SECOND DIVISION

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the

VINSON B. PINEDA, G.R. No. 155224 same trial court[7] a motion
Petitioner, for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.[8]
Present:
On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered
PUNO, J., Chairperson, petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty.
- v e r s u s - CORONA, Mariano.
AZCUNA and
G On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de
ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to
ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO, Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was
Respondents. Promulgated: denied. Hence, this recourse.

August 23, 2006 The issues raised in this petition are:

x----------------------------------------- (1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151

---------x had jurisdiction over the claim for
additional legal fees and
DECISION
(2) whether respondents were entitled
CORONA, J.: to additional legal fees.
The subject of this petition for review is the First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his
April 30, 2002 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of
CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order [2] of the main action in which his services were rendered
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch or in an independent suit against his client. The
151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.[9]
Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case
The facts follow. for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had
jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what
Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. respondents were demanding was additional payment
Petitioner was represented by respondents for legal services rendered in the same case.
Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and
Emmanuel Mariano. Second, the professional engagement
between petitioner and respondents was governed by
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a the principle of quantum meruit which means as much
settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights as the lawyer deserves.[10] The recovery of attorneys
over their minor child and the separation of their fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where
properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner there is no express agreement for the payment of
and both parties subsequently filed a motion for attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism
approval of their agreement. This was approved by which prevents an unscrupulous client from running
the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel
between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust
null and void. enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels
were well-compensated.[3] They, including their Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of
relatives and friends, even availed of free products Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic. controversies with clients concerning their
This notwithstanding, they billed compensation and to resort to judicial action only to
petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect
million[4] which the latter, however, refused to fees should be avoided and should be filed only when
pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.[11]
totaling P1.12 million[5] as full payment for settlement.
[6]
In the case at bar, respondents motion for
payment of their lawyers fees was not meant to collect
what was justly due them; the fact was, they had services to be rendered by respondent. The provision
already been adequately paid. for payment of the legal services reads:
Demanding P50 million on top of the
generous sums and perks already given to them was 1. (a)seven and one-half (7 %) of all cash
an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to recoveries, including damages, interests,
this Court. attorneys fees and costs; as well as
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded
that they are members of an honorable profession, 2. (b)five percent (5 %) of the market value of
the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents all properties awarded to [the petitioner] by
despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad the court or obtained through the
name in the minds of some people. The vernacular compromise agreement, valued at the time
has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law of recovery.2
is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.[12] However, on 5 December 1995, respondent withdrew
its appearance as counsel of petitioner, due to policy
Respondents claim for additional legal fees differences. On 18 December 1995, respondent sent
was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a the termination billing3 for the services they rendered
fee based on percentage, absent an express and billed petitioner the total amount of P1,000,000.00
agreement to that effect. The payments to them in plus 2% interest for every month of delay in payment,
cash, checks, free products and services from based on the provision for termination of services
petitioners business all of which were not denied by stated in their Fee Agreement, thus:
respondents more than sufficed for the work they did.
The full payment for settlement[13] should have 1. (C)Interest for late payment
discharged petitioners obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even All fees mentioned herein are payable within seven
delete the award of attorneys fees cannot be (7) days from receipt of our statement of account. It is
denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they understood that all late payments shall be subject to
participate in the fundamental function of interest payment at the rate of 2 % per month of
administering justice.[14] When they took their oath, delay, a fraction of a month being considered as one
they submitted themselves to the authority of the month, counted from the date the fees shall fall due,
Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial without need of prior demand.
control. [15] xxxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is 1. (F)Termination Clause

hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CAG.R. CV
It is understood that you may terminate our services
No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of
at any time. In such an event, we shall be entitled to
additional attorneys fees in favor of respondents is
collect fees for legal services already performed and
hereby DELETED.
results obtained based on quantum meruit.4
SO ORDERED.
On 7 March 1996, respondent filed with the RTC a
Notice5 of Charging Lien over the properties of the
Bach Ongkiko v. Kalaw
spouses Bach.
On 5 February 1997, the RTC issued an
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse
Order6 directing the annotation of the charging lien in
the Decision1 dated 8 October 2003 of the Court of
the amount of P1,000,000.00 on all the titles of the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74445, entitled, Ongkiko
spouses Bachs personal and real properties
Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law Offices v. Guenter
enumerated in the notice of charging lien.
Bach.
On 11 February 1999, respondent received a copy
The facts as culled from the records of the case
of the Order7dated 8 June 1998, granting petitioners
are as follows:
Motion to Withdraw his petition in Civil Case No. 95-
On 7 November 1994, petitioner Guenter Bach
224.
engaged the services of respondent law firm Ongkiko
Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law Offices to represent him
Despite respondents demands for his legal fees,
in a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed
petitioner failed and refused to pay. Thus, respondent
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
filed a Complaint8 for a sum of money also before the
RTC of Makati, Branch 148, docketed as Civil Case
Branch 143, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-224.
No. 99-514.
The parties signed a Fee Agreement, for the legal
Respondent prayed for the payment of the following:
P1,000,000.00 as the latters lawful fees for services
rendered in Civil Case No. 95-224, plus 2% interest DATE OF DEMAND UNTIL FULLY PAID IS
from date of final demand until paid; P250,000.00 as REASONABLE
exemplary damages; P200,000.00 representing WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS
billable time spent in prosecuting the case, plus TO AWARD P50,000.00 AS AND FOR LITIGATION
another P150,000.00 for any appeal taken; and EXPENSES AND COSTS OF SUIT.14
P50,000.00 as litigation expenses and the cost of suit.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
Within the period for filing an Answer, petitioner P750,000.00 awarded to the respondent by way
filed a Motion9 to dismiss on the ground that of quantum meruit, with interest of 2% a month from
respondents claim had already been paid, waived, date of demand until fully paid, is excessive,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished. Petitioner unreasonable and confiscatory. Thus, petitioner prays
contended that prior to respondents withdrawal as for reduction of the same.
counsel in Civil Case No. 95-224, petitioner had
already paid respondents services in the total amount Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court approved
of P200,000.00. the attorneys fees in the total amounts of
On 9 August 1999, the Motion to Dismiss was P750,000.00 plus 2 % interest for the services
denied10 by the RTC for lack of merit. Petitioner failed rendered by respondent in Civil Case No. 95-224.
to file his Answer; thus, he was declared in default In this regard, the rule is that the issue of the
and respondent was allowed to present its reasonableness of attorneys fees based on quantum
evidence ex parte.11 meruit is a question of fact, and well-settled is the rule
On 24 January 2002, the RTC rendered its that conclusions and findings of fact by the lower
judgment in favor of the respondent, the dispositive courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and will
portion of which reads: not be disturbed except for strong and cogent
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is reasons.
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against GR: The findings of the Court of Appeals by itself,
the defendant and the latter is hereby ordered to pay which are supported by substantial evidence, are
the following: almost beyond the power of review by the
Supreme Court.15 Thus, in the exercise of the
1. 1.The amount of P750,000.00 as plaintiffs Supreme Courts power of review the findings of facts
lawful fees for services rendered under of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on
Civil Case No. 95-224, plus interest at the the Supreme Court.
rate of 2% per month from the date of XPN: There are, however, recognized exceptions to
demand until paid; this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
2.P700,000.00 representing billable time which absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
was spent in prosecuting this case; of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
1. 3.P50,000.00 as and litigation expenses, and facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
2. 4.Costs of suit. case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of findings are conclusions without citation of specific
Appeals, which modified the RTC Decision, thus: evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
WHEREFORE, Based on the foregoing premises, the set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED and the main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
appealed January 24, 2002 Decision of the Regional respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are
Trial Court of Makati City-Branch 148 in Civil Case premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
No. 99-514 is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, the contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11)
award of P700,000.00 representing billable time when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
allegedly spent in the prosecution of the case a quo is certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
hereby DELETED. All other aspects of the appealed which if properly considered, would justify a different
DECISION are UPHELD.13 conclusion.16 Exceptions (4) and (11) are present in
Hence, this Petition filed by petitioner Guenter Bach the case at bar, and so this Court shall make its own
raising the following issues to wit: determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of
the case.
SC
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded
OF QUANTUM MERUIT, THE AMOUNT OF this case for further reception of evidence as to the
P750,000.00 AS FEES FOR SERVICES RENDERED extent and value of the services rendered by
WITH INTEREST PEGGED AT 2% A MONTH FROM respondent to petitioner. However, so as not to
needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively
simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of Responsibility enumerates the following factors which
attorneys fees in favor of respondent. should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
There are two concepts of attorneys fees. In the
ordinary sense, attorneys fees represent the 1. (a)the time spent and extent of services
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his rendered or required;
client for the legal services rendered to the latter.
(come from the client) On the other hand, in its 2. (b)the novelty and difficulty of the questions
extraordinary concept, attorneys fees may be involved;
awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be
paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. (Come 3. (c)the importance of the subject matter;
from the opposing party)

