Enterasys Nac Guide
Enterasys Nac Guide
Enterasys Nac Guide
Understanding NAC............................................................................. 3
Implementation................................................................................... 6
802.1X........................................................................................ 7
Kerberos Snooping........................................................................ 9
Assessment....................................................................................... 10
Agent-less.................................................................................. 11
Agent-based............................................................................... 12
Authorization..................................................................................... 13
Policies...................................................................................... 14
Disabling Ports........................................................................... 15
Remediation...................................................................................... 16
Monitoring......................................................................................... 16
Summary........................................................................................... 17
Appendix........................................................................................... 18
Introduction
Network Access Control (NAC) solutions deliver a comprehensive approach to identifying, controlling, and securing access to critical network
communications and business services. Well architected NAC solutions proactively manage whether a trusted user, a guest, or a device can connect to
a network and what they are authorized to do once connected; this is all based on policy criteria such as device and user identity, business role, time of
day, location, and health of the end system. Comprehensive NAC solutions use both agent-based and agent-less assessment technologies, along with
proactive and reactive policy enforcement to provide a solid pre-connect and post-connect end system security offering.
A well architected NAC solution will leverage a number of important functions including end system detection, authentication, assessment,
authorization, and remediation. This more easily enables IT organizations to quickly deploy NAC, and more importantly, to enable phased deployment
to best align with business needs.
Throughout this paper, a graphical representation of several key business variables will be offered as guidance related to specific NAC technologies.
A template is detailed below for reference.
Understanding NAC
NAC is an acronym which stands for Network Access Control. Sometimes it is also referred to as Network Admission Control. NAC is a common term
within IT organizations today, but there is much discussion around what NAC involves and what it does not. Some view NAC as simple registration and
authorization of network connected end systems. Some view NAC as a solution to protect the network environment from viruses and worms. Some view
NAC as a gatekeeper function to control how end systems and guest systems, which are not compliant with corporate computing guidelines, can access
the network. A well architected NAC solution is actually all of these things. Network Access Control is the integration of several technologies to provide
a solution that proactively and reactively controls end system communication on the network. There are a number of individual functions that make up
a comprehensive NAC solution.
Page 3
Detect - Detection and identification of new devices connecting to the network
Authorize - Authorization to use the network based on the results of the authentication and the assessment
Monitor - Monitoring users and devices once they are connected to the network
Contain - Quarantine problem end systems and/or users to prevent them from negatively impacting the overall network environment
A well architected solution should integrate highly advanced, policy-enabled network infrastructure, along with advanced security applications and
centralized management to deliver all of the required functions for pre and post-connect secure network access.
We would like to implement NAC to ensure our guests can access the internet in our conference rooms. Guests should not be allowed to
communicate or connect to our internal systems. All end systems connecting to our network should have a minimum level of security.
With this example, fundamental elements for a NAC project could be determined:
Page 4
NAC generally is a process and can be separated into:
Roles (who?)
Rights (how?)
Resources (what?)
Location (where?)
It is important to define all this information before embarking on a NAC deployment. A possible representation for the above example could be:
Often a description of roles and rights already exists within a local directory or within the corporate structure itself. It often makes sense to use those
rules (or groups) as a base for the NAC concept. A local directory can only be used as a starting point since most of the network systems are generally
not users. In a typical enterprise network, only 30-50% of all end systems are desktops or laptops. The greater percentage consists of a diverse array of
devices with different rights.
Number of Devices
Page 5
Some Preparation Questions:
- Have all required resources for the defined groups been identified?
- Are there any physical or logical restrictions? Should there be temporal restrictions?
Even if you only start out with some of the device or user groups, you need to have a full view of all of them in order to choose the right NAC
architecture. An agent-based solution for NAC for example, would not be applicable for all end systems and devices like printers, VoIP phones, and
others. This could cause problems after the roll out as many of your own clients will not be manageable.
Implementation
A phased approach for implementing a NAC solution is the preferred method. In general, a NAC implementation can be separated into the
following phases:
Phase 1: Collects information about all end systems without altering any existing network access. This is basically an inventory of end systems attached
to the network. This can be done with or without authentication.
Phase 2: Considers pre-defined rules and restrictions related to network access. This typically requires authentication to ensure unique network access
policies can be enforced for each end system and user.
Phase 3: Assessment of all end systems. This data can be accessed via an external management system (for software distribution), an agent, or a
network scanner. Typical information would be: operating system, vulnerabilities, and open ports.
