G.R. No.

L-45179

March 30, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., defendants. BENJAMIN
IRANG, appellant.
Conrado V. Sanchez for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice Melencio for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The accused Benjamin Irang appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime robbery with homicide, the robbery having been committed in the
house of Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Melocotones, and sentencing him
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P500, with the proportionate part of the costs of the trial.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as having
been committed by the court a quo in its decision in question, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant Benjamin Irang had been
sufficiently identified beyond reasonable doubt, and in not giving due
weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense.
2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant Benjamin Irang on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
The following undisputed facts have been established during the trial, to wit:
Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with
white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with
bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana
Vicente, where three lights were burning, one at the balcony, another in the room
and another on a table. Some of said individuals went up and others remained on
guard downstairs. Those who went up approached Perfecto Melocotones
immediately and ordered him to bring his money. Melocotones answered in the
affirmative but before he could do what was ordered him he was attacked with
bolos until he fell to the floor. Later another armed with a gun went up and
approaching Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein the
face with the butt of his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. When
she regained consciousness he saw her husband already dead. One of the assailants

then said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry." Maximiniana Vicente turned
over to the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 in cash and
jewelry valued at P200, which she has kept in a trunk. During the short space of
time that she was turning over the money and jewelry, she looked at the man's face
and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. That same night the
house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had been firing shots
before arriving at and going up the house. All of them had white stripe upon their
faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the
left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who opened her
trunk.
After the malefactors had left Perfecto Melocotones house, the latter's son Toribio
Melocotones, who had seen the assailants arrive but without recognizing them,
immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to the
constabulary, who went to the scene of the crime without loss of time.
Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary
that the person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and taken her money
and jewelry was a man of regular statute, with a lean body and pockmarked face.
With this description, said lieutenant went in search of said individual. Having
arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana Vicente's house so
that the latter might identify among them the one who struck her with the butt of
his gun, but she did not find such man. Later another group was presented to her
and in it she identified the herein accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who
had struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and
jewelry. He was likewise the same man arrested by Lieutenant Alejandre at
midnight on November 9, 1935, in the barrio of Tampac which is five or seven
kilometers from Maturanoc to which he was taken and brought to the house of the
deceased. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks
and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to her house that
same night. Once under arrest, the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang made an
affidavit in Tagalog (Exhibit B), stating that while he was in the barrio of Tampac,
municipality of Guimba. Province of Nueva Ecija, on November 9, 1935 at about 7
o'clock in the evening, Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian arrived; that Fidel
Estrella invited him to go to the house of Ignacio Sebastian's brother-in-law named
Angel Talens because Estrella had something to tell him; that upon arriving at
Angel Talens' house, Fidel Estrella invited him to go to Maturanoc to look for
business; that the appellant asked Fidel Estrella why he wanted to bring him in the
latter told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would slash him with his bolo;
that Fidel Estrella carried a bolo and Ignacio Sebastian an unlicensed firearms; that
they went to the house of Perfecto Melocotones in the barrio of Maturanoc,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and upon arriving there Fidel Estrella, who acted as the

ringleader, assigned to each and every one of them his corresponding place,
designating those who should assault that of Ursula Cabigon; that Benjamin Irang
was in the group formed by Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian, which assaulted
the house of Perfecto Melocotones, having been assigned to stand guard on the
stairs of said house; that Fidel Estrella, once inside the house, slashed Perfecto
Melocotones thrice with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella later told him that they had
succeeded in taking money and the shotgun; and that after the assault they
dispersed, each returning to his own home. This affidavit (Exhibit B) was sworn to
by Benjamin Irang before the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija , in the presence of Graciano Pigol, the constabulary soldier who
accompanied him. Before Irang affixed his thumbmark and took his oath, the
deputy clerk of court asked him if he understood Tagalog and when he answered in
the affirmative said deputy clerk read the contends of the document to him. Asked
whether he had any thing else to add thereto, the appellant answered that he had
nothing more to say.
The defense of the accused-appellant is an alibi to the effect that in the afternoon of
the day of the commission of the crime, he was in his rice field washing a fishing
basket. There he met Roberto Alcantara. Later he went to the house of
Buenaventura Javier to return the fishing basket in question and to exercise on the
rings (jugar a las arogallas) with the latter's son Pedro, and two unmarried sons of
the appellant's uncle, in the presence of several persons, returning home at 8
o'clock that night. When he was arrested the constabulary soldiers opened his box
but found nothing in it. They later took him in a jitney to the victims house in the
barrio of Maturanoc and upon being brought face to face with the widow
Maximiniana Vicente, Lieutenant Alejandre told the widow: "this is the one who
slashed your husband and punctured your face." The widow answered saying: "Is it
that man, sir." As Benjamin Irang answered that he had not left his house, the
lieutenant gave him a blow which made him lose consciousness. Then the
lieutenant said to the widow: "He is the same man. It was he to whom you
delivered the money and jewelry. Look at him well. Identify him well." In the
constabulary barracks in Cabanatuan the soldiers and a sergeant manhandled him
from the night of November 9, 1935, until 4 o'clock in the morning of the 11th of
said month and year, for having denied all knowledge of the crime, making him
lose his breath and punching him in the stomach. When he could no longer bear the
maltreatment, he agreed to tell what they wanted him to tell. Upon being taken for
investigation, the constabulary soldiers told him to agree to all that the clerk of
court might read to him, otherwise they would again manhandle him at the
barracks. He was not present when the affidavit Exhibit B was prepared. Neither
are the contents thereof true. He merely affixed his thumbmark upon said
document for fear of the soldiers.

