanations and the degree to which the "translated" public discourse
matched the women's own discursive needs affected the way public
discourse came back to private use. This is not to say that public
discourse in general has no effect but merely that it had a range of
effects because it has different uses for different persons. Articulation
of women's interests in public discourse was thus not a complete
solution; it was simply one component of a set of solutions to the
exclusions, problems, and challenges women faced.
Conclusion
This sample of discourse from the private lives of the women of
Pregnant by Mistake suggests that, indeed, the torrent of public discourse about abortion in America constituted a "meaningful" change
because of its relationship to the real lives of some women. The
persuasive force of the public tide was not a coercive revision of
women's worldviews but rather an enabling of discursive and pragmatic "choices" made possible by wider dissemination of a wider
range of ways of talking about childbearing decisions. Moreover, the
was materially grounded in women's

The vocabulary was formed from the inclusion and
transformation of the words women spoke the expression of their
"wants," their demands for more "choices," their framing of the
concrete realities of childbearing and sexuality and fetuses in their
public discourse about abortion
life
experiences.
lives.
The transformation of private to public produced a revision, howWhat had been a classless women's private discourse was publicly
articulated by middle- and professional-class American women (because they had the discursive skills and were economically privileged
enough to have access to the communicative channels). These women
did not share the economic problems and cultural barriers faced by
ever.
195
women in poverty or
were
likely to
minority groups. The childbearing choices they

emphasize were choices to limit or repudiate child-
spokeswomen advocated the women's

discourse within an American public vocabulary that featured an
bearing. In addition, these

historically
developed commitment
alism. Finally, they articulated
the pro-Life interest group.

the
way
American
that
it
As
to laissez-faire
economic
liber-
against competing arguments from
a consequence of
all
these limitations,
public version of the vocabulary of
Choice evolved in a
most closely the demands of middle- and profes-
made it fit
women. The
public meaning of "Choices" for women was

thus derived from very broad and multifaceted private desires for the
ability to make choices that served women's wants, but it was transformed into the narrower but still important ground of political
sional-class
laissez-faire.
The inclusion
in the public realm of
single issue that distinguishes
them
women's discourse on the
clearly as a class
their child-
bearing was therefore only partly accomplished. The compromise

achieved with the reigning public discourse and the Right-to-Life
Movement was bought at a cost to the least powerful women the
poor and to some extent the young and minority groups. That cost
was, of course, predictable: the unbending problem of poverty remains that those who are unempowered are always those who lack
access to articulation and hence have the least opportunity to generate
a discourse that will empower them. Because of the nature of the
persuasive process, those are the groups

always easiest for others to "compromise."
upon whose
interest
it is
Both of the dominant views of the rhetoric of Choice are therefore

inappropriate. "Choice" as
and
it
is
currently instantiated in American
is neither merely a partisan concern of middle-class women nor a fully adequate vocabulary to express all women's interests. The version of the discourse of Choice
that dominated the mid-eighties should be understood from a developmental, processual perspective. It constituted a public vocabu-
public law, discourse,
practice
women's discourse but was shaped by

other influences. Our judgments of the resulting public vocabulary
and our decisions about what arguments to make in the future ought
to be grounded in the realization that the inclusion of women's interests in the public vocabulary through the debate about abortion was
lary that
grew out
of a general
merely subject to the unceasing discursive processes that
argument
in
America
faces.
The public and
the individual interact in developing
cause
human beings
new
are both individuals
all
public
the private, the social
and
discursive formations. Be-
and
creatures of collectivity,
196
they employ both public and private discourses. In a world of limited

and billions of human beings, we are destined to
influence each other and are both enabled and constrained by that
material resources
destiny.
NOTES
On
such theoretical perspectives, compare Phillip K. Tompkins, ComAn Introduction to Rhetoric and Communication (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth, 1982), and Shanto Iyengar, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R.
Kinder, "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-so-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs," in Mass Communications Review
1.
munication as Action:
Yearbook, ed. Ellen Wartella and D. Charles Whitney (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage, 1983), pp. 77-87. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg broaches the issue of the
relationship between public and private in Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), pp. 45-47.

Katrina Maxtone-Graham, Pregnant by Mistake: The Stories of Seventeen
in Victorian
2.
Women (New
York: Liveright, 1973), hereafter cited in text by page number

(A new edition with introduction and new preface was printed in 1989
by Remi Books, New York). I have compared this set to a similar collection
produced by Linda Bird Francke, The Ambivalence of Abortion (New York: Dell,
1982 ed.). The latter was not systematically analyzed, but it does not seem to
only.
suggest in this chapter.

women did not choose to have an abortion. Some
chose adopting out a child or keeping it at one point while aborting another at
other times. Some were married, some were not.
4. My hypothesis is this: reporters are primarily articulators of a "popular
response" to the conditions on which they report. Women reporters who
contradict the findings
3.
Two
of the seventeen
researched the "back-alley abortion" stories were confronted with the multiplicity of details evident in the "women's stories" and desired to convey this
"response" to the public. The generic constraints of reportage did not allow
to report all these stories, so, in order to faithfully reproduce the
"meaning" of illegal abortion, they used their rhetorical skill to come up with
them simply
"worst cases"
to convey the same emotional meaning. Phenomenological studies and historical interview would be needed to confirm
the alternative
this claim.
5.
6.
"Abortion and the Law," Time, 3 August 1962, p. 30.

Charles H. Bayer, "Confessions of an Abortion Counselor," Christian
Century, 20
May
1970, p. 628.
"Abortion
Comes Out
"Abortion
Laws Should Be Revised,"
of the Shadows," Life, 27 February 1970, p. 22.

Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1982), esp. p. 19. For other critiques see "On In A Different Voice: An
Interdisciplinary Forum," Signs 11, no. 2 (Winter 1986), 304-33.
7.
8.
9.
p. 37.
Christian Century, 11
January 1961,

10.
''Abortion
11.
"Abortion
197
Laws Should Be Revised."

Laws Should Be Revised."
because the current attack on the term Choice and the

grounded in the claim that it was only a middle-/
professional-class term, but the discourse in Maxtone-Graham's interviews,
from women of different backgrounds, indicates that it was, in its original
form, a discourse indigenous to women of multiple classes and backgrounds.
See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Women's Choice (Boston, Mass.:
Northeastern University Press, 1984), and Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our
12.
Right
stress this point
vocabulary
liberal
to
often
is
Choose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983).
Feminists have also been skeptical of the male-dominated "population

control" movements on grounds that they are really interested not in
13.
women's control of their own reproductivity but in population control by any

means necessary and on grounds that they are potentially racist or ethnicist.
Those potentials should not be allowed to obscure the instrumental role of
these public discourses for women's staged liberation within the United
States in the past twenty years. The long-standing role of population control
groups is described in Colin Francone, Abortion Freedom: A Worldwide Movement (Boston and London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984). See also Petchesky and Nanette J. Davis, From Crime to Choice (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood
Press, 1985).
Alan
F. Guttmacher, "The
January 1960, p. 52.
14.
Digest,
The
15.
statistical
highly problematic.
estimates of
Good
Law
That Doctors Often Break," Reader's
numbers
records of
of illegal abortions are, of course,
illegal activities are
always impossible to
However, hospital admissions for complications from abortions provide one of the better measures. Cited, for example, in Jack Starr, "Growing
Tragedy of Illegal Abortion," Look, October 19, 1965, pp. 149-50. See chapter
2, notes 3 and 4.
16. Another good measure of the number and consequences of illegal
abortions can be gained by triangulations using birth rates, birth rates for
unmarried women, and maternal mortality rates. Before abortion was legalized in New York, such estimates indicated that illegal abortions accounted for
about half of maternal mortality. When abortion was legalized, the maternal
mortality rate dropped about half. "Abortion: Rhetoric and Reality," Christian
obtain.
Century, 21 July 1971. The article reports that after New York's liberalized
abortion law was enacted, maternal mortality reached an all-time low of 2.3
Other areas, with different

lower figures. See Vital Statistics of the United
States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Public Health Service, 1967 and following years) and see the Center for
per 10,000
live births
from 5.2
in the prior year.
characteristics, reported slightly
Disease Control in Atlanta's accountings reported in Stanley Hensshaw et al.,

"Abortion in the United States, 1978-79," Family Planning Perspectives 13, no. 1
(January/February 1981), p. 7, and Edward Weinstock et al., "Legal Abortions
in the
United States since the 1973 Supreme Court Decisions," Family Planning
Perspectives 1
(January/February 1975), pp. 23-25.
198
Guttmacher, p. 53.
Linda J. Greenhouse, "Constitutional Question: Is There a Right to
Abortion?" New York Times Magazine, 25 January 1970, pp. 30-31, 88. Physicians' interests are reflected in state licensing laws and formed the basis for
initial appeals in the federal courts.
19. Marilyn Balamaci, Mary A. Fischer, Julie Grenwalt, Eleanor Hoover,
Toby Kahn, Irene Neves, and Debbie Zahn, "Eight Other Women's Stories,"
17.
18.
August 1985, pp. 82-88.

"Abortion: Rhetoric and Reality" reports that after the enactment of
People, 5
20.
New
women declined
period of increase). Recent studies confirm this trend; see notes 16, 17,
and recent issues of Family Planning Perspectives, especially Susheela Singh,
"Adolescent Pregnancy in the United States: An Interstate Analysis" 18 (September/October 1986), pp. 210-20, and "Unwanted Childbearing in United
York's liberalized abortion law, births to unmarried
(after a
Still High Among Blacks, Singles" 17, no. 6

(November/December 1985), p. 274.
21. For most women abortions are now more available and more safe.
Studies by pro-Choice scholars indicate clearly that there is a severe shortage
of well-located abortion providers and problems of financial access, but access
for most women is easier now than before legalization. Pro-Life advocates
argue that abortions are not physically safer now, but by and large their
evidence is overwhelmingly outweighed by international and national comparisons. (They also tend to conflate first-term and later-term abortions.) This
is not to say that all clinics and settings today are adequately safe. The pro-Life
States Declines, But Levels
rhetors provide strong evidence indicating that physicians performing abor-
no more sensitive to women's needs than other physi(who, as feminists have long noted, tend to treat women in
reprehensible ways) and that there may in fact be an "abortion industry"
which puts money ahead of women's health. E.g., Carol Everett, "Abortion: A
First-Hand Account," public lecture, University of Illinois, Urbana, April 7,
tions are frequently
cians
1988.
As this book went to press,

handed down. It substantially
the decision in Webster
v.
Health Services
was
consensus and conditions that obtained during the period examined by this book. Four justices seem to argue
for the eventual overturn of Roe on the grounds that a state's compelling
interest in the fetus from the period of conception onward (not the Right to
Life of the fetus) outweighs women's Liberty. Although the dissents of Blackmun and Stevens seem to me to be legally definitive, as this chapter has
noted, the Court is at base motivated by political ideology, and the balance of
power has shifted.
alters the
AFTERWORD
The
Between 1960 and 1985 substantial social change with regard to abortion occurred: changes in practice made abortion legal, safer, and
more common, 1 while changes in discourse described both abortion
and motherhood as "choice." The change process was not, however, a
simple replacement of old practices and discourses with new ones.
An extremely complex interaction occurred in a variety of arenas,
producing negotiated compromise between the interests previously
represented and those newly empowered in the public, sociopolitical
sphere.
The compromise negotiated about abortion framed it as a woman's

choice but also as an undesirable moral act. Abortion was to be legally
permitted but not publicly financed. It was to be undertaken primarily
term of pregnancy. It was to give women new power over
reproduction but also to present them with new sets of problems. 2
These changes cannot be attributed solely to economic factors (e.g.
in the first
the enhanced position of many women in the labor market). Explaining the willingness of pro-Life women to fill the jails of Atlanta as the
simple result of labor-market shifts misses too
much
of the story.
woman whose personal experience of the abortion system has left her
does not march on behalf of the image of fetus and
family either because she expects economic gain or because she has
feeling betrayed
and important in their

