Ongsiako vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court

No. L-69901. July 31, 1987.*
ANTONIO RAMON ONGSIAKO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Simple Negligence; Although the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the
lower courts if it finds that they do not conform to the evidence on record.While
this Court is ordinarily not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse
the factual findings of the lower court if it finds that they do not conform to the
evidence of record. We so find in this case, for reasons to be discussed presently.
Same; Same; Same; Trial court's finding of negligence that the accused had enough
opportunity to avoid the collision because the jeep had still about 150 meters away
from the bus to avoid the collision with the oncoming bus, not correct, as the actual
distance is 150 feet; Case at bar.The trial court held, and the respondent court
affirmed, that "the jeep was still about 150 meters away from the Philippine Rabbit
bus when the accused drove his car toward the road shoulder to avoid the collision
with the oncoming bus. In other words, there was sufficient time for Antonio Ramon
Ongsiako to avail of a feasible time to avert hitting the jeep." The judge should have
been more careful in reaching this conclusion for it is not founded on the facts as
established. The evidence of record is that the distance was not 150 meters but 150
feet, which makes quite a difference, indeed. The correct distance, incidentally, was
established by no less than the trial court itself which, in its examination of Robert
Ha, the principal prosecution witness, elicited from him the said information. x x x
The Court considers this discrepancy important because the finding of negligence
by the trial court is based on whether or not the accused had enough opportunity to
avoid the collision. And that opportunity depended on the distance between the two
vehicles. If the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence and discovered that
the distance was 150 feet and not meters, it is doubtful that he would have
concluded as he did that the accused was negligent. The distance of 150 feet is less
than one-third of 150 meters, which means that the sufficient time imagined by the
trial judge would have been correspondinglyand significantlyreduced by twothirds of the actual period. The time as shortened could not have, if we apply the
trial judge's own calculations, prevented the petitioner from avoiding the collision.
Same; Same; Same; Finding of respondent court that the police sketch of the
collision scene fails to reveal any skidmark of the appellant's car on the highway, is
incorrect, as the sketch was made 5 days after the collision.Another indication of
carelessness, this time on the part of the respondent court, is its observation, in
rejecting the petitioner's version of the collision, that "the police sketch of the
collision scene fails to reveal any skidmarks of the appellant's car," on the highway.
What is rather odd about this finding is that the trial court, and the respondent court
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later, never considered the fact that the sketch was made five days after the
collision, as clearly emphasized by the petitioner in his brief. Apparently, it did not
occur to the courts belowand this is also somewhat puzzlingthat all skidmarks
would have disappeared by that time on the busy highway.
Same; Same; Same; There was disregard of the record by respondent court when it
observed that petitioner has not presented his companion to testify on his behalf,
when in fact he actually testified substantially corroborating petitioner's account of
the collision.There was also apparent disregard of the record when the respondent
court observed that the petitioner had not presented his companion to testify on his
behalf, concluding that "such failure to present Heras raises the presumption that
his testimony, had it been presented, would have been adverse to the appellant's
cause (Orfanel v. People, 30 SCRA 825)." This is another careless conclusion. The
premise is incorrect, and so the conclusion must also be rejected. In fact, the
petitioner did present Heras, and Heras did testify in support of the petitioner,
substantially corroborating the petitioner's account of the collision. A reading of the
transcript of the stenographic notes in the hearing of the case on July 27, 1983, will
readily disclose this.
Same; Same; Same; When petitioner lost control of his vehicle, he could not control
it or move it back to the highway because it was out of control.As the car was
"still out of control," why is it assumed that the petitioner would nonetheless be
able, although this would be "extremely stupid," to move it back to the highway? It
is really mystifying that the respondent court would still expect the petitioner to
control the car which, as it says so itself, was then "out of control." "Assuming the
appellant indeed lost control of his car as he hit the shoulder," the decision adds,
"he should have stopped his vehicle instead of driving it back to the highway and
risking collision with oncoming vehicles." This is hardly logical. The court cannot
assume that the petitioner lost control of his vehicle and on that assumption fault
him for not correctly controlling it. That would be impossible, to say the least. When
one loses control of his car, he cannot direct it the way he wants, or move it in the
direction he chooses, or accelerate or stop it, for the simple reason that it is
precisely out of control. A car out of control is simply out of control, period. As for
the "little pressure" the petitioner says he applied on the brakes, the purpose,
according to him, was to prevent his car from turning turtle as a result of a sudden
stop that would have been caused by his jamming on the brakes.
Same; Same; Same; Acquittal; Misappreciation of the evidence on record by
respondent court and the trial court; Guilt of the accused has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.At any rate, it is the finding of the Court, in view of the
misappreciation of the evidence of record by the respondent court and the trial
court, that the guilt of the petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, he should not have been held guilty of even simple negligence and
instead is entitled to be completely absolved of criminal responsibility.
