Velasco Cases-All Bar Subjects 2016

Deans
Circle 2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
CIVIL LAW
Supreme Court decisions penned by Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Civil Law (Cases Penned by J. Velasco) Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
Effect and Application of Laws ................................................................................................. 3
Publication of Laws.................................................................................................................. 4
Waiver of Rights ...................................................................................................................... 5
Human Relations ..................................................................................................................... 6
Persons and Family Relations ..................................................................................................... 7
Persons ................................................................................................................................... 7
Marriage ................................................................................................................................. 8
Dissolution of Marriage ..................................................................................................... 10
Property Relations of the Spouses ..................................................................................... 11
The Family ......................................................................................................................... 14
Paternity and Filiation ....................................................................................................... 14
Property ................................................................................................................................... 15
Accession .............................................................................................................................. 15
Donation ............................................................................................................................... 16
Prescription and Laches ............................................................................................................ 18
Laches ................................................................................................................................... 18
Obligations and Contracts ........................................................................................................ 20
Obligations ............................................................................................................................ 20
Definition .............................................................................................................................. 20
Nature and Effects of Obligations .......................................................................................... 21
Kinds of Civil Obligations ....................................................................................................... 22
Extinguishment of Obligations ............................................................................................... 23
Payment or Performance....................................................................................................... 23
Consignation ......................................................................................................................... 26
Contracts ............................................................................................................................... 27
Inadequacy of Consideration ................................................................................................. 29
Kinds of Contracts ................................................................................................................. 30
Estoppel ................................................................................................................................ 33
Sales ......................................................................................................................................... 34
Double Sale ........................................................................................................................... 34
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Equitable Mortgage ............................................................................................................... 36

Partnership, Agency and Trusts ................................................................................................ 37
Powers .................................................................................................................................. 37
Express vs. Implied Agency .................................................................................................... 38
Compromise ............................................................................................................................. 39
Credit Transactions ................................................................................................................... 41
Loan ...................................................................................................................................... 41
Real Mortgage ....................................................................................................................... 43
Land Titles and Deeds ............................................................................................................... 44
Torrens System...................................................................................................................... 44
Classification of Lands ........................................................................................................... 45
Determination of Valuation of Lands ..................................................................................... 46
Original Registration .............................................................................................................. 48
Subsequent Registration........................................................................................................ 50
Reconstitution of Title ........................................................................................................... 52
Reconveyance ....................................................................................................................... 54
Confirmation of Imperfect Title ............................................................................................. 56
Homestead Patents ............................................................................................................... 57
Notice of Lis Pendens ............................................................................................................ 60
Redemption .......................................................................................................................... 61
Acquisitive Prescription ......................................................................................................... 62
Torts and Damages ................................................................................................................... 64
Exemplary or Corrective Damages ......................................................................................... 64
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CIVIL LAW
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (CIVIL CODE)
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable

condition for the effectivity of a law.
Facts:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy
on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund
was Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA). Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the
PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
Per Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF),
the entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of First United Bank (FUB)
stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It would appear
later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA
would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b)
the increase in FUBs capital stock. In all, from the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a
total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) +
10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded the status of a
law without publication.
Ruling:
NO. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in
Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. It is well-settled
that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the
effectivity of a law. Taada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 1986) said as much: Publication of the law is
indispensable in every case x x x. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is
like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. The
publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public
of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or
whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of

P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a
copy thereof attached to the decree when published. The SC cannot, therefore, extend to the said
Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the Court joined the Sandiganbayan in its holding that
the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to
be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
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PUBLICATION OF LAWS
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA

G.R. No. 158761, December 4, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published.
Facts:
Respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga (Gonzaga) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for

membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II
(ZAMSURECO). Gonzaga was however disqualified on the ground that his spouse was an incumbent
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Under the Electric Cooperative
Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a
candidate whose spouse occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is
prohibited to run as director of an electric cooperative.
Thereafter, contending that the ECEC was never published, hence, null and void, Gonzaga
filed with the RTC a Petition for Prohibition and Damages against petitioner National Electrification
Administration (NEA). The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga and held that the failure of NEA to state
whether the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the
New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987 rendered the ECEC null and void. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the ECEC is valid.
Ruling:
No. The CA correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of
filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in
the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance with the
requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and
implemented.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the
procedure.
In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued by petitioner pursuant to its rule-making authority
provided in PD 269, as amended, particularly Sec. 24. The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in
the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987.
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WAIVER OF RIGHTS
ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE LIZARES v

GONZALO DIZON, RICARDO GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, ROBERTO DIZON,
EDILBERTO CATU, HERMINIGILDO FLORES, CIPRIANO DIZON, JUANARIO MANIAGO, GORGONIO
CANLAS, ANTONIO LISING, CARLOS PINEDA, RENATO GOZUN, ALFREDO MERCADO,
BIENVENIDO MACHADA, and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, REGION III
G.R. No. 148777, October 18, 2007, Velasco Jr. J.
Waiver or an intentional and voluntary surrender of a right can give rise to a valid title or
ownership of a property in favor of another under Article 6 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
Deceased Encarnacion Vda De Panilio (Panlilio) is the owner of various tracts of land located
in Pampanga. Several tenant-farmers, herein private respondents, were planting rice plant upon the
aforementioned tracts of land. On January 20, 1988, Panlilio executed an affidavit which states that
she has placed under the coverage of PD 27 the vast tracts of land without and exception and
therefore be later sold to the tenant-farmers tending the same. Thus pursuant to the January 20
affidavit, Emancipation Patents (EP) were issued to the tenant-farmers tending the aforementioned
tracts of land. On December 29, 1986 Panlilio died. Thereafter George Lizares (Lizares) herein
petitioner and administrator of the estate of Panlilio filed a complaint for cancellation of the EP
issued to the tenant-farmers on the ground that Panlilio executed a subsequent affidavit dated
February 3, 1977 effectively revoking the prior affidavit executed last January 20 of the same year.
The complaint was filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
The PARAD dismissed the complaint of Lizares. On appeal with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) the DARAB affirmed the decision of the PARAD. The CA also
affirmed the decision of the PARAD. It held that the February 3 affidavit was not an authentic
document. Now, Lizares comes to the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the January 12, 1977 affidavit executed by Panlilio contained a valid waiver.
Ruling:
Yes. In the instant case, a large portion of Hacienda Masamat with an aggregate area of
115.41 hectares was planted with sugar cane. It is undisputed, as was duly shown in the January 12,
1977 Panlilio Affidavit, that only 50.22 hectares were planted with palay. Thus, approximately 65.19
hectares of the subject landholdings were planted with sugar cane aside from the portions used for
the residences of the tenants and planted with crops for their daily sustenance. Needless to say, with
the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, she expressed her intent to include the 65.19 hectares to be
placed under the OLT pursuant to PD 27 in favor of her tenants which otherwise would have been
exempt. Indeed, waiver or an intentional and voluntary surrender of a right can give rise to a valid
title or ownership of a property in favor of another under Article 6 of the Civil Code. Thus, such
disposition through the OLT pursuant to PD 27 is indeed legal and proper and no irregularity can be
attributed to the DAR which merely relied on the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit.
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HUMAN RELATIONS
EUSEBIO GONZALES v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL BANK, EDNA OCAMPO,

and ROBERTO NOCEDA
G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011, Velasco, J.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Art. 19. Malice or bad faith "implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. The failure to give
prior notice of the termination of credit line in violation of the agreement stipulation and the
subsequent dishonor of the check on the part of the bank is already prima facie evidence of bad faith.
Facts:
Petitioner Gonzales was a client of the respondent bank. He was granted a Credit-On-Hand
Loan Agreement (COHLA) with his accounts as collateral on the limit of the credit line. Gonzales and
his spouse obtained 3 loans from the bank which was covered by 3 promissory notes and a real
estate mortagage over a parcel of land executed by Gonzales and spouses Panlilio who likewise
obtained one of the loans together with Gonzales. Thereafter, the spouses Panlilio who received the
total amount of the loan, failed to pay the interests due from their PCIB account. When Gonzales
issued a check in favor of Unson, it was dishonored by the bank due to the termination by the PCIB of
the credit line under COHLA and likewise froze the foreign account of Gonzales.
Upon failure of the bank to pay the check to Unson, Gonzales was forced to pay the former in
cash. Gonzales likewise demanded the bank to unfreeze his account since it was not him who
benefitted from the loans but the spouses Panlilio. However, PCIB still refused to heed his demand
which compelled Gonzales to file a case for damages against the bank for unjust dishonor of the check
issued in favor of Unson.
The RTC ruled in favor of PCIB which decision was affirmed by the CA. The lower courts
found Gonzales solidarily liable with spouses Panlilio and that the dishonor of the check as well as
the freezing of the foreign account was justified. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the bank was negligent in not giving prior notice to Gonzales in
terminating the COHLA as stipulated in the agreement.
(2) Whether or not the award of damages in favor of Gonzales is proper.
Ruling:
(1) YES. PCIB was grossly negligent in not giving prior notice to Gonzales about its course of
action to suspend, terminate, or revoke the credit line, thereby violating the clear stipulation in the
COHLA. It is undisputed that the bank unilaterally revoked, suspended, and terminated the COHLA
without giving Gonzales prior notice as required by the above stipulation in the COHLA. Thus
violating Art. 19 of the Civil Code.
In order for Art. 19 to be actionable, the following elements must be present: "(1) the
existence of a legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another." The Court found that such elements are present in the instant case.
The effectivity clause of the COHLA is crystal clear that termination of the COHLA should be done
only upon prior notice served on the CLIENT. This is the legal duty of PCIB to inform Gonzales of
the termination. However, as shown by the above testimonies, PCIB failed to give prior notice to
Gonzales.
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Malice or bad faith is at the core of Art. 19. Malice or bad faith "implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity." In the instant
case, PCIB was able to send a letter advising Gonzales of the unpaid interest on the loans but failed to
mention anything about the termination of the COHLA. More significantly, no letter was ever sent to
him about the termination of the COHLA. The failure to give prior notice on the part of PCIB is
already prima facie evidence of bad faith. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that this case falls squarely
within the purview of the principle of abuse of rights as embodied in Art. 19.
(2) YES. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind. Its
award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication
of a right. In the present case, Gonzales had the right to be informed of the accrued interest and most
especially, for the suspension of his COHLA. For failure to do so, the bank is liable to pay nominal
damages.
Moreover, the failure to give prior notice when required constitutes a breach of contract and
is a clear violation of Art. 21 of the Code which entitles Gonzales to an award for moral damages.
Even in the absence of malice or bad faith, a depositor still has the right to recover reasonable moral
damages, if the depositor suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation.
Furthermore, the initial carelessness of the banks omission in not properly informing
Gonzales of the outstanding interest dues aggravated by its gross neglect in omitting to give prior
notice as stipulated under the COHLA and in not giving actual notice of the termination of the credit
line justifies the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good.
Finally, an award for attorneys fees is likewise called for from PCIBs negligence which compelled
Gonzales to litigate to protect his interest.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
PERSONS
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA

G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.
For prejudicial question to exist, the civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action.
Facts:
Dreamwork Construction filed a complaint affidavit against Cleofe Janiola for violation of BP
22. Subsequently, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The
check, subject of the criminal case, was issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Dreamworks assail that there is no prejudicial question since the element that
the criminal action must be subsequent to the civil action, was missing.
Issue:
Whether or not a prejudicial question exists.
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Ruling:
No. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective since December 1, 2000 provides that
the two essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Therefore, in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case,
it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case.
Assuming arguendo that the civil case was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is still, no
prejudicial question to speak of due to the absence of the second element, because the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22.
The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check.
MARRIAGE (FAMILY CODE)
SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
To show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says,
"The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2)."
Facts:
Syed filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria with the RTC. He
alleged the absence of a marriage license, in Article 4 of the Family Code, as a ground for annulment.
Syed testified that Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia, issued a certification to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo and Myra. RTC held
that there was no valid marriage license because it was issued in violation of Article 9 of the FC as the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that such lack is an absence
of a formal requisite, thus the marriage is void ab initio. CA held that the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license was
conducted, and thus held that said certification has no probative value and gave weight to the fact
that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract and that they comported themselves
to be husband and wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the lack of a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.
Ruling:
YES. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo and Myra. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented
and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document. In Cario v. Cario (403
Phil. 861, 869, 2001), it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden
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of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article
4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, of the same Code. Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly
absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
ERIC U. YU v. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG-BRANCH 261; AND CAROLINE T. YU
G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the
trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition.
Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Eric Yu against Caroline Yu.
Caroline moved that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations, and not simultaneously. Judge Reyes-Carpio
granted such motion stating that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity of marriage and
the issues relating to property relations, custody and support are merely ancillary incidents thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the reception of evidence on custody, support and property relations is
necessary for a complete and comprehensive adjudication of the parties respective claims and
defenses.
Ruling:
NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment
granting the petition. Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. The
trial court shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition.
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DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT
G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in

the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Facts:
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot (Rebecca) and Vicente Madrigal Bayot (Vicente) were
married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified
Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA. Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured
as the latter initiated divorce proceedings in the CFI of Dominican Republic which ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.
Rebecca filed a petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed
an opposition, insisting her Filipino citizenship, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
The RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite. The CA dismissed the petition of Rebecca and set aside incidental orders the
RTC issued in relation to the case.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in
this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated
being an American citizen. The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino
citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of,
or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
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2. Yes. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other. Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husband's obligation under the Civil Code.
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744, 29 February 2008, Second Divison, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal.
Facts:
During the existence of the marriage of Pascual and his wife Florencia, they purchased a lot
in Makati. The TCT was issued in the name of Florencio married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson
Pascual. Subsequently their marriage was declared null and void by the RTC. However, they were
unable to liquidate their conjugal partnership. After the termination, Florencia obtained a loan with
Metrobank, with the property above as one of the securities of the loan. When Florencia failed to pay
the obligation, Metrobank foreclosed on the said property. When Nicholson heard of the foreclosure
proceedings, he filed with the RTC to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property,
since the property, still a conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. The RTC declared
the mortgage to be null and void, since the encumbrance of the property was made without the
consent of Nicholson.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Article
116 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson
and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code. It is Art. 160 of the Civil
Code that would apply. While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art.
116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the
enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally
presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal
funds. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal.
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METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744, 29 February 2008, Second Divison, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
While the declared nullity of marriage of severs the marital bond and dissolves the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
Facts:
During the existence of the marriage of Pascual and his wife Florencia, they purchased a lot
in Makati. The TCT was issued in the name of Florencio married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson
Pascual. Subsequently their marriage was declared null and void by the RTC. However, they were
unable to liquidate their conjugal partnership. After the termination, Florencia obtained a loan with
Metrobank, with the property above as one of the securities of the loan. When Florencia failed to pay
the obligation, Metrobank foreclosed on the said property. When Nicholson heard of the foreclosure
proceedings, he filed with the RTC to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property,
since the property, still a conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. The RTC declared
the mortgage to be null and void, since the encumbrance of the property was made without the
consent of Nicholson.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage
between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community property of the spouses.
Ruling:
No. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital
bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of
the partnership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot a little less than
two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. What governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was
given is co-ownership. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage her one-half undivided interest
in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as
mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and
void.
SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA v. ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and
VILMA B. DE LEON
G.R. No. 185063. July 23, 2009. Third Division. Velasco, Jr., J.
For the presumption to arise, it is not even necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal.
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Facts:
Bonifacio O. De Leon, while still single, purchased from the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) through a Conditional Contract to Sell on July 20, 1965 a parcel of land. Two
years later, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. Full payment for the purchase price was paid during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. However, the title of the land was registered in the name of
Bonifacio with a civil status as single. Later, Bonifacio, without the consent of Anita, conveyed the
property to Spouses Tarrosa.
Subsequently, Bonifacio died. Thereafter, Spouses Tarrosa sought the registration of the
Deed of Sale and issuance of a title of the subject property in their favor. This prompted the children
of Bonifacio and Anita to file a reconveyance suit with the RTC on the grounds that the sale was
fraudulent and lack of consent of Anita to the sale. The RTC ruled that the property is a conjugal
property and rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children. It further nullified the sale
between Bonifacio and Spouses Tarrosa. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute
was conjugal. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the subject property is a conjugal.

2. Whether or not the sale is void due to lack of consent of Anita.
Ruling:
1.Yes. The subject property is the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Article 160 of the
1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted
marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the
presumption to arise it is not even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption
that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired
does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-
Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and
Anita. In a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full
payment of the price. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he
had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than
two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.
2.Yes. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as
administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in
several cases the Court ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds
from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.
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Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions
executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their
validity. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between Bonifacio and the
Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.
THE FAMILY
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that
time already married to someone else. Two sons were born out of their relationship. However, The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. Petitioner, later on, left for the United States with her two children.
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), appending a notarized Deed
of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the
CA. CA modified the Decision of the RTC ruling that notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his
children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons. It also maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO." Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insofar
as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language
may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without
the consent of their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not a father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:
No. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
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readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of
his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children. On the matter of childrens surnames, the use of the fathers surname does not
serve the best interest of the minor child. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is
second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering
his circumstances.
PROPERTY
ACCESSION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ et al.

G.R. No. 179518. November 19, 2014. THIRD DIVISION. Velasco, Jr., J.
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted and sown without right to indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Facts:
Vicente Victor C. Sanchez, Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and Imelda C. Vda. De Sanchez are owners
of a registered land. Felisa Yap (Yap), the widow of Kenneth Nereo Sanchez, and Jesus V. Garcia
(Garcia), doing business under the name Trans American Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), agreed to
the sale of the aforementioned property subject to the conditioned that Garcia shall cause the
reconstitution of the original title. Pursuant to this agreement, Yap turned over to Garcia the original
owners copy of TCT 156254 and other related documents. Unknown to Yap and Vicente, Garcia took
possession of the property and advertised the construction and sale of "Trans American Townhouse
V" thereon. Later, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon.
Thereafter, Yap and the Sanchezes filed before the RTC in Quezon City a Complaint dated for
the rescission of contract, restitution and damages with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction
against TSEI and Garcia. Meanwhile, Garcia managed to cause the cancellation of TCT 156254 and its
replacement with TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI and use such to entice buyers who to buy the
townhouse units being constructed by TSEI on the subject lot. Furthermore, Garcia was able to
convey parts of the property to several buyers who intervened in the instant case: the spouses Jose
and Visitacion Caminas (Caminas), Reynaldo V. Maniwang (Maniwang), Generoso C. Tulagan
(Tulagan), Varied Traders Concept, Inc. (VTCI), and Arturo Marquez (Marquez).
The RTC ruled that anent the rights of intervenors, the Sanchezes to have a better right over
the subject property considering that the transactions between Garcia/TSEI and the intervenors
suffered from several irregularities, which they, the intervenors, in bad faith, ignored.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sanchezes and Yap are entitled to the remedies provided in Article 449-
450 of the Civil Code.
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Ruling:
Yes. The Sanchezes are to elect their option under the Arts. 449-450 of the New Civil Code.
The bad faith on the part of TSEI, Garcia and the intervenors leads to the application of Articles 449-
450 of the New Civil Code. Consequently, the Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the
property with the townhouses and other buildings and improvements that may be thereon without
indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to demolish what has
been built on the property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay
the price of the land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within thirty
(30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the
value of the land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair
market value of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.
If the Sanchezes decide to appropriate the townhouses, other structures and improvements
as their own pursuant to Article 449 of the Civil Code, then the intervenors-purchasers Caminas,
Maniwang, Tulagan, Marquez and VCTI shall be ordered to vacate said premises within a reasonable
time from notice of the finality of the decision by the Sanchezes. They have a right to recover their
investment in the townhouses from Garcia and TSEI. If the Sanchezes do not want to make use of the
townhouses and improvements on the subject lot, then the purchasers can be ordered to demolish
said townhouses or if they dont demolish the same within a reasonable time, then it can be
demolished at their expense. On the 3rd option, if the Sanchezes do not want to appropriate the
townhouses or have the same demolished, then they can ask that the townhouse purchasers pay to
them the fair market value of the respective areas allotted to their respective townhouses subject of
their deeds of sale.
DONATION
TIRSO MONTEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 105608, April 30, 2008, J. Velasco, Jr.
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO MONTEROSO
The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way
enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject
of ratification, either express or implied.
Facts:
Don Fabian Monteroso, Sr. married twice and sired eight (8) children, four (4) from each
union. In his first marriage with Soledad Doldol, Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso were born.
After Doldol died, his second marriage with Sofia Pendejito bore Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and
Fabian, Jr. During the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed before the CFI of Agusan an
intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife to obviate any dispute over the
inheritance. The project for partition was approved and the intestate estate of Doldol was partitioned
and distributed to her four (4) children in equal shares.
In the meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married accordingly,
Soledad to Atty. Perfecto Cagampang, Sr., Reygula to Jose Bayan, Benjamin to Mauricia Nakila; and
Tirso to Melecia Tana. Benjamin died, leaving behind four (4) children and his wife. A year and a half
later, Don Fabian also passed away. This brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal
patrimonies of Don Fabian from his two (2) successive marriages. The children of Benjamin filed
with the RTC a complaint for recovery of property with damages against their uncle, Tirso.
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As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, Tirso was entrusted with of the parcel
of land part of the share from the estate of Doldol. However, their uncle refused to surrender and
deliver the same when demanded upon the reaching of their majority age. Tirso, in response, alleged
that the said portion was never entrusted to him. It was in the possession of his sister, Soledad, who
was not entitled to any share in the said parcel, having previously opted to exchange hers for another
parcel of land. On the other hand, filed a complaint for partition and damages with receivership
against his stepmother Pendejito and all his step-siblings, which involves 12 parcels of land.
In the latter civil case, Tirso alleged the following: 1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land
belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian; (2)
SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for
the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as
some parcels were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his 1/4 share or legitime; and (3) the parcels
acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian are not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito
Vda. de Monteroso. The said civil cases were consolidated and the RTC, after fifteen (15) years,
decided in Tirsos favor. However, the subsequent ruling of the RTC ordered Tirso and Soledad to
deliver the specific properties to the respective heirs of Benjamin. On appeal, the CA declared the
partition valid and dismissed the opposition of the Cagampang spouses and Reygulo Monteroso-
Bayan, who all claimed ownership over some of the parcels of land on the strength of the deeds of
conveyance executed in their favor. On the alleged donation to Reygula, the CA likewise agreed with
the RTCs ruling on the nullity thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation executed after the death of Don Fabian in favor of
Reygula is valid, even if Tirso and the heirs of Benjamin do not question its validity as they in fact
signed the same.
Ruling:
No. Just like the issue of the nullity of the three deeds of absolute sale, we agree with the
determination of the RTC and CA as to the invalidity of the donation to Reygula. We need not repeat
the reasons for such determination, except the most basic. We refer to the authority of the person
who executed the deed of donation. As it were, the widow of Benjamin, Nakila, signed the deed of
donation. She, however, cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto.
The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet applies to this instance as Nakila only has usufructuary
right equal to the share of her children under Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides,
Nakila signed the deed of donation in her name and not in the name of her children who are the heirs
in representation of their father, Benjamin. Lest it be overlooked, the then minor children were not
under the legal guardianship of Nakila, a situation which thus disqualifies her from signing on their
behalf.
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PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES
LACHES
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY v. CELSO OATE

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier. Verily, laches
serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies.
Facts:
Spouses Oate, owner of a lot, had 3 children: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco. Celso Oate is
the son of Francisco. Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on a portion of the
disputed lot. Celso filed a reconstitution which was granted by the RTC. Later, a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate and Cession was executed by Celso and his sisters who waived their successional
rights. Celso claimed ownership of said lot through the deed of extrajudicial settlement. He caused
the lot to be subdivided into 5 lots. Celsos counsel sent a letter to DepEd apprising it about the facts
and circumstances affecting the elementary school and proposed that it purchase a portion Lot No.
6859-A and requested for reasonable rentals from. Celso filed a complaint for Annulment of Donation
and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of the lot. The RTC ruled in favor of Celso and
upon appeal, the CA declared the appeals of both petitioners abandoned and dismissed for failure to
pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period. It filed a MR and its appeal was
reinstated. The Municipality of Daraga, Albay totally lost its appeal due to inaction, and the CA issued
a Partial Entry of Judgment and further ruled that Celso's claim of ownership over the lot occupied by
the school is conclusive for being soundly predicated on its title.
Issue:
Whether or not laches can inure to the benefit of DepEd considering that the lot was devoted
to public education when the civil case was filed by Celso.
Ruling:
Yes. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done
earlier. Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to
the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice
to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant case, with the foregoing
considerations, we are constrained from giving approbation to the trial and appellate courts' ruling
that the application of the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for
the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had
slept on their rights for 52 years. Also, the inaction of respondent Oate and his predecessors-in-
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interest for over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a stale
demand.
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS(ALU) and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-

ALU(DWUEU-ALU) v. CA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PALO, LEYTE(RCAP) and
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN(DWUT)
G.R. No. 156882, October 31, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by the exercise of due diligence could or should have been done earlier.
Facts:
RCAP is a corporation sole which sold to Societas Verbum Dei(SVD) the subject 13 parcels of
land. While the conveying document was not notarized, the SVD was able to secure the
corresponding TCTs over the subject lots, but the deed conditions, restrictions, and reversionary
right of the RCAP were not annotated. Due to labor unrest, DWUT, run by the SVD, and the Union
engaged in a protracted legal battle. RCAP filed a petition for annotation. RTC dismissed the petition.
RCAP filed a MR. RTC denied the MR on the ground of laches noting that it took the RCAP 37 years
after the execution of the deed of sale before taking judicial action to assert his rights. CA reversed
and held that the RCAP was not barred by laches from asserting his legal right to cause the
annotation of the pertinent paragraphs of the deed of sale on the TCTs covering the subject
properties. It ratiocinated that despite the lapse of 37 years, the annotation would not be inequitable
or prejudicial to any party since the SVD, under whose name the TCTs of the subject properties were
issued, did not interpose any objection to the annotation. It noted that the RTC Order did not specify
the party who would be prejudiced by the annotation.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of laches.
Ruling:
No. According to settled jurisprudence, "laches" means "the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligence
could or should have been done earlier." Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it of any
judicial remedies. Elements: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the
defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the
defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded
to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
The 4th and most important element, that is, injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held barred, is not present under the
premises. As the CA aptly observed, no prejudice can result from the annotation pleaded by the RCAP
since the SVD, the property purchaser, did not oppose the annotation as evidenced by a
manifestation the DWUT filed before the RTC. More so, no prejudice can befall the Union for no
judgment lien has attached or been imposed over the subject properties and, as earlier explained,
there is no showing that the subject properties are the only properties the DWUT has or that its other
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assets and properties are insufficient to meet its obligations. Thus, failing to show any actual interest
over the subject properties that need judicial protection, the Union will not suffer any damage with
the annotation.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
OBLIGATIONS
DEFINITION
SM LAND, INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015, Velasco Jr., J.
A contract is a juridical convention manifested in legal form, by virtue of which one or more
persons bind themselves in favor of another or others, or reciprocally, to the fulfillment of a prestation
to give, to do, or not to do. Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat
the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public.
Facts:
Pursuant to R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA opened for disposition and development its Bonifacio
South Property. SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the
development of the lot which was accepted by the BCDA. However, the BCDA clarified that its act
should not be construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture agreement with SMLI but
only constitutes an authorization to conduct detailed negotiations with SMLI and iron out the terms
and conditions of the agreement. Afterwards, a Certification was issued by the BCDA and signed by
both parties. Then, instead of proceeding with the Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded
with SMLI stating that it will welcome any voluntary and unconditional proposal to improve the
original offer. In turn, SMLI increased the total secured payments with an upfront payment. Without
responding to SMLIs new proposal, the BCDA sent a memorandum to the OP categorically
recommending the termination of the Competitive Challenge. Alarmed by this development, SMLI
urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge as agreed upon. However, the BCDA
terminated the Competitive Challenge altogether.
For its part, SMLI alleged in its petition that the Certification issued by the BCDA and signed
by the parties constituted a contract and that under the said contract, BCDA cannot renege on its
obligation to conduct and complete the Competitive Challenge. The BCDA relies chiefly on the
reservation clause in the Terms of Reference (TOR), which mapped out the procedure to be followed
in the Competitive Challenge, which allegedly authorized the agency to unilaterally cancel the
Competitive Challenge. BCDA add that the terms and conditions agreed upon are disadvantageous to
the government, and that it cannot legally be barred by estoppel in correcting a mistake committed
by its agents. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not there exists a valid agreement between SMLI and BCBA.
(2) Whether or not estoppel can be invoked against BCDA.
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Ruling:
(1) YES. There is a perfected contract. When SMLI submitted the first Unsolicited Proposal
to BCDA, the submission constituted an offer to undertake the development of the subject property.
BCDA then entered into negotiations with SMLI until the BCDA finally accepted the terms of the final
unsolicited proposal. Their agreement was thereafter reduced into writing through the issuance of
the Certification of Successful Negotiations where the meeting of the parties minds was reflected.
Then, to manifest their assent to the terms thereof and their respective obligations, both parties
affixed their signatures thereon and had it notarized. The cause of the agreement in the case at hand
is their interest in the sale or acquisition and development of the property and their undertaking to
perform their respective obligations, among others, as reflected in the Certificate and TOR issued by
BCDA. When the BCDA Board issued the Certification, it not only accepted SMLIs Unsolicited
Proposal and declared SMLI eligible to enter into the proposed JV activity. It also agreed to subject
SMLIs Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge pursuant to the NEDA JV Guidelines, which
competitive challenge process shall be immediately implemented following the TOR Volumes 1 and
2. Moreover, said Certification provides that the BCDA shall, thus, commence the activities for the
solicitation for comparative proposals xxx on which date SMLI shall post the required Proposal
Security xxx.
(2) YES. This is in view of the fact that despite BCDAs repeated assurances that it would
respect SMLIs rights as an original proponent, and after putting the latter to considerable trouble
and expense, BCDA went back on its word to comply with its obligations under their agreement and
instead ultimately cancelled the same. BCDAs capriciousness becomes all the more evident in its
conflicting statements as regards whether or not SMLIs proposal would be advantageous to the
government. Despite the testament, the BCDA, over a year later, made a complete turnaround stating
that straight bidding will be best for the Government. As can be gleaned from the BCDAs
Memorandum to the President, respondents themselves recommended to the President that the
selection proceedings be terminated. Moreover, the alleged adverse economic impact on the
government, in finding for SMLI, does not constitute a valid cause for the reversal of the assailed
Decision. To clarify, the courts ruling did not award the project in petitioners favor but merely
ordered that SMLIs proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge. Consequently, any alleged
disadvantage the government would suffer is speculative at most as there is no final award for the
project yet.
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF OBLIGATIONS
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. SPS. LIBRADO RAMOS and REMEDIOS RAMOS

G.R. No. 193723, July 20, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandable
and liquidated; second, the debtor delays performance; and third, the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtors performance.
Facts:
General Milling Corporation (GMC) entered into a Growers Contract with spouses Librado
and Remedios Ramos to supply broiler chickens for the spouses to raise. The contract was
accompanied by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a piece of real property. The spouses further
agreed to put up a surety bond. Spouses Ramos eventually were unable to settle their account with
GMC. On March 31, 1997, GMC notified Spouses Ramos that GMC would institute foreclosure
proceedings. On May 7, 1997, GMC filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. The
property was subsequently sold. The Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or
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Declaration of Nullity of the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale with Damages. It was alleged that the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage had no fixed term. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Ramos stating that the
action of GMC in moving for the foreclosure was premature, because the latters obligation under
their contract was not yet due. The CA found that GMCs action against Spouses Ramos was
premature, as they were not in default when the action was filed on May 7, 1997. GMC claims that its
March 31, 1997 letter is akin to a demand.
Issue:
Whether or not a sufficient demand was made by GMC.
Ruling:
No. According to the CA, GMC did not make a demand on Spouses Ramos but merely
requested them to go to GMCs office to discuss the settlement of their account. In spite of the lack of
demand made on the spouses, however, GMC proceeded with the foreclosure proceedings. We agree
with the appellate court that GMC should have first made a demand on the spouses before
proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage. In the case of Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Licuanan, the court stated that the issue of whether demand was made before the foreclosure was
effected is essential. If demand was made and duly received by the respondents and the latter still did
not pay, then they were already in default and foreclosure was proper. However, if demand was not
made, then the loans had not yet become due and demandable. This meant that respondents had not
defaulted in their payments and the foreclosure by petitioner was premature. Foreclosure is valid
only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation.
KINDS OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ et al.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code states that rescission is available to a party in a reciprocal
obligation where one party fails to comply therewith.
Facts:
Vicente Victor C. Sanchez, Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and Imelda C. Vda. De Sanchez are owners
of a registered land. Felisa Yap (Yap), the widow of Kenneth Nereo Sanchez, and Jesus V. Garcia
(Garcia), doing business under the name Trans American Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), agreed to
the sale of the aforementioned property subject to the conditioned that Garcia shall cause the
reconstitution of the original title. Pursuant to this agreement, Yap turned over to Garcia the original
owners copy of TCT 156254 and other related documents. Unknown to Yap and Vicente, Garcia took
possession of the property and advertised the construction and sale of "Trans American Townhouse
V" thereon. Later, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon.
Thereafter, Yap and the Sanchezes filed before the RTC in Quezon City a Complaint dated for
the rescission of contract, restitution and damages with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction
against TSEI and Garcia. Meanwhile, Garcia managed to cause the cancellation of TCT 156254 and its
replacement with TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI and use such to entice buyers who to buy the
townhouse units being constructed by TSEI on the subject lot. Furthermore, Garcia was able to
convey parts of the property to several buyers who intervened in the instant case: the spouses Jose
and Visitacion Caminas (Caminas), Reynaldo V. Maniwang (Maniwang), Generoso C. Tulagan
(Tulagan), Varied Traders Concept, Inc. (VTCI), and Arturo Marquez (Marquez).
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The RTC ruled that anent the rights of intervenors, the Sanchezes to have a better right over
the subject property considering that the transactions between Garcia/TSEI and the intervenors
suffered from several irregularities, which they, the intervenors, in bad faith, ignored.
Issue:
Whether or not rescission of the agreement is barred by the subsequent transfer of the
property.
Ruling:
NO. Rescission of the Agreement was not barred by the subsequent transfer. In the extant
case, the failure of TSEI to pay the consideration for the sale of the subject property entitled the
Sanchezes to rescind the Agreement. And in view of the finding that the intervenors acted in bad faith
in purchasing the property, the subsequent transfer in their favor did not and cannot bar rescission.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and
PRODUCERS BANK.
G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the
creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to the latter.
Facts:
Respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner Allied Banking Corporation a money
market placement of PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days. Then, a person claiming to be Lim Sio
Wan called up an officer of Allied to pre-terminate the money market placement, to issue a managers
check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos.
Allied issued a check, which was cross-checked "For Payees Account Only" and given to Santos. The
Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Banks payment of its
obligation to FCC. Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check. The check was sent to Allied through
the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the
authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement. Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second
money market placement. Upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan
went to Allied to withdraw it. She was then informed of the events that transpired but she denied it
authorizing it. The bank manager then assured her that her money would be recovered. However,
when she realized that the promise would not happen, she sent a demand letter to Allied. Allied
refused to pay claiming that Lim Sio Wan authorized the pre-termination.
Issue:
Whether or not Allied and Metrobank is liable to Lim Sio Wan.
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Ruling:
Yes. The relationship between a bank (Allied) and a client (Lim Sio Wan) is one of debtor-
creditor. A money market placement is a simple loan or mutuum. Allied is negligent in issuing the
managers check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization. Allied did not
even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her
residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have prevented the whole
fraudulent transaction. As commented by Tolentino, payment made by the debtor to a wrong party
does not extinguish the obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be
imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the
person of his creditor, or through error induced by the fraud of a third person, the payment to one
who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such payment, is void, except as provided in
Article 1241. Since no effective payment was made to Lim Sio Wan, the bank still has an obligation to
pay her at 6% interest. However, Metrobank, as the last indorser of the check, is also liable. When
Metrobank indorsed the check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations without verifying
the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans indorsement and when it accepted the check despite the fact that it
was cross-checked payable to payees account only, its negligent indorsement contributed to the
easier release of Lim Sio Wans money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the relative participation
of Allied and Metrobank, both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of
the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank must be upheld.
HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. vs. DYNAMIC PLANNERS AND
CONSTRUCTION CORP.
G.R. Nos. 169408 & 170144, April 30, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
An obligee is deemed to have waived strict compliance by an obligor with an obligation when
there is an actual knowledge and with intentional acceptance of an incomplete performance, and under
circumstances that would indicate an intention to consider it as complete.
Facts:
Hanjin was awarded a contract for the construction of Davao International Airport Project. It
entered into a Subcontract Agreement with Dynamic wherein Hanjin agreed to pay Dynamic a down
payment within 20 days from contract execution, however, it was paid in 10 installments and also
payments for progress billings came late. Dynamic found design deficiency and called Hanjins
attention to it but upon the prodding of Hanjin which relied on a contrary assessment, Dynamic
proceeded with the construction. The flawed design manifest themselves by cracks appearing in the
beams to the second floor. Upon investigation, it was found out that there was a failure of structural
design. Dynamic recommended post-tensioning but Hanjin refused and it eventually approved the
use of carbon fiber to be used by a new subcontractor. Hanjin served notice that it will not pay the
progress billings for works done after April 2000. By December 2002, when project works had
reached a 94% completion level, Hanjin took over the Project because of alleged abandonment.
Hanjin claims that Dynamic should not be entitled to the retention money because of the delay and
Dynamics subsequent abandonment. Dynamic denies the abandonment but admits suspending work
due to Hanjins act of withholding the release of the down payment and the payment of its progress
billing.
Issue:
Whether or not Dynamic abandoned the work and whether or not it is entitled to the
retention money.
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Ruling:
No. Dynamic did not abandon the work and it is entitled to the retention money. By its
unjustifiable actions, Hanjin forced Dynamic out of the Project when the subcontract works were
already 94% complete. In net effect, Hanjin accepted the benefits arising from the subcontract
agreement without asking Dynamic to finish its part of the bargain. An obligee is deemed to have
waived strict compliance by an obligor with an obligation when the following elements are present:
(1) an intentional acceptance of the defective or incomplete performance; (2) with actual knowledge
of the incompleteness or defect; and (3) under circumstances that would indicate an intention to
consider the performance as complete and renounce any claim arising from the defect. All elements
are present. Hanjin knew that the subcontract works were not yet complete as there were
unresolved matters involving structural design deficiencies. Hanjin made no demand upon Dynamic
to finish its contractual undertaking. By operation of law, Hanjin is thus deemed to have waived its
right to claim any payment for expenses it incurred in completing the work. The admission by Hanjin
that after the April 2002 progress billings, it did not pay Dynamic for work it had accomplished
provides sufficient legal justification for not continuing with the work. There is no legal basis for
Hanjin to withhold payment of Dynamics retention money because when it willfully took over the
unfinished work, it in effect waived any and all of its rights to hold Dynamic liable for any defects,
deficiencies or unfinished work.
BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES -

MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163101, February 13, 2008, Velasco J.
When the mode of payment embodied in the contract is complied with by obligee, the contract
is deemed consummated and cannot be cancelled for non-payment by reason of non-compliance of a
requirement not indicated in the contract.
Facts:
Benguet Corporation and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims. Thus,
on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its
intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President sent a letter to the
President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP on the following
grounds: (a) The fact that the company has failed to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP,
i.e., to undertake development works within 2 years from the execution of the
Agreement; (b) Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on our claim (c) No
stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of the RAWOP. (d) Non-payment of the
royalties thereon as provided in the RAWOP.
Thereafter, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP
with the Legaspi City Panel of Arbitrators (POA) which cancelled the RAWOP and subsequently
affirmed by Mining Adjudication Board (MAB). Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of the Royalty agreement for alleged breach of contract by
non payment is proper.
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Ruling:
Yes. Evidently, the RAWOP itself provides for the mode of royalty payment by Benguet. The
fact that there was the previous practice whereby J.G. Realty picked-up the checks from Benguet is
unavailing. The mode of payment is embodied in a contract between the parties. As such, the contract
must be considered as the law between the parties and binding on both. Thus, after J.G. Realty
informed Benguet of the bank account where deposits of its royalties may be made, Benguet had the
obligation to deposit the checks. J.G. Realty had no obligation to furnish Benguet with a Board
Resolution considering that the RAWOP itself provided for such payment scheme.
CONSIGNATION
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. v. ROSARIO ALZUL

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities
whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior
tender of payment.
Facts:
Alzul purchased from B.E. San Diego 4 subdivision lots and took possession of the property.
Alzul signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights" which assigned to Wilson Yu
her rights under the Contract to Sell in which B.E. San Diego was notified. The contract in Alzuls
name was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of Yu. Alzul informed B.E. San Diego about
Yu's failure to pay the amounts due and manifested that she would be the one to pay the installments.
Alzul filed for rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against Yu and caused the annotation
of notices of lis pendens on the titles. The RTC ruled in favor of Alzul and was affirmed by the CA. B.E.
San Diego notified Alzul that the contract was declared rescinded and the lots were sold to Spouses
Ventura who later filed an action for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and
Damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses but was reversed upon appeal.
Alzul tried to serve payment upon B.E. San Diego but the latter refused to accept it. Hence,
Alzul made a manifestation regarding the refusal. Alzul's counsel wrote a letter to B.E. San Diego
citing the latter's refusal and that due to it, Alzul would just consign the balance before the proper
judicial authority but such was rejected by B.E. San Diego. Hence, Alzul filed an action for
consignation and specific performance before the HLURB which was dismissed. Upon appeal to the
OP, it ruled that there was no valid consignation since the period had already prescribed. However, it
was reversed by the CA stating that although there was no valid consignation it found that justice
would be better served by allowing Alzul to effect the consignation.
Issue:
Whether or not Alzul is still entitled to consignation despite the lapse of the period
prescribed by the Court.
Ruling:
No. We agree with petitioner's assertion that even granting arguendo that the instant case
for consignation was instituted within the 30-day period or within a reasonable time thereafter, it
would still not accord respondent relief as no valid consignation was made. Certainly, the records
show that there was no valid consignation made by respondent before the HLURB as she did not
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deposit the amount with the quasi-judicial body as required by law and the rules. Pertinently, the
first paragraph of Article 1258 of the Civil Code provides that "consignation shall be made
by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment
shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases."
Moreover, in order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there
was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom
tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because s/he was absent or incapacitated, or
because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the
obligation had been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person
interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the
court; and (5) after the consignation had been made, the person interested was notified of the action.
Respondent did not comply with the provisions of law particularly with the fourth and fifth
requirements specified above for a valid consignation. In her complaint for consignation and specific
performance, respondent only prayed that she be allowed to make the consignation without placing
or depositing the amount due at the disposal of the court of origin. Verily, respondent made no valid
consignation.
CONTRACTS
SPOUSES TAGUMPAY N. ALBOS and AIDA C. ALBOS v. SPOUSES NESTOR M. EMBISAN and
ILUMINADA A. EMBISAN, DEPUTY SHERIFF MARINO V. CACHERO, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210831. November 26, 2014. THIRD DIVISION. Velasco, JR., J.
Art. 1306. The contracting parties mayb establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
Facts:
Spouses Albos entered a loan agreement with Spouses Embisan in the amount P84,000.00
payable within 90 days with a monthly interest rate of 5% secured by a real estate mortgage. Due to
the repeated failure of the petitioners to settle their obligation and their subsequent request for
extensions, Spouses Embisan, imposed a condition that the monthly 5% interest from then on will be
compounded. However this agreement was not reduced into writing. With the interest being
compounded, the obligation of the petitioner ballooned to P296,658.70. Despite the extension given,
Spouses Albos failed to pay their loan. This prompted Spouses Embisan to extra-judicially foreclose
the property. Spouses Embisan emerged as the highest bidder and were issued a Sheriffs Certificate
of Sale. Due to failure to redeem the property, Spouses Emisan executed an Affidavit of Consolidation
over the property and the property was later registered in their name.
Issue:
Whether or not the interest rate agreed upon by the parties is unconscionable.
Ruling:
Yes. Imposing 5% monthly interest, whether compounded or simple, is unconscionable.

Even if there was such an agreement that interest will be compounded the 5% monthly rate, be it
simple or compounded, written or verbal, is void for being too exorbitant, thus running afoul of
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Article 1306 of the New Civil Code. As case law instructs, the imposition of an unconscionable rate of
interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is
tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the
common sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience
nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that
may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.
P.L. UY REALTY CORP. v. ALS MANAGEMENT AND DEV. CORP. and ANTONIO S. LITONJUA
G.R. No. 166462, October 24, 2012, Velasco, J.
Art. 1306 of the Civil Code guarantees the freedom of parties to stipulate the terms of their
contract provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Thus, when the provisions of a contract are valid, the parties are bound by such terms under the
principle that a contract is the law between the parties.
Facts:
PLU (vendor) and ALS (vendee) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage covering a
parcel of land. Notably, the parties stipulated in paragraph 4.a of the Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage on the eviction of informal settlers: It is understood that the VENDOR shall have the
property clear of any existing occupants/squatters, the removal of which shall be for the sole
expenses & responsibilities of the VENDOR & that the VENDEE is authorized to withhold payment of
the 1st 24% installment unless the above-undertaking is done and completed to the satisfaction of
the VENDEE. Subsequently, the parties executed a Partial Release of Mortgage attesting to the
payment by ALS of the first installment. ALS, however, failed to pay the 2nd payment despite
demands. PLU filed a Complaint. RTC declared that the removal of the informal settlers on the
property is still a subsisting and valid condition, thus it found the obligation of ALS to pay the balance
of the purchase price has not yet fallen due and demandable and it dismissed the case for being
premature. PLU filed another complaint and RTC dismissed it.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in paragraph 4.a between PLU and ALS is valid.
Ruling:
YES. Art. 1306 of the Civil Code guarantees the freedom of parties to stipulate the terms of
their contract provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Thus, when the provisions of a contract are valid, the parties are bound by such terms
under the principle that a contract is the law between the parties.
Here, both parties knew for a fact that the property subject of their contract was occupied by
informal settlers, whose eviction would entail court actions that in turn, would require some amount
of time. They also knew that the length of time that would take to conclude such court actions was
not within their power to determine. Despite such knowledge, both parties still agreed to the
stipulation that the payment of the balance of the purchase price would be deferred until the
informal settlers are ejected. There was never any allegation that PLU was coerced into signing the
Deed of Sale with Mortgage or that its consent was in any way vitiated. PLU was free to accept or
decline such contracted provision. Thus, PLU cannot be allowed to renege on its agreement. It is to be
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borne in mind that the facts show that the parties were fully aware that the land described was
occupied by squatters. As the parties must have known that they could not take the law into their
own hands, but must resort to legal processes in evicting the squatters, they must have realized that
the duration of the suits to be brought would not be under their control nor could the same be
determine in advance. The conclusion is thus forced that the parties must have intended to defer the
performance of the obligations under the contract until the squatters were duly evicted.
INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION

Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a contract void under Article 1355
of the Civil Code. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven that there
was fraud, mistake or undue influence.
Facts:
Philippine Coconut Administration(PCA) have the largest membership in the COCOFUND. A

part of the coconut levy funds was acquired by the United Coconut Planters Bank(UCPB). Cojuangco
had the exclusive option to acquire UCPBs controlling interests. The 1st agreement was by and
between Cojuangco for and in his behalf and Pedro Cojuangco in which the former was purportedly
accorded the option to buy the option shares. The 2nd agreement had PCA, for itself and for the
benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco the shares of stock subject of the 1st
Agreement.
While the 64.98% portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of
and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion,
which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the UCPB capital stock were
not covered by any of the agreements. PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute the UCPB shares
purchased to such coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND receipts on equitable basis. As
found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase
of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it would later reimburse itself from the coconut levy fund. And per
Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the 72.2%
option shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangcos
equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but
unissued shares of UCPB and (b) the increase in UCPBs capital stock. In all, from the "mother" PCA
shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 UCPB shares broken down as follows: 14,440
shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Issue:
Whether or not the PCA-COJUANGCO agreement is a valid contract.
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Ruling:
Yes. Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a contract void under Article
1355 of the Civil Code. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven
which in the case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. While one may
posit that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement puts PCA and the coconut farmers at a disadvantage, the
facts do not make out a clear case of violation of any law that will necessitate the recall of said
contract. Indeed, the anti-graft court has not put forward any specific stipulation therein that is at
war with any law, or the Constitution, for that matter. It is even clear as day that none of the parties
who entered into the two agreements with petitioner Cojuangco contested nor sought the
nullification of said agreements, more particularly the PCA who is always provided legal advice in
said transactions by the Government corporate counsel, and a battery of lawyers and presumably the
COA auditor assigned to said agency. A government agency, like the PCA, stoops down to level of an
ordinary citizen when it enters into a private transaction with private individuals. In this setting, PCA
is bound by the law on contracts and is bound to comply with the terms of the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement which is the law between the parties.
While consideration is usually in the form of money or property, it need not be monetary. A
consideration, in the legal sense of the word, is some right, interest, benefit, or advantage conferred
upon the promisor, to which he is otherwise not lawfully entitled, or any detriment, prejudice, loss,
or disadvantage suffered or undertaken by the promisee other than to such as he is at the time of
consent bound to suffer. The Court rules that the transfer of the subject UCPB shares is clearly
supported by valuable consideration.
KINDS OF CONTRACTS
ANTHONY ORDUA, DENNIS ORDUA, and ANTONITA ORDUA v. EDUARDO J. FUENTEBELLA,

MARCOS S. CID, BENJAMIN F. CID, BERNARD G. BANTA, and ARMANDO GABRIEL, JR.
The Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. 2 of the Civil Code applies only to
executory contracts. The legal consequence of non-compliance with the Statute does not come into play
where the contract in question is completed, executed or partially consummated.
Facts:
Gabriel, Sr. sold the subject lot to petitioner Antonita Ordua, payable in installment, but no
formal deed was executed to document the sale. The installments were paid to Gabriel, Sr. and later
to Gabriel, Jr. after the formers death. Improvements were thereafter made by petitioner. Without
the knowledge of petitioners, Gabriel, Jr. sold the property to Banta, who then sold the same to the
Cids and ultimately it was ceded to respondent Fuentebella. Petitioner, after being demanded by
Fuentebella to vacate the disputed land, then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Title,
Reconveyance with damages with a prayer to acquire ownership over the subject lot upon payment
of their remaining balance. The RTC dismissed the petition because the verbal sale was
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The CA affirmed this ruling.
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Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the subject lot by Gabriel, Jr. to Antonita is unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds.
Ruling:
No. The Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. 2 of the Civil Code applies only to
executory contracts, i.e. those where no performance has yet been made. Stated a bit differently, the
legal consequence of non-compliance with the Statute does not come into play where the contract in
question is completed, executed or partially consummated. The Statute of Frauds, in context,
provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of an interest therein shall be unenforceable
unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party or his
agent. However, where the verbal contract of sale has been partially executed through the partial
payments made by one party duly received by the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is taken
out of the scope of the Statute.
A contract that infringes the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under
the contract. Evidently, Gabriel, Jr., as his father earlier, had benefited from the partial payments
made by the petitioners. Thus, neither Gabriel Jr. nor the other respondents successive purchasers
of subject lot could plausibly set up the Statute of Frauds to thwart petitioners efforts towards
establishing their lawful right over the subject lot and removing any cloud in their title. As it were,
petitioners need only to pay the outstanding balance of the purchase price and that would complete
the execution of the oral sale.

