[G.R. No. 119602.

October 6, 2000]

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in CAG.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant,
versus Philippine President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by
Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the
Orinoco River.[1] He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11,
1988[2] boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.[3]
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon,
was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate
(then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port [4] at
1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988.[5] Captain Colon left the bridge when the
vessel was under way.[6]
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the
San Roque Channel at mile 172.[7] The vessel proceeded on its way, with the
pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the
shallowness of the channel.[8]
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations.
These occurred at 4:12 a.m.[10] It was then that the watch officer called the
master to the bridge.[11]
[9]

The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel [12] and verified that
it was in the centre of the channel. [13] He then went to confirm, or set down, the
position of the vessel on the chart.[14] He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief
Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.[15]
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River,[16] thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto
Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines,
Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon
amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of
litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed
in an Order dated November 7, 1988.[17]
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective pleadings;
"2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine Roxas at the time of
the incident;
"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance underwriter for defendant
PPL;
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the vessel
Malandrinon, whose passage was obstructed by the vessel Philippine Roxas at Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in par. 4, page 2 of the complaint;
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was navigating the channel
at Puerto Ordaz, the said vessel grounded and as a result, obstructed navigation at the
channel;
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage channel;

"7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under the
command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned by the government thereat, but
plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the master;
"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is related to the present
case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a vessel owned by the
defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes approximately 12 hours to
navigate out of the said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after the Philippine
Collier was arrested; and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by the Steamship Mutual
Underwriters Ltd."[18]
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the
petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant Philippine
President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual and
compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses incurred abroad for its
foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of
plaintiff's local lawyer, and to pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."[19]
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest
with the private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out
with its questioned decision dated June 14, 1994,[20] the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious, judgment is

hereby rendered reversing the Decision of the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's
Complaint is dismissed and it is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the amount of
Three Hundred Twenty-three Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos
(P323,042.53) as and for attorney's fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is
DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."[21]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[22] but

the same was denied for lack of

merit in the resolution dated March 29, 1995.[23]

Hence, this petition.

The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
TO THE MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE
GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO
ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION
FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED
BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY
FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS MERITORIOUS HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD
BE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST.

The petition is without merit.

The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is

applicable to the case at bar.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[24]
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder.Where
the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert
witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.[25]
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
(Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a
written foreign law.[26]
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal,[27] it

was

held that:

" Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, since the year
1918 under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Code and stated
that said section was in force at the time the obligations of defendant to the plaintiff
were incurred, i.e. on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence
sufficiently established the fact that the section in question was the law of the State of

California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil
Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact You ask the witness what the law is; he may, from
his recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say what it is.' (Lord
Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice Denman in a well-known
English case where a witness was called upon to prove the Roman laws of marriage
and was permitted to testify, though he referred to a book containing the decrees of the
Council of Trent as controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition, Volume 4, pages
3148-3152.) x x x.
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, [28] to
testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)[29] and the Reglamento Para la Zona de
Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco
River). Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight years.
[30]
As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and
navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come
into the office of the harbour masters.[31]
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in
the Gaceta Oficial[32]of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta
Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of
Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in
a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.[33] Only a
photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be
public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers
of Venezuela.[34]

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following

requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a
certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.[35] The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to
justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a
foreign country.[36]
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence
with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the
documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be
found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the
written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority,
when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be
proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.[37]
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not
pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.[38]
A review of the Complaint[39] revealed that it was never alleged or invoked
despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the

same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.[40]
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the
errors assigned by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private
respondent that would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to
give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance with
the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence
which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own
property. This we have found private respondent to have exercised when the
vessel sailed only after the "main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries"
were checked and found to be in good running condition;[41] when the master
left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is
experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the
inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred
anew.[42]
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master
of a vessel and its pilot, among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these
persons are quoted hereunder:

Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or
fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent
or minimize the damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds
whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on
board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by
reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability
of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against
said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by
competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
xxx
Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots Association. -- The duties
and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx
f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he
assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely;
Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master
neglects or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a
captain of a vessel, to wit:
Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of captain:
xxx
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and leaving
ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot on board discharging his
duties. x x x.