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Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability; While the quantum of proof for conviction has not
been established, there is preponderance of evidence to hold petitioner liable in
damages from the injuries sustained by the victims; Moral damages, not awarded.
While the quantum of proof necessary for conviction has not been established, there
is, in our view, a preponderance of evidence to hold the petitioner liable in damages
for the injuries sustained by the victims of this accident. Although it is really
doubtful that he was criminally negligent, we find there is enough evidence to
sustain the conclusion that a little more caution and discretion on his part in
reacting to the threat of a head-on collision with the oncoming bus, could have
avoided the unfortunate accident. For this shortcoming, we hold him liable for the
hospitalization expenses and unearned salaries of the victims as itemized by the
trial court and affirmed by the respondent court. We absolve him, however, from the
payment of moral damages and so reduce his total civil liability to P46,131.04.
Ongsiako vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CRUZ, J.:
Prosecuted for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple physical injuries and
damage to property, the petitioner was convicted by the trial court* of only simple
negligence resulting in serious physical injuries and damage to property. He was
sentenced to two months of arresto mayor and to pay a total indemnity of
P143,131.04 for medical expenses, unearned salaries and as moral damages.1 On
appeal, the conviction was affirmed but the respondent court** reduced the moral
damages by P84,000.00, thus lowering the total indemnity to P61,131.04.2 Still not
satisfied, the petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the
judgment below.
This case arose from a collision between the car being driven by the petitioner and
the jeep of Robert Ha on December 30, 1981, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. at
MacArthur Highway, in Moncada, Tarlac. The petitioner had a companion, Leon
Miguel Heras, who was seated beside him. Robert Ha was at the wheel of his
vehicle, which had seven other passengers. It appears that the petitioner was
south-bound, toward Manila, and the jeep was coming from the opposite direction;
that a Philippine Rabbit bus ahead of the jeep swerved into the petitioner's lane to
overtake and bypass a tricycle; and that as a result of this sudden move, the
petitioner, to avoid a head-on collision, immediately veered his car to the shoulder
of the highway. The car went out of control when it hit the soft shoulder, moved
back diagonally across the cemented highway, then collided with Ha's jeep,
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damaging it and causing multiple injuries to its passengers. The Philippine Rabbit
bus sped away.3
After considering the arguments of the parties in the petition itself, the comment
thereon of the public respondent and the reply thereto, we gave due course to this
petition and required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda. The petitioner
complied in due time but the Solicitor General, to avoid repetitiousness, as he put it,
merely adopted his sketchy comment as the memorandum for the respondent.4
While this Court is ordinarily not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that they do not conf orm
to the evidence of record. We so find in this case, for reasons to be discussed
presently.
The trial court held, and the respondent court affirmed, that "the jeep was still
about 150 meters away from the Philippine Rabbit bus when the accused drove his
car toward the road shoulder to avoid the collision with the oncoming bus. In other
words, there was sufficient time for Antonio Ramon Ongsiako to avail of a feasible
time to avert hitting the jeep."5 The judge should have been more careful in
reaching this conclusion for it is not founded on the facts as established. The
evidence of record is that the distance was not 150 meters but 150 feet, which
makes quite a difference, indeed. The correct distance, incidentally, was established
by no less than the trial court itself which, in its examination of Robert Ha, the
principal prosecution witness, elicited from him the said information in the following
exchange:
"COURT:
"Q
How far was the Philippine Rabbit bus ahead of you before the car swerved to your
lane?
"WITNESS
"A:
Approximately about 150 feet ahead of me, Your Honor."6
The Court considers this discrepancy important because the finding of negligence
by the trial court is based on whether or not the accused had enough opportunity to
avoid the collision.
And that opportunity depended on the distance between the two vehicles. If the
trial judge had carefully considered the evidence and discovered that the distance
was 150 feet and not meters, it is doubtful that he would have concluded as he did
that the accused was negligent. The distance of 150 feet is less than one-third of
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150 meters, which means that the sufficient time imagined by the trial judge would
have been correspondinglyand significantlyreduced by two-thirds of the actual
period. The time as shortened could not have, if we apply the trial judge's own
calculations, prevented the petitioner from avoiding the collision.
Another indication of carelessness, this time on the part of the respondent court, is
its observation, in rejecting the petitioner's version of the collision, that "the police
sketch of the collision scene fails to reveal any skidmarks of the appellant's car."7
on the highway. What is rather odd about this finding is that the trial court, and the
respondent court later, never considered the fact that the sketch was made five
days after the collision, as clearly emphasized by the petitioner in his brief.