The fact that only one of the subject lots was used as collateral for a P 600 loan, which the
Cagampang spouses took out, does not weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of the
contracts, as logically drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to.
Facts:
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Issue:
Whether or not the deeds of sale are sham, fictitious and simulated.
Ruling:
Yes. The antecedent facts, as borne by the records, strongly indicate the simulated character
of the sale covered by the deeds of absolute sale. As found below, Don Fabian never relinquished
possession of the covered properties during his lifetime. The first deed was executed on May 1, 1939;
the second on May 10, 1939; and the third on September 24, 1939. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang,
however, only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabians death in 1948 or nine (9)
years after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the
parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby.
The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the
amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed
as real party-in-interest on the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back portion of the titles. If
only to stress the point, when the deeds were executed in 1939, Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang,
the notarizing officer, were already married. A property acquired during the existence of a marriage
is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to
make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wifes paraphernal properties. No
explanation was given for this unusual move.
Hence, the Court agrees that the unexplained situations described above sufficiently show
that the purported conveyances were simulated. We also accord credence to Tirsos allegation that
the Cagampang spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties
which have to be "hidden" by means of simulated conveyances to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang.
The fact that only one of the subject lots was used as collateral for a P 600 loan which the Cagampang
spouses took out does not weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of the contracts, as
logically drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to.
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ESTOPPEL
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v ALFREDO ONG

G.R. No. 190755, November 24, 2010, Velasco Jr. J.
The elements of estoppel are: First, the actor who usually must have knowledge, notice or
suspicion of the true facts, communicates something to another in a misleading way, either by words,
conduct or silence; second, the other in fact relies, and relies reasonably or justifiably, upon that
communication; third, the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to assert any
claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct; and fourth, the actor knows, expects or foresees that the
other would act upon the information given or that a reasonable person in the actors position would
expect or foresee such action.
Facts:
Sps. Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City (Land Bank) herein petitioner, in the
amount of P16,000,000. The aforementioned loan was secured by 3 parcels of land. Subsequently
however, the Sps Sy found that they could no longer pay their loan. As a result, they sold the
aforementioned 3 parcels of land to one Angelina Gloria Ong married to Alfredo Ong. Thereafter
Alfredo Ong (Ong), herein respondent, went to Land Bank to inform it about the aforementioned sale
and their assumption of mortgage. Land Bank told Ong to pay part of the principal which was pegged
at P750,000 so that their application for assumption of mortgage would be approved by Land Bank.
Thus Ong, paid the aforementioned amount. However, Land Bank denied his application for
assumption of mortgage. Subsequently, Ong learned of the foreclosure of the aforementioned
mortgaged properties. This prompted Ong to demand the return of the P750,000 he paid to Land
Bank on the ground that his application for assumption of mortgage was denied. Land Bank refused
to return the aforementioned amount. This prompted Ong to file a case for sum of money against
Land Bank for the return of the P750,000 paid by the former to the latter.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ong and ordered Land Bank to return the amount of P750,000
paid. On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Now, Land Bank comes before
the Supreme Court assailing decision of the RTC and CA. Land Bank argues that it should not be
ordered to return the P750,000 to Ong because the aforementioned payment was tendered prior to
the application for assumption of mortgage and that in truth and in fact it was tendered to be applied
for the debt contract by the Sps. Sy. Furthermore, it alleged that it enjoyed a presumption of
regularity and was in good faith when it accepted the P750,000.
Issue:
Whether Land Bank should return the amount paid by Ong.
Ruling:
Yes. We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the P750,000 based on the
principle of unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to
recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land Bank is
not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estopped by
its action of accepting Alfredos payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as
the new debtor. By accepting Alfredos payment and keeping silent on the status of Alfredos
application, Land Bank misled Alfredo to believe that he had for all intents and purposes stepped into
the shoes of the Spouses Sy.
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ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS S. YUJUICO, represented by ADMINISTRATORS BENEDICTO V.

YUJUICO and EDILBERTO V. YUJUICO; and AUGUSTO Y. CARPIO v REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF APPEALS
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was
already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest
the title for an unreasonable length of time.
Facts:
Sometime in 1973, one Fermina Castro (Castro) filed an application for registration and
confirmation of her title over a parcel of land somewhere in Paranaque City with the RTC having
jurisdiction over the same. The Republic through the OSG filed its respective opposition. On 1974, the
RTC rendered its decision, declaring Castro as the true and absolute owner of the parcel of land.
Thereafter, Castro sold the aforementioned lot to Jesus Yujuico (Yujuico) and transferred the
ownership of the land. Subsequently, Yujuico died. On 2001, the Republic through the OSG filed a
complaint for annulment and cancellation of title and reversion against the Heirs of Jesus Yujuico
(Heirs), herein petitioners, over the aforementioned land sold by Castro to Yujuico. The complaint
was filed with the RTC in Paranaque.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of the OSG. On appeal, the CA reversed, it held that the
parcel of land was of public domain and therefore inalienable. Now, the Heirs come before the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. They contend that the remedy of reversion invoked
by the OSG is not the proper remedy. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic through the OSG can validly revert the land in favor of the State.
Ruling:
No. The lapse of almost three decades in filing the instant case, the inexplicable lack of action
of the Republic and the injury this would cause constrain us to rule for petitioners.
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot
was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to
contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.
SALES
DOUBLE SALE
RUPERTA CANO and JESUS CARLO GERARD VDA DE VIRAY v. SPS JOSE and AMELITA USI
A double sale situation arises when the following requisites concur: (a) The two (or more) sales
transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over
the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller.
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Facts:
Lot 733, registered in the name of Mendoza is the subject of this case. Geodetic Engr Fajardo
prepared the Fajardo Plan, in which Lot 733 was divided into 6 smaller parcels of differing size
dimensions: Lot 733(A-F). Mendoza executed 2 separate deeds of absolute sale, the first, transferring
Lot 733-F to Jesus and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A to Sps Viray. Vda. de Viray is the
surviving spouse of Jesus. Mendoza, Vda. de Mallari and Sps. Usi, as purported co-owners of Lot 733,
executed the 1st Subdivision Agreement (SA) in accordance with Galang Plan. Then they executed the
2nd SA. The subdivision of Lot 733, per the Galang Plan, and the 2 SAs concluded based on that plan,
virtually resulted in the loss of the identity of what under the Fajardo Plan were Lot 733-A and Lot
733-F. The Sps. Viray and the late Jesus purchased Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F, respectively, from
Mendoza. As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions involving the same property or
portions thereof spawned several suits and counter-suits.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale to Sps Usi constituted as a double sale and therefore invalid.
Ruling:
Yes. The earlier sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F was valid and effective conveyances. The
subsequent transfers to the Sps. Usi of substantially the same portions of Lot 733 accomplished
through the subdivision agreements constitute in effect double sales of those portions. The Deeds of
Absolute Sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F are valid. It must be noted that the RTC upheld the validity
of the separate deeds of absolute sale of Lots 733-A and 733-F. There can be no question as to the
ownership of the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray over the specified and delineated portions of Lot 733
which they purchased for value from Mendoza. Mendoza, as vendor, was bound to transfer the
ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant, the thing which is the object of the sale.
The survey report of LMB surveyor, Engr. Nicdao, would support a finding of double sale. His
report, as earlier indicated, contained the following key findings: (1) Lot 733-A sold to the Sps. Viray
is within Lot 733-B, the part assigned to Sps. Usi under the division; and (2) Lot 733-F is almost
identical to the combined area of Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to Ellen Mendoza and her
children, McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia, and a portion of Lot 733-C-10 (Galang Plan)
adjudicated to Sps. Usi. A double sale situation, which would call, if necessary, the application of Art.
1544 of the Civil Code, arises when, as jurisprudence teaches, the following requisites concur: (a) The
two (or more) sales transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions
must pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the
rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two
(or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought
from the very same seller.
There is no valid sale from Mendoza to respondents Usi. The parties did not execute a valid
deed of sale conveying and transferring the lots in question to respondents. The third element of
cause of the obligation which is established under Art. 1318 of the Civil Code is likewise visibly
absent from the two SAs. The transfer of title to respondents based on said SAs is flawed, irregular,
null and void. Thus the two SAs are not "sales transactions" nor "valid sales" under Art. 1544 of the
Civil Code and, hence, the first essential element under said legal provision was not satisfied.
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EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
SPOUSES FELIPE SOLITARIOS AND JULIA TORDA v. SPOUSES GASTON JAQUE AND LILIA JAQUE
In determining the nature of a contract, the intention of the parties, as shown by the
surrounding circumstances, must be considered. If the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a loan, then it is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, under
Article 1602(6) of the Civil Code.
Facts:
In a complaint, Spouses Jaque alleged that they purchased a lot from Spouses Solitarios in
stages. One-half of the lot was sold to them, and the other half was mortgaged to them to secure a
loan. Spouses Solitarios then agreed to sell the mortgaged half, but Spouses Jaque allowed the former
to retain possession of the lot subject to the condition that they will deliver a portion of the lots
produce. However, Spouses Solitarios stopped delivering any produce and claimed ownership over
the lot. Spouses Solitarios, on the other hand, alleged that they merely mortgaged the lot to Spouses
Jaque after the latter helped them redeem the land from PNB, with the agreement that they would
pay back the Jacques by delivering to them a portion of the lots produce. However, Jacque informed
Spouses Solitarios that he was taking possession of the lot as owner, by showing the deeds of sale,
REM contract, and a TCT to prove his claim. Spouses Solitarios contended that these deeds of sale
were fictitious and that their signatures were forged. They also challenged the validity of the TCT
through fraud machinations.
RTC declared that what the parties entered into was actually an equitable mortgage.
However, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, and ruled that what was entered into was a
contract of sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the parties entered into a contract of absolute sale.
Ruling:
No. The parties entered into an equitable mortgage, and not a contract of sale.
First, in determining whether a deed of absolute sale in form is a mortgage, the decisive
factor is the intention of the parties, as shown by all the surrounding circumstances. Moreover,
Article 1602 enumerates instances when a contract purporting to be an absolute sale is presumed to
be an equitable mortgage. Article 1602 (6) then provides that in any other case where it may be
fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of
a debt or the performance of any other obligation then it is presumed to be an equitable mortgage.
This presumption finds support in the following: (1) the testimony of Jaque and the documents he
presented establish the existence of two loans; and (2) the testimonies of the parties reveal that they
came to an agreement regarding payment terms. The fact that the parties agreed on payment terms
is inconsistent with the claim of Jaque that when Spouses Solitarios executed the questioned deeds of
sale they had no other intention but to transfer ownership over the lot.
Second, the Court held that a purported contract of sale where the vendor remains in
physical possession of the land, as lessee or otherwise, is an indicium of an equitable mortgage.
Retention by the vendor of the possession of the property is inconsistent with the vendees
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acquisition of ownership under a true sale, because in the latter, the legal title is immediately
transferred to the vendee.
Lastly, it is further established that when doubt exists as to the true nature of the parties
transaction, courts must construe such transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage,
as the latter involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property. It is contrary to
human experience that a person would easily part with his property after incurring a debt. Rather, he
would first look for means to settle his obligations.
PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUSTS
POWERS
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION et al. vs EIB SECURITIES, INC.,

An agent must act within the scope of his authority. An act beyond the scope of authority given
does not bind the principal.
Facts:
Plaintiffs bought Kuok Properties, Inc. (KPP) shares of stock and DMCI shares through the
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE). The KPP shares were acquired by plaintiffs through their broker,
defendant EIB. Under the agreement between the plaintiffs and their broker EIB, EIB is given the
authority to dispose of the shares of stocks bought by the plaintiff solely for the purpose of paying the
obligations and liabilities of the plaintiffs.
The defendant EIB, however, sold the DMCI shares of stock in order to buy back the KPP
shares of stock.
The plaintiff argues that the disposition of EIB of their DMCI shares of stock does not bind
them as principals because EIB, as agent, acted beyond the scope of their authority.
The RTC rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiffs but the CA reversed
said RTC decision and remanded the same for further proceedings. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether EIB is authorized to sell the DMCI shares for the purpose of reacquiring the KKP
shares.
Ruling:
NO. Under the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the right to sell or
dispose of the properties of petitioners by EIB is unequivocally confined to payment of the
obligations and liabilities of petitioners to EIB and none other. Thus, when EIB sold the DMCI shares
to buy back the KKP shares, EIB acted beyond the ambit of its authority as agent. Such act is surely
illegal and does not bind petitioners as principals of EIB.
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EXPRESS VS. IMPLIED AGENCY
FILIPINAS (PRE-FAB BLDG.) SYSTEMS, INC. v MRT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; COURT OF

APPEALS; CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION; and VICTOR P. LAZATIN,
ELISEO I. EVANGELISTA, and JACINTO M. BUTALID
G.R. Nos. 167829-30, November 13, 2007, Velasco Jr. J.
While the general rule is one cannot be bound to a contract entered into by another person,
there are exceptions, such as when the contracting person was authorized to enter a contract on behalf
of another, or when such contract was ratified.
Facts:
Filipinas Systems Inc (FSI), herein petitioner, is a contractor who submitted its bid to the
Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation (MRTDC) herein respondent, for the construction of the
North Triangle Project which is poised to be a major hub of the light rail transit line system along
EDSA. Verily MRTDC engaged Parsons Interpro JV (PIJV) to act as the Project Management Team to
supervise the project. It also engaged the services of one David Sampson (Sampson) who was
designated as the Area Construction Manager tasked to monitor the day-to-day activities on the
construction site. FSI won the bidding for the construction of the aforementioned project and was
thus awarded with a Notice of Award. The Notice of Award provides that in case of early completion
of construction by FSI, it shall be entitled to an early completion bonus. Thereafter, construction
commenced. The deadline given to FSI was until January 14, 1999 however FSI was only able to
finish construction on May 17, 1999. On October 8, 1999 FSI issued a letter to Sampson requesting an
extension of time and verily move the project deadline. This was approved by Sampson. Thus, the
deadline was moved from January 14, 1999 to August 2, 1999. Because of the change in deadline, FSI
sought its early completion bonus from MRTDC. MRTDC refused to pay FSI the bonus. This prompted
FSI to file its claim with the CIAC.
The CIAC held that MRTDC is liable for the bonus in favor of FSI. On appeal, the CA reversed
the decision of the CIAC. Now, FSI comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. In
its defense, MRTDC avers that Sampson had no authority as Area Construction Manager to authorize
the extension of time for the deadline of the project, and therefore the extension was without legal
effect. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not MRTDC is liable for the early completion bonus in favor of FSI.
Ruling:
Yes, MRTDC is liable. Article 1317 of the New Civil Code provides that a contract entered into
in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
David Sampson was clearly authorized to issue change orders as he was in charge of the
daily activities of the project. David Sampson was the representative or agent of PIJV who was
engaged as the Project Manager by MRTDC. Being clearly authorized, the acts of David Sampson shall
bind MRTDC and therefore, it shall be held liable for the early completion bonus.
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COMPROMISE
ADRIATICO CONSORTIUM, INC., et al. v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187838 December 23, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
In the construction or interpretation of a compromise agreement, the intention of the parties is

to be ascertained from the contract and effect should be given to that intention. A contract must be
interpreted from the language of the contract itself according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
Facts:
Respondent Land Bank approved the application of William Siy, the former president of ACI,
for a credit line of P200M. A Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) was created to secure the loan. The
MTI was amended to include J.V. Williams Realty and Development Corporation (JVWRDC), a
majority-owned corporation of Siy, as borrower. It was later discovered that Siy did not remit ACIs
payments of the loan. Land Bank obliged petitioners ACI and PRC, with Benito Cu-Uy-Gam, ACIs new
president, to pay the maturing obligations of JVWRDC. Petitioners then filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity, Specific Performance, Injunction, and Damages with Prayer for a TRO against
Land Bank and Siy with the RTC of Manila.
The parties entered into a Partial Compromise Agreement wherein ACI agreed, among
others, to pay and actually paid to Land Bank the amount of loan plus interests. The said Agreement
was approved by the RTC. Land Bank, however, informed ACI that the JVWRDC loans were included
in a sealed-bid public auction of Land Bank Non-Performing Assets under the Special Purpose Vehicle
Act. Petitioners filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC stating that Land Bank violated Section 5
of the Partial Compromise Agreement, which provides that the parties agree to suspend all actions
against each other x x x. The RTC granted petitioners Motions and issued the corresponding Writ of
Execution and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA arguing that the sale of
the MPCs is not prohibited by the Agreement. The CA granted the petition and found that the
compromise agreement sought to prohibit only legal actions.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of Land Bank in selling the receivables violated the Partial
Compromise Agreement, specifically Section 5.
Ruling:
YES. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,

avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In the construction or interpretation of a
compromise agreement, the Court is guided by the fundamental and cardinal rule that the intention
of the parties is to be ascertained from the contract and effect should be given to that
intention. Likewise, it must be construed so as to give effect to all the provisions of the
contract. Evidently, had the parties intended to limit the application of Sec. 5 to legal actions only,
they would have written a specific word or phrase to pertain to legal actions and not just the word
actions alone.
A contract must be interpreted from the language of the contract itself according to its plain
and ordinary meaning. In the case at bar, the word action should be defined according to its plain
and ordinary meaning, i.e., as the process of doing something; conduct or behavior; a thing done. It is
not limited to actions before a court or a judicial proceeding. Therefore, the only logical conclusion
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that can be derived from the use of the word action in Sec. 5 is that the parties intentionally used it
in its plain and ordinary sense and did not limit it to mean any specific legal term.
Furthermore, Sec. 5 of the Partial Compromise Agreement speaks of cooperation between

the parties to determine the person or persons ultimately liable. By selling the receivables, Land
Bank did not cooperate with petitioners. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the act of Land Bank is
a clear and patent violation of Sec. 5 of the Partial Compromise Agreement.
ALEXANDER S. GAISANO v. BENJAMIN C. AKOL

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation, or put an end to one already commenced. Its validity depends on its fulfillment of the
requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law; its terms and conditions being not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.
Facts:
Akol filed a complaint for recovery of shares of stock against Gaisano. The RTC dismissed the
complaint while the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. While the case was pending with the SC, the
parties jointly filed an Agreement to Terminate Action duly signed by them and their respective
counsels.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement filed by the parties allows to court to validly render judgment
based on said agreement.
Ruling:
Yes. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal

concessions, avoid litigation, or put an end to one already commenced. Its validity depends on its
fulfillment of the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law; its terms and conditions
being not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.
A scrutiny of the aforequoted agreement reveals it is a compromise agreement sanctioned

under Article 2028 of the Civil Code. Its terms and conditions are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy and public order. Hence, judgment can be validly rendered thereon.
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
LOAN
SPOUSES TAGUMPAY N. ALBOS and AIDA C. ALBOS v. SPOUSES NESTOR M. EMBISAN and
ILUMINADA A. EMBISAN, DEPUTY SHERIFF MARINO V. CACHERO, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210831. November 26, 2014. THIRD DIVISION. Velasco, JR., J.
Article 1956 provides that No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing.
Facts:
Spouses Albos entered a loan agreement with Spouses Embisan in the amount P84,000.00
payable within 90 days with a monthly interest rate of 5% secured by a real estate mortgage. Due to
the repeated failure of the petitioners to settle their obligation and their subsequent request for
extensions, Spouses Embisan, imposed a condition that the monthly 5% interest from then on will be
compounded. However this agreement was not reduced into writing. With the interest being
compounded, the obligation of the petitioner ballooned to P296,658.70. Despite the extension given,
Spouses Albos failed to pay their loan. This prompted Spouses Embisan to extra-judicially foreclose
the property. Spouses Embisan emerged as the highest bidder and were issued a Sheriffs Certificate
of Sale. Due to failure to redeem the property, Spouses Emisan executed an Affidavit of Consolidation
over the property and the property was later registered in their name.
Issue:
Whether or not the compounding of interest is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The compounding of interest should be in writing. As mandated by the foregoing

provision, payment of monetary interest shall be due only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for
the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for such payment was reduced in writing. Thus, the
collection of interest without any stipulation thereof in writing is prohibited by law.
Given the circumstances, the first requirementthat there be an express stipulation for the
payment of interestis not sufficiently complied with, for purposes of imposing compounded
interest on the loan. The requirement does not only entail reducing in writing the interest rate to be
earned but also the manner of earning the same, if it is to be compounded. Failure to specify the
manner of earning interest, however, shall not automatically render the stipulation imposing the
interest rate void since it is readily apparent from the contract itself that the parties herein agreed
for the loan to bear interest. Instead, in default of any stipulation on the manner of earning interest,
simple interest shall accrue.
Settled is the rule that ambiguities in a contract are interpreted against the party that caused
the ambiguity. Any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations
must be read against the party who drafted it. In the extant case, respondent spouses, having
imposed, unilaterally at that, the compounded interest rate, had the correlative duty of clarifying and
reducing in writing how the said interest shall be earned. Having failed to do so, the silence of the
agreement on the manner of earning interest is a valid argument for prohibiting them from charging
interest at a compounded rate.
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TING TING PUA v. SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG
G.R. No. 198660, October 23, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
The collection of interest in loans or forbearance of money is allowed only when these two
conditions concur: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; (2) the agreement
for the payment of the interest was reduced in writing. Absent any of these two conditions, the money
debtor cannot be made liable for interest.
Facts:
Respondents owed Petitioner a sum of money way back in 1988 for which the latter gave her
several checks. All of the checks, however, were dishonored and petitioner has not been paid the
amount of the loan plus the agreed interest. Eventually, respondents approached her to get the
computation of their liability including the 2% compounded interest. After bargaining to lower their
liability, respondents gave her another postdated check but like the other checks, the drawee bank
likewise dishonored this check.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents should be obliged to pay the 2% compounded interest.
Ruling:
No. As aptly held by the court a quo, however, respondents cannot be obliged to pay the
interest of the loan on the ground that the supposed agreement to pay such interest was not reduced
to writing. Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates
that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Thus, petitioner is
entitled only to the principal amount of the loan plus the allowable legal interest from the time of the
demand, at the rate of 6% per annum.
ARTHUR F. MENCHAVEZ v. MARLYN BERMUDEZ

Voluntariness does not make the excessive and exorbitant 5% per month or 60% per annum
stipulation on interest valid.
Facts:
Bermudez obtained a P500,000 loan from Menchavez which she promised to pay in 1 month,
with 5% interest per month. The sum of P565,000 was paid through post-dated checks. Menchavez
alleged entering into a verbal compromise agreement with Bermudez about the delay in payment
and the accumulated interest. Bermudez would deliver 11 post-dated Prudential Bank checks worth
P300,000 as payment. However, 8 of the checks were dishonored as Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds. She was charged with violating BP 22. The MeTC acquitted Bermudez because of payment of
P925,000. The amount was acknowledged by Menchavez in the statement of account which he
prepared where P624,344 was credited to interest and P300,565 to the principal. In the civil aspect
of the case, the RTC ordered Bermudez to pay 165,000 as civil liability. Bermudez appealed to the CA,
which reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that the compromise agreement could not be taken
independently of the loan and that 5% per month or 60% per annum was an unconscionable rate of
interest.
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Issue:
Whether or not the loan obligation of Bermudez has been extinguished with the payment of
P925,000.
Ruling:
YES, the obligation has been extinguished. First, the compromise agreement is not
independent of the original loan. By stating that the compromise agreement and the original loan
transaction are separate and distinct, petitioner would now attempt to exact payment on both. This
goes against the very purpose of the parties entering into a compromise agreement, which was to
extinguish the obligation under the loan. Petitioner may not seek the enforcement of both the
compromise agreement and payment of the loan, even in the event that the compromise agreement
remains unfulfilled. It is beyond cavil that if a party fails or refuses to abide by a compromise
agreement, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand. To allow such would constitute unjust enrichment.
Second, Menchavez has been fully paid. The 5% per month interest rate is excessive,
iniquitous and unconscionable. The Statement of Account prepared by Menchavez showed that
Bermudez has already paid P925,000, P425,000 over the P500,000 loan. The original obligation of
PhP 500,000 had already been satisfied, and the PhP 425,000 would be treated as interest paid, even
at the iniquitous rate of 60% per annum.
Parties may be free to contract and stipulates as they see fit, but that is not an absolute
freedom. Art. 1306 of the Civil Code provides. "The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." While petitioner harps on the
voluntariness with which the parties agreed upon the 5% per month interest rate, voluntariness does
not make the stipulation on interest valid. The 5% per month, or 60% per annum, rate of interest is,
indeed, iniquitous, and must be strucked down. Petitioner has been sufficiently compensated for the
loan and the interest earned, and cannot be allowed to further recover on an interest rate which is
unconscionable. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express
contract on said interest rate. Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity
demand.
REAL MORTGAGE
Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Alejandro and Myrna Reblando

G.R. No. 194014 September 12, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
Facts:
Alejandro and Myrna Reblando (Reblando) obtained a loan from the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). To secure the payment of their loan, the spouses Reblando executed a real estate
mortgage over two parcels of land. The spouses Reblando defaulted on their payment. So, PNB was
prompted to commence an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage over the two parcels of land. PNB
was the lone bidder and the lots were awarded to them. The redemption period lapsed without the
spouses Reblando redeeming the parcels of land. So, PNB became the owner thereof upon securing a
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new title over the properties. Spouses Reblando filed a complaint in the RTC for the declaration of
nullity of mortgage over one of the lots. They claimed that at the time the mortgage was constituted,
they were not the owner thereof so they cannot validly constitute a mortgage over the lot. They cited
Article 2085 of the Civil Code which provides that one of the essential requisites of a valid mortgage
is that the mortgagor is the absolute owner of the property mortgage. In its defense, PNB asserted the
issue of estoppel.
Issue:
Whether or not a mortgage can be validly constituted over the lot.
Ruling:
Yes, a mortgage can be validly constituted over the lot. Respondents act of entering into the
mortgage contract with petitioner, benefiting through the receipt of the loaned amount, defaulting in
payment of the loan, letting the property be foreclosed, failing to redeem the property within the
redemption period, and thereafter insisting that the mortgage is void, cannot be countenanced.
Actions of this kind, bearing a hint of fraud on the part of mortgagors, should not be tolerated, for
they go against the basic principle that no person shall unjustly enrich himself or herself at the
expense of another and that parties in a juridical relation must act with justice, honesty, and good
faith in dealing with one another. Respondents are estopped from contesting the validity of the
mortgage, absent any proof that PNB coerced or fraudulently induced respondents into posting the
lot as collateral.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
TORRENS SYSTEM
HEIRS OF MAXIMO LABANON vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANCIO LABANON

G.R. No. 160711, August 14, 2004, VELASCO, JR., J.
Section 32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the registration proceedings for titles
covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the reconveyance of the
property to its rightful owner.
Facts:
Constancio Labanon settled upon, cultivated and introduced improvements on a piece of

alienable and disposable public agricultural land situated at Brgy. Lanao, Kidapawan, Cotabato.
Constancio then asked his brother, Maximo Labanon who was better educated to file the
corresponding public land application to which Maximo acceded. Eventually, the Homestead
Application by Maximo was approved and the Original Certificate of Title No. 41320 was issued in his
favor. In 1955, Maximo executed a notarized document denominated as "Assignment of Rights and
Ownership" to safeguard the ownership and interest of Constancio. In 1962, Maximo executed a
sworn statement reiterating his desire that Constancio, his heirs and assigns shall own the eastern
portion of the Lot. After Constancios death, his heirs extra-judicially settled his estate with
simultaneous sale over the aforesaid eastern portion of the lot in favor of Alberto Makilang. However,
the heirs of Maximo deprived the heirs of Constancio of their ownership over the eastern portion of
said lot. They argue that the heirs of Constancio can no longer question Maximos ownership of the
land after its registration under the principle of indefeasibility of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
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The RTC ruled in favor of the defendant-heirs of Maximo Labanon. However, the CA reversed the RTC
decision upon appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 41320 in the name of MAXIMO LABANON be
now considered indefeasible and conclusive.
Ruling:
No. While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration
becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy
in law.
The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of
said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. The remedy of the land owner
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year
from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages. Undeniably, the heirs of Constancio are not precluded from recovering the eastern portion
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14320, with an area subject of the "Assignment of Rights
and Ownership" previously owned by their father, Constancio Labanon. The action for Recovery of
Ownership before the RTC is indeed the appropriate remedy.
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
CONRADA O. ALMAGRO v. SPS. MANUEL AMAYA, SR. and LUCILA MERCADO, JESUS MERCADO,
SR., and RICARDO MERCADO
The identification and classification of lands and qualification of farmer-beneficiaries are

factual determination performed by government officials and personnel with expertise in the line of
work they are doing. Their findings, conclusions/recommendations and final actions on the matter,
after thorough investigation and evaluation, have the presumption of regularity and correctness.
Facts:
Conrada allowed spouses Amaya to construct a house on a 46-square meter portion of Lot
No. 13333 on the condition that no additional improvements shall be introduced and that they shall
leave the area upon a 90-day notice. A decade later, Conrada asked the Amayas to vacate. Instead of
heeding the vacation demand, the Amayas, built permanent improvements on their house. Conrada
filed a Complaint against the Sps. Amaya before the DARAB for "Ejectment, Payment of Rentals with
Damages. In their Answer, the Amayas asserted possessory rights over the area on which their house
stands and a portion of subject they are cultivating, they claimed, monthly-rental paying tenant-
farmers. Said portion, the Amayas added, has been placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. Conrada on the other hand contends that the lot has
been primarily devoted to vegetables production and cultivation, not to corn or rice, thus, outside the
ambit of the OLT under PD 27.
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DARAB issued a Decision upholding the validity of the issuance of the EPs to Spouses Amaya,
thus effectively recognizing their tenurial rights. Appellate court affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not said portions are primarily devoted to vegetable production, as petitioner
insists.
Ruling:
No. PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily devoted to
rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the
landholdings cultivated by respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely
outside the coverage, and necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27.
It must be stressed that the issuance of the EPs in the instant case creates a presumption
which yields only to a clear and cogent evidence that the awardee is the qualified and lawful owner
because it involves a tedious process. Moreover, the identification and classification of lands and
qualification of farmer-beneficiaries are factual determination performed by government officials
and personnel with expertise in the line of work they are doing. Their findings,
conclusions/recommendations and final actions on the matter, after thorough investigation and
evaluation, have the presumption of regularity and correctness.
DETERMINATION OF VALUATION OF LANDS
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, in his capacity as

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay
It is only after the DAR has made its final determination of the initial valuation of the land that
the landowner may resort to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land.
Facts:
Federico S. Suntay owned hectares of land called the Suntay Estate the 300 hectares of
which were erroneously subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform program (CARP) instead
of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Consequently,
Certificates of Landownership Award were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in possession of the
land. However, years passed but Suntay remained unpaid for the property. Hence, Josefina Lubrica,
as assignee of Suntays property, filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Jose, Oriental Mindoro which
determined the value of the preliminary just compensation and directed the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to immediately pay the amount to Lubrica. LBP filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court arguing that the petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation with PARAD
was filed prematurely. The RTC denied LBPs petition and directed the latter to make a deposit of the
amount just compensation which PARAD has fixed.
Subsequently, LBP filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and impleaded the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the ground that the latter failed to deliver a claim folder
upon which LBP will preliminary determine the valuation of the covered lands and process the
compensation claims. LBP further averred that the amount to be deposited under Sec. 16 of RA 6657,
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or the Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, should be based on purchase price determined by DAR for the
land contained in the notice of acquisition and not the price determined in an administrative
proceeding before the PARAD but the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the PARAD which determines the preliminary valuation of the proper
amount to be deposited under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657.
Ruling:
No, it should be the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP. Sec. 16 of RA 6657 contains
the procedure for the acquisition of private lands, to wit: (a) xxx; (b) xxx; (c) xxx; (d) xxx; (e) Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from
the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution
of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Conspicuously, there is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16(e) when it speaks
of "the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act." Moreover, it is only after the DAR has made its final
determination of the initial valuation of the land that the landowner may resort to the judicial
determination of the just compensation for the land. Clearly, therefore, it is the initial valuation made
by the DAR and LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the landowner under Sec. 16(a), said
valuation of which must be deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of the
property.
Notably, DAR failed to prepare the claim folder which is necessary for the LBP to make a
valuation of the land to be expropriated. The proper remedy would have been to ask the DAR and
LBP to determine such initial valuation and to have the amount deposited to his account, in
accordance with Sec. 16 of RA 6657. Nevertheless, it was erroneous for private respondent to have
filed a Petition for Determination of Just Compensation with PARAD when the remedy that she was
seeking was for the deposit of the initial valuation that the DAR and LBP should have made.
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ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. APOSTOLITA SAN MATEO, BRIGIDA TAPANG, ROSITA

ACCION, AND CELSO MERCADO
A CENRO certification that a certain property is alienable, without the corresponding proof
that the DENR Secretary had approved such certification, is insufficient to support a petition for
registration of land. Both certification and approval are required to be presented as proofs that the land
is alienable. Otherwise, the petition for registration must be denied.
Facts:
A petition for registration of title was filed by the respondents. The respondents merely
relied on the certification of DENR-CENRO to the effect that the subject property is alienable. The
concerned government agencies and the owners of the adjoining lots were notified of the hearing.
The notice was also posted in several public places and was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and the Official Gazette.
RTC granted the petition for registration. On appeal, the Republic posited that RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case, because the notice of hearing failed to include the names of all the
owners of the adjoining properties; that the respondents failed to prove their claim of absolute
ownership, because they failed to prove possession over the land sought to be registered; and that
they failed to show that the land sought to be registered is part of the alienable and disposable part of
the public domain. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is alienable and disposable.
Ruling:
NO. The Court held that, to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the
Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a
certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary. As an exception,
however, the courts in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record
may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that
there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an
absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications
for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this decision and shall be
inapplicable to all future applications.
In this case, when the RTC rendered its decision, the rule on strict compliance was already in
effect, pursuant to the rule laid down in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, as
opposed to the rule on substantial compliance in the case of Republic v. Vega [654 Phil. 511, (2011)],
which is pro hac vice. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the respondents to comply with the new
rule, and present before the RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South
CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.
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JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO v. ABUNDIO ORCIGA, et al.

G.R. No. 153850 August 31, 2006, Velasco, Jr., J.
Land transfer under PD No. 27 is effected in two (2) stages: (1) issuance of a CLT to a farmer-
beneficiary; and (2) issuance of an Emancipation Patent.
Facts:
Jovendo del Castillo is the son and administrator of Menardo del Castillo, who previously
owned the subject riceland. The farmland was formerly cultivated by Eugenio Orciga. Pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD No. 27), Eugenio Orciga became the beneficiary of the Land Transfer
Program of the government during his lifetime and was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No.
0070176 over the said landholding. When Eugenio Orciga died, his heirs agreed to rotate among
themselves the cultivation of the riceland covered by said CLT. After cultivating and harvesting the
riceland, Ronald Orciga abandoned the said farm and left the barrio without turning over the
landowners share of the agricultural harvest.
Del Castillo forcibly entered the subject riceland and started cultivating the said land over
the objection of the respondents. Hence, respondents filed a Reinstatement with Mandatory
Injunction and Damages with the Office of Provincial Adjudicator, DARAB. The petition was
dismissed and its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the DARAB ordered
del Castillo to vacate the subject landholding for the proper disposition of the DAR. The CA denied
del Castillos petition and ruled that he had no right to take possession of the farmland being
disputed even if the heirs had failed to deliver the agricultural lessors share.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as representative of the disputed farmland, is the rightful
possessor of the disputed farmland under the DAR Land Transfer Program.
Ruling:
No. Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary and predecessor-in-interest of respondents, was
awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0070176 over the contested land pursuant to PD No. 27.
Therefore, for all intents and purposes, he is the acknowledged owner of the contested land.
A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a document issued to a tenant-farmer, which proves

inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued
in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land. This certificate prescribes the terms and
conditions of ownership over said land and likewise describes the landholding its area and its
location. A CLT is the provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is
awaiting full payment of the lands value or for as long as the beneficiary is an "amortizing owner."
Land transfer under PD No. 27 is effected in two (2) stages: (1) issuance of a CLT to a farmer-
beneficiary as soon as DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that
said person is a "deemed owner"; and (2) issuance of an Emancipation Patent as proof of full
ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the
farmer or beneficiary.
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SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
SAMUEL U. LEE AND PAULINE LEE AND ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC., v. BANGKOK
BANK PUBLIC COMPANY, LIMITED.
G.R. No. 173349, February 09, 2011, J. Velasco Jr.
The presumption of fraud established under Art. 1387 of the Civil Code does not apply to
registered lands if the judgment or attachment made is not also registered.
Facts:
Midas Diversified Export Corp. (MDEC) and Manila Home Textile, Inc. (MHI), which are
owned and controlled by the Lee family, entered into two separate Credit Line Agreements (CLAs)
with Bangkok Bank, which required guarantees from the Lee family. MDEC was likewise granted a
loan facility by Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. When MDEC had defaulted in the payment of its
loan, Asiatrust initiated negotiations with MDEC and required the Lee family to provide additional
collateral that would secure the loan. Asiatrust agreed that Samuel Lee would mortgage the subject
Antipolo properties to secure the loan, and execute a REM over the properties.
Similarly, the Lee family defaulted and incurred aggregate obligations to Bangkok Bank and
to other creditors, particularly the Security Bank Corp. (SBC). SBC filed a case against the Lee family
for a sum of money resulting from the nonpayment of obligations. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment
in favor of SBC was granted attaching the defendants' real and personal properties. The writ,
however, was neither registered nor annotated on the titles of the subject Antipolo properties at the
RD. Moreover, Bangkok Bank was also granted a writ of preliminary attachment, covering the
properties of the Lee family in Antipolo, Cavite, Quezon City, and Baguio, among others.
With MDEC still unable to make payments on its defaulting loans with Asiatrust, the latter
foreclosed the subject mortgaged Antipolo properties. Subsequently, the sale was registered.
Believing the REM and the foreclosure sale to be fraudulent, Bangkok Bank did not redeem the
subject properties. Consequently, the TCTs covering the subject properties were consolidated in the
name of Asiatrust and new titles were issued in the name of Asiatrust without the annotation of the
writs of preliminary attachment in favor of Bangkok Bank, which were deemed canceled. Hence,
Bangkok Bank filed the instant case for the rescission of the REM over the subject properties,
annulment of the foreclosure sale, cancellation of the new TCTs issued in favor of Asiatrust, alleging
that the presumption of fraud under Article 1387 of the Civil Code applies, considering that a writ of
preliminary attachment was issued. It also claimed that collusion and fraud transpired between the
spouses Lee and Asiatrust in the execution of the REM.
Issue:
Whether or not the REM executed over the subject Antipolo properties and the foreclosure
sale were committed in fraud of petitioners' other creditors hence, the questioned mortgage could be
rescinded.
Ruling:
No. While a judgment was made against the spouses Lee in favor of SBC, this, however, was
not annotated on the titles of the subject properties. In fact, there is no showing that the judgment
has ever been annotated on the titles of the subject properties. As established in the facts, there were
only two annotations at the back of the titles of the Antipolo properties: first, the REM executed in
favor of Asiatrust; and second, the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Bangkok
Bank. Considering that the earlier SBC judgment or attachment was not, and in fact never was,
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annotated on the titles of the subject Antipolo properties, prior to the execution of the REM, the
presumption of fraud under Art. 1387 of the Code clearly cannot apply.
Furthermore, a careful reading of Art. 1387 of the Code vis--vis its Art. 1385 would plainly
show that in allowing rescission in case of an alienation by onerous title, the third person who
received the property conveyed should likewise be a party to the fraud. As a general rule, whether
the person, against whom a judgment was made or some writ of attachment was issued, acted with
or without fraud, so long as the third person who is in legal possession of the property in question
did not act with fraud and in bad faith, an action for rescission cannot prosper. Asiatrust, being a
third person in good faith, should not be automatically presumed to have acted fraudulently by the
mere execution of the REM over the subject Antipolo properties, there being no evidence of fraud or
bad faith.
ENRIQUETA M. LOCSIN v. BERNARDO HIZON, CARLOS HIZON, SPS. JOSE MANUEL & LOURDES
GUEVARA
G.R. No. 204369, September 17, 2014, Velasco Jr., J.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons claim.
Facts:
Enriqueta M. Locsin, owner of the subject property located in Quezon City went to the United
States after entering into a compromise agreement in 1993 with Billy Aceron against whom the
former filed an ejectment case. However Locsin, did not know that Marylou Bolos had secured a new
TCT in her favor by registering a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Locsin in 1979. Bolos
later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon for P1,000,000 but the land was titled to Carlos name
who is Bernardos son. Despite Bernardos promise for a win-win situation with Locsin, he still sold
the property for P1,000,000 to Spouses Guevarra who in turn mortgaged the property. Locsin then
filed an action for reconveyance, annulment and cancellation of the mortgage lien. The CA affirmed
the RTCs finding that the respondents were innocent purchasers for value.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondents were innocent purchasers for value.
Ruling:
No. Bernardo knew that Bolos never acquired possession over the lot. In his direct
testimony, Bernardo admitted that he knew of the prior compromise agreement entered by Locsin
with Aceron which recognized Locsin as the registered owner of the land. Having knowledge of the
foregoing facts, Bernardo and Carlos should have been impelled to investigate the reason behind the
arrangement. If Bolos already acquired ownership of the property as early as 1979, it should have
been her who entered into a compromise agreement with Aceron in 1993, not her predecessor-in-
interest, Locsin, who, theoretically, had already divested herself of ownership thereof. The transfer to
Spouses Guevara was also suspicious since there was no deed evidencing the sale. It appeared that
the mortgage was a mere ploy to make it appear that the Sps. Guevara exercised acts of dominion
over the subject property when in fact the Spouses had lack of interest in protecting themselves in
the case.
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The circumstances, taken altogether, strongly indicate that Carlos and the spouses Guevara
failed to exercise the necessary level of caution expected of a bona fide buyer. An innocent purchaser
for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving
any notice of another persons claim.
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DONATO SANCHEZ and JUANA MENESES,
represented by RODOLFO S. AGUINALDO
It is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued.
Facts:
Respondents filed an amended petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title

pursuant to Republic Act No. 26. However, due to difficulties encountered in securing the required
documents ordered by the trial court, respondents moved for the archiving of the case, which motion
was granted by the trial court. The amended petition for reconstitution was later revived when
respondents finally secured the said documents. The petition was published anew and trial later
ensued, with the following documents submitted by respondents in evidence. The RTC though
rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of sufficient evidence, ruling that R.A. No. 26
only applies in cases where the issuance of the OCT sought to be reconstituted has been established,
only that it was lost or destroyed. While acknowledging the existence of Decree No. 418121 which
was issued for the lot subject of the case, the RTC nevertheless held that there is no established proof
that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of said Decree. Respondents insisted that there was
sufficient evidence to prove the issuance of OCT No. 45361.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents presented by respondents were sufficient to warrant the
reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT No. 45361.
Ruling:
No. The Court agrees with the trial court that no clear and convincing proof has been
adduced that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of Decree No. 418121. The Decision dated March
21, 1930 and the Registrars Index Card containing the notation on OCT No. 45361 do not cite nor
mention that Decree No. 418121 was issued to support the issuance of OCT No. 45361. At this point,
it is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for obvious reasons.
Assuming arguendo that respondents were able to sufficiently prove the existence of OCT
No. 45361 considering the totality of the evidence presented, the Court finds that reconstitution
thereof is still not warranted, applying Section 15 of R.A. No. 26. Before a certificate of title which has
been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be proved by the claimants that said
certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, among others. Here, the mere
existence of TCT No. 10202, later cancelled by TCT No. 44365, which, in turn, was superseded by TCT
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No. 80792. It clearly shows that the OCT which respondents seek to be reconstituted is no longer in
force, rendering the procedure, if granted, a mere superfluity.
LOURDES A. PASCUA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

The purpose of reconstitution of title is to have the original title reproduced in the same form it
was when it was lost or destroyed.
Facts:
Petitioner Pascua claimed that she is the owner of a lot as she inherited it from her parents
and together with her predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, public, continuous and
peaceful possession of the disputed lot since 1956. The lot was bought by Pascuals parents from
Limuaco who acquired the lot by an award from the cadastral court. Since the title of the lot went
missing and the original copy filed in the Register of Deeds also was lost, Pascual filed a petition
judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title of the said lot. However, the RTC denied the
petition for reconstitution for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC because the petitioner failed to present the documents sufficient for reconstitution as provided
for by Section 2, Republic Act No. (RA) 26 entitled An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the
Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed, as amended by RA 6732, or any other
document that could be a sufficient basis for reconstituting title. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Pascual satisfies the requirement of the law in reconstituting the titlE of the
disputed land.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 2 of RA 26 provides that original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in the following order: (a) The owners
duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the
certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or
patent, as the case may be pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A
document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in
said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original has been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
R.A 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already
been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System, Act No. 496. Petitioners evidence itself,
the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and her parents, stated that the lot was not registered under Act
No. 496 and that the parties agreed to register it under Act No. 3344. Even the Deed of Co-owners
Partition stated that the subject lot, Lot No. 19-pt, is not registered. The other piece of evidence, the
certifications from the LRA, merely stated that Decree No. 412846 covering Lot No. 3209 was issued
on December 4, 1930, but the copy of said decree is not among the salvaged decrees on file with said
office. The said copy is presumed lost or destroyed during World War II. The LRA neither stated that
a certificate of title was actually issued nor mentioned the number of the OCT. It cannot be
determined from any of the evidence submitted by petitioner that the adjudicatee of the purported
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decree was Limuaco. Assuming that Lot Nos. 19-pt and 3209 are the same, we are still constrained to
deny the reconstitution of title mainly because there is no proof that a certificate of title was
originally issued to both lots. The Solicitor General notes that both lots are still unregistered land of
the public domain; thus, no certificate covering such property can be issued under the instant
proceeding.
RECONVEYANCE
AQUALAB PHILIPPINES, INC. v. HEIRS OF MARCELINO PAGOBO, G.R. No. 182673, October 5,
2009, J. VELASCO JR.
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the
plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw in the title of his
transferor
Facts:
The heirs of Marcelino Pagobo were in actual possession of the disputed land in controversy
since it was acquired through homestead patent issued in 1969 until 1991 when Aqualab disturbed
their possession. Aqualab on the other hand claims their right to the land on the basis of transfer
from Gaw Kache.
The heirs of Pagobo filed a case in 1994 for the reconveyance of the land due to fraud.
Aqualab however move for the dismissal of the case arguing that an action for reconveyance due to
fraud prescribes in 4 or 10 years. Hence, on the ground of prescription, the subject transaction which
occurred in 1970 or more than 24 years later is already barred. Further, Aqualab also claims that
they are innocent purchaser for value.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the action of Pagobo is barred by prescription.

2. Whether or not Aqualab is an innocent purchaser for value.
Ruling:
1. No. Heirs of Pagobo have duly averred continuous possession until 1991 when such
possession was allegedly disturbed by Aqualab. Being in possession of the subject land. Hence,
Pagobos right to reconveyance or annulment of title has not prescribed or is not time-barred. The
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years,
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in possession.
Thus, one who is in actual possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership thereof may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
In the instant case, the heirs of Pagobo were in possession until 1991, and until such
possession is disturbed, the prescriptive period does not run. Since respondents filed their complaint
in 1994, or three years after their possession was allegedly disturbed, it is clear that prescription has
not set in, either due to fraud or constructive trust.
2. No. In the instant case, it would appear that Anthony Gaw Kache, Aqualabs predecessor-
in-interest, was not in possession of subject lots. Such a fact should have put Aqualab on guard
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relative to the possessors (Pagobo) interest over subject lots. A buyer of real property that is in the
possession of a person other than the seller must be wary, and a buyer who does not investigate the
rights of the one in possession can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.
EULOGIO M. PEDRANO v. HEIRS OF BENEDICTO PEDRANO, namely: ROMANA PEDRANO,

ANTONIO PEDRANO, ROSENDA PEDRANO RAAGAS, LEONIDA PEDRANO VILLAMOR, and
ZENAIDA P. DAGOHOY; and HEIRS OF NORBERTO M. PEDRANO, namely: NORBERTO C.
PEDRANO, JR., MARILYN C. PEDRANO, and BENEDICTO C. PEDRANO, represented by NORMIE P.
ALCORIN
An action for the reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust,
prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title of the property. Without an OCT, the date from whence the prescriptive
period could be reckoned is unknown and it could not be determined if indeed the period had already
lapsed or not.
Facts:
The subject of the present case is Lot No. 6416 which was originally owned by one Dr.
Hynson who sold the lot to respondent Romana, wife of the deceased Benedicto Pedrano.
Subsequently, a deed of Sale was executed between petitioner Eulogio, a son of Romana, and Romana
herself, wherein Romana agrees to sell the lot to Eulogio for P30,000. However, despite the
expiration of the period within which to pay, Eulogio still failed to pay Romana the agreed price.
Consequently, respondents, the Heirs of Benedicto, filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the
Annulment of the Deed of Sale as well as the recovery of the possession and ownership of Lot No.
6416.
Meanwhile, since the subject lot was yet untitled, it became the subject of a Cadastral Case
for titling. The Cadastral Court rendered a decision adjudicating the lot to Eulogio. However, although
the lot was adjudicated in favor of Eulogio, no Original Certificate of Title was issued in his favor.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eulogio and held that Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that if
the action is based on a written contract, the action should be filed within 10 years from the time the
right of action accrues. Consequently, since the Deed of Sale was executed on December 22, 1981,
and the instant action was filed only on September 5, 1996, after more than 14 years, prescription
had already set in. On appeal however, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that the
present case involves an implied trust, thus, the applicable law is Art. 1456 of the Civil Code. Hence,
this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Eulogio held the property by virtue of an implied trust.
2. Whether or not the action of respondents had prescribed.
Ruling:
1. Yes. What is clear in the aforecited deed of sale is that the late Romana was the buyer of
Lot No. 6416 from Dr. Hynson; that petitioner was to pay Romana PhP 30,000 for it; and that he had
until December 31, 1982 to do so. Petitioner claims he did but offers no proof of payment although he
occupied the land. While it is incumbent for petitioner to present proof that he indeed paid it, he had
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not presented any. Under these facts and even if we concede that the sale was perfected, still
petitioner failed to perform his obligation to pay the consideration of PhP 30,000 to Romana. Since
petitioner failed to comply with what is incumbent upon him, the injured parties (respondents as
heirs of Romana) may choose between fulfillment and rescission of the sale under Art. 1191 of the
Civil Code. Respondents chose rescission. Thus, the juridical tie between the parties is invalidated
and it leaves the parties with their respective property rights relating to Lot No. 6416 before the
celebration of the December 22, 1981 Deed of Sale.
What remains therefore is the undisputed March 15, 1965 Deed of Sale with Romana as the
buyer. Petitioners possession of Lot No. 6416, owned by his parents, was an implied trust
constituted upon petitioner. The CA is correct in applying Art. 1456 on implied trust to this case.
2. No. An action for the reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust, as we have already explained in this case, prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title of the property.
In the instant case, no OCT has yet been issued to Lot No. 6416 despite an order on July 3, 1989 to
title Lot Nos. 6409-A and 6416. Without an OCT, the date from whence the prescriptive period could
be reckoned is unknown and it could not be determined if indeed the period had already lapsed or
not. Thus, we agree with the CA that prescription has not yet set in when the instant case was filed on
September 5, 1996.
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its
Executive Minister ERAO MANALO as Corporate Sole
The reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title is the
actual possession of the property. It is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already
alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed.
Facts:
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo filed its Application for Registration of Title of a
parcel of land before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. During trial it was established that the subject lot
formed part of a bigger lot owned by one Dionisio Sabuco which was sold to INC in 1952 and
subsequently in 1959 from Bernardo Badanguio, who acquired the remaining lot from Sabuco. The
MCTC, acting as cadastral court, granted INCs application. The CA affirmed the decision.
Consequently, the Republic assails that the subject lot was certified as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain only on May 16, 1993 while the application was filed only in 1998. According to
the Republic, since INC only had five years of possession from the declaration, it fell short of the 30-
year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Issue:
Whether or not the reckoning period of the possession of an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title is to be counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable
and disposable.
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Ruling:
No. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court resolved the conflicting rulings of the
case of Herbieto and Naguit. The correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 was the principle
adopted in the Naguit ruling. PD 1529 merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. The
required possession is not reckoned from the time of the declaration of the property as alienable and
disposable. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable.
HOMESTEAD PATENT
Josephine Taguinod and Vic A Aguila v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 154654, September 14, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J
Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homestead patent are
superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Law but it must be
substantiated by substantial evidence
Facts:
Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots emanated from a
homestead patent. However prior for registration, Salud has to cancel the title of the lot and
registered in his name. Later on the lots were transferred to Vic A. Aguila and Josephine A. Taguinod
within the prohibition period provided by law. Thereafter, President Ferdinand Marcos promulgated
PD 27 for the emancipation of tenant-farmers from private agricultural lands they till that are
primarily devoted to rice and corn. Pursuant to PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
launched Operation Land Transfer (OLT) to implement and enforce the laws provisos of transferring
ownership to qualified tenant-farmers or farmer-beneficiaries of the rice or corn land they are
cultivating under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, with the landowner having retention of not
more than seven (7) hectares of agricultural land thereby including Vic Aguila and Josephine
Taguinods lots. Vic A. Aguila, Salud Aguila, on behalf of then minor Aguila, and Taguinod filed a
notarized application for retention. DAR PARO issued a Resolution granting the application for
retention under not more than seven (7) hectares and the excess shall be placed under OLT
Coverage. Office of the Presidential rendered a Decision reversing of DAR Secretary homestead
subject lots are superior than that of DAR law. CA reversed the decision of OP and ruled that
Taguinod and Aguila failed to discharge the burden of adducing evidence to prove the identities of
the original homestead patentees and that they are the direct compulsory heirs of the original
patentees.
Issue:
Whether or not Taguinod and Aguila proved with substantial evidence identities of the
original homestead patentees and that they are the direct compulsory heirs of the original patentees.
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Ruling:
No. Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homestead patent are
superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Law.
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law
gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and
plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of lifes other needs. The right of the
citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life
itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as human beings, and the State which
looks after the welfare of the peoples happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this
vital right.
It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to identify substantial evidence on record to

support the OPs finding that their lots are excluded from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program which they have failed to do so for they did not present evidence to support their
claim. If Salud Aguila was the original homestead patentee, as now alleged by petitioners, why was
there a need to cancel the first title and issued it on her name? This is incongruous to say the least. No
explanation was given. Verily, the records do not show who the original homestead patentee was
and whether petitioner Taguinod is a direct compulsory heir of the homestead patentee. Petitioners
contend that the original patentee was one Patrocinia Alvarez, the biological mother of petitioner
Taguinod. This again was not borne out by the records.