The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the
vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control of the ship
as he can still perform the duties conferred upon him by law [43]despite the
presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not required
of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or
passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
xxx.
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the
engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal,
bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar
Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at Port
Ordaz, Venezuela,[44] and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years. [45] He
also had experience in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.[46]
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the
order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine
Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel, [47] mayhap,
because the latter had assured him that they were navigating normally before
the grounding of the vessel.[48] Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on
account of his experience he was very familiar with the configuration of the
river as well as the course headings, and that he does not even refer to river
charts when navigating the Orinoco River.[49]
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master
chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of the
Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot
Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in a different
class from ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill and a knowledge of
navigation in the particular waters over which their licenses extend superior to that of

the master; pilots are bound to use due diligence and reasonable care and skill. A
pilot's ordinary skill is in proportion to the pilot's responsibilities, and implies a
knowledge and observance of the usual rules of navigation, acquaintance with the
waters piloted in their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all known
obstructions. The character of the skill and knowledge required of a pilot in charge of
a vessel on the rivers of a country is very different from that which enables a
navigator to carry a vessel safely in the ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of the rules
of navigation, with charts that disclose the places of hidden rocks, dangerous shores,
or other dangers of the way, are the main elements of a pilot's knowledge and
skill. But the pilot of a river vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the individual's
personal knowledge of the topography through which the vessel is steered." [50]
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When
the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going on,
and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the channel and
that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of the channel."[51]
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine
Roxas as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of
the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the
portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the
depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all
probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and
liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury done by the
negligence of the crew employed in the ship. The same doctrine will apply to the case
of a pilot employed by the master or owner, by whose negligence any injury happens
to a third person or his property: as, for example, by a collision with another ship,
occasioned by his negligence. And it will make no difference in the case that the pilot,
if any is employed, is required to be a licensed pilot; provided the master is at liberty
to take a pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master acts voluntarily,
although he is necessarily required to select from a particular class. On the other
hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is
bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner
will be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot; for in such a

case the pilot cannot be deemed properly the servant of the master or the owner, but is
forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not apply."
(Underscoring supplied)
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none,[52] the
voyage has been sufficiently planned and monitored as shown by the following actions undertaken by the
pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to wit: contacting the radio marina via VHF for information regarding the
channel, river traffic,[53] soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on the buoys. [54] The officer on
watch also monitored the voyage.[55]

We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the
cause for the grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because
the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on
the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following
conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant
an inference that it would not have happened except for defendant's
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.[56]
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control
over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory
pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to
apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are absent.
As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not.
The Lloyds Register of Shipping confirmed the vessels seaworthiness in a
Confirmation of Class issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the above
named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the class "+100A1 Strengthened
for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be empty (CC) and +LMC" from
31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about 12/2/88." [57] The same would
not have been issued had not the vessel been built according to the standards
set by Lloyd's.

Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified

thus:
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any bearing at all to the
seaworthiness of the vessel?
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class record of the vessel,
wherein recommendations were made on the top side tank, and it was given sufficient
time to be repaired, it means that the vessel is fit to travel even with those defects on the
ship.
"COURT
What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even with defects? Is that
what you mean? Explain.
"WITNESS
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the third party looking
into the condition of the vessel and as far as their record states, the vessel was class or
maintained, and she is fit to travel during that voyage."
xxx
"ATTY. MISA
Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the 'class +100A1
Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?
"WITNESS
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules and she is capable
of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is particularly capable of carrying Ore Cargoes with
No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
xxx
"COURT
The vessel is classed, meaning?
"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy."[58]

It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship

must be reasonably fit to perform the services, and to encounter the ordinary
perils of the voyage, contemplated by the parties to the policy.[59]

As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the

deposition of pilot Vasquez:
"Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not complied with because of
the inability of the vessel to do so?
"A No.
"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?
"A. The vessel was navigating normally.[60]

Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an

accident report wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he checked and
prepared the main engine, machineries and all other auxiliaries and found
them all to be in good running condition and ready for maneuvering. That
same day the main engine, bridge and engine telegraph and steering gear
motor were also tested.[61] Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel for
consumption for maneuvering and checked the engine generators.[62]
Finally, we find the award of attorneys fee justified.
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
xxx
"(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
xxx
Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was
unjustifiably forced to litigate, thus the award of attorneys fees was proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 36821 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.