BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE R On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No.

however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3,
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant. 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the
Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and
his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the
DECISION Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This
prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of
ZALDIVAR, J p:
the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2 Upon the facts agreed upon
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894. by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow: August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered
sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and
such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay
referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this
containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: action." 3

"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by law, assigning the following errors:
this Agreement." "I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
following day, March 4, 1964. "II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and
by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an the cost thereof."
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful

1
associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective
in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call
prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a for the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12 and that unless Republic
given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be
their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by in order to do away with labor organizations.13
the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does
Constitution. 6
not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience
impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right
its collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act
relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was
of union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that the Act does not
impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for
the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 7 Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of
those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an
religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free
Article III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference over union security measures
certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8 which are merely contractual 16 ; that said Act does not violate the constitutional
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending
provision that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose
the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally,
law has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted
conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the
membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, diversities of their religious beliefs. 18
said Act would violate religious freedom. 9
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection premise that there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed
of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as by in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are
exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and
emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10 the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with
the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19
provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11

2
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an
members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with
surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of such labor organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of
association. a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any
person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence,
Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article n the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No.
875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial
or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the
jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on
whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is
is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of
which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding
any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the
abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
enjoin an employee to sign up with any association. constitutional provision on freedom of association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the 2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the
Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its
refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent
only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to employees workers". This agreement was already in existence at the time Republic
be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Act No. 3350 was enacted of June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to
Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment,

3
Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations
job even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts,
Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27
Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union
security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the
obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within
positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said the domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving public
union security clause. welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an
infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish work
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of on Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted to secure the well-being
the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for and happiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of
its enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not the police power. 29
a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its
obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the
contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance. 22 Impairment has
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract
also been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all
substantial contractual rights. 23 circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined,
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances.
contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted
outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to
with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be
impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in
harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate
to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its
effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural,
contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only
police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It
power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be
prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection.
a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two
of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital,
harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a
power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows that not all collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective
legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of
constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet
exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must

4
a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
the collective bargaining relationship. 31 religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights."
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory
Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows: The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by
"It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also
who, on account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
accept membership in a labor organization although he amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. 36 Any
discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions,
religion discards membership in any labor organization,
or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden
Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their
may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by
right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
in any manner violating their religious faith and/or belief." 32
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing
purpose exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union such burden. 38
security agreements is reasonable.
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular ID character even if the incidental
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the
to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a
occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to
not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the
position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom Constitution.
of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
danger.
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment
religious sects in violation of Section 1(7) of Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid
which is now Section 8 of Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides: objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford
protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital and
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, industry. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without.

5
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and
relation between workers and employers." 42 remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples,
would hurt, rather than help, labor unions. Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the
collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a
religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to fortiori to a labor union - assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or
diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit 4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for
"establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits Its
religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from
a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive
require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not
the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of required to do a positive act to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union.
religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious
It was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from
Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take the labor union he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement
away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated that a labor union may have entered into. How then can there be a religious test
by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No.
intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to
3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is
withhold exemption.
never an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain desired result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do
religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor it. 49
organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory
unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and
legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue
the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and
advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935
protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is
Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law
laws. 50
may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,

6
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their
of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important and
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation should not be ignored.
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which
Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on real and
it is to operate.
important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the certain rules of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in sentiment makes a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea human life its distinctive-character, its tone, its happiness, or unhappiness, its
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All that is religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the important to them than their religion, or their not having any religion. Because of
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs
class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
arbitrary. 55 beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed
and war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,
over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of rests on substantial distinctions.
discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or
marked differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose
classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join
may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59for the equal protection labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, their work because of union shop security agreements.
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective
Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the
security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop
convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who
prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the the coverage of said agreements continues.
beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident
religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious
from its provision.
beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all

7
The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by membership. Social justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality
itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective
to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal equality, being
and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or
religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, natural conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is
because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,
render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
its nature involves inequality.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not Act No. 3350 is not called for - in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of
rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the
constitution simply because in practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of
matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to
object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the
obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act is
advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62 declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of religious sects
that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to
unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional employees who are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the
provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems
welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute
looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end
unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the
determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the
necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is sufficient that a portion of criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
the state be benefited thereby.
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's
insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through the fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely
members of the community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing
the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also contravenes
elements of society, for it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually
failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The dismissed by the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at
Act also advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions all. 72
and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case
compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements, and
there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to
equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits
maintain its membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by
membership in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said

8
its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice
institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code.73
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield.
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded
appellant provides that: "when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff . . .to incur expenses
to protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and
"No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the
any court against a labor organization or any officer or member instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's
thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such organization in dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his
furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as
ground only that such act induces some other person to break a matter of course to the prevailing party.
a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or
interferes with the trade, business or employment of some WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26,
other person or with the right of some other person to dispose 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed
of his capital or labor." (Emphasis supplied) from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union.

That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be 'disputed for appellant It is so ordered.
sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under
Makalintal, C .J ., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz
Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is
Palma and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
included in the term "labor dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the
labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in Fernandez, J ., did not take part because he was co-author, when he was a Senator,
asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done . . . in furtherance of of Rep. Act No. 3350.
an industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not
necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial
dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24