4. (d)the skill demanded;

The issue in this case concerns attorneys fees in
the ordinary concept.
5. (e)the probability of losing other employment
Generally, the amount of attorneys fees due is as a result of the acceptance of the
that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is proffered case;
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers
compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of 6. (f)the customary charges for similar services
attorneys fees is fixed on the basis of quantum and the schedule of fees of the IBP
meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys Chapter to which he belongs;
services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorneys
fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable
7. (g)the amount involved in the controversy
under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a
and the benefits resulting to the client from
lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
the service;
reasonable,
pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: 8. (h)the contingency or certainty of
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys fees; compensation;
agreement as to fees.An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a 9. (i)the character of the employment, whether
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view occasional or established; and
to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
10. (j)the professional standing of the lawyer.
the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on respondent as compensation for their services
its own professional knowledge. A written contract on quantum meruit, based on the factors
for services shall control the amount to be paid abovequoted, it is proper to consider all the facts and
therefor unless found by the court to be circumstances obtaining in this case.
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered
supplied.) services as counsel for the petitioners in Civil Case
We have identified the circumstances to be No. 95-244. The services rendered consist of the
considered in determining the reasonableness of a following:
claim for attorneys fees as follows: (1) the amount
and character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, 1. 1.Respondent was able to annotate a
and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of notice20 of lis pendenson the property of
the litigation or business in which the services were Spouses Bach in Caloocan City covered by
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the TCT No. C-12112, thereby preventing easy
amount of money or the value of the property affected disposition of the property by Luzviminda
by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) Bach;
the skill and experience called for in the performance
of the services; (7) the professional character and
social standing of the attorney; (8) the results 2. 2.Respondent was likewise able to annotate
secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or a notice21 of lis pendens on the property of
contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may Spouses Bach in Pasig City covered by
properly charge a much larger fee when it is TCT No. 48223, thereby preventing
contingent than when it is not.
 disposition of the property by Luzviminda 3. 12.Other services included the filling of
Bach; several oppositions30to certain motions filed
by petitioners wife;
3. 3.Further, respondent annotated a
notice22 of lis pendens on the property of 4. 13.Respondent filed a motion31 to set the
Spouses Bach in Dasmarias, Cavite case for preliminary investigation;
covered by TCT No. T-339282, thereby
preventing disposition of the property by 5. 14.Respondent filed an ex parte motion32 to
Luzviminda Bach; declare petitioners wife in default;

1. 4.Additionally, respondent annotated a 6. 15.Respondent submitted a supplemental

notice23 of lis pendens on the property of comment33 on the motion for leave to
Spouses Bach in Tanza, Cavite, covered by withdraw funds from Certificate of
TCT No. T-255263, thereby preventing Participation filed by petitioners wife;
disposition of the property by Luzviminda
Bach;
7. 16.Respondent filed a manifestation and
motion34 praying the court to direct
2. 5.Respondent also worked on the annotation petitioners wife to designate her lead
of the notice24of lis pendens on the property counsel in the case;
of Spouses Bach in Makati, covered by
TCT No. S-62541, thereby preventing
disposition of the property by Luzviminda 8. 17.Respondent prepared a Reply35 to
Bach; comments on opposition of petitioner;