Phase 4: Further network access policy rules are enforced to individual end systems, using assessment data results. The user should be informed about
this assessment and should be given the opportunity to remediate if not in compliance with appropriate security policies.
The following sections will detail the technologies critical to supporting a phased NAC implementation.
In order for this to occur you need to know who is connected to the network and where they are located. Manual documentation of the network should
become unnecessary. With NAC, you should be able to realize a self-documenting network.
MAC and IP addresses are the most commonly used methods for identification, but they can be changed in less than two minutes and are therefore only
suitable to a limited extent. Actually, the identification of an end system goes hand in hand with its authentication. The same mechanism that is used
for authentication is often also used to identify the end system.
However, the question you need to ask before deciding on any method is: What authentication is supported by the end system?
There are many technical methods that can be leveraged for authenticating end systems and/or users. A comprehensive NAC solution should be able to
support multiple methods:
Page 6
- Web based authentication
- Kerberos snooping
Other context such as host name or IP address can also be used for identification purposes. This can be very effective and helpful, especially for non-
desktop systems.
802.1X
The most secure authentication method is the detection of end systems at the network switch port using 802.1X authentication. This requires particular
capabilities on the switch, the client, and the local authentication entity (RADIUS server). 802.1X also allows for the authentication of both the end
system and the user (either separately or as a combined entity).
There are situations where the 802.1X authentication method is not appropriate. Some end systems may not support or do not contain an 802.1X
supplicant (the software agent for authentication). Examples of devices not supporting 802.1X might be older printers or IP video cameras. Also, there
are some network switches that do not support 802.1X. Finally, guests may not be configured correctly, based on the corporate IT standards, to be
authenticated via 802.1X.
Companies often have heterogeneous networks that may support partial or no authentication. The goal here is to implement improved technology
wherever possible. However, a complete replacement of the network is usually a cost-prohibitive proposition. The goal should be to ensure any new
network switches support 802.1X as well as multiple individual authentication sessions per port. They should also support different authentications for
multiple end system types allowing per port flexibility (e.g., VoIP phone plus PC or mini-/office-/cable switches).
Page 7
Conclusion Benefits Disadvantages
This method is a solution for special Standard for current systems Many requirements
end systems. It is better than static Centralizes administration Low security
port/MAC assignment since dynamic Real time detection Additional information is limited
and scalability are the same as for Good scalability
802.1X.
A well architected NAC solution may use a different approach. Traffic can be classified by the network switches based on OSI layer 2 through 4
information in the packets, allowing enforcement of firewall-like rules to individual traffic flows in the network. This will be further explained in the
Authorization section.
Page 8
Conclusion Benefits Disadvantages
The cheapest, but the least useful Cheap High administrative effort
solution for NAC. Works for every switch No centralized management
Low security
No additional information
Queries via SNMP can lead to excessive load on routers and switches, and in the worst case can crash an infrastructure device itself. In regards to
security, the process of port/MAC configuration is managed dynamically. With this, knowledge exists identifying where an end system was located during
the last query. An often used counteraction is disabling the port or reconfiguring the port VLANs. Neither of these options gives the user any visibility
as to why access to the network has been denied. Also, VLAN reconfigurations often run into problems if DHCP is in use and the client does not ask
immediately for a new address. Due to the very limited security in combination with the several other problems and the administrative effort involved,
this method should only be used in very small environments, and only if 802.1X is not an option.
Kerberos Snooping
The Kerberos protocol is used for authentication in a network. Typically for, but not limited to, Windows Active Directory domains (Novell NDS uses it as
well and it is often used in Linux environments). Kerberos snooping reads encrypted data traffic and can identify if a system has successfully logged on
to a domain. Kerberos delivers the username and the host name as identification attributes.
Page 9
The advantage of Kerberos snooping is that the only requirement is the usage of the Kerberos protocol. The identification and authentication is
detached from the switch and can often be implemented without any major intervention. The disadvantage is the need for an in-line appliance
similar to an Intrusion Detection System to read the relevant communication. The appliance offers a lot more functionality than a standard 802.1X
implementation on a switch. Such a solution is possible for environments needing a higher level of firewall-like security and also when no other
possibilities of identification are available. Such an appliance is typically used in the distribution layer of a tiered network and can also monitor WAN
transitions like VPN access. This solution allows a quick implementation of NAC without investing in intelligent access switches.
