Al-Farabi and The Reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle
Al-Farabi and The Reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle
Al-Farabi and The Reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle
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AL-FARABI AND THE RECONCILIATION
OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
BY MAJID FAKHRY
fact that the views ascribedto Plato and Aristotle in the Reconcilia-
tion do not always agree fully with the views expoundedin the other
more systematic works, but agree instead with the Neo-Platonic ex-
egesis of the later commentators,such as Simplicius, Syrianus and
Philoponus. In any case, we shall set forth here the argument of
al-Farabi,as embodiedin his importanttreatise on the Reconciliation
of the Views of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle, which
should be reckonedamong the major links in the Neo-Platonic tra-
dition of Platonic-Aristotelianexegesis,whether or not it has a Greek
precedent.
Al-Farabi'sargumentin this book is conductedagainst the back-
groundof an Islamic controversywhich saw in the apparentdiscord
of the two major proponentsof Greek philosophya serious challenge
to their authority,as indeed to the reiteratedclaims of their followers
that they were the two infallible spokesmenof the truth. If philoso-
phy is defined as the "knowledgeof existing things in so far as they
exist," al-Farabi argues, then the alleged disharmonybetween the
two philosophers,who not only laid down the foundationsbut also
perfected the science of philosophy and are universally regardedas
its two foremost exponents, can only be due to one of three things:
(a) either the above-mentioneddefinitionof philosophyis wrong; or
(b) the universalregardin which these two philosophersare held is
unwarranted;or (c) their alleged disagreementon essentials is due
to an inadequate understandingof their teaching.22
Now this definitionof philosophyis incontrovertibleand is borne
out both by Plato, who resorts to the method of dichotomy in the
matter of definition, and by Aristotle, who resorts to the syllogistic
method. As to alternative (b), the consensus of the general run of
mankind concerningthe preeminenceof Plato and Aristotle cannot
be seriously questioned,since consensusis universally regardedas a
positive criterionof truth.23Thus only the third alternative (c) re-
mains, viz. that their disharmony arises from an imperfect under-
standing of their doctrine,bound up with the ingrainedtendency of
most people to judge falsely from inessential differences,such as the
different temperamentsand manners of life of Plato and Aristotle,
and sundry statements they make which appear to be incompatible
with each other, etc.
Of these differencesal-Farabi mentions Plato's other-worldliness
and contempt for earthly possessions and worldly glory and his ad-
monition against covetousness,in contradistinctionto Aristotle'sun-
stinted concern for both material wealth and popular acclaim, as
illustrated by his association with Alexanderthe Great, his family
life, etc. These differencesmight give rise to the belief that their
22 Cf. Al-Jam' bain Ra'yai
al-Hakimain,80 (Dieterici, 3).
23In Islamic doctrine,consensus(ijma') is one of the criteriaof religioustruth,
and one of the most potent factors in determiningMuslim attitudes and beliefs.
474 MAJID FAKHRY
mary, but only in his logic and physics,where the conditionsof things
nearest to sense are considered,whereas Plato states the universals
to be prior in his metaphysics and his 'theology,' which deal with
immutable and eternal entities.28
Next we might examinethe allegedincompatibilityof their theory
of vision. Aristotle, it is argued,believed vision to result from an af-
fection of sight, whereasPlato believed it to be the outcomeof an ef-
fluence emanating from our body and meeting the visible object.29
The conceptof such an effluence,however,involves numerousabsurd-
ities, for if we assumeit to be light or air, then it would be quite un-
necessaryor superfluous,consideringthe air and light surroundingus.
If fire, then it will cause the burningof objects seen. If somethingelse
less subtle, then it would obstruct vision altogether.
The same might be said about the concept of an affection. For
affectioninvolves change either in the retina of the eye or in the dia-
phanous medium (air), and this involves the absurd consequence
that the eye is susceptible of infinite change correspondingto the
succession of colors, and that the air can receive contrary impres-
sions.30But the controversybetween the Platonists and Aristotelians
arises from a misconceptionof the nature of effluence,as conceived
by Plato, and that of affection, as conceived by Aristotle, who use
such ambiguousand incongruousexpressionsowing to the inadequacy
of language. Despite their verbal disagreement,however, both Plato
and Aristotle concur in the view that a medium serving as a link
between sight and its object is essential. However, it is owing to the
subtlety of the processin question and the inadequaciesof language
that the two sages have been led to use the analogy of effluenceand
affection,which fail neverthelessto describethe processadequately.31
Equally unwarrantedis the claim that Plato and Aristotle dis-
agree in their conceptionof ethical traits, since Aristotle holds them,
it is maintained, to be a matter of habituation, whereas Plato holds
them to be inborn, and hence difficult to alter. But Aristotle, who
speaks of moral traits in his Ethics in abstract and generalterms, be-
lieved those traits to be rooted in so many dispositionsor aptitudes
with which the child is born, and which as such are dependentupon
education or training. Plato, on the other hand, is concernedin the
Republic and Statesman with political regimes, in which the indi-
vidual becomesaccustomedto a certain mode of life which is hard to
change later on. But, obviously, what is hard is not impossible.32
Three cognate questions are next broached:the Platonic concept
of knowledgeas recollection;the fate reservedto the soul after death;
28 Cf. al-Jam',86 (Dieterici, 12f.). 29 Cf. Theaetetus,156D.
30Cf. Jam', 97f (Dieterici, 22f.). On the diaphanous,compare De Anima, II,
418b-7.