3. 6.Respondent worked on the annotation of a 9. 18.Respondent was able to secure an

notice of lis pendens on the property of Order36 from the said court freezing the
Spouses Bach in Dasmarias, Cavite, United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
covered by TCT No. T-380848, thereby
preventing disposition of the property by 1. account in the name of petitioners wife,
Luzviminda Bach; Luzviminda Bach, containing about
P6,500,000.00, representing the balance of
4. 7.Respondent annotated a notice25 of lis the proceeds from the sale of their conjugal
pendens on the property of Spouses Bach property in Pasig City;
situated in Tagaytay City, covered by TCT
No. P-705, thereby preventing disposition 2. 19.Respondent represented petitioner in
of the property by Luzviminda Bach; numerous hearings in Civil Case No. 95-
224, evidenced by the signatures of the
5. 8.Respondent filed the Petition26 for lawyers of respondent Law Firm in the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and minutes dated 25 April 1995, 27 April, 1995,
Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of 14 June 1995, 27 June 1995, 1 August
Gains of petitioner with his wife; 1995, 11 August 1995, 22 September 1995,
10 October 1995, 17 October 1995, 1
December 1995, 7 December 1995, 29
6. 9.Respondent prepared an affidavit27 in favor March 1996 and 16 January 1997;37
of petitioner attesting to the fact of
petitioners marriage and their properties
acquired during his marriage with 3. 20.Conducted several preliminary and post
Luzviminda Bach: litigation conferences in the proceedings for
preliminary injunction leading to the
freezing of the bank account of the parties;
1. 10.Respondent prepared an ex and
parte motion28 to declare petitioners wife to
have waived her right to file answer for
failure to file the same within the period 4. 21.Prepared and sent out numerous letters
granted by law and to direct the public to third parties and entities to protect the
prosecutor to determine whether or not a interest of petitioner and notices to
collusion exist; petitioner updating him of the status of the
case and the courses of action taken by
respondent Law Firm.38
2. 11.Respondent prepared a Petition29 for
appointment of a receiver and to compel
petitioners wife to render an accounting;
In sum, the services rendered by the respondent as This is a very different rule from that announced in
enumerated above and as admitted39 by Atty. Mario section 1091 of the Civil Code with reference to the
Ongkiko during the ex parte hearing, consist of obligation of contracts in general, where it is said that
annotating notice of lis pendens on the conjugal such obligation has the force of law between the
properties of petitioner and his wife; filing the Petition contracting parties. Had the plaintiff herein made an
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; preparing and express contract to pay his attorney an uncontingent
filing various pleadings and documents relevant to the fee of P2,115.25 for the services to be rendered in
case; obtaining a freeze order of petitioners funds in reducing the note here in suit to judgment, it would not
the UCPB; attending hearings in Civil Case No. 05- have been enforced against him had he seen fit to
224, and sending notices to petitioner updating the oppose it, as such a fee is obviously far greater than
latter of the status of the case. is necessary to remunerate the attorney for the work
Nothing in Civil Case No. 95-224 so far appears involved and is therefore unreasonable. In order to
complicated and no extraordinary skill was enable the court to ignore an express contract for
needed for lawyers of respondent Law Firm to attorneys fees, it is necessary to show, as in other
accomplish what they had done in the case before contracts, that it is contrary to morality or public
they withdrew their appearance. policy (Art. 1255, Civil Code). It is enough that it is
We do not find herein a situation so intricate that unreasonable or unconscionable. (Emphases
demands more than a careful scrutiny of the legal supplied.)
matters involved. These are simply the normal duties We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking
of a lawyer that he is bound by law to render to his venture and lawyers are not merchants. 43 Law
clients with utmost fidelity for which his client must not advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that
be burdened to pay an extra price. yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards
It bears stressing that at the time respondent firm for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
withdrew their appearance due to policy differences unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal
with petitioner, the case was still in its initial stage. of freedom from governmental interference, is
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject
pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case to State regulation.44
and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold A lawyer is not merely the defender of his clients
that the amount of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and cause and a trustee of his clients cause of action and
fair compensation for the legal services rendered by assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of
respondent to the petitioner. the court and participates in the fundamental function
of administering justice in society.45 It follows that a
The imposition of legal interest on the amount lawyers compensation for professional services
payable to private respondent as attorneys fees is rendered are subject to the supervision of the court,
unwarranted. not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and
Even as we agree that parties can freely stipulate receives remain reasonable and commensurate with
on the terms of payment, still the imposition of interest the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity
in the payment of attorneys fees is not justified. In the and integrity of the legal profession to which he
case of Cortes v. Court of Appeals,40 we ruled that belongs. Upon taking his attorneys oath as an officer
Article 220941 of the Civil Code does not even justify of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority
the imposition of legal interest on the payment of of the courts to regulate his right to charge
attorneys fees as it is a provision of law governing professional fees.46
ordinary obligations and contracts. It deleted the 6% Though we reduced the award of attorneys fees
interest imposed by the appellate court on the and disallowed the imposition of interest thereon, the
payment of attorneys fees. fact that an attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to
It ratiocinated by citing Mambulao Lumber Co. v. secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a
Philippine National Bank,42 thus: means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
Contracts for attorneys services in this the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to
jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different judicial protection against injustice, imposition of fraud
