A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No.

13-4144-RTJ], February 02, 2016

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick
O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City.
This administrative case traces its roots to the Informations for violation of Section 3(e) 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and
malversation of public funds2 filed by the People of the Philippines against the respondent judge before the Sandiganbayan. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68.
The Informations essentially alleged that the respondent, then the City Mayor of Dapitan City, had conspired with Police Inspector
(P/Insp.) Pepe Nortal to facilitate the latters withdrawal of P1 million from the Confidential and Intelligence Fund ( CIF) and, thereafter,
used this amount for his (the respondents) personal benefit.
In its decision3 dated April 29, 2013, the Sandiganbayans First Division found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged.
The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution successfully proved that the respondent instigated Nortals withdrawal of a P1 million
cash advance from the CIF allotted for the Mayors Office, and that he (the respondent) received and used this amount for his personal
benefit. The court found that the respondent directed Nortals request for the cash advance because he (the respondent) already had four
(4) unliquidated cash advances as of December 31, 2006, and that three of these cash advances (with a total of PI,3 84,280.00) already
came from the CIF. The testimonies of the city treasurer, the city accountant, and the city budget officer supported the conclusion that the
respondent actively worked for the approval of the P1 million cash advance.
The Sandiganbayan also found that the respondent acted in bad faith since the cash advance was made five (5) days after he had lost his
bid for re-election, and that the proposed withdrawal covered the CIF appropriations for the entire year. The court likewise found no merit
in the respondents defense of denial.
The Sandiganbayan accordingly imposed the following penalties on the respondent: (a) the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) month, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. 27467 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; ( b)
the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. 27468 for malversation; and (c) perpetual special
disqualification. The court also ordered him to pay a P950,000.00 fine; and P950,000.00 as indemnity to the City of Dapitan.
The respondent moved for the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction and likewise moved for a new trial, but the Sandiganbayan
denied these motions in its resolution4 of August 28, 2013.
The OCA received a copy of the Sandiganbayans April 29, 2013 decision in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468, and in its Report 5 of
October 4, 2013, made the following recommendations:
x x x Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this Honorable Court are the following recommendations:
That the instant report be considered a formal complaint against Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge, Branch 61, Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and that the same be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter;
That Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz be FURNISHED a copy of this report and that he be required to comment thereon within ten (10)
days from notice; and
That Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz be SUSPENDED without pay and other monetary benefits effective immediately from his receipt of
this Courts resolution, pending resolution of the instant administrative matter, or until lifted by this Honorable Court. 6
x x x x (emphasis in the original)
The OCA reasoned out that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is classified as a serious charge under Section 8(b) of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court. It likewise explained that the Courts power to preventively suspend judges, although not clearly delineated
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel, and that a
judge can be preventively suspended until a final decision is reached in an administrative case against him,.
The records also showed that on October 18, 2013, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing his
convictions by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468. This case was docketed as G.R. Nos. 209073-74.7
In its November 20, 2013 minute resolution, 8 the Courts Third Division resolved: (1) to re-docket the OCA report dated October 4, 2013,
as a regular administrative matter, and to consider it as a formal complaint against the respondent for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (2) to furnish the respondent a copy of the OCAs Report, and to require him to file a comment; and (3) to
suspend the respondent from office without pay and other monetary benefits, effective immediately from his receipt of this Courts
Resolution, pending resolution of the instant administrative matter, or until lifted by this Court.
In his comment dated January. 24, 2014, the respondent posited that the administrative complaint against him is premature because his
Sandiganbayan convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468 are not yet final. The respondent also stated that he went on leave of
absence after his Sandiganbayan conviction, and had submitted his application for optional retirement on May 27, 2013 (to take effect on
December 31, 2013). The respondent thus argued that there was no more need to suspend him from office because he should be
considered already retired from government service when he received on January 9, 2014, a copy of the Courts November 20, 2013
Resolution.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to dismiss the respondent from the service he has dishonored and to bar him from the ranks of legal professionals whose
standards he has likewise transgressed.
I. The Courts disciplinary powers over justices and judges
We find no merit in the respondents claim that the present administrative case against him is premature because his criminal convictions
by the Sandiganbayan are not yet final.
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel.
This grant empowers the Supreme Court to oversee the judges and court personnels administrative compliance with all laws, rules, and
regulations,9 and to take administrative actions against them if they violate these legal norms. 10
In the exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated rules of procedure in the discipline of judges. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an
anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and
concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
 Based on this rule, disciplinary proceedings against sitting judges and justices may be instituted: ( a) motu proprio, by the Court itself ;
(b) upon verified complaint, supported by the affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of the facts alleged, or by documents
substantiating the allegations; or (c) upon anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.11
It was pursuant to this power that the Court on its own initiative ordered the re-docketing of the OCAs report as a formal complaint
against the respondent and as a regular administrative matter for the Courts consideration.
The Court likewise possesses the power to preventively suspend an administratively charged judge until a final decision is reached,
particularly when a serious charge is involved and a strong likelihood of guilt exists. This power is inherent in the Courts power of
administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel as a measure to allow unhampered formal investigation. It is likewise a
preventive measure to shield the public from any further damage that the continued exercise by the judge of the functions of his office
may cause.
In the present case, we placed the respondent under preventive suspension because he is alleged to have committed transgressions that are
classified as serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
1 Bribery, direct or indirect;
2 Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3 Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4 Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding;
5 Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6 Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7 Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8 Immorality;
9 Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10 Partisan political activities; and
11 Alcoholism and/or vicious habits, (emphasis supplied)
The respondents convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds
confirm that the administrative charges for which he may be found liable are serious charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. Malversation is likewise considered as a serious charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.
While the term moral turpitude does not have one specific definition that lends itself to easy and ready application, 12 it has been defined as
an act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the performance of private and social duties that man owes to his fellow man or to society
in general.13
Notably, jurisprudence has categorized the following acts as crimes involving moral turpitude: abduction with consent, bigamy,
concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker,
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, intriguing against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public records, fabrication of
evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, and
estafa thru falsification of public document.
To our mind, malversation considering its nature should not be categorized any differently from the above listed crimes. The act of
embezzling public funds or property is immoral in itself; it is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted standards of justice, honesty, and
good morals.14
The preventive suspension we impose pending investigation is not a penalty but serves only as a preventive measure as we explained
above. Because it is not a penalty, its imposition does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent. It also matters not that
the offenses for which the respondent had been convicted were committed in 2001 when he was still the Mayor of Dapitan City. 15 As
explained below, it is likewise immaterial that his criminal convictions by the Sandiganbayan are still on appeal with this Court.
Optional early retirement
The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a letter on May 27, 2013 (or soon after his Sandiganbayan convictions), requesting
that he be allowed to optionally retire effective November 30, 2013. 16 He later requested, in another letter,17 that the effectivity date of
his optional retirement be changed from November 30, 2013 to December 31, 2013.
The Court has not acted on the respondents request for optional early retirement in view of his standing criminal convictions; he stands to
suffer accessory penalties affecting his qualification to retire from office should his convictions stand. 18 The OCA records19 also show that
he is currently on on leave of absence status. In any case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does
not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the service. As we held in Gallos v.
Cordero:20
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had
ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent
of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications x x x If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which
he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.
Nor does separation from office render a pending administrative charge moot and academic. 21
II. Administrative Liability
In the present case, our task is not to determine the correctness of the Sandiganbayans ruling in Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68, a case that
is separately pending before us and which we shall consider under the evidentiary rules and procedures of our criminal laws.
In the present proceedings, our function is limited to the determination of whether substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent
administratively liable for acts he is alleged to have committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City.
In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts
imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this
situation, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices
and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent
continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s against the respondent
through proof that the respondent committed the imputed act/s violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court.22
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sardido,23 the Court definitively ruled that:
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense. Whether
the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is of no moment.
Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney or judge is
distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of an
administrative case arising from the same set of facts, x x x (emphases supplied)
We reiterate that only substantial evidence is required to support our conclusions in administrative proceedings. 24 Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard of substantial is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 25 That the respondent committed acts constituting malversation or violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act should be adjudged in the same manner that other acts classified as serious charges under Rule 140
(such as bribery, immorality, gross misconduct, dishonesty, and partisan political activities) should be weighed through substantial
evidence.26 Expressed from the point of view of criminal law, evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary in an
administrative proceeding like the present case.
The Sandiganbayan, in considering the respondents guilt in the criminal case before it, gave full probative value to the testimonies of
Fatima Ruda (OlC-City Budget Officer), Jose R. Torres (OlC-City Treasurer), Glendora Deloria (City Accountant), and Pepe Nortal
(Police Inspector of the Dapitan City Police). These conclusions and approach do not mean that we shall not examine, on our own in the
present proceedings, the evidence on record before us.
For purposes of the original administrative proceeding before us and to fully accord the respondent the due process owed him in these
proceedings, we shall examine all the evidence adduced and apply to these pieces of evidence the substantial evidence rule that the
present proceedings require. This approach is only proper, as the present proceeding is not an appeal from the Sandiganbayan ruling but is
an original one for purposes of establishing or negating the claimed administrative liability on the part of the respondent.
What do the evidence on record show?
Torres testified that when his office received a Request for Obligation Allotment ( ROA)27 and a Disbursement Voucher (DV)28 on May 16,
2001, for a P1 million cash advance payable to Nortal, he immediately sent a letter to the respondent (through the City Budget Officer)
informing him that he could not accommodate the request because the CIF appropriation covered the whole of 2001, and that Nortal was
not properly bonded.
On the same day, Torres letter was returned with the respondents handwritten notation asking him to reconsider his position. Torres
eventually signed the ROA after the respondent prevailed upon him to reconsider, 29 although he still noted his objection to the payment of
the claim when he received the disbursement voucher from the accounting office, on the belief that the disbursement should only cover
two quarters, not the whole year.
In his affidavit, Torres stated that the CIF could not be released without the respondents approval because this fund was an appropriation
under the Office of the City Mayor.
Ruda declared on the witness stand that right after the May 11, 2001 elections, the respondent directed her to release the whole
appropriation (totalling P1 million) for the CIF. Ruda hesitated to do as told considering that the respondents term would end on June 30,
2001, while the amount to be released corresponded to the appropriation for the entire 2001. Ruda gave in to the respondents request after
the latter stressed to her that he (respondent) was still the mayor until the end of June 2001.
In her affidavit, Ruda stated that it was not customary for her office to release, in the middle of the year, the whole intelligence fund
appropriation for the year.
Deloria testified that when she received a ROA and a DV for a P1 million CIF cash advance, she informed the respondent that the amount
requested covered the appropriations for the entire 2001. The respondent informed her that the city government needed the money badly.
Ruda reviewed the request and found out that the payee, Nortal, had not yet posted a fidelity bond. The respondent told Ruda that he had
already applied for Nortals bond.
In her affidavit, Deloria stated that it was the first time that her office processed a request for funds intended for the entire year.
Nortal, for his part, narrated that the respondent asked him on May 16, 2001, to withdraw P1 million from the CIF on his (respondents)
behalf. Nortal initially refused since he might not be able to liquidate this amount as the respondent had lost in the elections. Instead,
Nortal suggested that the Chief of Police be asked to make the withdrawal. The respondent, however, assured Nortal that one of his men
would help him liquidate the requested amount. Nortal thus yielded to the respondents request and proceeded to the City Budget Office to
sign the covering ROA and DV.
Nortal added that the respondents private secretary picked him up at his house on May 30, 2001, informing him that the check of P1
million was already at the Treasurers Office. After securing the check, they proceeded to the Philippine National Bank ( PNB) in Dipolog
City to encash it. Thereafter, they went to the respondents office where Nortal handed him the P1 million. Nortal asked the respondent for
a receipt, but the latter refused to issue one; instead, the respondent gave him P50,000.00 to be used in the citys drug operations.
In his affidavit, Nortal stated that the respondent told him that he (respondent) could no longer make any cash advances since he had
unliquidated cash advances.
Leonilo Morales, State Auditor of the City Auditors Office from 1997 to 2000, corroborated NortaPs affidavit when he testified that the
respondent had not liquidated his cash advances from the CIF.

