Lect. 2 Natural and Positive Law
Lect. 2 Natural and Positive Law
Lect. 2 Natural and Positive Law
The philosophical discussion of the role and function of the law in society,
many distinguished legal philosophers have engaged in this question.
However, one stock answer cannot be identified. It depends partly on the
view taken of the nature of law.
Legal theorist can thus be divided into two schools of thought, those
who adhere to positivism and others who subscribe to the natural law theory.
The positivists, like Hart and Austin, merely attempts to define what law is,
not what it should be, or its content.
The natural law theorists on the other hand, believe that rules or
principles can only be legitimately be called law if they conform to an
acceptable code of moral behaviour. The proponents of the natural law
school of thought include St. Thomas Aquinas1 and Fuller.2
Application of Positivism
Law might simply be considered as a set of rules within the society. However,
this description does not tell us as much about the authoritative and coercive
nature of a legal rule. John Austin responds by saying that the law is different
from other rules because it is a command from the legitimate sovereign. 3
1
Aquinas, T (St), Summa Theologica, 1942, London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.
2
Fuller, R, The Morality of the Law, 1969, London: Yale UP.
3
Austin, J, The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined, 1954, London: Weidenfield and
Nicolson
1
This command is backed by sanctions. For the purpose of this theory, we
must be able to identify sovereign.
A similar question was could have been posed in the case of Phillips
and Others v DPP,5 when, after another coup, this time in Trinidad and
Tobago, rebels sized power. In this case, the court was concerned with the
validity of a pardon given to the rebels.
As Hart points out, the command theory, while authoritative, makes the
erroneous assumption that all legal rules makes commands or imposes
sanctions. There are many laws which merely confer rights and are not
backed by sanctions.
Hart identifies two main sets of rules, primary and secondary rules.
Primary rules are those that society needs in order to survive. They forbid
the conducts most destructive to society, such as murder. Even simple
society contains these rules. Secondary rules are those which confer power
rather than duties. They are divided into three types: rules of adjudication,
rules of change and rules of recognition.
4
[1985] LRC (Const) 127; (1985) 32 WIR 241, PC.
5
[1992] 1 AC 545
2
The first rules of adjudication are designed to allow the society to settle
disputes such as legal offences and the sentences. Rules of change are those
which promote other new rules. Rules of recognition are those which
demonstrate the acceptance of the law by the society. They thus spell out
which rules in the society have legal force. For example, Hart says, the UK
has a single rule of recognition: what the queen enacts is law. In like vein,
our rule of recognition in the commonwealth Caribbean is the constitution.
Dworkin6 rejects Harts theory, on rules on the basis that laws contains
not just rules, but a set of principles upon which these rules are based. These
principles are the guidelines which inform the law but do not propose a
solution. One such principle is that no one should benefit from their own
wrong. These principles have a certain dimension of weight or importance
that rules lack. This enables judges to weight conflicting principles.
Those that argue in the affirmative believe that there should be some
kind of higher law, to which we must turn for basic moral code. There are
divergent views of the moral code however. Some, like Aquinas, argue that it
comes from God. Other see it merely as a question of basic ethics of the
society based on reason. The moralists believe that the law should not only
be moral in itself but should contain rules which prohibit, immoral
behaviour. The law cannot divorce itself from moral values.
6
Dworkin, K, Taking rights seriously, 1977, London: Duckworth.
3
The belief that the law should reflect morality has spurned some
interesting cases. In Shaw v DPP,7 for example, the House of Lords upheld a
conviction of the offences of a conspiracy to corrupt publics morals when the
defendant published a pornographic book. The court found that a
fundamental purpose of the law was to conserve not only the safety and
order but also the moral welfare of the state. 8 Similarly, in R v Gibson, a
conviction was obtained for the common law offence of outraging public
decency when the defendant artist exhibited earrings made from freeze-
dried foetuses.
Even if we can identify if we can identify the law, still the question
remains when should we obey the law? Is it as Austin thought, because of
the sanctions behind it, or as Hart believed, because we accept it? Perhaps it
is obeyed because it is the most convenient and fair way of organizing any
society? We may also obey the law because we believe it is the right or
morally correct.
7
[1991]1 ALL ER 439, CA.
8
See Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435, which was a conviction for publishing advertisement for
contacting others for homosexuals purposes.
4
Is there an obligation to obey rules emanating from the state which are
immoral? There are several examples of these: the Nazi laws of Germany,
the apartheid laws of South Africa; these were all legitimized by the relevant
parliaments. But did these laws have moral authority? The people who
obeyed these laws may have simply believed they were just obeying the law.
Yet they can be brought before international courts, for example, on claims
that they have committed crimes against humanity, or genocide, or as in
South Africa, new national courts, for legal violation which are based on a
higher moral order. Rules must conform to acceptable moral standards
before we can consider them to be law.