The authentication methods above are the most common, but not necessarily the only methods. To decide which method might be the best for a
specific organization, some analysis can help:
- Which systems that might be problematic today can be adjusted in the future?
- Does more than one end system need to be authenticated on a single port (e.g., a VoIP phone and PC)?
- If more than one end system has to be authenticated, can this be done via different methods (e.g., 802.1X and web)?
In most cases, a combination of methods is necessary to ensure full NAC functionality across the network. Even if a large portion of end systems can be
authenticated via 802.1X, an in-line appliance capable of a variety of authentication methods would offer strategic points to ensure more NAC coverage.
Assessment
A strong integration of the registration process into the assessment of an end system is still not very common. The registration process is an important
component of NAC implementation. Standards for assessment frameworks are the Microsoft (Network Access Protection) and TNG (Trusted Network
Connect) frameworks. The IETF is also working on this but doesnt have a completed framework at the moment. The function of assessment goes
beyond the switch port and tries to assess the end system itself. Assessments, or health-checks, can be separated into two methods:
Page 10
- -
Agent-less:
Network Based - a network scanner scans the end system remotely (over the network)
Applet Based - a java applet is used to launch assessment functions on the end system (web browser based)
Agent-based:
Thin Agent - a temporary agent (can be loaded and unloaded on the end system using various vendor-specific techniques)
Fat Agent - a persistent suite of assessment software with firewall and host intrusion detection established on the end system
During an assessment, end systems are checked for compliance and/or vulnerabilities. This also includes testing the end system embedded firewall and
other applications for vulnerabilities.
Determining which assessment method is the most appropriate for a particular environment is based on what you are trying to check and what
possibilities the end system allows. It would obviously be a challenge to install an agent on a printer or telephone. On the other hand, a network scanner
may run into problems with a local anti-virus scanner when trying to scan for current virus signatures.
The assessment duration and load on the network is also very different for each method. A network scanner scans the network and therefore can cause
more load and requires more bandwidth. An agent relocates this load onto the client and only requires local resources until the final report is sent to
a centralized location. Local resources required for fat agents can be extensive since they often work via self enforcement to also serve as personal
firewall and/or host intrusion prevention systems. The required time for scanning with any of these methods is difficult to measure as it depends on
the tests and their intentions. A quick scan for the local firewall process is of course easier and faster than a more comprehensive scan with tests for
vulnerabilities on thousands of Layer 4 ports.
An extensive assessment can not only provide health status information about the end systems, but also additional data for inventory and auditing purposes.
Agent-less
The extent of the end system tests partly depends on the software used for the assessment, but is also limited by what can be done off-box. There is a
large market for vulnerability scanners offering a wide array of programs that are only designed for this and are continuously updated with new test sets.
2. Portscan TCP/UDP
3. Vulnerability identification
4. Vulnerability exploits
Each of these steps should be separately configurable and one should be able to use the results for any following step. For load and performance
reasons it makes sense to only scan open ports for vulnerabilities. Some network scanners can also connect to the client itself (with user name and
password) and run local tests on the client. Care is required when performing a vulnerability scan since this can cause a crash of the end system.
The disadvantage of this method is the accuracy of the results, since on one hand you are only able to check for known vulnerabilities and on the other
hand services and versions cannot be accurately identified via remote communications through the network. Another issue is the increased load (caused
by the scan) on the scan server itself. It is actually quite unrealistic to regularly scan thousands of end systems with a single server since this will not
scale well. An advantage of this method of assessment is the extent of the tests - which are usually greater than an agent could provide. In addition, in
an environment with guests you dont need to force them to install any software.
Page 11
The major advantage of this method is the capability to scan end systems that dont allow any agents, which of course increases the number of devices
included in a NAC implementation.
Agent-based
An agent is a standalone piece of software that runs on an end system and provides information about the health of an end system and in some cases
also works proactively against threats. The big advantage of an agent is the option to request and check all data on one system. But there are also
disadvantages with this method. Since an agent has to be installed on the end system, there may be limitations in the coverage capability within an
enterprise network environment.
In areas with multiple operating systems and applications, extensive adjustments of configurations on the client may be necessary and often are not
even considered as an option. The agent also has to be very social and has to be able to communicate with its environment. This can cause problems
in a multi-vendor environment. Most NAC vendors also offer their own agent to strengthen their NAC solutions and to restrict any integration with
other solutions.