Apparently, it did not occur to the courts belowand this is also somewhat puzzling
that all skidmarks would have disappeared by that time on the busy highway.
There was also apparent disregard of the record when the respondent court
observed that the petitioner had not presented his companion to testify on his
behalf, concluding that "such failure to present Heras raises the presumption that
his testimony, had it been presented, would have been adverse to the appellant's
cause (Orfanel v. People, 30 SCRA 825)."8 This is another careless conclusion. The
premise is incorrect, and so the conclusion must also be rejected. In fact, the
petitioner did present Heras, and Heras did testify in support of the petitioner,
substantially corroborating the petitioner's account of the collision. A reading of the
transcript of the stenographic notes in the hearing of the case on July 27, 1983, will
readily disclose this.9
The Court is also perplexed by the following portion of the appealed decision:
"If it was true that appellant lost control of his vehicle as early as when his car hit
the shoulder of the road, it was extremely stupid of him to move his car back to the
highway while his car was still out of control. This is especially true in the face of his
own admission that he saw the Rabbit bus for the first time when it was still about
200 meters away overtaking a vehicle (jeep of Robert Ha) which was immediately
behind a tricycle' (p. 2, ibid.). Assuming that appellant indeed lost control of his car
as he hit the shoulder, he should have applied full not a little pressure upon his
brakes. He should have stopped his vehicle instead of driving it back to the highway
and risking collision with oncoming vehicles."10
As the car was "still out of control," why is it assumed that the petitioner would
nonetheless be able, although this would be "extremely stupid," to move it back to
the highway? It is really mystifying that the respondent court would still expect the
petitioner to control the car which, as it says so itself, was then "out of control."
"Assuming the appellant indeed lost control of his car as he hit the shoulder," the
decision adds, "he should have stopped his vehicle instead of driving it back to the
highway and risking collision with oncoming vehicles." This is hardly logical. The
court cannot assume that the petitioner lost control of his vehicle and on that
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assumption fault him for not correctly controlling it. That would be impossible, to
say the least. When one loses control of his car, he cannot direct it the way he
wants, or move it in the direction he chooses, or accelerate or stop it, for the simple
reason that it is precisely out of control. A car out of control is simply out of control,
period. As for the "little pressure" the petitioner says he applied on the brakes, the
purpose, according to him, was to prevent his car from turning. turtle as a result of a
sudden stop that would have been caused by his jamming on the brakes.
The real culprit in this unfortunate incident, as the Court sees it, could be the driver
of the Philippine Rabbit bus whose recklessness was the cause of the collision
between the petitioner's car and Robert Ha's jeep. We notice that the trial court
made the meaningful observation that "the Philippine Rabbit bus may be faulted,"
but added rather helplessly, that "it is not here charged."11 We hope it did not
mean by this that someone else had to be made liable, to vindicate the victims'
rights.
It seems to us that a simple investigation would have uncovered the identity and
whereabouts of the Rabbit bus driver, with a view to his prosecution for his
involvement in the collision. Why this was not done reflects on the sense of duty of
the law-enforcement officers who investigated this matter and on the
resourcefulness of the petitioner and his counsel whose cause could have improved
with the indictment of the said driver.
At any rate, it is the finding of the Court, in view of the misappreciation of the
evidence of record by the respondent court and the trial court, that the guilt of the
petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, he should
not have been held guilty of even simple negligence and instead is entitled to be
completely absolved of criminal responsibility.
The civil liability is, however, a different question.
While the quantum of proof necessary for conviction has not been established, there
is, in our view, a preponderance of evidence to hold the petitioner liable in damages
for the injuries sustained by the victims of this accident. Although it is really
doubtful that he was criminally negligent, we find there is enough evidence to
sustain the conclusion that a little more caution and discretion on his part in
reacting to the threat of a head-on collision with the oncoming bus, could have
avoided the unfortunate accident. For this shortcoming, we hold him liable for the
hospitalization expenses and unearned salaries of the victims as itemized by the
trial court and affirmed by the respondent court. We absolve him, however, from the
payment of moral damages and so reduce his total civil liability to P46,131.04.
We apply here the doctrine announced in the recent case of People v. Ligon,12
where the accused was acquitted of the crime of homicide f or lack of clear and
convincing proof that he had criminally caused a cigarette vendor to fall to his death
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from the jeep where he was hanging onto. Nevertheless, from the totality of the
facts presented, we declared there was a preponderance of evidence to hold the
accused liable in damages for the tragic mishap that befell the victim. We make a
similar finding in this case and hold the petitioner civilly answerable for his quasidelict.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is ACQUITTED and his conviction is REVERSED, but he is
held liable in the total sum of P46,131.04 for damages as above specified. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Petitioner acquitted. Ongsiako vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 627, No.
L-69901 July 31, 1987

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