81 Ibid., 94 (Dieterici, 24f.). 82Ibid., 96 (Dieterici, 28f.).
476 MAJID FAKHRY
and the status of universals. On the first score, al-Farabi cites the
Platonic argument in the Phaedo, but observes that Plato simply
reiteratesthere the view of Socrates.33This view, however,is not in-
consistent with the view of Aristotle, who urges at the opening of
the Analytica Posteriora that all instruction rests upon preexistent
knowledge,and shortly thereafter that the acquisition of knowledge
in some cases precedesinstruction, whereas in other cases it is con-
temporaneouswith it.84
Moreover,universalsare either known directly,in which case they
are called the principlesof demonstrationsor mediately through in-
duction from particulars. Owing to the progressive nature of our
apprehensionof universals,we are not fully consciousof the fact that
these universals existed potentially in the soul and became elicited
through experience.Further, the urge to know, as well as the satis-
faction consequentupon discovery,might be comparedto recollection,
in so far as such discovery correspondsto knowledge preexisting in
the soul; e.g., when the soul acquiescesin the judgment that such
and such an object is animate or inanimate, it does so by virtue of
its preexistingnotion of animate.35
With regardto the Forms or Ideas, Aristotle was relentless in his
criticism of Plato, as is well-known. However, in his Theology, he
reaffirmsthe existenceof "SpiritualForms"in the 'divineworld.'Now
unless one of these two seemingly contradictoryviews is spurious
(which our philosopherhastens to rule out on the groundof the uni-
versally accepted authenticity of these two works),86the incompati-
bility of these two views must be accountedillusory. Nor should we
be misled by Plato's metaphorical allusions to hierarchicalworlds,
in which the Ideas or the soul, as the intermediarybetween the world
of reasonand that of nature,are dwelt upon in the Timaeus.For such
metaphorsshouldnot be taken literally, since they refer simply to the
order of preeminencein which God, Reason, the Soul and Nature
stand one to the other. Aristotle himself has used such metaphorical
languagein the Theology,where he speaks of the soul's vision of the
beauty of the intelligible world.However,neither he nor Plato meant
to assign to the soul or the Ideas a local site, as even the beginnerin
philosophy will at once perceive. The role which the Forms were
meant to play was to serve as the eternal archetypes of creation
existing in God'smind. For otherwisethings would either have been
producedpurely arbitrarilyand fortuitously,without any preexisting
pattern; or would have been generatedsimultaneouslywith the par-
ticularswhich God created; and this latter alternative would involve
a change in the essence of God, which is absurd.87
SS Ibid., 98
(Dieterici, 31.).
Cf. Post. Analyt. I, 71a If. & 71a 16f.
34 35 Cf. Jam', 99f (Dieterici, 32f.).
86 Ibid., 106 (Dieterici, 45). However,neither in the Philosophyof Aristotlenor
in the Enumerationof the Sciences is the Pseudo-Theologyincluded in the Aris-
totelian corpus, as mentionedabove. 7 Ibid., 106 (Dieterici, 45f.).
AL-FARABI ON PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 477
Even the survival of the soul after death and its susceptibilityto
reward and punishment, on which Plato dwells in the Republic, is
not ruled out by Aristotle, as can be seen from his letter to Alexan-
der'smother on the occasionof the latter's death, in which he writes:
"Godwill not mete out to any one what he has meted out to Alexan-
der in point of election or favor. The righteous is he whom God has
elected. In some, the signs of election attest to their rectitude,whereas
in others they are invisible."38
On the crucial question of the eternity of the world, alleged to
have been affirmedby Aristotle and denied by Plato, the disagree-
ment is only apparent.Those who advancein support of the eternity
of the world accordingto Aristotle, the statement in Topica that in
the case of some propositionsboth thesis and antithesis might be
supported by syllogistic proofs, which rest upon generally received
premisses,e.g. the worldis eternal or the worldis not eternal,39forget
that an instance cited in a formal logical context does not necessarily
entail assent to what the statement purports to assert. Moreover,
those who subscribeto this view have been misled by Aristotle'sstate-
ment in De Caelo40that the whole has no temporalbeginning,from
which they have inferredthat it must thereforebe eternal. However,
this is far from being the case, since Aristotle has shown in the Phy-
sics and Metaphysics that time is the number of the motion of the
heavens and is generated therefrom.Now what is generated by an
agent does not contain that agent within itself. Thus his statement
that the worldhas no temporalbeginningmust be understoodsimply
to mean that it has not come into being in successive stages, a part
of it coming after the other, as the parts of a house come one after
the other in time. Now "since time results from the movement of
the heavens it is impossible that it should have had a temporal be-
ginning. From which it follows that the heavens are createdby God,
most High, instantaneously, in no time, and from the movement
thereof time results."41 Hence on the twofold question of the exist-
ence of God and the creation of the world in time, Aristotle'sworks
speak eloquently in no uncertainterms. Indeed, we owe it to the two
Greek Sages, Plato and Aristotle, to have lighted upon the notion of
creationin the first instance.For all the ancient philosophers,Pagan,
Jewish or Magian, speak of natural processesin terms of becoming
and development. These processes, it need hardly be observed, are
logically at variancewith the doctrineof creationex nihilo, advanced
by Plato and Aristotle and confirmedby revelation. The difference
between the two doctrines,however, is that the latter addressesthe
masses at large in a manner proportionateto their degree of under-
standing,42whereasthe formeris reservedfor the philosophicallyini-
tiated few.
38Ibid., 110 (Dieterici,52). 39 Cf. Top. 104b 15. 40 De Caelo, I, 279b.