There has been some work to design better interoperable frameworks to include multi-vendor agent options. Microsoft offers its Network Access
Protection (NAP) as an interface between agents and NAC on the operating system itself. Generally one should consider the sustainability and
compatibility to remain flexible for any future decisions involving a NAC deployment.
The possibilities are almost indefinite, but specific tests add complexity since the agent first has to learn what should be tested and how to differentiate
between good and bad. An agent is able to perform an assessment and provide the results quicker than other methods. It also relocates the majority
of the load to the end system. This makes the agent-based solution more scalable for larger network environments. In some cases the agent can also
perform auto-remediation like turning on the local end systems firewall. Guests are also easier to manage with the use of dissolvable agents, where the
agent installs in RAM on the end system and dissolves after the next restart of the system.
Page 12
Conclusion Benefits Disadvantages
Agents can do it all (almost) but not Direct access to client information End system compatibility
on every end system. Actions can be Proactive actions Often single vendor only
run locally on the client and load and Very good scalability Large configuration effort
scalability are ideal. Very good load balancing
Very short scan time
Obviously there is not just a single assessment solution for all end systems. The best approach would be agent where possible and a network scan
where needed. Both methods supplement each other, and in environments with a high level of security it sometimes even makes sense to use both at
the same time. Another advantage, apart from the information about the security level of the end systems, is extensive documentation of all network
devices. This advantage is even bigger if the NAC solution provides open interfaces for all kinds of data.
Authorization
After detecting, authenticating, and assessing an end system, a well architected NAC solution can leverage the information learned to perform an
authorization for the end system to access the network and specific services.
The authorization process applies all the rules planned during the preparation phase of a NAC deployment. As discussed previously, there are multiple
options available regarding authorization of services for end systems. These options may be dependent on the performance of the network and in
particular the NAC solutions capabilities. Additionally, choice of authorization enforcement options also depends on the required level of security as
well as the design of the infrastructure itself. It is important to know if more than one end system needs to share ports or if devices, users, ports, or
individual traffic flows need to be considered.
- Should everything be denied by default and only permitted case by case? Or vice versa?
Regarding 802.1X and DHCP, an end system must be informed via its supplicant that it is in a different VLAN and needs to request a different IP
address. Without this capability, issues can arise when changing anything in the VLANs without 802.1X (e.g., via SNMP), and might even cause a
loss of connectivity. Some vendor workarounds consist of turning the port on/off but this causes communication issues for other devices/users (e.g.,
VoIP telephones) when using the same switch port and actually just one device had to be authorized. Multiple clients using one switch port is always a
challenge. Some solutions provide the possibility that one of the two devices (generally the phone) can tag its communication data with the matching
VLAN ID. This allows the switch to differentiate between the two devices. This solution is not optimum since the users/devices should usually leave it
up to the network to assign VLANs.
Page 13
Just allowing one device per port is often not an option and is expensive. Traffic cannot be distinguished and classified, and only a classification for an
entire port is used. Port VLAN allocation offers a compromise, but the weaknesses have to be considered when planning the project.
Policies
Policy-based networking and NAC enable a dynamic firewall capability right at the switch port in the network. Policies define what is allowed and not
allowed on the network, what priority a device, user, or application can have on the network, and how much bandwidth each are allowed to use. With
policies you have the capability of distinguishing between different systems and services, and there is no need for separation with VLANs. In addition to
the authorization, traffic can be classified through many characteristics and can be treated individually.
Typical examples:
- HTTP access to a quarantine/remediation server is always allowed, and any further access only after successful assessment
- Legacy protocols like IPX or unusual traffic are detected directly at the switch port
- Single flows can be pushed to other VLANs without the client noticing
Access Control
Switch
Layer 2
MAC Address
EtherType (IP, IPX, AppleTalk, etc.)
Deny
Layer 3
IP Address
IP Protocol (TCP, UDP, etc.) Permit
Port
ToS
Layer 4
TCP/UDP port (HTTP, SAP,
Kazza, etc.) Contain
VLAN
User
Class of Service
Priority/QoS
Flow
Rate Limit
Matrix N-Series
Page 14
Although policy enforcement offers seemingly endless opportunities and very high visibility, it is important to know beforehand what is allowed and what
is not. This can be simplified through roles and service based policies.