chained themselves to statehouse
gates to insist on the Right to Choice did not do so merely in expectation of economic gain
the goods they sought were much broader
than material security. Many tossed away economic security to leave
been duped. Her experiences are
own
right. Likewise,
real, valid,
women who
confining, traditional homes.
The economic explanation

crucial inputs long
because
it
fails to
inadequate not only because it ignores

dismissed as illusory or overdetermined but also
is
explain the outcomes
abortion issue in the United States
199
is
fully.
The current
*stasis of the
only partly explicable in eco-
200
nomic terms. 3 Other
might have served the economic

imperatives equally well. The minor historical accident constituted by
the Supreme Court's membership and the haphazard way in which
alternatives
was apportioned were not economically pre-ordained, and had these things been only slightly different, the Court's
decision could have taken other forms. 4 The result might have been
an abortion policy which compromised the interests involved along
this particular case
might have allocated power to a committee system. It

up criteria for cases under which abortion would be
permitted. It might have forbidden second- term abortions. Each of
these options has been taken at different times in different Western
nations because each can be made to serve effectively the constellation
of interests that make up the economic system in advanced capitalist
states. They may again take form in the United States. There is no
doubt that economic factors were a dominant input, but they were not
state lines.
might have
It
set
the sole input.
Neither
is
the social change process in the abortion controversy
fully explicable as a rational
outcome
women
of a logical debate (e.g., the
and liberty and of protecting

would have sought to preserve Life
through Choice. It would have focused substantial resources on eliminating unwanted pregnancies, both by reducing unplanned pregnancy and by providing resources so that women who wished to raise
children were guaranteed civilized conditions in which to do so. That
would have protected the birth rate as well as women and fetuses.
To comprehend the full story of the outcome of the controversy, we
must also understand its character and features as a communicative
correctness of allowing
fetuses).
equality
fully rational society
process. In part, these resulted from the general nature of rhetoric. In
whose interests and values are not identical

movement organizations must find super-ordinate
order to persuade others

to their
own,
social
and characterizations that present proposed politerms that represent their desirability for other community
members. For example, in the abortion debate the women's "want"
was transformed to "unwanted children." Such representation, however, carries consequences: it reshapes the precise contours of the
policies and terms at issue. In seeking to persuade others, persuaders
adapt their case to the audience's interests and are thereby "persuaded" to represent the issue in terms that incorporate more than
their own unalloyed experiences. The process of persuasion is thereby
inherently a process of compromise, combining interests (including
economic dimensions), logic (because of the ideational elements of
values, narratives,
cies in
The Social Force of Rhetoric
201
and the discourse itself. The abortion controversy resulted

of Choice because of this feature.
compromise
a
Understanding the process of communicating social change also
discourse),
in
requires general understandings of the properties of various units of

discourse. Narratives have specific features that allow them to open
up new
public discursive territory
contradictions.
They
and
to
embody and
also have limitations that prevent
highlight
them from
Ideographs have different features that

power. In the abortion controversy, the
avoidance of other economically adequate solutions such as committee systems or prohibition on second-term abortions has in large part
fully resolving social conflicts.
give
them tremendous
social
been a result of the power of the term Choice. Lastly, characterizations

are perhaps the most fundamental and most slippery of discursive
units. It seems relatively easy to create forceful characterizations,
especially through visual images, and to shade their meanings in
partial ways. It seems equally difficult to challenge such characterizations directly. They form the building blocks of narratives, and yet, on
their own, no matter how emotionally compact and stirring, they can
not generate a full persuasive or rational case for policy. The simultaneous mass consensus and activist polarization resulted from this
feature of the image of the fetus.
Finally, understanding the rhetorical process of change requires
attention to the particular content of a social argument. The particular
characteristics of Life and Choice, for example, had consequences
beyond their general features as ideographs or as elements in the
persuasive process. Life, with its linkage to young children, motivated
large numbers of housewives to political action in ways that other
terms would not have done. Choice provided a rationale not only for
women seeking abortion but also for those who wished not to finance
abortions. In studying social processes there is no possibility of adequate explanation solely at the general level. General theories explain
much about public controversies, but understanding specific historical outcomes also requires studying the particularities of content.
The equivalent of the predictive test of explanations in human science
cannot be achieved without accounting for content. Human processes
matter of meaning, and they cannot be understood adequately when meanings are completely deleted through the
process of theoretical abstraction.
Scholars have only begun to scratch the surface in our efforts to
understand how social change is communicated. The complexity of
are, at least in part,, a
these processes sends us tracking after
many false leads, and we have
202
between
way to go
hopes and concrete gains. We

any general agreement
difficulty distinguishing
false
have, further, a long
to achieve
about what methods are appropriate for balancing the objectivity of

generalized description with the subjectivity of the meaning-making
process.
This account of the public controversy over abortion has attempted
employ methods of rhetorical analysis that bridge the gap between

abstracted theory and real and important controversy. It has been
motivated by the belief that theories which are not about important
social phenomena are as unworthy of pursuit as are unreflective,
atheoretical accounts of those phenomena. It has described public
discourse as material, fluid, and changeable. The flow that is rhetoric
could take up the interests of wage-laboring women, a group with
relatively little power in the social system, and through the persuasive
to
process transform their indigenous expression into a public vocabulary that gave them additional social power.
The process began with a narrative women's story of unwanted
pregnancy in a social scene of illegal abortion. The internal contradictions and materially emotional force of this story spurred broader
Although persuasively challenged by
discursive revisions.
hegemony-maintaining historical narratives, the public argumentative space and argumentative criteria still allowed the women continued confidence in their voice. They therefore moved the controversy to the level of fundamental rights asserting a Right to Choice.
This too was challenged, not only by the fundamental value of Life
but by the construction of a potent persuasive image of the fetus.
The result of this competition between two powerful, incommen-
surable discourses was a series of compromises, arrived at indirectly

in several realms. Because of the intricate and particular constellation
of
law and public discourse, Choice was legally legitimated, but only
removing the coercive force of the state, not to the

was also culturally enacted, but only
within limited contexts and against moral preference. Gradually, the
public settled down to live in the limited new vocabulary, even while
extremist ideologues, not content to accept the discursive compromise, continued their impassioned arguments and even abandoned
the realm of argument to substitute their own coercive force for that of
the state. The private lives of many women were changed by these
uneven modifications of the public sphere, occasioned by its assimilation of women's discourse.
To say that "in the United States, public persuasion is the process of
social change," therefore, is not to say that Americans make univerto the extent of
extent of social support. Choice
The Social Force
of Rhetoric
203
based on calm, fair, and dispassionate

and evidence. It is to say that there is a unique communicative
process, open in some important ways, which in its own rather lively
fashion constructs vocabularies and policies from vivid images, sound
arguments, partisan interests, and historically instantiated public
sally shared, rational decisions
logic
It is a messy, imperfect system, but understanding

workings may give us greater power to improve it and, thereby,
improve what it is we shall come to speak and to be.
warrants.
its
to
NOTES
1
The increase
in the
number
a politically loaded issue.
of abortions
upon
legalization
However, the precipitous drop
is,
of course,
in the birth rate in
1971, when legalized abortion in New York allowed women from across the
country access to abortion, seems explicable only in terms of an increased rate
of abortion. This does not deny the fact that many women were having
abortions long before abortion was legalized, but it suggests that the numbers
increased, perhaps by about a third. A graph of the relationship of abortion
laws to the live birth rates would indicate this impact fairly clearly. From 1965
to 1970 the birth rates in the United States and in the state of New York were
declining at a steady rate (almost 3.8 million in 1965 vs. approximately 3.6
million in 1969). Between 1969 and 1970 the U.S. rate increased slightly, but
after 1970, when New York legalized abortion, both the U.S. live birth rate
and the New York live birth rate dropped more precipitously (from approximately 3.75 million in 1970 to approximately 3.1 million in 1973). (See figures 1
and 2, p. 204.) This difference was very close in size to the legal abortion rate.
(As a result of the maturing of a sizable cohort of women, and arguably, as the
ironic result of increased sexual activity resulting from the appearance of
liberation provided by legalized abortion, this trend bottomed out around
1974.) See Vital Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, 1967).
2. Some of these new problems, for example, revolved around the responsibility for one's sexuality, including the responsibility for resistance to male
demands on
one's
own
desires as well as responsibility for children
if
women
chose not to abort, in contravention of the male progenitor's preferences.

3.
tition
Celeste Michelle Condit,
and the Production
"TV
Articulates Abortion in America:
Compe-
of a Cultural Repertoire," Journal of Communication
(Summer 1987), 47-59.

For an account of the happenstances surrounding the Supreme Court
decision, see Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the
Inquiry 11
4.
Supreme Court
(New
York:
Simon and
Schuster, 1979).
FIGURE
28 200
Illegitimate Birth Rate

27
175
B
26
\
\
/
25
125
/
24
100
23
75
/
X
^/
/\
150
/^r-^^^
//
>
^
/
/ ^0-**
/
>"^
^^
1965
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
A. Rate of Illegitimate births in the United States per 1000 unmarried

women ages 15-44.
B. Rate of Illegitimate births in the United States per 1000 live births.
FIGURE
A
L ,ive Births
New York Re-legalizes
3800 370
\\ A
3700 350
\
B
3600 330
1200
c.
\
\
1000
/
/
/
\
\
3500 310
1400
Abortion 1970
\
\
800
3400 290
600
3300 270
/
/
400
3200 250
200
^:
3100
730
000
1965
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
A. Live births
(in
thousands) in the United States.
B. Live births (in thousands) in
C.
Number of legal
New York state.
abortions (in thousands) in the United States.
APPENDIX A
A "Right to Life"?
The
issue of
whether or not a
fetus has a Right to Life
and the
implications of such a right for the abortion debate are important but
have been dealt with only indirectly to
this point (i.e., with regard to

This
issue must be more fully
5).
addressed because the Right-to-Life movement has made it a central
question on the public agenda. They have been able to do so, in part,
the image of the fetus, chapter
because the persuasive value of their pictures and films derives from a
real material entity with more or less substantial being
the fetus.
Deciding the status of the fetus is, therefore, a real question that has
colored the story I have told here (for I have tried to be non-judgmenwhereas one who
tal in describing the path of the public argument
accepted the Right to Life of the fetus probably would have condemned the path of the controversy between 1960 and 1985). 1 I believe it is an issue yet unresolved, and since its full impact on the
abortion controversy is yet to be unraveled, I can analyze only the
current stasis of the issue.
Life vs. Choice

first substantive question might seem to be, Does the fetus have
the Right to Life? Before addressing that issue, however, I wish to
make clear that this question is not itself simple or decisive. As several
feminists have pointed out, the Right to Life does not entail the right
The
to
use the body of another
human being. 2 Few would want to endorse
the principle that the state can coerce
some people
to allow others to
use their bodies (e.g., kidneys, bone marrow, blood), even to maintain the life of the others. Such a principle would leave us the nightmarish possibility of a state that decides which of us shall be sliced up
Thus, even if the fetus has a Right to Life,

the pregnant woman does not necessarily lose the right to abort the
fetus. Numerous concerns affect the final outcome of this issue,
for the benefit of others. 3
205
Appendix
206
including the special responsibility a
an issue which
woman may or may not have to a
view
of sexuality
and the active
nature of abortion as opposed to the more passive character of most
other types of refusal to support others. Further, the fact that many
pro-Life advocates support exceptions to a ban on abortion (usually
fetus
entails one's
for cases of rape, incest,
and
threat to the pregnant
woman's
life)
indicates clearly that they also believe that the existence of the Right to
Life of the fetus is not determinative.
Therefore, even
if
we were
to find that a fetus has a Right to Life,
would not necessarily mean that a fetus had the right to use the
body of a woman. A fetus's right does not necessarily outweigh a
woman's Right to Choice, even though the Life of the fetus may seem
to some to be a more serious value than the Choice of the woman. In a
legal system built on principle and individual rights, we cannot reach
judgment by choosing which of two entities the society weighs as
more serious (the woman's Choice or the fetal Life). Instead, judgments are based on the spheres covered by individual rights. In this
case, the fetal right may not reach far enough to abrogate the woman's
this
Nonetheless,
Right to Life.
right.
we ought
to
examine the claim
that a fetus has a
Right to Life?
After examining the arguments presented by pro-Life activists on the