Aside from the testimonies of these witnesses and their respective affidavits, the records before the Sandiganbayan are replete with
documentary proof showing that the respondent committed the acts attributed to him. The respondent failed to refute these pieces of
evidence before the Sandiganbayan or in the comment he filed with this Court.
The respondents signature on the following documents showed that he facilitated Nortals withdrawal of P1 million from the CIF: (a)
Disbursement Voucher No. 105.0105.3888; (b) Request for Obligation Allotment; and (c) PNB Check No. 0001097358.
The respondents signature, as approving officer, on Disbursement Voucher No. 105.0105.3888, proved that he authorized the
disbursement of a P1 million cash advance to defray Confidential and Intelligence Expenses. 30 The respondents signature on the ROA
also showed that he (and Nortal) requested P1 million to be used for confidential expenses. Finally, the respondents signature on the PNB
check established that he allowed Nortal to withdraw the requested amount.
Considering that the CIF was an appropriation under the Mayors Office, it is unlikely that Nortal would attempt to withdraw the P1
million CIF cash advance without the respondents imprimatur. In other words, Nortal even if he wanted to could not have
withdrawn any amount from the CIF without the approval and authority of the respondent City Mayor.
That the respondent authorized the withdrawal of the entire CIF for the year 2001 after he lost in his reelection bid (and less than two
months before the expiration of his term) is indicative of his bad faith. We note that several of the citys financial officers, no less, made
known to him their objections to the request due to its patent irregularity.
Indeed, if the request for cash advance request had been legitimate, there would have been no need for Nortals intervention in effecting a
withdrawal as the respondent was the City Mayor and the CIF was a fund under his office. This reality validates Nortals claim that the
respondent could no longer withdraw from the CIF because he already had existing unliquidated advances.
Significantly, the records show that the withdrawn amount was never liquidated as shown by the Commission on Audits schedule of
unliquidated cash advances as of January 31, 2013. No evidence also exists showing that the withdrawn fund had been used for its
intended purposes, i.e., for confidential or intelligence activities.
Viewed against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which are supported by the documents on record, the respondents
denial cannot stand. The respondent even failed to substantiate his claim that the charges against him had been politically motivated.
Thus, bysubstantial evidence, we consider it fully established that the respondent actively worked for the approval of the P1 million cash
advance from the CIF; that he facilitated the withdrawal of the P1 million by Nortal; and that he received and used this withdrawn amount
for his personal benefit.