footing from contracts for the payment of on the part of his client as the client against abuse on
compensation for any other services. x x x [A]n the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not
attorney is not entitled in the absence of express alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful
contract to recover manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid
more than a reasonable compensation for his his just fees. With his capital consisting only of his
services; and even when an express contract is brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost
made, the court can ignore it and limit the recovery to not only in money but in expenditure of time and
reasonable compensation if the amount of the energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
stipulated fee is found by the court to be tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to
unreasonable. escape payment of his just compensation. It would be
ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure
justice for his client, he himself would not get his which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
due.47
essentially a process by which every member of the
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
expenses of litigation. Article 2208, paragraphs 2, 5 Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
and 11, of the Civil Code, authorize the recovery of carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
such fees (2) When the defendants act or omission obliged to hear his portion of its responsibilities.
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate x x x or to incur
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
expenses to protect his interest; x x x (5) Where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in Integrated Bar is an official national body of which
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
demandable claim; x x x and (11) In any other case therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
recovered. Considering the fact that respondent was payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
drawn into this litigation by petitioner to protect and discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
defend their interest and taking into account the
to a code of professional ethics or professional
services already rendered by respondent to petitioner,
the sum of P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation and responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
cost of suit would be reasonable under the premises. reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS to the effect that
the attorneys fees awarded to respondent is discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
REDUCED to P500,000.00, the legal interest of 2% The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously
on the amount due to respondent is DELETED, and dictated by overriding considerations of public
the award of litigation expenses is REDUCED to interest and public welfare to such an extent as
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED. more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares- restrictions that integration imposes upon the
Santiago,Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., personal interests and personal convenience of
concur.
individual lawyers.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.An award of attorneys fees must have a
factual, legal or equitable justification and cannot be Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration
left to speculation and conjecture. (Mateo vs. of the Bar is a valid exercise of police power of the
Diaz, 374 SCRA 33 [2002])
Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is State; Practice of law, nature of.Apropos to the
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his above, it must be stressed that all legislation
interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other directing the integration of the Bar have been
party. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 378 SCRA 82 [2002])
exercise of the police power over an important
IN RE CUNANAN profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
IN RE DILLON
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
AC-1928. August 3, 1978.*
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues functions of the Statethe administration of justice
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP as an officer of the court. The practice of law
Administrative Case No. MDD-1) being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
Bar common good, to the extent of the interest he has
Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
membership dues; Integration of the Bar, its concept Justice Roberts explained, the expression affected
and purpose.An Integrated Bar is a State- with a public interest is the equivalent of subject
organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, to the exercise of the police power.
as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in
 Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court the common good; Reasons.Thus, when the
authorized to adopt rules of court to effect respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
integration of the Bar.When, therefore. Congress the said profession, which affect the society at large,
enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the were (and are) subject to the power of the body
Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the politic to require him to conform to such regulations
integration of the Philippine Bar under such as might be established by the proper authorities
conditions as it shall see fit, it did so in the for the common good, even to the extent of
exercise of the paramount-police power of the State. interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
The Acts avowal is to raise the standards of the wish to submit himself to such reasonable
legal profession, improve the administration of interference and regulation, he should not have
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
responsibility more effectively. Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in Same; Same; Same; Constitutional
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Law; Constitutionality and validity of Bar
Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and integration sustained by explicit grant of precise
the President of the Philippines in decreeing the power to the Supreme Court under Art. X of the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate 1973 Constitution resting the Court with plenary
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, power in all cases regarding admistion to and
1973, were prompted by fundamental supervision of the practice of law.But the most
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a compelling argument sustaining the
desire to meet the demands of pressing public constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in
necessity. The State, in order to promote the the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
general welfare, may interfere with and regulate precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5)