status of the fetus, I believe that there is an important core to this
argument. Pro-Life arguments contend that the human fetus is a

being of value, deserving consideration in the abortion issue. Because
of this value, an abortion always contains morally undesirable elements. There are, however, incontrovertible differences between
fetuses
and human persons, and therefore the
claim that a fetus
is
identical to a
pro-Life
movement's
*human being/person from
the
period of conception is not true. Moreover, the advocates have yet to

establish the lesser claim that, in spite of the differences between a
human fetus and a human person, we should weigh a fetus as a full
human being (although this is a proposition that they might someday
be able to establish with added grounds and ^warrants). To explain

these conclusions, I will review here the argument about the status of
the fetus in
some
detail.
Because the fetus has characteristics both
human
like
being, the classification of the fetus
"rationally undecidable
and
is
and unlike those
of a
a contingent matter,
rhetorically constructed, rather than a
A
basic fact of nature.
As
a consequence, rather than relying
natural, logical classification,
Such
207
''Right to Life"?
we must
choose
how
on some
count the
fetus.
than
grammatical or logical necessity. This is not the case in all classifications (I am not maintaining an utter relativism here); for example, the
classification of "red" as a "color" is a necessary one. 4 Natural and
necessary classifications are usually either tautologies or built on
analogies that are fundamentally profound, meaning that no overriding differences generate inconsistencies and that to deny the essenclassifications
can be a matter of social
to
choice rather
tiality of the similarities of the compared objects would result in

evident contradictions. Some definitional sets operate like that. If we
define color with reference to blue and yellow, the analogy between
red and blue and yellow makes it impossible to deny that red is a
color. More formal definitions, focusing on wavelengths of light,
similarly entail that red is a color because of the way both red and color
are defined in terms of wavelengths of light. Such neat classifications
are usually found in science, but some are also found in social lan-
guage use.
many
The
whether people are "adults" and so
to be permitted adult rights such as drinking at age eighteen or at
twenty-one) are precisely that social choices. They are not "mere
rhetoric" in the sense that journalists fling that term around, for the
choices are based on the careful weighing of a host of relevant facts
and values through public discussion ("rhetoric" in the classical
In social
choices
life,
made
however,
classifications are not so neat.
in these cases (e.g.,
sense). Because
such
"weighing"
groups who
social definitions are subject to a
process, they will be decided differently
by
different
weigh things through their own ideologies and

Wherever there are both significant similarities and sigdifferences, therefore, we are thrown back on social choices
must, quite
rationally,
conditions.
nificant
rather than
if
upon
natural, logical, or necessary classifications. Clearly,
the fetus has major characteristics both like
and unlike "human beings/persons," the

such a matter of
"human beings/persons"
classification of a fetus is
rational, deliberative choice (either for individuals or
for the society).
Before analyzing the characteristics of the fetus, the contest over

must be clarified. Pro-Choice advocates prefer the term person
labels
and
pro-Life rhetors prefer the label human being. Even after arguing
hours over the status of the "personhood" of the fetus, pro-Life
rhetors will charge that their opponents "never disagree with us that
the fetus is a human being"; therefore, we will have to explore the
implications of both labels. However, neither label establishes that
for
Appendix
208
fetuses before Viability have,
by grammatical,
logical, biological, or
historical necessity, a Right to Life.
The fetus clearly does not have, and cannot have, status as a full
person on legal grounds. The Supreme Court's ruling that the constitutional usages of "person" have not included the unborn is convincing. Most simply, the constitutional protections spoken about
usually refer to things that can only apply to those "persons born or
naturalized in the United States of America." More important, the
legal problems that would be generated by declaring a fetus a person
are legion. Fetuses would have to be counted as dependents for tax
purposes, covered by the census and apportionment, and treated as
"persons" in dozens of other ways where it is simply not possible to
treat them "the same as" persons (e.g., in assault laws). Although
exceptions and modifications or special bills could be written on
issues such as inheritance, taxes, and assault laws, the very fact that
exceptional laws would have to be written indicates quite clearly that
the fetus cannot share the same legal status as "persons." The law must
treat the fetus differently from other persons because of the objective
material differences between persons and the fetus. Legally, then, a
fetus cannot be "a full human person" to be treated exactly as all
human
persons. Even a legal declaration that a fetus was a
human
person by the Supreme Court, a constitutional amendment, or Congress could not make it fully true, for exceptional laws that denied the
claim would also have to be written.
This legal limitation arises from a biological fact. Legally, to have a
"right" requires that one be an individual, and until birth, or until a
viable separation from the mother, the fetus has not been individuit remains, absolutely, physiologically, a part of the
mother. One cannot have a right to life unless one is capable of life,
and the fetus before viability is not individually capable of life. ProLife advocates object to this standard of viability on two grounds
that the period of viability is changing to an ever-earlier stage and that
no human being lives "independently," so the presumed indepen-
ated; biologically,
dence of the fetus
The
first
viability
is
a chimera.
medical science can
at viability is
objection
that
valid only
if
alter the point of
we believe that some unalterable, permanent
time-line determines the status of the fetus. The general pro-Life

world view maintains such a view that things "are" permanently. 5
Essence cannot change. But this Platonic view offers only one possible
set of criteria. A broad range of scholars in the twentieth century have
pointed out the contingency of language as well as the radical changes
in meanings of terms over time. 6 For those able to see that words
"Right to Life"?
209
unceasingly change some elements of their denotations through time,

the fact that the numerical referent of viability may change does not
invalidate it as a logically necessary standard for a Right to Life.
The second objection to viability arises from the concept of "independence." Viability provides an appealing standard for demarcating
the transition from mere fetus to "person" because at that point the
fetus is capable of independent life. In response, pro-Life advocates
point out that no human being can really live independently; we all
depend on others at some point in our lives. But, of course, this is not
the kind of dependence at issue. To survive, a nonviable fetus must
depend on precisely one other person's body; no other human being
can offer the fetus what it needs. Moreover, what the fetus requires is
the substance of the mother's body. That clearly is a unique kind of
dependence, to which human beings are not otherwise subject. That
difference is recognized in the law: even when a given person is
dependent on precisely one other human being for a donated organ
(e.g., a kidney) because only one other person can provide a good arid
timely match, the law and society refuse to compel that potential
donor to give up the kidney for another, even if the donor is dead.
The fetus thus has at least one substantial biological difference from
the rest of us (others will be explored in the discussion of "human
beings").
Therefore
ception, that
viability
the point at which the fetus can survive
dependence on precisely one other person not conmarks the biological point at which it is reasonable to
it is
without absolute
conclude that, like all human beings, the fetus has a Right to Life
because it is capable of sustaining life in the same way all human
persons are capable of sustaining independent life. This statement
might be taken to imply that, once medical science can keep a fetus
alive from conception to viability outside the womb, the fetus may
have a biologically based Right to Life from conception. The fact that
personal physical independence is a necessary condition for a Right
to Life does not mean that it is also a sufficient condition and that
issue has not yet been much explored.
If the standard of viability is taken to be a sufficient condition,
there are serious implications. A woman does not have the Right to
Choose the death of a technologically viable human just because she
does not want to have it in her body any longer. 7 Therefore, if
technology allows removal of a fetus, even at very early stages of
pregnancy, without killing the fetus, then, assuming that the physical
risk to the woman is the same, she should forego abortion for removal. Some women will not like this requirement because they may
Appendix
210
continue to
feel
more responsibility and want legal
control. In addition to
creating moral dilemmas, this technological capability will generate a
whole host of new policy problems including issues of overpopulation and of financial responsibility for such children (and I believe that
the state cannot coerce such
to
assume
artificial
''orphanage'' situation).
If
viability is
and sufficient standard, however,
AND require the woman

NOR place the fetus in an
births
financial responsibility for
it
accepted as a logically necessary

eventually to face such
we will have
issues.
on both legal and biological grounds, there are

between fetuses and human persons which deny the
Currently, however,
clear differences
statement "The fetus IS a person" status as a simple, non-problematic

The final grounds on this issue are historical. For indeed, language is an historical entity, and if our culture had always said "the
fetus is a person," then the claim, although not a necessary natural
fact, would have presumption as a true statement because it would
reflect a prior classification, made through history by the society. But
this also is not the case.
American society has systematically treated a fetus as different
from a person. Aside from the legal factors mentioned above, custom
has treated the fetus differently. Persons in our society have names,
and we have never given fetuses names. The naming as a unique
individual person occurs at birth. Additionally, persons in our society
are given ritualized burials, but outside of the Catholic church (and
fact.
î^y*
$T^
.
"
'
fa*
x-
K
\y-
frvf
*v^ &
^
^
.^^
even here, by necessity, the fetus is treated somewhat differently),

miscarriages have not generally been given the same funeral and
burial customary in the society. This, of course, is especially true for
the thousands of early miscarriages that occur each year. Moreover, in
terms of the response of individuals, an early miscarriage is generally
not as crushing a blow as the death of a newborn infant. Thus, our
culture has not, historically, treated the fetus as a person.
On
historical, legal,
and
biological grounds, therefore, the state-
moment of conceptipn is not

apparently a simple statement of fact. Rather, it is a rhetorical suggestion, an urging that we make such a classification. The tactic used is
"classification by denial of classification." Pro-Life rhetors seek to get
their classification accepted as a fact by "naturalizing" the issue; denying that they are proposing a classification, they pretend instead that
the "fact" is self-evident and inescapable. Instead of claiming that the
fetus should be classified or treated as a human person, they claim
that the fetus IS a human person. By mere assertion of factual status,
they gain the persuasiveness of factual status.
ment
that a fetus
is
a person from the
A
The
pro-Life
movement, however,
claim that the fetus

is
and
human
is
211
"Right to Life"?
prefers to rest
a person but rather
its
case not
on the grounds
being. Arguing to the effect that the fetus
a being, they indicate that the conclusion
is
is
on the
that the fetus
both
human
inescapable that the
is a human being. Here, we should begin with Abe Lincoln's

caution that just because you have a chestnut and you have a horse
fetus
does not
tion
//
and
mean that you have
human and
,/
"human
a chestnut horse. In a fallacy of composi-
meaning
meanings
division, pro-Life rhetors elide the non-technical
"being" with the richly
being." This
embedded
move once again
relies
cultural
on
of
of
careful rhetorical
construction.
argument in this area has been vivid

and
the
claim
that science has discovered that the
pictures of fetuses
fetus is a human being from the moment of conception. The "discoveries"
are the early-nineteenth-century finding that the fetus begins to grow
after the joining of sperm and egg, nine months before its birth, and
The core
of the pro-Life
the twentieth-century investigations into the genetic
makeup
of the
from conception.
Although science has indeed discovered that the fetus has a
unique, human set of chromosomes from the moment of conception,
a problem arises when we try to link this fact with the larger claim
that, therefore, because of its chromosomes, a blastocyst, embryo, or
fetus
fetus
a human being. For example, after conception the "human

may turn into twins, which might even recombine or dissolve
According to the pro-Life definition, we have a unique person
is
being"
later.
suddenly constituting two unique individuals and then, perhaps,

back to one again. In addition, studies suggest that, for perfectly
natural causes, as many as a third of all conceptions do not come to
term. It seems extremely awkward to our conceptual system to suggest that a third of all "human beings" never get even to the developmental stage of viability. Finally, in addition to genetics other factors
determine the characteristics of a fetus carried to term. What the
pregnant woman ingests food, drugs, germs, cigarette smoke, industrial chemicals
and what she does physical activity, listening to
music, natural vs. caesarean birth will have a huge impact on the
specific human being the fetus becomes. A conceptus with chromosomes that would allow musical brilliance or mathematical facility
might be born grossly incompetent in these areas if its mother is
deprived of a few small vitamins. Consequently, nourishment and
history are as crucial as chromosomes in shaping the human person-
ality.
One
of the
major reasons that genetics appears determinative for
Appendix
212
though it provides only a partial account,

derives from their underlying belief structure. For different belief
pro-Life advocates, even
groups, the essence or "being" of a thing has been identified with its
"substance" (physical or material), with its "spirit" (or "idea"), or with
the unique fusion of substance, idea, and, perhaps, history. Because
of their religious ideology, pro-Life advocates work from a rhetorical
system in which "spirit" or "idea" is the sole important element.
Genetic structure, taken as a "code" with information possibilities at
it's core, fits the concept of "idea" or "spirit" reasonably well. Consequently, the point at which this "idea" is fixed appears to pro-Life
advocates to be the point at which the fetus has its "essential" element. All other characteristics are merely accidental. Hence their
statement that "anything with a human set of chromosomes is a
human being."
Again, however, such a rhetorical structure is not a necessary one.
Others view material being as more important or consider idea and
material as of equal importance. From either of these alternate perspectives, unless the fetus has a certain material being, it cannot be a
human being. The pro-Life claim that once conception has occurred
"all that is added is nutrition" thus glosses a major issue. For "mere
nutrition" (i.e., physical substance), along with the substance of a
personal history, might well be considered necessary components of
human
nature. This, of course,
is
son's objection to anti-abortion laws.