Lieutenant Alejandre as well as Sergeant Lubrico denied that the accused had been
maltreated in the least.
The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the
accused-appellant Benjamin Irang was identified as one of those who assaulted the
house of Perfecto Melocotones, killed him and robbed his wife Maximiniana
Vicente of money and jewelry.
Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the
face with the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money and
jewelry scrutinized the latter's face and notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on
his left eyelid. When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided
by the description given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person
who might have maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry and
presented a group of persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man
who had maltreated her was not among those who composed that first group. Said
lieutenant later presented another group to her but neither did the widow find in it
the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun. In the third group presented to
her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein
accusedappellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was
he who had struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant became
silent.
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about
one hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same
night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of
them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a
maong-colored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant,
opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the
man of the same description was the open who went to her house and demanded
delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein
accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in
a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it
tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or
when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime (16, C. J., 610,
611, sec. 1196).
Maximiniana Vicente's identification of the herein accused-appellant is likewise
corroborated by the latter's own admission invited to assault the house of Perfecto
Melocotones which they in fact the lower court of the appellant's admission under

oath upon the assumption that it was not made voluntarily, is erroneous, inasmuch
as the only evidence that it was not voluntarily is the accused-appellant's own
testimony that he had been manhandled by the constabulary soldiers and threatened
with further maltreatment if he did not testify as they wished. This imputation of
fortune was categorically denied by Lieutenant Alejandre and Sergeant Lubrico of
the Constabulary, before whom the accused-appellant made the admission and who
caused it to be put in writing. The imputation is likewise contradicted by the
deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija before whom the
accused-appellant swore to his admission and who testified that before he
administered oath to said accused-appellant, he asked him whether he understood
Tagalog and, having been answered in the affirmative, he read said document to
him and asked him whether he had anything to add, the appellant affixing his
thumbmark upon it after answering that he had nothing more to say (U. S. vs. Zara,
42 Phil., 308). There is no doubt that an admission made under oath under such
circumstances cannot be considered involuntary and therefore is admissible against
the person making it.
This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the accused-appellant identity as one of
those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones and robbed Maximiniana
Vicente of her money and jewelry, is established conclusively beyond reasonable
doubt.
The defense of the accused is an alibi and has for its purpose to show that he could
both have been at the scene of the crime between 7 and 8 o'clock at night because
he was in another place about seven kilometers away at that time. This defense of
alibi is contradicted by the above-stated testimony of Juana de la Cruz and by the
accused-appellant's own admission under oath Exhibit B.
The facts established at the trial as committed by the accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide defined in
article 293, in connection with article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
and punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Taking into consideration all the
circumstances of the case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial
judge is in accordance with the evidence and with law. It is not so, however, with
the pecuniary liability because, taking into account the gravity of the offense, the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be P1,000 and that for the stolen
goods not restored P390.
Wherefore, with the sole modification that the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang is
sentenced further to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and
to restore to Maximiniana Vicente the sum of P70 and the stolen jewelry and gun,

or to reimburse the value thereof in the amount of P390, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this instance to the
appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions LAUREL,

J., dissenting:
I dissent.
The evidence presented by the prosecution consists in the main of (a) Exhibit B,
which is alleged confession of the appellant herein, (b) the testimony of Toribio
Melocotones, son of the deceased, (c) the testimony of Juana de la Cruz, (d) that
the Lieut. Roman Alejandre of the Philippine Army, and (e) that of Maximiniana
Vicente, widow of the deceased.
In his affidavit, marked Exhibit B, the appellant admitted his participation in the
commission of the crime charged. This written confession was not given any value
by the trial judge. According to the appellant, it was obtained from him by an
unknown soldier, through force and violence, under circumstances which makes it
involuntary and, therefore, inadmissible as proof of guilt (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil.,
308; People vs. Buda Singh, 45 Phil., 676; People vs. Takeo Tabuche, 46 Phil., 28;
People vs. Guendo Nishishima, 57 Phil., 26; People vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 418).
Toribio Melocotones testified that he saw the band of seven robbers on their way to
his father's house; that at that time he did not know who they were but the he now
knows five of them to be the accused Fidel Estrella, Jacinto Sebastian, Ignacio
Sebastian, Juan Levaste (alias Juan de Caste), and the appellant herein, Benjamin
Irang; that he saw the seven men enter the yard of his father's house, where he had
planted himself; that the seven men entered the house, one at a time, the smallest in
the group, Fidel Estrella, first followed by a bigger man, the appellant Benjamin
Irang, then by Juan Levaste (alias Juan de Caste), by Jacinto Sebastian, by Ignacio
Sebastian, and finally, by the two members of the band who were unknown to him
that as soon as they all had entered he followed them but saw one of them standing
guard and firing several shots, as a result of which he heard his brothers and sisters
shouting; that it was on that occasion when he came nearer the house but was seen