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
and property may be subjected to restraints and Philippines. xxx Quite apart from the above, let it
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity be stated that even without the enabling Act
and welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, Salus language of the provision of the Constitution
populi eat suprema lex. The public welfare is the granting the Supreme Court the power to
supreme law. To this fundamental principle of promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
government the rights of individuals are procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which practice of law, it at once becomes indubitable that
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme
prevail over authority because then society will fall Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726). admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
some individuals from all freedom, and all Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership
individuals from some freedom. dues; Effect of Bar integration upon a lawyers
freedom of association; Compelling a lawyer to be a
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the
exercise of the legal profession clothed with public constitutional freedom to associate but the only
interest and lawyers must be bound by such compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the payment of
regulations as might be established by the proper annual dues which is not violation of the
authorities for Constitution; Compulsion upon a lawyer if any
justified by exercise of police power of the State;
Reasons.The first objection posed by the
respondent is that the Court is without power to
compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court which power the respondent acknowledgesfrom
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his requiring members of a privileged class, such as
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to defraying the expenses of regulation of the
be a member of the Integrated Bar is no violative of profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
his constitution freedom to associate. Integration that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
does not make a lawyer a member of any group of measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
which he is not already a member. He became a the objectives and purposes of integration.
member of the Bar when he passed
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalties; E
557 nforcement of penalty provisions for non-payment of
membership dues not a deprivation of due process;
Reasons; Practice of law in the courts subject to
regulation and inquiry; Practice of law is not
the Bar examinations. All that integration property right but mere privilege.That respondent
actually does is to provide an official national further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
organization for the well-defined but unorganized provisions would amount to a deprivation of
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is property without due process and hence infringes
already a member. Bar Integration does not compel on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to practice of law is property right, in the sense of its
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated being one that entitles the holder of a license to
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections practise of law is a property right, in the sense of its
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is being one that en-
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the professional in his fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
titles the holder of a license to practise a
regulatory programthe lawyers. Assuming that
profession, we do not here pause to consider at
the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
length, as it is clear that under the police power of
lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such
the State, and under necessary powers granted to
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
power of the State.
respondents right to practise law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same; Provisions regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
of the Court Rule requiring payment of membership imposed the fee as regulatory measure is
dues by lawyers not violative of the Constitution; recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce its
The 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
Supreme Court from requiring lawyers to pay
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
reasonable membership fees; Nature of membership
arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the
fees.The second issue posed by the respondent is
practice of law is not a property right but a mere
that the provision of the Court Rule repairing
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
payment of a membership fee is void. We see
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
with the lawyers public responsibilities.
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Court; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court has power
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of
its Roll of Attorneys; Courts jurisdiction provided the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
for in the 1973 Constitution.Relative to the issue unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of admission, suspension, disbarment and of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
supervision have been and are indisputably membership dues to the IBP since the latters
recognized as inherent judicial functions and constitution notwithstanding due notice.
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion. The Courts jurisdiction was greatly
reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
. . . . and the admission to the practice of law and resolution to the Court for consideration and
the integration of the Bar . . . . . (Article X, Sec. approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
5[5]) The power to pass upon the fitness of the Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the . . . . Should the delinquency further continue until
Court. the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
Court 139-A and ByLaws of the Integrated Bar appropriate, including a recommendation to the
providing for payment of membership dues are Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
neither unconstitutional nor illegal; Respondent members name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice
lawyer disbarred and his name striken from the of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme Court for repeated to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
failure to pay membership dues; Case at bar.We concerned.
thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of
Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal. x x x It is the On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. the membership fees due from him.