is
common
The
element of the layper-
lay statement that the fetus
just a "small blob of cells" captures the sense in
and history
which the mate-
it to count
chapter 9 directly responded to the
fetus in this way. In sum, the conclusion that the fetus is a human
being because it has a full set of human chromosomes is logical only for
those who constitute being solely through "idea" or spirit, supplied in
riality
as a
of the fetus are too insubstantial to allow
human being. The women in
this case
by genes.
which attempt to address the issue of "substance" to some extent. In pictures

and verbal descriptions they emphasize the substantial elements of
the fetus, citing the developmental stages at which its "heart" begins
to function, when it has "brain waves," and so on. Here too, however,
the pro-Life rhetoric uses metaphorical language that pretends to be
literal. When they say that "the heartbeat begins between the eigh-
The
pro-Life rhetors have other arguments, however,
teenth to twenty-fifth day," 8 they refer to the early fetal "pulse"

which, while definitely an analogy and forerunner of the human
heart, does not have the four developed major compartments of the
human heart or the developed arteries and veins and pumps at a
"Right
213
to Life"?
tenth of the relative force. Therefore, when they say an early fetus has
a "heartbeat," they conjure up the image of a beating human heart,
but the substance of a "human heart" is not really there. Even when
referencing material acts, the pro-Life rhetors refer to idea alone.
The same is true of "brain waves." Although electrical impulses can

be measured in the embryo as early as forty days, these do not have
the full complex patterns of adult brain waves, nor does the embryo
have the substantial parts of a human brain. Not until somewhere
between the twentieth and fortieth weeks do fetuses even begin to
have the kind of brain development that would allow perceptions
such as awareness of pain. Once again, the pro-Life rhetoric effectively asserts an analogy as a literal identity. This elision occurs
because they take "idea" or "potential" as subsuming substance.
The genetic argument for claiming a fetus to be a human being is
therefore internally sound but inadequate because it is incomplete:
human beings are not mere chromosome content or "spirit."
The other major pro-Life argument derives from the pictures of
fetuses. As chapter 5 indicated, on their own visual grounds the
pictures demonstrate that until at least eight to twelve weeks, and
perhaps even later, the fetus does not look much like a human being
or have much substance. It is difficult to draw lines here another
woman might not be deterred by the appearance of the fetus until as
late as sixteen to twenty weeks
but clearly, if visual evidence is the
grounds for decision, the early fetus does not meet the criterion
required of a full human being. The fact that the pictures circulated in
the early eighties by pro-Life rhetors in national magazines were of
nineteen-week-old fetuses, not two-week-old fetuses,
is
a clear sign of
their partisanship here.

is a human being from the
not a simple statement of natural fact but a
highly constructed claim. However, this does not mean that we have
no rational grounds for choosing to count the fetus as a human being/
The
pro-Life position that the fetus
moment
of conception
is
person, for the partial grounds of the pro-Life rhetors are nonetheless
strong grounds. Ultimately, then, we may choose to classify the fetus
as a human. Our choice to do so, however, will be based on the
weighing of the similarities between "fetus" and "human being/person" against the differences. To this point, there has been no public
consensus (nor
One
much
discussion) about this weighing process.
argument is of interest on the pro-Life side. In public,

on a national scale, pro-Life rhetors are usually careful to
last
especially
avoid citing religious tradition as a reason for their claims; in fact, proLife advocates generally deny the religious foundations of their beliefs
Appendix
214
However, since these religious foundations are an absoessential component motivating the movement, it is important
in public.
lutely
to address the Christian Bible. 9

I do not wish to suggest that the Bible is an adequate authority in
the public controversy. Although this nation was founded as a set of
Christian theocracies, we have evolved past such city-state tyrannies
into a secular state in

dhists,
and
atheists
Bible can hold
all
which Moslems, Jews, deists, Hindus, Budhave their rights, and arguments based on the
no public authority over these groups. The pro-Life

vehement denials of a religious base
rhetors recognize this fact in their
arguments.
Nonetheless, in spite of vehement in-group assertions by pro-Life
activists to the contrary, the Bible itself does not explicitly ban abortion. To support their claim, pro-Life advocates cite only the general
commandment against killing, vague and metaphorical passages
about the beginning of life in the womb, and one ambiguous passage
about accidentally induced miscarriage. These proofs are surprising
for the conspicuousness of their weakness and indirection. None
mentions abortion explicitly. The religious proscription of abortion is
not, therefore, the result of clear Biblical commandment but a byproduct of Catholic tradition and the recent fundamentalist politics
that have combined to construct a set of interpretations that cast moral
to their
and
religious
On
the
opprobrium on abortion.
a multiplicity of grounds, the pro-Life advocates' assertion that
" fetus is
human being and
therefore abortion
"true" claim but a rhetorical tactic
an
is
murder"
is
not a
effort to establish the claim as a
social choice disguised as a statement of fact.
There
the solid grounds employed by the pro-Life
is
slippage between
movement and
the over-
claiming they do on the basis of those grounds, and this slippage may
be part of the reason that their position has not been fully successful
in legal
and other realms.
Until recently the pro-Choice
movement has been
reticent in ad-
dressing this issue. Because they argue that the issue is a matter of
individual Choice, they have refused to "take a position" on the status
of the fetus. While ideologically consistent, that refusal allows the
pro-Life claims to go uncontested. In the long run, this
may
result in
the adoption of the pro-Life "choice" about the status of the fetus by a
majority of individuals. This could lead to legislative coercion to
compel
all
individuals to act
on the
pro-Life definition.
The pro-
Choice movement's discursive choice may, therefore, also form part of

the long-term outcome of the controversy.
Even if we dismiss, at least for now, the pro-Life claim that a fetus is
215
"Right to Life"?
we should
not dismiss the grounds they

kind of either/or response is as partisan as the pro-Life
over-claiming). If, indeed, we block out their partisan overstatement
and concentrate on the substance of what is left, the pro-Life rhetoric
indicates with gleaming clarity that the fetus has value in its material
being, its potential, and its "spirit." It seems inhumane to look at the
pro-Life pictures, watch their movies, listen to their descriptions of
fetal development, and conclude that a fetus is, throughout its development, nothing but a blob of tissue. The human fetus is a living,
a person with a Right to Life,
offer
us
(that
growing thing, increasingly precious as it develops, gains substance,

and builds relationships to the pregnant woman and, through her, to
the social world. The pro-Life argument forces us to face the real
violence in abortion, and their truths are necessary to keep us morally
responsible. They prevent us from seeing abortion as a casual act of
birth control; they remind us, powerfully, that we ought to take
serious measures as individuals and as a society to reduce or eliminate
abortions, even if we must do so through means that do not violate
the rights of
women. 10
NOTES
1.
My analysis of this still-current political issue of the status of the fetus is

my own predispositions, and so will indicate what my as-
influenced by
sumptions and premises are. I define myself as a "substantive liberal": I

believe in a balance between the rights of the "individual" and the good of a
community or social system. Ultimately, however, I place individuals as
primary because they are discrete material entities, while the community is
always a non-discrete hodge-podge of material, discursive, and ideal components. I believe, therefore, that a society should endeavor to provide the
substance necessary for individuals to exercise their fundamental rights. The
fact that I focus on a "balance" point predisposes me toward openness to all
arguments, because I am constantly trying to adjust rather than to defend a
The roots in individualism predispose me

toward egalitarianism, which, in this particular historical situation, means I
am also predisposed to feminism. I am predisposed against using a religious
base for public policy and toward definitions that include both material and
ideal elements. I tend further to oppose the use of state power for enforcing
singular side of the equation.
morality.
My
background influences the way
debate, but
my
position
is
interpret the issues in the abortion
a centrist position in the United States today.
probably the most generally

One fundamental stumbling
the issue of religious worldviews. As the
Hence, the "bias" in this analysis

taken one. There is, however, one
stone in the abortion debate
is
is
one
that
is
crucial caveat.
Appendix
216
preceding chapters have indicated, religion has been the underlying motivation and worldview of most pro-Life activists, but religious discourse has not
formed the overt center-post of their public argumentation. The following
analyses do not accept any overt or covert assumptions deriving from religious views. Consequently, those who look at the issues from a religious
foundation will not find these suggestions comforting. The same, however, is
true
on the other
side of the issue for feminists.
Although some
and I share
feminist worldview has been part of the public argument,
of the
it,
that
view has not been willing to incorporate the contributions of the pro-Life
argument, and I have attempted to do so. In sum, my position ends up
pleasing neither pro-Choice nor pro-Life activists, but it probably will end up
offering alternatives least acceptable to religious activists.
2.
For example, see Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right
New Abortion Ethic (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983).

3. Our government does, in fact, take it upon
to
Choose: Toward
itself to act coercively, in
disregard for individual rights in
some
drafted as well as others. This
clearly not the case in the abortion contro-
most notably for the draft

and for taxation. I am partially convinced that it should not do so in these
cases. However, I believe that a simple distinction between such cases and
those of the fetus vs. the woman is that in these other cases the "social good"
done is a tangible one for the person whose rights are deprived as well as for
others. Taxes provide services directly to the individual taxed. Even the draft,
in theory at least, is undertaken to protect the Freedom of the individual
is
instances,
woman's right is not a social good

but the competing individual interest of the fetus (except where criminalization of abortion is justified on explicitly pro-natalist grounds, but that would
raise an entirely different frame for the issue).
4. For the theoretical underpinnings of this view, see Celeste Condit
versy.
The reason
Railsback,
for the abrogation of the
"Beyond Rhetorical Relativism:
Structural-Material
Model
of
Truth and Objective Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech 69 (1983), 351-63.

5. There is not yet published an adequate description of the philosophical
pinnings of the pro-Life view, but for partial development see Celeste Condit
Railsback, "Pro-Life, Pro-Choice: Different Conceptions of Value," Women's
Studies in Communication 5 (Spring 1982), 16-28; Randall Lake, "Order and
Disorder in Anti-Abortion Rhetoric: A Logological View," Quarterly Journal of
Speech 70 (1984), 425-43; Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
6. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. C.
E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), pp. 83, 31e-32e; Alfred
Korzybski, Science and Sanity, 4th ed. (Lakeville, Conn.: The Institute of
General Semantics, 1958); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976); Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Con-
A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). For a concrete example
see Michael Calvin McGee, "The Origins of 'Liberty': A Feminization of
Power," Communication Monographs 47 (1980), 23-45, or McGee, "An Essay on
dition:
217
"Right to life"
the Flip Side of Privacy," Argument
in Transition: Proceedings of the
Third
Summer
David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack

Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 105-
Conference on Argumentation, ed.
Rhodes (Annandale,
Va.:
15.
The reason
7.
for this has
been eloquently implied by
women who
argue
against the destruction of disabled fetuses or female fetuses (femicide).

