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EN BANC

ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 207105

Petitioner,
Present:

SERENO, CJ
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
*BRION,
**PERALTA
'
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
***MENDOZA
'
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN, and
**** JARDELEZA, JJ:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and SALVADOR S. PILLOS, Promulgated:
Respondents. November 10, 2015
x-------------------------------------------------------~~~=--~------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running for a public

office in the Philippines.

The Case

The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the adverse resolution
issued on April 23, 2013 in SPA No. 13-023 (DC), 1 whereby the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc disposed:

On leave.
No part.
*'' On leave.
"" No part.
1
Rollo, pp. 195-20 I.

~
Decision 2 G.R. No. 207105

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Reconsideration of Petitioner Stewart D. De La Cruz in SPA No. 13-024
(DC) is denied for lack of merit. On the other hand, the Motion for
Reconsideration of Petitioner Salvador S. Pillos in SPA No. 13-023 (DC)
is granted; consequently, the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent
Arsenio A. Agustin is hereby CANCELLED and DENIED DUE
COURSE.

SO ORDERED.2

Antecedents

In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States

of America (USA).3 On October 5, 2012,4 he filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections.5 As the
official candidate of the Nacionalista Party,6 he declared in his CoC that he
was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a
natural born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years.7

On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty

candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed as SPA
No. 13-023 (DC),8 alleging that the petitioner had made a material
misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter
therein only on May 31, 2012. The petition stated the sole ground thuswise:

THE DECLARATION UNDER OATH MADE BY THE

RESPONDENT THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE OR SEEK
TO BE ELECTED TO (sic) CONSTITUTES MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATION FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER (sic)
HE HAS NOT RESIDED AS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A PERIOD OF
ONE YEAR IN THE LOCALITY HE SEEKS TO BE ELECTED.9

and prayed, viz.:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed before this Honorable

Commission, to issue an order to immediately deny due course and or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Arsenio A. Agustin.

2
Id. at 200.
3
Id. at 65.
4
Id. at 44.
5
Id. at 34.
6
Id. at 45.
7
Supra at note 4.
8
Id. at 32-36.
9
Supra at note 5.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 207105

Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed of (sic).10

In his answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year requirement

referred to residency, not to voter registration; that residency was not
dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business
purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence; and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his
Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S./American Citizenship executed on October
2, 2012.11

On January 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued its

omnibus resolution,12 pertinently holding:

As can be clearly gathered from the Velasco case, a candidates

status as a registered voter is a material fact which falls under the same
classification as ones citizenship or residence. While they are under the
same classification as referring to a candidates qualification for elective
office, the requirements are different. The requirement that a candidate
must be a registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that he
must be so one year before the elections because this refers to the
residency qualification.

On this score, it could not be said that respondents falsely

represented the length of their residence in the municipality simply
because they became registered voters thereof only fairly recently. As far
as registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are duly
registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the period prescribed by
law for such registration.

Anent petitioners[] allegations that respondents were unable to

vote because they are residents of other countries, the records are bereft of
any evidence that would substantiate this. It is a fundamental rule that he
who alleges, not he who denies, must prove. Here, petitioners have not
adduced a single shred of competent evidence that respondents were
actually residents or citizens of other countries that is why they were
unable to vote.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby

DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

On February 12, 2013, Pillos moved for the reconsideration of the

January 28, 2013 resolution with the COMELEC En Banc.14 He underscored
in his motion that the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
10
Id. at 36.
11
Id. at 52-54, 65.
12
Id. at 162-166.
13
Id. at 165-166.
14
Id. at 167-184.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 207105

reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents
that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on
October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of
his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October
5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a resident of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the petitioners declaration of his eligibility in
his CoC constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet
the citizenship and residency requirements.

The petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration. 15

On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed

resolution cancelling and denying due course to the petitioners CoC,
observing as follows:

Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had the burden of

proving through his evidence that he complied with the statutory
requirements imposed upon dual citizens provided under Republic Act
9225, particularly Section 3 and 5(2) thereof, to wit:

xxxx

While Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation,

he failed to furnish this Commission a copy of his Oath of Allegiance.
Noteworthy is the fact, that in Agustins Affidavit of Renunciation, it was
stated that his Oath of Allegiance is attached as Annex B; however, said
attachment has not been made available for the perusal of this
Commission. Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the
provisions of RA 9225, Agustins COC must be cancelled and/or denied
due course. Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration is only granted
as against Respondent Agustin.16

On May 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Verified Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration with Leave of Court.17 He attached thereto copies of the
Order of Approval dated February 12, 201218 and his Oath of Allegiance
dated March 9, 2012,19 both issued by the Consulate General of the
Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii. He further attached certifications issued
by Election Officers in Ilocos Norte attesting that the documents had been
received by the COMELEC and retained in its files. He explained that the
documents were not presented during the course of the proceedings because
the sole issue raised by Pillos Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had involved only his (petitioner)
compliance with the one-year residency requirement.