RESOLUTION
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP
CASTRO, C.J.: President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply
to Editions comment: on March 24, 1976, they
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly submitted a joint reply.
licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June
3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of
their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth The obligation to pay membership dues is couched
submitted for resolution. in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues.Every member of the

Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the Board of Governors shall determine with the
respondents pleadings would show that the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . .
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The _____________
respondent, however, objects to particular features
of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as 1
Adopted in the Supreme Courts Resolution,
the Court Rule)1in accordance with which the Bar promulgated on January 9, 1973, ordaining the
of the Philippines was integratedand to the integration of the Bar of the Philippines.
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The core of the respondents arguments is that the

above provisions constitute an invasion of his
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
delinquent members name from the Roll of status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member
Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of that as a consequence of this compelled financial
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in support of the said organization to which he is
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.Subject guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
warrant suspension of membership in the no legal force and effect.
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name The respondent similarly questions the
of the delinquent member from the Roll of jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the
Attorneys. Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter
is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP is stated in these words of The case at bar is not the first one that has
the Court Rule: reached the Court relating to constitutional issues
that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
SECTION 1. Organization.There is hereby surface whenever attempts are made to regulate
organized an official national body to be known as the practice of law, define the conditions of such
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, composed of practice, or revoke the license granted for the
all persons whose names now appear or may exercise of the legal profession.
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court. The matters here complained of are the very
same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled Administrative Case No. 526, In public interest and public welfare to such an extent
the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the as more than constitutionally and legally justifies
Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., the restrictions that integration imposes upon the
Petitioners. The Court exhaustively considered all personal interests and personal convenience of
these matters in that case in its Resolution individual lawyers.3
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that
Court there made the unanimous pronouncement all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
that it was have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important
. . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
and the mass of factual data contained in the duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar in the profession, to
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally ______________
unobjectionable. . . .
2
114 A.L.R. 101.

3
Memorandum of Authorities on the
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited in the
posture of the Court. Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to also Supreme Court Resolution of January 9, 1973,
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a one of the most important functions of the State
process by which every member of the Bar is the administration of justiceas an officer of the
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying court.4 The practice of law being clothed with public
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by a degree of control for the common good, to the
or under the direction of the State, an integrated extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
are required to be members. They are, therefore, explained, the expression affected with a public
subject to all the rules prescribed for the interest is the equivalent of subject to the exercise
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of of the police power (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S.
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective 502).
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient No. 63975authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon rules of court to effect the integration of the
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.2 fit, it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Acts avowal is to raise the
The integration of the Philippine Bar was standards of the legal profession, improve the
obviously dictated by overriding considerations of administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively. and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, Salus
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar populi est supreme lex. The public welfare is the
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
1973, and the President of the Philippines in government the rights of individuals are
decreeing the constitution subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
______________ prevail over authority because then society will fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
4
In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 259 S. It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida State Bar some individuals from all freedom, and all
Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State individuals from some freedom. But the most
Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280; In re compelling argument sustaining the
Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; Commonwealth constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
53; Ayres vs. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5)
905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of Bar of Philippines, which reads:
Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark
vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. powers:
265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292
291; Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; xxx
In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185
Okla. 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel Rice vs. Cozad, (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. admission to the practice of law and the integration
244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. of the Bar xxx.
2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404.
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which
5
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE reads:
INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of
on September 17, 1971. this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
of the IBP into a body corporate through the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that
the demands of pressing public necessity. even withoutthe enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely tothe language of the
The State, in order to promote the general provision of the Constitution granting theSupreme
welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal Court the power to promulgate rules
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and concerningpleading, practice and procedure in all
property may be subjected to restraints and courts, and the admission to the practice of law, it
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity at once becomes indubitable thatthis constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court withplenary to provide an official national organization for the
power in all cases regarding the admission to well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group
andsupervision of the practice of law. of which every lawyer is already a member.8

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
the legal profession, his practice of law and his associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
exercise of the said profession, which affect the attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
of the body politic to require him to conform to such chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
regulations as might be established by the proper subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
authorities for the common good, even to the extent Supreme Court, in order to further the States
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable professional legal services, may require that the
interference and regulation, he should not have cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory programthe lawyers.9
On this score alone, the case for the respondent
must already fall. Assuming that the questioned provision does in
a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
The issues being of constitutional dimension, Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. exercise of the police power of the State.10