Clearly implied in their arguments is the assumption of the unique value
even of pre-humans. See, for example, Anne Finger, "Claiming All Our
Bodies: Reproductive Rights and Disabilities," and Viola Rogencamp, "Abortion of a Special Kind: Male Sex Selection in India," both in Test Tube Women,
ed. Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli-Klein, and Shelley Minden (London, Boston:
Pandora Press, 1984), pp. 281-97 and 266-78.
8. For an example of such claims, see Dr. and Mrs. J. C. Willke, Handbook
on Abortion (Cincinnati, Ohio: Hayes, 1979), p. 18.
9. I have already cited several examples of this, but consider, for example,
the case of Joseph M. Scheidler. In public media he argues pointedly that his
position is based not on religion but on science. "Discussion," Christian
Century, 18 July 1979, p. 738. In *in-group rhetoric, however, Scheidler's
discourse is some of the most thoroughgoingly Christian I have seen. He
argues the necessity of saving the souls of women and abortionists for God,
even against their own will; for example, "We want the abortionists to be
converted, returned to God, and be saved," or "We do not want anyone to
lose his soul. We do not want the abortionists to be punished in hell for
eternity." Scheidler, Abortion: Opposing Viewpoints (St. Paul, Minn.: Greenhaven Press, 1986), pp. 171-75.
10.
Policies
which would protect Life through Choice would include intenespecially for young males, about the consequences of
sified education,
intercourse, the reasons for abstinence, the available contraceptive options,
along with the provision of more attractive alternatives than young, unwed
motherhood to economically deprived teenagers and the provision of maternal care, day care, and other child-raising support mechanisms to women
who
desire to have children.
APPENDIX
Text of
Anonymous
Letter
Claiming Responsibility
for Pensacola Clinic
Dear Editor:
So you want
to
know who bombed
Bombings
the 3 abortion clinics,
huh?
did.
Let me tell you why.

When I was stationed
here in the waves, before I got married, I got

pregnant. Everyone had told me that a fetus was just a little shapeless
blob anyway, so I got an abortion. I was almost 6 months pregnant by
then.
Later, after it was too late, a friend gave me some literature one day
showing how the baby developed at different stages. I never realized
that at that stage, a fetus is so much a baby that some of them have
been born at that point and LIVED!
Well, you cannot imagine what that did to me, knowing that I had
not just "had an unwanted intra-uterine growth "removed", [sic] but
had KILLED MY BABY It just about ruined my life. Even today,
several years later, I lay awake at nights sometimes crying about it.
So maybe you can undertand my reason for doing what I did.
It was not because of religious fanaticism ... I don't even go to
!
church.
of
to
It was because I have seen for myself what the psychological effects
an abortion can do to a woman, and I didn't want what happened
me to happen to anyone else.
I
did not act alone.
And if these clinics reopen, we will see that they
are closed again.
Some will say that it is wrong to use violent means to put an end to
the killing. Well, we used a lot of violence in World War II to stop the
killing of the Jews.
It
is
a well-established principal
218
[sic]
of justice that force,
even
Text of
Anonymous
219
Letters
deadly force, is justified in order to save innocent

So, I do not feel that I have done anything wrong.
lives
if
necessary.
We will stop the slaughter of the innocents. We WILL put an end to

the
murder
of babies.
And we WILL
prevent any more lives from
being ruined.
Signed,
A Woman Who Knew

What She Was Doing
Printed in the Pensacola Journal, 28 December 1984, p.

Makes Claim," 27 December 1984,
Pensacola News, "Writer
1,
retained the original layout, punctuation, and emphasis as

possible.
and the
p. 1.
have
much
as
APPENDIX C
Methodological Issues
from Chapter 9
The unique task undertaken in Chapter 9 the comparison of public

and private discourse generates at least two serious methodological
problems. The first is simply gaining access to any real data base of
"private talk." The second is determining how such unique data might
be compared. This appendix addresses these issues.
"Private" Discourse
A full comparison of public discourse and private talk requires a broad
about abortions decisions about whether

have abortions and whether to perform abortions, and probably
gossip about one's neighbors' abortions as well. Further, to grant
perfect understanding these texts would have to be spaced through
set of private discussions
to
time to precede, parallel, and follow the public discussion of abortion.

Of course, such a fantasy data base is simply not available. All that
talk has occurred but has now disappeared into the atmosphere,
inaccessible to us. Moreover, to collect private discourse on a topic
before it becomes a controversial public issue, we would require
rather impressive predictive powers. We are driven, then, to obtain
any scrap of material we can use to make what few comparisons can
be made. We cannot discover irrefutable laws of cause and effect
through less full sets of discourse, but we may seek useful suggestions about similarities, differences, and interactions.
The discourse set offered by Katrina Maxtone-Graham's Pregnant by
Mistake is imperfect in many ways. In the first place, it is partially
edited. Fortunately, the editor appears sincerely to have removed as
little as possible and to have carefully avoided adding or altering.
Secondly, these women are "justifying" their decisions after the fact,
rather than actually talking about a decision in progress. While this
220
Methodological Issues from Chapter 9
221
how public
discourse influences private discussion in making abortion decisions,
it does give us a basis for comparing that public discourse to the ways
women talk about their childbearing decisions in their own lives.
does not give us an accurate data source for determining
women
are not a "representative sample."
If such a thing
cannot be achieved in seventeen case histories.
Some of these women are unusually aware of abortion issues (two
had made a study of the public discourse before having their abor-
Finally, the
could be assembled,
it
Many became abortion

counselors after their own abortions. Many joined women's groups or
what they call "Women's Lib." However, not all of the women fit these
models, and there is great diversity among them. Clearly, some of the
women are well-educated, some have worked outside the home, and
some are older. Others, however, are young, immature, or, in their
tions, as part of their decision processes).
own words, unstable. One woman is black; the others are white.
Some are Catholic; some are not. If there is a serious bias to the
sample, it is simply the fact that all of these women found themselves
with "unwanted pregnancies." That leaves us unable to guess at how
public discourse on abortions affects women who do not have to
decide about unwanted pregnancies. Nonetheless, even given the
limitations of the texts available, the issue of the inter-relationship of
public discourse and private lives deserves our willingness to make a
first effort
and
to see
what comparisons might be made.
Critical
Coding Procedures
The comparison of a large number of texts on a micro-analytic scale

presents some challenging problems. The first issue is one of comparison sets. I selected three sets of arguments from mass distribution
magazines for comparison with the private discourse from Pregnant by
Mistake. For the years 1960-61, 1964-65, and 1970-71, I examined all
the articles listed in the Reader's Guide
to Periodical Literature
that
made
and directed argument in favor of legalized abortion

(thereby excluding arguments against abortion, "How to get an abor-
a fairly direct
expected these articles to

resemble most closely the private discourse that favored the abortion
choice. The three time periods represented roughly the "beginning"
of this round of the public discourse, the point at which the private
discourse was made, and a mid-point in the development of the
argument (which earlier work had indicated was a turning point).
The second procedural issue is what to compare and how. In order
to assess this, I first made a preliminary critical reading of the texts,
tion" articles, foreign comparisons, etc.).
Appendix
222
drawing on standard procedures in rhetorical criticism. This reading,

of course, ultimately depended on the categories I have been trained
to notice, but during the readings I attempted to maintain at least one
open eye. This critical reading suggested to me fifteen bases of comparison between and among the sets of texts. These formed a set of
internal hypotheses and coding categories:
Categories Coded and Counted

Public and Private Abortion Discourse
in
Structure (organizational plan)
Number
of lines of
Statistics
Narratives (abortion stories)

Histories (social narratives)
Examples (comparisons
to other countries)
Statements of
Principles
Responsibility
Opposition to criminal abortion
Response
to issue
Abortion as killing/murder
Universalization
Generalization
Normalization
Response
to narratives
Identity
Sympathy
Purpose of abortion
Eugenics
Rape
Incest
Economics
Life-style
Characterizations
Method
of determining
Adjectives applied about subject
History of actions
Manner of expression
Grammar
Word choice
Goals stated
Purposes characterized
Social roles
Methodological Issues from Chapter 9
Demographic
223
profiles
Age
Number
of children
Marital status
Groups
Pregnant
women
Opponents
of reform
Supporters of reform
Word counts
Law, legal, illegal
Life, mother's life, fetal/child's life
Wanted/unwanted, needed, had to
Fair, choice, equality, discrimination,
freedom, rights
then returned to the texts, this time coding and counting the
coding effort does not match current social
scientific standards for quantitative work. There are no reliability
tests for my coding to compare with that of someone else. In addition,
given the complexity of the amount of data I was coding for, I certainly
missed some factors and elements at some times. Thus, this semiquantitative effort is not "content analysis" but rather a more rigorous
verification of initial critical insights. Some portions of it might later be
subjected to quantitative verification if the benefits proved worth the
I
fifteen elements. This
//
,,
costs.
Following, I present a summary of the numerical findings of this

coding and counting. These are not presented in statistical form
because I believe this material does not fit the standard assumptions
for statistical tests. The discourse does not accurately represent a
sample from a population. The public discourse is all of the locatable
discourse of this form. The private discourse and public discourse are
both influenced by unique formal characteristics that make statistical

tests misleading. Consequently, the author and reader are required to
substitute
judgment
for statistical tests in assessing the significance of
these numerical variations. In the text I have cited those numerical

variations that seem to me to be of importance. They remain open to
debate.
Appendix
224
Results of Coding and Counting

and Private Abortion Discourse*
of Public
Category Coded
Private
Discourse
Publ
\c
Discourse
1964/65
1960/61
#1
Statistics
Narratives
1970/71
S/R
<1%
7/9
9/10
8%
6/8
7%
90%
8/9
12%
50%
9/10
31%
6/8
16%
7/9
81
8/10
c**
S/R***
1/15
15/15
S/R
S/R
Law
#5 Word Count
Raw
score
Use/line of text
108
.328
.231
8/8
172
.343
#7 Word Count2
5/9
3/10
16
7/8
81
91
7/9
29
7/10
29
5/8
20
5/9
10
5/10
13
6/8
21
wanted/unwanted
77
5/9
13
6/10
17
6/8
21
choice
12
1/9
4/10
6/8
Life
my/mother's
life
fetal/child's
life
#8 Word Count
rights
^Private discourse
favor of
**C
is
total
change
is
from Pregnant By Mistake; public discourse are
all articles arguing in

indexed in the Reader's Guide for the indicated years
that is the number of articles that used that item out of the
of articles available
is either a percentage (where

appears in the indicated sample
***S/R
34
in abortion laws
the consistency score
number
appears) or a raw
number
of times the item
GLOSSARY
ALL
that
The American Law Institute sponsor of a revised "model" penal code

would have legalized abortion in cases of rape, incest, fetal deformity,
life of the pregnant woman.