15
Id. at 188-192.
16
Id. at 199-200.
17
Id. at 202-211.
18
Id. at 216.
19
Id. at 217.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 207105

Pillos submitted a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and

Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court
on May 8, 2013,20 praying that a writ of execution be issued to implement
the cancellation of the petitioners COC.

On election day, May 13, 2013, the name of the petitioner remained in
the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for obtaining 5,020 votes,21 the highest among the
contending parties.

Sensing that the 30-day period within which a petition for certiorari
should be filed in the Supreme Court was about to expire, the petitioner filed
on May 24, 2013 an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated May 3, 2013.22

On May 28, 2013, the petitioner thus instituted this case, alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the COMELEC En Banc based on the following grounds:

a. The assailed En Banc Resolution was promulgated in gross violation

of Petitioners guaranteed Constitutional Right to Due Process and to
be informed of the facts and the law on which the same was based; and

b. The grave erroneous appreciation of the facts, law, and the evidence of
the case.23

Meanwhile, on June 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, pointing out

that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an en banc resolution was
not allowed under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and
that, accordingly, the April 23, 2013 resolution was deemed final and
executory pursuant to Section 8, paragraph 2 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, issued the writ of execution.24

On July 16, 2013, the Court required the parties to observe the status
quo prevailing before the issuance of the COMELEC En Banc resolution
dated April 23, 2013.25

20
Id. at 249.
21
Id. at 225.
22
Id. at 226-229.
23
Id. at 9.
24
Id. at 250-251.
25
Id. at 256-257.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 207105

Issues

The core issue involves the eligibility of the petitioner as a candidate

for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

A secondary issue concerns the propriety of Pillos claim as the

rightful occupant of the contested elective position.

Ruling

The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

The Court finds and declares that the petitioner made no material
misrepresentation in his CoC; hence, there is no legal or factual basis for the
cancellation of the CoC. Even so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual citizen. With his
disqualification having been determined and pronounced by final judgment
before the elections, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted.
Accordingly, his rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected
Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections.

1.
Administrative due process was observed

Before anything more, let us deal with the petitioners insistence that
the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in resolving Pillos
motion for reconsideration based on a ground that was neither the basis of
nor raised in the Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin; that the non-presentation of
his Oath of Allegiance should not be fatal to his constitutional right to run
for public office especially because the sole ground for Pillos petition in the
COMELEC had dealt only with the residency requirement; that Pillos could
have included citizenship as a ground by the amendment of his petition, but
he did not move for that purpose; that he duly complied with the
requirements for the re-acquisition of his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225, and the proof of the re-acquisition had been
submitted to the Election Officers in Ilocos Norte; and that the COMELEC,
by not at least holding a clarificatory hearing to ascertain and confirm such
matters, violated his right to due process by denying to him the opportunity
to prepare for his defense.

The petitioners insistence lacks merit.

Decision 7 G.R. No. 207105

We note that the petitioners citizenship came to the fore because he

himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in his answer to Pillos petition to
cancel his CoC in order to bolster his allegation of compliance with the one-
year residency requirement. As such, he could not credibly complain about
being denied due process, especially considering that he had been able to file
an opposition to Pillos motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to state that
the observance of due process in administrative proceedings does not always
require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of due process is
also met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to
explain or defend himself. Also, due process is satisfied by giving the
opportunity to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.26 The rule is the same in election cases. 27

2.
The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of
his USA passport after his renunciation of
foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified
from continuing as a mayoralty candidate

A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a persons declaration of

his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the
person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.28

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a

candidate from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for
disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,29 the
Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise:

[A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on

Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand,
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on
a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
a CoC.30

26
Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 626, 640.
27
Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522, 538-539.
28
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 196804 and G.R. No. 197015, October 9, 2012, 683
SCRA 197, 231.
29
G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.
30
Id. at 796.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 207105

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

The Court has described the nature of a Section 78 petition in Fermin

thusly:

[t]he denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility
for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a
quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.31

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a finding not only that a
person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such
he made a material representation in the CoC that was false. The Court has
stressed in Mitra v. Commission on Elections32 that in addition to materiality
there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render the candidate ineligible, viz.:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a

deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the
requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate
as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results.
The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from

31
Id. at 792-794.
32
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744, 769.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 207105

a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate

who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot
serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.33

A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of COC that

falls short of the foregoing requirements should not be granted.