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is
that the Court is without power to compel him to that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the payment of a membership fee is void. We see
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
unconstitutional for it impinges on his Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
of his constitutional freedom to associate.6 which power the respondent acknowledgesfrom
requiring members of a privileged class,
Integration does not make a lawyer a member
of any group ______________

______________
7
Diokno, Jose W., Bar IntegrationA Sword
and a Shield for Justice (Manor Press, Q.C., 1962)
6
In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. p. 17.
2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d
643; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.
8
Fellers, James, Integration of the Bar
W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. Aloha!, Journal of the Am. Judicature Society, Vol.
ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; Railways Employes 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256.
Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76
S. Ct. 714. 9
Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102,
N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6
of which he is not already a member. He became a L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations.7 All that integration actually does is
 10
Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 12
In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
236; Herron vs. State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 53,
147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of The following words of Justice Harlan are
California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, apposite: The objection would make every
202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d 398; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, Governmental exaction the material of a free
292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858; In speech issue. Even the income tax would be
re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths
State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P. 623. that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to thus extended,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
defraying the expenses of regulation of the war or of any other end condemned by his
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory private judgment has never yet been exalted above
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
the objectives and purposes of integration.11 Government. (Concurring opinion of Harlan, J.,
joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donohue,
3. The respondent further argues that the 367
enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due But we must here emphasize that the practice of
process and hence infringes on one of his law is not a property right but a mere
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is privilege,13 and as such must bow to the inherent
a property right, in the sense of its being one that regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
entitles the holder of a license to practise a with the lawyers public responsibilities.
profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it clear that under the police power of the 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or
State, and under the necessary powers granted to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
respondents right to practise law before the courts sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
of this country should be and is a matter subject to suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is authorities holding such are legion.14
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.12
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194),
______________ in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
11
Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
So. 2d 902; In re Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,
P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of said: The power to regulate the conduct and
Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification of constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, which is inherent in this court as a court
35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
vs. McGhnee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. administration of justice . . . the argument that this
State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P. is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
623; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
W. 2d 404. misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. Fernando Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,
It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a Respondent disbarred.
determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of
an honorable profession and to protect the public Notes.A contract for attorneys fees cannot be
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of used as a cloak for an exorbitant exaction. If after
the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not receipt of such amount by the attorney, the
be misused or prostituted. . . petitioner is still required to deposit a sum for the
same purpose, clearly there would be an exorbitant
The Courts jurisdiction was greatly reinforced exaction. The test certainly is one of fairness, and
by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted in that sense the due process clause can be relied
to the Court the power upon to protect an attorneys client. (A.D. Santos,
Inc. vs. C.I.R, 72 SCRA 230; Bachrach vs.
_______________ Golingco, 39 Phil. 139).

U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 2 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing An attorney must establish a clear right to his
Cardozo, J., with Brandeis and Stone, JJ., claim for attorneys fees before he may be entitled
concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of to a writ of mandatory injunction for deposit of his
California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. alleged fees in court. (Integrated Construction
197.) Services, Inc. vs. Relova, 65 SCRA 638).

13
In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291. Where there is no valid reason to investigate a
complaint against a lawyer, after the complainant
Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re
14
filed an affidavit of desistance, the case will be
Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others. dismissed. (Santiago vs. Bustamante, 76 SCRA
527).
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice .
. . . . and the admission to the practice of law and Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the
the integration of the Bar . . . . . (Article X, Sec 5(5) organization of the Integrated Bar of the
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent Philippines as well as the By-laws
to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. of the IBP did not withdraw from the courts the
authority to investigate and decide complaints
We thus reach the conclusion that the against erring members of the Bar. (In re:
provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By- Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1).
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor An attorney abuses his right of recourse to the
illegal. Supreme Court where he files multiple petitions for
the same cause in false expectation of getting a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the favorable action from one division as against the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent adverse action of the other division. (Cabagul vs.
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 299).
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
IN RE SYCIP