Able to persuasively speak one's interests. After using this term,
discovered a related usage by Stuart Hall, but Hall seems not to recognize
or threat to the physical health or

Articulate.
I
the
way
which the material
in
instantiation of articulations in individual
speaking subjects is crucial to social processes; he abstracts "articulation"

from the process of articulating individuals and groups.
Articulation.
The expression of a group's interests in public in such a way
that it is, or seeks to be, persuasively related to the public vocabulary. See
also "double articulation."
In general
Catholics.
refer to the
identify with a given
dogma,
church hierarchy and those members
rather than the entire
membership
church. The role of the church in the abortion controversy
any account
of the debate
must describe
this role.
believe
is
it
large,
acts, scenes, or
and so
important to
distinguish opposition to the church hierarchy and its political

from prejudice against individual members as human beings.
Characterization.
who
of the
activities
universalized depiction of a class of concrete agents,
purposes
that are culturally current (positive
and negative
forms of "stereotypes").
Technical term for a characterization.
Multiple individuals who share with each other important characteristics
e.g., gender, wealth, role in productive processes, race, etc. See
Character-type.
Classes.
groups.
One
Commentary.
of the three rhetorical processes that influence the per-
suasiveness of a visual image; the words that describe, name, or associate a

visual
image used persuasively.
Constitutive values.
Continuity.
One
See Ideograph.
of the three rhetorical processes that influence the per-
suasiveness of a visual image; the use of a series of images to link image

"A" and "B" wherein each element of the series takes on more and more
similarities of the opposite
Culture.
The
image
(or character-type).
collection of discourses, artistic objects, behavioral
that constitute the boundaries within
meaning of the experiences of their lives

community, family, tribe, polis, section,
Diachronic.
Across time rather than
static;
a subset of diachronic studies.
225
norms,
etc.
which individuals structure the

in any social network (e.g., nation,
etc.).
opposite of synchronic; history
is
226
Glossary
A rhetorical tactic which draws distinctions between related
Differentiation.
or similar groups in order to control
by sanctioning some and praising
others.
Dominant
Individuals
elites.
ganizations explicitly
and
and groups who have
their interests
implicitly recognized in the legal
systems of society, currently in a disproportionate manner

unrecognized groups.
and
and
or-
cultural
the expense
at
of
Double articulation (of rhetoric). A characteristic of persuasive discourse,

which allows it to be read on two levels manifest interest and rhetorical
tactics. This new application of the linguistic term double articulation is my
own, but it should be noted that Murray Edelman has clearly pointed out
the ability of discourse to have both a "universal" symbolic dimension and
a partisan, functional dimension. I suggest here two things. First, both
levels of this discourse are both symbolic and functional. Second, such an
evaluation eliminates the "dismissive" response toward public discourse
suggested by Edelman and others. Merely because there is an interest
component to a discourse does not disqualify our attention to the public,
universal components that may be served by the discourse. See Murray
Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, 111. University of Illinois
Press, 1964).
Dramatic structure. Kenneth Burke's dramatistic pentad the

agency, purpose, and scene that constitutes any narrative
human
depiction of
Enthymeme.
situations
act,
agent,
discursive
and events.
Inferential structure in discourse, generally taken to require
the audience's participation in reasoning about probabilities; sometimes
described as a rhetorical syllogism.
One
Epideictic.
of Aristotle's three macro-genres of public discourse; cere-
monial address
Framing.
(as
The use
opposed
to deliberative
of ambiguity
and
forensic address).
and multiple interlocking themes to conand controls the meaning of
struct a simple, singular square that limits
some
significant object or event.
Grounding images.
Visual representations that provide original support for

argumentative claims by adding information that is not fully carried
through verbal grounds or verbal commentary on the image.
Groups. Members of a class that are organized to protect their interests
through public action.
Control of vocabulary and practices by dominant elites,

achieved rhetorically, hence, not by direct demand but rather through
Hegemony.
compromise
of
unspeakable,
competing
interests; often functions
by making alternatives
unpersuasive.
Heritage.
A social myth constructed about a shared past, which gives that
past a unified set of meanings, endorses the social formations represented
i.e.,
227
Glossary
as existing in that past,
and thereby constructs
a description of
what the
future should be.
Human
being/person.
In order to avoid taking sides in this technical dis-
combine the preferred terms of each side of the controversy.

Hyperbole. Figure of speech in which the words or other symbols chosen
deliberately overstate some characteristics of the entity they supposedly
pute,
represent.
Ideograph. A word or short phrase that sums up key social commitments

and thereby constitutes a society.
The
Ideology.
set of beliefs, values,
and ways
of
communicating of a
group; always more or less partial and preferring.

Image. Visualization or actual visual representation;
social
especially
of
character-type.
In-group rhetoric. Discourse directed to those audiences already committed

to the central vocabulary of any group.
Inter-textualized.
Gaining meaning through relationships with other texts
or sets of texts.
Male-dominated. Any culture, institution or the like in which political,

economic, and social power is held disproportionately by males or in
which those
and
values, narratives,
characterizations traditionally associ-
ated with the male gender in Western industrial societies are disproportionately reproduced.
Maximal human reproduction.
manner
tity
The birthing and
raising of
human
off-
an optimal balance between a high quanand a functional quantity of people, especially from the perspective of
spring in a
that insures
capitalists.
which the connotations and sometimes

one item are transferred to another item,
"renaming" it, at least in part; e.g., the "leg" of a chair was once a metaphor
transferring the meaning of an animal's body part to a support in a piece of
Metaphor.
figure of speech in
denotations of the
name
for
furniture.
Metonymy.
name
for
Figure of speech in which one technical, precise, or denotative
some
class of things is replaced
by
a different
name
that relates to
a quality, attribute, or characteristic of a thing.
between female parents

dominant in American mass culture
before 1960, the "myth of motherhood" prescribed this role as the primary
or sole identity of women and idealized it.
Myth. A narrative or component of a narrative that has become a commonplace in a culture and carries great social force.
Mythic commonplace. A portion of a social myth or a truncated version of
that myth (a "commonplace" is a classical rhetorical term for a set-piece of
Motherhood.
and
The
culturally prescribed relations
their children; varies widely;
discourse, repeatable in a variety of situations).
Glossary
228
A story; the recounting of the actions of an agent for a purpose in
Narrative.
a scene with a
method.
Out-group
Discourse, usually persuasive, directed to those not

rhetoric.
already committed to the discursive core of an organized social group.
A speech act which creates a condition through its utterance;

"promise" creates an obligation through being spoken; as opposed
to expressive or referential functions of language usage.
Popular opinion. The range of beliefs held by all of the citizens of a nation.
See also public opinion.
Presence. Technical term formulated by Chaim Perelman and L. OlbrechtsTyteca in The New Rhetoric to describe the ability of rhetoric to give more
force to particular symbols, acts, agents, etc., or to make them more salient
simply by repetition in a discursive arena.
Presumption. A formal term in argumentation theory (deriving primarily
from Whately) that indicates which side of a controversy must only defend
their case (holding presumption) and which side must attack (carrying the
'burden of proof); the side of a case that has either history, majority, least
Performative.
e.g., a
cost, or prior
agreement on
its
side.
Supporters of re-legalization of abortion laws, motivated by the

rhetoric of "right to choose."
Supporters of a ban on abortion, publicly motivated by a concern
Pro-Life.
for the "right to life" of the human conceptus.
Supporters of liberalization of abortion laws who promoted
Pro-reform.
ALI-type laws or were motivated by the "myth of illegal abortion."
Public.
The social formation constituted through the interests and voices of
Pro-Choice.
all
"active" or potentially active
elite is
of
of
members
of a social group.
the most active subset of the public.
The public
members of a social group; "the people" is

any public and it is constituted through the
all
is
The dominant
an
active subset
the self-ascribed identity
discourse of a leader or
leader-system.
Public opinion.
The range
of beliefs held
by the
articulated
members
of a
populace.
Public vocabulary.
The acceptable words, myths, and
for warranting social behavior in a
Quickening.
The point
Rationally undecidable.
which
at
characterizations used
community.
woman
feels a fetus
move
inside herself.
question for which, although there are relevant,

no single "correct" answer because different
objective facts, there can be
groups must weigh the
facts in
ways
that lead to disparate conclusions.
which mediates between subcommitments; a means term.

Rhetoric.
The use of language to persuade; the persuasive dimensions of a
communicative act; the study of public discourse in its persuasive dimenRegulative ideographs.
stantive constitutional
constitutive value
229
Glossary
sions; that
element of a discourse which makes
therefore compelling; persuasive discourse.
The
it
appear truthful and
social process of gover-
nance through mutual persuasion.
The sum
Rhetorical conditions.
groups in a
of rhetorical positions of all individuals
and
social system.
The
group counterpart to the "rhetorical situasystem-network held by a group, especially

with regard to the policies and vocabulary they wish to support and the
factors which create resistance; such a place interacts with the arguments
Rhetorical position.
tion"
the place
social
in the social
available to the group.
Rhetorical
The
tactic.
generalized
lists
particular approach used to
make
a persuasive case;
of such approaches are never definitive but heuristic
because of the interaction between form and content.
One of the three rhetorical processes that influence the persuasiveness of visual images as metaphors; the choice of particular images
to stand for a given character-type.
Selection.
The
Selfish.
desire to serve one's
own
interests before those of others;
term is ascribed to women more frequently than men,

presumably because greater self-sacrifice has historically been expected of
women than of men.
Stasis.
A technical term of classical rhetoric signifying the point on which an
significantly, the
issue or cause rests; the heart of a contested matter at a given point in time;
also the
development
Substantive ideograph.
itself;
of
an issue
at a
given point in time.
constitutive value term that serves as
an end in
a reason for the constitution of a people.
visual depiction of a narrative that is widely used by

a social group; generally adds force through graphic and shorthand
Summarizing image.
portrayal of the "point" of a narrative but has primary value as reminder

that unifies.
Synecdoche.
whole
The
figure of speech
which
substitutes a part of
an item
for the
of another.
The rhetorical definition of an event or issue by indicating

meaning is captured in a single principle or maxim.
Traditional family.
The social myth that describes the ideal life as being
conducted within the bounds of a social formation consisting of a mother,
father, and children living under the same roof, with the father as economic support and final decision authority.
Thematization.
that
its
Universality.
Having application to all members of the culture.

The increase in universality of participation
Universalization.
in a social
process.
Universalizing.
The attempt
the interests of
all
members
to
demonstrate that an action or value serves

used to mis-identify
of the culture; frequently
particular interests as general interests; also universalization.
Glossary
230
The ability of a developing human to survive outside the womb of

woman who gestated it for a substantial period of time without perma-
Viability.
the
nent damage arising from early separation from the womb.

Especially "public vocabulary" but also a group or class vocabulary; the words, phrases, narratives, ideographs, images, and characterizations used habitually in the public arena i.e., in public argument.
Vocabulary.
Wage-laboring woman. Any female human being who works for a direct
cash income usually paid on a weekly or monthly basis. The needs of this
particular group constituted the impetus behind the move for abortion
reform. This struggle simultaneously constituted them as one of the
groups to be represented in the system-network. May include professional, middle-, and working-class women (some of whom are also or
instead poverty class).
Warrants. Underlying generalizations that constitute the link between a
claim and its argumentative support. Something like a "major premise" in
classical logic. Derived from Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation as
consisting of claims, grounds, and warrants.
INDEX
Abortion(s): allowance
analogy to
of, 67;
Sherri Finkbine, 25, 28-31, 35-36, 177;
women
slavery or murder, 49-50, 89-90, 164;
stories
changes in practice and meaning
173-96; tension between old beliefs
of, 1,
about individual
199; definition of, xiv; legalization of,
and new conditions
Medicaid funding for,

112-15, 122n; medical insurance
coverage of, 37 n; medical risks of, 37 n,
77n, 112, 198??; as personal choice, 28-
lary
22, 99, 100-104;
31, 35-36, 174-76; portrayal of,
on
1,
heritage narrative; Persuasive narrative
tele-
Abortion study: focus on abstract ideas,

3;
22-36,
176-77; rhetorical articulation
of,
23-
Adoption, as alternative to
tion, 60
Alaska, abortion law in, 65
Abortion law; Illegal abortion; Legal abortion, Roe v. Wade

Abortion clinics: bombing of, 151-63,
218-19; comparison to "Nazi ovens,"
ALL
new
as central
emergence
in, 15;
narratives as discursive units in,
of
vocabulary
Abortionists: characterization
tion narrative, 33-34;
and
of,
Life
Institute
65, 74m
of, 66;
as major constitutive value ground-
Arguments: construction
of,
10-11,
19rc
Aristotle, 48
Abortion law: discrimination
need
abor-
ing, 59-63; organization of, 66
in abor-
class struc-
ture, 34
history
American Law
illegal
early visible, 52-53; financing
123-24
of,
pol-
Anti-abortion forces: Catholic church as
13-14, 31
Abortion culture, creation
3;
American Law Institute (ALI), 225;