The petition of Pillos in SPA No. 13-023 (DC) was in the nature of
the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to cancel the CoC of the
petitioner because it contained allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition,
namely: (a) the petitioner as a candidate made a representation in his CoC;
(b) the representation referred to a material matter that would affect his
substantive right as candidate (that is, the right to run for the position for
which he filed his CoC); and (c) he made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office, or
he deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render him ineligible. Pillos further challenged the petitioners
eligibility for public office based on his failure to comply with the one-year
residency requirement stated in the Local Government Code, and ultimately
specifically prayed that the COMELEC issue an order to immediately deny
due course and or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent
Arsenio A. Agustin.34

Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioners CoC not

because of his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his
failure to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA
9225.35 In our view, such basis for cancelation was unwarranted
considering that he became eligible to run for public office when he
expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he fully complied with
the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, to wit:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who

retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of

33
See also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 29, at 792; Salcedo II v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 455.
34
Rollo, p. 36.
35
Id. at 200.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 207105

candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

xxxx

More particularly, the petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March

9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By
his Oath of Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he
reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012,
the date he filed his CoC he was, therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen,
rendering him eligible to run for public office. His CoC was valid for all
intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not make therein
any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

Nonetheless, we uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc

that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6,
2012,36 after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed
his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing
himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his
subsequent travels abroad37 despite having been already issued his Philippine
passport on August 23, 2012.38 He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of
renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport
after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he
could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days
from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.

The petitioners continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the

USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA
citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen.39 Such
reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, viz.:

Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

36
Rollo, p. 126.
37
Id. at 126, 324-325.
38
Id. at 238.
39
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 207105

A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office,

and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective
office.40 Even if it made no finding that the petitioner had deliberately
attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his
CoC, the COMELEC could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the
requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code.

3.
The petitioner was declared disqualified by
final judgment before election day; hence, the
votes cast for him should not be counted.

Considering that the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to

cancel the CoC requires a finding that he made a material representation in
the CoC that was false, the COMELEC En Banc, in granting Pillos motion
for reconsideration, expressly held the petitioner ineligible to participate in
the elections or disqualified from the mayoralty race, which was the basis for
the cancellation of his CoC. Such reason cancelling the petitioners CoC
despite the absence of the material misrepresentation at the time he filed his
CoC might not be in order, but the undisputed fact is that the COMELEC En
Banc expressly decreed his disqualification in the April 23, 2013 resolution.

The effect of the petitioners disqualification under the April 23, 2013
resolution depended on when the disqualification attained finality. The
distinction exists because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who

has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.

In Cayat v. Commission on Elections,41 the Court has expounded on

the effect of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 thusly:

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final

judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
40
Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 33, at 457.
41
G.R. No. 163776 and G.R. No. 165736, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 207105

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate

who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two

situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the
elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6.
The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections,
which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the
Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a
candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution
disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10
May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor
are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only
candidate, second to none.42

Even if his disqualification did not subvert the validity of his CoC, the
petitioner would be reduced to a non-candidate under the terms of Section 6,
supra, should it be shown that the disqualification attained finality prior to
the 2013 elections. The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray,
resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate.

It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the

judgment declaring the petitioner disqualified from running for the local
elective position attained finality.

Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed
final and executory as of May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was
issued on June 18, 2013; and that the petitioners disqualification thus
attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections.

Pillos submission is correct.

42
Id. at 45.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 207105

Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 3, 2013 43 upon receiving the
April 23, 2013 resolution granting Pillos' motion for reconsideration, 44 such
filing did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being deemed final
and executory because Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure expressly disallowed the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. 45 Within the context of Section 13, Rule 18, 46 and Section 3,
Rule 37,47 both of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the April 23,
2013 resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon the
lapse of five days from its promulgation without a restraining order being
issued by the Supreme Court.

Under the circumstances, the finality of the petitioner's

disqualification pursuant to the April 23, 2013 resolution prior to the May
13, 2013 elections rendered him a non-candidate, and the votes cast for him
should not have been counted. 48 Pillos, being the qualified candidate
obtaining the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed duly elected as
Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the 2013 elections.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari;

AFFIRMS the resolution dated April 23, 2013 insofar as it disqualified
petitioner Arsenio A. Agustin from running for any local elective position in
the May 13, 2013 elections; DECLARES respondent Salvador S. Pillos the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the May
13, 2013 elections; ORDERS the Commission on Elections to cause the
proclamation of respondent Salvador S. Pillos as the duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the May 13, 2013 elections; and
REQUIRES the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

43
Rollo, pp. 202-212.
44
Supra note 2.
45
Section I. What Pleadings are not Allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:
xx xx
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en bane ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election
offense cases; x x x
xx xx
46
Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. - x xx
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolutions of the Commission en bane shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court.xx x
xx xx
47
Section 3. Decisions Final Ajier Five Days. - Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny
due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to
disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the
lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
48
Caya! v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 41, at 45.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 207105

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

PRESBITER'O J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

~Jn1.1JA ~ k r!Mk (On Leave)

~ J. LE'ONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

~~ J

(<9
ENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
t

fAf,. ,. ~ /
ESTELA MIPIURLA~ERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

----
Decision 15 G.R. No. 207105

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the court.

~9> "''-1 .~ ,,_

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Cf:R11f1ED XEROX COPY;

~~~~~
CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC
SUPREME COURT