Disabling Ports
Disabling ports as an authorization technique is a less-specific approach than enforcing communication policies. Disabling a port disconnects the end
system from the network, but there is no possibility of later remediation. It is also impossible to find out if the end system is still connected to the port.
To find this out, the port often is enabled again after a short period, checked, and then disabled again. If this isnt done, a malicious attacker might
shut down the entire network by disabling one port after the other.
With this method it is impossible to manage multiple devices on one switch port. At least every switch in the market offers this method, which allows
heterogeneous deployments, but the disadvantages typically outweigh this availability. A method that doesnt even offer the possibility for dynamic
remediation is not advisable. It is still used in some small, out-of-band solutions with dynamic port control via SNMP or Telnet/SSH, but should not be
an option for typical enterprise deployments.
802.1X and other authentication methods are generally used in combination with RFC3580 (Port/VLAN allocation) or policies, if available. Sometimes
in-line appliances are used for enforcing policies if the network doesnt support this capability embedded in the switches. This is also an option for
central WAN transitions, especially if access to the infrastructure of remote sites is not available.
Page 15
Remediation
NAC must have the function of remediation fully integrated into the solution. Without options for remediation, a NAC solution could end up preventing
significant numbers of (and possibly all) end systems from connecting to the services they require to maintain business continuity and productivity.
Remediation is the process of supporting end systems to reach the required level of compliance and to then offset restrictions to the network. To
minimize the manual remediation process, problems with end systems and user actions should be solved automatically or by the user rather than
forcing involvement of the IT helpdesk.
Automated remediation is possible with an agent, since changes in configuration or even services have to be installed (e.g., the firewall) most of the
time. In some cases a software management solution can be triggered from the NAC solution to solve the issue.
The most common solution for manual (end user-driven) remediation is a specific remediation web server to which the users are redirected. The
advantage of this is a centralized management of the available remediation process, with execution distributed to the end user community.
- Information about the status of the end system: in quarantine, allowed on the network, etc.
- Specifications about the end systems violation: firewall disabled, outdated signature base, etc.
Remediation should be automated and minimize user intervention. These systems should only allow administrator access to make sure no additional
software can be installed. The better the remediation process, the less additional administrative work load, since most of the troubleshooting can be
redirected to the agent or the user.
Questions:
- Who is responsible for the remediation? An agent, the user or the administrator?
Monitoring
Up to now the discussion has focused on assessment of end systems in the pre-connection phase. But who can guarantee that changes arent done to
cause the end system to fall out of compliance after successfully connecting to the network? Tools for a continuous monitoring/assessment are often in
place in addition to the recurring pre-connect assessment. Depending on the method, different intervals for post-connection assessment can be used.
An agent or a remote scan of an end system can perform continued assessment at a specified interval rate.
The NAC solution should also include a general variety of configuration options to meet the requirements of the network. The chosen NAC solution
should work flexibly but based on templates to keep administrative effort at a minimum and simplify troubleshooting.
- Can the clients remain connected during the assessment, or should they be quarantined by default?
Page 16
In addition, NAC is a perfect supplement for behavior and anomaly-based security solutions. These solutions generally evaluate network
communications flow data and detect Layer 3-7 attacks but are not able to apply any mitigating action in the actual communication infrastructure. This
kind of monitoring can be integrated into a well architected NAC solution to provide granular and effective post-connect protection. Another option is
the combination of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and a NAC solution to detect attacks and also have an effective automated response system.
The more open a NAC interface is, the more security solutions can use this interface and the greater the value.
Summary
A NAC project does not have to be complex and difficult. NAC deployments can be broken down into logical steps or phases and incremental benefits
can be quickly realized throughout the implementation process. The success of a NAC project really depends on the right start. The more information
that is available and the better the policies are defined, the easier the actual implementation will be.
To learn more about how Enterasys provides a well architected NAC solution, visit us at www.enterasys.com.
Page 17
Appendix
The following attachments highlight some examples and checklists for various NAC deployment scenarios. A demo environment for testing is always
advisable to evaluate potential solutions before implementing into a production environment.
Page 18
Contact Us
For more information, call Enterasys Networks toll free at 1-877-801-7082,
or +1-978-684-1000 and visit us on the Web at enterasys.com
Patented Innovation
2008 Enterasys Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Enterasys Networks reserves the right to change
specifications without notice. Please contact your representative to confirm current specifications.
Please visit http://www.enterasys.com/company/trademarks.aspx for trademark information.