"model law" on abortion, 23, 24, 35,
43,60
American Medical Association, 43
51; picketing of, 151, 153
women and motherhood
See
ALI-type reform laws,
Abortion controversy: characterizations

to, 14;
inclusion of discursive forces,
itics of, xi-xiii
24. See also
of
31-34; vocabu-
in,
in, 35. See also Pro-Life
Abortion reform, responses of pro-Life

forces to, 60-61
vision, 125-42; pro-Life portrayal of,
44-45; as public concern,
used
in, 35,
of,
for
in,
Arkansas, abortion law
66-67;
100-102; public advocacy on
reform
of, 24;
role of doctors
lem, 23; access
in controlling, 22-23, 3Sn, 39n; studies
on changes in, 2
Abortion narrative: audience
35; class differences in, 26,
in,
60
8;
double,
9,
to,
by powerful groups,
226
"Assignment Abortion," 157

in, 26,
34-
35-36; con-
troversy in, 31; creation of mythic
monplace
in,
Articulation, 4, 23, 225; of abortion prob-
Basil,
com-
54
Birth control: effectiveness

torical features of,
27-28, depiction of
of,
69-70; rhe-
69
illegal
Blackmun, Harry A., 98, 100-101,

108, 109, 110-11
Brown v. Board of Education, 111
of
Buffalo Bill, portrayal of abortion on, 125
abortion victims
in, 32;
depictions of
agents involved, 32-34; description of

abortion in, 26-27, 33-34; image
motherhood in, 25, 29, 31; legal and
medical need for, 23-24; per-
suasiveness
trayal of
of,
27-28, 30-31, 36; por-
women
prostitution
Cagney and
and gambling
in, 27; of
Lacey, portrayal of abortion
on, 125, 126-33, 137, 139, 140
in, 23, 25, 26;
California, abortion law in, 60
231
103,
Index
232
Call to Glory, portrayal of abortion on,
Catholics, 30, 47, 225; anti-abortion
stance, 52-53;
heritage
of,
and defense
of Life, 166;
in pro-Life heritage tale,
of,
in controlling abortion
Doe
v.
39n
Bolton, 96, 99
Dominant
Double
226
elites, 67,
articulation, 9,
226
Douglas, William, 105
47-49, 93, 98, 225
14, 25,
Doctors, role
law, 22-23, 3Sn,
125, 134
abortion narrative, 25; bridge between
Dramatic structure, 190, 226

Dred Scott, 50
ideographs and,
Due
Characterization, 14, 25, 93, 98, 225; in

98; of contents of
public discourse,
types
in, 14; of
ratives, 14; of
9;
Process clause, 105
inclusion of stereo-
motherood,
women,
14; in nar-
Eclipse of Reason, 82,
Enthymeme,
14
11,
91-92
19-20, 226
Character-type, 39n, 71, 98, 225
Epideictic, 6, 8, 226
Charity, as alternative to abortion, 60
Equality, 63-65; appropriateness
Chastity, as alternative to abortion, 60
Choice, 187-88; biological, 69-70; enacting, 96-117; as ideograph, 59, 67-73,

96, 201; occupational, 70-72;
lary
of, 3,
vocabu-
96, 116-17, 122n, 194, 197n
Christian, early position
on abortion, 45-
46
Civil disobedience, 151, 153
Class structure,
and abortion,
8, 34, 67,
225-26
Colorado, abortion law
in,
ograph, 59, 63-67, 75n

Equal pay controversy, 70, 77n
Equal Rights Amendment, 7
Establishment clause, 97
Eugenic abortion, 48
Euthanasia, comparison of abortion with,
89-90
Roe v. Wade as, 49; separation of
"good" from, 47-48
Evil:
60
Commentary, 83, 84-85, 225

Comparable worth controversy, 77n
Connecticut, abortion law
in,
65
Conservative position, on representative
government, 5-6
Constitutive public values, 59. See also
Ideograph
Family, portrayal of abortion on, 125
Feminist: position
on
abortion, 12-13,
20n, 61, 67-68, 104, 197n; role
64
Fetus: characterization
of,
182-85; in pro-
Life
argument,
3, 61, 63, 79,
Right to Life
of,
206-15; status
viability of, 112, 206, 209,
205, 213, 215-16rc;
Figures of speech: analysis
225
88, 227;
Dallas, portrayal of abortion on, 125, 134
Defenders, portrayal of abortion on, 123,

124, 125, 137
in,
230
of, 91;
hyper85-
bole, 81, 90, 227; metaphor, 81, 83,
Cronemeyer, Robert, 153
Delaware, abortion law
of,
82-83, 85-
67, 108-12,
"Contradiction-suppression," 31
5, 123,
60
metonymy, 82-83,
90, 227;
synecdoche, 81, 88-89, 229; use of, in

audience persuasion, 10, 8L-82
Finkbine, Sherri, 25, 28-31, 35-36, 177
Flowers, Robert, 98, 108-9
Floyd,
Jay,
98
Diachronic explanation, 14, 225
Framing, 45-46, 226
Differentiation, 48, 226
Freedom
of Choice. See Choice; Pro-
Choice advocacy
Discourse analysis, 14
Discrimination: in abortion laws, 66-67;
Free exercise clause, 97
in availability of abortionists, 34; equality as
opposition
to, 63;
in
xi,
88, 213;
Courtney, James, 157
of,
abortion movement,
Continuity, 83, 84, 225
Culture,
of, 63;
challenge to (1971-72), 65-67; as ide-
as negative
ideograph, 64
Discursive processes. See Rhetoric
Gambling, in abortion narrative, 27

Genetics, 210-11
Georgia, abortion law in, 98
233
Index
Gessell,
Judge Gerhardt,
Gideon
Project, 153, 155-63;
claiming credit
letter
60, 65
for,
Illegal abortion,
anonymous
161-62, 218-
I96n;
22-36; "back alley," 27,
methods used
rative of, 25-28;
in,
26-27; nar-
number
of, 37rc,
197w;
portrayal
of,
in media, 26-27, 196n;
Gilligan, Carol, 179
portrayal
of,
in pro-reform tale, 32-33;
Goldsby, Mathew, 155-56, 158
underworld and racketeers and, 27
19
Goldsby, Rhoda, 157

"Good," separation from "evil," 47-48
Goodness, rhetorical quality
of,
25
92-94; pro-Life, 79-80, 81-83, 85-88;
and
Gow, Haven, 160

Gratian, 45
in, 45,
47
89-90
In-group rhetoric, 12-13, 227
Connecticut (1965), 104
v.
79-94
comparison of abortion with,
rhetoric,
Infanticide,
Greco-Roman world, abortion

Griswold
Images, 73, 98, 227; of fetus, 79, 82-83,

85-88; of freedom, 92-94; pro-Choice,
Grounding images, 226

Group rhetoric, 6-8, 12-13, 226-28
Inter-texualized, 227
and congressional reon choices, 112-15; decoding,

96-98; Doe v. Bolton, 99; and freedom
of choice, 102-8; history and precedent
for, 100-102; and justiciability, 99-100;
and legal conclusions, 115-17; and
Right to Life, 108-12; Roe v. Wade
Judicial rhetoric:
straint
Hall, Stuart, 225
Harris
McRae, 104
v.
Hawaii, abortion law
Hegemony,
7,
in,
65
44, 226
Heritage, 43, 226-27
Hermeneutics, 14
Hill Street Blues, portrayal of
125, 126,
abortion on,
133-34
Hippocratic Oath, 101
98-99
99-100
Kansas, abortion law
History: denying authority to, 54-55; resistance to
(1973),
Justiciability,
change
in,
43-44
Kasun
in,
60
(attorney), 158
Kindeness, Rep., 115
Holocaust, pro-Life comparison of abortion with, 49, 51
Kinsolving, Lester, 53-54
Koop, Everett, 51, 55
Hospitals: admission to, for incomplete

abortions, 37; committee system for
controlling abortions, 23;
number
of
legal abortions in, 22
Human
being/person, 206, 207, 211, 227
Hyde, Henry,
66, 67, 114
Hyde Amendment,
113, 122n
Hyperbole, 81, 90, 227
Lader, Lawrence, 54-55
Law, and public rhetoric, 96-117

Legal abortion(s): and drop in maternal
mortality, 37n; hospital control of, 23;
number
of, 22;
public opinion on, 37-
3Sn, 147-48, 168n; shift toward, 22-25;

state availability of,
37-38
Levi-Strauss, Claude, 31
Ideas, convincing
and
forceful, 9
use of, 86
Ideograph(s), 59, 227; as based on equality, 64-65; characterizations and, 98;
Identification, pro-Life
Choice
as, 59,
definition
of, 64;
tures
67-73, 96, 187-88, 201;
of, 13;
discrimination as form
Equality as, 59, 63-67, 75n; fea-
of,
201; Liberty as, 97; Life as, 59-
Property as, 97; regulative, 75m, 113-14, 228; setting off, in

text, 73m; substantive, 75k, 114, 229
Ideology, 7, 60, 227; and rhetoric, 147-66
63, 96, 97, 201;
Liberal position,
on representative gov-
ernment, 5-6
Liberty, as ideograph, 97
Life: anit-abortion view on, 59-63; as
ideograph, 59-63, 96, 97, 201; pro-Life
view on,
Lincoln,
61;
vocabulary
Abraham,
of,
96
210; link to pro-Life
heritage tale, 49-50
Lloyd, Rep., 114
Magruder and Loud, portrayal of abortion

on, 125, 140
234
Index
Male domination, 185, 197m, 227

Maternal mortality. See Legal abortion
Maude, portrayal of abortion on, 123, 124,
125, 137
Out-group
rhetoric, 13, 228

Over-weighing, 159, 160, 164
Paul, Rep., 115
Maximal human reproduction,

Media: exposes of
62,
illegal abortion,
relation to public portrayal of

in, 25; relation to
227
Pennsylvania, abortion law
24-25;
Pensacola: clinic bombings, 153, 155-63;
women
public discourse, 12,
anonymous
letter
65
in,
claiming credit
for,
161-63, 217-18
Perelman, Chaim, 228
145n
Medicaid, debate over abortion funding

by, 112-15, 122n
Performative power, 97, 228
Permenter, Dr. William, 156
Menard, Ruby, 157
Personalization, 54-55
Metaphor,
Persuasion:
power
227
Metonymy, 82-83, 90, 227
Michigan, abortion law in, 65
Morality: foundations of, 180-81; of having abortion, 177-80
Pheaster,
Motherhood: definitions
Picketing, of abortion clinics, 151-53
81, 83, 85-88,
of, 6,
106, 227;
Hugh
Plessy
Polarization, 165
as,
45-46, 164; as uni-
on, 46, 59-60
Myths,
227
in,
22-
v.
M., 34
Ferguson, 111
Political/cultural discourses, public
pact
of,
im-
10
Political labeling, practice of,
in public rhetoric, 13, 28, 59, 98,
of,
36; social limitations of, 35
in abortion controversy, 14, 23, 25, 29,
versal concern, 46; pro-Life position
79-80; process
Persuasive narrative(s): abortion
31-33, 60, 72
Murder: abortion
of,
10-11, 13, 81-82
Popular culture, and rhetoric, 123-42

Popular opinion, 148, 228
Population Institution, 124
Naive idealism, 9
Practical labeling, practice of, 10
Narrative(s), 228; limitations of, 35; per-
suasiveness
oric,
of,
30-34; in public rhet-
13-14; legal and medical, 100-
102; television as
medium
of,
123-24.
See also Abortion narrative; Persuasive

narrative; Pro-Life heritage narrative
Nathanson, Dr. Bernard, 87

National Organization for
Women,
xi
National Right to Life Committee, 105
New Mexico, abortion law in, 60

New York, abortion law in, 65
Ninth Amendment, interpretation
102-3, 119-20H
Pregnancy, as justiciable issue, 99

