FERNANDEZ V.

LEDESMA 1963

Facts:

Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan, he

took his oath of office on the same date, and his appointment was confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments. 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia, in an
administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been
found guilty of gross negligence, violation of law, and dereliction of duty.

Fernandez was later charged before the RTC of Basilan City with two
offenses, one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer and another
for oral defamation for which he was suspended from office by the then
Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. He asked that his order of suspension
be lifted but it was denied. He was then acquitted in the two criminal cases
abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no
formal administrative charges were instituted against him, or any
administrative investigation conducted of said charges.

On1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo wrote Fernandez

informing him that the President has terminated his services as chief of
police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio Ledesma in his place
requesting him at the same time to turn over his office to Ledesma.
Thereafter, Fernandez instituted an action for quo warranto with mandamus
against Ledesma before RTC seeking his reinstatement on the ground that
his removal from office without cause as provided by law was in violation of
our Constitution.

Issue:

WON the removal of Fernandez is valid?

Held:

Yes. The court agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law says
that the President may remove at his discretion any of the appointive officers
of the city with the exception of the municipal judge who may be removed
only according to law, it is evident that the legislative intent is to make the
continuance in office of any of said appointive officers dependent upon the
pleasure of the President.

Nowhere in Republic Act No. 288 is there any mention that the term of office
of the chief of police, and for that matter of any appointive officer, with the
exception of the municipal judge, should be for a fixed period. The fact that
no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of an
intention to make it dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of
the appointing power.

The contention of petitioner that appointing Cecilio Ledesma to the position

of chief of police of Basilan City in his place is tantamount to his removal
without cause from office in violation of Section 4, Article XII, of our
Constitution, cannot be sustained considering that the position of the chief of
police does not have a fixed term. As already said, it was made dependent
upon the discretion or pleasure of the President, whereas the cases invoked
by appellant relate to positions for which the law fixes a definite term of
office.

HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS 1965

Facts:

Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director
for Security of the Bureau of Customs. He was sent to the United States to
study enforcement techniques and customs practices, and when Villegas
returned to the Philippines, he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre
Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was designated
Acting Director for Security.

Then, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the

President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent,
stating in his letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change
of designation and status from Director for Security which is confidential in
nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a classified position." A few days later, the
appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director for Security was
likewise proposed.

The President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and

Keefe. Thereafter, 1958, villegas served notice on Customs Commissioner
Eleuterio Capapas that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office
as Director for Security. He also wrote the Auditor General, Secretary
Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget Commissioner, and the
Civil Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the promotional
appointment of Keefe to the post of Director for Security.

When all else failed, Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in RTC of
Manila. The court gave judgment for Villegas with right to collect backpay as
Director for Security from January 1, 1958. Its decision was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

(1) Whether the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of Customs, is a
primarily confidential position;

(2) whether the Director for Security can be transferred to another position
without cause

Held:

Court of Appeals relied mainly on Section 671 of the Revised Administrative

Code

The following officers and employees constitute the unclassified

service:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Positions which may be declared by the President of the

Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service, as policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical.

in reaching the following conclusion:

... the only authority who, by constitutional and, legal provisions, is

competent to classify a position into primary confidential is the
President. The heads of departments and the Commissioner of Civil Service
can only recommend or make comments
The evidence show that there is no indication that position of Director for
Security has ever been classified into primarily confidential according to the
procedure laid down by the law and the Constitution. It results that the
removal of the plaintiff from the said position without justifiable
cause and his transfer to the position of arrastre superintendent are
illegal ... . Consequently the appointment of defendant Keefe to the position
of Director for Security, the effect of which is to exclude and remove the
plaintiff from the said position, is also illegal.

For our purpose, we do not need to consider the position involved in this
case is primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is
nevertheless subject to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause." Villanuevas' removal, is, therefore, concededly without cause.

ABAS KIDA V. SENATE

Facts:

This is a consolidated case. The petitioner/s in G.R. No. 196271 (abas de

kida) raise the following grounds in support of their motion: (I). THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS
ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE
ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS; (II). R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE
ORGANIC ACT; (III). THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT
(R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE LAWS; (IV) SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF
R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
CONSTITUTION; (V.) BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.]

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
"The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later
than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of
ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333
was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country. With the enactment into
law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from
different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and
R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert
that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement
of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as
the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

Issue:
 1. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections
2. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution

Held:

Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A.

10153 in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections,
the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three
years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve
synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based
on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections
(fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the
terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized
to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that

the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with
the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on
the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the
ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X
of the Constitution entitled "Local Government. "Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article
wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore,
cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform
its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave
abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling
force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization
operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the
term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-
the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to
adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence
to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these
limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-
2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover
violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms of
local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing
no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself
and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus,
the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA
No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office ."This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore
emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to
synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.