The deceased shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but "by his heirs in law, who shall be
entitled to have issued to them the patentif they show that they have complied with the requirements
therefor".
Facts:
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Issues:
(1) Whether or not Tirso repudiated his co-ownership; and

(2) Whether or not Pendejito is the successor of Don Fabian in the homestead application.
Ruling:
(1)No and (2) No. Tirsos acknowledgment of Pendejito and her childrens possession of four
(4) parcels of land cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from pursuing his right
to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude
another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito
and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and
then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention. To be sure, Tirso
and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on three (3) specific properties, even if these
parcels of land formed part of the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. There can be
no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of
Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage.
Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of Don Fabian
under Sec. 105 of C.A. No. 141, which pertinently provides: If at any time the applicant or grantee
shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease,
or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government, in
accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land
applied for or granted or issued under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have
issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the
requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes
of this Act.
It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who was subrogated to
the rights of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing
from the latter Parcel S-1 on May 8, 1943. Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and declared it for
taxation purposes. The application, however, would be rejected because death supervened. In 1963,
Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1. Said Sec. 105 has been interpreted
in Soliman v. Icdang as having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to
secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926, otherwise known as the Public Land Act of 1903.
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It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements of law for
homesteading Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be categorized as the paraphernal
property of Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the
name of the compulsory heirs of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to Article
834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the
corresponding share of each of Don Fabians compulsory heirs, i.e., his eight children.
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
FRANCISCO MOTORS CORP. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO RAQUIZA

G.R. No. 117622-23 October 23, 2006, Velasco, Jr. J.
The cancellation of a notice of pendency terminates the effects of such notice; thus, the buyers
of the property cannot be considered transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith.
Facts:
The spouses Alano and Antonio Raquiza entered into a Contract of Legal Retainer wherein it
was agreed that Raquiza would be paid his attorneys fees equivalent to 30% of the properties in
litigation. However, Raquiza was dismissed without justifiable cause. Hence, he was allowed to
intervene in the civil cases with respect to his claim for attorneys fees. The trial court ordered the
annotation of attorneys lien in the titles involved in the civil case including the Las Pinas property
then in the name of Miguel Campos, but said annotation was later cancelled. A judgment was
rendered granting Raquiza his attorneys fees. Pending appeal of said decision, the Las Pias
property was transferred from Miguel Campos to CPJ Corporation as nominee of the Alano spouses,
and later to the Alanos. Despite the fact that the transfer was not yet registered, the Alano spouses
mortgaged the property in favor of petitioner FMC. Thereafter, the property was transferred in the
name of the Alanos, and subsequently, in the name of petitioner FMC.
The CA modified the lower courts judgment holding that Raquiza is entitled to 30% pro
indiviso interest in all the properties reconveyed by Campos et al. The Decision became final and
executory and a writ of execution was subsequently issued by the trial court. FMC moved to quash
the writ of execution alleging that it is a buyer in good faith. The motion to quash was denied. On
reconsideration, the motion was granted and the writ of execution was quashed on the ground that
the Las Pinas property was sold by the Alano spouses to FMC long before the CA awarded Raquizas
attorneys fees.
Raquiza filed a Motion to Enforce his Motion to Execute which was denied on the ground
that the decision sought to be enforced had become final and executory after the lapse of five
years.Hence, Raquiza filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court, which was remanded to the CA.
The CA granted the petition stating that FMC was bound to recognize the attorneys liens, although
not inscribed in the title, and held that Raquizas petition for certiorari was proper.
Issue:
Whether or not Raquiza can enforce his attorneys lien against the Las Pinas property bought
by FMC in good faith from the Spouses Alano.
Ruling:
No. The annotation of attorneys lien on TCT No. 56520 was cancelled long before petitioner
FMC acquired the property in question. TCT No. 56520 was later cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
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190712 in the name of CPJ Corporation. A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT No. 190712 by
spouses Epifanio J. Alano and Cecilia Alano in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 4622. On the
other hand, respondent Antonio Raquiza did not bother to have his attorneys lien annotated at the
back of TCT NO. 190712, to protect his interests in it. This annotation was cancelled by the Alano
spouses. Private respondent did not cause the reannotation of the attorneys lien and the notice of lis
pendens despite the pendency of the two civil cases. Thus, when petitioner bought the property in
question, the title was free from the attorneys lien and notice of lis pendens.
The Court held that the filing of a notice of lis pendens in effect (1) keeps the subject matter
of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment so as to prevent the
defeat of the latter by successive alienations; and (2) binds the purchaser of the land subject of the
litigation to the judgment or decree that will be promulgated there on whether such a purchaser is
a bona fide purchaser or not; but (3) does not create a non-existent right or lien. The cancellation of a
notice of pendency terminates the effects of such notice; thus, the buyers of the property cannot be
considered transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith. Petitioner FMC bought the property
pending appeal. The title carried no notice of lis pendens and the private respondent did not cause the
reannotation of or the attorneys lien. Thus, petitioner FMC could not be considered a
transferee pendente lite and buyer in bad faith.
REDEMPTION
ILIGAN BAY MANUFACTURING CORP., et al. v. HENRY DY

G.R. No. 140836 & 140907, June 8, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
In cases involving redemption, the law protects the original owner. It is the policy of the law to
aid rather than to defeat the owner's right.
Facts:
Iligan Bay Manufacturing Corp. (IBMC) constructed its oil mills on a parcel of land and later
IBMC became part of United Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM). Henry Dy was a supplier providing
electrical and construction supplies for the oil mills. IBMC became bankrupt hence its creditors
initiated collection suits. UNICOM, as assignee, acquired the right over the loan accounts of IBMC and
the mortgage on the land where IBMC's oil mill was located. UNICOM foreclosed the mortgage and
acquired the lot. The Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte certified that IBMC/UNICOM was
delinquent in paying its taxes, hence it levied the disputed lot and sold it to Dy being the highest
bidder. Due to IBMC'S unpaid obligations, Dy filed collection suits and a writ of attachment was
issued over the disputed lot. Dy exercised his right of redemption in the tax delinquency sale by
tendering a check and asked that a certificate of redemption be issued in his favor but the Provincial
Treasurer did not do so. Later, the President of UNICOM redeemed the lot and a certificate of
redemption was issued. The Office of the Provincial Treasurer informed UNICOMs president that
there was still an additional redemption price due from UNICOM. Due to UNICOM's failure to pay the
total redemption price, Dy requested that a final deed of sale be executed in his favor but was denied.
Hence, Dy filed a case for Mandamus with Damages. The RTC found that the refusal of the Provincial
Treasurer was proper since UNICOM had redeemed the subject property within the prescribed
period. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the redemption was not valid for failure to pay the total
redemption price.
Issue:
Whether or not UNICOM had validly redeemed the subject property.
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Ruling:
Yes. Redemption has been defined as "the right of a debtor, and sometimes of a debtor's
other creditors, to repurchase from a buyer at a forced sale, property of the debtor that was seized
and sold in satisfaction of a judgment or other claim against the debtor, which right is usually limited
to forced sale of real property." We have established in jurisprudence that in cases involving
redemption, the law protects the original owner. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat
the owner's right. Therefore, "redemption should be looked upon with favor and where no injury will
follow, a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws, specifically on the exercise of the
right to redeem."
As provided in Sec. 78 of PD 464, the redemption price should consist of: (1) the total
amount of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, (2) the costs of sale, and (3) the
interest at the rate of twenty per centum (20%) on the purchase price. We find no error in the CA's
finding that there was a deficiency of PhP 13,742.11 in UNICOM's redemption price. However, we
find no evidence that UNICOM was notified of this deficiency. The Provincial Treasurer's
letters, which were submitted as evidence to prove that there was a deficiency in UNICOM's
redemption payment, did not prove that UNICOM received such letters; thus, there was substantial
compliance of the requirements of the law.
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

Acquisitive prescription does not lie against Tirso Monteroso as the required extraordinary
prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such
would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the
Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession of the subject properties.
Facts:
Don Fabian Monteroso, Sr. married twice and sired eight (8) children, four (4) from each union. In his
first marriage with Soledad Doldol, Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso were born. After Doldol
died, his second marriage with Sofia Pendejito bore Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr. During
the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed before the CFI of Agusan an intestate
proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife to obviate any dispute over the inheritance. The
project for partition was approved and the intestate estate of Doldol was partitioned and distributed
to her four (4) children in equal shares.
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Issues:
(1) Whether or not partition is the proper remedy to recover the properties sold to Soledad
Montereoso-Cagampang; and
(2) Whether or not the action of Tirso is barred by extinctive prescription and laches.
Ruling:
(1) Yes and (2) No. Being inextricably intertwined, the Court tackles both issues together.
The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession
of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of
a co-ownership. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand
from, and act of initiating a civil caseagainst the Cagampang spouses for his share, necessarily implies
that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the
Cagampang spouses, through the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the
hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into
the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust
and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon.
Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the proper remedy for
compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court pertinently provides that In a complaint in action for partition of real estate, a person having
the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
With regard to the issue on acquisitive prescription, considering that the new Civil Code was
already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at
the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirsos cause of
action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine (9) years after
the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso
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even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the Cagampang
spouses since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of
30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even
if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses took
exclusive possession of the subject properties.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ y MIRANDA, alias DIDONG, G.R. No.
184792, October 12, 2009, J. VELASCO JR.
If the killing is attended with aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may be awarded.
Facts:
Didong was convicted of the crime of murder as qualified by treachery. The appellate court
reduced the award of civil indemnity to PhP 50,000, deleted the award of moral damages for want of
evidence to support it, and further ordered the payment of PhP 25,000 in exemplary damages. The
accused questions the award of damages made by the court. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Appellate Courts imposition of Didongs civil liability is correct.
Ruling:
No. When as a consequence to a criminal act death ensues, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; and (4) exemplary damages.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime. The award of civil indemnity of PhP 50,000 is increased to
PhP 75,000 in view of the ruling that the crime is murder qualified by the aggravating circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation. Said crime is a heinous crime under Republic Act 7659
punishable by death but now reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue of RA 9346, which prohibits
the imposition of death penalty.
The deletion of the award of moral damages was erroneous. Moral damages are mandatory
in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. The
award of PhP 75,000 as moral damages is consequently in order and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.
The award of exemplary damages is proper under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, since the
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
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Deans Circle
2016
University of Santo Tomas
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
MERCANTILE
LAW
Mercantile law (Cases penned by J. Velasco) Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
Negotiable Instruments ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Rights of a Holder ............................................................................................................................................ 1
Holder in Due Course .................................................................................................................................. 1
Consideration ................................................................................................................................................... 3
Accommodation Party ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Corporation Law................................................................................................................................................... 5
Grandfather Rule ............................................................................................................................................. 5
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil ........................................................................................................................... 6
Board of Directors and Trustees ..................................................................................................................... 7
Shares of Stock................................................................................................................................................. 8
Insolvency......................................................................................................................................................... 9
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
Rights of the Holder
Holder in Due Course
SPOUSES PEDRO AND FLORENCIA VIOLAGO v. BA FINANCE CORPORATION AND AVELINO VIOLAGO
A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and from
defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full
amount thereof
Facts:
To increase the sales quota of Violago Motor Sales Corporation (VMSC), its president Avelino Violago
(Avelino) offered to sell his car to his cousin Pedro Violago and his wife Florencia (Spouses). Avelino said that
the spouses need only pay the amount of p60,500 while the balance will be financed by BA Finance
Corporation (BA Finance). Under these terms, the spouses agreed to purchase a car. The spouses signed a
promissory note under which they bound to pay p209,601 in 36 monthly installments. In turn, the spouses a
chattel mortgage over the car in favor of VMSC as security for the amount of the promissory note. VMSC then
indorsed the promissory note to BA Finance. After VMSC received the amount of p209,601, it assigned its
rights and interests under the promissory note and chattel mortgage in favor of BA Finance. Meanwhile, the
spouses remitted to VMSC the amount of p60,500. The spouses were unaware that the car had already been
sold to Esmeraldo Violago (Esmeraldo), another cousin of Avelino. So, the spouses demanded for the delivery
of the car, but to no avail. Since there was no delivery, the spouses did not pay any amortization to BA
Finance. BA Finance then filed a complaint against the spouses for the delivery of the car, or if not possible,
the payment of the amount of the promissory note. As this happening, Esmeraldo conveyed the vehicle to Jose
Olvido who executed a Chattel Mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Generoso Lopez as security for a loan
covered by a promissory note in the amount of p260,664. This promissory note was later endorsed to BA
Finance, Cebu City branch.
In their defense, the spouses contended that BA Finance is not a holder in due course under the
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) since it knew through its Cebu Branch that the car was never delivered to
the spouses.
Issue:
Whether BA Finance is a holder in due course under the NIL
Ruling:
Yes. BA Finance meets all the requisites to be a holder in due course, namely: a) Promissory note is
complete and regular on its face; b) Promissory note was endorsed by VMSC to BA Finance; c) BA Finance
when it accepted the Note, acted in good faith and for value; d) BA Finance was never informed, before and at
the time the Promissory Note was endorsed to the it, that the vehicle sold to the spouses was not delivered to
them and that VMSC had already previously sold the vehicle to Esmeraldo. Although Jose Olvido mortgaged
the vehicle to Generoso Lopez, who assigned his rights to the BA Finance Corporation Cebu Branch, the same
occurred only on May 8, 1987, much later than August 4, 1983, when VMSC assigned its rights over
the Chattel Mortgage by the spouses to BA Finance. A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any
defect of title of prior parties and from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce
payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof. Since BA Finance is a holder in due course, petitioners
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cannot raise the defense of non-delivery of the object and nullity of the sale against the corporation. The NIL
considers every negotiable instrument prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration.
Consideration
TING TING PUA v. SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG
G.R. No. 198660 October 23, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
Section 24. Presumption of consideration. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have
been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a
party for value.
Facts:
Respondents owed petitioner a sum of money for which the former gave the latter several checks. All
of the checks, however, were dishonored and petitioner has not been paid the amount of the loan plus the
agreed interest. Eventually, respondents approached her to get the computation of their liability including the
2% compounded interest. After bargaining to lower their liability, respondents gave her another postdated
check but like the other checks, it was dishonored by the drawee bank. Respondents deny the existence of the
debt. They hypothesize that petitioner Pua is simply acting at the instance of her sister, Lilian, to file a false
charge against them using a check left to fund a gambling business previously operated by Lilian and
respondent Caroline. While not saying so in express terms, the appellate court considered respondents
denial as worthy of belief. Petitioner filed a case in the RTC which ruled in her favor. On appeal by the
respondent, the CA overturned the decision ruling that petitioner "failed to establish the alleged indebtedness
in writing." Consequently, so the CA held, respondents were under no obligation to prove their defense.
Issue:
Whether respondent is indebted to petitioner and thus should be liable
Ruling:
Yes. The 17 original checks, completed and delivered to petitioner, are sufficient by themselves to
prove the existence of the loan obligation of the respondents to petitioner. Note that respondent Caroline had
not denied the genuineness of these checks. Instead, respondents argue that they were given to various other
persons and petitioner had simply collected all these 17 checks from them in order to damage respondents
reputation. This account is not only incredible; it runs counter to human experience, as enshrined in Sec. 16 of
the NIL which provides that when an instrument is no longer in the possession of the person who signed it
and it is complete in its terms "a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is
proved."
Accommodation Party
EUSEBIO GONZALES v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL BANK, EDNA OCAMPO, and
ROBERTO NOCEDA
G.R. No. 180257 February 23, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
An accommodation party is a person who has signs the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or
indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. The
relation between an accommodation party and the accommodated party is one of principal and surety, the
accommodation party being the surety.
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Facts:
Gonzales was a client of respondent bank (PCIB). He was granted a Credit-On-Hand Loan
Agreement (COHLA) with his accounts as collateral on the limit of the credit line. Gonzales and his spouse
obtained 3 loans from the bank which was covered by 3 promissory notes and a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land executed by Gonzales and spouses Panlilio who likewise obtained one of the loans together
with Gonzales. Thereafter, the spouses Panlilio, who received the total amount of the loan, failed to pay the
interests due from their PCIB account. When Gonzales issued a check in favor of Unson, it was dishonored by
the bank due to the termination by the PCIB of the credit line under COHLA and likewise froze Gonzales
foreign account.
Gonzales was forced to pay Unson in cash. Gonzales demanded the bank to unfreeze his account since
it was not him who benefitted from the loans but the spouses Panlilio. PCIB refused, compelling Gonzales to
file a case for damages against the bank for dishonor of the check issued in favor of Unson.
The RTC ruled in favor of PCIB which decision was affirmed by the CA. The lower courts found
Gonzales solidarily liable with spouses Panlilio and the dishonor of the check as well as the freezing of the
foreign account justified. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
(1) Whether Gonzales is solidarily liable with the spouses Panlilio
(2) Whether PCIB properly dishonored Gonzales check
Ruling:
(1) Yes. Gonzales merely accommodated the spouses Panlilio in order to facilitate the fast release of
the loan. By signing as borrower and co-borrower on the promissory notes with the proceeds of the loans
going to the spouses Panlilio, Gonzales has extended an accommodation to said spouses. As an
accommodation party, Gonzales is solidarily liable with the spouses Panlilio for the loans.
The accommodation party, as surety, is deemed an original promisor and debtor from the beginning;
he is considered in law as the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the
obligation of the latter since their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. Although a contract of
suretyship is in essence accessory or collateral to a valid principal obligation, the suretys liability to the
creditor is immediate, primary and absolute; he is directly and equally bound with the principal. As an
equivalent of a regular party to the undertaking, a surety becomes liable to the debt and duty of the principal
obligor even without possessing a direct or personal interest in the obligations nor does he receive any
benefit therefrom.
(2) No. There was no proper notice to Gonzales of the default of the PhP 1,800,000 loan. It must be
borne in mind that while solidarily liable with the spouses Panlilio, Gonzales is only an accommodation party
and as such only lent his name and credit to the spouses Panlilio. While not exonerating his solidary liability,
Gonzales has a right to be properly apprised of the delinquency of the loan precisely because he is a co-
signatory of the promissory notes and of his solidary liability.
A written notice on the default and deficiency of the PhP1,800,000 loan covered by the three
promissory notes was required to apprise Gonzales, an accommodation party. PCIB is obliged to formally
inform and apprise Gonzales of the defaults and the outstanding obligations, more so when PCIB was
invoking the solidary liability of Gonzales.
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There is no dispute on the right of PCIB to suspend, terminate, or revoke the COHLA under the "cross
default provisions" of both the promissory notes and the COHLA. However, these cross default provisions do
not confer absolute unilateral right to PCIB, as they are qualified by the other stipulations in the contracts or
specific circumstances, like in the instant case of an accommodation party.
CORPORATION LAW
Nationality of Corporations
Grandfather Rule
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and
MCARTHUR MINING, INC. v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014, Velasco Jr., J.
There are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and
the grandfather rule. The grandfather rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in
doubt.
Facts:
Redmont, a domestic corporation, learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration
and mining activities were already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three separate
petitions for the denial of petitioners applications for MPSA. It alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock
of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. It also argued that given that petitioners capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were
likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino
citizens. In a resolution issued by POA, petitioners were disqualified from gaining MPSAs for being
considered as foreign corporations. On appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, the latter reversed and set
aside the resolution of the POA denying also the motion for reconsideration filed by Redmont. However, the
CA upheld the findings of the POA.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are foreign corporations
Ruling:
Yes. The first part of paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating "shares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality, pertains to the control test or the liberal rule. On the other hand, the second part of
the DOJ Opinion which provides, "if the percentage of the Filipino ownership in the corporation or
partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted
as Philippine nationality," pertains to the stricter, more stringent grandfather rule. The grandfather rule or
the second part applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where
the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the
59% less Filipino).
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McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60%
or more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners corporate
owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further, MBMIs Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
statement regarding the "joint venture" agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and "Alpha"
groups involves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. The ownership of the "layered" corporations boils down to
MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with,
practically exercising majority control over the corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the
capital structure or the underlying relationships between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT
Filipino nationals and must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital stocks or equity
interests are owned by MBMI.
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil (Test in Determining Applicability)
KUKAN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. HON. AMOR REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, and ROMEO M. MORALES, doing business under the
name and style RM Morales Trophies and Plaques
The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, and the resulting treatment of two related
corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given transaction, is basically applied only to
determine established liability; it is not available to confer on the court jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the
first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.
Facts:
Romeo M. Morales, doing business under the name RM Morales Trophies and Plaques, was
awarded a P5 million contract for the supply and installation of signages in a building constructed in Makati.
The contract price was later reduced to P3,388,502. Morales complied with his contractual obligations but he
was paid only the amount of P1,976,371.07 leaving a balance of P1,412,130.93. He filed a case against Kukan,
Inc., for a sum of money with the RTC of Manila. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Morales and ordered
Kunkan, Inc. to pay for the balance, damages and cost of the suit which became final and executory. During
the execution, the sheriff levied the personal properties found at the office of Kukan, Inc. Claiming it owned
the properties levied, Kukan International Corporation (KIC) field an Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Morales
filed an Omnibus Motion praying to apply the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity. He alleged that
Kukan, Inc. and Kukan International Inc. (KIC) are one and the same corporation. His motion was granted. KIC
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Upon appellate review, the CA likewise denied KICs
petition and Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity was correctly applied
Ruling:
No. A corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the courts process of piercing the veil
of its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation and,
hence, any proceedings taken against that corporation and its property would infringe on its right to due
process. The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case
after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation. Before this doctrine can be applied, the
court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation.
The implication of the above comment is two-fold: (1) the court must first acquire jurisdiction over
the corporation or corporations involved before its or their separate personalities are disregarded; and (2)
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the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity can only be raised during a full-blown trial over a cause of
action duly commenced involving parties duly brought under the authority of the court by way of service of
summons or what passes as such service.
No full-blown trial involving KIC was had when the RTC disregarded the corporate veil of KIC. KIC
was not impleaded in the collection case filed by Morales against Kukan Inc. It was dragged to the case after it
reacted to the improper execution of its properties and veritably hauled to court, not through the usual
process of service of summons, but by mere motion of a party with whom it has no privity of contract and
after the decision in the main case had already become final and executory.
Board of Directors and Trustees (Responsibility for Crimes)
ARNEL U. TY, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY, and ALVIN TY v. NBI SUPERVISING AGENT
MARVIN E. DE JEMIL, PETRON GASUL DEALERS ASSOCIATION, and TOTALGAZ DEALERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 182147 December 15, 2010, Velasco, Jr. J.
Even if the corporate powers of a corporation are reposed in it under the first paragraph of Sec. 23 of
the Corporation Code, the board of directors is not directly charged with the running of the recurring business
affairs of the corporation and may not be held liable under BP 33.
Facts:
Arnel Ty, Marie Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy, Alvin Ty, are the Directors of Omni Gas
Corporation (Omni) while Arnel was the president of Omni, engaged in the refilling of LPG cylinders in Pasig
City. Omni was investigated by the NBI for allegedly violating pertinent provision of BP No. 33 which in
essence penalizes the unauthorized use of LPG cylinders owned by Petron, Shell and Totalgaz, as well as the
under filling of the LPG cylinders by Omni.
After finding probable cause, the NBI caused the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor against Omni and its directors for violation of BP No. 33. To this Omni and its directors
opposed. However, the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, DOJ Secretary, as well as the CA found merit in the
filing of the information against Omni and its directors.
Omni and its directors come to the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA in directing the
issuance of the Information for the prosecution of Omni and its directors insofar as to the liability of its
directors. Arnel, et al. avers that they cannot be held personally liable since Omni is a separate and distinct
juridical entity. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether Arnel, Marie, Ong, Dy and Ty can be held criminally liable for violation of BP No. 33
Ruling:
Yes, as regards Arnel who is the President and Director of Omni. On the other hand, Marie, Ong, Dy,
and Ty cannot be held liable as directors for the criminal acts committed by Omni.
The law applicable in this case is Sec. 4 of BP 33 which provides:
Sec. 4. Penalties.
When the offender is a corporation, partnership, or other juridical person, the president, the general
manager, managing partner, or such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs
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thereof, or employee responsible for the violation shall be criminally liable; in case the offender is an
alien, he shall be subject to deportation after serving the sentence.
Arnel, as President, who manages the business affairs of Omni, can be held liable for probable
violations by Omni of BP 33. The fact that Arnel is ostensibly the operations manager of Multi-Gas
Corporation, a family-owned business, does not deter him from managing Omni as well. Where the language
of the law is clear and unequivocal, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. As to the other petitioners,
unless otherwise shown that they are situated under the catch-all such other officer charged with the
management of the business affairs, they may not be held liable under BP 33, as amended, for probable
violations. With the exception of Arnel, the charges against other petitioners must be dismissed.
Shares of Stock (Nature of Stock)
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as NTC Commissioner, and EDGARDO CABARRIOS,
in his capacity as Chief, CCAD
When stock dividends are distributed, the amount declared ceases to belong to the corporation but is
distributed among the shareholders. Consequently, the unrestricted retained earnings of the corporation are
diminished by the amount of the declared dividend while the stockholders equity is increased. Therefore, stock
dividends acquired by shareholders for the monetary value they forego are under the coverage of the SRF and
the basis for the latter is such monetary value as declared by the board of directors.
Facts:
Under Section 40 (e) of the Public Service Act (PSA) the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) is authorized to collect from public telecommunications companies Supervision and Regulation Fees
(SRF) of PhP 0.50 for every PhP 100 or a fraction of the capital and stock subscribed or paid for of a stock
corporation, partnership or single proprietorship of the capital invested, or of the property and equipment,
whichever is higher. Consequently, the NTC sent SRF assessments to petitioner PLDT. The SRF assessments
were based on the market value of the outstanding capital stock, including stock dividends, of PLDT. PLDT
protested the assessments contending that the SRF should be based on the par value of its outstanding capital
stock. Its protest was denied by the NTC as well as its motion for reconsideration. The case reached the
Supreme Court, and the Court, in G.R. No. 127937, ruled that the SRF should be based neither on the par value
nor the market value of the outstanding capital stock but on the value of the stocks subscribed or paid
including the premiums paid therefor. Furthermore, the Court ruled that in the case of stock dividends, it is
the amount that the corporation transfers from its surplus profit account to its capital account, that is, the
amount the stock dividends represent is equivalent to the value paid for its original issuance. Thereafter, the
NTC, in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127937, reassessed PLDT but now
based its assessment on the value of the stocks subscribed or paid, including the premiums paid for the
stocks, if any. Hence, this petition.
PLDT argues that the reassessment issued by NTC is in violation of the decision of the Court in G.R.
No. 127937 because according to PLDT, the Court in that case excluded stock dividends from the SRF
coverage.
Issue:
Whether stock dividends are included in computing Supervision and Regulation Fees
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Ruling:
Yes. Dividends, regardless of the form these are declared, that is, cash, property or stocks, are valued
at the amount of the declared dividend taken from the unrestricted retained earnings of a corporation. Thus,
the value of the declaration in the case of a stock dividend is the actual value of the original issuance of said
stocks. In G.R. No. 127937 we said that "in the case of stock dividends, it is the amount that the corporation
transfers from its surplus profit account to its capital account" or "it is the amount that the corporation
receives in consideration of the original issuance of the shares." It is "the distribution of current or
accumulated earnings to the shareholders of a corporation pro rata based on the number of shares owned."
Such distribution in whatever form is valued at the declared amount or monetary equivalent.
Thus, it cannot be said that no consideration is involved in the issuance of stock dividends. In fact, the
declaration of stock dividends is akin to a forced purchase of stocks. By declaring stock dividends, a
corporation ploughs back a portion of its entire unrestricted retained earnings either to its working capital or
for capital asset acquisition or investments. It is simplistic to say that the corporation did not receive any
actual payment for these. When the dividend is distributed, it ceases to be a property of the corporation as the
entire or portion of its unrestricted retained earnings is distributed pro rata to corporate shareholders.
In essence, therefore, the stockholders by receiving stock dividends are forced to exchange the
monetary value of their dividend for capital stock, and the monetary value they forego is considered the
actual payment for the original issuance of the stocks given as dividends. Therefore, stock dividends acquired
by shareholders for the monetary value they forego are under the coverage of the SRF and the basis for the
latter is such monetary value as declared by the board of directors.
Insolvency
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and EQUITABLE PCI BANK v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
There are two kinds of insolvency contemplated in it: actual insolvency, i.e., the corporations assets are
not enough to cover its liabilities; and technical insolvency defined under Sec. 3-12, i.e., the corporation has
enough assets but it foresees its inability to pay its obligations for more than one year.
Facts:
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Equitable PCI Bank are members of the consortium of creditor
banks constituted pursuant to the Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) by and between Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation-Trust and Investments Division, acting as trustee for the consortium, and ASB
Development Corporation (ASBDC, formerly Tiffany Tower Realty Corporation). Under the MTI, petitioners
granted a loan of PhP1,081,000,000 to ASBDC secured by a mortgage of five parcels of land with
improvements. Private respondents filed with the SEC a verified petition for rehabilitation. Private
respondents stated that they possess sufficient properties to cover their obligations but foresee inability to
pay them within a period of one year. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the SEC Hearing
Panel issued an order suspending for 60 days all actions for claims against the ASB Group and appointing
Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group. Atty. Jacob was later replaced by Atty. Fortunato
Cruz. The consortium of creditor banks, which included petitioners, filed their opposition praying for the
dismissal of the petition. The ASB Group submitted a rehabilitation plan but the consortium of creditor banks
moved for its disapproval. However, the Hearing Panel denied the opposition of the banks and held that the
ASB Group complied with the requirements of Sec. 4-1 of the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery,
which allows debtors who are technically insolvent to file a petition for rehabilitation. The creditors filed a
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Supplemental Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SEC en banc to question the foregoing order but it
was dismissed. The CA affirmed the ruling of the SEC en banc. Hence, the case.
Issues:
Whether ASB Group is considered technically insolvent
Ruling:
Yes. The ASB Group filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of
actions and proceedings pending rehabilitation. Contrary to petitioners arguments, the mere fact that the
ASB Group averred that it has sufficient assets to cover its obligations does not make it "solvent" enough to
prevent it from filing a petition for rehabilitation. A corporation may have considerable assets but if it
foresees the impossibility of meeting its obligations for more than one year, it is considered as technically
insolvent. Thus, at the first instance, a corporation may file a petition for rehabilitationa remedy provided
under Sec. 4-1. When Sec. 4-1 mentioned technical insolvency under Sec. 3-12, it was referring to the
definition of technical insolvency in the said section; it was not requiring a previous filing of a petition for
suspension of payments which petitioners would have us believe.
Petitioners harp on the SECs failure to examine whether the ASB Group is technically insolvent. They
contend that the SEC should wait for a year after the filing of the petition for suspension of payments when
technical insolvency may or may not arise. This is erroneous. The period mentioned under Sec. 3-12, "longer
than one year from the filing of the petition," does not refer to a year-long waiting period when the SEC can
finally say that the ailing corporation is technically insolvent to qualify for rehabilitation. The period referred
to the corporations inability to pay its obligations; when such inability extends beyond one year, the
corporation is considered technically insolvent. Said inability may be established from the start by way of a
petition for rehabilitation, or it may be proved during the proceedings for suspension of payments, if the
latter was the first remedy chosen by the ailing corporation. If the corporation opts for a direct petition for
rehabilitation on the ground of technical insolvency, it should show in its petition and later prove during the
proceedings that it will not be able to meet its obligations for longer than one year from the filing of the
petition.
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Deans Circle
2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO
TOMAS
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
CRIMINAL
LAW
[Type the abstract of the document here. The abstract is typically a short summary of the contents of
the document. Type the abstract of the document here. The abstract is typically a short summary of
the contents of the document.]
Criminal Law (Cases Penned by J. Velasco Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
BOOK 1 REVISED PENAL CODE AND RELATED SPECIAL LAWS .................................................................................................... 3
Felonies ............................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit a Crime ......................................................................................................................... 5
Complex Crimes and Special Complex Crimes ........................................................................................................................ 8
Circumstances affecting criminal liability ................................................................................................................................ 10
Justifying Circumstances ..................................................................................................................................................... 10
Exempting Circumstances .............................................................................................................................................. 17
Mitigating Circumstances............................................................................................................................................... 18
Aggravating Circumstances ............................................................................................................................................ 19
Defenses ................................................................................................................................................................................ 26
Alibi ................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
Persons Criminally Liable ........................................................................................................................................................ 29
Degree of Participation ....................................................................................................................................................... 29
Penalties ................................................................................................................................................................................ 31
Prescription of Crimes (RPC and Special Penal Laws) .............................................................................................................. 32
BOOK 2 REVISED PENAL CODE AND SPECIAL LAWS ................................................................................................................. 34
Crimes Against Public Order................................................................................................................................................ 34
RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act and Its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) ........................................ 35
Art. 171, RPC ...................................................................................................................................................................... 61
Art. 177, RPC ...................................................................................................................................................................... 62
RA 7877 Anti-Sexual Harrasment Act................................................................................................................................... 63
Crimes Committed by Public Officers .................................................................................................................................. 64
Arts. 203-245, RPC.............................................................................................................................................................. 64
RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act...................................................................................................................... 66
Misconduct ........................................................................................................................................................................ 68
Crimes Against Persons....................................................................................................................................................... 70
Arts. 246-266, RPC.............................................................................................................................................................. 70
RA 7610 Anti-Child Abuse Law .......................................................................................................................................... 107
Crimes Against Property ................................................................................................................................................... 108
Crimes Against Honor ....................................................................................................................................................... 111
Tariffs and Customs Code ................................................................................................................................................. 113
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BOOK 1 REVISED PENAL CODE and related SPECIAL LAWS
FELONIES
A. Classifications (Intentional and Culpable Felonies)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BONIFACIO BADRIAGO

G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, Velasco, J.
The offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the
victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.
Facts:
Adrian Quinto, together with Oliver Quinto (deceased), was delivering a letter. On their way
home, they had an encounter with Badriago. The latter hacked Adrian with a Sundang. Adrian
managed to push Oliver out of the pedicab to call for help and was able to run before he lost
consciousness. When he woke in the hospital, he found out that Oliver was dead. Badriago claimed
that he tried to get away with the Quintos but the latter chased him and insisted a fight. He claimed
that Adrian bumped his pedicab that caused the respondent to swerve to the middle of the road.
Seeing Adrian was about to stab him, he grabbed a bolo from his pedicabs passenger seat and used
it to strike at Adrian, injuring his left hand. Adrians knife fell and when he bent to pick it up,
Badriago again hacked at him with his bolo.
On a complaint filed by Adrian, RTC convicted Badriago for (1) the crime of frustrated
murder instead of frustrated homicide for hacking Adrian and (2) murder for the death of Oliver.
CA however modified the same and held him guilty of frustrated homicide and murder. Badriago
challenged the conviction on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not Badriago is guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide for hacking Adrian
Ruling:
Yes. To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that
person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all
the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the
victim without medical intervention or attendance.
On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) The
offender performs all the acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
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From the evidence presented to the trial court, it is very much clear that accused-appellant
was able to perform all the acts that would necessarily result in Adrians death. His intention to kill
can be presumed from the lethal hacking blows Adrian received. His attack on Adrian with a bolo
was not justified. His claim of self-defense was not given credence by both the trial and appellate
courts. Neither are there any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide, and infanticide.
The circumstances, thus, make out a case for frustrated homicide as accused-appellant performed
all the acts necessary to kill Adrian; Adrian only survived due to timely medical intervention as
testified to by his examining physician.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL LINDO y VERGARA

G.R. No. 189818 August 9, 2010 Velasco Jr. J.
The mere introduction of the male organ in the labia majora of the victims genitalia
consummates the crime; the mere touching of the labia by the penis was held to be sufficient.
Facts:
AAA, the private complainant, was 11 years old while Lindo was her neighbor. While AAA
was sleeping in the pabasa she attended, Lindo took her away to a place near a creek. He tried
inserting his penis into her vagina, whereupon his penis made contact with her sex organ but there
was no complete penetration. Not achieving full penile penetration, he then made her bend over,
and inserted his penis into her anus, causing her to cry out in pain. RTC found him guilty of
statutory rape under Art. 335 of the RPC in relation to R.A No. 7610. The CA affirmed the judgment
and awarded exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in convicting the accused.
Ruling:
No. It has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Lindo had carnal
knowledge of AAA. The insertion of his penis into the vagina of AAA, though incomplete, was
sufficient. As held in People v. Tablang, the mere introduction of the male organ in the labia
majora of the victims genitalia consummates the crime; the mere touching of the labia by the penis
was held to be sufficient. The elements of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code are present. Under the said article, it provides that rape is committed by a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman when the offended party is under twelve years of age. AAA was 11
years old at the time accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. As such, that constitutes
statutory rape. The two elements of the crime are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. Thus, the CA correctly upheld the
conviction of accused-appellant by the RTC.
Both the RTC and the CA, however, erred in finding only one count of rape in the present
case. From the information filed, it is clear that accused-appellant was charged with two offenses,
rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1 (d) of the RPC, and rape as an act of sexual assault under Art. 266-A,
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par. 2. Accused-appellant was charged with having carnal knowledge of AAA, who was under
twelve years of age at the time, under par. 1(d) of Art. 266-A, and he was also charged with
committing an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person under the
second paragraph of Art. 266-A. Two instances of rape were indeed proved at the trial, as it was
established that there was contact between accused-appellants penis and AAAs labia; then AAAs
testimony established that accused-appellant was able to partially insert his penis into her anal
orifice.
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit a Crime
JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAOJAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209373, July 30, 2014, Velasco, J.
It is common design which is the essence of conspiracyconspirators may act separately or

together in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The character and effect
of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by
looking at it as a wholeacts done to give effect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts.
Facts:
Petitioners Yongco and Laojan, as security guards in the premises of the City Engineers
Office (CEO), and Tangian as garbage truck driver of the City Government of Iligan were charged for
allegedly stealing one unit transmission of Tamaraw and l-beam of Nissan with a total value of P40,
000.00. RTC held petitioners liable for qualified theft via conspiracy.
Aggrieved, petitioners, in their appeal, prayed that the CA reverse the RTC decision.
Tangian claimed that he should not be considered as a conspirator since he merely innocently
obeyed Laojans instructions on the assumption that the latter was his superior and that he had no
criminal intent whatsoever. Yongco, in his defense, argued that Tangian and his two other helpers
asked for his assistance which he extended in good faith, in view of Laojans statement earlier that
day that the office garage has to be cleared. Laojan, on the other hand, insisted that he cannot be
considered as a conspirator since he was not present at the time of taking, and that the mere giving
of a thumbs-up sign to Tangian when the latter delivered the materials to the junk shop does not
amount to conspiracy. CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Laojan is liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy despite his absence
during the commission of the crime.
Ruling:
Yes. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a
felony and decide to commit it. Well-settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the
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offense was perpetrated. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of
criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances.
The RTC correctly ruled that Laojan have instigated and marshalled the entire scheme. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation. The guilt of one
is the guilt of all. Applying this doctrine in the case at bench, it can reasonably be concluded that
despite Laojans lack of physical participation in hauling the items to Tangians truck and bringing
them to the junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BARANGAY CAPTAIN TONY TOMAS, SR., BENEDICTO

DOCTOR, AND NESTOR GATCHALIAN
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence
consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the
commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.
Facts:
One evening, Estrella Doctor Casco along with her mother named Damiana and two care-
takers Liezl and Angelita, were walking home from Damianas medical check-up when Estrellas
cousins Tony Tomas and Benedicto Doctor, together with Nestor Gatchalian, suddenly came out
from the side of the road. Without uttering a word, Tomas drew a gun and shot Estrella twice, while
Gatchalian, without a gun, allegedly blocked the road, and Doctor positioned himself at the back of
Damiana and Angelina and poked a gun at them. Estrella fell down but Tomas fired three more
gunshots at the former when she was already down on the ground. After which, the three accused
fled from the scene of the crime. The RTC convicted the accused Tomas, Doctor and Gatchalian of
the offense of Murder and appreciated the attendance of treachery and conspiracy which the CA
affirmed with modification. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the finding of conspiracy in the commission of the crime of murder gives the
same criminal liability to three accused.
Ruling:
No. The court cannot agree to the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court
that Gatchalian is equally guilty on account of conspiracy to merit the same criminal liability as
accused-appellants Tomas, Sr. and Doctor.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
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evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after
the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. To be equally guilty for
murder, it must be shown that Doctor and Gatchalian conspired with Tomas, Sr., for in a conspiracy,
every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose of such a
conspiracy is the act of all. From the clear testimony of Angelita and Liezl, it has been duly
established that Doctors contemporaneous act was made in furtherance of the common purpose of
killing Estrella and ensuring impunity from the act. Indeed, Doctors cooperation in the shooting of
Estrella ensured its accomplishment and their successful escape from the crime scene. Doctor is,
thus, equally guilty and liable with Tomas for the murder of Estrella on account of conspiracy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO BUCAYO, HECTOR BUCAYO AND JAYSON ORTIZ
There is conspiracy when the separate acts committed, taken collectively, emanate from a
concerted and associated action, albeit each circumstance, if considered separately, may not show
confabulation.
Facts:
In Tondo, Manila, Perez and Buencillo were on their way home when they passed by the
group of Fernando Bucayo, Hector Bucayo and Jayson Ortiz (whom Perez recognized). The group
surrounded and blocked their way, taunting and shouting incentives at them until a rumble ensued.
Perez, who attempted to flee, was dragged back to the melee by Hector. Perez saw Hector and Ortiz
gang up on Buencillo as Fernando struck him repeatedly with a steel chair. As Perez was trying to
escape, he got hold of a barbecue stick and stabbed Hector with it. When his attempt to make the
group stop assaulting Buencillo proved futile, he asked for assistance from the police and went to
Buencillos house. After the melee, Buencillo was pronounced dead by Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Hospital.
Fernando, Hector and Ortiz were charged with the murder of Buencillo but Ortiz and
another member of the group remained at large. The RTC found the accused persons guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by superior strength. The CA affirmed with
modification, asserting conspiracy as a qualifying circumstance.
Issue:
Whether or not conspiracy has transpired.
Ruling:
Yes. Altogether, the incidents prior to the melee, the simultaneous active participation of the
accused and use of their superior strength and number, and the flight of the Ortiz brothers
undoubtedly establish a conspiracy to assault and harm Jonathan and Edison, leading to Edisons
death. In this case, to reiterate, the CA observed that (1) Fernando and his group blocked Jonathan
and Edison as the two were on their way home; (2) they all participated in the attack on Jonathan
and Edison; (3) when Jonathan had a chance to flee, Hector dragged him back; and (4) Hector and
Jayson exchanged blows with Jonathan and Edison as Fernando viciously hit Edison with a steel
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chair causing the demise of Edison. All these constitute circumstances that lead to the conclusion
that all the accused conspired to harm their prey. These, taken with the eyewitness testimonies and
the physical evidence supported by the medico-legals findings, establish without doubt the guilt of
the accused-appellants.
Complex Crimes and Special Complex Crimes
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABDUL AMINOLA y OMAR

and MIKE MAITIMBANG y ABUBAKAR,
G.R. No. 178062, September 8, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate
connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the
former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time.
Facts:
Aminola and Maitimbang were accused of the crime of robbery with homicide for robbing
one Nestor Gabuya of his personal properties and for killing the latter by reason or on occasion
thereof with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The eyewitness Jesus Oliva identified the two accused
to have perpetrated the same. The RTC convicted Maitimbang of the crime charged and sentenced
them to death. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision but reduced the penalty imposed
to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime of homicide with robbery.
RULING
Yes. The following elements must be established for a conviction in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide: (1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) The property taken belongs to another; (3) The taking is animo
lucrandi; and (4) By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
The prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellants committed robbery with
homicide through the totality of their evidence. The first three elements were established when an
eyewitness testified that he saw, and positively identified, accused-appellants taking Gabuyas
property by force and both shooting Gabuya. Gabuyas death resulting from their attack proves the
last element of the complex crime as duly confirmed by the post-mortem report.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MITSUEL L. ELARCOSA and JERRY B. ORIAS

G.R. No. 186539, 29 June 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
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In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only
one crime in the eyes of the law, as well as in the conscience of the offender x x x when various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Facts:
One evening, Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias, both members of the CAFGU, entered
the house of Segundina Cruz and requested that supper be prepared for them as they were roving.
While Segundina and Rosemarie were preparing in the kitchen, Elarcosa and Orias fired their guns
at Jose and Jorge Cruz. Segundina ran towards his son while Rosemarie hid in the shrubs.
Rosemarie heard her mother crying loudly and after a series of gunshots, silence ensued. The
following morning, Rosemarie returned to their house where she found the dead bodies of her
parents and her brother. The amount of P40,000 and a certificate of registration of large cattle
were also gone. Elarcosa and Orias were thereafter charged with robbery with multiple homicide.
RTC convicted the accused of the offense as charged. The CA, however, changed the conviction to
multiple murder, ratiocinating that robbery was not proved and that the killing was qualified by
treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of multiple murder.
Ruling:
Yes. Accused-appellant Orias should be convicted of three (3) counts of murder and not of
the complex crime of murder.
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law, as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is
only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime. It is clear from the evidence on
record that the three (3) crimes of murder did not result from a single act but from several
individual and distinct acts. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Simon Fernan Jr. and Expedito Torrevilas v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
Reasonable doubt is present when after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidences, leaves the minds of the judges in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it
Facts:
Simon Fernan Jr. and Expendito Torrevilas were engineers of CEBU Highway project. Later
on it was discovered that there were falsified Letters of Advice Allotment and vouchers for the
project which are needed for the release of the fund. The funds were illegally released based on
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alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which
they admittedly signed for the said construction. Thus the amount released was P3, 839 ,810.74.
They were charged together with the several persons for complex crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents and convicted by the Sandiganbayan as conspirators. However, they
contended that the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused our guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
Yes, their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. A thorough scrutiny of the records is
imperative to determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused Fernan,
Jr. and Torrevillas. The prosecution presented evidences that the accused Fernan, Jt. And
Torrevillas has knowledge of the fake tally sheets and the Letters of Allotment which led to the
release of government funds and based on the testimony of state witness which is the accountant
for the project. Thus, the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Justifying Circumstances
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARBALATE

To support a claim of self-defense, it is essential that the killing of the victim be simultaneous
with the attack on the accused, or at least both acts succeeded each other without appreciable interval
of time.
Facts:
Ruperto Arbalate and his sons Roel and Ramil Arbalate were charged with murder for
killing Selemen. Roel and Ramil were able to evade arrest and remain at large. Hence, only Ruperto
faced trial. During the arraignment, Ruperto pleaded not guilty. In his defense, Ruperto invoked
self-defense. Moreover, he argued that there was no abuse of superior strength. The presence of
two or more aggressors does not necessarily create such aggravating circumstance; there must be
proof of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressors. In this case, the attack
of the three accused was not clearly shown. Without clear proof of this qualifying circumstance, he
must be convicted of homicide only.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruperto correctly invoked self-defense.
Ruling:
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No. In the case at bar, there was no unlawful aggression shown by the victim. The victims
action hardly constitutes unlawful aggression since it was a reaction to Rupertos assault with a
piece of wood. After that push, the victim ceased to attack him. Where the
inceptual unlawful aggression of the victim had already ceased, the accused had no more right to
kill the victim. In addition, the court found Rupertos theory of self-defense to be incredulous in light
of the physical evidence, i.e., the nature, character, location, and extent of the wounds inflicted on
the victim. The death certificate, the due execution of which was admitted by the defense; and the
photographs of the victim show that he sustained multiple hacking and stab wounds. The cause of
his death was severe hemorrhage secondary to irreversible shock. The wounds as well as the act of
beheading the victim clearly belie self-defense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAVID MANINGDING

Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing
the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger
not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to ones life.
Facts:
At around 10:25 in the evening in Pangasinan, while Aladino (prosecutions 1st witness) was
tending to his sari-sari store, he noticed brothers Rommel and Marlon conversing with each other
while seated on a bench beside his store. While this was transpiring, the accused arrived. The
victim, Marlon, stood up and greeted the accused, who happened to be his brother-in-law, "good
evening."He stated that the accused kept quiet and suddenly raised the right hand of Marlon and
stabbed him by the armpit with a knife that he was carrying. Marlon shouted because of the pain,
which caused the people in the neighborhood to come out. At this instance, the accused ran away.
Dr. De Guzman and Rommel were presented by the prosecution as its corroborating witnesses.
After his arrest, David Maningding pleaded not guilty of the murder charged against him.
The RTC convicted the accused. The RTC found that treachery attended the stabbing of the victim,
being sudden and unexpected. The RTC also explained that the facts indicate no showing that there
was any altercation between the accused and the victim immediately prior to the stabbing that
could have warned the latter of the said ensuing incident. The accused appealed the Decision of the
RTC, reiterating his argument of self-defense but the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants stabbing of the victim is justified by self-defense.
Ruling:
No. Preliminarily, it is a settled rule that when an accused claims the justifying circumstance
of self-defense, an accused admits the commission of the act of killing. The burden of evidence,
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therefore, shifts to the accuseds side in clearly and convincingly proving that the elements of self-
defense exist that could justify the accuseds act. In this case, considering that at the outset,
accused-appellant has already maintained a claim of self-defense, the burden of evidence rests upon
him in proving his act of stabbing as justifiable under the circumstances.
According to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, "any person who acts in defense of his
person or rights" do not incur any criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur:
(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Conversely, the
accused must be able to establish that all three circumstances concur in order for the accuseds act
to be justified under the law.
Particularly, in the case of unlawful aggression, People v. Gabrino, following the ruling in
People v. Manulit, explained that Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive
and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only
when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life.
In this case, the records would show that accused-appellant was clearly not able to establish
the aforementioned requisites. Worse, his sole evidencehis own testimonywas found by the
RTC to be so weak and devoid of any credibility as against those presented by the prosecution.
From the facts of the present case, the RTC gave credence and weight to the evidence presented by
the prosecution, whose testimonies rule out accused-appellants claim of self-defense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO DOLORIDO y ESTRADA

This Court said in People v. Catbagan, "There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense."
Facts:
An information was filed against respondent Rogelio Dolorido (Dolorido) charging him of
murder for the death of one Daniel Estose (Estose). During trial, the witnesses for the prosecution,
Aniolito Avila and Adrian Avila (the Avilas), testified that on the day of the murder while the Avilas
were walking towards the coconut plantation they saw Dolorido standing near the coconut drier of
Estose, appearing very angry. Thereafter, Dolorido proceeded to Rustica Doloridos coconut drier
located a hundred meters away and hid behind a coconut tree. Moments later, when Estose passed
by Rustica Doloridos coconut drier, they saw Dolorido suddenly hack Estose twice. When Estose
tried to retreat, he fell down and it was then that Dolorido stabbed him, which caused his death. For
his part, Dolorido raised the defense of self-defense. Dolorido was found guilty of murder qualified
by treachery.
Issue:
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Whether or not self-defense should be appreciated as interposed by Dolorido.
Ruling:
No. In order for self-defense to be successfully invoked, the following essential elements
must be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense.
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the accused-appellant failed to prove the
existence of unlawful aggression. But he maintains that Estose provoked him when the latter
started to unsheathe his bolo from his scabbard. Nevertheless, as aptly found by the trial court, his
testimony is too incredible to be believed, viz:
Doloridos plea failed to impress the Court. To be sure, his story on how the deceased
was killed is too incredible to inspire belief. According to him, it was the deceased who first
unsheathed his bolo but did not succeed in his attempt to fully unsheathe it because he
(Accused) hacked him. Thereafter, the deceased tried to wrest Accuseds bolo but was injured
instead. If the deceased failed to unsheathe his bolo because Accused was able to hack him,
how could the deceased then have attempted to dispossess the Accused of the latters bolo?
The truth, of course, is that the Accused waylaid the deceased, as testified to by the
prosecution witnesses.
SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 191913 March 21, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
Unlawful aggression does not contemplate a mere threatening or intimidating attitude.
Facts:
Shortly before 10pm, officer-of-the-day Lolito gave a lawful order to SPO1 Eduardo Basilio
and the victim SPO1 Doddie Espejo to stop boarding a tricycle. Lolito told Doddie that he should
stay because he was already drunk and that he is still on duty. Doddie, known for his combative
behaviour, alighted from the tricycle and held his .45 caliber gun. Lolito fired his M-16 armalite
upward as a warning shot. Undaunted, Doddie drew his gun and pointed it at Lolito. The accused
then shot Doddie on the head, killing the victim instantly. Lolito then surrendered to the station
Chief of Police.
Lolito was charged with homicide, but Lolito claimed self-defense. Reverse trial ensued, and
both the RTC and CA found Lolito guilty of homicide for lack of unlawful aggression on Doddies
part.
Issue:
Whether or not Lolito should be acquitted on the ground that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Doddie.
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Ruling:
Yes. For self-defense to be credited as a justifying circumstance, the following elements

must be present: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation by the accused.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent

danger on the life and limb of a person at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor, Unlawful aggression does not contemplate a mere threatening or intimidating attitude.
Hence, the act of Doddie pointing a gun at the accused establishes the presence of unlawful
aggression.
Even assuming that the prosecution is correct in saying that Doddie only drew his gun
without pointing it to Lolito, the accused still had every reason to suspect that his life was in actual
danger. To be sure, jurisprudence holds that the act of drawing a gun per se is ordinarily insufficient
to establish unlawful aggression. But in this case, the following circumstances confirm the actual
and imminent threat to Lolitos life when Doddie drew his gun: (1) The victim was drunk; (2) The
victim was a police officer trained to shoot; (3) The victim was known for his combative behavior;
(4) The victim ignored the accuseds lawful order; and (5) The victim ignored the warning shot by
the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS D. MANULIT