Pregnant by Mistake (Maxtone-Graham),
173-85, 219-23
144t!, 228
Presumption, 228
Prime-time abortion, 123-42; false-preg-
Presence,
nancy programming, 125, 134-36; proabortion programming, 125, 136-41;

professional choice programming, 125,
126-34
Privacy doctrine,
of,
Noonan, John, 44-45, 46, 47, 54, 162

North Carolina, abortion law in, 60
North Dakota, abortion law in, 65
xi;
feminists on, 104;
pro-Life attack on, 104; protection of
abortion under, 97; Supreme' Court's
use
of,
103-4
Private discourse,
comparison
of,
with
public discourse, 219-23

Private lives: access to, for study, 172-74;
Obey, Rep., 115

Occupation: effect on Choice, 70-72
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 228
Opinion polls: 8, 37-38n, 147-49, 159,
167-68 passim, 170
Oregon, abortion law in, 60
impact of public discourse on, 190-94;

influence of, on public discourse, 18590
Pro-Choice advocacy, 36n, 228; defense of
Life by, 61; strategies
used
by, 159, 160,
164-66; visual images used
in,
92-94;
Index
vocabulary in, 96, 116-17, 194, 197w
Pro-Choice narrative: legal precedent
and, 100-102; real women in, 28-31,
35-36, 173-96; rhetorical tactics
235
of, 13;
as unit
and the
law, 96-117; narratives
13-14
of,
Public vocabulary, 5, 35, 59, 96, 228
in, 28,
30, 32-33, 54-55; story of abortion in,
"Quality of
24-28, 33-34, 52-55
Quickening, 36n, 228
life" ethic, 62,
74
Pro-Life advocacy, 228; defense of Life by,
61-62; strategies used by,
2, 44, 49,
54-
55, 60-61, 74n, 91-92, 104, 151-53,
155-63; visual images used
vocabulary used
211-12
in,
in,
79-82;
13-14, 61, 106,
Pro-Life heritage narrative: Christian tra-
and
Racketeers,
illegal abortion,
27
Rape, 67, 69
Rationally undecidable, 206, 228
Reagan, Ronald, 49-50, 55
Reed, Mary, 164
Reed, Scott, 164
dition in, 45-52; history of abortion in,
Regulative ideograph, 75n, 113-14, 228
43-52, 164; legal precedent and, 100-
Rehnquist, William, 105, 112

Representative government: conservative
102; persuasiveness of, 43, 52; rhetorical tactics in,
44-50, 54-55
position
Pro-natalism, 112; as motivation for proLife rhetoric,
62-63
Property, as ideograph, 97
Pro-reformers, 27, 228; depiction of
il-
legal abortion by, 32-33; description of
abortionists by, 33-34; negative re-
sponse
27
by,
Prostitution, in abortion narrative, 27

Public, 6, 228;
makeup
Public advocacy,
need
of,
law
of, 8,
in,
with
vate discourse, 219-34; contents
determinist position
3;
with private
of,
in,
of, 9;
4-5; impact
of,
private lives on, 185-90; rhetoric in, 4,
through rhetorical pro-
and
cultural
of,
3-4
229
tactic,
redefinition
of,
116-17. See also Choice
Right-to-Life argument, 102
Robertson,
Pat,
63
Rockefeller, Nelson, 65
v.
Wade
(1973), 96, 97, 98-99, 111,
and
and free102-8; history and pre-
123; dissenting opinion in, 105-6;
doctrine of "scrutiny," 103;
dom
discourses, 5
Public opinion, 2, 228. See also Opinion
of choice,
cedent
for,
100-102; impact
justiciability of issues in,
polls
opinion
Public polls. See Opinion polls
jority
Public realm, 148
trine, 97,
Public rhetoric: comparison
with pri172-73; ideographs as unit

of,
1-15,
Right to choice, 67-68, 103; and the birth

control pill, 69-70; origin of term, 3;
Roe
cess, 7
Public good, advantage in producing, 10

Public impact, of political
of,
11
Rhetorical position, 229

Rhetorical
pri-
private lives, 190-94; influence of
of,
force
of,
Rhetorical criticism, 14; maturation of
American school
173-74; comparison
vate lives,
6, 7; social
Rhetorical conditions, 229
19n;
Public discourse: in abortion rhetoric,
common grounds
of, 4;
culture, 123-42; in public
199-203; vocabulary
through, 96
shaping
12-15; negative connotations
discourse,
development of new vocabulary
6;
of, on culture, 5; and ideology, 147-66;

and image, 79-94; methods of analy-
and popular
for abortion
Public argument: definition
on
Reproductive freedom: interpretation of,

68; as term, 76-77n
Rhetoric, 4-5, 228-29; balance between
in-group and group, 20n; dualistic
sis,
7-8
reform, 24
lives,
5-6; liberal position on, 5-
of,
as rhetorical process, 9
nature of internal structure, 10; focus
sought
to illegal abortion as
6;
in, 107;
of, 22;
99-100; ma-
and privacy doc-
103-4; pro-Life treatment
49; revolutionary
Dred Scott and, 50
importance
of,
22;
of,
236
Index
Safety issue, in abortion, 77n, 112, 198n

St.
Elsewhere, portrayal of abortion on,
125, 126, 137,
138-39
Toulmin, Stephen, 230
Toulmin model of argumentation, 19m

Traditional family, 229
Saturday Evening Post, exposes in, 24
Scapegoating, 47
Science, authority
Uddo, Basil, 44
Underworld, and illegal abortion, 27
Universalized argument, 10, 127, 229
61
of,
Selection, 83, 84, 176, 229
229
Selfish,
Semiotics, 14
Sexuality,
181-82
Viability, 208, 209,
35; of
Choice, 96, 116-17, 122; de-
velopment through public argumentation, 96; emergence of, in abortion
Shofner, David, 155

Silent Scream, 82, 86,
230
Vocabulary, 230; of abortion narratives,
Shared meanings, as term, 7

Shimik (attorney), 158
87
Simmons, Jimmy, 155-56, 157

Simmons, Kathryn, 155-56, 157, 158
controversy, 15; legal, 97; of Life, 96;
Sixtus V, in pro-Life heritage tale, 54
11
Slavery,
comparison of abortion with,
49-50, 164
Social change, impact
on public opinion,
Warrants, 205, 230; for rhetorical arguments, 7

Webster, portrayal of abortion on, 125
myths, 28
"Speak Outs," 165
Social
Weddington, Sarah,
Spenser for Hire, portrayal of abortion on,

125, 137-38, 139, 140
Stasis,
public, 5, 35, 59, 96, 228; in rhetoric,
Stereotypes, 14
Synecdoche,
definition
92, 229
81, 88-89,
99-100
Willke, John C, 44, 161

Womanhood: motherhood
199-200, 229
Summarizing image,
Symons, Bishop, 155
98,
White, Byron, 105, 106, 112

Wiggins, Kaye, 155-56, 157, 158
Women:
of,
as essential
106
in abortion narratives, 23, 25,
26; as central to abortion controversy,
229
14;
improved economic position
protective legislation for,

Texas, abortion law in, 98
6; in
gramming, 143m; working,
Thalidomide, and legal abortion, 28-29
72, 122n,
of, 3;
TV pro-
28, 63,
70-
230
Thematization, 229
Thornburgh
cians
v.
American College
and Gynecologists, 105
of Obstetri-
Zero Population Growth movement, 187
<(
to
lic
our theory and understanding of pubdiscourse. I cannot commend this book
too highly."
Martha
Solomon,
editor,
Quarterly Journal of Speech
"Condit's book
is
an example of
how
scholarship can contribute in significant
ways
to those outside of
academe who
are trying to sort out the abortion debate
or to discover effective strategies for use
advocating a particular position."

Sonja K. Foss, author of Rhetorical Crit-
in
icism: Exploration
and Practice
Celeste M. Condit is an associate professor of speech communication at the

University of Georgia. She is the author
of articles published in Quarterly Journal
of Speech, Critical Studies in
munication,
Of Related
Mass Com-
and elsewhere.
Interest
Private Matters
American Attitudes toward Childbearing
and Infant Nurture in the Urban North,
1800-1860
Sylvia Hoffert
"An
impressive contribution to the his-
tory of childbirth in America.
Hoffert
provides the reader with informed and

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vate world." Jane

of
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in the series
pri-
Donegan, author
Women and Men Midwives:
Morality, and
B.
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Women
in
American
wo^ni
Also of Interest
Privacy in America
Is
Your Private
David
Privacy in America
is
F.
Linowes
a dramatic yet balanced account of the dangers
of the electronic age.
illuminates the
Eye?
Life in the Public
ways
in
Reporting the results of a recent survey, it

which America's largest corporations handle
personal information about their former, current, and prospective

employees. Detailed personal information about all of us is being
stored in computer memories of government agencies, corporations,
educational institutions, and churches. These records could sabotage
your efforts to find a job or obtain credit, regardless of their accuracy

Linowes explores the magnitude of this problem and suggests ways
in which individuals may correct recordkeeping mistakes and minimize
outside invasions into personal
affairs.
Symbolic Defense
The Cultural Significance
of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Edward Tabor Linenthal

With a foreword by Paul Boyer
"Symbolic Defense
is
an extraordinary work of
cultural retrieval
and
analysis. Linenthal not only assembles a valuable, meticulously doc-
umented
cultural archive of the rhetoric
and imagery surrounding
'Star
Wars' but also provides an incisive cultural analysis of the symbolic
dynamics of
strategic defense in
American popular
culture. Symbolic
Defense marks an important advance in our understanding of the
meaning and power
of
America
in the nuclear age."
author of Patterns of Power: Religion and
David Chidester,
Politics in
American Culture
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

Urbana and Chicago
ISBN D-ESZ-DltHT-S

Condit, Celeste Michelle. 1990. Decoding Abortion Rhetoric. Communicating Social Change

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Condit, Celeste Michelle. 1990. Decoding Abortion Rhetoric. Communicating Social Change

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Celeste Michelle Condit

Abortion: reproductive control or murder? Guaranteed by a right to choice or

must never be-

the validity of a specific view.

arguments of the opposing sides have

"Professor Condit's book

both sides of the abortion controversy,

velopment of issues and positions

gether with her thoughtful treatment of

this topic. Her rhetorical

reading for anyone con-

Decoding Abortion Rhetoric

CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

1990 by the Board of Trustees of the University

printed on acid-free paper.

Excerpts from Pregnant by Mistake: The Stories

Originally published by Liveright Publishing Corporation. Reprinted

and new introduction, by Remi Books,

rights reserved. Reprinted

bv permission of the author.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Abortion Moral and ethical aspects.

Deirdre Moira Condit,

whose expense I have gained much:

Social Force of Rhetoric

Pro-Life Heritage Tale

Rhetoric and History, 1965-81

Rhetoric and Values, 1965-72

Constructing Visions of the Fetus and Freedom

Mass Compromise and Minority Violence

Rhetoric and Narrative,

Social Force of Rhetoric

Responsibility for Pensacola Clinic

Appendix C: Methodological Issues from

and family. I am, therefore, more than usually

other scholars in the field of rhetorical criticism and com-

munication studies who have provided feedback on portions of this

for her permission to use her interviews in chapter 9

her assistance in making sure I have done so accurately. I am indebted

Quarterly Journal of Speech

70 (November 1984), 410-24; the Journal of Communication Inquiry for

this discourse contributes in

toward the collective craft of women's scholarship as well as to our

practice of abortion has always been politically charged and

work had profound implications for the issue

reproduction, and this

the abortion "choice"

deformed fetuses (disvaluing disabled persons) or females. 4 Feminist

To write a book about abortion rhetoric in the midst of such controversial

Decoding Abortion Rhetoric

" rhetoric, "

term has taken on the connotations of "empty

was molded through the public

between the various

offers detailed analysis of the

it may be of use or interest to

functioning of opposing positions,

sary for scholarly work,

from the problems raised by the investigation