III. The Appropriate Penalty

Section 11 of Rule 140, as amended, states that [i]f the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed: (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.

Considering the nature and extent of the respondents transgressions, we find the imposition of the supreme administrative penalty of
dismissal to be appropriate. The peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the competence and diligence of the
members of the bench, but also on their integrity and moral uprightness. 31 We would violate this standard and unduly tarnish the image of
the Judiciary if we allow the respondents continued presence in the bench. We would likewise insult the legal profession if we allow him
to remain within the ranks of legal professionals.

We emphasize that judges should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and their conduct should be above
reproach. They must adhere to exacting standards of morality, decency, and probity. A magistrate is judged, not only by his official acts,
but also by his private morality and actions. Our people can only look up to him as an upright man worthy of judging his fellow
citizens acts if he is both qualified and proficient in law, and equipped with the morality that qualifies him for that higher plane that
standing as a judge entails.

In Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,32 we ruled that:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judges official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. (emphasis ours)

The conduct of judges, official or otherwise, must always be beyond reproach and must be free from any suspicion tainting him, his
exalted office, and the Judiciary. A conduct, act,- or-omission repugnant to the standards of public accountability and which tends to
diminish the peoples faith and confidence in the Judiciary, must invariably be handled with the required resolve through the imposition of
the appropriate sanctions imposed by law33 and by the standards and penalties applicable to the legal profession.

Administrative Matter No. 02-9-02-SC (which took effect on October 1, 2002) provides that an administrative case against a judge of a
regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as
disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar. It also states that judgment in both respects may be incorporated
in one decision or resolution.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of
law, among others, for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Bengco v. Bernardo,34 we ruled that it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the
two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and to save courts of justice from persons unfit to practice law. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of
all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies including government-owned and -controlled corporations. As a consequence of this ruling, Judge Ruiz is
likewise declared DISBARRED and STRICKEN FROM the roll of attorneys.