by the guard who pointed a gun at him and ran away. The trial judge brushed aside
the testimony of this witness as unworthy of credence and belief. He said:
. . . En primer lugar, cada uno de estos acusados fueron sucesivamente llevos
a su casa y presentados alli para ser reconocidos en dias y noches sucesivos.
Sin embargo, dicho testigo no indico a ninguno de ellos que fuera el que en
la noche de autos asalto a su casa. Este testigo., no obstante, no fue llamado
como tal en la investigacion prelominarde esta causa en el Juzgado de Paz
para indicar, de conformidad con los detalles que he dado, que los acusados
eran asaltaron su acsa. Es verdad que esta falta de explicacion no es
suficienta para desacreditar su testimonio. Este acusado es uno de los
probatorio de su testimonio. Este acusado es uno de los mas altos se entre to
dos los acusados, por consiguente, no puede decirse que era el mas pequeno.
Aun admitiendo que el testimonio del testigo al hablar de que el primero que
entro era el mas pequeno se referia si volumen del individio. Fidel Estrella
tampoco puede considerarse como el mas flaco de entre los acusados. Es de
cuerpo regular y se confunde casi como cualquiera de los otros acusados en
su volumen, a excepcion del acusado Emilio de Guzman, que es el mas
grueso de entre los mismos. Su testimonio, pues en opinion del Juzgado, no
puede servir ni siquiera como un indicio de que los acusados eran los
ladrones que ni siquiera como un indicio de que los acusados eran los
ladrones que asaltaron su casa en la noche de autos. (underlining is mine.)
Juana de la Cruz testified that her house had also been assaulted by tulisanes on the
same night and that she had recognized the appellant as one of them. The
testimony of this witness refers to an event wholly distinct and separate from the
criminal act imputed to the appellant in the case at bar, during the commission of
which she stated she was at her house about five meters away.
The testimony of Lieut. Alejandre refers to the investigation conducted by him and
to posterior occurrences, of scarcely any importance in proving the identity and
guilt of the appellant. Lieut. Alejandre arrested the appellant on the strength of the
description furnished him by the widow of the deceased. How good the description
is may be judged from the fact that prior to the appellant's arrest, Lieut. Alejandre
had arrested three other persons, later to release them as "wrong parties!".
The only remaining basis for the conviction of the appellant by the lower court is
the testimony of the widow, Maximiniana Vicente. In the opinion of the trial court,
this witness has sufficiently identified the appellant herein. Lieut. Alejandre
testified that when this witness, Maximiniana Vicente, confronted the defendant
she recognized him as one of the assaillants. This the appellant denied, stating that

the widow identified him "in obedience to Lieut. Alejandre's order." On

crossexamination, the witness stated that she was able to identify the appellant
"porque el Teniente Alejandre le habia indicado que era uno de los que tomaron
parte en el asalto de su casa." When called again to the witness stand she retracted
this statement. I am reluctant to join trial judge in attributing this contradiction on
her part merely to her ignorance.
Two important detail in this case deserve more than passing mention. It appears
that soon after the band of robbers had deported, Lieut. Alejandre arrived at the
scene of the crime and conducted an investigation. The widow, on that occasion
referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks. About one month later, she
testified that she recognized him besides by a scar on his left eyelid. A scar
identifies a man more effectively than mere pockmarks, these common. But I do
not know why it took the witness one month to discover this important descriptive
detail. The widow also testified that she recognized the appellant, Irang, because of
the light because it was he who hit her with the butt of his gun and because it was
to him that she delivered money and jewelry. It should be observed, however, that
the assaillants were disguised when they committed the crime. This makes
identification difficult, if not impossible, and probably accounts for the fact that the
widow made no reference to the appellant's scar in the beginning.
It is true that the finding of fact made by trial judge are entitled to great weight and
credit and should not be overturned unless grave considerations warrant the taking
of such a course. But I am not convinced that appellant has been satisfactorily
identified in the case at bar (U. S. vs. Asio, 1 Phil., 304).
The defense interposed by the appellant is an alibi. While alibis are easily
concocted and ,for this reason, are received by court with great caution, I express
the opinion that conviction should be predicated on the sufficiency of the evidence
for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. I am,
therefore, of the opinion that the appellant is entitled, like his six co-accused in the
court below, to an acquittal.
Concepcion, J., concurs.