EN BANC

to Isagani de Leon and the government in the aforementioned amount of

P6,200.00.
June 30, 1987
Contrary to law.

G.R. Nos. L-51065-72

Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the aggrieved private
party, the PNB Check number, the amount involved and the number or John Does, the
seven other informations are verbatim repetitions of the above.

ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:

CORTES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of the
Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly
tried before the Sandiganbayan. The eight informations substantially allege the same set
of circumstances constituting the offense charged, Criminal Case No. 002 reads as
follows:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October 1977 to
February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
employed in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila,
as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and confederating together with two (2)
other John Does whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown, with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate
the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment in the removal and
reconstruction of his house and a part of his land expropriated by the
government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba
Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the accused, Arturo A.
Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or administrative functions and
after said claim was approved and the corresponding PNB Check No. SN
5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00 given only
P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating, applying and converting
to themselves the amount of P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice

Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled
laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent
in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February,
1974 up to December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate
with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose
of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the
proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were
Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la
Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog,
Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons
and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their
lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the process,
Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the
Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove
and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied
without bothering to find out what the documents were all about as they were only
interested in the payment of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective
properties of the claimants were made to appear very much higher than the actual value
claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the
improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the
value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was, in
turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants
containing an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to
Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only
a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out, however, that said

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Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered
in the names of other persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the
Office of the Highway District Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila,
to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and
encashing the checks by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied
them to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to
them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00
was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All
the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his
armed companion.
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints with the
Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in their supporting sworn
statements what they later testified to in court.
Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent jurisdiction duly constituted
in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to
the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and
the offense proved;
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the Sandiganbayan in arriving
at a verdict of conviction of petitioner is correct is a question of law which this Honorable
Court is authorized to pass upon.
I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to allege the essential ingredients or
elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged provides:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of
Section 3(e).
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of granting licenses
or permits or other concessions. Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is not charged
with the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer
contemplated by Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the
view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended
to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government
corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within
the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to
public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be a public officer.
This, the informations did not fail to allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the
payments were allegedly made on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway
District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that
the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the
true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the
Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and
which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no

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participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to
negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the
purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested
of a large proportion of their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than
the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which
they are entitled.

We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 54288,
December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case, the petitioner De Guzman questioned
the authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case on the same ground that
herein petitioner assails its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the
Sandiganbayan saying that:
Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and eight
Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of
the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the
"Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each" while Section
5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a division shall
be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.

Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference was done through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each
Division functions independently of the other. As long as a division has been
duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as
judgments of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to
the complainants and the government must have been caused by the public officer in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the
damage was caused to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his official
administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the
petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants
sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained
falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad
faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when
he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the
allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law
because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but
the crime of robbery. Contrary to the petitioner averment. We find no variance between
the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able
to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through
evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The
manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation they
received was part of' the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the
claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. CruzCalamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of
Section 3(e).

The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First

Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement of
a judgment as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.
III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment.
Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of
the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of
the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares,
102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty
and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
"imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve
more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty
years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for
the eight informations filed against the accused-petitioner. As We pointed out in the case
of People v. Peralta, (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):

II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide
this case. He argues that before the Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial
body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the justices shall have been duly
constituted and appointed.

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... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as
many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for
every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law.
Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the
courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as
harsh, cruel and unusual (See Veniegas v. People, G.R. No. 57601-06 July 20, 1982, 115
SCRA 790, 792).

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of the foregoing
discussion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

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