G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010, Velasco, Jr. J.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate
threat to ones life.
Facts:
Anabel Bautista and Reynaldo Juguilon, were walking along Dagupan Extension, Tondo,
Manila on their way home when they passed by accused-appellant Manulit, who was sitting in front
of his house across the barangay hall. Upon seeing them, Manulit stood up and successively shot
Reynaldo at the back, resulting in the latters death. He then tucked the gun in his waist, raised his
hands, and shouted, O, wala akong ginawang kasalanan at wala kayong nakita. And he ran towards
the direction of the basketball court adjoining the barangay hall. This was corroborated by the
testimonies of two eye witnesses
In his defense, Manulit offered a story of self-defense. He testified he asked his cousin,
Marvin Manulit, to have a drink with him. While they were drinking, Reynaldo barged in holding a
gun with both his hands. He appeared not to be his normal self with reddish eyes, as if high on
drugs. His cousin, Marvin Manulit, corroborated his testimony. Thereby he was charged with
murder. RTC convicted him with murder aggravated by treachery which was later on affirmed by
the CA which added that the he has failed to prove the presence of unlawful aggression, which is
one of the key elements of self-defense.
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Issue:
Whether or not the unlawful aggression was present which would absolve Manulit of the
crime of murder.
Ruling:
No. Unlawful aggression was not present. The essential elements of self-defense are: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. The person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving
all the elements. More importantly, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to
inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
Although all of the three elements must concur, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order
for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words, there
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.
In the instant case, accused-appellant failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression.
After a careful perusal of the records of this case, this Court finds no plausible reason to question
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO SATONERO @ RUBEN

G.R. No. 186233; October 2, 2009; Velasco, Jr., J.
For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal
safety. There must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.
Facts:
Leticia and her nephew, Ramon Amigable were in Brgy. La Esperanza, Tulunan waiting for a
tricycle ride to a place called Mlang. Leticia had just received a gift from her sister. Accused-
appellant, Leticias nephew too, happened to be nearby. Accused-appellant, upon seeing the gift
Leticia was holding, inquired where it came from. When told of the source, accused-appellant
mocked the gift-giver for giving more to those who have more in life. Accused-appellant then asked
Leticia if she knew who he was, followed by a remark that he would throw her into the irrigation
ditch. When Ramon was about to board the tricycle, accused-appellant followed him, shot him three
times with a short-barreled gun, then stabbed him several times. All told, Ramon sustained nine
stab wounds on different parts of his body.
Accused-appellant urges his acquittal on the ground he acted in self-defense. He asserts that
the unlawful aggressor in the fatal episode in question was Ramon, who started it by
calling accused-appellant a fool and then chasing him around with a knife. Pressing the
point, accused-appellant alleges that the assault came without sufficient provocation on his part,
having just arrived from a farm work when Ramon attacked him. Ramon, so accused-appellant
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claims, resented the fact that he, accused-appellant, was presently working on a piece of land which
the former used to till and longed to possess.
Issue:
Whether or not self-defense should be appreciated in the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. There was no self-defense on the part of accused-appellant in the instant case. The
element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is absent, or at least not convincingly
proved,accused-appellants claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. For unlawful aggression to
be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. There must be an actual, sudden,
and unexpected attack or imminent danger, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. But assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on Ramons part, the Court
distinctly noted that the means accused-appellant employed to prevent or repel the supposed
unlawful aggression were far from reasonably necessary. The number and nature of the wounds
sustained by Ramon certainly belie a claim of self-defense. It is worth stressing that accused-
appellant inflicted nine stab wounds on Ramon after he pumped a bullet on the latters lower left
chest. Said gunshot wound, as medical report later showed, was by itself already fatal. Significantly,
after Ramon fell as a result of his bullet wound, accused-appellant still proceeded to stab him. As
aptly observed by the trial court, Ramon could not have walked far after he was hit by the
bullet. Accused-appellants pretense, therefore, that he had no intention to harm Ramon after the
shooting and that he only approached the fallen Ramon to bring him to the doctor, stretches
credulity to the absurd and must be rejected. Certainly, the nature and number of the injuries
inflicted by accused-appellant on the victim should be significant indicia in determining the
plausibility of the self-defense plea.
ALBERTO GARONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Where two criminal cases arose from one incident, and the accused cries self-defense, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove all of its elements. Self-defense is a factual allegation which
should be proved during trial. Since the findings of the trial court are regarded with finality, we cannot
review such factual issue on appeal.
Facts:
Morta tried to stab Guevarra and Garong. The two were able to avoid the stab blows. A
single shot was then fired at Morta. When the police investigated the incident, Morta reported that
Garong shot him.
Two criminal cases were filed from this single incident. Morta was charged with multiple
attempted homicide while Garong was charged with frustrated murder. Garong contends that he
acted in self-defense against the real aggressor, Morta. He theorizes that the plea of self-defense, if
considered, would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle him to acquittal.
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Issue:
Whether or not Garong acted in self-defense.
Ruling:
No. For self-defense to prosper, there must be: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. The burden of proving the elements of self-defense shifts to
the accused.
In this case, the prosecution presented the following compelling evidence, among others: 1)
positive identification by the complainant; 2) physical evidence of blood drops found by the police
officer; 3) the admission of petitioner that he had a gun at the time of the incident; and 4) the point
of entry of the gunshot in the complainants left buttock. The foregoing circumstantial and pieces of
physical evidence disprove the claim of self-defense. While petitioner harps on the alleged
complainants unlawful aggression, the trial court found that there was no proof beyond reasonable
doubt against the complainant. Hence, Gerson Morta was acquitted in Criminal Case No. C-
3402. Assuming arguendo that Gerson Morta was the aggressor, petitioner must prove the
existence of the two (2) other elements of self-defense: the aforecited second (2nd) and third (3rd)
elements. A mere allegation of self-defense will not exempt Garong from criminal
liability. Petitioner should squarely meet the circumstantial and physical evidence presented by the
prosecution. Unfortunately, there was no sufficient or satisfactory explanation for the
aforementioned evidence against the petitioner.
Exempting Circumstances
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAUL ALIPIO

The moral and legal presumption is always in favor of soundness of mind; that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. It is improper to assume the contrary.
Facts:
AAA is a 41-year old mentally retarded woman. Marilou Gipit Alipio often hired AAA to
watch over her children. Marilou sent AAA to Sitio Liman, Sorsogon to borrow money from
Marilous father, Saul but Saul told AAA that he would give the necessary amount to Marilou
directly. While about to head for home, AAA heard Paul calling her from his house. Suddenly, Paul
held her hand, pushed her inside and, while covering AAAs mouth, brought her to his bedroom. He
then removed her shorts and panty and likewise, undressed himself. Paul then went on top of her,
kissed her, and fondled her breasts. Eventually, he entered her, first using his finger, then his penis.
Before finally letting the crying AAA go, however, Paul threatened her with death should she
disclose to anybody what had just happened between them. Psychiatric evaluation revealed that
AAA, although 42 years old at that time, had the mental capacity and disposition of a nine or 10
year-old child. Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in giving full credence to and
reliance on AAAs inculpatory statements in the witness box, it being his contention that her account
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of what purportedly happened reeks of inconsistencies and does not jibe with the normal flow of
things. As asserted, it is quite unnatural for a woman finding herself in a sexually-charged situation
not make an outcry or use her hands to ward off the advances of a sex fiend.
In a bid to escape from criminal liability, accused-appellant invokes insanity. He contends

that the psychiatrist who examined him consistently testified that there was a high possibility that
he was suffering from schizoaffective disorder when the alleged rape incident happened.
Issue:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity can be properly invoked by Alipio.
Ruling:
No. Exempting Circumstance of Insanity Is Absent. The moral and legal presumption is
always in favor of soundness of mind; that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition
of a person. It is improper to assume the contrary. This presumption, however, may be overcome by
evidence of insanity, which, under Art. 12(1) of the RPC, exempts a person from criminal liability.
The evidence offered by the defense in this case miserably failed to establish clearly and
convincingly the presence of the stringent criterion for insanity. On the contrary, the evidence
tended to show, albeit impliedly, that accused-appellant was not deprived of reason at all and can
still distinguish right from wrong when, after satisfying his lust, he threatened AAA not to tell
anybody about what he had done; otherwise, she would be killed. This single episode irresistibly
implies, for one, that accused-appellant knew what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to
keep it a secret. And for another, it indicated that the crime was committed during one of accused-
appellants lucid intervals. In this regard, no less than his father admitted in open court that there
were times when his son was in his proper senses.
Mitigating Circumstances
Nemrod Gotis v. People of the Philippines

In order to determine the sufficiency of a provocation for the purpose of mitigating a crime,
one must look into the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked,
and the place and time when the provocation is made. In the present case, a finding that the act of the
victim did not constitute unlawful aggression does not automatically negate the attendant
circumstance of sufficient provocation.
Facts:
Nahom and Nemrod Gotis were brothers. They went to the house of Serafin to kill him but
he was not found thereby threatening to Nilda the wife of Serfin that he would kill the latter. Nilda
told Serafin about what happened and he went to Nahoms house. Upon reaching the gate of
Nahoms house, Serafin called for Nahom and asked him to come out. When Nahom heard the shouts
of Serafin, he immediately called Nemrod for help. Nemrod came over and advised Serafin to go
home, but he refused to leave. Instead, Serafin attempted to hack Nemrod and tried to enter the
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gate of Nahoms house. Thereafter, Nahom struck Serafin on the head with a bolo. Meanwhile,
Nemrod his brothers house to look for a bolo. After being hit, Serafin ran away. Nemrod, however,
pursued him, and hit him several times on the back and arm. Thereafter Nemrod ran away. The two
were charged with homicide. Serafin died eventually during treatment. Nemrod voluntarily
surrender to the authorities. The trial court ruled that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide. But for Nemrod a mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and
voluntary surrender is thereby credited. However he appealed to the CA and ruled that he has failed
to prove satisfactorily the elements of self defense and that unlawful aggression did not exist at the
time he attacked the Serafin. observed that the unlawful aggression against Nemrods life had
already ceased when petitioner went inside his brothers house and the victim ran away. Thus, his
coming out of the house with a bolo is indicative of a determination to kill Serafin Gotis and not
merely to defend himself. Thereby hes not entitled to mitigating circumstance.
Issue:
Whether or not Nemrod is entitled to mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
Ruling:
Yes. As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and

unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim. On the other hand, as a
mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate
in gravity. Notably, while an act cannot be considered an unlawful aggression for the purpose of
self-defense, the same act can be considered as sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating
the crime.
In the present case, a finding that the act of the victim did not constitute unlawful
aggression does not automatically negate the attendant circumstance of sufficient provocation. In
the present case, Nemrod was merely pacifying Serafin when the latter suddenly attempted to hack
the former. Although Nemrod evaded the attack, Serafins act was enough provocation to anger
Nemrod and cause him to strike back. Thus, SC find that sufficient provocation attended the crime.
Aggravating Circumstances
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROEL RUEL SALLY,

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
unsuspecting victims, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victims. The kind of weapon used is immaterial.
Facts:
Two criminal informations were filed against Roel Ruel Sally for the murder of Edwin Lucas
and Jose Bersero. According to the prosecution witness Roger Lara, he saw the accused hit the
victims with a piece of pipe while sleeping. Sally denied the charges against him and alleged that he
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had no knowledge of the matters testified to by Lara. The RTC found Sally guilty of murder. In his
appeal to the CA, Sally questioned the finding that treachery attended the killings, qualifying the
crime to murder, instead of homicide. He pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that an
iron pipe was used in the killing of the victims as the weapon was not retrieved or presented in
evidence, nor was the medico-legal officer certain if an iron pipe would cause the injuries suffered
by the victims. However, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sally should have been convicted of homicide.
Ruling:
No. Article 14, paragraph 16(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. This precisely covers the
situation that accused-appellant took advantage of, when he attacked the victims while they were
sleeping. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
unsuspecting victims, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.
The RTC was thus correct in appreciating the circumstance of treachery accompanying the
act, which qualifies the killing to murder under the first paragraph of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, not homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY TORRES, SR.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in its execution which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself.
Facts:
Larry Torres, Sr. was charged with murder for shooting Michael Santonia with an
unlicensed firearm and without warning. The brother of Michael, Mitchell, testified that they were
at the house of Perez and he heard Santonia and the accused having an argument so he pulled his
brother aside and told him that they should leave. On their way out, Mitchell heard a gunshot and
he looked back when he sensed that his brother was falling over. He saw the accused at an arms
length away holding a .38 caliber gun. He noticed blood oozing from his brothers head. Santonia
was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival. Another witness, Carandang,
corroborated such testimony and added that he was two arms length away from Santonia when the
latter fell down. The accused alleged that Santonia poked a gun at him while he was about to take a
shot of alcohol. He said that Santonia had his right hand on the firearm so he tried to stop Santonia
by placing his hand on the formers right hand. The gun fired while they were struggling. He
maintains that treachery did not attend the killing of Santonia, because there was an altercation
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between him and the victim, making it impossible for the latter not to have been forewarned of any
danger to himself. Both the RTC and CA found him guilty of the crime charged and that there was
treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
Ruling:
Yes. The charge of murder was established by the prosecution through its documentary and
testimonial evidence. All the elements of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code were duly proved. Santonia was shown to have died of internal hemorrhage caused by a
gunshot wound. The accused was positively identified. The testimonies on how the accused shot
Santonia materially corroborated each other. Santonias death and the treachery that qualified the
killing to murder were established. The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in its
execution which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself or
herself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. Santonia was not afforded
any means of defending himself or an opportunity to retaliate. The attack on the victim was sudden,
unexpected and without warning because he was on his way home already and had no reason to
feel that his life was in danger. He could not have protected or defended himself as his back was
turned when he was suddenly shot from behind. The strategy employed by accused-appellant and
the means he used to accomplish the act ensured that the killing of Santonia would be without risk
to himself. The conviction of the accused is affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEX PALING, ERNIE VILBAR @ "DODONG" (at large),
and ROY VILBAR ALEX PALING
G.R. No. 185390, March 16, 2011, Velasco, J.
The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is considered

whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressors that is plainly
and obviously advantageous to the aggressors and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
Facts:
On July 1, 1996, accused Paling, accompanied by Vilbar, allegedly killed Walter Nolasco in
Roxas, Cotabato. When arraigned, they both pleaded not guilty. One of the witnesses for the
prosecution, Richard, said that he saw Paling and Ernie stabbing Walter while Vilbar held him. After
killing Walter, the accused warned Richard not to speak about what he saw otherwise, they would
also kill him. On the other hand, the defense denied all the allegations against the accused. The RTC
convicted Paling and Vilbar of the crime of murder with a qualifying circumstance of treachery and
evident premeditation which decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
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Whether or not Paling is guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
Yes. The killing of Walter is qualified by abuse of superior strength, not by treachery or
evident premeditation. In this regard, it is worth noting that "qualifying circumstances cannot be
presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing
itself."
The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is considered

whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressors that is
plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressors and purposely selected or taken advantage of
to facilitate the commission of the crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely
used excessive force that is "out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked." The victim need not be completely defenseless in order for the said aggravating
circumstance to be appreciated. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless.
In the present case, the victim, Walter, while being restrained by Vilbar, was simultaneously
stabbed by Paling and Ernie. Plainly, not only did the perpetrators outnumber their victim, more
importantly, they secured advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with
impunity. Under these circumstances, it is undeniable that there was gross inequality of forces
between the victim and the three accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAVID MANINGDING

There is treachery when "the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Facts:
At around 10:25 in the evening in Pangasinan, while Aladino (prosecutions 1 st witness) was
tending to his sari-sari store, he noticed brothers Rommel and Marlon conversing with each other
while seated on a bench beside his store. While this was transpiring, the accused arrived. The
victim, Marlon, stood up and greeted the accused, who happened to be his brother-in-law, "good
evening."He stated that the accused kept quiet and suddenly raised the right hand of Marlon and
stabbed him by the armpit with a knife that he was carrying. Marlon shouted because of the pain,
which caused the people in the neighborhood to come out. At this instance, the accused ran away.
Dr. De Guzman and Rommel were presented by the prosecution as its corroborating witnesses.
After his arrest, David Maningding pleaded not guilty of the murder charged against him.
The RTC convicted the accused. The RTC found that treachery attended the stabbing of the victim,
being sudden and unexpected. The RTC also explained that the facts indicate no showing that there
was any altercation between the accused and the victim immediately prior to the stabbing that
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could have warned the latter of the said ensuing incident. The accused appealed the Decision of the
RTC, reiterating his argument of self-defense but the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery is present in the case.
Ruling:
Yes. In People v. Dela Cruz, this Court discussed that in order for an accused to be convicted
of murder, the following elements must concur: 1) That a person was killed, 2) That the accused
killed him, 3) That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.
248, and 4) The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Moreover, Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[a]ny person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with x x x treachery." There is treachery
when "the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make."These means or methods
are made in the form of a swift, deliberate and unexpected attack, without any warning and
affording the victim, which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to resist or escape
the impending attack.
In this case, it is undisputed that it was accused-appellant who stabbed and killed the
victim, which is neither a crime of parricide nor infanticide. We are, therefore, left with the issue of
whether there was treachery in the attack. Going over the records of the case, We are convinced
that, indeed, treachery was employed and present in the stabbing by accused-appellant of the
victim, which led to the latters ultimate death. From the testimonies of Aladino and Rommel, it
cannot be gainsaid that accused-appellant without any warning or suspicion, and taking advantage
of the circumstances, immediately attacked the victim. The victim did not have any suspicion that
could have alerted him of the impending attack. As clearly demonstrated in the trial court, the
attack was swift and unexpected, even to the eyewitnesses, Aladino and Rommel. We, therefore,
agree with the RTCs ruling and finding, and We find no reason to veer away from them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO DOLORIDO y ESTRADA

The "essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk of himself."
Facts:
An information was filed against respondent Rogelio Dolorido (Dolorido) charging him of
murder for the death of one Daniel Estose (Estose). During trial, the witnesses for the prosecution,
Aniolito Avila and Adrian Avila (the Avilas), testified that on the day of the murder while the Avilas
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were walking towards the coconut plantation they saw Dolorido standing near the coconut drier of
Estose, appearing very angry. Thereafter, Dolorido proceeded to Rustica Doloridos coconut drier
located a hundred meters away and hid behind a coconut tree. Moments later, when Estose passed
by Rustica Doloridos coconut drier, they saw Dolorido suddenly hack Estose twice. When Estose
tried to retreat, he fell down and it was then that Dolorido stabbed him, which caused his death. For
his part, Dolorido raised the defense of self-defense. Dolorido was found guilty of murder qualified
by treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the elements of treachery.
Ruling:
No. Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated,
two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him.
In the case at bar, it was clearly shown that Estose was deprived of any means to ward off
the sudden and unexpected attack by accused-appellant. The evidence showed that accused-
appellant hid behind a coconut tree and when Estose passed by the tree, completely unaware of any
danger, accused-appellant immediately hacked him with a bolo. Estose could only attempt to parry
the blows with his bare hands and as a result, he got wounded. Furthermore, when Estose tried to
retreat, stumbling in the process, accused-appellant even took advantage of this and stabbed him
resulting in his death. Evidently, the means employed by accused-appellant assured himself of no
risk at all arising from the defense which the deceased might make. What is decisive is that the
attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.
Without a doubt, treachery attended the killing.
People of the Philippines v. Prince Francisco y Zafe

Treachery exists even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no
opportunity to repel it or defend himself, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate
Facts:
Ramil while he was attending a wake with his brother Cristopher was sitting nearby on a
parked motorcycle talking to someone when Prince appeared from behind and started stabbing
Ramil using a knife. He pleaded to Prince to stop for he might die but Prince kept on stabbing him.
Then later on died. Prince was charged with murder. Prince admitted the death of Ramil which
resulted from his assault but he argued that the offense was only homicide and not murder because
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there was no treachery. He argued that he did not attack Ramil from behind. RTC convicted Prince
with murder which was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Prince argues that the attack was
not from behind but frontal thereby treachery was not present
Issue:
Whether or not there was treachery.
Ruling:
Yes. There was treachery. Settled jurisprudence prescribes two essential elements in order
to support the finding of treachery as an aggravating circumstance: (1) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on
the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2)
deliberate and conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution.
In this factual setting, the selection of the knife as the weapon to kill Ramil was arrived at so
as not to create any noise that can alert the victim. Prince planned to attack Ramil when Ramils
back is turned from appellant to preclude any window for self-defense or retaliation on the part of
Ramil. The attack was swift and unexpected. He rained numerous stabbing blows on the body of
Ramil to ensure the success of his assault. Ramil was unarmed at the time of the attack depriving
him of any opportunity to defend himself. Indeed, there was a deliberate, premeditated choice of
the means, method, or manner of executing the crime that would shield appellant from any
counterattack from Ramil. Ergo, the two elements of treachery were unquestionably met.
While Prince may claim that the attack is frontal and Ramil had the opportunity to defend
himself, the Court explained in People v. Segobre that treachery exists even if the attack is frontal if
it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself, for what
is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. This is the unfortunate case of Ramil who was unable to repel the
attack except only to plead for his life. As the CA aptly pointed out, even if Ramil was attacked
frontally which is definitely not the case he was bereft of any opportunity to defend himself due to
the swiftness and suddenness of the attack.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHBERT AMODIA y BABA,MARIO MARINO y PATNON,

and ROY LO-OC y PENDANG,
To stress, qualifying circumstances must be proved as clearly as the crime itself. In order to
appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not only is it necessary to
evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects
employed by both sides, but it is further necessary to analyze the incidents and episodes constituting
the total development of the event.
Facts:
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Richard Roda, an Assistant Manager of Nognog Videoke Restaurant in Quezon City, noticed
that Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were beating Jaime. As a result of the beating died. Roda went
to Camp Karingal in Quezon City to report what he had witnessed. The police then filed an
investigation report which became the basis for the filing of Information against Amodia et al. RTC
ruled that Amodia et al. were guilty of Murder. The CA, moreover, held that the killing was qualified
by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength; thus, affirming the RTC decision. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
No. To appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be
considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense. Mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior
strength. There must be clear proof that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of
proportion to the defense available to the person attacked.
In this case, although the victim was unquestionably outnumbered, it was not shown that
accused-appellants deliberately applied their combined strength to weaken the defense of the
victim and guarantee the execution of the crime. Notably, accused-appellants took turns in boxing
the victim. When the victim fell, the prosecution witness was able to hold him, preventing accused-
appellants from further hurting him. Then accused-appellants simply turned away. To be sure, had
accused-appellants really intended to use their superior strength to kill the victim, they would have
finished off the victim, and probably even the lone prosecution eyewitness.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL CUASAY

We held that treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specially to ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Facts:
Cuasay with treachery, without any justifiable cause and with the deliberate intent to take
the life of Ansuli with a sharp-pointed instrument thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound
on the chest, causing his untimely demise. Cuasay plead "not guilty" to the charge. Cuasay claimed
killing Ansuli in self-defense. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and awarded moral
damages to the heirs of the victim. CA affirmed but modified the award.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
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Ruling:
No. We agree with CAs finding of treachery. We held that treachery exists when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly or specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
In the case at bar, the victim was unarmed and unsuspecting when accused-appellant
suddenly stabbed him. Treachery was clearly present in Cuasays method. Also, the CA should not
have deleted the award of moral damages. In murder cases, the heirs of the victim should be
automatically indemnified in the amount of P50, 000 as moral damages. No proof is necessary since
the emotional and mental suffering of the heirs is apparent.
DEFENSES
Alibi
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUANITO APATTAD

Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.
Facts:
Accused Juanito Apattad was charged in four separate informations with the crime of rape
against his 12-year old daughter. The child, AAA, testified that in 2001, she was molested and in
June 10 and 11, 2003, she was raped by the accused. The accused threatened to kill her if she will
report the incident to her mother. However, she finally told her mother on June 13, 2003 that she
was being abused by her father. Her mother whipped her not telling it immediately. She was
interviewed by a DSWD personnel and Dr. Mila Simangan conducted a physical examination on her
and discovered that AAA had a healed hymen laceration. The accused denied the accusation of rape
and claimed that his wife was the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she
thinks that he has a mistress. A defense witness claimed that on the date of the incident, the accused
stayed in the formers house, which was only three kilometers away from the house of the accused.
The RTC found him guilty of three counts of rape. CA affirmed with modification as to the award of
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. The accused contends that while the defense of alibi is frowned upon, it assumes
signifance when corroborated by credible and disinterested witness, in his case, that of Calimag.
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The guidelines for assessing the the defense of alibis and denials are: (1) they are generally
disfavored by the courts for being weak; (2) they cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrators of the crime; (3) for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission; (4) alibi assumes
significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested
witnesses; (5) alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the assessment
made by the trial court, unless patently and clearly inconsistent, must be accepted.
Measured against the foregoing yardstick, accused-appellants defenses of alibi and denial
cannot prosper as AAA positively identified him in her testimony as the very perpetrator of the
crime of rape committed against her. In addition, a distance of three kilometers does not make it
physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Alibi also becomes unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused
himself, his relatives, friends and comrades-in-arms, and not by credible persons. Accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of 3 counts of rape.
PO1 LORETO NERPIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 155153 July 24, 2007 Velasco, Jr., J.
It is a settled doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
at some other place when the crime was committed; but the defense must likewise demonstrate that
the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate
vicinity, during its commission.
Facts:
SPO1 Loreto Nerpio held a childrens birthday party for his son at his residence. Mario
Salazar joined the drinking session and later on left the house of Nerpio. Thereafter, Nelly
Villanueva, who was then waiting for a friend, saw Salazar walking along the street. Villanueva saw
a man poked a gun at the right side of Salazars neck, and fired it. He identified Nerpio as the
malefactor. Nerpio was charged with homicide. He was found guilty as charged by the RTC. His
conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the CA seriously erred in disregarding the accuseds defense of alibi despite the
patent weakness of the prosecutions evidence.
Ruling:
NO. In considering the physical distance of the accused from the crime scene, the Court has
rejected alibi where the two places are in the same municipality, where they are easily accessible by
any mode of public transportation, where the distance can be covered by walking for thirty minutes
or by riding a vehicle for twenty minutes, or even when it could be reached after approximately an
hour.
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In the present case, the geographical proximity of petitioner to the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission was clearly established by the prosecution. Petitioner claims that at the time
of the alleged killing, he was at home hosting a party. However, he also testified that it was only 150
meters away from the crime scene. He even admitted that he went to the crime scene but only after
the shooting took place. Apparently, petitioner failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ y MIRANDA, alias DIDONG

G.R. No. 184792, October 12, 2009, Velasco Jr., J.
Where the possibility exists for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi
must fail.
Facts:
On November 20, 2001 in a forested area nearby the place and house of the accused Didong
and company, Didong hit with his piece of wood the nape of Ahladdin (the victim who was also
drunk at the time) then held by the hand by Nante. When Nante released his hold, Didong again hit
Ahladdin on the back of the knees. After Boyet, Nante and Didong stabbed Ahladdin, Fred Gongon
shot him saying Siguraduhin niyo patay na yan. The following morning the dead body of Ahladdin
was discovered. Consequently, based on these established facts Didong and company were charged
of murder qualified by treachery. On this charge Didong merely provided the defense of alibi and
denial. He testified to being at Tata Freds house from five in the afternoon of November 20, 2001
until seven in the evening. Accordingly, he then headed home and stayed there the whole night. He
only found out about Ahlladins death when his neighbors informed him about it the next day.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of alibi will prosper.
Ruling:
No. Didongs proffered defense to evade criminal responsibility is too feeble to merit
consideration. His defense of alibi cannot overcome, and is in fact destroyed by the categorical
testimony of Anthony, who positively pointed to and identified him as one of the malefactors.
Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on alibi, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) he was somewhere else at the time of the commission of the offense;
and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. And when the law speaks of physical impossibility, the reference is to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the locus criminis, as well
as the facility of access between the two places. Evidently, here, the requisites for appreciating alibi
are not present. In fact, by appellants own admission, he was with one of his co-accused the day
before Ahlladins death was uncovered. Even supposing that during the latter part of the day, he
really did go home, such a detail does not remove the possibility of his being at the forested area,
the scene of the crime.
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PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Degree of Participation
ALBERT G. AMBAGAN JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO. 204481-82, October 14, 2015, Velasco Jr., J.
The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be
made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement be
the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.
Facts:
Accused Mayor Ambagan Jr. was charged and convicted by the Sandiganbayan with two
counts of homicide as principal by inducement. The prosecution presented statements from two
persons who was said to be directly present during the shooting. The first witness (Bawalan) said
that shooting started after he heard the mayor said GE, IYAN PALA ANG GUSTO MO, MGA KASAMA
BANATAN NYO NA YAN. However, the second witness contradicts this when he said that he
instead pushed the mayor out of the road where the shooting incident occurred and that he did not
hear the mayor saying those words which could have provoked and initiate the shooting of the
victims. Further, evidence provides that Rene Amparo (one of Mayor Ambagans men) has negative
paraffin test which would lead to the fact that it is not the Mayors men who initiated the shooting
but rather from the deceased Rey Santos. The Sandiganbayan convicted Ambagan of the crime of
double homicide. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted ruling. The
Sandiganbayan, however, would deny petitioner's motion through its assailed October 31, 2012
Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Ambagan can be held guilty for double homicide as principal by
inducement.
Ruling:
No. This Court is not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed made the declaration that
started the fray. The court a quo failed to take note of substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies
of star prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These contradictions refer not only to
minor details but even to the facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the
weight of the evidence of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of
petitioner Ambagan.
This Court is not bound by the findings of the Sandiganbayan should it discover that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are marred with inconsistencies that are neither collateral
nor trivial, but are material and substantial in matters determinative of petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In conclusion, the scant evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of
petitioner as principal by inducement. It was not convincingly established, beyond reasonable
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doubt, that petitioner indeed ordered his men to open fire at Santos and Domingo Bawalan. The
evidence offered against him in court does not pass the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to
rebut the presumption of innocence that petitioner is entitled to under the Bill of Rights. And where
there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an accused, he must be acquitted even though his
innocence may be questioned, for it is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even
though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary.

The court ruled in People v. Ballesta that mere presence at the scene of the incident,
knowledge of the plan and acquiescence thereto are not sufficient grounds to hold a person as a
conspirator. x x x Lacking sufficient evidence of conspiracy and there being doubt as to whether
appellant acted as a principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and
is thus held liable only as an accomplice.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the finding of conspiracy made Gatchalian guilty as a conspirator.
Ruling:
No. Gatchalian is differently situated as Doctor. The evidence adduced and the records
would show that Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. The
mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation
or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.
Gatchalians presence is merely extraneous to the accomplishment of the crime. Thus, with
his lack of overt acts manifestly contributing to the accomplishment of the common design to shoot
Estrella, there is some doubt if he indeed conspired with Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. This, however, does
not exculpate him from criminal liability absent proof that he merely tagged along or just happened
to meet his employer (Tomas, Sr.) shortly before the incident or was merely taken along without
being told about the other accused-appellants plan. The fact that Gatchalian appeared together with
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the other accused-appellants and fled with them, while not constitutive of proof beyond reasonable
doubt of conspiracy, still proves a certain degree of participation and cooperation in the execution
of the crime. Consequently, in line with the principle that whatever is favorable to an accused must
be accorded him, Gatchalian is guilty as an accomplice only.
PENALTIES
ROSVEE C. CELESTIAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Applying article 70 of the RPC, such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
Therefore, in spite of the six (6) penalties of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, petitioner shall only
suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years. A downward modification of the penalty
imposed by the RTC is then in order.
Facts:
Celestial was convicted of six counts of qualified theft through falsification of commercial
document. The issue of conviction has attained finality after the failure of Celestials counsel to file
her appellant brief. The court now only delves on the issue of the imposition of proper penalty.
Issue:
What is the proper penalty for Celestials conviction of six counts of qualified theft with the
total amount of $50, 000.00
Ruling:
In ascertaining the proper penalty, we are guided by our pronouncement in People v.

Mercado:
First, we get the value of the property stolen as determined by the trial court
Second, we determine the imposable base penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC. Here, since
the totality of the stolen amounts for each case exceeds P22,000.00, the imposable base penalty for
each count, as per Art. 309 (1), is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed
in the maximum period, which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, had the crime charged been simple theft.
Third, since the value of the stolen goods exceeds P22,000.00, We compute for the
additional years of maximum imprisonment under Art. 309 (1) by deducting P22,000.00 from each
case, and by subsequently dividing each difference by P10,000.00, disregarding any remainder
amount.
Fourth, we add the maximum of the base penalty to the above-determined quotient to
arrive at the maximum imprisonment term imposable had the crime committed been simple theft
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Fifth, the maximum imprisonment term should not exceed the 20-year cap under Art. 309
(1), and any imprisonment term in excess of the cap should be disregarded. In this case, since all
sums exceeded 20 years, the proper penalty - the maximum period adverted to in Art. 309 (1) -
would have been 20 years of reclusion temporal, before the application of the indeterminate
sentence law, for each count, had petitioner been convicted of simple theft.
Sixth, the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than that for simple theft. Under
Art. 25 of the RPC, two (2) degrees higher than reclusion temporal- the penalty following reclusion
perpetua
Lastly, since petitioner is convicted of six (6) counts of qualified theft through falsification
of commercial documents with corresponding six (6) penalties of forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua, Art. 70 of the RPC on successive service of sentences shall apply.
Prescription of Crimes (RPC and Special Penal Laws)
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v.

THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN Conchita Carpio-Morales et al.
G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014, Third Division, Velasco, Jr., J.
When date of the violation was committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from the
discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.
Facts:
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 13 issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos creating a
Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, a report dated January 4, 1993
identified the accounts of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC) as behest in character. Later the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint on January 6,
2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman, against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the
directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. However the Ombudsman dismissed petitioners Affidavit-
Complaint on grounds of prescription. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense has already prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall
prescribe in ten years. This period was later increased to 15 years with the passage of BP Blg. 195,
which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive
period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019. The longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant
to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending
law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975,
and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law
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in force at that time. What is, then, left for determination is the reckoning point for the 10-year
period.
Notably, RA 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription shall begin to run. This void,
however, is remedied by Act No. 3326, Section 2 which provides for two reckoning points for the
counting of the prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the commission of the violation of the law;
and 2) if the day when the violation was committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from
the discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and
punishment.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the Court have
recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple
expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. The Court, therefore,
count the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993,
when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the President its findings and
conclusions anent RHCs loans. This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten years from the date of
discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to
institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss petitioners
complaint on the ground of prescription.
BOOK 2 REVISED PENAL CODE and related SPECIAL LAWS
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
EDMUND SYDECO Y SIONZON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is disputable by contrary proof and
which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. The absence of
conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the
police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt
for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that four police officers, manning a legal checkpoint, spotted a
swerving vehicle, driven by Sydeco who was under the influence of liquor. The police officers
flagged the vehicle down and asked Sydeco to alight from the vehicle. However, Sydeco denied
being drunk, and yelled at the officers. At that remark, they arrested Sydeco who put up resistance,
and brought him to the hospital where he was examined and found to be positive of alcohol breath.
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On the other hand, Sydeco averred that he was signaled to stop by the police officers and asked him
to open the vehicles door and to alight from the vehicle for a body and vehicle search. He refused
and insisted on a plain view search only. By this remark, the policemen told him that he was drunk,
boxed him, and poked a gun at his head. The officers pulled Sydeco out of the vehicle and brought
him to the hospital where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate depicting Sydeco as
positive of alcohol breath.
Sydeco was charged for violation of Section 56(f) of RA 4136 or the Land Transportation
Code and another for violation of Article 151 of the RPC. Sydeco then filed a complaint-affidavit
against the police officers. MeTC found Sydeco guilty as charged. The RTC affirmed Sydecos
conviction. This was affirmed by the CA and upheld the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by the police officers.
Issue:
Whether or not the police officers performed their duties as required by law.
Ruling:
No. At the time of Sydecos apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, he has not
committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. Swerving may become punishable
when there is a sign indicating that it is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature of
reckless driving. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive
of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving Sec. 48 of RA 4136, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Moreover, the area where Sydeco was spotted
was a no swerving or overtaking zone.
Furthermore, under Article 151 of the RPC, two elements of resistance and serious
disobedience must be present: (1) that a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) that the offender resists
or seriously disobeys such person or his agent. Clearly, the police officers are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But Sydecos act of exercising ones
right against unreasonable searches to be conducted cannot be equated to disobedience nor
resisting a lawful order. There is also nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning
policemen to order Sydeco to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And none of the
police officers denied the allegation of Sydeco about being physically hurt before being brought to
the hospital. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three of them to subdue Sydeco. Both
actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136.
RA 9165 COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATION (IRR)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NENE QUIAMANLON Y MALOG

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The IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule is not to be rigorously applied,
provided "the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team." Moreover, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved,
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Evidently, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Facts:
Acting upon a tip from a female confidential informant, the District Anti-Illegal Drugs
(DAID) of Quezon City formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend a certain
Myrna who was allegedly conducting illegal drug activities within Quezon City. According to the
prosecution, the DAID recovered the marked 500-peso bill used by the team from "Myrna," as well
as two plastic sachets, at the time of arrest of both "Myrna" and her companion, later identified as
Saguera Samula y Dalunan (Samula). "Myrna," who was later identified as Nene Quiamanlon, and
Samula, as well as the recovered articles were brought to the station for proper investigation and
disposition.
RTC convicted Quiamanlon of violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act,

specifically Sections 5 and 11 of Article II thereof. Quiamanlon was sentenced to life imprisonment,
P800, 000.00 in fines, and costs of suit. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Quiamanlon claimed that the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation failed to
observe the existing rules in the proper custody of the seized items, thereby casting doubt as to the
identity and integrity of the sachets allegedly containing shabu presented as evidence by the
prosecution. Quiamanlon insisted that any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs
and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Quiamanlon is guilty of violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to Quiamanlons assertion, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs
was adequately established in the instant case. A testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. The
IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule is not to be rigorously applied, provided
"the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team." Thus, the supposed procedural infirmities alleged by Quiamanlon with regard to the
custody, photographing, inventory, and marking of the seized items do not, in any manner, affect
the prosecution of the instant case and do not render her arrest illegal or the items seized from her
inadmissible.
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Moreover, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a

showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. In this case,
Quiamanlon bears the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a
presumption that they properly discharged their duties. Failing to discharge such burden, there can
be no doubt that the drugs seized from Quiamanlon were the same ones examined in the crime
laboratory. Evidently, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the
seized drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVANGELINE SOBANGEE Y EDAO

In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be
able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
Facts:
A confidential informant reported to the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) of Makati City that a
certain "Vangie" was engaged in drug pushing activities. Hence, a buy-bust operation was planned
by the DEU. Vangie was contacted by SPO4 Mangulabnan through a mobile phone, and a drug deal
worth P150, 000.00 was agreed upon. Vangie arranged to meet at Starbucks Caf on Rockwell
Drive, Makati City. SPO1 Fulleros acceded to her request and headed to the coffee shop. Minutes
after, Vangie arrived and looked for the poseur-buyer. He gave Vangie the boodle money after
examining the plastic bags. Afterwards, he gave the pre-arranged signal to alert his team that the
transaction had been consummated. The back-up operatives arrived while he was introducing
himself to Vangie as a DEU operative. She was placed under arrest and later identified as Sobangee.
RTC and CA found Sobangee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sec. 5, Art. II
of RA No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Sobangee claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses suffered from
major inconsistencies, such as: (1) the date the alleged informant came to the DEU office; (2) the
time the buy-bust team left the office to conduct its operation; (3) the place that the team first went
to before going to the buy-bust at Rockwell Center, Makati City; (4) the location of the operatives
during the buy-bust operation; (5) the site where the illegal substances seized were marked; (6) the
amount involved in the buy-bust; (7) the officer who informed Sobangee of her constitutional
rights; and (8) the identity of the informant.
Issue:
Whether or not Sobangee violated the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Ruling:
Yes. The inconsistencies referred to are inconsequential. What is important is that the
prosecution was able to establish the key elements needed for a conviction. Minor variances in the
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details of the witnesses' accounts, more frequently than not, are badges of truth rather than indicia
of falsehood, and they often bolster the probative value of their testimonies.
The RTC correctly ruled that the prosecution succeeded in proving the presence of all the
elements of the offense charged. The plastic bags containing white crystalline substance taken from
the accused. The identity of the accused was positively established. In open court, witnesses for the
prosecution pointed to the accused as the person they arrested after consummation of the buy-bust
operation. This same person when asked of her identity identified herself as Evangeline Sobangee.
The marked money found in the possession of the accused consisting of one genuine one thousand
peso bill placed on top of a bundle of money was likewise positively identified by the arresting
officers as the same one provided and used in the operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUFINO VICENTE, JR. y CRUZ

Sec. 21 of RA 9165 need not be followed as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does
not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. It is not a
serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is
essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
An informant arrived at the District Anti-Illegal Drugs at the Southern Police District, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig and reported that a certain Paks was pushing shabu on P. Mariano St., Taguig.
Acting on the information from the informant, P/Insp. Rodolfo Anicoche ordered PO2 Boiser to
verify the drug-peddling activities of Paks. PO2 Boiser proceeded to Ususan accompanied by the
informant. After confirming the informants report, they went back to the police station to recount
what they had seen to P/Insp. Anicoche. Thereafter, a team was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust
operation. PO2 Boiser and PO2 Lagos walked with the informant to meet Paks. PO2 Boiser was
then introduced to Paks as a balikbayan who wanted to score some drugs. He also told Paks that he
had been released from rehab and wanted to use again. Paks, satisfied that PO2 Boiser was indeed
a drug user, agreed to sell P500.00 worth of shabu. He reached from his camouflage shorts a plastic
sachet and handed it to PO2 Boiser. After receiving the plastic sachet from Paks, PO2 Boiser
examined it under the light of a lamppost. Seeing the pre-arranged signal acted out by PO2 Boiser,
PO2 Lagos went to the scene and introduced himself as a police officer to Paks. The buy-bust
money was then seized from Paks.
RTC found Vicente, Jr. guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, Vicente, Jr. is convinced that
Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 were not complied with, since
the buy-bust team failed to present a pre-operation report and photographs of the seized items. He
concludes that there is uncertainty as to the identity of the illegal drugs seized. He says that due to
the buy-bust team's omissions, there is a lingering doubt as to whether the drugs that underwent
laboratory examination were the same items allegedly seized from him. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue:
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Whether or not Vicente Jr. is guilty of violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of
2002.
Ruling:
Yes. The prosecution showed that there was a meeting of the minds between the witness
Boiser, poseur-buyer and the seller, accused Rufino Vicente, Jr., to sell to the former shabu for
P500.00. The act of the accused-seller in receiving the money and delivering the said shabu
consummated the sale. The straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
clearly established the elements. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. In cases involving violations
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary. Absent any indication that the police officers were ill-motivated
in testifying against the accused, full credence should be given to their testimonies.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEDDY BATOON y MIGUEL and MELCHOR BATOON y MIGUEL
G.R. No. 184599, November 24, 2010, Velasco Jr. J.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Notably, exclusive possession of the prohibited
drug is not required.
Facts:
Sometime in 2005, the police received a report that there was rampant selling of shabu
somewhere in Ilocos Norte. According to the report, the brothers Teddy (Teddy) and Melchor
Batoon (Melchor), herein accused-appellants were two of the most notorious sellers of illegal drugs
in the area. Acting on the report, the police conducted a buy-bust operation which led to the arrest
of Teddy and Melchor. Sachets containing shabu were seized from Teddy and Melchor. Thereafter,
Teddy and Melchor were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for possession and
selling of illegal drugs.
The RTC and CA found Teddy and Melchor guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense
charged. Now, Teddy and Melchor come before the SC assailing the decision of the RTC and CA. In
their defense, they aver that the chain of custody over the alleged confiscated prohibited drugs was
not followed and that there was an absence of regularity in the performance of the police officers
duty when they were arrested. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Melchor Batoon of the crime of illegal possession of shabu
is proper.
Ruling:
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Yes. In this case, although the three sachets containing shabu were found solely in the
possession of Teddy, it was evident that Melchor had knowledge of its existence. Moreover, as
correctly found by the CA, Melchor had easy access to the shabu, because they conspired to engage
in the illegal business of drugs. The CA explained, thus: As the records would show, when PO2
Vicente handed to Melchor Batoon a marked [PhP] 500.00 bill, the latter went to his brother Teddy
and gave him money. Upon receipt of the money, Teddy Batoon handed a sachet to Melchor, who
then gave it to PO2 Vicente. When the arrest [was] affected on both of them, the three additional
sachets were found on [Teddy] by PO1 Cabotaje. These acts of the accused indubitably demonstrate
a coordinated plan on their part to actively engage in the illegal business of drugs. From their
concerted conduct, it can easily be deduced that there was common design to deal with illegal
drugs. Needless to state, when conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all conspirators.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON ABETONG Y ENDRADO

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation conducted, the accused, Marlon Abetong, was caught selling shabu
to a police poseur buyer. The RTC rendered a decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The CA affirmed his conviction. The accused
contended that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove that the integrity of the evidence was
preserved. Raising non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165, he argued, among others: (1) that the
markings on the items seized do not bear the date and time of the confiscation, as required; (2) that
about three days have passed since the items were confiscated before they were brought to the
crime laboratory; and (3) that there was neither an inventory nor a photograph of the recovered
plastic sachet. He likewise hinged his appeal on the fact that Inspector Lorilla, who had the only key
to the evidence locker, did not testify during trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
drug evidence.
Ruling:
No. Jurisprudence indeed instructs that failure to observe strictly the above-quoted
provision can be excused as long as (1) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers and (2) non-compliance was attended by
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justifiable grounds. However, the prosecution in this case was unsuccessful in showing that there
was no opportunity for tampering, contamination, substitution, nor alteration of the specimens
submitted. The prosecution likewise failed to offer any justification on why the afore-quoted
provision was not complied with.
In the case at bar, the failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecutions case.
As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the chain, Inspector Lorillas testimony became
indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution cannot skirt the issue of the broken chain of custody by relying on the
presumption of regularity. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. Any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTORIO PAGKALINAWAN

A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation or what
is known as a decoy solicitation, is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy-bust operation
invalid.
Facts:
The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team upon receipt of a report of illegal activities of
Pagkalinawan. He was arrested after sachets of shabu were recovered from him. Pagkalinawan,
interposed the defense of alibi. He said that armed men barged into his house and pointed a gun at
him. He was brought to the police station when the police could not find any prohibited drugs.
Pagkalinawan insists that what actually happened was an instigation and not a buy-bust
operation. He claimed that there was no compliance with the law as to the proper requirements for
a valid buy-bust operation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid buy-bust operation.
Ruling:
Yes. One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be
an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.
In order to determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, this Court has consistently
applied the objective test. In People v. Doria, this Court stressed that in applying the objective test,
the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and
adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by
the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. It further emphasized that the manner by which
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the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug,
the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant
alone or the police officer, must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment, not
instigation, to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug. It was the confidential
informant who made initial contact with appellant when he introduced PO1 Memoracion as a buyer
for shabu. Appellant immediately took the P500.00 buy-bust money from PO1 Memoracion and
showed him three pieces of sachet containing shabu and asked him to pick one. Once PO1
Memoracion got the shabu, he gave the pre-arranged signal and appellant was arrested. The facts
categorically show a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers
conduct was within the acceptable standards for the fair and honorable administration of justice.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DARIUS BAUTISTA Y ORSINO @ DADA

In cases of dangerous drugs, what is important and necessary is for the prosecution to prove
with moral certainty "that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused be
the same item recovered from his possession." As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team," the seizure of and custody
over the dangerous drugs shall not be rendered void and invalid
Facts:
As a result of a buy-bust operation, Darius O. Bautista was charged with and convicted of
drug pushing. In his appeal to the SC, he alleged that reasonable doubt exists because there is a
break in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drug. He further alleged that there was a
serious deviation from the requirements of Sec. 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002on the custody and disposition of the said seized dangerous drug.
Issue:
Whether non-compliance with chain of custody in drug cases render the seizure of drugs
void.
Ruling:
No. The law itself lays down certain exceptions to the general compliance requirement,
stressing the point that "as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team," the seizure of and custody over the
dangerous drugs shall not be rendered void and invalid.
In cases of dangerous drugs, what is important and necessary is for the prosecution to
prove with moral certainty "that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the
accused be the same item recovered from his possession." In this case, it is undoubted that the
witnesses for the prosecution clearly established such essential requirement.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GARRY DE LA CRUZ Y DELA CRUZ

The prosecution must offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete
chain of custody. The failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized
drugs raises doubt as to its origins and also negates the operation of the presumption of regularity
accorded to police officers.
Facts:
As a result of a buy-bust operation, Dela Cruz was charged with and convicted of the crime
of drug pushing. In his defense, the accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the
accused used the defense of denial and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers. On appeal, he
imputed material irregularities on the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Issue:
Whether the required chain of custody is properly observed.
Ruling:
No. The records belie a conclusion that there was an unbroken chain of custody of the
purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the
identity of the plastic sachet duly marked with the initials EIGC, there was no sufficient proof of
compliance with the chain of custody. The records merely show that, after the arrest of accused-
appellant, the specimen was allegedly turned over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was
not revealed. The Court cannot make an inference that PO2 Ibasco passed the specimen to an
unnamed desk officer on duty until it made its way to the laboratory examination. There are no
details on who kept custody of the specimen, who brought it to the Crime Laboratory, and who
received and kept custody of it until Engr. Jabonillo conducted the forensic examination. The
stipulated facts merely made an allusion that the specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory had
possession of the specimen and released it for the proceedings before the trial court.
In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of
custody, the accused is acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HASANADDIN GUIARA y BANSIL

What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.
Facts:
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A confidential informant arrived at the Taguig City Police Station and reported the illegal
drug peddling activities of one alias Mads. A buy-bust operation was later on conducted. Thereafter,
Mads was apprehended. An information was filed against him. After trial, the RTC convicted
accused-appellant. On appeal to the CA, accused-appellant disputed the lower courts decision
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He raised the issue that the police
officers failed to conduct a legitimate and valid buy-bust operation. He also questioned whether the
chain of custody of the shabu allegedly recovered from him was properly established arguing that
the police officers failed to follow the established rules governing custodial procedures in drug
cases without any justification for doing so.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. In the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu, the essential elements have to be established,
to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. In the instant case, the
prosecution was able to establish these elements. Accused-appellant sold and delivered
the shabu for PhP 500 to PO2 Concepcion posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified
as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the
marked money and contraband; and finally, accused-appellant was fully aware that he was selling
and delivering a prohibited drug.
On the other hand, in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be proved with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the
object identified as a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs without any showing that he
was duly authorized by law to possess the same. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is,
therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on accused-appellants part.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ADRIANO CONCEPCION

Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure of R.A. 9165, under justifiable grounds, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. What is
significant in the requirement is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.
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Facts:
P01 Willie Tadeo received a phone call that there was rampant selling of drugs in Banga,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. The chief of police instructed the police officers to form a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation, with PO1 Tadeo acting as the poseur-buyer. In the target area, a club located at
Banga, PO1 Tadeo was given two pieces of P100-bills, and he marked the same with his initials
"WCT." PO1 Tadeo handed alias Joel the marked P100-bills, while the latter in turn gave PO1 Tadeo
a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Tadeo, thereafter, made contact with
his back-up officers and they, in turn, entered the premises and arrested the following: Robert
Carmelo and accused-appellant Adriano Pascua.
After placing the necessary markings, the 2 plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance recovered from the accused-appellant and Carmelo were submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for analysis. The seized specimen yielded positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug. During his arraignment, the accused-
appellant plead guilty of violating R.A. 9165. The RTC found him guilty of the offense charged. On
appeal, accused averred that the trial court erred in proving the integrity of the seized drug for
failure to comply with the rule on chain of custody and in convicting Concepcion based solely on the
testimony of PO1 Tadeo. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not Concepcion is guilty despite the prosecutions failure to prove the integrity
of the seized drug.
Ruling:
No. Apart from establishing the elements in the illegal sale of drugs, it must further be
shown by the prosecution that the drugs seized and tested are the same as the corpus delicti
presented in court.
In the instant case, the chain of custody over the seized drugs was testified on by PO1
Tadeo. After the buy-bust was completed, PO1 Tadeo marked the plastic sachet sold by accused-
appellant with the initials "WCT." PO1 Michael Sarangaya, who arrested accused-appellants co-
accused Carmelo, marked the plastic sachet from Carmelo with "MCS." A request for laboratory
examination of the seized items was made. Afterwards, PO1 Tadeo personally brought the request
and the seized items to the PNP crime laboratory. The same specimens tested positive for shabu as
evidenced in Chemistry Report No. D-768-2003 and were subsequently presented during trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLO MAGNO AURE y ARNALDO

and MELCHOR AUSTRIACO y AGUILA
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of RA
9165, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What is material to the
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prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.
Facts:
An information reached the Office of Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 2
that a certain Carlo, later identified as respondent Carlo Magno Aure y Arnaldo (Aure), was
rampantly selling illegal drugs along F. Nazario Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City.
Accordingly, a buy-bust team was formed. MADAC operative Bilason (Bilason) was assigned as the
poseur-buyer to be provided with 12 marked five hundred peso bills, amounting to PhP 6,000.
When the buy-bust team reached F. Nazario St., Bilason approached the car where Aure and
respondent Austriaco was then sitting. Aure gave Bilason a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and the latter in turn gave Aure the 12 marked five hundred peso bills. After
ascertaining that what Aure gave him was shabu, the buy-bust team proceeded to arrest Aure and
Austriaco. Another plastic sachet containing substantial amount of shabu wrapped in red wrapping
paper, empty plastic sachets, and glass pipe tooter were recovered from the bag of Aure.
Consequently, respondents were convicted of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
two accused.
Ruling:
Yes. As shown in Bilasons testimony, a buy-bust operation took place. Being the poseur-
buyer, he positively identified accused-appellants as the sellers of a sachet containing a white
crystalline substance for a sum of P6, 000.00. The sachet was confiscated and marked with the
initials "CAA" and was subsequently taken to the crime laboratory for examination, where a
chemical analysis on its contents confirmed that the substance is indeed Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu. Moreover, the testimonies of the other members of the buy-bust team, PO3
Lagasca and MADAC operative Flores, substantially corroborated Bilasons testimony.
As regards the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA
9165 against accused-appellant Aure, We also find that the elements of the offense have been
established by the evidence of the prosecution. In the instant case, a brown bag was found inside
the car of accused-appellant Aure. It yielded a plastic sachet of shabu weighing 86.23 grams
wrapped in red wrapping paper, small plastic sachets, and an improvised plastic tooter.
Considering that during the sale to Bilason, it was from the same bag that accused-appellant
Austriaco took the sachet of shabu, per order of accused-appellant Aure, the owner-possessor of
said bag and its contents is no other than accused-appellant Aure, who has not shown any proof
that he was duly authorized by law to possess them or any evidence to rebut his animus possidendi
of the shabu found in his car during the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ADRID y FLORES

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Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity
of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
Facts:
A male informant arrived at the Manila Police District (MPD) Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit (DAID)
to report that one "Jon Jon", who was later identified as Edgardo Adrid (Adrid), is pushing illegal
drugs at Tondo, Manila. The DAID Chief immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation and the designated poseur-buyer was SPO1 Marinda. While in the area, the informant
approached Adrid and then called SPO1 Marinda, who expressed his desire to purchase shabu.
During the negotiations, SPO1 Marinda told that he was buying the value of P200. Ardid handed to
SPO1 Marinda a sealed plastic sachet, with white substance. SPO1 Marinda received the plastic
sachet and handed Adrid the P200 marked money. SPO1 Marinda then immediately grabbed
Adrids arm, introduced himself as a police officer, and arrested the latter. In his testimony during
the trial, SPO1 Marinda claimed that he turned over the plastic sachets recovered from Adrid,
together with the marked money, to the investigator at DAID, a certain SPO1 Pama who, in his
(SPO1 Marindas) presence, marked the recovered sachet as "DAID-1" He admitted that he had no
participation in the submission of the specimen for examination. The RTC found Adrid guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in sale of illegal drug. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was properly followed.
Ruling:
No. The prosecution failed to supply all the links in the chain of custody rule. SPO2 Marinda
testified that he supposedly turned-over the confiscated plastic sachets to the investigator SPO1
Pama. However, the latter was never presented to testify on this matter. The prosecution also failed
to testify on what happened to the subject specimens after these were turned-over to Pama and
who delivered these to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is an unexplained gap in the chain of
custody of the dangerous drug, from the time the same were supposedly seized by SPO2 Marinda
from accused-appellant, until these were turned-over to the crime laboratory.
The Court particularly notes that of the individuals who came into direct contact with or
had physical possession of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from appellant, only SPO1 Marinda
testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. But his testimony failed to sufficiently
demonstrate an unbroken chain, for he himself admits that at the police station he transferred the
possession of the specimen to an investigator at the MPD DAID, one SPO1 Pama to be precise.
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It baffles this Court no end why the prosecution opted not to present the investigator,
identified as SPO1 Pama, to whom SPO1 Marinda allegedly handed over the confiscated sachets for
recording and marking. If SPO1 Pama indeed received the sachets containing the illegal drugs and
then turned them over to the laboratory for testing, his testimony is vital in establishing the
whereabouts of the seized illegal drugs and how they were handled from the time SPO1 Marinda
turned them over to him, until he actually delivered them to the laboratory. He could have
accounted for the whereabouts of the illegal drugs from the time he possessed them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELIZABETH MARCELINO y REYES

G.R. No. 189278 July 26, 2010 Velasco Jr. J.
Non-compliance with the provisions of RA 9165 on the custody and disposition of dangerous
drugs is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case.
Facts:
SPO1 Dela Cruz was part of a team that conducted a test-buy on to verify a report of
Elizabeth engaging in illegal drug activities. When this was confirmed, a buy-bust operation
ensued. SPO1 Dela Cruz subsequently marked the sachet that was sold to him as MDC-1 and the
sachet found on the person of Elizabeth as MDC-2. The chemistry report confirmed that the subject
drugs were positive for shabu. RTC held her guilty of the offenses charged, illegal sale and illegal
possession of prohibited drugs. The CA in its Decision affirmed the appealed RTC Decision.
Elizabeth imputes grave doubts on whether SPO1 Dela Cruz observed the requirements of
RA 9165 on inventory and photographing of the illegal substance, arguing that said police officer
did not state where and when he marked the sachets of shabu.
Issue:
Whether or not Elizabeth should be convicted.
Ruling:
Yes. Here, the chain of custody was established through the following links: (1) SPO1 Dela
Cruz marked the seized sachet with MDC-1 for the sachet that was the subject of the buy-bust, and
MDC-2 for the sachet found on accused-appellants person; (2) a request for laboratory examination
of the seized items MDC-1 and MDC-2 was signed by Police Senior Inspector Arthur Felix Asis; (3)
the request and the marked items seized were received by the Bulacan Provincial Crime
Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-628-02 confirmed that the marked items seized from
accused-appellant were shabu; and (5) the marked items were offered in evidence as Exhibits C-1
and C-2.
As it is, there was substantial compliance with the requirements under RA 9165, and the
prosecution adequately established that there was an unbroken chain of custody over
the shabu seized from Elizabeth.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELSIE BARBA Y BIAZON

The chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the
same ones presented in court; otherwise, the case shall be resolved in the acquittal of the accused
based on reasonable doubt.
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that a buy-bust operation was conducted against Barba as the
police officers were satisfied that she was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. PO2 Rabina, who
acted as poseur-buyer, went to Barbas house with their informant and asked Barba if he could buy
PHp 200 worth of shabu from her. Barba left to go inside her house and came back with two sachets
which she gave to PO2 Rabina. He gave a PHP 200 marked bill to Barba and signaled the other
member of the buy-bust team to arrest Barba. The Php 200 marked bill, shabu, drug paraphernalia
found were seized and brought to the police station. PO2 Rabina marked the plastic sachets and
PO1 Almacen marked the confiscated tooter. The seized dug and paraphernalia were then
submitted for laboratory examination and tested positive for shabu. Barba was subsequently
charged for drug pushing.
Barba, on the other hand, alleged that the door of her house was forcibly opened by 8
persons, entered her house and searched the premises. Although no illegal drugs had been found,
she was still arrested and brought to the police station. RTC ruled against Barba and this was
affirmed by the CA. Barba asserted that the RTC erred giving credence to the evidence presented by
the prosecution, with regard to the identity of the substance.
Issue:
Whether or not the identity of the subject substance is properly established.
Ruling:
No. The identity of the subject substance is established by showing the chain of custody. The
chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the same ones
presented in court: (1) testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the item.
The prosecutions evidence does not supply all the links needed in the chain of custody rule.
The records do not provide what happened after the seized items were brought to the police station
and after these were tested at the laboratory. Doubt is now formed as to the integrity of the
evidence. Furthermore, no explanation was proffered as to why key individuals who had custody
over the drugs at certain periods were not identified and/or not presented as witnesses.
Uncertainty, therefore, arises if the drugs and paraphernalia seized during the buy-bust operation
were the same specimens presented in court. Thus, given the failure of the prosecution to identify
the continuous whereabouts of such fungible pieces of evidence, all elements of the crime have not
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARSENIO CORTEZ Y MACALINDONG A.K.A. ARCHE

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment. And under the objective test in determining its
validity, the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and
adequately shown and must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that an informant reported to the Pasig City Police that a certain
Archie was selling shabu. SPO2 Zipagan was designated as the team leader poseur-buyer to conduct
a buy-bust operation. Two Php 100 bills to be used as buy-bust money were marked. They then
located Archie whereupon the informant introduced the poseur-buyer to him. When asked how
much he wanted to buy, SPO2 Zipagan replied Php 200 worth only and gave Archie the marked
money. Archie gave a transparent plastic sheet containing a white crystalline substance. Signifying
the consummation of the transaction, SPO2 Zipagan introduced himself and announced Archies
arrest. The seized transparent plastic sheet containing the white crystalline substance was
examined and tested positive for shabu. On the other hand, the defense alleged that Archie was in
his house when a visitor offered to sell a cell phone to him. When he expressed disinterest, the
visitor made a call and four persons suddenly entered. He was then brought to the police station for
investigation and was detained.
Cortez was then charged with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Drugs Act. RTC then found him guilty of the offense charged and was affirmed by
the CA. Cortez contended that the buy-bust operation was illegal as he was a victim of a frame-up.
Issue:
Whether or not the buy-bust operation conducted was legal.
Ruling:
Yes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment. It is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken. In determining the occurrence of entrapment, two tests have been
developed: the subjective test and the objective test. Under the subjective view, the focus is on the
intent of the accused to commit a crime. Under the objective view, the primary focus is on the
particular conduct of law enforcement officials or their agents. Courts have adopted the objective
test in upholding the validity of a buy-bust operation and under this test, the details of the
purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown and
must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense.
The evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment to nab Cortez in the act
of selling shabu. The established sequence of events categorically shows a typical buy-bust
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operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers conduct was within the acceptable standard
of fair and honorable administration of justice.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARSENIO CORTEZ Y MACALINDONG A.K.A. ARCHE

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
However, the prescriptions of Sec. 21 of IRR are not condition sine qua non for a prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. Non-compliance therewith does not render the arrest illegal or the items
seized inadmissible in evidence. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items.
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that an informant reported to the Pasig City Police that a certain
Archie was selling shabu. SPO2 Zipagan was the team leader poseur-buyer to conduct a buy-bust
operation. Two Php 100 bills to be used as buy-bust money were marked. They then located Archie
whereupon the informant introduced the poseur-buyer to him. When asked how much he wanted
to buy, SPO2 Zipagan replied Php 200 worth only and gave Archie the marked money. Archie gave a
transparent plastic sheet containing a white crystalline substance. Signifying the consummation of
the transaction, SPO2 Zipagan introduced himself and announced Archies arrest. The seized
transparent plastic sheet containing the white crystalline substance was without delay brought to
the police station and was forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination. It tested positive for
shabu.
Cortez was then charged with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165. RTC then
found him guilty of the offense charged and was affirmed by the CA. Cortez asserted that the
apprehending police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized item and mark the container
of the substance recovered from him, thus raising doubts as to the identity of what was seized.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased was broken.
Ruling:
No. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. This would cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited
drug up to the time it is offered in evidence. However, IRR of RA 9165 states that the custodial chain
rule admits of exceptions. The prescriptions of the Sec. 21 of IRR need not be followed with
pedantic rigor as a condition sine qua non for a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Non-
compliance with Sec. 21 does not render the arrest illegal or the items seized from the accused
inadmissible in evidence. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
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In this case, there had been substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item. Its integrity and evidentiary value had not been diminished. The chain
of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case has not been shown to have been broken.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIA MUSA y PINASALO, ARA MONONGAN y PAPAO, FAISAH
ABAS y MAMA, and MIKE SOLALO y MILOK
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can be appreciated in fixing the penalty
that should be imposed in prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Facts:
Musa et al. were charged with violating RA 9165 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The Taguig police organized a buy-bust operation upon a tip from an informant that
Musa et. al. were selling drugs. PO1 Memoracion was the poseur-buyer with five P1000 bills as
marked money. Memoracion wanted to buy P5000 worth of shabu from Abas and Solano, but they
didnt have that amount on stock. They accompanied Memoracion to a nearby condomimium where
Memoracion bought shabu from Musa and Monongan. Monongan accepted the marked money
while Musa gave a sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer. Memoracion then called the rest of the team
and Musa et al were arrested. PO1 Arago confiscated the marked money and Memoracion marked
the seized sachet of shabu with APM or the initials of Aisa Pinasilo Musa. He then delivered the
confiscated item to the PNP Crime Lab and the Report showed that the substance was 4.05 grams of
shabu.
The RTC found all of the accused guilty. Citing Art. 62 of the RPC, it imposed the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC also found that the offense was committed by an
organized/syndicated crime group and imposed a fine of P10 million. However, the RTC lowered
the penalty of Monongan who was only 17, a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
CA affirmed the decision but imposed upon Monongan the penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the penalty of Monongan should be life imprisonment despite her minority.
Ruling:
No. The CA erred in imposing life imprisonment. Jurisprudence holds that: (a) pursuant to
Sec. 98 of RA 9165, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the
same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death when the offender is a minor; and (b) that the
penalty should be graduated since the said provision adopted the technical nomenclature of
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed.
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The proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily,
also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor
aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which
has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is
inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIA MUSA y PINASALO, ARA MONONGAN y PAPAO, FAISAH
ABAS y MAMA, and MIKE SOLALO y MILOK
A drug syndicate is any organized group of two (2) or more persons forming or joining
together with the intention of committing any offense prescribed under RA 9165.
Facts:
Musa et al. were charged with violating RA 9165 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The Taguig police organized a buy-bust operation upon a tip from an informant that
Musa et. al. were selling drugs. PO1 Memoracion was the poseur-buyer with five P1000 bills as
marked money. Memoracion wanted to buy P5000 worth of shabu from Abas and Solano, but they
didnt have that amount on stock. They accompanied Memoracion to a nearby condomimium where
Memoracion bought shabu from Musa and Monongan. Monongan accepted the marked money
while Musa gave a sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer. Memoracion then called the rest of the team
and Musa et al were arrested. PO1 Arago confiscated the marked money and Memoracion marked
the seized sachet of shabu with APM or the initials of Aisa Pinasilo Musa. He then delivered the
confiscated item to the PNP Crime Lab and the Report showed that the substance was 4.05 grams of
shabu.
The RTC found all of the accused guilty. Citing Art. 62 of the RPC, it imposed the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC also found that the offense was committed by an
organized/syndicated crime group and imposed a fine of P10 million. However, the RTC lowered
the penalty of Monongan who was only 17, a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
CA affirmed the decision but imposed upon Monongan the penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not a fine of P10M should be imposed due to the existence of an aggravating
circumstance of an offense committed by a syndicated group.
Ruling:
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No. The lower courts erred in imposing a fine of P10 million. The records are bereft of any
proof that accused-appellants operated as members of a drug syndicate. By definition, a drug
syndicate is any organized group of two (2) or more persons forming or joining together with the
intention of committing any offense prescribed under RA 9165. The existence of conspiracy among
accused-appellants in selling shabu was duly established, but the prosecution failed to provide
proof that they operated as an organized group or as a drug syndicate. Consequently, the
aggravating circumstance that "the offense was committed by an organized/syndicated group"
cannot be appreciated. Thus, the maximum P10 million imposed by the trial and appellate courts
upon each of accused-appellants should be modified to P500, 000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO J. ROSIALDA

GR. No. 188330 August 25, 2010, Velasco Jr. J.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by police officers and an informant where Police
Officer 1 Roland A. Panis acted as poseur buyer. Thereafter, PO1 Panis marked the plastic sachet as
Exh A RAP 3/27/03. At the police station, PO1 Panis turned over the plastic sachet to Police Senior
Inspector Rodrigo Villaruel, who prepared a laboratory examination request. The contents of the
plastic sachet were then examined yielding positive for shabu. An Information was filed against
Rosialda for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC held him liable for the offense
charged. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was unbroken.
Ruling:
Yes. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement
performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous

whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers
and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered
in evidence.
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The Court finds that the prosecution has adequately showed the continuous and unbroken
possession and subsequent transfers of the plastic sachet containing dangerous drugs from the time
accused-appellant Rosialda handed it to PO1 Panis to consummate the sale of illicit drugs until it
was offered in court. The fact that the plastic sachet containing shabu was immediately marked by
PO1 Panis with such marking remaining until the plastic sachet was presented in court persuasively
proves not only the identity of the shabu as seized from Rosialda, but more importantly that it is the
same item seized from the buy-bust operation. Its integrity and evidentiary value were, thus, duly
preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LITO MACABARE y LOPEZ

G.R. No. 179941. August 24, 2009. Third Division. Velasco, Jr., J.
Conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive
possession would not exonerate the accused.
Facts:
Lito Macabare, a detention prisoner at Manila City Jail, was found in possession of illegal
drugs thereby violating Section 16 of RA 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Macabare
denied ownership or knowledge of the confiscated shabu and claimed that the arrangement of the
occupants of the each cell made it possible for other inmates to place the confiscated drugs in his
cell. Information charging for the unlawful possession of drugs was filed against him with the RTC
of Manila to which he pleaded not guilty. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to convict Macabare.
Ruling:
Yes. The appellate court, in affirming Macabares conviction, relied on the following
circumstantial evidence: First, Macabare was assigned a kubol inside Cell No. 2. This served as his
quarters. Second, he was the lone occupant assigned to the kubol. Third, when the inspection team
reached Macabares kubol inside Cell No. 2, SJO2 Sarino spotted a Coleman cooler. He discovered a
plastic pack wrapped in a towel which was on top of the cooler. Fourth, the plastic pack contained
white crystalline granules which later tested positive for shabu. And last, Macabare was not able to
explain how the plastic pack containing the shabu ended up in his kubol. These circumstances were
duly proved at the trial and are consistent with a finding of guilt. This set of circumstances
sufficiently leads one to conclude that Macabare indeed owned the contraband. Moreover, the
prosecution was able to show Macabares liability under the concepts of disputable presumption of
ownership and constructive possession.
The defense failed to disprove Macabares ownership of the contraband. They were unable
to rebut the finding of possession by Macabare of the shabu found in his kubol. Such possession
gave rise to a disputable presumption. Moreover, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive
possession, and a showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact
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of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference
drawn therefrom. Finally, the defense was not able to present evidence refuting the showing of
animus possidendi over the shabu found in his kubol. Macabares insistence that someone else
owned the shabu is unpersuasive and uncorroborated. It is a mere denial which by itself is
insufficient to overcome this presumption. The presumption of ownership, thus, lies against
Macabare. Moreover, it is well-established that the defense of alibi or denial, in the absence of
convincing evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor by the courts for it can be easily concocted,
especially in cases involving the Dangerous Drugs Act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO CAPALAD y ESTO

G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
Facts:
Reynaldo Capalad was charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of the R.A. 9165. At the trial,
the prosecution presented PO3 Fernando Moran, PO1 Jeffred Pacis, and PO1 Victor Manansala as
witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused and his son, Reymel Capalad.
After the trial, he was convicted by the RTC of both charges. On appeal, he questioned the legality of
his arrest. He disputed the prosecution witnesses claim that an entrapment operation took place.
He also argued that the testimony of his son, Reymel, should have been given more weight. The CA,
however, still affirmed the lower courts judgment. The accused contends before the Court among
others that the principle that a child is the best witness should have been applied to his case giving
emphasis on his son's testimony corroborating his version of events.
Issue:
Whether or not Reynaldo Capalad is guilty of violating R.A. 9165.
Ruling:
Yes. The accused in a prosecution for drug pushing or possession has to contend with the
credibility contest that ensues between the accused and the police. In scrutinizing this issue, the
Court is guided by the rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which
involve the credibility of witnesses, are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. This rule is applied more rigorously where said findings are sustained by the
CA.
As the defense asserts, a child witness testimony should normally be found credible due to
his unlikely propensity to be dishonest. This Court, however, finds the credibility of accused-
appellants nine-year old son, Reymel, to be doubtful. His testimony is necessarily suspect, as he is
accused-appellants close relative. Furthermore, Reymel allegedly heard the police officers barge in
and claim that they had a warrant of arrest for accused-appellant. Yet on cross-examination, he
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admitted having only heard the words "warrant of arrest" on television. Besides, even if accused-
appellant and his son were actually playing a video game around 8:00 in the evening of October 29,
2003, this does not refute the police officers testimonies that he was arrested at 1:00 a.m. the
following morning after an entrapment operation. He could have very well finished playing with
Reymel when the buy-bust operation took place. All told, the elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs have been established by the prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONALYN CERVANTES y SOLAR

As embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drug shall immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Facts:
The Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV) received a tip about a group of drug
traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. Acting on the information, a team was
arranged to conduct a buy-bust operation led by SPO2 Geronimo Pastrana, PO3 Ramos, and PO2
Emerson Balosbalos. They arranged the operation in front of the McDonalds branch in P. Ocampo
St., Pasay City, when Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will come
out from the nearby Estrella St. Later, the accused-appellant emerged approached PO3 Ramos to
check if he still had the money. The sale was then consummated and PO3 Ramos gave his signal and
arrested them. The accused, by way of defense, alleged that she just finished her laundry when she
took her child to McDonalds when she saw a commotion. She then saw a woman who alighted from
a van and pointed at her to her companions and boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold
of her child. The RTC and the CA ruled against the accused. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Cervantes is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating RA 9165.
Ruling:
No. The prosecution, having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the
seized regulated substance, is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
accused-appellants guilt. As the Court distinctly notes in this case, only PO3 Ramos testified for the
specific purpose of identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how
he and his companions, right after the buy bust, handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. It is
fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized
prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation, as embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165. In this case,
no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles
at the crime scene which PO3 Ramos admitted.
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Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP
personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. This presumption is, however, disputable and may be overturned
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; any taint of irregularity vitiates
the performance and negates the presumption. Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty always yields to the presumption of innocence and does not
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt
of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal
liability.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL RESURRECCION

G.R. No. 186380, OCTOBER 12, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody.
Facts:
Manuel Ressurreccion was convicted of illegal sale of shabu. On appeal to the Supreme
Court he broaches the view that SA Isidoros failure to mark the confiscated shabu immediately
after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the drugs identity. Accused-appellant Resurreccion
now points to the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately mark the seized drugs as a cause to
doubt the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately mark the seized drugs
causes doubt as to the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated.
Ruling:
No. The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As
we held in People v. Cortez, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.
People v. Sanchez explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for immediate
marking, or where said marking should be done. What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of marking of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence
subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the
marking of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
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It is clear then that the prosecution was able to provide all the facts necessary to establish
adherence to the chain of custody rule. First, SA Vallejo, upon consummation of the transaction with
accused-appellant, handed the sachets of shabu to SI Isidoro; second, SI Isidoro marked the sachets
at their headquarters; third, SI Isidoro then personally brought the specimens to Forensic Chemist
Felicisima Francisco, who found the items positive for shabu; and fourth, the same specimens were
presented during trial as Exhibit C.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO RUSIANA y BROQUEL

G.R. No. 186139, OCTOBER 5, 2009, Velasco Jr., J.
In People v. Cortez, this Court held that although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect
chain of custody in the handling of evidence, substantial compliance with the legal requirements on
the handling of the seized item is sufficient.
Facts:
Pursuant to an information of an alleged illegal drug activities a buy-bust team was

conducted. The team proceeded to Manukan in Las Pias past 9:00 p.m. PO2 Paule (Poseur buyer)
and the informant went to Unads Rusianas house. The informant called Unad, who met with them
outside. PO2 Paule exchanged the marked PhP 100 bill with suspected shabu from Unad. PO2 Paule
then introduced himself as a police officer, which made Unad try to resist. He was caught by PO2
Paule while running back to his house and was frisked. The marked money and another six (6)
plastic sachets were found on his person. Two other men were found in his house, one of whom
threw a sachet. The man was likewise arrested. Back at the office, all six sachets were marked by
the investigator on duty, PO2 Dalagdagan, with the initials LBR and numbered from 1 to 6.
The defense claims that there were gaps in the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly
seized raising doubts as to the ownership of the shabu. The defense claims that since the
apprehending officers were not the ones who placed the markings on the shabu immediately after
its seizure, there is doubt as to whether this was the one presented during trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody requirement was substantially complied with.
Ruling:
Yes. As an exception substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of
the seized item is sufficient. Behind this is an acknowledgment that the chain of custody rule is
difficult to comply with. Hence, exceptions must be recognized, as indeed the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 does. On its own, a non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165 will
not invalidate an accuseds arrest or a seizure made in drug cases. What should be of importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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As gleaned from PO2 Paules testimony, the chain of custody over the shabu was preserved.
It was established by the prosecution, as follows: (1) plastic sachets were seized by PO2 Paule from
accused-appellant; (2) PO2 Paule turned the items over to PO2 Dalagdagan, who marked each item
with the initials LBR; (3) a Request for Laboratory Examination was then made by Police Senior
Inspector Vicente V. Raquion; and (4) the items were examined by Forensic Chemist Abraham
Tecson, and his findings documented in Chemistry Report No. D-432-02 showed that the specimens
tested positive for shabu. These links in the chain are undisputed; the integrity of the seized drugs
remains intact. As jurisprudence has shown, what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, a requisite present in the instant case. The
documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, presented a clear buy-bust operation and
satisfied the requisites for a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO RUSIANA y BROQUEL

G.R. No. 186139, OCTOBER 5, 2009, Velasco Jr., J.
What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Facts:
Pursuant to an information of an alleged illegal drug activities a buy-bust team was

conducted. The team proceeded to Manukan in Las Pias past 9:00 p.m. PO2 Paule (Poseur buyer)
and the informant went to Unads Rusianas house. The informant called Unad, who met with them
outside. PO2 Paule exchanged the marked PhP 100 bill with suspected shabu from Unad. PO2 Paule
then introduced himself as a police officer, which made Unad try to resist. He was caught by PO2
Paule while running back to his house and was frisked. The marked money and another six (6)
plastic sachets were found on his person. Two other men were found in his house, one of whom
threw a sachet. The man was likewise arrested. Back at the office, all six sachets were marked by
the investigator on duty, PO2 Dalagdagan, with the initials LBR and numbered from 1 to 6.
The defense claims that there were gaps in the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly
seized raising doubts as to the ownership of the shabu. The defense claims that since the
apprehending officers were not the ones who placed the markings on the shabu immediately after
its seizure, there is doubt as to whether this was the one presented during trial.
Issue:
Whether or not Rusiana is guilty of the crime of unauthorized sale of shabu.
Ruling:
Yes. Jurisprudence dictates that conviction can be had in a prosecution for illegal sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for it. We hold that these elements have been satisfied by the prosecutions evidence.
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Trial courts are our eyes.. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, the police
officers who testified gave a straightforward narration of the buy-bust operation. We see no
circumstance contradicting this finding.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONATO CAPCO y SABADLAB

In the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the traded substance
the object evidence which is the core of the corpus delicti.
Facts:
RTC found Capco guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. On appeal,
Capco questioned the RTCs decision on the ground that it convicted him in spite of the
inadmissibility of the evidence against him and notwithstanding the prosecutions failure to present
the alleged confidential informant. He, too, raised the prosecutions failure to establish the
prohibited nature, and the chain of custody, of the seized item. The CA however, affirmed the
decision, noting, among other things, that the informant was not an indispensable witness. The CA
likewise held that the non-presentation of the police investigator and the PNP Crime Laboratory
personnel who received the shabu did not affect the case, as the prosecution witnesses presented
sufficiently proved that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was never broken.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish that the item allegedly confiscated was
indeed a prohibited drug.
Ruling:
No. In the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the traded
substance the object evidence which is the core of the corpus delicti. These requirements have been
sufficiently established in the instant case. What is more, the integrity of the evidence is presumed
to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered with. Capco has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers. Capco failed in
this respect.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLOS DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 182348, November 20, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
An accused can be held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs if it shown that they
enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found.
Facts:
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An informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that
wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his Nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal.
When the team reached the said Nipa Hut, Dela Cruz was seen holding a shotgun but he later on
dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the
premises and saw a plastic bag of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Dela Cruz was subsequently
arrested and was separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted
him of possession of dangerous drugs. The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC
Decision on the ground that the prosecution his arrest was patently illegal and the prosecution
failed to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession. The CA
sustained accused-appellant's conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Dela Cruz is in actual or constructive possession of Illegal Drugs.
Ruling:
No. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether
in its actual or constructive sense. The two buy-bust team members corroborated each other's
testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol talking to Dela Cruz by a table inside the Nipa hut and that
table, they testified, was the same table where they saw the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact
was used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant exercised dominion and control over
the shabu on the table. This is too broad an application of the concept of constructive possession.
Dela Cruz did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was he a tenant or occupant
of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol.
Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol.
ART. 171, RPC
ATTY. RODOLFO PACTOLIN v. THE HONORABLE FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 161455, May 20, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of
and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.
Facts:
Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis
Occidental. The mayor of Ozamis City, Benjamin Fuentes, received a letter from the coach of the
citys volleyball team, Elmer Abastillas, requesting for the governments financial assistance. Mayor
Fuentes immediately approved and granted the request. The letter was forwarded to the city
treasurers office for processing. Shortly thereafter, Mario Ferraren, a member of the city council,
was appointed the Officer-In-Charge Mayor (OIC-M) for the duration of Mayor Fuentes trip to
Cagayan de Oro City.
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While Ferraren was the OIC-M, Pactolin borrowed Abastillas letter from the assistant
treasurer, Alma Toledo, to photocopy the same. Afterwards, Pactolin filed a complaint against Mario
with the Ombudsman, alleging that Mario illegally disbursed public funds in connivance with the
then city accountant, Cynthia Ferarren. Attached as Annex A was the alleged falsified version of
Abastillas letter. Therein, it was shown that it was Mario, not Fuentes, who approved the request
for financial assistance. Aggrieved, Mario instituted a criminal complaint against Pactolin before the
Sandiganbayan. Pactolin was charged of falsification of public document under Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Pactolin is guilty of falsifying a public document.
Ruling:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan had established the following undisputed facts: (1) the request for
financial assistance of the volleyball players, represented by Abastillas, was approved by Mayor
Fuentes and not by OIC-Mayor Mario; (2) the original Abastillas letter was in the custody of Toledo
in her official capacity and she testified that the approving authority was Mayor Fuentes and no
other; (3) Pactolin borrowed the Abastillas letter for photocopying upon oral request, and Toledo
granted the said request because she knew him as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
their province; and (4) Pactolin filed a complaint against Mario with the Ombudsman for illegal
disbursement of public funds, and the principal document he attached to show the alleged illegal
disbursement was the Abastillas letter on which was superimposed Marios signature, thus making
it appear that Mario approved the financial assistance to the volleyball players, and not Mayor
Fuentes. In short, the Sandiganbayan clearly established that the copy of the Abastillas letter that
Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory
explanation regarding Pactolins possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Pactolin who falsified the letter. The settled
rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a
forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.
ART. 177, RPC
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to
the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he
organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly with the end in view of regulating and
monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar.
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged
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forest products were issued to various recipients. On the basis of the issued Permits to Transport,
221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Functions were filed against Ruzol for taking advantage of their official position and committing the
offense in relation to his office by willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issuing permit to transport
several forest products under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to
do so because such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.
Ruzol contends on the other hand that as Chief Executive of the municipality of General
Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160.
The Sandiganbayan rendered decision finding Ruzol guilty offense of Usurpation of Official
Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruzol is guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized
under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
No. The case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecutions theory that
the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged
forest products. DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits
relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general
welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the
permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit
issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority
as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records
are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said
permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport
was not Ruzols decision alone of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
RA 7877 ANTI-SEXUAL HARRASMENT ACT
DIOSCORO BACSIN v. EDUARDO WAHIMAN

The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of
the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the
designation of the offense.
Facts:
Dioscoro Bacsin, a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School in Camiguin Province,
asked AAA, his student, to be at his office to do an errand. Once inside, he asked her to come closer
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to his table, held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast five (5) times. A classmate of AAAs,
claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified in her favor as AAA was relaying the incident.
Bacsin was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge by the regional director of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). In his defense, Bacsin claimed that the touching incident happened by accident
and that AAA left afterwards without any complaint. The CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct
on the ground of acts of sexual harassment and dismissed him from service. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Bacsin could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment, a grave misconduct,
which was an offense not alleged in the formal charge filed against him at the inception of the
administrative case.
Ruling:
Yes. It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against
him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended
himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of
no moment in this administrative case. The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning R.A.
7877, imputes on Bacsin acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of
Bacsin, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held
that it may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender." The CSC found, as did
the CA, that even without an explicit demand from Bacsin, his act of mashing the breast of AAA was
sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of R.A. 7877, sexual
harassment in an education or training environment is committed "when the sexual advances result
in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice." AAA
even testified that she felt fear at the time Bacsin touched her.
Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal charge, it is
clear that there is misconduct on the part of Bacsin. The term "misconduct" denotes intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. In grave misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be manifest. The act of Bacsin of fondling one of his students is against a law, R.A. 7877, and is
doubtlessly inexcusable. The particular act cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple
misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannot but be
categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers,
and expect them to be their guardians while in school. Bacsin has violated that trust. The charge of
grave misconduct proven against him demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and
continue to discharge the functions of his office.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
ART. 203-245, RPC
MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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ERNESTO G. PESCADERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

While demand is not an element of the crime of malversation, it is a requisite for the
application of the presumption. Without this presumption, the accused may still be proved guilty
under Art. 217 based on direct evidence of malversation.
Facts:
In 1999, an audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the period starting July 27,
1998 up to May 23, 1999 was conducted in the Provincial Government of Sulu. The COA Special
Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances,
and benefits, among others. Pursuant to such findings, three informations were filed by the
Ombudsman against Munib Estino, then Acting Governor, and Ernesto Pescadera, the Provincial
Treasurer during Estinos stint. The said charges involve malversation of public funds under Art.
217 of the Revised Penal Code and two violations of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan, in
the consolidated criminal cases, convicted both Estino and Pescadera for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the
provincial government employees of Sulu but acquitted them as to the other charge for the same
violation. As to the charge of malversation of public funds, the Sandiganbayan exonerated Estino
but convicted Pescadera for failure to remit the GSIS contributions of the provincial government
employees.
Issue:
Whether or not Pescadera is guilty of malversation of public funds for failure to remit the
GSIS contributions.
Ruling:
No. There is no proof that Pescadera misappropriated the amount for his personal use.
The demand made by Provincial Auditor recommending to the Chairperson of the COA in
the "State Auditors Opinion on the Financial Statements" where it was stated require the
Provincial Treasurer to remit all trust liabilities such as GSIS premiums/loans repayments/state
insurance, MEDICARE AND PAGIBIG is not the demand contemplated by law. The demand to
account for public funds must be addressed to the accountable officer. It can be concluded then that
Pescadera was not given an opportunity to explain why the GSIS premiums were not remitted.
Without a formal demand, the prima facie presumption of conversion under Art. 217 cannot be
applied.
The elements of Art. 217 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, (2) he or she has custody or
control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (3) the funds or property are
public funds or property for which the offender is accountable, and, most importantly, (4) the
offender has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them. The last and most important element of
malversation. There is no proof that Pescadera used the GSIS contributions for his personal benefit.
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The prosecution merely relied on the presumption of malversation which has already been
disproved due to lack of notice.
ROBERT P. WA-ACON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer requires proof by the State that the
accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property. Instead, a
presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which said officer is accountable should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing
funds or properties to personal use.
Facts:
Wa-acon, a Special Collecting Officer of the National Food Authority, embezzled stocks of
rice worth P114, 303. The Sandiganbayan convicted him of the crime of malversation of public
funds. It held that Wa-acon failed to rebut the presumption that the failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
Wa-acon asserts that the unremitted amounts for the rice stocks and the money allegedly
gained from the empty sacks were not used for his personal use and therefore, the fourth element
of malversation that the accused appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property
for which he was accountable was not proven. According to petitioner, while he might have violated
certain auditing rules and regulations, this violation is not tantamount to malversation.
Issue:
Whether or not Wa-acon is guilty of malversation.
Ruling:
Yes. The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 are: (a) that the
offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office; (c) these funds were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and
(d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.
After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an explanation, Wa-
acon was not able to make money readily available, immediately refund the shortage, or explain
satisfactorily the cash deficit. These facts or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he
converted such funds to his personal use. Since Wa-acon lamentably fell short of adducing the
desired quantum of evidence, his weak and unconvincing testimony standing alone did not
overthrow the presumption that he misappropriated public funds. Without any strong and
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convincing proof to bring down the disputable presumption of law, the Court is left with no other
option but to sustain petitioners conviction.
RA 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J. (Resolution)
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Facts:
Petitioner Uyboco, a private individual, and his co-accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan
erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in convicting him in the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy.
Issue:
Whether or not Uyboco is guilty for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ruling:
Yes. For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements
must concur: 1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and 3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
Based on the records of the case, the elements of the crime charged exist in the present case.
Accused Valencia was a public officer at the time the acts in question were committed. Thus, while
petitioner was a private individual, he was found to have been in conspiracy with accused Valencia.
This is in accord with the rule that private persons may be charged in conspiracy with public
officers, as held in People of the Philippines v. Henry T. Go:
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.
ENGR. RICARDO SANTILLANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 3, 2010, Velasco, J.
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Jurisprudence laid to rest the debate on a private persons culpability in cases involving RA
3019 by unequivocally stating that private persons found acting in conspiracy with public officers may
be held liable for the applicable offenses found in Sec. 3 of the law.
Facts:
Santillano, a contractor, was given unwarranted benefits in the construction of a public

market, municipal building and a municipal guest house.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Santillano of three counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA

3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue:
Whether or not Santillano should be convicted although he is a private individual and not a
public officer
Ruling:
Yes. RA 3019 punishes not only public officers who commit prohibited acts enumerated
under Sec. 3, but also those who induce or cause the public official to commit those offenses. This is
supported by Sec. 9, which includes private persons as liable for violations under Secs. 3, 4, 5, and 6.
In Go vs. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan the Court went on to explain that: the fact that one of the
elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is that the accused is a public officer does not necessarily
preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with
conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder.
Misconduct
CORAZON TENORIO, REPRESENTED BY IMELDA TENORIO-ORTIZ v.

ALYN C. PERLAS, SHERIFF III
A.M. No. P-10-2817, January 26, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
While it is true that sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to serve court
writs, execute all processes and carry into effect all court orders promptly and expeditiously, it needs
to be pointed out that this ministerial duty is not without limitation. In the performance of their duties,
they are deemed to know what is inherently right and inherently wrong and are bound to discharge
such duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the
management of their affairs.
Facts:
According to the letter-complaint of Tenorio, Sheriff Perlas, accompanied by other persons,

arrived at her store, Ten Rey Gravel and Sand and Construction Materials and served upon her a
Notice of Levy on Attachment clearly addressed to spouses Edgardo Pile and Marissa Pile (spouses
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Pile) of Apalit, Pampanga. Tenorio emphasized that Sheriff Perlas served the notice in a
discourteous and arrogant manner. After this, Tenorio showed Sheriff Perlas the Certificate of Car
Registration of their two units of dump trucks and pleaded to her not to take the trucks away
because they were the registered owners of the trucks. However, despite this, Sheriff Perlas forcibly
took the two units of trucks without even verifying with the LTO as to who were the true registered
owners of the trucks. Aggrieved, Tenorio filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Court
Administrator, charging Sheriff Perlas with Oppression, Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct under
RA 6713 and with violation of RA 3019. According to Tenorio, Sheriff Perlas used her public office
as Sheriff to oppress and harass her.
Sheriff Perlas denied all the allegations and recounted that Judge Gaerlan-Mejorada issued a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment against Spouses Pile in relation to a civil case. She claimed that she
acted within the scope of her authority and maintained that she was not arrogant, discourteous or
callous.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Perlas is guilty of simple misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. The conduct of Sheriff Perlas in implementing the Writ is inexcusable. The facts clearly
show that the two trucks seized by her did not belong to the spouses Pile but to herein complainant,
Tenorio. What is more, she could have acted in good faith and checked from the LTO the identity of
the registered owners of the said vehicles before proceeding with their seizure. As agents of the
law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their functions with due care and utmost
diligence because, in serving the court's processes and implementing its order, they cannot afford
to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.
Misconduct is the unlawful behavior of a public officer. It means the "intentional

wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behaviour, especially by a
government official." In order for misconduct to constitute an administrative offense, it should be
related to or connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
Accordingly, Sheriff Perlas is only guilty of misconduct in the discharge of her functions.
FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

represented by HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO; and PNP-CIDG,
represented by DIR. EDUARDO MATILLANO
To constitute misconduct, the complained act/s or omission must have a direct relation and be
linked to the performance of official duties. Owning properties disproportionate to ones salary and
not declaring them in the corresponding SALNs cannot, without more, be classified as grave
misconduct.
Facts:
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Flor Gupilan-Aguilar and Honore Hernandez were among the personnel of the Bureau of
Customs against whom an investigation was conducted by PNP-CIDG. According to the
investigation, there is a wide variance between Aguilars acquired assets and what she spent for her
four-year overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other, finding that she has violated
RA 1379 in relation to RA 3019 and RA 6713. She was charged with grave misconduct and
dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the same offenses. The Ombudsman created an
investigating panel which then conducted administrative proceedings on the complaint. Aguilar
was placed under preventive suspension for six months. She was found guilty by the investigating
panel. In a supplemental decision, Hernandez was likewise found guilty. Aguilar and Hernandez
moved for but were denied reconsideration. Petitioners went to the CA on petition for review under
Rule 43. The CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of grave misconduct.
Ruling:
No. The Court finds that even if petitioners, for argument, failed to include several
properties in their SALNs, the omission, by itself, does not amount to grave misconduct. To
constitute misconduct, the complained act/s or omission must have a direct relation and be linked
to the performance of official duties. Owning properties disproportionate to ones salary and not
declaring them in the corresponding SALNs cannot, without more, be classified as grave
misconduct.
The inculpatory allegations in the controversy, if proved, qualify as acts of dishonesty that
would merit dismissal from service. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined, as it were, in the
Constitution to promote transparency in the civil service and operates as a deterrent against
government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means.
The failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and would
normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration in the
SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to
conceal the truth or to make false statements; otherwise, the government employee may only be
liable for negligence, not for dishonesty. In addition, only when the accumulated wealth becomes
manifestly disproportionate to the income of the public officer/employee and income from other
sources, and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain these sources of
income and acquisitions, does he or she become susceptible to dishonesty.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
ARTS. 246-266, RPC

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For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: (1) the malefactor
employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive
or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method and manner of execution were
deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the
witness right at the inception of the attack.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not aleviosa or treachery attended the commission of the crime.
Ruling:
Yes. The issue of the presence of treachery hinges on the account of eyewitnesses Liezl and
Angelita, who witnessed everything from the inception of the attack until accused-appellants fled
from the crime scene. Both were not only certain and unwavering in their positive identification of
accused-appellants, but their testimony, as aptly noted by the courts a quo, were also factual,
straightforward and convincing on how the murder transpired.
While the party of Estrella was walking, accused-appellants suddenly appeared from the
side of the road. Without uttering any word, Tomas, Sr. drew his gun and shot Estrella twice, while
Doctor simultaneously poked a gun at Angelita and Damiana. And when Estrella already fell down,
Tomas, Sr. shot her thrice more perhaps to ensure her death. Then accused-appellants fled. It is,
thus, clear that the shooting of Estrella by Tomas, Sr. was done with treachery. The nefarious act
was done in a few moments, it was unexpected as it was sudden. The act of Doctor in immobilizing
Angelita and Damiana in those brief moments afforded and ensured accused-appellants impunity
from the unarmed Estrella and her three similarly unarmed companions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTHONY C. DOMINGO and GERRY DOMINGO,

It is elementary that not all inconsistencies in the witnesses testimony affect their
credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies.
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Facts:
Anthony was charged with murder and frustrated murder. The court a quo found him guilty
of the offenses charged. On appeal, aside from reiterating his alibi, he also pointed out the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. For one, Nida claimed that the window
was open at the time of the shooting which contradicts Vivians testimony that the window was
closed. Also, according to Anthony, the inaction of Gina de Pedro, Nidas niece, during the incident
was contrary to human nature. Ginas allegation that there was only one shot also contradicts the
prosecutions evidence showing four gunshot wounds on Vivian, two deformed pellets, and one
plastic cap recovered from the crime scene. He also contended that since Leopoldo was not among
the first to respond to Nidas cries for help, he could not have been at the crime scene and witnessed
the attack. Lastly, Anthony attributed ill motive to the prosecution witnesses since they charged
him of killing Tenorio, Nidas brother. The CA found no merit in Anthonys contentions. In reviewing
the testimonies of the witnesses, the appellate court found no inconsistencies that would question
their credibility. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of Anthony has been established beyond reasonable doubt
considering the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Ruling:
Yes. Nida firmly stated that she saw accused-appellants fire at her. The court further affirms
the lower courts reliance on the testimony of Leopoldo, specifically, that the latter was at the crime
scene and witnessed the attack. He was not among the first to arrive at Nidas house because he hid
behind a pile of soil for three minutes after the shooting incident. Also, a witness inability to move,
help or even to run away when the incident occurs is not a ground to label his testimony as doubtful
and unworthy of belief. There is no prescribed behavior when one is faced with a shocking event.
Moreover, The CA correctly held that a shotgun can fire a single bullet with several pellets that can
cause multiple injuries or deaths. Anthonys alibi, that he was at Alfredo Dalidas house, has no
merit. Alibi is the weakest of defenses. The Court has patiently reiterated the requisites for alibi to
prosper, that is, the accused was not at the locus delicti when the offense was committed and it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission. Anthony failed to comply with the time and distance requisites of alibi.
It is doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a witness and his or her
testimony is accorded the highest respect because of the courts untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the
truth. It is also settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING

G.R. No. 197807 April 16, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
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Treachery exists when (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him.
Facts:
The accused Cecilia was angered upon knowing that Donna Maniego, a woman with whom
she had a close relationship for ten years, eloped with Jondel Santiago. One afternoon, while Donna
and her mother Violeta Sicor were inside a sidecar, Cecilia stabbed Violeta at her buttocks. Donna
ran to the Barangay Hall for help, and later went to check on Jondel at her mothers house. On her
way there, Donna saw Jondel, who was just lighting his cigarette, get stabbed by Cecilia on the chest,
back, and neck. Both Violeta and Jondel were rushed to the hospital, but Jondel died. Violeta, on the
other hand, was incapacitated to work for two (2) days.
Cecilia was charged with murder of Jondel and frustrated murder of Violeta. Both the RTC
and the CA found Cecilia guilty of murder, but found her guilty only of less serious physical injuries
in the case of Violeta.
Issue:
Whether or not Cecilia is guilty of murder.
Ruling:
Yes. The elements of murder are established: (1) Jondel was killed; (2) the accused Cecilia
killed him; (3) the killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance mentioned in Art.
248, RPC; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Two elements must be present for treachery to exist: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted
the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. Both elements were present
when Cecilia deliberately, swiftly, and unexpectedly stabbed Jondel, who was only lighting a
cigarette, offering the latter no chance to resist or escape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. JOHBERT AMODIA y BABA,MARIO MARINO y PATNON,

and ROY LO-OC y PENDANG,
Positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill-motive on the part of an eye witness testifying on the matter, prevails over denial of
[the] accused, which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Facts:
Richard Roda, an Assistant Manager of Nognog Videoke Restaurant in Quezon City, noticed
that Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were beating Jaime. As a result of the beating died. Roda went
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to Camp Karingal in Quezon City to report what he had witnessed. The police then filed an
investigation report which became the basis for the filing of Information against Amodia et al. RTC
ruled that Amodia et al. were guilty of Murder. CA affirmed the RTC decision. CA gave credence to
the positive testimony of the prosecution eyewitness who, was not actuated by improper motive to
testify against accused-appellants. The CA, moreover, held that the killing was qualified by the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Amodia et al. contends that conviction is anchored on the positive testimony of the
prosecution eyewitness which was full of inconsistencies. They allege that it was unbelievable that
a person who had witnessed a crime should simply go home without immediately reporting the
matter to the authorities.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the
incredible testimony of the prosecution witness.
Ruling:
No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair
the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given. In this case, the
prosecution eyewitness explained that he did not immediately report the incident to the police
because the assailants threatened to hurt him. What made this threat appear so real was the fact
that accused-appellants lingered within the vicinity of the crime for a couple of hours after the
mauling incident. After the authorities had discovered the victim, however, he volunteered to relate
what he had seen. It took him only two days before giving his statement. This delay, if it can be
considered as one, is hardly unreasonable or unjustified under the circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANSELMO BERONDO, JR. y PATERES

Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.
Facts:
Anselmo Berondo, Jr., Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario were indicted for the crime of
robbery with murder committed against Genaro Laguna. The crime took place on February 13,
1999 but it was only two years later when the witnesses, Herbert Nietes and Pedro Tero, admitted
to Genaros widow that they had witnessed the crime. Trial proceeded only against Berondo
because the two other accused remained at-large. He was found by the RTC guilty as principal in the
crime of murder. The CA, on appeal, convicted Berondo only of homicide for the prosecutions
failure to prove the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Nevertheless, it gave credence to Nietes testimony pointing to accused-appellant as one of the
persons who stabbed the victim. It held that Nietes delay in reporting the crime was reasonable
considering that eyewitnesses have a tendency to remain silent rather than imperil their lives or
that of their family.
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Issue:
Whether or not the delay impaired Nietes credibility.
Ruling:
No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair
the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given. No standard form of
behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience.
Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a
criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons.
Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the
crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider
the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay.
In this case, although it took Nietes more than two years to report the identity of the assailants,
such delay was sufficiently explained. Nietes stated that he feared for his life because the three
accused also lived in the same town and the incident was the first killing in their area. He only had
the courage to reveal to Dolores what he had witnessed because his conscience bothered him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ y MIRANDA, alias DIDONG

G.R. No. 184792, October 12, 2009, Velasco Jr., J.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressors on
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressors, and without the slightest provocation on the victims part.
Facts:
On November 20, 2001 in a forested area nearby the place and house of the accused Didong
and company, Didong hit with his piece of wood the nape of Ahladdin (the victim who was also
drunk at the time) then held by the hand by Nante. When Nante released his hold, Didong again hit
Ahladdin on the back of the knees. After Boyet, Nante and Didong stabbed Ahladdin, Fred Gongon
shot him saying Siguraduhin niyo patay na yan. The following morning the dead body of Ahladdin
was discovered. Consequently, based on these established facts Didong and company were charged
of murder qualified by treachery. On this charge Didong merely provided the defense of alibi and
denial. He testified to being at Tata Freds house from five in the afternoon of November 20, 2001
until seven in the evening. Accordingly, he then headed home and stayed there the whole night. He
only found out about Ahlladins death when his neighbors informed him about it the next day.
Issues:
Whether or not Didong was guilty of murder for the killing of Ahladdin as qualified by
treachery.
Ruling:
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Yes. We find that circumstances do exist to justify the finding of treachery in this case. The
prosecution alleged and sufficiently proved that Ahlladin was too drunk to fight off any aggression
from his four assailants, at least two of them armed. His killers took advantage of his condition and
attacked him without considerable difficulty, as plainly seen in the post mortem report on
Ahlladins body.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JIMMY ALVERIO

In cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape, corroboration of the victims testimony is
not a necessary condition to a conviction for rape where the victims testimony is credible, or clear and
convincing or sufficient to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Facts:
The accused was charged of the crime rape of certain AAA. The prosecution presented the
fact that the victim together with her friends, went to a dance event but later on as she noticed that
her friends were no longer at the dance floor, she decided to go home to her grandmothers house
when on her way home, Alverio suddenly appeared and took hold of her and dragged her towards
the back of the barangay hall where she was raped by the accused. During the incident, Alverio was
armed with a knife which he used to poke the victim and threatened her that he would kill her if she
told anyone of what he has done. On the other hand, the accused denied all the accusations against
him with an alibi that he was just in the adjacent barangay chapel and went home at 12:00
midnight. He likewise admitted that AAA is his cousin. The RTC convicted Alverio which decision
was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape by relying on the sole testimony of
the victim.
Ruling:
Yes. This court held that in cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape, corroboration
of the victims testimony is not a necessary condition to a conviction for rape where the victims
testimony is credible, or clear and convincing or sufficient to prove the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, appellate courts generally do not disturb the findings of the
trial court with regard to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the reason being that the
trial court has the "unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination." More importantly, courts generally
give full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially one who is only a minor.
The exceptions to this rule are when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not
supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and value likely to change
the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or when the assailed decision is
based on a misapprehension of facts. However, this Court finds none of these exceptions present in
the instant case.
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Furthermore, Alverios defense of alibi cannot stand versus the positive identification of
AAA. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than the rule that alibi and denial
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the accused by the
complainant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELMER BARBEROS ALIAS EMIE

Full penile penetration of the penis into the vagina is not required for the commission of rape,
as mere penile entry into the labia of the pudendum of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration
of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape.
Facts:
AAA, then 15 years old, went to her grandmothers house upon learning that her father and
uncle were quarreling there. When she cried for help, Elmer Barberos, a neighbor, went to her and
told her that he would protect her. Barberos brought AAA to his house and led her to a room where
he made his move and succeeded in placing himself on top of her. AAA tried to shout for help, but
Barberos choked her and threatened her with death. Barberos was able to get inside her, although
AAA felt less-than-total penetration. AAA was able to escape by jumping out of the window when
someone knocked at the door. Both the RTC and CA convicted Barberos of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of rape are present.
Ruling:
Yes. Rape is defined and penalized under Arts. 266-A and 266-B of the RPC, as amended.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman, (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of
the crime of rape, albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration. What is
more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the
findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable
in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRIZALDO PACHECO y VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 187742, April 20, 2010, Velasco, J.
In People v. Ofemiano, the Court ruled that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not
negate rape. Even the victims lack of resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into
submission, does not signify voluntariness or consent. In People v. Corpuz, we acknowledged that even
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absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has moral
ascendancy over the victim. We emphasized that in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims
father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy
substitutes for violence or intimidation.
Facts:
AAA was raped by her stepfather Pacheco many times. The accused insists that he cannot
rape AAA since there were nine of them living in the same house. He was convicted by the RTC. On
appeal, Pacheco argued that the demeanor of AAA was inconsistent with that of a girl who had been
ravaged: she did not shout for help, she did not report the rape to her family. The accused further
stressed that his brother in law also allegedly raped AAA, and that fact creates a serious doubt as to
who the real offender was. The prosecution, on the other hand, argues that the healing of AAA's
hymenal laceration does not negate the fact that she had been raped.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. There are those charged with the serious crime of rape who try to escape liability by
questioning why the alleged rape victim did not struggle against the rapist or at least shout for help.
They attempt to shift blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. This
Court, however, has repeatedly held that there is no clear-cut behavior that can be expected of one
who is being raped or has been raped.
The ruling in Ofemiano applies to this case. While AAA may not have exerted effort to free
herself from her rapist, her actions can be explained by the fear she already had of accused-
appellant, who had beat her up on more than one occasion. Accused-appellants moral ascendancy
over AAA, combined with memories of previous beatings, was more than enough to intimidate AAA
and rendered her helpless while she was being victimized. Moreover, in People v. Bagos, we held
that the lack of a struggle or an outcry from the victim is immaterial to the rape of a child below 12
years of age. The law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and
cannot have a will of her own. On this score, accused-appellants defense is wanting.
Accused-appellant cannot as well count on the much-abused line that rape is not committed
when others are present. Sadly, the presence of family members in the same room has not
discouraged rapists from preying on children, giving this Court to observe before that lust is no
respecter of time and place. Rape has been shown to have been committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there
are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO BANAN Y LUMIDO

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The date of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the said crime; it is merely a minor
inconsistency which cannot affect the credibility of the testimony of the victim. Further, it is well-
settled in rape cases that "the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain the verdict
of conviction."
Facts:
Domingo Banan was convicted with the crime of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
On appeal to the SC, Banan argued that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the
complainant, with respect to the date of the incident. He also contended that there was no credible
and admissible evidence that he had sexual congress with the private complainant, because the
physician who conducted the medical examination did not testify in court.
Issue:
Whether inconsistencies in the victims testimony with respect to the date of the crime of
rape affect its veracity and credibility.
Ruling:
No. The date of the rape is not important. It is not even an element of the crime of rape;
what should control is the fact of the commission of the rape or that there is proof of the
penetration of the female organ. In fact, if a minor inconsistency existed, such as the date, it
"strengthens rather than diminishes the credibility of complainant as it erases suspicion of a
contrived testimony." Again, the date of the crime is not an essential element of the crime of rape; it
is merely a minor inconsistency which cannot affect the credibility of the testimony of the victim.
Furthermore, the non-presentation of the doctor who conducted the medical examination is
of no concern. It is well-settled in rape cases that "the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is
sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELICIANO "SAYSOT" CIAS

A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have an unbridled license to subject his
beloved to his carnal desires against her will.
Facts:
Cias was charged with the crime of rape. In his defense, he argued that he and the victim
had been carrying an illicit affair for about six months. He alleged that in all their previous
assignations, she submitted herself to him voluntarily and willingly on each occasion that they had
sexual intercourse.
Issue:
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Whether the fact of love affair between the victim and accused negates the commission of
rape.
Ruling:
No. The fact alone that the victim and accused had an illicit affair, does not rule out rape as it
does not necessarily mean that consent was present. A love affair does not justify rape for a man
does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.
Moreover, the theory that Cias and AAA were having an illicit affair is unsupported by evidence.
Cias did not offer any other evidence--such as a love letter, a memento, or even a single photograph-
-to substantiate his claim that they had a romantic relationship.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO ARAOJO

The credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in prosecution for
rape. Withal, in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the highest degree of respect must be
accorded to the findings of the trial court.
Facts:
Four separate informations for rape and one for acts of lasciviousness were filed against
Araojo. The latter tags AAAs account of the alleged rape incidents, which, for the most part,
consisted of the same details, as utterly incredulous. And evidently proceeding on the assumption
that rape victims usually put up a struggle, he invites attention to AAAs failure to significantly
resist the alleged sexual attack. Also, Araojo maintains that the physical evidence ran counter to
AAAs allegations of rape. If, as AAA alleged, she was raped, then the results of her medical
examinations would have yielded complete hymenal lacerations, considering AAAs tender age and
the manner of the sexual assault. Araojo theorizes that, since AAA had been hired as a babysitter, it
is possible that she was exposed to various forms of exploitation.
Issue:
Whether or not the witnesses for the prosecution are credible.
Ruling:
Yes. As the Court has often repeated, the issue of credibility is a matter best addressed by
the trial court which had the chance to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. For
this reason, the Court accords great weight and even finality to factual findings of the trial court,
especially its assessments of the witnesses and their credibility, barring arbitrariness or oversight
of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. Testimonies of child-victims are normally
given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When
the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of
what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
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would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Where the victim is below 12 years old, the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal
knowledge took place. Proof of force, threat or intimidation is unnecessary since none of these is an
element of statutory rape. There is statutory rape where, as in this case, the offended party is
below 12 years of age. In light of this perspective, the absence of a struggle or an outcry from AAA, if
this really be the case, vis--vis the first three, i.e., 1997, 1998 and 1999, dastardly attacks, would not
carry the day for Araojo.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO ORJE

Courts look with disfavor on affidavits of desistance and/or retraction as it can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary considerations and because it is quite
incredible that after going through the process of having the accused apprehended by the police,
positively identifying him as the rapist, and enduring humiliation and examination of her private
parts, the victim would suddenly declare that the wrongful act of the accused does not merit
prosecution.
Facts:
AAA testified sleeping in their house and waking up at around 6 oclock in the evening with
the feeling of something heavy pressing on her body. It turned out to be her father, Joselito Orje,
who proceeded to strip out her shorts and underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina. Even
though she attempted to shout and struggle to break free in the beginning, her efforts proved futile
as he was holding her hands and covering her mouth at the same time. Eventually, she succeeded in
extricating herself and got hold of a chair which she threw at the accused. Two days after the
harrowing incident, the accused slapped her for arriving home late. When she was combing her
hair, accused suddenly came up from behind and started to fondle her breasts. This turn of events
prompted AAA to run to her cousin, BBB, for help and in the latters house, AAA confided what she
had gone through. BBB informed her parents who, in turn, reported the matter to the police.
Accuseds arrest followed. AAA also testified that apart from the above incidents, accused also
molested her two years prior on two different dates. She, however, kept the painful episodes to
herself for fear that her father would make good on his threat to kill her mother. Apart from AAAs
testimony in the witness stand, the Medico-Legal Report shows clear evidence of forceful insertion
or penetration of something into AAAs vagina. The RTC and the CA found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, appreciating the twin qualifying aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution has established accused-appellants guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
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Yes. We fully agree with the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-
appellant sexually abused AAA. Both courts were correct in giving credence to AAAs positive
testimony the first time around notwithstanding her retraction of her previous testimonies and the
allegations contained in her affidavit of desistance.
Rape may now be prosecuted de oficio; a complaint for rape commenced by the offended
party is no longer necessary for its prosecution. As corollary proposition, an affidavit of desistance
by the complaining witness is not, by itself, a ground for the dismissal of a rape action over which
the court has already assumed jurisdiction. An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the accuseds defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BEN RUBIO y ACOSTA

G.R. No. 195239 March 7, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is very important because of the following guiding
principles: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to
disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Facts:
While AAA was sleeping with her siblings in her house at around 2pm, the accused Ben
Rubio approached her and removed her shorts and panty. AAA tried to resist but he was too strong,
and Ben succeeded in inserting his penis inside AAA's vagina.
Ben was charged with qualified rape. During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that AAA was a
minor at the time of the incident and that the accused was AAAs father. Both the RTC and CA
convicted Ben as charged. The accused appealed to the SC, challenging the credibility of the victim-
complainant based on minor inconsistencies. The accused also claims that AAA failed to shout
during the alleged assault.
Issue:
Whether or not Ben is guilty of qualified rape.
Ruling:
Yes. There is qualified rape if the crime of rape is committed and coupled with any of the
aggravating circumstances mentioned in Art. 266-B, i.e. when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent. The crime of rape is committed when a man shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman against her will through force, threat, or intimidation. Here, the
parties stipulated that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident, and that the accused was
her father. AAAs testimony also establishes the fact that Ben had carnal knowledge with her
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through force and/or intimidation. The fact that she was not able to shout is immaterial since
physical resistance is not an essential element of rape.
The challenge must fall since (1) rape victims are not expected to make an errorless
recollection of a very humiliating and painful incident, so humiliating and painful that they might in
fact be trying to remove it from their memory. Inaccuracies, for as long as not material, will not
impair AAAs testimony. (2) The testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for
youth and immaturity are badges of truth.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WARLITO MARTINEZ

Anyone who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known such perception to others, may be
a witness. Thus, mental retardation does not disqualify a person from testifying. What is essential is
the quality of perception, and the manner in which this perception is made known to the court.
Facts:
On three different dates, Martinez allegedly raped his 13-year old daughter, AAA, who was
mentally retarded. Martinez threatened to kill AAA if she would reveal the incident to her mother.
However, AAAs teacher noticed that she appeared to be unusually weak. Aware of the fat that
Martinez had sired two children from AAAs elder sister, the teacher asked AAA if her father had
raped her, to which AAA answered in the affirmative. The teacher reported the same to the DSWD,
and BBB, her mother learned the rape incident. Martinez was then charged with three counts of
qualified rape. In his defense, Martinez raised denial and alibi that he was away from their house
during the times that the alleged rape took place. RTC found Martinez guilty of three counts of rape
under Art. 365 of the RPC. Convinced of AAAs credibility, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Martinez argued that AAAs testimony is not credible for she is mentally retarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the credibility of a mentally retarded complaining witness should be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a basic doctrine that anyone who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
such perception to others, may be a witness. Thus, by itself, mental retardation does not disqualify a
person from testifying. What is essential is the quality of perception, and the manner in which this
perception is made known to the court. The Court ruled in several cases that the credibility of the
mentally retarded complaining witness after noting that the witness spoke unequivocally on the
details of the crime should be upheld. The witness would not have spoken tenaciously about her
experience had it not really happened to her.
In this case, AAA testified in a straightforward and categorical manner that her father had
raped her. She even demonstrated before the court their relative positions during the molestations.
And even during grueling cross-examination, she remained consistent with her statement that her
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father had raped her. Thus, her conduct before the court does not indicate that she had been
coached.

The date of the commission of the crime is not an element of the crime of rape and has no
substantial bearing on its commission. What is essential is that there be proof of carnal knowledge of a
woman against her will.
Facts:
Martinez argued that there are inconsistencies in AAAs testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of AAA should be upheld despite the inconsistencies.
Ruling:
Yes. The inconsistencies that Martinez faults AAA with are too minor to be considered. The
date of the commission of the crime is not an element of the crime of rape and has no substantial
bearing on its commission. What is essential is that there be proof of carnal knowledge of a woman
against her will. And the testimony of AAA clearly proved that Martinez had raped her. She would
not have been firm in her allegations had not the same really happened.

When the victims forthright testimony is consistent with the physical finding of penetration,
there is then, sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.
Facts:
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Martinez argued that AAAs testimony is not supported by physical evidence and that the
lacerations on AAAs hymen are not conclusive proof of the crime attributed to him.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sexual intercourse that did take place based on AAAs testimony.
Ruling:
Yes. AAAs healed lacerations on her hymen support her testimony rather than destroy it.
True, a physicians finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not establish
rape. Such result, however, is not presented to prove the fact of rape; rather, it is presented to show
the loss of virginity. And when, as in this case, the victims forthright testimony is consistent with
the physical finding of penetration, there is then, sufficient basis for concluding that sexual
intercourse did take place.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELIX WASIT

The purported flaws in the prosecutions testimonial evidence do not have any negative effect
on the credibility of its witnesses. There are no material inconsistencies that merit a reversal of the
accuseds conviction
Facts:
AAA, then 13 years old, was asleep in her room in a boarding house owned by Wasits
parents. She was awakened by Wasit who was already on top of her, undressing and molesting her.
After succeeding in having penile penetration, Wasit proceeded to insert his finers inside AAAs
sexual organ and told her not to shout. After the rape incident, AAA report the matter to Wasits
sister but prevented her from leaving the boarding house. The next day, AAA told her teacher about
the incident and a few days later, AAAs uncle brought her to a hospital for medical examination,
wherein it was reported that there was a notable disruption of the continuity of the hymenal folds.
On the other hand, Wasit, a gardener, denied the rape incident. Wasit then was charged with rape.
RTC found him guilty as charged and this was affirmed by the CA. Wasit then questioned the
credibility of AAAs testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the credibility of the complaining victim should be upheld.
Ruling:
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Yes. An accuseds conviction or acquittal depends on the credibility of prosecutions

witnesses, most especially that of the private complainant, and her candor, sincerity, and like
virtues play a very significant role in the disposition of the case. If, in the eyes, heart, and mind of
the trial court, a complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, then the accused may be
convicted solely on that basis. And it is clearly showed that AAAs testimony on Wasits act of
molestation was positive and credible.
Second, the testimony of a minor rape victim is given full weight and credence as no young
woman would plausibly concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts,
and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by
the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are badges
of truth.
Third, jurisprudence provides that between categorical testimonies that ring of truth, on
one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the Court has strongly ruled that the former must prevail.
Indeed, positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. In
this case, considering that alibis are easy to fabricate with the aid of immediate family members or
relatives, they assume no importance in the face of positive identification by the victim herself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PASTOR LLANAS, JR. Y BELCHES

An offended woman's testimony hurdling the exacting test of credibility would suffice to
convict. In fine, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in prosecution for
rape. Withal, in passing upon the credibility of the victim-witness, the highest degree of respect must
be afforded to the evaluation and findings of the trial court.
Facts:
Pastor Llanas tricked his 9-year old daughter AAA into going with him to a "camalig" to play.
Llanas laid AAA and removed her garments and told AAA not to report anything or else he would
kill her and BBB, AAAs mother. Llanas was able to have carnal knowledge with AAA and the latter
was left crying in pain. At home later, AAA, remembering the threat her father made, kept her
peace. One day the following year, Llanas again sexually abused AAA, now 10 years old. AAA, now
15 years old, was approached by Llanas and asked her to play. AAA rejected as she was frightened
by the remark but Llanas told her that: "para lang yan. It's just that. You are not going to be
pregnant because I'm withdrawing my semen." Llanas was again able to have carnal knowledge
with AAA. On a later date, Llanas again attempted to ravish AAA but failed to do so. Later, AAA
disclosed everything to her mother and they reported to the police the incident. Llanas denied all
the allegations about raping AAA and said that he was working at that time. The RTC found Llanas
guilty which was affirmed by the CA. Llanas questions the credibility of the prosecutions key
witness and its evidence since AAAs account is inconsistent and does not jibe with the normal flow
of things.
Issue:
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Whether or not the testimony of AAA is sufficient to render conviction for Llanas.
Ruling:
Yes. Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy involving only two persons and not generally
attempted save in secluded places far from prying eyes. By the intrinsic nature of rape cases, the
crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended girl herself and conviction
invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's single witness of the actual occurrence.
Without hesitation, AAA had pointed an accusing finger at the appellant, her father no less,
as the person who forced himself on her on at least three occasions and who caused her pain when
he inserted his sex organ into her vagina. As determined by the trial court, AAA's testimony on the
fact of molestation was given "in a straightforward and candid manner, unshaken by rigid cress-
examination that indeed she has been raped by her father in 3 occasions which are the subject of
these cases."
Testimonies of rape-victims normally carry and are given full weight and credit, since when
a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age
and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMMEL BELO Y DE LEON

"Sweetheart" theory, being an affirmative defense, must be established by convincing evidence

-- some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, photographs and the
like.
Facts:
AAA was alone in her house and was taking a bath when she noticed that the lights in the
living room were turned off which she thought was done by her live-in partner so she called his
name. However, upon opening of the bathroom door, she saw Rommel Belo who was holding a
bread knife and said "Sandali lang ito" and pushed her inside the bathroom. Belo kissed and
touched AAA's private parts while pointing the knife at AAA and eventually he was able to insert his
penis into her vagina. Belo threatened her not to tell anybody about what just happened, or else, he
would kill her. AAA told her live-in partner about it and they reported the incident to the
authorities. Belo, in his defense, claims that it was a consensual sex and that AAA was his girlfriend.
Further, he claims that the absence of bruises and contusions on AAAs body, based on the medico-
legal report, negates the crime of rape. The RTC found Belo guilty of rape and was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue:
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Whether or not Belo is guilty of rape despite his defense of consensual rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Further, the defense of consensual sex must be established by strong evidence in order
to be worthy of judicial acceptance. Notably, apart from accused-appellant's allegation that he and
AAA were sweethearts, no love letter, memento or picture was presented by him to prove that such
romantic relationship existed. While Vergara testified on his knowledge of the supposed
relationship, he admitted that his basis was merely the information previously given by accused-
appellant and that he really had no personal knowledge concerning the same. And as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, even supposing that the sweetheart theory is true, a love affair
does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will for love is not a
license for lust.
The absence of bruises and contusions does not negate the commission of rape. As held
in People v. Dado (G.R. No. 87775, June 1, 1995): The absence of finger grips, contusions, bruises or
scratches on; the different parts of Eden's body does not negate the commission of rape. It is not
necessary that the victim should bear marks of physical violence sustained by reason of the
persistence of the sexual attacker, nor is the exertion of irresistible force by the culprit an
indispensable element of the offense. Corollarily, Eden's failure to shout or offer tenacious
resistance cannot be said to render voluntary her submission to the lustful criminal act of appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO GARBIDA

The only elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) the such woman is under twelve (12) years of age.
Facts:
AAA's biological father and mother separated after the birth of AAA and another child.
AAA's mother married Roberto Garbida and had children of their own. While at home, Garbida
suddenly pulled AAA into a room and undressed her. Garbida had sexual intercourse with AAA,
even as AAA's mother witnessed the act who tried to intervene but was unsuccessful. The act was
repeated and the AAAs mother who again intervened failed to do so. They reported the crime and
Garbida was arrested and was charged with rape in 7 separate amended informations for each act
of sexual intercourse with AAA. Garbida admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA but he
claimed that the acts of sexual intercourse were consensual. The RTC found Garbida liable for 7
counts of statutory rape but the circumstances of minority and relationship were not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. AAA's birth certificate was not presented as well as the marriage
certificate between Garbida and AAA's mother. The RTC also ruled that the offense was aggravated
by ignominy since the omission was done in the presence AAAs mother. The CA modified the
penalty imposed reclusion perpetua due to the abolishment of the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not Garbida is guilty of statutory rape.
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Ruling:
Yes. The acts were committed by accused-appellant in April of 1997, before RA 8353, the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, took effect on October 22, 1997 and amended the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on the crime of rape. Thus, Article 335(3) of the Revised Penal Code defining how
statutory rape is committed is the applicable law. The very act of sexual intercourse was
established, in fact admitted by accused-appellant. The age of AAA was established before the RTC
to be 11 years. The acts of accused-appellant fall squarely under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as the elements of the crime of statutory rape have been sufficiently proved. We held in People v.
Lopez (G.R. No. 179714, October 2, 2009): It must be remembered that under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence, the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. The only elements
of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the such
woman is under twelve (12) years of age.
The voluntary submission of AAA, even if the Court were convinced that such is the case, to
the sexual desires of accused-appellant will not relieve him of criminal liability. As she was 11
years old at the time, she could not give consent, and if she had indicated in any way to accused-
appellant that she consented to having sexual intercourse with him, there is no reason for him,
were he not morally depraved, to take advantage of her consent. Sexual congress with a girl under
12 years old is always rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO PALER

A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a
bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is
intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already
constitutes rape; without requiring proof that the accused used force or intimidation in committing
the act.
Facts:
AAA has a mental condition akin to that of a 5 years old child. AAA went home after
attending classes which is at the eastern portion of the cemetery. While she was walking along the
path near the Chinese pagoda, Arturo Paler pulled her to the side of the pagoda. Arturo had sexual
intercourse with AAA who felt pain. AAA went home after what happened without telling anyone
about the incident. The same incident happened again. AAA told her aunt about what happened
who later helped her in filing the case. AAA underwent 3 medical examinations. AAA also
underwent a psychological examination in which it was reported that AAA's mental condition is
classified as severely retarded. It was noted that AAA's IQ is equivalent to that of a 5-year-old child
and needs to be under continued counseling to help her develop the skills needed to enable her to
perform her daily living as a normal person. Paler denied the charges against him. The RTC found
him guilty and was affirmed by the CA which upheld AAAs credibility despite AAAs mental
capacity.
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Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Paler is guilty of rape despite the fact of AAAs mental
retardation was not alleged in the informations.
Ruling:
Yes. In Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental
retardate is rape. In this circumstance, what needs to be alleged in the information and proven
during trial are the facts of appellant's carnal knowledge of the victim, and the victim's mental
retardation. However, such is not the situation here. In the case at bar, appellant was charged with
rape through force and intimidation. For conviction to lie, it is necessary for the prosecution to
prove two elements--that appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim and that such act was done
through force or intimidation. Clearly, contrary to appellant's claims, an allegation in the
Information of the victim's mental retardation was not necessary.
Appellant attacks the victim's capacity to testify based on her weak mental
condition. However, as correctly held by the appellate court, mental retardation, by itself, does not
disqualify a person from testifying. What is essential is the quality of perception, and the manner in
which this perception is made known to the court. In this case, records show that despite the
victim's mental retardation, she testified in a straightforward and categorical manner that appellant
had raped her.
Appellant's carnal knowledge of the victim was established by her categorical narration of
the incident. The victim clearly recounted how appellant pulled her in a secluded portion of the
cemetery, removed her clothes, and had sexual intercourse with her. Aware that appellant had
committed an act she describes as "niyotnak" and "eyot", she said that she felt pain after the
incident. Her testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of lacerations on her hymen.
Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIANO OFEMIANO

G.R. No. 187155 February 1, 2010, Velasco, J.
The victims inability to remember the exact dates of the rape should not be taken against her.
The exact time of the commission of the crime of rape is not a material ingredient of this crime.
Facts:
AAA, BBBs eldest daughter, live with BBB and her lover accused-appellant Mariano
Ofemiano. On the very night of AAAs arrival and the following days thereafter, Ofemiano sexually
molested her. AAA reported to her mother BBB what Ofemiano was doing to her but BBB did not
believe her daughter. But when AAA had the chance, she told her aunt what Ofemiano was doing to
her. The aunt immediately reported the matter to the authorities. RTC and the CA convicted
Ofemiano with rape. Hence, this case. Ofemiano argues that it was unlikely that the complaining
witness did not struggle to free herself or scream for help, considering that her mother and siblings
were sleeping beside her and could easily be awakened. Likewise, accused-appellant questions the
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fact that the complaining witness could not remember the dates when the sexual molestations
occurred.
Issue:
Whehter or not Ofemiano is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. In People v. Corpuz, we acknowledged that even absent any actual force or
intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has moral ascendancy over the victim. We
emphasized that in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy substitutes for violence or
intimidation. Thus, in this case, it was understandable for the victim to have silently endured the
sexual attacks of her mothers live-in partner. As correctly observed by the appellate court, accused-
appellant evidently used his moral ascendancy over the victim to carry out his bestial desire.
Moreover, it is of no moment that the rape occurred in a small room where other people
were sleeping together with the victim. Court has already taken judicial notice of the fact that
among poor couples with big families cramped in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons. Notably, the victim sufficiently explained that
accused-appellant prevented her from screaming by covering her mouth with his hand and by his
constant threat of harm on her family.
In this case, the victim was raped almost every night for a year by her mothers live-in
partner, with her mother turning a deaf ear to her cries for help. Under these circumstances, we
could not expect the victim to recall her harrowing experiences in an exact, detailed, and flawless
testimony. Verily, as in this case, it is sufficient if the acts complained of are alleged to have taken
place as near to the actual date at which the offenses are committed as the information or complaint
will permit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESSIE MALATE y CAETE

G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009, Velasco, J.
Minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of
the witness for they show that his testimony was not contrived or rehearsed. Trivial inconsistencies do
not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they
manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.
Facts:
Malate was accused of a crime of raping BBB. After trial, the RTC convicted Malate. CA
affirmed the same. Hence, this Appeal. Malate argues that the trial court erred in giving full
credence and reliance on the narration of the private complainant who gave implausible statements
and whose testimony was full of inconsistencies, thus rendering the entire charge incredible. He
asserts that BBBs varied versions of the incident demonstrate her lack of credibility.
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In support of his position, Malate draws attention to the fact that during direct examination,
BBB testified that her path was allegedly blocked by him and, then and there, she was forcibly
assaulted. But during her cross-examination, she stated that Malate passed by her and then
suddenly grabbed her from behind. Likewise, he points out that BBB was positive of the rapists
identity because of a light emanating from the houses nearby; but again, during her cross-
examination, she stated that the light came from the brightness of the moon and a lamp post. To
him, the foregoing inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony should suffice to support a
judgment of acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the
prosecution witness materially inconsistent and unreliable testimony.
Ruling:
No. Accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony
of the complainant to discredit her account of the incident. Even if they do exist, minor and
insignificant inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witness for
they show that his testimony was not contrived or rehearsed. Trivial inconsistencies do not rock
the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they
manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming. As aptly held in the American case of State v. Erikson,
the rule that a victims testimony in sexual assault cases must be corroborated "does not apply
where the inconsistency or contradiction bears upon proof not essential to the case." Well to point,
even the most truthful witnesses can sometimes make mistakes, but such minor lapses do not
necessarily affect their credibility.
Undoubtedly, the complainants testimony has been found to be credible by the trial court
and this Court finds no reason to disturb such determination. Further, it is worth noting that no
married woman in her right mind would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation in order
to perpetuate a falsehood.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMELITO LAURENTE CAPWA

To sustain a conviction for rape, there must be proof of the penetration of the female organ.
Facts:
On the evening of September 4, 1998, Capwa entered his childrens room and raped AAA,
her 15-year old daughter. AAA went to her auntie BBBs house and told her that she was raped by
her father. AAA, assisted by a social worker, lodged a complaint against Capwa before the police.
Consequently, an Information for attempted rape was filed. However, before arraignment, the
prosecution filed an Amended Information for consummated qualified rape. Capwas defense was
denial, claiming that AAA accused him of raping her only because he scolded and threatened to kill
her for refusing to end her relationship with her boyfriend. RTC found Capwa guilty of incestuous
rape and taking into consideration the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the victim is under
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18 years old and the offender is her own father, RTC imposed upon him the mandatory penalty of
death by lethal injection.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in allowing the amendment of the Information and in ruling that
Capwa is guilty of raping his daughter
Ruling:
No. Capwa confused the determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial with the
determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. The duty to determine the existence
of probable cause in order to charge a person for committing a crime rests on the public
prosecutor. On the other hand, the duty to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a
warrant of arrest rests on the judgea judicial function to decide whether there is a necessity for
placing the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Courts
cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged.
Thus, it cannot dismiss the information on the ground that the evidence upon which the
information is based is inadequate.
Moreover, to sustain a conviction for rape, there must be proof of the penetration of the
female organ. In this case, the inaccuracy in AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay may be attributed to the
inadequacy of the investigators language, and not on her alleged lack of honesty. Moreover, AAAs
testimony in court clearly proved that Capwa had sexually abused her. It must be stressed that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the affidavits being invariably
incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate due to partial suggestions or want of specific inquiries.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORANTE ELA

In rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible and free from fatal and material
inconsistencies and contradictions, can be the basis for the prosecution and conviction of the
accused. The rule can no less be true than when a rape victim testifies against her own father;
unquestionably, there would be reason to give it greater weight than usual.
Facts:
At at around two a.m, AAA was asleep at her residence, specifically on the lower portion of a
double-decker bed, while her three younger sisters on the upper portion. Florante Ela, the victim's
biological father, entered the room, turned off the light, pressed a sharp object against her neck, and
told her not to shout. He then proceeded to undress her and, after placing himself on top of her,
inserted his penis into her vagina. In the morning after the rape occurred, BBB, her stepsister,
approached her and asked why she screamed during the night. At first AAA didn't answer, but later
she told BBB that her father raped her. BBB accompanied AAA to the police and they both executed
sworn testimonies. During her testimony, the trial court noted that the victim began to weep when
she testified that her father raped her. AAA stated that this was not the first time she was raped by
him. She alleged that she was raped at least 10 times previously and that the rapes occurred when
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her mother was not around. On Elas part, he alleged that he went to Laguna to work as a carpenter
and went home only during the latter part of the month, implying that he was not home during the
date when the alleged rape occurred. He further alleged that he did not know why AAA would
accuse him of raping her; and the fact that AAA failed to immediately tell her mother of the rape
right after it occurred cast serious doubt on the credibility of the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not Ela is guilty of raping his minor daughter.
Ruling:
Yes. In prosecuting for rape, the single most important issue is the complainant's credibility.
A medical examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable
to a prosecution for rape. The court may convict the accused based solely on the victim's credible,
natural, and convincing testimony. In rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible and
free from fatal and material inconsistencies and contradictions, can be the basis for the prosecution
and conviction of the accused. The rule can no less be true than when a rape victim testifies against
her own father; unquestionably, there would be reason to give it greater weight than usual.
One of the most convincing pieces of evidence that leaves no doubt as to the guilt of Ela is
the testimony of his wife, CCC, who incidentally testified in his favor. Ela claimed, as an alibi, that he
was in Laguna at the time the rape occurred. It is clear that he would like to make it appear that he
was too far away from their residence in Tagaytay City to rape his daughter. However, CCC clearly
stated in her testimony that when she found out about the rape incident, she went to Dasmarias,
Cavite where the Ela worked in order to confront him. Dasmarias, Cavite is merely a half-an-hour
away from Tagaytay City via public transportation. In other words, it was not physically impossible
for accused-appellant to be in Tagaytay City at the time of the rape. Hence, the eloquent testimony
of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough
to confirm the truth of the charges.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LILIO U. ACHAS

The failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victims
submission to the criminal acts of the accused.
Facts:
Lilio U. Achas was charged of two (2) counts of the crime of rape committed against AAA,
the daughter of his common-law wife, BBB. Achas denied the charges and claimed that AAAs
account is inconsistent with human experience as she never cried for help during the incident when
in fact AAA was not alone in the house. He further asserts that the lack of hymenal laceration in the
medical records of AAA ran counter to AAAs testimonial evidence.
The RTC found Achas guilty sentencing him to death for each crime. On intermediate
review, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence, this appeal.
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Issue:
Whether or not Achas is guilty.
Ruling:
Yes. Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the
victim and the latter submits herself out of fear. As has been held, the failure to shout or offer
tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victims submission to the criminal acts of the
accused. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. AAAs
credibility should, thus, not be undercut just because she did not cry out, if this really be the case,
for help.
Achas has made much of the absence of medical traces of hymenal laceration on AAA. The
Court cannot accord merit to the argument that the lack of physical manifestation of rape weakens
the case against Achas. The medical report on AAA is only corroborative of the finding of rape. The
absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants body does not necessarily negate
the commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape,
albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration. What is more, the foremost
consideration in the prosecution for rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS PARAGAS CRUZ

Impotency as a defense in rape cases must likewise be proved with certainty to overcome the
presumption in favor of potency.
Facts:
Cruz was charged with one count of rape committed against AAA, 9 years old. Upon
arraignment Cruz pleaded not guilty. Medical examination result showed that AAA had two (2)
hymenal lacerations. For his part, Cruz claimed that it was impossible for him to commit rape as he
had been sexually impotent since 1995. This was further corroborated by his wife by saying that
they seldom had sexual intercourse after 1995. In 2001, Cruz was diagnosed to be suffering from
erectile dysfunction.
The RTC found Cruz guilty for the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of
RTC and ruled that his impotency was not proved with certainty and that the medical finding of
erectile dysfunction was based on an examination more than three years after the rape occurred;
thus, no categorical conclusion could be made that Cruz was impotent when the rape was
committed.
Issue:
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Whether or not the defense of impotence is sufficient to exculpate Cruz from the criminal
liability.
Ruling:
No. As a defense, impotence is both a physical and medical question that should be
satisfactorily established with the aid of an expert and competent testimony. Impotency as a
defense in rape cases must likewise be proved with certainty to overcome the presumption in favor
of potency. While Cruz was indeed diagnosed as suffering from erectile dysfunction, this does not
preclude the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with AAA. The diagnosis on Cruz in 2001 is,
therefore, useless to disprove his sexual potency at the time of the rape incident. It merely
corroborates his assertion that he is currently sexually impotent, and not that he has been so since
1995. Cruz was not able to adduce hard evidence to demonstrate his impotency prior to or on June
6, 1998 when the crime of rape was committed. Moreover, assuming arguendo that he was indeed
impotent since 1995, it does not discount the possibility that his erection was cured by drugs like
Viagra or Ciales. There was simply no proof of his alleged impotency on June 6, 1998 when the
beastly act of rape was committed against AAA.
Furthermore, we find the testimony of Cruzs wife Melinda more harmful than helpful to the
theory of the defense. It can be recalled that she testified as to having infrequent sexual intercourse
with her husband after 1995 because he had become impotent. This contradicts Cruzs claim that it
was impossible for him to have raped AAA because of his medical condition. Apparently his alleged
impotence, which started in 1995, did not completely stop him from engaging in sexual intercourse
over the years.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO ABOGANDA

The only elements of rape that are relevant to the instant case are (1) carnal knowledge of a
woman and (2) this was committed by using force, threat, or intimidation. A slew of cases has
discussed the elements of such a crime, and the time and date of its commission are not one of these
elements.
Facts:
Eduardo Aboganda was charged with two counts of rape committed against his own
daughter who was then 13 years old. The informations state that the crimes were committed on or
about the month of February, 2000 and on or about the month of March 2000. The RTC found
him guilty of incestuous rape. On appeal, he questioned the vagueness of the date and time alleged
in the informations. The said decision was affirmed by the CA with modification ruling that the
information suffices if there is an approximation of the date the offense was committed, more so in
the case of rape when the time it was committed is not an essential element of the crime. However,
he cannot be convicted of incestuous rape in view of the failure of the informations to allege AAAs
minority. Nevertheless, he is still guilty of qualified rape since it was shown that the accused used a
deadly weapon when he committed the offenses.
Issue:
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Whether or not the precise date of the commission of the rape is an essential element of the
crime charged.
Ruling:
No. Section 10, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 10. Date of the Commission of the Offense.It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.
Accused-appellants argument does not apply to the crime of rape. The only elements of
rape that are relevant to the instant case are (1) carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) this was
committed by using force, threat, or intimidation. A slew of cases has discussed the elements of
such a crime, and the time and date of its commission are not one of these elements.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YOON CHANG WOOK

Rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or
intimidation.
Facts:
Yoon and AAA, both Korean nationals, met in Seoul, South Korea in 1995 through a third
party to whom AAA intimated her wish to send her daughter to the Philippines to study. In January
1996, Yoon enrolled AAAs daughter at Brent Southville International School in Metro Manila. Soon
enough, both Korean nationals entered into a relationship which was, was short-lived owing to guilt
feelings on the part of AAA and her realization that Yoon was just after her money. Sometime in
April 1998, AAA, now back in Seoul, received a call from Yoon. After informing AAA that he has
changed for the better and now owning a restaurant, Yoon asked AAA to come to Manila, promising
to pay 80 million Won he owed her. AAA went at Yoons restaurant alone on June 6, 1998 at
around 2:00 p.m. Yoon suddenly got hold of her neck, pushed her head down, and dragged her
towards the door of the restaurant.
Once inside, Yoon and four unidentified Korean nationals brought her to the second floor of
the restaurant. Yoon then stripped her of clothes while his companions punched and kicked her,
gagged her mouth, bound her legs and arms, and blindfolded her. They then dragged her to the
bathroom where they poured gasoline all over her body.The men scratched a lighter as if to set her
on fire. There and then, Yoon asked her to copy a promissory note showing indebtedness to Yoon,
which she did against her will. After she had put on her clothes, AAA was allowed to leave. When
she looked into her bag, 50,000,000 and USD 350 were missing. Yoon denied raping AAA, but
admitted to having a two-year relationship with her which ended in 1997 when AAA suggested that
he eliminate her husband. Two complaints were filed against Yoon and four John Does, one for rape
and one for robbery. The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Yoon of robbery, but convicting him of
the crime of rape and the CA affirmed the decision in toto.
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Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred affirming the RTCs decision convicting the accused of rape.
Ruling:
No. The CA was correct. Rape, in context, is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge
of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The elements of carnal knowledge and the use of
force, threat and/or intimidation have sufficiently been proved. The second element came in the
form of being threatened, beaten up, bound on a chair, and blindfolded by Yoon and his bullies. But
being threatened with death by fire before the molestation was perhaps the most frightful act of
violence employed on AAA on the fateful day of June 6, 1998.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NELSON ABON Y NOVIDO

The credibility of the testimony of a young incestuous rape victim cannot be diminished by an
unsupported allegation that she is mentally disturbed. Considering that family honor is at stake, a
minor rape victim will not fabricate a story that she was raped by her own father unless it was true.
Facts:
Nelso Abon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. He interposed denial and alibi as
his defenses. He further casted doubt on AAAs credibility by tagging her as a disturbed child who
invented the accusation against him because he maltreated her. However, the court found him
guilty of having raped his own daughter.
Issue:
Whether the victims alleged mental disturbance makes her testimony incredible.
Ruling:
No. Rape victims, especially those of tender age, would not concoct a story of sexual
violation, or allow an examination of their private parts and undergo public trial, if they are not
motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against them. Moreover, a rape
victims testimony against her father goes against the grain of Filipino culture as it yields
unspeakable trauma and social stigma on the child and the entire family. Thus, great weight is given
to an accusation a child directs against her father.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABRAHAM BUNAGAN Y SONIO

G.R. No. 177161 June 30, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Failure of the victim to shout or offer tenacious resistance alone did not make the victims
submission voluntary.
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Facts:
Sometime in the first week of February 2002, a 12-year old AAA passed by the house of
Abraham, who was then holding a bolo. There and then, Abraham approached AAA, approached
AAA, held her hands, covered her mouth with his palm, and brought her at the back of his house
where he succeeded in inserting his two fingers into her vagina.
On April 2, 2003, Abraham approached AAA while armed with a bolo. Abraham brought
AAA to a grassy area and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA tried to resist but she was
threatened with a bolo.
Abraham was charged with rape by sexual assault and simple rape. In his defense, Abraham
argued that the date of the sexual assault was not precisely stated. Abraham also admitted that he
had carnal knowledge with AAA, but claims that their sexual relations was consensual.
Issues:
Whether or not the sexual encounters happened with AAAs consent.
Ruling:
No. Intimidation is generally addressed to the mind of the victim. Being subjective, its
presence could not be tested by any hard and fast rule but must be viewed in the light of the
victims perception and judgment at the time of the crime. Failure of the victim to shout or offer
tenacious resistance alone did not make the victims submission voluntary. Intimidation was
established in this case when Abraham had sexual congress with her while armed with a bolo, and
even warned AAA not to report the incident or else he would kill her.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO TECZON y PASCUAL

G.R. NO. 174098 September 12, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Infliction of physical injury is not an essential element of rape. The gravamen of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation against her will or without her consent.
What is imperative is that the element of force or intimidation be proven; and force need not always
produce physical injuries.
Facts:
AAA, 14 years old, accompanied her aunt to school to attend a PTA meeting. She left to get
refreshments and on her way back to school, Teczon invited her to eat in his house but she refused.
He then pulled out a fan knife and pointed it to the left side of her neck, dragged her to a forested
area, and raped her there. Teczon was charged with rape. In his defense, he alleged that on the same
day on his way to see the albularyo, he saw a boy and a girl having sex behind some tall plants 10-
15 meters away from the road. He shouted at them and they scampered in different directions and
allegedly told the story to the albularyo and schools canteen operator. The RTC convicted him of
rape, which the CA affirmed.
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Issue:
Whether or not Teczon is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. He is guilty of rape. Infliction of physical injury is not an essential element of rape. What
is imperative is that the element of force or intimidation be proven; and force need not always
produce physical injuries. Notably, force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term,
depending on the age, size, strength, and relationship of the parties. In her testimony, complainant
stated that accused-appellant dragged her into a forested area with a knife pointed on her neck. As
correctly observed by the trial court, complainant submitted to the will of accused-appellant
because of fear for her life.
Complainant could not be faulted for initially concealing the truth from her schoolmates and
teacher as she was, at that time, still overcome by shock and fear. There is no standard form of
reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when confronted with a horrifying experience such as a
sexual assault. The actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience should not be
judged by the norms of behavior expected from adults when placed under similar circumstances.
To stress, when the offended party is a young and immature girl between the ages of 12 to
16, as in this case, courts are inclined to give credence to her version of the incident, considering
not only her relative vulnerability but also the public humiliation to which she would be exposed by
a court trial if her accusation were untrue.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER UGOS

Rape can now be committed through sexual assault by inserting "any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person."
Facts:
Ugos was charged with raping AAA, his 7-year old stepdaughter. While they were looking
for AAAs mother, Ugos brought AAA to a creek and undressed her and inserted his finger into her
vagina four times. He bit AAAs face and inserted his penis. He held her by the neck and boxed her in
the face and stomach. Ugos denied the allegations and stated that the victim fell while looking for
her mother because the road was dark and slippery. The RTC found him guilty, which the CA
affirmed. Ugos contends that the testimonies of AAA and her mother reveal only the commission of
acts of lasciviousness and not rape since he only inserted his finger into her sex organ.
Issue:
Whether or not Ugos is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
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Yes. He is guilty of rape, not mere acts of lasciviousness. The charge of rape was supported
by the testimony of AAA, and the medical report on her physical injuries. Accused-appellants denial
of the crime cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the victim. A rape victims
straightforward and candid account, corroborated by the medical findings of the examining
physician, is sufficient to convict the accused. This conclusion becomes all the more firm where, as
in this case, the child-victim takes the witness stand. Previous decisions involving rape cases have
shown us the high improbability that a girl of tender years would impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape if what she claims is not true.
We reject accused-appellants argument that had he been found to have merely fingered
AAAs sexual organ, he would only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness. As held in De Castro v.
Fernandez, Jr., (515 SCRA 682) the new law on rape now includes sexual assault. Although the
amendment to the law on rape was made after accused-appellant was charged, it is well to point out
that with its expanded definition, rape can now be committed through sexual assault by inserting
"any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MOISES OLIVA ORBITA

The accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such
testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.
Facts:
AAA, born on January 18, 1995, was the daughter of BBB and CCC. In 2001, accused saw
BBB playing cards games at the condominium unit where he was employed as the security guard.
He was dressed in civilian clothes and reeking of alcohol. He watched for about an hour before he
left. BBB, who was attending to her other child, did not notice the accused leave but she
remembered seeing AAA sitting on the lap of the accused. At around 1 in the morning, AAA went
down the stairs, visibly frightened and walking awkwardly. AAA narrated that she was taken to the
rooftop by Kuya (Brother) Jun, herein accused, and once there, the accused undressed her, laid her
down near the washing area, and then raped her. BBB examined AAAs underwear and saw
bloodstains on it, which made BBB hysterical. On the same day, the rape incident was reported.
Accused interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. According to him, he proceeded to the
condominium unit of BBB to play tong-its, a card game, until 8:30 in the evening, and left and went
back to the ground floor and took a rest. He testified that BBB and AAA concocted the rape story
because BBB allegedly harbored negative feelings against him after he saw BBB embracing
somebody on several occasions.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of statutory rape.
Ruling:
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Yes. The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposed upon him.
Conviction or acquittal in rape cases, more often than not, depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony. For, by the very nature of this crime, it is usually only the
victim who can testify as to its occurrence. The accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. And, in the evaluation of the credibility of the complainants
testimony, the sound determination and conclusion by the trial court are accorded much weight
and respect. In this case, he failed to substantiate his claim of ill motive on the part of BBB, as it is
unnatural for a mother to use her offspring as a tool of malice. Moreover, AAAs testimony was
strongly supported by the evidence of the prosecution culled from the records that leaves no doubt
as to her credibility. And what reinforces the credibility of her testimony is the fact that she was
only six years old when she testified and, indubitably, her statements rang true.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO MALIBIRAN

We adhere to the following guiding principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: an accusation
for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Facts:
Respondent is the maternal grandfather of AAA. BBB, AAAs mother, AAA, and her siblings
stayed with Ernesto in Aurora. AAA was a child of seven. Ernesto raped her several times, i.e.,
around 20 times. Ernesto would usually pull her inside the room, strip her of her shorts, lay her
down, go on top of her, and insert his penis into her sex organ, the process accompanied by the
mashing and sucking of breasts. One afternoon, BBB noticed her father suddenly pulling AAA to the
kitchen; and that is when AAA told BBB that Ernesto had mashed her breast and touched her
private part. BBB filed the case against respondent. The RTC and the CA rendered a decision against
respondent imposing the penalty of death. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence adduced are sufficient to convict respondent beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of Qualified Rape.
Ruling:
Yes. For the following pieces of evidence: First, the testimony of private complainant AAA
was categorical and positive as to the molestations committed by Ernesto through force and threats
of physical harm; Second, medical evidence provides confirmatory dimension to the fact of rape;
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Third, the defenses of denial and alibi do not foreclose the commission of rape by Ernesto; Fourth,
the qualifying blood relationship between the minor AAA and Ernesto had adequately been proved.
As regard the qualifying circumstance, Minority and relationship which, in a prosecution for
rape, constitute special qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved
during trial. These aggravating, nay, qualifying, circumstances have been duly alleged and proved
beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the twin aggravating circumstances of minority of the
victim and her blood ties to the offender were properly appreciated. The concurrence of the
minority of the rape victim and her relationship to the offender is a special qualifying circumstance
which ups the penalty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEPITO NEVERIO

Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, if the victim is demented, the
element of force becomes immaterial and absence of consent is presumed.
Facts:
Two Informations were filed against Pepito for the commission of rape against AAA, a
mentally deficient lass. The RTC rendered a Decision, finding the accused, Pepito Neverio, a.k.a.
Totoy, GUILTY in both cases, of the crime of rape. The case was subsequently appealed to the CA.
The CA found that despite AAAs mental retardation, her testimony was direct, natural and
unvarnished. It noted further that the physical evidence fully supports the allegations of AAA.
In his Brief, Pepito argued that the prosecution failed to prove two elements of the crime as
alleged in the Information; AAAs mental retardation and the use of force and intimidation in
committing the sexual act. He claimed that medical findings confirming AAAs mental retardation
should have been presented; however, none was given in this case.Also, he maintained that it was
incredible for him to have managed to hold a knife against AAA with one hand, while at the same
time undressing and later having sex with her with only one hand free. We, however, hold that his
arguments deserve scant consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the element of force is immaterial in the crime of rape when the victim is
demented.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, if the victim is demented,
the element of force becomes immaterial and absence of consent is presumed. Thus, only sexual
intercourse must be proved in order to convict an accused. For this reason, if the mental age of a
woman above 12 years old is that of a child below 12 years old, even if she voluntarily submits
herself to the bestial desires of the accused, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation are
absent, the accused would still be liable for rape. If the victim, however, is above 12 years old and
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has normal psychological faculty at the time of the crime, sexual intercourse and the attendant
circumstance of force, violence, intimidation, or threat must be proved.
In this case, the Information alleged that AAA is mentally retarded. It, however, contained
also an allegation that sexual intercourse was committed against AAA through force and
intimidation and without her consent. The trial court convicted Pepito after finding that sexual
congress through force and intimidation had been sufficiently established. It did not consider the
mental condition of AAA because it was no longer necessary. As correctly ruled by the CA, AAAs
mental retardation was inconsequential because the conviction of the accused was based on the use
of force and intimidation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FIDEL CANETE

In People v. Santos, the Court has ruled that it is common for a young victim of tender age to
be fearful in the face of the mildest threat against her life. Although not alleged in the information, the
moral ascendancy of accused-appellant over his victim as her uncle was more than sufficient to cow
her into submission, even without use of a deadly weapon.
Facts:
The six Information filed against accused-appellant Fidel Canete contain the same
accusatory portion as the first Information which provides that in or about the year 1994, in the
municipality of BBB, province of Bulacan, Philippines, the accused, being the uncle of the offended
party, AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, then 9 years old,
against her will and without her consent.
Sometime in June 1994, September 199, AAA was raped by accused-appellant. Another rape
incident occurred in 1996 and 1997. Sometime in November 1998, accused-appellant sexually
abused AAA once again. Two more rapes were committed by accused-appellant sometime in 1999.
AAA divulged to her friend, Daisy Manlapit, the sexual abuse to which she had been
subjected. She told the councilor about her ordeal. Accompanied by her friend, Rose, AAA executed
an affidavit at the barangay narrating the rape incidents. As a defense, accused-appellant denied all
the charges hurled at him. The RTC found accused guilty of all six (6) counts of rape. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision with a modification on damages awarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Accused-appellant advances the theory of the improbability of the rape incidents
having occurred based on certain details in the victim's testimony. He wonders how it was possible
for the offenses to have transpired when the victim's relatives were in the same room. He likewise
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avers that the victim should have cried out for help while she was being raped. He argues that there
was no proof that he could inflict immediate harm on AAA as he supposedly did not have a deadly
weapon during the rape incidents.
Canete's exculpatory allegations do not merit concurrence. It is not improbable that

accused-appellant was able to succumb to his lechery while AAA's grandmother and sister were
sound asleep. Moreover, AAA testified that accused-appellant warned her not to tell anyone of the
sexual abuse or else he would kill her. It is not unnatural then for AAA to have kept silent during the
rape for fear for her personal safety. The failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate the
commission of rape.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. AMELIO TRIA AND JOHN DOE

Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against, or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the
latters consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.
Facts:
Respondent Amelio Tria (Tria) is a former branch manager of Philippine National Banks
(PNB) Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) branch. MWSS opened an account
in PNB-MWSS. On April 22, 2004 PNB-MWSS received a letter from MWSS instructing the former to
issue a managers check in the amount of P5, 200, 000.00 in favor of a certain Atty. Rodrigo Reyes.
The employees of PNB, after authentication and verification approved the request for the issuance
of the managers check. On April 26, 2004 Tria accompanied Atty. Reyes to PNB Quezon City branch
since PNB-MWSS had insufficient funds to pay the amount. He told the employee of PNB QC that
Atty. Reyes is their valued client. On February 2, 2005, Zaida Pulida (Pulida), a MWSS employee
handling the subject bank account inquired to PNB about the P5, 200, 000.00 debited to the
account. Pulida notified PNB that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the said managers check.
Furthermore, upon verification with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it was confirmed that
there was no Rodrigo Reyes included in its roster. PNB conducted its own investigation and held
Tria liable for qualified theft. Tria denied the allegation and contended other bank employees
should be liable for the loss.
Issue:
Whether or not Tria is guilty of qualified theft in issuing a managers check.
Ruling:
Yes. Amelio Tria is guilty of qualified theft. The requisites of qualified theft are: 1) Taking
personal property; 2) said property belongs to another; 3) Taking with intent to gain; 4) that it be
done without owners consent; 5) accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons
and force upon things; 6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
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As standard banking practice intended precisely to prevent unauthorized and fraudulent

withdrawals, a bank manager verifies with the client-depositor to authenticate and confirm that
he/she has validly authorized such withdrawal. Such failure of Tria as bank manager to verify the
legitimacy of the requested withdrawal lends credence to the accusation that he colluded with Atty.
Reyes to feloniously take money from PNB, and his complicity includes depriving the bank of its
opportunity to deny and withhold the consent for the necessary issuance of Managers Check. It
cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that PNB consented to the issuance of the check and its eventual
encashment which both constitute the taking of personal property as respondents had made sure
that the bank was rendered inutile and incapable to give its consent.
RYAN VIRAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not
by itself, without more, create the relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the
imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified theft.
Facts:
Private complainant Vedua hired Viray to assist her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their
cage. In October, Vedua, before leaving, locked the doors of her house, and left Viray to attend to her
dogs. Later, Vedua arrived home, entering through the back door of her house. As she was about to
remove her earrings, she noticed that her other earrings worth P25, 000.00 were missing. She then
searched for the missing earrings but could not find them. She also discovered that her jacket,
jewelry, a gameboy, a compact disc player, a Nokia cellular phone and a Nike Air Cap were likewise
missing. The total value of the missing items supposedly amounted to P297, 800.00. Witnesses and
pieces of evidence pointed out to the accused.
The RTC held that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as
there was an actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry into the house.
Aggrieved, Viray elevated the case to the CA. However, the CA found that the Information filed
shows that the prosecution failed to allege one of the essential elements of the crime of robbery,
which is "the use of force upon things." But, the CA still held that a conviction of the accused for
qualified theft is warranted considering that Viray enjoyed Veduas confidence, being the caretaker
of the latters pets.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be held guilty of simple theft.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner
cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. Also, it
cannot be considered as qualified theft since private complainant did not repose on Viray
"confidence" that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft. The very fact that
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petitioner "forced open" the main door and screen because he was denied access to private
complainants house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant.
The offended partys very own admission that the accused was never allowed to enter the
house where the stolen properties were kept refutes the existence of the high degree of confidence
that the offender could have allegedly abused by forcing open the doors of the same house.
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of
force in breaking the door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held
accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial

evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The
circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the crime.
Facts:
An Information was filed against petitioner Zabala before the RTC, charging him with theft.
The RTC rendered its Judgment convicting petitioner of the offense charged. Petitioner appealed to
the CA but it was denied and the CA likewise affirmed the decision of the TC. The CA ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through
circumstantial evidence.
The CA then found that the series of circumstances present in this case supports a
conviction, and constitutes the basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the facts thereby
sought to be proved. Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled that he offered no evidence
other than an alibi to exculpate him from the crime charged. It then cited the rule that alibi is a
weak defense, and cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a truthful witness. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but CA denied it. Respondent People insist that the prosecution was
able to establish petitioners guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It argues that the CA correctly ruled
that the series of circumstances presented before the trial court is sufficient to support a conviction.
Petitioner alleges that the evidence presented before the trial court is insufficient to convict him of
the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented before the trial court is insufficient to convict
petitioner of theft.
Ruling:
Yes. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the

circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
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reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.
The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the
crime. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to
convict the petitioner of the offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before
the trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
RA 7610 Anti-Child Abuse Law
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ADELADO ANGUAC y RAGADAO

The character of the crime is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances
in the information.
Facts:
Adelado Anguac is the common-law spouse of BBB, the mother of AAA. Sometime in 1998
while sleeping with her siblings in a room in their residence, AAA who was then 17 years old, found
herself suddenly awakened by Anguac who threatened and poked a knife at her. Anguac succeeded
in removing the underwear of the struggling AAA and then sexually forced himself on AAA while
pointing the knife just below her ear. The sexual assault on AAA was repeated for five times. AAA
subsequently became pregnant. She disclosed the assaults to her Aunts. Two separate informations
were filed charging Anguac with rape and violation of RA 7610. The RTC found Anguac guilty. CA
affirmed the RTCs ruling but treated the crime of rape charged in Criminal Case No. RTC 2757-I as a
violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 instead of Sec. 5(a) as found by the trial court. Anguac on the other
hand, questioned the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence
Issue:
Whether or not the character of the crime is determined by the caption of the information.
Ruling:
No. The character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the
information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
information. Consequently, even if the designation of the crime in the information was defective,
what is controlling is the allegation of the facts in the information that comprises a crime and
adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused. Sec. 5(a) of RA
7610 refers to engaging in or promoting, facilitating, or inducing child prostitution. Sec. 5(b), on the
other hand, relates to offenders who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse. Since the information
charged accused-appellant with having sexual congress with AAA through force, threats, and
intimidation the allegations properly fall under a charge of Sec. 5(b).
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Anguacs claim that it is impossible for AAAs young siblings sleeping beside or near her not
to be awakened while she was allegedly being rape is untenable. Lust, being a very powerful human
urge, is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest places and
circumstances, and by the most unlikely persons. The alleged motive of AAA is unwarranted.
Motives, such as those arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the
Court from giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor complainants.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
DENNIS MANGANGEY, GABRIEL WANASON, and ANSELMO FORAYO v. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 147773-74, February 18, 2008, J. Velasco, Jr.
The elements of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 of the RPC are: (1) the accused made
false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business, or imaginary transactions; (2) such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) such false pretenses or
fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his
money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province. They issued a
Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance in relation to the completion of a road construction in the
said municipality. As a result, the Government subsequently issued a check for 106,970 pesos as
payment for the project. After COA investigation, petitioners were charged with Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents. It was alleged that petitioners made it appear that they have
personally inspected the construction project and thereafter found the same to have been fully
accomplished 100%, when in truth and in fact, the work on the aforesaid project was not yet
finished.
Issue:
Whether the crime of estafa thru falsification of public document was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document
are present. The first element, that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations
was proven. The project was far from finished at the time the certifications were signed by
petitioners and when the government paid for the road project. The second element was likewise
proven. The falsifications were made during the commission of the crime. Lastly, the falsified
certificates of inspection and acceptance resulted in the government paying for the unfinished
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project to the disadvantage and injury of the State. Altogether, the elements of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document are present.
ELISEO AND ERLINDA ASEJO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 157433 July 24, 2007 Velasco, Jr., J.
Demand under this kind of estafa [Art. 315 (b)] need not be formal or written.
Facts:
Spouses Erlinda and Eliseo Asejo went to the house of Vilma Castro to borrow PhP 100,000
to be shown to the bank (show money) and make it appear that the Asejos were financially
liquid. The spouses went back to Castros house where she received the amount and signed a Trust
Undertaking. When the obligation became due, Castro went to the spouses to demand payment but
she failed to collect the money. Spouses Asejo were charged with Estafa under Art. 315 (b). They
were found guilty as charged by the RTC. The CA affirmed the judgment but modified the penalty.
Issue:
(1) Whether formal demand is required to hold petitioner liable for estafa under Art.
315 1(b).
(2) Whether the amount received was pursuant to a loan and not a trust agreement.
Ruling:
(1) No. We agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or
written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in
estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word
demand should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a
written demand as evidence is not fatal.
(2) No. As long as the money was received in trust, on commission, for administration, or
under an obligation to return, failure to account for it upon demand is punishable under Art. 315
1(b).
In the case at bar, the amount was received by the petitioner for the sole purpose of using it
as show money to the bank. The money was entrusted to her for a particular purpose. Hence, she
did not acquire the right to dispose or spend the amount as she sees fit; she had the obligation to
account for said amount.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT (accused-appellant), FIDES

PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA DUNGO
G.R. No. 187730, 29 June 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
Facts:
The accused were convicted for the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa based
on the complaint of Dela Caza. After having been assured that MPM Agency have already sent many
workers abroad and that there are job placements for the complainant and other applicants as
factory workers in Korea, Dela Caza was convinced to part with her money in the amount of
P45,000, as placement fee. After a few months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the
other applicants decided to take action, thereafter, the accused were arrested. Rodolfo Gallo denied
the allegations against him and asserted that he was merely an errand boy of the agency, thus, not
being an officer or employee of the agency, he could not be held criminally liable for the crimes
charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
Yes. The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by
abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations,
or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the
other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and
capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as
factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with
their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant
and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing
complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad.
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME

It is clear that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the
offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently
described and identified.
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Facts:
Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a
jewelry business. Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) went to see Rita at her house in Cebu City,
expressing her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. Cynthia, delivered to
Senador several pieces of jewelry worth P705, 685. Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the
sale or return the unsold jewelry within 15 days as agreed upon. Rita demanded from Senador the
return of the unsold jewelry or the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to
her. The demand was unheeded prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against
Senador.
Senador refused to testify but instead, she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the
Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. Senador asserted that the
person named as the offended party in the Information is not the same person who made the
demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information
went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be
"Rita Jaime." Citing People v. Uba, et al. and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, Senador
would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against her has been violated.
The RTC finds Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under Par. 1
(b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA rendered a decision upholding the finding of the
RTC that the prosecution established the guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the CA
ruled that Uba is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime against property and
not oral defamation, as in Uba.
Issue:
Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information is a ground for the acquittal of
the accused.
Ruling:
No. As correctly held by the appellate court, Senadors reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba,
the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the
person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. On the contrary,
in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not
absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party.
Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against
property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its
dismissal.
In offenses against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not
identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the
offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject
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matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other
generic property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of P705 ,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed
out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Senador and presented during trial. The
error in the designation of the offended party in the information is immaterial and did not violate
Senadors constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
ERWIN TULFO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO

G.R. No. 161032 September 12, 2008, Velasco, J.
The mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or a matter of public interest
does not automatically exclude the author from liability. For a discreditable imputation to a public
official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
Facts:
Four Informations for libel were filed against Erwin Tulfo as author/writer, Susan Cambri
as managing editor, Rey Salao as national editor, Joeclyn Barlizo as city editor and Philip Pichay as
president of Carlo Publishing House of the tabloid Remate, in connection with articles written by
Tulfo about one Atty. Carlos So of the Bureau of Customs. In these articles, Atty. So was labeled as
an extortionist, a smuggler, and a corrupt public official who had acquired ill-gotten wealth through
his work in the Customs. The accused were all convicted by the RTC, which the CA affirmed. Before
the SC, the accused Tulfo argued that the articles were qualified privileged communication as they
were fair commentaries on matters of public interest and thus, a valid defense for libel.
Issue:
Whether or not the articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged communication.
Ruling:
No. The doctrine of fair comment does not apply. In this case, the trial court found that the
allegations against Atty. So were false. Tulfo did not even offer proof of the accusations. The
columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being privileged
simply because the target was a public official. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory
utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official
duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public interest involving them, such
defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech. Journalists still bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession,
even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest.
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The articles cannot be considered as qualified privileged communication under the second
paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the presumption of malice "a fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions." To be considered privileged, the following must exist: (a) That it is a fair and true
report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a
public officer in the exercise of his functions; (b) That it is made in good faith; and (c) That it is
without any comments or remarks. In this case, the articles are plain baseless accusations based on
the word of one unnamed source. The articles also failed to satisfy the requirements of being fair
and true.
ANG KEK CHEN v. SPOUSES ATTY. ELEAZAR S. CALASAN and LETICIA B. CALASAN,
For purposes of determining venue, residence is not synonymous with domicile. One may reside
in a place apart from ones legal residence, without changing domicile, and that residence would
constitute actual residence for purposes of determining venue.
Facts:
Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan was born in Aparri. He owns real property, his ancestral home
situated on Quirino Street, Aparri, Cagayan. However, respondent Atty. Calasan also has a house
and lot in Las Pias, Metro Manila, which he and his family live in. Atty. Calasan was acting as
counsel for Jaime Lim. Ang Kek Chen, opponent of Lim, wrote a letter and filed a counter-affidavit
which Atty. Calasan believed maligned him. Atty. Calasan then filed criminal cases for libel against
Ang Kek Chen in Aparri, Cagayan, which were dismissed. Spouses Calasan filed a complaint for
damages with the Aparri, Cagayan RTC for alleged malicious imputations against Atty. Calasan. This
was dismissed on the ground that the venue had been improperly laid. On appeal, CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The spouses filed their MR which was granted.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in granting the MR of the spouses.
Ruling:
Yes. This case will be resolved on the core issue the interpretation and application of the
third paragraph of Article 360 of the RPC. In Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., the
term residence was equated with domicile as far as election law was concerned. However the case
also stated that:
for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of residence is adopted. Thus,
it is understood to mean as the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
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place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile.
Thus, the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint because it found that the
offended parties actually resided for the greater part of the year 2000 in Las Pias, even if their
legal residence was in Aparri, Cagayan. To reiterate, for purposes of determining venue, residence
is not synonymous with domicile. One may reside in a place apart from ones legal residence,
without changing domicile, and that residence would constitute actual residence for purposes of
determining venue.
Tariff and Customs Code
RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B. GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and ROGER A. BASADRE v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not
on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution.
Facts:
Raul Basilio Boac, Ramon Betuin Golong, Cesar Fantone Beltran, Roger Alcantara Basadre,
and Benjamin Castaneda Alfonso are members of the PNP-CIDG. They were charged with violation
of Sec. 2203 in relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Golong, Beltran, Basadre, and
Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but without the authority from and coordination with the BOC,
Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three container vans consigned to Kakiage
Surplus.
Dario C. Amolata, license customs broker, testified that he went to see the vans after
learning that they were flagged down by petitioners. The following day, he went to the warehouse
with Melvin Yamit and Richard Godoy of the Enforcement and Security Services of the BOC, Region
X to witness the inspection of the vans. No contrabands were found upon inspection. Yamit
corroborated the testimony of Amolata.
For the defense, Boac testified that on July 27, 2004, he was in Manila on leave. Beltran
allegedly informed him that three container vans with contrabands were released by the BOC; thus,
Boac instructed Golong and his team to flag down the subject vans. After the inspection of the vans
and without finding any contraband, Boac directed Golong to leave the premises. Golong
corroborated Boac's testimony, adding that he and his team did not open the vans on July 27, 2004
because there were no representatives from the BOC.
The Sandiganbayan finds accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of Section
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
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Issue:
Whether or not the accused were guilty of violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Ruling:
No. The foregoing testimony, which Golong corroborated, was not disputed by the
prosecution. It is thus very clear that the search was not done by petitioners but by the Customs
Police. Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested anybody. They merely observed the search
which they requested to be undertaken to check for contrabands. Notably, the consignee did not file
any complaint against petitioners.
The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down, searching, and seizing the
three container vans on July 27, 2004. Petitioners, however, could not also be held liable for these
acts. It is a fact that no search and seizure of the vans was done on the night of July 27, 2004. The act
of flagging down the vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans is not punishable under the said law.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest,
not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. In
this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioners committed the acts prohibited by Sec. 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is no such evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that identifies
petitioners as responsible for the alleged illegal search. Hence, acquittal is in order.
Page 116 of 116

Deans
Circle 2016
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
LEGAL
ETHICS
Legal and Judicial Ethics (Cases Penned by J. Deans Circle
Velasco) 2016
Table of Contents
Legal Ethics .......................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer ......................................................................................................... 1
To Society ................................................................................................................................................................... 1
To the Legal Profession ....................................................................................................................................... 5
To the Courts ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
To the Clients ..........................................................................................................................................................11
Notarial Practice ........................................................................................................................................................14
Judicial Ethics ...................................................................................................................................................................16
Discipline of the Members of the Judiciary ..................................................................................................16
Disqualification of Judges and Justices ...........................................................................................................22
Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers ...................................................................................25
Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographers .....................................................26
Retirement of Members of the Judiciary .......................................................................................................27
1|Page
Velasco) 2016
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer
To society
CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA

A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
There is gross misconduct when there is a transgression of some established or definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation
of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules.
Facts:
Atty. Rodolfo represented himself as an administrator of Mt. Crest Hotel before a certain
Jung Jong Chul, for purposes of leasing an office space at the hotel. A lease contract was entered
between Atty. Rodolfo and Jung without the knowledge of Corazon, the principal stockholder of the
family corporation which owns Mt. Crest Hotel. Notably, Atty. Rodolfo signed over the printed name
of one of the principal stockholders and even notarized the document himself. Atty. Rodolfo also
received the sum of P90,000.00 as rental deposit.
In the course of their dealings, Corazon also delivered jewelries worth P300,000.00 and a
Rolex watch worth P12,000.00 to Atty. Rodolfo for purposes of selling them. Despite repeated
demands, Atty. Rodolfo failed to deliver either the proceeds of the sale or the items themselves.
The IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Rodolfo guilty of gross misconduct,
violation of the notarial law, and misappropriation of funds and property of the client.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rodolfo is guilty of (1) gross misconduct, (2) violation of the notarial
law, and (3) misappropriation.
Ruling:
(1) YES. There is gross misconduct when there is a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or
persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules. Here, Atty. Rodolfo took
advantage of his apparent close relationship with Corazon by misrepresenting himself to be
authorized to enter into a contract of lease, and even receiving the benefits of the said contract. Atty.
Rodolfos acts therefore constitute gross misconduct.
(2) YES. The notarial law disqualifies a notary public from performing a notarial act if he or
she is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized. In this case, Atty. Rodolfo
became a party to the contract of lease when he affixed his signature above the printed name of one
of the principal stockholders without any qualification. When he notarized the same contract, he
went against the function of a Notary Public to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement.
(3) YES. Rule 16.03 of the CPR demands that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Having been tasked to sell such valuables,
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Velasco) 2016
Atty. Rodolfo was duty-bound to return them upon demand. Sure enough, the absence of a lawyer-
client relationship between Atty. Casuga and Corazon does not exonerate the former. Both the CPR
and case law penalize not only malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also gross
misconduct not connected with the professional duties of the lawyer.
VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO

A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also
for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Facts:
Respondent borrowed from petitioner two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) to
secure the payment of the loan. Atty. Espejo (respondent) simultaneously issued and turned over to
Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000)
covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, the check was dishonoured. When
respondent still refused to pay, petitioner filed a criminal complaint against her for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa. However, respondent disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office which she personally received and continued to ignore
petitioners demands. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant administrative case against respondent
before the CBD.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless
checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As the Court has
held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may
not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or private
capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his
misconduct outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him
morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to
conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7,
Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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Velasco) 2016
SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA

A.C. No. 7434, August 23, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession.
Facts:
A disbarment case was initiated by petitioners-spouses Tejada before the IBP against Atty.
Antoniutti K. Palaa for his continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation. It was alleged
that Atty. Palaa borrowed money from the petitioners in the amount of P100,000 so that he may have
the Torrens title of a parcel of land owned by him reconstituted. The parties executed a written
agreement stipulating that after Atty. Palaa has already reconstituted such Torrens title, he will
deliver the same to the petitioners as security for the amount financed and that he will pay P70,000
by way of interest on top of the P100,000 borrowed by him. Atty. Palaa assured the petitioners that
he will comply with his obligations within 3 months from the execution of said written agreement.
However, he failed to fulfill the same. Legal demands had already been made to Atty. Palaa but to no
avail. Moreover, he failed to participate in the proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP despite notice. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for 3 months.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Palaa is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
YES. The Court found that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the
representations of respondent. He knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a
petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only P3,145, and other expenses including the publication of
the filing of the petition could not have cost more than P20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in
convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have been
easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a
member of the bar. He also failed to pay his just and legal obligation.
His disobedience to the directives of the IBP in failing to participate in the proceedings
before it is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of
the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, the SC found that a heavier
sanction should fall on respondent. Thus, penalty is increased to 6 months suspension from the
practice of law.
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To the legal profession
a.) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO

A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also
for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Facts:
Respondent borrowed from petitioner two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) to
secure the payment of the loan. Atty. Espejo (respondent) simultaneously issued and turned over to
Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000)
covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, the check was dishonoured. When
respondent still refused to pay, petitioner filed a criminal complaint against her for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa. However, respondent disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office which she personally received and continued to ignore
petitioners demands. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant administrative case against respondent
before the CBD.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless
checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As the Court has
held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may
not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or private
capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his
misconduct outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him
morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to
conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7,
Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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b.) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues
ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards then Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. As
such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator. For her part, Senator Santiago averred that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust
act of the JBC which calls for future remedial legislation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is actionable.

2. Whether or not Senator Santiago violated the provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
1. NO. Senator Santiagos privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary

proceeding under the Rules of Court.
2. YES. The lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and
officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of
public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should have known, as any
perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the
integrity of the courts.
To the courts
a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
ANTONIO CONLU v. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR.

A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of
uncertainty. The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence.
Facts:
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Conlu was the defendant in a civil case for quieting of title and recovery of a parcel of land
before the RTC of Silay, Negros Occidental. He hired Atty. Aredonia, Jr. to represent him in the case.
The RTC rendered judgment adverse to Conlu. Therefrom, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. appealed to the CA, the
recourse being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. The CA, per its resolution, eventually dismissed
the appeal for non-filing of the appellants brief within the reglementary period. Antonio only got
wind of the dismissal from his wife who verified the status of the case when she happened to be in
Manila.
When confronted about the dismissal, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. promised to seek reconsideration,
which he did, but which the CA later denied for belated filing of the motion. In that motion, Atty.
Aredonia, Jr. averred that he only received the disputed February 10, 1997 CA resolution on April 25,
1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who initially received the copy of the
resolution was not authorized. Conlu got the records of the case back and personally filed another
motion for reconsideration on October 13, 1997, which the CA again denied. Conlus petition for
certiorari before the SC was also dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Aredonia, Jr. should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with
competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the
counsels care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in
court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client
or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights
of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal
constitutes inexcusable negligence. This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon
18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Conlu was not abhorrent enough,
Atty. Aredonia, Jr. tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10,
1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such
copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this
conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty. Aredonia, Jr.s signature appearing in the pleadings
with that in the registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to
stress, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the
self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
The Court cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Aredonia,
Jr.s defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to
file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3)
extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when
ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and
was granted a 30-day extension but the required comment never came. When the Court eventually
directed the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located.
Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent
Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility which he also violated is Canon 12.
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b) Respect for courts and judicial officers
ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards then Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. As
such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator. For her part, Senator Santiago averred that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust
act of the JBC which calls for future remedial legislation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is actionable.

2. Whether or not Senator Santiago violated the provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
1. NO. Senator Santiagos privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary

proceeding under the Rules of Court.
2. YES. The lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and
officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of
public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should have known, as any
perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the
integrity of the courts.
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

negligence.
Facts:
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Manila.
Issue:
Ruling:
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d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence or gives
the appearance of influence upon the courts
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON K. ILUSORIO,

MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A. BISUA, and ATTY. MANUEL R.
SINGSON
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge evincing a willingness to

discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judges sala cannot be over-emphasized. A
Lawyer shall refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a disbarment charge against Atty. Manuel Singson on the grounds of
attempted bribery and serious misconduct. The documentary evidence submitted provide (1) the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of Judge Reyes in Civil
Case 4537-R when the judge made it of record about the attempt to bribe; (2) the affidavit of Judge
Reyes dated December 23, 2004 narrating in some detail how and thru whom the attempt to bribe
adverted to was made; and (3) the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla who admitted having been approached by
Atty. Singson to intercede for his case pending with Judge Reyes. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted
having made phone calls to Judge Reyes, either in his residence or office in Baguio City during the
period material. However, he said that he was merely following up the status of a temporary
restraining order applied for and sometimes asking for the resetting of hearings.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Singson should be disbarred.
Ruling:
NO. Matters touching on case status could and should be done through the court staff, and
resetting is usually accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court. The highly immoral
implication of a lawyer approaching a judge evincing a willingness to discuss, in private, a matter
related to a case pending in that judges sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson
did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, is
determinative that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his clients favor.
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court. The possibility of an
attempted bribery is not far from reality considering Atty. Singsons persistent phone calls. However
heeding the injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction would suffice to
accomplish the desired end, a suspension for one year from the practice of law was found to be
appropriate.
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To the clients
ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR. v. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL

A.C. No. 7820, September 12, 2008, Velasco, J.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the
courts order and processes.
Facts:
Atty. Frial was the counsel of Lucy Lo in a case against Atty. Salomon. A writ of attachment
was issued in favor of Lo for Salomons Volvo and Nissan Sentra. In a complaint for disbarment, Atty.
Salomon alleged that instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, the attaching
sheriff of Manila turned them over to Atty. Frial. On several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted
being used by unauthorized individuals. It was seen in front of a battery shop in Quezon City, in a
Shell station in Manresa, and another Shell station near Kamias St., Quezon City. It was also spotted
being driven by bondsman Liquigan with Atty. Frials consent. Atty. Frial also allegedly withheld
information as to the whereabouts of the Volvo. It turned out that the car was totally destroyed by
fire in front of Atty. Frials house and the latter failed to inform the court about such. The IBP
Commission concluded that Atty. Frial failed to observe the diligence required of him as custodian of
the cars and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Frial failed to observe the diligence required as custodian.
Ruling:
YES. He is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the CPR which
provides that money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
profession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the
courts order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with
the writ of attachment the court issued. Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of
the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business
using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is
worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its
authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, the Court found Atty. Frial guilty
of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at this
juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without legal recourse in recovering the
Volvo's value from Atty. Frial should they desire to do so.
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Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
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a.) Competence and diligence

negligence.
Facts:
Manila.
Issue:
Ruling:
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Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
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DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI and
JUANITO V. LEGASPI v. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document
unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before
the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein.
Facts:
In a complaint for disbarment, Dela Cruz, et. al. alleged that Atty. Dimaano notarized an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights where their signatures were forged, they did
not appear and acknowledge the same before Atty. Dimaano as notarizing officer, and the community
tax certificates in the document were not theirs. This document enabled their sister, Zenaida
Navarro, to sell the property to the DPWH. Atty. Dimaano admitted that he notarized the document,
relying in good faith on Navarros assurance that the signatures and tax certificates were correct. The
Commission on Bar Discipline found that Atty. Dimaano violated the Notarial Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Dimaano violated the Notarial Law.
Ruling:
YES, Atty. Dimaano violated the Notarial Law. Notaries public should refrain from affixing
their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same
individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of
what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document
in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed. Furthermore,
notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has
acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of
certification.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present
competent evidence of identity: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; (b) the oath or affirmation of one
credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to
the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual
and shows to the notary public documentary identification. For failing to meet such requirements,
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Atty. Dimaanos notarial commission was revoked. He was disqualified from being commission for 2
years and was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Discipline of members of the Judiciary
RICKY GARAY, et al. v. JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1703, June 17, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets. For when
they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the
competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal
commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and surely is not
an embodiment of a judge.
Facts:
Complainants are the accused in a criminal case wherein they were charged with qualified
theft of bus starters and different tools amounting to P187,000. Judge Nicasio Bartolome, the MTC
judge handling the case, issued a warrant of arrest against them and detained them in the provincial
jail. In the clarificatory hearing conducted during the preliminary investigation, only Garay attended.
Three (3) months after, Judge Bartolome issued the disputed resolution subject of this case.
In this administrative complaint filed by the complainants before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), the latter found that a criminal case for qualified theft involving P187,000 falls
clearly within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC. The OCA found Judge Bartolome guilty of
violating Sections 3 and 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, note that
Judge Bartolome issued the Order submitting the cases for resolution on September 23, 2005. It was
only on December 27, 2005, more than three (3) months after, when he issued the Joint Resolution
ordering the return of the cases to the provincial prosecutor for further preliminary investigation.
Section 5 of the rules requires that Judge Bartolome submit his resolution of the case within ten (10)
days after the preliminary investigation and transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or
city prosecutor. There is no question that Judge Bartolome took inordinate delay of three (3) months
in submitting his resolution of the preliminary investigation. Section 5 also requires that Judge
Bartolome state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action which he did not.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Bartolome should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. As can be gleaned from his Joint Resolution, Judge Bartolome made no determination
on whether or not there was sufficient ground to hold complainants for trial. He did not recommend
the dismissal of the criminal complaints nor the filing of the appropriate informations against
complainants. Neither did he state the law upon which he based his order. Judge Bartolome's failure
to follow the procedures outlined in Secs. 3 and 5 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is a clear indication of his gross ignorance of the rules on preliminary investigation, and
his delay of more than three (3) months in resolving the investigation only to order that it be re-
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investigated specially when the accused are detention prisoners deserves serious sanction from the
Court.
When a judge shows utter unfamiliarity with fundamental rules and procedures, he
contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. Ignorance of the law is a
mainspring of injustice. When judges show professional incompetence, and are ignorant of basic and
fundamental rules, they are guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedures, a serious charge
under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 11(A) of Rule 140 punishes the offense.
JOSEFINA NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTCC, BR. 1, MALOLOS
CITY, BULACAN
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1807-MTJ], March 23, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
In ejectment cases, the first duty of a judge is to examine the allegations in the complaint and
the evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent for the
dismissal of a civil action. If there is a ground for dismissal existing and apparent upon the filing of the
complaint, and yet the judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on, the judge is guilty of undue
delay in rendering a decision.
Facts:
Judge Capellan was administratively charged with Delay in Rendering Judgment relative to
an ejectment case. He dismissed the said case on the ground that the plaintiffs representative lacked
the personality to file the case because his authority, as reflected in the corporate secretary's
certificate appended to the complaint, was for another case. As alleged, it took the respondent judge
six years to resolve, on technicality, a case governed by the rule on summary procedure.
Issue:
Whether respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
Ruling:
YES. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the first duty of the respondent upon the filing
of the case for ejectment was to examine the allegations in the complaint and the evidence appended
to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent for the dismissal of a civil
action. In this case, the ground for dismissing the Civil Case existed and was apparent upon the filing
of the basic complaint. The representatives lack of personality was reflected in the corporate
secretary's certificate appended to the complaint. Yet, respondent judge allowed the case to
unnecessarily drag on for more than five years. Further, respondent having allowed several and
doubtless unnecessary postponements which contributed to the delay in the resolution of what was
otherwise a simple case. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious
offense for which respondent is subjected to a fine.
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RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C. CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL EMPLOYEES OF

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS against ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS,
CA - Mindanao Station
A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J, January 11, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the ways on how to institute administrative
proceedings against judges. Under this rule there are three ways: first, motu proprio by the Supreme
Court; second, upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or third, upon an anonymous
complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
Facts:
The present case was brought about by a letter-complaint filed by a litigant in the case
entitled Algabre v. RTC, Branch 15, Davao City, which was raffled to Justice Elbinias as ponente. Justice
Elbinias assigned complainant Atty. Cayetuna to draft the letter-reply explaining what transpired
with the case. Justice Elbinias likewise asked Atty. Cayetuna to sign the letter-reply and explained to
him that he would simply note it. Atty. Cayetuna, however, refused to sign the letter-reply. This
earned the ire of Justice Elbinias who peremptorily terminated Atty. Cayetunas employment with the
CA.
Subsequently, Atty. Cayetuna, together with the other complainants, filed the instant
unverified complaint against Justice Elbinias charging the latter with Gross Inefficiency; Bribe
Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of Government Property and
Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employees Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow
Justices; Oppression through Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse
of Authority. For his part, Justice Elbinias merely denied the allegations against him and likewise
assailed the fact that the complaint filed against him was not verified as well as the fact that the
Omnibus reply and manifestation of the complainants were not under oath.
Issue:
Whether or not the fact that the complaint filed against Justice Elbinias was not verified is
fatal to the case of the complainants.
Ruling:
YES. Both the letter-complaints of April 30, 2008 and June 18, 2008 are unverified, while the
June 3, 2010 Omnibus Reply and Manifestation of complainants is not under oath. It must be noted
that most of the complainants are lawyers, and are presumed and ought to know the formal
requirement of verification for administrative complaints as stated under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
Indeed, complainants not only failed to execute a verified complaint but also never
submitted their affidavits showing personal knowledge of the allegations embodied in their letter-
complaints. To cover this procedural deficiency, they assert that the Court properly recognized their
letter-complaints as an anonymous complaint, relying on Sinsuat v. Hidalgo.
In Sinsuat, the Court took cognizance of the unverified motion and subsequent letters of
complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator since the unverified complaint was
properly considered as an anonymous complaint and the material allegations were not only admitted
by respondent judge but are also verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records
of the trial court, as aptly found by the CA.
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This is not the case in this instant. Complainants reliance on Sinsuat is misplaced. For one,
even a passing perusal of the Comment and Supplemental Comment does not show respondent
Justice Elbinias admitting the allegations in the letter-complaints. For another, the averments and
material allegations of complainants are neither verifiable from public records of indubitable
integrity nor supported or substantiated by other competent evidence submitted by complainants.
The formal faux pas of complainants could have been remedied by the submission under
oath of their subsequent pleadings, particularly the Omnibus Reply, where they traversed the points
and defenses raised by respondent vis--vis their allegations. They could have appended thereto their
respective affidavits attesting to their personal knowledge of the facts of their material allegations.
But, as it is, complainants chose not to place their Omnibus Reply under oath, much less submitted
their affidavits. Verily, after receiving copies of respondents Comment and Supplemental Comment,
they had ample opportunity but chose not to correct the deficiencies of their complaints while
submitting the instant case for resolution based on the pleadings filed sans their affidavits.
PROSEC. JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BR. 36, CALAMBA CITY,
LAGUNA
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, September 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
In administrative cases against judges, it is the complainants duty to substantiate his

allegations with evidence.
Facts:
Prosec. Baculi filed an information for qualified theft against Capacete but Judge Belen
dismissed the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Prosec. Baculi stated: The dismissal of the
information by the court was motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice against Asst. State
Prosecutor II Jorge Baculi, the Investigating Prosecutor at the Preliminary Investigation. Judge Belen
found Baculi guilty of direct contempt and indirect contempt for the contemptuous nature of
pleadings Baculi filed in his sala. In both direct and indirect contempt proceedings, Prosec. Baculi
filed manifestations and motions to postpone or cancel hearings. Prosec. Baculi then filed two
administrative complaints against Judge Belen for gross ignorance of law, gross misconduct and
issuance of fraudulent and unjust orders. Baculi argues that he was not formally charged and that no
notice of hearing was conducted to afford him the opportunity to air his side.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Belen should be held administrative liable for holding Prosec. Baculi in
contempt.
Ruling:
NO, Judge Belen is not administratively liable. Aside from his bare allegations, the
complainant has not presented any credible evidence to support his allegations against Judge Belen.
The fact that Judge Belen had initiated contempt proceedings against him, and in fact convicted him
in such contempt proceedings, does not by itself amount to ill motives on the part of Judge Belen. The
initiation of the contempt proceedings stemmed from the acts of the complainant himself. His
unsupported claim that the prior libel case he filed against Judge Belen created animosity between
them is not sufficient to prove his claim of evil motives on the part of Judge Belen.
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The complainant has also failed to adduce evidence in support of his claim of evil or corrupt
motives on the part of the judge. That, and the fact that the subject decisions are already final and
executory, leads the Court to conclude that no administrative liability can arise on the part of Judge
Belen, if the contempt proceedings that he conducted followed the required procedure under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.
Baculi was also afforded the opportunity to present his defense but he failed to do so. Baculi
blatantly refused to answer the charges of indirect contempt initiated against him. Instead, he filed
numerous motions and manifestations to postpone or cancel the hearings. Instead of answering the
charges however, Baculi filed several motions, reiterating his argument that Judge Belen should be
subject to disciplinary proceedings. Not once in his submissions did he controvert the charges
against him, opting instead to merely harp on his contention that Judge Belen harbored a personal
resentment against him. However, the Court had already adjudged Judge Belen guilty of grave abuse
of authority and gross ignorance of law in a previous administrative case, which warranted his
dismissal from service
GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Cebu City
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity
with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the
public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies.
Facts:
Geoffrey Beckett (Beckett), an Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa Densing
Beckett (Eltesa), a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born, Geoffrey Beckett, Jr. (Geoffrey, Jr.). Eltesa
filed a case against Beckett for violation of RA 7610, followed by a suit for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Both cases ended in the sala of Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. (Judge Sarmiento). Judge
Sarmiento rendered judgment based on a compromise agreement in which Eltesa and Beckett
agreed, to cause the dismissal of all pending civil and criminal cases against each other and that
Beckett shall have full and permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then 5 years old, subject to the
visitorial rights of Eltesa.
In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in Australia. In the 2010 visit, Beckett
consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child
on January 9, 2011. January 9 came and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltesa, prompting
Beckett to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Beckett said that while waiting
for the pre-trial conference to for the petition, he saw one Helen Sy, purportedly a close friend of
Eltesa, enter Judge Sarmientos chambers. Then, during the conference itself, Eltesa moved for
reconsideration of the courts order, praying that it be set aside insofar as it directed her to return
the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett. However, instead of enforcing said order and/or waiting for
Becketts comment, Judge Sarmiento, in open court, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr.
Beckett filed the instant complaint and alleges that Judge Sarmiento is liable for (1) gross
ignorance of the law for granting Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr.; and (2) partiality by
committing acts of serious misconduct and irregularities in the performance of official duties, such as
but not limited to allowing one Helen Sy to enter his chambers before hearing. Beckett predicates his
charge of dereliction and neglect of duty on respondents alleged failure to resolve his motion for
reconsideration of the order giving provisional custody of his child to his mother.
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In his answer, Judge Sarmiento denied Becketts allegations of partiality and of being biased
against the latter, particularly describing his order granting Eltesa provisional custody as proper.
Judge Sarmiento stated that Beckett did not cry "bias" when he approved the compromise agreement
and when he later urged Beckett to commence habeas corpus proceedings.
The OCA regards the complaint meritorious insofar as the charges for gross ignorance of the
law is concerned given that respondent judge issued his order granting provisional custody in favor
of Eltesa despite the existence of the judicial compromise. The OCA recommended that respondent
judge be adjudged liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined with stern warning.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
NO. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to
erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. Not to know
the law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of established rule of
law as if he were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is excused,
especially an RTC judge.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother,
Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation
engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be
returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to
accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to
borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals," is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-
examined and adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody
agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the
situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed
arrangement would no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment
involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HON. LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, September 27, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
No less than the 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 15(1), Article VIII, mandates lower
courts to decide or resolve all cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission. In
relation to this mandate, the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to dispose of their business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. The Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-99
dated January 15, 1999, likewise requires judges to scrupulously observe the periods provided in the
Constitution. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable
reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.
Facts:
Judge Leodegario C. Quilatan requested for a certificate of clearance with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) in support of his application for compulsory retirement benefits under
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Republic Act No. 910, as amended, effective July 21, 2003. However, the monthly report cases for
2009 revealed that he had left forty-eight (48) cases (all criminal) submitted for decision at the time
of his retirement. Of the said number, thirty-four (34) cases were already beyond the reglementary
period to decide and no reason or explanation is indicated in the monthly report for this occurrence.
Thus, the OCA found Judge Quilatan liable for gross inefficiency for failure to decide the 34 cases
submitted for decision within the required period. The OCA recommended that the case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the erring judge be fined fifty thousand pesos
(PhP 50,000). Acting on the said recommendation, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and required Judge Quilatan to manifest whether he would submit the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed. Judge Quilatan failed to file a manifestation; thus, he is
deemed to have waived the filing of his manifestation.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Quilatan is guilty of gross inefficiency for failure to decide the 34 cases
submitted for decision within the required period.
Ruling:
YES. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to resolve their cases with
dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious violation of the parties constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Without doubt, Judge Quilatan violated his
mandate when he failed to decide 34 cases within three (3) months from their submission, for which
he should be administratively sanctioned.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision is a less serious
offense punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) month nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP
20,000.
Since Judge Quilatan failed to decide 34 cases, a fine of PhP 50,000 is proper in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.
Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO

Grounds raised outside the five (5) mandatory disqualification of judges enumerated in the first
paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 are properly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge
hearing a case as pertinently provided for in the second paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137.
Facts:
Jimmy Go (Go), herein petitioner, filed a criminal case for estafa against Alberto Looyuko
(Looyuko), herein respondent, alleging that the latter misappropriated the stock certificates
belonging to Go by converting the said shares of stocks for his own (Looyukos) personal benefit by
causing the transfer of the aforementioned stock certificates to Looyukos name after receiving the
aforementioned stock certificates in trust from Go. Thereafter, during the pendency of the criminal
case, the prosecution on behalf of Go, wanted to present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of
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the prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need for the testimonies of the aforementioned
witnesses. This prompted Go to file an administrative complaint against Judge Nemesio Felix (Judge
Felix) for partiality.
The CA dismissed the complaint of Go. It rationalized that Judge Felix had the discretion to
inhibit himself from the case unless the ground for his inhibition is that which calls for mandatory
inhibition of the same, and in this case no such ground exists. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid ground for the inhibition of Judge Felix.
Ruling:
NONE, there was no manifest partiality. Indeed, the adverse rulings on the denial of the
proposed testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses are judicial in nature. Absent proof that the trial
court judge had acted in a wanton, whimsical or oppressive manner or for an illegal consideration,
and similar reasons, in giving undue advantage to respondent, inhibition is not a remedy to oust the
judge from sitting on the case.
Second, the other two (2) grounds raised by petitioner are also baseless. It is an age old rule
in civil cases that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.
Verily, the assailed orders were issued with judicial discretion and no administrative liability
attaches absent showing of illegal consideration or giving undue advantage to a party, and much less
can the Court compel the trial court judge to inhibit himself absent valid grounds therefor.
Lastly, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit
himself lies within the sound discretion of Judge Felix. Grounds raised outside the five (5) mandatory
disqualification of judges enumerated in the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 are properly
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge hearing a case as pertinently provided for
in the second paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137.
JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Tabuk City, Kalinga
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
Affinity is defined as the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives
of the other. There is no relationship by affinity between two persons if they are not in-laws of each
other. In such cases, the judge who is alleged to be related to the person involved in the case handled by
the former is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear the election case.
Facts:
Johnwell W. Tiggangay (Tiggangay) ran for mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga in May 2007 election
but lost to Rhustom L. Dagadag (Dagadag). Tigganay filed an electoral protest with the RTC of Tabuk
City, Kalinga which was raffled to Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas). Judge Wacas rendered a
decision declaring that Tinggangay lost in the election and which was affirmed by the COMELEC.
Tinggangay filed a verified letter-complaint charging Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas) with
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Impropriety and Partiality for not inhibiting himself in the case alleging that Judge Wacas is
Dagadags second cousin by affinity, the formers aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. Judge Wacas
denied being related by affinity to Dagadag, adding that Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of
"some reliable sources," not from his personal knowledge. Judge Wacas maintained that Tiggangay
never moved for his inhibition during the entire proceedings.
Acting on the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court referred the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA), through Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting (Justice Inting), for
investigation and report with appropriate recommendations. Justice Inting transmitted to the Court
her Report, recommending the dismissal of the instant complaint for lack of substantial evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag will result in the
automatic disqualification of Judge Wacas to hear the case.
Ruling:
NO. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present substantial
evidence to prove his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere allegation
is not evidence.
The supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and Dagadag, unsubstantiated as it were by
the required substantial relevant evidence, remains a mere allegation of Tiggangay. Tiggangay tried
to assert that Judge Wacas and Dagadag are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt
of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. The fact, however, is that no substantial evidence
was presented to prove the relationship angle.
Granting arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag, such
reality is not a ground for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 1of Rule 137,
Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity between Judge Wacas and
Dagadag. Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood
relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wifes brother, but not to the wife of his
wifes brother. There is no affinity between the husbands brother and the wifes sister.
In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in
the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge
Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree.
Nonetheless, Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as
they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is
the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of
Judge Wacas aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under
Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear the election case.
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Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)
ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN

Public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By
the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and
render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Facts:
Complainant was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in an unlawful detainer case.
After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co-defendants. Therefrom, Rafols, through
complainant, appealed the case to the RTC. Pending appeal, the court issued an order granting the
motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. Complainant sought reconsideration but the
motion was denied. Upon the implementation of the writ of execution, an argument took place
between complainant and respondent. The former claims that he has a pending motion for
reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of execution, but the latter said that the motion has
already been denied. Since no Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the
implementation, respondent claimed that he is legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty of
enforcing the writ. Complainant countered that he has not yet received a copy of the denial of the
motion, rendering the execution premature. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with the
execution of the judgment and in enforcing, allegedly uttered words degrading to the reputation of
the complainant. He then filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff for grave
misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES, the respondent should be penalized for discourtesy in the performance of his official
duties. As a public officer and a trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of
respondent to demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public. Public
service requires integrity and discipline. At all times, employees of the judiciary are expected to
accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee. Their every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Government service is people-
oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no place therein.
Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed
been remiss in this duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised
restraint in dealing with the complainant instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a hostile
encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm
respondent felt from complainant's criticisms in the performance of his duties. On the contrary,
respondent's demeanour tarnished the image not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a
whole, exposing him to disciplinary measure.
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Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer (Rule 136)
JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN v. NICOMEDES C. DELA CRUZ, Process Server, MTCC, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan,
A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Verbally abusing co-employees and appearing at his place of work drunk can only be regarded
as simple misconduct since it has no direct relation to the performance of his official duties.
Facts:
After complainant judge left her office a few minutes before 5:00 p.m., security guard
reported to her that process server Dela Cruz allegedly arrived in the office, apparently drunk, and
hurled invectives while pointing his fingers at other employees present. Afterwards, respondent
attempted to punch one of them.
After hearing the report, respondent was summoned into the complainants office where he
denied the contents of the said report. Respondent admitted taking alcoholic drink but denied being
drunk at that time. When the employees involved in the incident confronted respondent, he called
them liars and left the complainants chambers without a word. Giving his version of the incident in
question, he alleged that he was just having an argument with his co-employees, adding that he
raised his voice merely to stress a point. A sanction of 1-year suspension without pay on the ground
that respondents inculpatory acts constituting gross insubordination and misconduct was proposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent was guilty of gross insubordination and misconduct.
Ruling:
YES. Insubordination is the refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to
give. The respondent deported in a manner reflecting lack of restraint and disrespect towards his
superior. And if this was not enough, he rudely and unceremoniously walked out of the meeting. He
even had the audacity to ignore complainants requests for him to return to the meeting. Worse, after
hiding in the comfort room of the clerk, he went home without so much as seeking leave from the
judge. Without a doubt, respondents actions amount to gross insubordination, not to mention gross
disobedience and disrespect to the judicial authority and the position of complainant judge.
On the other hand, respondents act can only be regarded as simple misconduct since it has
no direct relation to the performance of his official duties. Respondent committed misconduct when
he verbally abused his co-employees and appeared at his place of work drunk. Drinking during office
hours may constitute misconduct and is prohibited under the Civil Service Rules. Drinking
undermines efficiency and is counter-productive. It generates an unwholesome consequence on a
public servant. And when the culprit is an employee of the court, the image of the judiciary as a whole
cannot but be affected.
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RETIREMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
In Re: Expiration of Fixed Term of Office of Atty. Saaduddin A. Alauya, Office of the
Jurisconsult, Zamboanga City
A.M. No. 11238-Ret, August 18, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
Retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
Facts:
On August 12, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Alauya as Jurisconsult in
Islamic Law for a term of seven (7) years. His term of office expired on August 20, 2003. Atty. Alauya
had rendered government service in various government posts prior to his appointment as
jurisconsult. As of August 20, 2003, Atty. Alauya who was then 65 years old, had already rendered 33
years of government service behind him, the last seven (7) of which served as Jurisconsult. He filed
an application for retirement to retire under the provisions of RA 910. In terms then of the
requirements on age and length of service in government, Atty. Alauya was qualified to retire under
Section 1 of that law, as amended. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), recommended the
denial of Atty. Alauyas application to so retire under that law on the postulate that Sec. 1 of RA 910
applies only to justices or Judges. Before Atty. Alauyas retirement papers, as Jurisconsult, could be
completely processed, however, the Court en banc, conferred upon him the rank and privileges of a
Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge effective October 1996. In a letter, Atty. Alauya reminded the Court
that he was allowed to and did retire on August 21, 2003 under RA 910 and thus was entitled to a
lifetime monthly pension after August 2008, or five years after his retirement. In a Resolution, the
Court denied Atty. Alauyas above request. From the above adverse action, as subsequently
reiterated, Atty. Alauya repeatedly sought reconsideration. Premised on the Courts previous denial
resolutions, the OCA at first urged the denial of the desired reconsideration, but later changed its
earlier stance and recommended the approval of Atty. Alauyas request for a lifetime monthly
pension.
Issue:
Whether or not the term privileges of a judge of the RTC also include in context lifetime
monthly pension.
Ruling:
YES. Time and again, the Court has followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon
retirement issues and claims, particularly of judges and justices, obviously in keeping with the
beneficial intendment of retirement laws which is to reward satisfactory past services and at the
same time provide the retiree with the means to support himself and his family in his remaining
years. On several occasions, this Court has liberally interpreted retirement laws in keeping with its
purpose. In Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon: Retirement laws, in particular, are
liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the retirees
sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood.
The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency,
security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws are
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts
are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. Upon the foregoing
perspective, the term privileges of an RTC judge and the conferment thereof must be considered as
covering the retirement benefits under RA 910, meaning a lump-sum payment of five years salary
and a monthly pension until death after the 5-year period.
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Deans
Circle 2016
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
LABOR LAW
Labor Law (Cases Penned by J. Velasco Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
Illegal Recruitment ................................................................................................................................................................ 2

Regulatory and Visitorial Powers of the DOLE Secretary........................................................................................... 3
Labor Standards .................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Wages ................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Minimum Wage...................................................................................................................................................... 5
Non-diminution of Benefits.............................................................................................................................................. 6
Separation Pay .................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Retirement Pay ................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Employer-employee Relationship .................................................................................................................................... 8
Four-fold Test ....................................................................................................................................................... 10
Project-employment ...................................................................................................................................................... 11
Job Contracting ............................................................................................................................................................... 12
Effects of Labor-Only Contracting ....................................................................................................................... 12
Termination of Employment .......................................................................................................................................... 14
Just Causes............................................................................................................................................................ 14
Authorized Causes................................................................................................................................................ 19
Twin-Notice Requirement ................................................................................................................................... 22
Hearing: Meaning of Opportunity to be Heard ................................................................................... 23
Reinstatement ...................................................................................................................................................... 28
Preventive Suspension ......................................................................................................................................... 29
Constructive Dismissal ......................................................................................................................................... 30
Certification Election ...................................................................................................................................................... 31
Union Security Clauses ................................................................................................................................................... 32
Unfair Labor Practice of Employers ............................................................................................................................... 33
Illegal Strike ..................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Liability of Ordinary Workers............................................................................................................................... 37
Procedure and Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................................ 38
Appeal to the NLRC .............................................................................................................................................. 39
Jurisdiction of NLRC ............................................................................................................................................. 40
Remedies .............................................................................................................................................................. 41
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction of Med Arbiters .......................................................................................... 42
Social Legislation............................................................................................................................................................. 45
SSS Law ................................................................................................................................................................. 45
Employees Compensation ................................................................................................................................... 46
1|Page
2016
LABOR LAW
Recruitment and Placement
Illegal Recruitment (Sec. 5, R.A. No. 10022)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA BARTOLOME

Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: First, the offender does not have the
required license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Second, the offender
undertook (a) recruitment and placement activity defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or (b) any
prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the same code. Illegal recruitment is qualified into large scale, when three or
more persons, individually or as group, are victimized.
Facts:
Gloria Bartolome, without a license for the placement of workers, impressed upon four (4) of her
childhood acquaintances that she could send them to Bahrain for overseas employment. For her promise of
employment, Gloria asked a fee from all of them to cover all expenses. Upon receiving payment, Gloria sent a
photocopied plane ticket to each person. Gloria vanished after her promises did not materialize. The POEA
initiated the complaints against Gloria, and the latter was convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Issue:
Whether Gloria is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale
Ruling:
Yes. Gloria lacked the required license as shown by the fact that the POEA no less initiated the filing
of the complaints. Gloria also engaged in recruitment activities per Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code when she
promised employment for a fee to all four (4) persons. Finally, she recruited more than three (3) persons.
Hence, Gloria is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR
MANTA DUNGO
The elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are: (a) the offender undertakes any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement as defined under the Labor Code; (b) he has no valid license or authority
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement; and (c) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of
three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
Facts:
The accused were convicted for the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa based on the
complaint of Dela Caza. After having been assured that MPM Agency had already sent many workers abroad
and that there are job placements for the complainant and other applicants in Korea, Dela Caza was convinced
to part with her money in the amount of P45,000 as placement fee. After a few months of waiting to be
deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants took action. Thereafter, the accused were arrested. Rodolfo
Gallo asserted that he was an errand boy, not an employee of the agency; thus, he could not be held criminally
liable.
2|Page
2016
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment
Held:
Yes. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution shows that, in consideration of a promise of
foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of PHP45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-
appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys purported power and authority to recruit for
overseas employment and collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed
illegal recruitment. Accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was indeed an
employee of the recruitment agency. His active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The
fact that he was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.
Regulatory and Visitorial Powers of the DOLE Secretary
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) v. THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
DOLE REGION VII, AND JANDELEON JUEZAN
The DOLE can make a prima facie determination of the existence of EER, to the exclusion of the NLRC,
for purposes of determining if it has jurisdiction over a complaint brought before it.
Facts:
Jandeleon filed a complaint against Bombo Radyo with the DOLE Regional Office for delayed payment
of wages, and non-payment of other benefits. Bombo Radyo disputed the existence of an employer-employee
relationship (EER). After summary investigation, the Regional Director, as affirmed by the Acting Secretary of
Labor and Employment, found the presence of EER and ruled for Jandeleon. The SC originally ruled that the
DOLE Secretary has no jurisdiction to determine the presence of EER.
The Public Attorneys Office and the DOLE moved to clarify the original decision as to the extent of
the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE.
Issue:
Whether the DOLE Secretary may determine the existence of an EER to the exclusion of the NLRC
Ruling:
Yes. (1) The law did not say that the DOLE must first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence
of an EER, or that should the existence of the EER be disputed, the DOLE should refer the matter to the NLRC.
(2) The DOLE can use the same test (i.e. the four-fold test) used by the NLRC to determine the existence of
EER. (3) The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered
nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the EER, force the referral of the
matter to the NLRC. As to the extent of the findings of EER by the DOLE Secretary, a prima facie determination
of the existence of EER is sufficient to determine if the DOLE has jurisdiction over the case.
The following are guidelines to determine if the DOLE has jurisdiction should a complaint be brought
before the DOLE to give effect to labor standards provision of the Labor Code or other labor legislation: (1)
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The DOLE shall make a prima facie determination of the existence of EER, to the exclusion of the NLRC; (2) If
the DOLE finds that there is no EER, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC; (3) If the complaint before the
DOLE is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction belongs with the Labor Arbiter under Art.
217 (3); and (4) The findings of the DOLE may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. If the complaint is filed with the NLRC while there is still an existing employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE.
Labor Standards
Wages
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS(ALU) and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU(DWUEU-

ALU) v. CA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PALO, LEYTE (RCAP) and DIVINE WORD
UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN (DWUT)
Art. 110 of the Labor Code applies only to cases of bankruptcy and liquidation. Likewise, the
concurrence and preference of credits properly come into play only in cases of insolvency.
Facts:
RCAP is a corporation sole which sold to Societas Verbum Dei (SVD) the subject 13 parcels of land, the
last 4 of which were untitled when the sale was concluded. While the conveying document was not notarized,
the SVD was able to secure the corresponding TCTs over the subject lots, but the deed conditions, restrictions,
and reversionary right of the RCAP were not annotated. Due to labor unrest, DWUT, run by the SVD, and the
Union engaged in a protracted legal battle. RCAP filed a petition for annotation. DWUT issued notices to
unions members of the closing of the university and consider themselves dismissed. Prompted by the closure
of DWUT and the resulting termination of its members services, the Union filed a complaint.
The Union alleged in its complaint that the sale of the subject properties over which the DWUT is
located was incomplete. What is more, the RCAP did not, despite the sale, sever its employment relations with
DWUT which, thus, rendered the RCAP solidarily liable with DWUT for the payment of the benefits of the
Union members. RTC dismissed the petition. The parties entered in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). CA
reversed and granted the petition to annotate.
Issue:
Whether Article 110 of the Labor Code in relation to the Civil Code provisions on concurrence and
preference of credits apply in the instant case
Ruling:
No. The judgment lien over the subject properties is really non-existent as it has not been shown that
a levy on execution has been imposed over the subject properties. We agree with the RCAP that a judgment
lien over the subject properties has not legally attached and that Art. 110 of the LC, in relation to Arts. 2242,
2243, and 2244 of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits, does not cover the subject
properties. Art. 110 of the LC applies only to cases of bankruptcy and liquidation. Likewise, the
abovementioned articles of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits properly come into play
only in cases of insolvency. Since there is no bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding to speak of, much less a
liquidation of the assets of DWUT, the Union cannot look to said statutory provisions for support.
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Moreover, we note the utter lack of showing that DWUT has no other assets to answer its obligations.
DWUT may have liquidity problems hampering its ability to meet its judicially-imposed obligations. The
school, however, appears to have other properties it can and in fact did use to settle its obligations as shown
in the MOA. A scrutiny of the MOA readily shows that the subject properties were not included in the assets or
properties earmarked to settle DWUTs obligations.
Minimum Wage
NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI) v.

NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)-ALU-TUCP
G.R. No. 162411 June 30, 2008 Velasco, Jr., J.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific enough to cover only minimum
wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the prescribed minimum wage.
Facts:
Wage Board of Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02
which granted an additional PhP12 per day cost of living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that
region. Owing allegedly to NIASSIs failure to implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint before
the DOLE for inspection and the enforcement of WO RXIII-02. But the inspection team stated that WO RXIII-
02 was not applicable to NIASSIs employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher than the
prescribed minimum wage.
Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Unions prayer for the
implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit the grant of
wage increase to employees earning above the minimum wage. On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order
specifically enumerated those who are outside its coverage, but did not include in the enumeration those
earning above the minimum wage. On appeal, CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the WO RXIII-02 may be made to apply and cover Nasipits employees who, at the time of
the issuance and effectivity of the wage order, were receiving a wage higher than the prevailing minimum
wage
Ruling:
No. WO RXIII-02 and its IRR provide that only minimum wage earners are entitled to the wage
increase. The only situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the WO
RXIII-02 may still benefit from the order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the correction of
wage distortions. In any case, it would be highly irregular for the Wage Board to issue an across-the-board
wage increase, its mandate being limited to determining and fixing the minimum wage rates within its area of
concern, in this case the Caraga Region, and to issue the corresponding wage orders and implementing rules.
In the same case, the Court held that a RTWPB commits an ultra vires act when, instead of setting a
minimum wage rate, it prescribes a wage increase cutting across all levels of employment and wage brackets:
The RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the floor-wage method or the salary-
ceiling method in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a wage
adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-the-board wage increase of P15.00 to all
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employees and workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage
of the Wage Orders to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without a
denominated salary ceiling.
Only employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage
increase set forth under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, to the grant of increase to correct wage distortions
consequent to the implementation of such wage order. Considering that NIASSIs employees are undisputedly
already receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally obliged to
grant them wage increase. Decision of the arbitrator is reversed.
Non-diminution of Benefits
TSPIC CORPORATION v. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW)

An erroneously granted benefit may be withdrawn without violating the prohibition against non-
diminution of benefits.
Facts:
TSPI Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the corporation Union for the
increase of salary for the latters members for the year 2000 to 2002. Thus, the increase in salary was
materialized on January 1, 2000. However, on October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage and production
Board raised daily minimum wage from P223.50 to P250.00 starting November 1, 2000. Conformably, the
wages of the 17 probationary employees were increased to P250.00. They therefore became regular
employees and received another 10% increase in salary. In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage
rates as mandated by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees who were senior to the 17 recently regularized
employees, received less wages. On January 19, 2001, TSPICs Human Resource Development notified the 24
employees who are private respondents, that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they were
overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their salaries starting February 2001. The Union
asserted that there was no error and the deduction of the alleged overpayment constituted diminution of
pay.
They brought the issue to the grievance machinery but the TSPIC and the Union failed to reach an
agreement. They went to a voluntary arbitration where the arbitrator held that the unilateral deduction made
by TSPIC violated Art. 100 of the Labor Code. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the deduction of the overpayment constitutes diminution of benefits
Ruling:
No. Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed
by the employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on
a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period; (2) the practice is consistent and deliberate; (3) the
practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4)
the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
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The overpayment of its employees was a result of an error. This error was immediately rectified by
TSPIC upon its discovery. No vested right accrued to individual respondents when TSPIC corrected its error
by crediting the salary increase for the year 2001 against the salary increase granted under WO No. 8, all in
accordance with the CBA. Hence, any amount given to the employees in excess of what they were entitled to
may be legally deducted by TSPIC from the employees salaries. It was also fair that TSPIC deducted the
overpayment in installments over a period of 12 months starting from the date of the initial deduction to
lessen the burden on the overpaid employees. TSPIC must refund to respondents any amount deducted from
their salaries which was in excess of what TSPIC is legally allowed to deduct from the salaries.
Separation Pay
CENTRAL PHILIPPINES BANDAG RETREADERS, INC. v. PRUDENCIO J. DIASNES

When dismissal is due to the employees fault, separation pay should not be awarded.
Facts:
Due to personal problems, Prudencios performance as sales manager of Central Philippines Bandag
Retreaders, Inc. (Bandag) waned and his absences became more frequent. The Employee Adjudication
Committee unanimously agreed to relieve Prudencio for three (3) months to settle his problems, after which
Prudencio may either return to work but with another position, or retire and receive his separation pay.
Instead of availing either option in the report, Prudencio requested that he be transferred from
Tacloban City to Cebu City, to which Bandag agreed. However, Prudencios attendance and punctuality were
still poor. The company eventually dismissed Prudencio for gross and habitual neglect of duty under Art. 282
of the Labor Code. Prudencio claims that assuming that he was legally separated from his employment, he is
still entitled to separation pay.
Issue:
Whether an employee validly dismissed due to his own fault is entitled to separation pay
Ruling:
No. When an employee is lawfully dismissed, separation pay may only be awarded if the cause of
dismissal was not due to the employees fault, but due to: (1) the installation of labor saving devices, (2)
redundancy, (3) retrenchment, (4) cessation of employers business, or (5) when the employee is suffering
from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health and to the
health of his co-employees (Art. 283 & 284, Labor Code). It may also be awarded in case of strained relations.
When the case falls under Art. 282, like gross and habitual neglect of duty, separation pay should not
be paid to the employee. Although there are cases when social justice may warrant the award of separation
pay or financial assistance, the labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must be most judicious and circumspect
lest the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor be at the expense of the employers.
In addition, while the company did make an offer of separation pay upon adopting the original
recommendation of the Committee, the same offer was superseded when Bandag agreed to Prudencios
proposal to transfer to Cebu City.
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Retirement Pay
RICARDO G. PALOMA v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. AND

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 148415, 156764, July 14, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Unlike the public sector, there is no law allowing for commutation of unused or accrued sick leave
credits in the private sector. Commutation in the private sector is allowed only by way of voluntary endowment
by an employer through company policy or by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Facts:
Ricardo worked with Philippine Airlines (PAL) for 35 years and retired on March 1992, or 9 months
before PAL was privatized. Ricardo was paid his sick leave credits worth in accord with company policy.
Ricardo complained, arguing that the sick leave credits paid to him was much lower than that required by
Executive Order No. 1077, issued in 1986. The said EO, allows retiring government employees to commute,
without limit, all his accrued vacation and sick leave credits.
Issue:
Whether Ricardo is entitled to the benefits under EO 1077
Ruling:
No. PAL never ceased to be operated as a private corporation, and was not subjected to the Civil
Service Law. PAL was incorporated as a private corporation. While PALs controlling interest was once owned
by GSIS for a time, and while during the said period, PAL may be considered as a GOCC, one fact remains: PAL
still functioned as a private corporation and for profit. It was the Labor Code and not the Civil Service Law
that was applied to PAL through the years, since its incorporation. Since Ricardo was never a government
employee covered by the Civil Service Law, he never acquired the benefits accorded by EO 1077. What applies
instead is the company policy of PAL.
Employer-employee Relationship
RAUL G. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. TOMAQUIN v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.
The power of control is the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used
in reaching such end.
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) and the Security and Safety Corporation of the
Philippines (SSCP) entered into a Security Services Agreement (Agreement) whereby SSCP would provide
armed security guards to PLDT to be assigned to its various offices. Pursuant to such agreement, Raul Locsin
and Eddie Tomaquin, among other security guards, were posted at a PLDT office. PLDT issued a
Letter terminating the Agreement effective October 1, 2001. Despite the termination of the Agreement,
however, petitioners continued to secure the premises of their assigned office. They were allegedly directed
to remain at their post by representatives of respondent. In support of their contention, petitioners provided
the Labor Arbiter with copies of petitioner Locsins pay slips for the period of January to September 2002.
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On September 30, 2002, petitioners services were terminated. They filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and recovery of money claims.
Issue:
Whether petitioners became employees of PLDT after the Agreement between SSCP and PLDT was
terminated
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent must be considered as petitioners employer from the termination of the Agreement
onwards as this was the only time that any evidence of control was exhibited by respondent over petitioners.
Respondent, by directing petitioners to remain at their posts and continue with their duties, exercised control
over them. This is sufficient to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship. While
respondent and SSCP no longer had any legal relationship with the termination of the Agreement, petitioners
remained at their post securing the premises of respondent while receiving their salaries, allegedly from
SSCP. With the behest and, presumably, directive of respondent, petitioners continued with their services.
Evidently, such are indicia of control that respondent exercised over petitioners.
GREGORIO V. TONGKO v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (PHILS.), INC. and RENATO A.
VERGEL DE DIOS
Whenever the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four elements constitute the
reliable yardstick: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. It is the so-called "control test" which
constitutes the most important index of the existence of the employer-employee relationship that is, whether the
employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work to be
done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
Facts:
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. (Manulife) is a domestic corporation engaged in life
insurance business. Petitioner Gregorio Tongko (Tongko) entered into a Career Agents Agreement with
Manulife. As an agent, his duties consisted of canvassing for applications for group policies and other
products of the company. Tongko was named unit manager in Manulife's Sales Agency Organization, branch
manager, and sales manager. Tongko failed to comply with policies of Manulife, his Agency Agreement was
terminated.
Tongko filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Tongko, in a bid to establish an
employer-employee relationship, alleged that De Dios gave him specific directives on how to manage his area
of responsibility and also claimed that his dismissal was without basis and that he was not afforded due
process. Manulife alleged that Tongko is not its employee, and that it did not exercise "control" over him.
Manulife claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The labor arbiter decreed that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. The
NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision finding Tongko to have been illegally dismissed. The CA reversed
the decision of the NLRC finding the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and
deeming the NLRC with no jurisdiction over the case.
Issues:
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Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between Manulife and Tongko
Ruling:
Yes. The NLRC arrived at its conclusion, first, on the basis of the letter dated November 6, 2001
addressed by De Dios to Tongko. According to the NLRC, the letter contained "an abundance of directives or
orders that are intended to directly affect complainant's authority and manner of carrying out his functions as
Regional Sales Manager."
The NLRC further ruled that the different codes of conduct that were applicable to Tongko served as
the foundations of the power of control wielded by Manulife over Tongko that is further manifested in the
different administrative and other tasks that he was required to perform. The NLRC also found that Tongko
was required to render exclusive service to Manulife, further bolstering the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. Finally, the NLRC ruled that Tongko was integrated into a management structure over
which Manulife exercised control, including the actions of its officers. The NLRC held that such integration
added to the fact that Tongko did not have his own agency belied Manulife's claim that Tongko was an
independent contractor. Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was tasked with
recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his other administrative functions, leads to no other
conclusion that he was an employee of Manulife.
Four-fold Test
MARIAN B. NAVARETTE v. MANILA INTERNATIONAL FREIGHT FORWARDERS, INC./MIFFI LOGISTICS

COMPANY, INC., MR. HARADA, AND MBI MILLENNIUM EXPERTS, INC.,
The power of control is determinative of the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Facts:
MIFFI entered into a contract with MBI for the provision of production workers and technical
personnel for MIFFI's projects or temporary needs. MBI hired Navarette and assigned her as a temporary
project employee to MIFFI's Packaging Department. For a fixed period of three (3) months, she worked
amongst MIFFI's regular employees who performed the same tasks as hers. She used MIFFI's equipment and
was supervised by employees of MIFFI. Navarette, joined by other employees, filed a complaint for inspection
against respondents MIFFI, MLCI, MBI and a certain PAMS with the DOLE Regional Arbitration Branch IV.
Following an inspection of respondents' premises, certain violations of labor laws were uncovered, including
labor-only contracting by MBI. Several hearings were had and eventually, the parties decided to submit an
agreement to be signed by all concerned and to be approved by DOLE officials.
Pursuant to said covenant, MBI called a meeting where Navarette and her co-workers were asked to
sign a document. However, Navarette found the contents of the document to be erroneous since it stated that
the parties had already come to an agreement on the issues and conditions when, in fact, no such agreement
was made. This angered Navarette, causing her to throw the document and to say, "Hindi ito ang pinag-
usapan natin sa DOLE! Niloloko niyo lang kami." Her actuations, to MBI, constituted serious misconduct, for
which a show-cause memorandum was issued directing her to explain herself. After issuing several
memoranda setting conferences on the matter to which Navarette could not attend because of her work
schedule, MBI terminated Navarette's employment. Navarette filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC against MBI, MIFFI and MCLI. The respondents claimed that since MBI is a legitimate labor contractor,
MBI is liable to the petitioner.
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Issue:
Whether Navarette is MBI's employee
Ruling:
Yes. A fundamental principle in Philippine labor law is the application of the four-fold test in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, thus: (1) selection and engagement; (2)
payment of wages; (3) power to dismiss; and (4) power of control over the means and methods by which the
work is to be accomplished. There are, however, instances when these elements are not exercised by a single
person or entity. There are cases where one or more of the said factors are assumed by another entity, for
which reason, the Court made it clear that of the four tests mentioned, it is the power of control that is
determinative. One such instance is whenever an employer supplies workers to another pursuant to a
contracting agreement, i.e., job contracting.
Per DOLE Order No. 3, Series of 2001, there is contracting or subcontracting whenever an employer,
referred to as the principal, farms out the performance of a part of its business to another, referred to as the
contractor or subcontractor, and for the purpose of undertaking the principal's business that is farmed out,
the contractor or subcontractor then employs its own employees. In such an arrangement, the four-fold test
must be satisfied by the contractor or subcontractor. Otherwise, it is the principal that shall be considered as
the employer.
Project employment
EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL SERVICES (ETS) & JOSEPH JAMES DEQUITO v. CA, ALEX ALBINO, et.al.
The principal test for determining whether one is a "project employee," as distinguished from "regular
employee," is whether he was assigned to carry out "a specific project or undertaking," the duration and scope of
which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for that project.
Facts:
One of ETS clients was Uniwide. Dequito was occupying the position of manager of ETS. ETS hired
the services of Albino, et.al. as pipe fitters, plumbers, or threaders. ETS experienced financial difficulties when
Uniwide failed to pay for the plumbing work being done at its Coastal Mall. ETS was only able to pay its
employees 13th month pay equivalent to two weeks salary. Thus, Albino, et. al. filed a case before the LA,
which decided in favor of Albino, et. al. and declared that their dismissal was illegal. NLRC reversed but
upheld the validity of the monetary award given. The CA reversed and ordered ETS to pay their holiday pay
and service incentive leave pay.
Issue:
Whether Albino, et. al. are project employees
Ruling:
No. The service of project employees are coterminous with the project and may be terminated upon
the end or completion of that project or project phase for which they were hired. Regular employees, in
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contrast, enjoy security of tenure and are entitled to hold on to their work or position until their services are
terminated by any of the modes recognized under the Labor Code.
ETS admits hiring Albino, et. al. to perform plumbing works for various projects. Regular
employment may reasonably be presumed and it behooves ETS to prove otherwise, that the employment in
question was contractual in nature ending upon the expiration of the term fixed in the contract or for a
specific project or undertaking. But the categorical finding of the CA is that not a single written contract of
employment fixing the terms of employment for the duration of the Uniwide project, or any other project, was
submitted by ETS. Records of payroll and other pertinent documents, such as job contracts secured by ETS
showing that they were hired for specific projects, were also not submitted by ETS. Moreover, if they were
indeed employed as project employees, ETS should have had submitted a report of termination every time
their employment was terminated owing to the completion of each plumbing project. ETS failure to report
the employment termination and file the necessary papers after every project completion tends to support
the claim of not being project employees.
Also, the constitutionally-protected right of labor to security of tenure covers both regular and
project workers. Their termination must be for lawful cause and must be done in a way which affords them
proper notice and hearing. Private respondents are regular employees whose services were terminated
without lawful cause and effected without the requisite notice and hearing.
Job Contracting
Effects of Labor-only Contracting
FONTERRA BRANDS PHILS., INC. v. LEONARDO LARGADO AND TEOTIMO ESTRELLADO

Respondents, by accepting the conditions of the contract, cannot now argue that they were illegally
dismissed when their contracts were not renewed after expiration.
Facts:
Fonterra contracted the services of Zytron for the marketing of its dairy products. Pursuant to the
contract, Zytron provided Fonterra with trade merchandising representatives (TMRs), including herein
respondents. Subsequently, Fonterra sent Zytron a letter terminating its promotions contract and it soon
entered into an agreement for manpower supply with A.C. Sicat Marketing and Promotional Services.
Respondents submitted their job applications with A.C. Sicat, which hired them for a term of five months.
When respondents 5-month contracts with A.C. Sicat were about to expire, they allegedly sought renewal
thereof, but were allegedly refused. Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, non-
payment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay, and actual and moral damages, against Zytron and
A.C. Sicat.
Issues:
1. Whether Zytron and A.C. Sicat are labor-only contractors

2. Whether respondents were illegally dismissed
Ruling:
1. Yes. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the

following conditions concur:
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The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to
perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own
manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual
employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to
self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.
2. No. The termination of respondents employment with the latter was simply brought about by
the expiration of their employment contracts.
Respondents were employed by A.C. Sicat as project employees. In their employment contract with
the latter, it is clearly stated that [A.C. Sicat is] temporarily employing [respondents] as TMR[s] effective June
6, 2006 under the following terms and conditions: The need for your service being only for a specific project,
your temporary employment will be for the duration only of said project of our client, namely to promote
FONTERRA BRANDS products xxx which is expected to be finished on or before Nov. 06, 2006.
Non-renewal of their contracts by A.C. Sicat is a management prerogative, and failure of respondents
to prove that such was done in bad faith militates against their contention that they were illegally dismissed.
The expiration of their contract with A.C. Sicat simply caused the natural cessation of their fixed-term
employment thereat.
W.M. MANUFACTURING, INC. v. RICHARD R. DALAG AND GOLDEN ROCK MANPOWER SERVICES
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and
the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the
principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an
agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter
were directly employed by him.
Facts:
Golden Rock contracted a Service Agreement with WM MFG. WM MFG engaged the services of
Dalag as a factory worker assigned at its factory thus creating a five-month Employment Contract between
them. Dalag later on filed a complaint for illegal dismissal as he was not allowed to work and that he was
denied due process as to why he is not allowed. He further claimed that he was assigned as a side seal
machine operator which was necessary and desirable for WM MFGs plastic manufacturing business making
him a regular employee. He alleged that Golden Rock and WM MFG engaged in labor-only contracting because
all equipment for the job were furnished by WM MFG and all jobs were to be done in the vicinity of WM MFG
and he was under the control by the supervisors of WM MFG. WM MFG alleged in their position paper that
Dalag abandoned his work and was not illegally dismissed. He was sent memos for several faults he has done
but never received them and did not report for work anymore. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of
Dalag. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter agreeing to the fact that WM MFG and Golden
Rock engaged in labor-only contracting. A Motion for Reconsideration was later granted and setting aside the
previous NLRC decision. The CA ultimately reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Dalag stating that
Golden Rock was not able to prove that it was an independent contractor as they were not able to show proof
that they had substantial capital and exercise control over Dalag.
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Issue:
Whether WM MFG and Golden Rock engaged in labor-only contracting
Ruling:
Yes. It may be that the DOLE Regional Director for the National Capital Region was satisfied by
Golden Rock's capitalization as reflected on its financial documents, but the basis for determining the
substantiality of a company's "capital" rests not only thereon but also on the tools and equipment it owns in
relation to the job, work, or service it provides. DO 18-02 defines "substantial capital or investment" in the
context of labor-only contracting as referring not only to a contractor's financial capability, but also
encompasses the tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used
by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted
out.
Notwithstanding the contract stipulation leaving Golden Rock the exclusive right to control the
working warm bodies it provides WM MFG, evidence shows that it was WM MFG who exercised supervision
over Dalag's work performance. Dalag was supervised by WM MFG's employees. WM MFG even furnished
Dalag with not less than seven memos directing him to explain within twenty-four hours his alleged work
infractions. The company took pains in issuing investigation reports detailing its findings on Dalag's
culpability. Clearly, WM MFG disciplined Dalag for violation of company rules, regulations, and policies,
validating the presence of the right to control.
Termination of Employment
Just Causes
ESTRELLITA G. SALAZAR v. PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., and /or LEONORA FONTANILLA

The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to oppress employers. The
cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when the law is clearly on its side.
Facts:
Salazar was terminated from her employment due to alleged falsification of company records. Salazar
denies receiving Duplicator's termination letter. The Labor Arbiter held that the dismissal was for a just cause
but the company breached the twin-notice requirement as provided by law. It ordered Duplicators to pay the
indemnity of PHP10,000.
Issue:
Whether Salazar validly dismissed
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner was charged with falsifying company records. On this issue, Labor Arbiter Caday made
the following findings, viz:
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A scrutiny of these documentary evidence reveals that on November 20, 1998, at

around 3:00 PM complainant Salazar visited Juliet Alvarez of Banco-Filipino-Legal, Paseo de
Roxas, Legaspi Village, Makati City (Annex A and A-1 attached to Respondents Rejoinder).
This belies complainants claim that she visited the respondents customer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc. on November 20, 1998 at around 3:00P.M. (Annex C attached to Complainants Reply).
Moreover, Mr. Enrique Patag signed the Certification on December 15, 1998 on the date
when complainant (Salazar) was no longer reporting for work and filed a case for illegal
dismissal against respondents docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-12-10174-98 which was later
ordered dismissed by Labor Arbiter Eduardo Carpio for lack of interest to prosecute.
Similarly, the certification issued by Mr. Frederick Sison of the D.M. Consunji, Inc. attesting to
complainants visit on November 20, 1998, at 2:00 p.m. is confuted [sic] by the fact that
on November 20, 1998, complainant [Salazar] visited Fely/Federico and Lilian at
the Makati Medical Center as appearing in customer ledger of Makati Medical Center. (Annex
B and B-1 attached to Respondents Rejoinder). With the foregoing observations,
complainants pretensions [are] at once noticeable and [merit] scant consideration.
The findings of Arbiter Caday jibe with those of the NLRC, to wit:
Specifically, in a report she stated that she made a follow-up with Leny Sambrano of Bengson
Law Office on November 20, 1998. However, in her Reply, she admitted that she saw, not
Sambrano, who was not around, but his secretary. It appears that [in] the report in question,
Sambrano wrote, there was no visit last Friday,11/20 and then affixed [her] signature. In
another report, she stated that she made a follow-up with Jun of ICLARM on November 20,
1998, but it appeared that Jun Fedrigon wrote on the same report, which he also signed, that
she did not visit his office on the date in question. In a letter dated December 15, 1998, he
stated that he had no memory of seeing the complainant on the date in question. x x x
The findings of both Arbiter Caday and the NLRC were sustained by the CA, which ruled that there is
ample proof to bear out that the petitioner knowingly recorded erroneous entries in her Daily Sales Reports.
It is well-settled that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded not only respect
but even finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence; more so when such findings were
affirmed by the CA and such findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Petitioner committed fraud
or willful breach of the employers trust reposed in her under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

ELEAZAR S. GRAN
In termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
dismissal is for just and valid causes. The employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing
evidence to prove that the dismissal is legal.
Facts:
EDI is engaged in recruitment and placement of OFWs. Eleazar Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI to
work Omar Ali Bin Bechr Est. at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. EDI and OAB entered into an employment contract with
Gran whereby the latter will work as a computer specialist for OAB while EDI would process the papers of
Gran necessary for his employment at Saudi Arabia. Gran started working for OAB. However, Gran was
terminated by OAB on the ground of insubordination against the management of OAB. Gran was given his
final pay and was sent back to the Philippines. Gran filed a complaint for underpayment and illegal dismissal
against EDI before the LA.
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The LA dismissed the complaint. On appeal with the NLRC, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA
and held that there was underpayment and illegal dismissal thus warranting the award of backwages in favor
of Gran. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether EDI is guilty of underpayment of wages and illegal dismissal
Ruling:
Yes. EDI claims that Gran was validly dismissed for just cause, due to incompetence and
insubordination or disobedience. To prove its allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence. The first is
the July 9, 1994 termination letter, addressed to Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB.
The second is an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which outlined the
reasons why OAB had terminated Grans employment.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position because he had
insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system. Petitioner also claims that
Gran was justifiably dismissed due to insubordination or disobedience because he continually failed to
submit the required Daily Activity Reports. However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other
evidence was presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or
disobedient.
EDI failed to overcome the burden of proving that Gran was validly dismissed. An allegation of
incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may be shown by weighing it against a
standard, benchmark, or criterion. EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran
incompetent.
ROLANDO V. AROMIN v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, XAVIER P. LOINAZ, President, and EDMUNDO A. BARCELON, Senior Vice-President
Loss of confidence, as a ground for dismissal, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds
a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence.
Facts:
Aromin worked for BPI for 26 years and he was the assistant vice-president when he was terminated.
He headed the BPIs Real Property Management Unit (RPMU) when the botched purchase by Limketkai of a
trust asset held by BPI happened. Revilla, authorized by the owner to sell the lot, informed BPI that he has a
buyer in Limketkai. The brothers Limketkai met with Aromin to negotiate whether they can pay the purchase
price on terms instead of in cash. Limketkai tendered full payment a few days after but BPI refused to receive
it. Limketkai, in a bid to consummate the sale, filed a case against BPI. Asked to comment on the material
allegations of the said complaint, Aromin sent to the BPI Legal Services Division a September 6, 1988
memorandum. He also received a warning about belated submission of work assignments, tardiness, and
unexplained absences. In the course of the trial of the civil case filed by Limketkai, specifically on December 3,
1990 hearing, Aromin testified to the surprise of BPIs legal counsel. A show-cause memorandum gave
Aromin five days to explain why he did so. It appears that Aromins testimony, apart from being inimical to
BPIs interests, contradicted what he wrote in the September 6, 1988 memorandum. The RTC found the
testimony of Aromin vital in determining a "meeting-of-the-minds" regarding the sale of, and the price for, the
Pasig property. The RTC rendered judgment finding for Limketkai. BPI served on Aromin a Notice of
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Termination, citing willful breach of trust and loss of confidence, as grounds for termination. Aromin filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether Aromin was illegally dismissed
Ruling:
No. BPI had indeed a valid case for dismissal against Aromin on the ground of loss of confidence.
Being an AVP during the period material, Aromin falls under the category of a managerial employee upon
whom trust and confidence had been reposed by the employing bank. Violating that trust and confidence is a
valid cause for dismissal under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. However, the employer must clearly and
convincingly establish the charges. Loss of confidence, as a ground for termination, should not be (1)
simulated; (2) used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified; (3) arbitrarily
asserted; and (4) a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
The position assumed and the answers given by Aromin when he testified proved to be adverse to his
employers interest. The acts committed, inclusive of those done before he took the witness stand to testify
falsely against the interest of the employer, adversely reflected on his competence, loyalty, and integrity. Said
acts were sufficient for his employer to lose trust and in him.
BLUE ANGEL MANPOWER AND SECURITY SERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMEL CASTILLO,
WILSON CIRIACO, GARY GARCES, AND CHESTERFIELD MERCADER
To constitute resignation, it must be unconditional with the intent to operate as such. There must be
clear intention to relinquish the position. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with
resignation.
Facts:
Blue Angel hired respondents as security guards and detailed them at the National College of Business
and Arts (NCBA). On April 20, 1999, respondents filed a complaint for illegal deductions against Blue Angel
and later on amended it to be an action for illegal dismissal. The respondents allege that Blue Angel deducted
P100 from their salary as a cash bond. Upon being apprised of the original complaint for illegal deductions,
Blue Angel terminated their services. In its defense, Blue Angel contended that the respondents committed
Insubordination, sleeping on duty, and absence without leave and when told that they will be subjected to
investigation, they pleaded that they be allowed to resign instead. They tendered their pro-forma letters of
resignation, followed by handwritten resignation letters.
Issue:
Whether the pro-forma letters of resignation and handwritten resignation letters are indication of
respondents resignation
Ruling:
No. The undated, similarly worded resignation letters tended to show that the guards were made to
copy the pro-forma letters, in their own hand, to make them appear more convincing that the guards had
voluntarily resigned. The element of voluntariness of the resignations is even more suspect considering that
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the second set of resignation letters were pre-drafted, similarly worded, and with blank spaces filled in with
the effectivity dates of the resignations. Respondents claimed being forced to sign and copy the pro-
forma resignation letters on pain that they would not get their remaining compensations. The fact that
respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal from employment against Blue Angel completely negates
the claim that private respondents voluntarily resigned. Respondents actively pursued their illegal dismissal
case against Blue Angel such that they cannot be said to have voluntarily resigned from their jobs.
GREGORIO V. TONGKO v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (PHILS.), INC. and RENATO A.
VERGEL DE DIOS
The burden of proving the validity of the termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to
discharge this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. Unsubstantiated
suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing
employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of
our labor laws and Constitution.
Facts:
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. (Manulife) is a domestic corporation engaged in life
insurance business. Gregorio Tongko entered into a Career Agents Agreement with Manulife. As an agent, his
duties consisted of canvassing for applications for group policies and other products of the company. Tongko
was named unit manager in Manulife's Sales Agency Organization, branch manager, and sales manager.
Tongko failed to comply with policies of Manulife; thus, his Agency Agreement was terminated.
Tongko filed a complaint with the NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissal. Tongko, in a bid to
establish an employer-employee relationship, alleged that De Dios gave him specific directives on how to
manage his area of responsibility and also claimed that his dismissal was without basis and that he was not
afforded due process. Manulife alleged that Tongko is not its employee, and that it did not exercise control
over him. Manulife claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The labor arbiter decreed that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. The
NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision finding Tongko to have been illegally dismissed. The CA reversed
the decision of the NLRC finding the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and
deeming the NLRC with no jurisdiction over the case.
Issues:
Whether Manulife is guilty of illegal dismissal
Ruling:
Yes. Manulife failed to cite evidence to support its claims. Manulife did not point out the specific acts
that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife
merely cited Tongko's alleged "laggard performance," without substantiating such claim.
Manulife failed to overcome such burden of proof. Manulife even failed to identify the specific acts by
which Tongko's employment was terminated much less support the same with substantial evidence. Mere
conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Tongko was illegally dismissed.
Moreover, as to Manulife's failure to comply with the twin notice rule, it reasons that Tongko not being its
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employee is not entitled to such notices. Since we have ruled that Tongko is its employee, however, Manulife
clearly failed to afford Tongko said notices. Thus, on this ground too, Manulife is guilty of illegal dismissal.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES v. NOWELLA REYES

An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of
the employer.
Facts:
Wesleyan University dismissed its University Treasurer Nowella Reyes since it allegedly lost trust
and confidence owing to an interplay of the events such as: (1) encashing a check payable to the University
Treasurer in the amount 300K; (2) encashing crossed checks payable to the University Treasurer, when the
intention of management in this regard was to merely transfer funds from one of petitioners accounts to
another in the same bank; and (3) spurious duplicate checks bearing her signature were encashed causing
damage to petitioner.
Respondent post-haste filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor.
However, this was reversed by NLRC. On appeal, CA reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this
Petition.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner adequately proved respondents dismissal was for a just cause, based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts as required by jurisprudence. The question of
whether she was a managerial or rank-and file employee does not matter in this case because not only is
there basis for believing that she breached the trust of her employer, her involvement in the irregularities
attending to petitioners finances has also been proved.
A company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection. This is truer
in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility. Respondent was not an ordinary
rank-and-file employee as she was the Treasurer who was in charge of the coffers of the University. It would
be oppressive to require petitioner to retain in their management an officer who has admitted to knowingly
and intentionally committing acts which jeopardized its finances and who was untrustworthy in the handling
and custody of University funds.
Authorized causes
RUBEN L. ANDRADA, BERNALDO V. DELOS SANTOS, JOVEN M. PABUSTAN, FILAMER ALFONSO, VICENTE
A. MANTALA, JR., HARVEY D. CAYETANO, and JOVENCIO L. POBLETE v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, SUBIC LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINO, INC., and/or MR. HWA PUAY, MS.
FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES RAYEL, and its CORPORATE OFFICERS
Employment is not merely a lifestyle choice to stave off boredom. Employment to the common man is his
very life and blood, which must be protected against concocted causes to legitimize an otherwise irregular
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termination of employment. Imagined or undocumented business losses present the least propitious scenario to
justify retrenchment.
Facts:
Ruben Andrada, Jovencio Poblete, Filamer Alfonso, Harvey Cayetano, Vicente Mantala, Jr., Bernaldo
delos Santos, and Joven Pabustan were hired on various dates as architects, draftsmen, operators, engineers,
and surveyors in the Subic Legend Resorts and Casino, Inc. (Legend) Project Development Division on various
projects. Legend sent notice to the DOLE of its intention to retrench and terminate the employment of thirty-
four (34) of its employees, which include petitioners, in the Project Development Division. Legend explained
that it would be retrenching its employees on a last-in-first-out basis on the strength of the updated status
report of its Project Development Division.
Legend sent the 34 employees their respective notices of retrenchment, stating the same reasons for
their retrenchment. On the same day, the Labor and Employment Center of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority advertised that Legend was in need of employees for positions similar to those vacated by
petitioners.
Subsequently, 14 of the 34 retrenched employees filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for
illegal dismissal and money claims which ruled in their favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LAs decision.
Said employees filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed on the ground that the
retrenched employees were validly dismissed from employment due to redundancy and not retrenchment. It
also held that the CA held that the NLRC had sufficiently explained that it was not Legend but Gaehin
International Inc. (Gaehin) which asked for Subic Bay Metropolitan Authoritys help in recruiting personnel.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners were validly dismissed based on redundancy and not on retrenchment
Ruling:
No. Retrenchment and redundancy are two different concepts; they are not synonymous and
therefore should not be used interchangeably. This Court explained in detail the difference between the two
concepts in Sebuguero v. NLRC (G.R. No. 115394, September 27, 1995):
Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded
by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity
of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
Retrenchment is used interchangeably with the term lay-off. It is the termination of employment
initiated by the employer through no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by
management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during
lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production
program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation. It is an act of the
employer of dismissing employees because of losses in the operation of a business, lack of work, and
considerable reduction on the volume of his business, a right consistently recognized and affirmed by this
Court.
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Redundancy exists when the number of employees is in excess of what is reasonably necessary to
operate the business. The declaration of redundant positions is a management prerogative. The
determination that the employees services are no longer sustainable and therefore properly terminable is an
exercise of business judgment by the employer. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to
the discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC.
However, the pieces of evidence submitted by Legend are mere allegations and conclusions not
supported by other evidence. Legend did not even or explain why it considered petitioners positions
superfluous. The CA puts too much weight on petitioners failure to refute Legends allegations contained in
the document it submitted. However, the employer bears the burden of proving the cause or causes for
termination. Its failure to do so would necessarily lead to a judgment of illegal dismissal.
Substantial evidence is the question of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. It is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The basis for retrenchment was not established by substantial evidence, Legend failed to establish by
the same quantum of proof the fact of redundancy; hence, petitioners termination from employment was
illegal.
ALFREDO A. MENDROS, JR. v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS. CORPORATION (MMPC)

Decisional law teaches that the requirements for a valid retrenchment are: (1) that the retrenchment is
reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis,
but substantial, serious, and real, or only if expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in
good faith by the employer; (2) that the employer serves written notice both to the employees concerned and the
DOLE at least a month before the intended date of retrenchment; (3) that the employer pays the retrenched
employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code; (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to
retrench in good faith; and (5) that it uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched
or retained.
Facts:
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) hired Alfredo A. Mendros, Jr. as regular body
prepman, he was then promoted as an assembler major in the companys manufacturing division. Due to
some economic problems, MMPC sustained financial losses. MMPC implemented various cost-cutting
measures, such as but not limited to: cost reduction on the use office supplies and energy, curtailment of
representation and travel expenses, employment-hiring freeze, separation of casuals and trainees, manpower
services reduction, intermittent plant shutdowns, and reduced work week for managerial and other monthly-
salaried personnel. Eventually MMPC instituted a series of retrenchment program, one of those who were
affected is Petitioner. The temporary lay-off move was not enough to avert the losses; thus, petitioner and
other personnel received notices of their permanent lay-off. Alfredo filed a case for illegal dismissal and
damages.
Issues:
Whether Alfredos temporary lay-off and eventual retrenchment is legal and valid.
Ruling:
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Yes. The right of management to retrench or to lay-off workers to meet clear and continuing
economic threats or during periods of economic recession to prevent losses is recognized by Article 283 of
the Labor Code. First, MMPC suffered substantial losses in FY 1997 and continued to bleed in 1998. Second,
Alfredo cannot feign ignorance that MMPC was in dire straits in 1997 and 1998. Neither can he impugn the
bona fides of MMPCs retrenchment strategy. Third, Art. 283 uses the phrase "retrenchment to prevent
losses." The phrase implies that retrenchment may be effected even in the event only of expected losses. The
employer need not wait for substantial losses to materialize before preventing such losses. MMPC was
already financially hemorrhaging before finally resorting to retrenchment. Fourth, MMPC had complied with
the prior written notice and separation pay requirements. Finally, as the Court sees it, the merit rating system
MMPC adopted as one of the criteria for selecting who are to be eased out was fair and reasonable under the
premises.
ROSALES v. NEW A.N.J.H. ENTERPRISES

Mere ownership by a single stockholder of all or nearly all of the capital stock of the corporation does
not by itself justify piercing the corporate veil.
Facts:
Due to alleged dwindling capital, respondent wrote the Director of the DOLE Region IV-A a letter
regarding New ANJHs impending cessation of operations and the sale of its assets to respondent NH Oil Mill
Corporation (NH Oil), as well as the termination of thirty-three (33) employees by reason thereof. Petitioners
received their respective separation pays, signed the corresponding check vouchers and executed Quitclaims
and Release before Labor Arbiter Melchisedek A. Guan (LA Guan). LA Guan then declared the labor dispute
between New ANJH and petitioners as dismissed with prejudice on ground of settlement.
Petitioners however, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with NLRC Regional Arbitration alleging
in their complaint that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil using the
same machineries and with the same owners and management, thus, in circumvention of their security of
tenure. Petitioners advance the application of the doctrine because they were terminated from employment
on the pretext that there will be an impending permanent closure of the business as a result of an intended
sale of its assets to an undisclosed corporation, and that there will be a change in the management.
Issue:
Whether the cessation of the operations and subsequent sale of ANJH constitutes illegal dismissal
Ruling:
Yes. The application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon.
However, the Court may disregard the corporate fiction if it is used to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or
crime is committed against another. Subsequent events revealed that the buyer of the assets of their
employer was a corporation owned by the same employer and members of his family. Furthermore, the
business re-opened in less than a month under the same management. Mere ownership by a single
stockholder of all or nearly all of the capital stock of the corporation does not by itself justify piercing the
corporate veil. Nonetheless, in this case, other circumstances show that the buyer of the assets of petitioners
employer is none other than his alter ego.
Twin-notice requirement
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ALEX Q. NARANJO, DONNALYN DE GUZMAN, RONALD V. CRUZ, ROSEMARIE P. PIMENTEL, and ROWENA
B. BARDAJE v. BIOMEDICA HEALTH CARE, INC. and CARINA "KAREN" J. MOTOL
The termination of employment must be based on a just or authorized cause of dismissal and the
dismissal must be effected after due notice and hearing.
Facts:
Petitioners are employees of Biomedica Health Care, Inc. with Carina J. Motol as its president. On
November 7, 2006, petitioners were all absent for various personal reasons. Later that day, the petitioners
went to Biomedica to report to work after having received a text message requiring them to proceed to
Biomedica. However, they were refused entry and told to start looking for another workplace. The next day,
petitioners came to work but were not allowed to enter the premises. Carina J. Motol ordered them to look for
another employer. On November 9, 2006 Biomedica sent notices to petitioners accusing them of having
conducted an illegal strike. On November 20, 2006 petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
On November 29, 2006 Biomedica sent notices of termination to petitioners. In its decision, the Labor Arbiter
found that petitioners indeed conducted a mass leave akin to an illegal strike. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the Labor Arbiter decision saying that petitioners were indeed illegally dismissed. Biomedica then appealed
the case to the CA which reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. The CA
ruled that petitioners staged a mass leave, and such act constitutes serious misconduct.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioners were not afforded procedural due process because the notice given to them did not
specify the exact acts that the company considers as constituting an illegal strike. A mere general description
of the charges against the employee by the employer is insufficient. Secondly, petitioners were not afforded
substantive due process. The dismissal of an employee must be based on Just and Authorized causes as
provided under the Labor Code. Serious misconduct is one of the just causes of dismissal under the said code.
However, to justify the dismissal of an employee on the ground of serious misconduct, the employer must
first establish that the employee is guilty of improper conduct, that the employee violated an existing and
valid company rule or regulation, or that the employee is guilty of a wrongdoing. Biomedica failed to establish
that petitioners indeed violated any company rules.
Hearing; meaning of opportunity to be heard
KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT, INC., et al. v. SANTIAGO MAMAC

The following should be considered in terminating an employee: (1) first written notice to be served on
the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination, (2) hearing or conference, and (3)
written notice of termination.
Facts:
Santiago Mamac was hired as bus conductor of Don Mariano Transit Corporation (DMTC). Most
DMTC employees were transferred to KKTI and were not able to participate in the certification election in
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DMTC. Mamac was required to accomplish a "Conductor's Trip Report" which indicates the ticket opening
and closing for that day of duty and to submit it to the company after each trip for auditing. An "Irregularity
Report" against the employee is issued once irregularity is discovered and the employee is asked to explain
the incident. Upon audit of Mamacs report, KKTI discovered that he declared some sold tickets as returned
tickets causing KKTI to lose income. Although no irregularity report was made, KKTI asked Mamac to explain
the discrepancy as part of its procedure. Mamac said that it was unintentional and that during that day's trip,
the windshield of the bus assigned to them was smashed and they had to cut short the trip. Hence, he got
confused in making the report. Later, he received a letter terminating his employment alleging that the
irregularity which occurred was an act of fraud against the company and also cited other offenses he allegedly
made. Mamac filed a complaint but was dismissed by the labor arbiter. Upon appeal to the NLRC, it ruled that
KKTI shall indemnify Mamac for failure to comply with due process. Mamac filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA which affirmed the NLRC but modified its decision by awarding full backwages and further
ruled that there was just cause for his dismissal.
Issue:
Whether KKTI complied with the due process requirements in terminating Mamac
Ruling:
No. The following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit
their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules
means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare
adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from
receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a
union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the
complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis
for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice
should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under
Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct
a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their
defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the
evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their
choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an
amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge
against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance
of their employment.
After a finding that petitioners failed to comply with the due process requirements, the CA awarded
full backwages in favor of respondent in accordance with the doctrine in Serrano v. NLRC (G.R. No. 117040,
January 27, 2000). However, the doctrine in Serrano had already been abandoned in Agabon v. NLRC (G.R. No.
158693, November 17, 2004) by ruling that if the dismissal is done without due process, the employer should
indemnify the employee with nominal damages. Thus, for non-compliance with the due process requirements
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in the termination of respondent's employment, petitioner KKTI is sanctioned to pay respondent the amount
of PhP30,000 as damages.
MARILOU S. GENUINO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITIBANK, N.A., WILLIAM

FERGUSON, and AZIZ RAJKOTWALA
G.R. Nos. 142732-33, December 4, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
In dismissing an employee, the Labor Code mandates that the requirement of twin-notices must be met.
The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written
explanation within a reasonable period. The notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are
violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees. After serving
the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will
be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present
evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.
After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written
notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have
been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.
Facts:
Marilou Genuino, an employee of Citibank, received a letter from the latter charging her with
"knowledge and/or involvement" in transactions "which were irregular or even fraudulent." In the same
letter, Genuino was informed that she was under preventive suspension. Genuino in turn wrote Citibank
asking for a bill of particulars regarding the charges against her. Citibank replied that it had no intention of
converting the case into a full blown trial, as such, Citibank informed Genuino that what it can only give her is
an opportunity to explain her side on the issue of whether she violated the conflict of interest rule, either in
writing or in person during the administrative investigation. Genuino failed to submit a written explanation.
Genuino likewise failed to appear during the administrative investigation. Consequently, Genuino's
employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust
reposed upon her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of Genuino was made in accordance with procedural due process
Ruling:
No. The letters dated August 23, September 13 and 20, 1993 sent by Citibank did not identify
the particular acts or omissions allegedly committed by Genuino. The August 23, 1993 letter charged
Genuino with having "some knowledge and/or involvement" in some transactions "which have the
appearance of being irregular at the least and may even be fraudulent." The September 13, 1993 letter, on the
other hand, mentioned "irregular transactions" involving Global Pacific and/or Citibank and 12 bank clients.
Lastly, the September 20, 1993 letter stated that Genuino and "Mr. Dante Santos, using the facilities of their
family corporations appear to have participated in the diversion of bank clients' funds from Citibank to, and
investment thereof in, other companies and that they made money in the process, in violation of the conflict
of law rule [sic]." The extent of Genuino's alleged knowledge and participation in the diversion of bank's
clients' funds, manner of diversion, and amounts involved; the acts attributed to Genuino that conflicted with
the bank's interests; and the circumstances surrounding the alleged irregular transactions, were not specified
in the notices/letters. While the bank gave Genuino an opportunity to deny the truth of the allegations in
writing and participate in the administrative investigation, the fact remains that the charges were too general
to enable Genuino to intelligently and adequately prepare her defense.
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While we hold that Citibank failed to observe procedural due process, we nevertheless find Genuino's
dismissal justified. Art. 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment
for fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her employer or duly
authorized representative. In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should relate
to acts inimical to the interests of the employer. Also, the act complained of should have arisen from the
performance of the employee's duties. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee's
dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient
to warrant the employee's separation from work.
As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank's Treasury Department, Genuino was tasked to solicit

investments, and peso and dollar deposits for, and keep them in Citibank; and to sell and/or push for the sale
of Citibank's financial products, such as the MBS, for the account and benefit of Citibank. She held a position of
trust and confidence. There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the bank's policies nor her
understanding of these policies as reflected in the survey done by the bank. She could not likewise feign
ignorance of the businesses of Citibank, and of Global and Torrance. Assuming that Citibank did not engage in
the same securities dealt with by Global and Torrance; nevertheless, it is to the interests of Citibank to retain
its clients and continue investing in Citibank. Curiously, Genuino did not even dissuade the depositors from
withdrawing their monies from Citibank, and was even instrumental in the transfers of monies from Citibank
to a competing bank through Global and Torrance, the corporations under Genuino's control.
R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES ESCOBIA v. NICASIO C. GALIT

Reasonable opportunity under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management
must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed
as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to
study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on
the defenses they will raise against the complaint.
Facts:
R.B. Michael Press hired Nicasio Galit as its offset machine operator. Due to the latters tardiness,
absences, discourtesy to his superiors and unwillingness to render overtime work. Michael Press sent an
office memorandum warning Galit of his dismissal from work and informing him that a hearing shall be held
in the afternoon of the same day to determine the status of his employment. Consequently, Galit was
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether Michael Press complied with the two-notice rule
Ruling:
No. Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before his
employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second
notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being terminated. Not to be taken lightly of
course is the hearing or opportunity for the employee to defend himself personally or by counsel of his
choice.
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The undue haste in effecting respondents termination shows that the termination process was a
mere simulation that the required notices were given, a hearing was even scheduled and held, but respondent
was not really given a real opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that petitioners had already decided to
dismiss respondent from service, even before the first notice had been given.
Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, there was merely a general description of the
claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999the
day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any opportunity at all to consult a union
official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.
Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, respondent, without any lawyer or friend to
counsel him, was not given any chance at all to adduce evidence in his defense. At most, he was asked if he did
not agree to render overtime work on February 22, 1999 and if he was late for work for 197 days. He was
never given any real opportunity to justify his inability to perform work on those days. This is the only
explanation why petitioners assert that respondent admitted all the charges.
In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified respondents dismissal by
citing his admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify the details surrounding the offenses and the
specific company rule or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was grounded. In view of the
infirmities in the proceedings, we conclude that termination of respondent was railroaded in serious breach
of his right to due process.
ARMANDO ALILING v. JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL F. SAN MATEO, JOSEPH R. LARIOSA, AND WIDE
WIDE WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer must prove that the dismissal was for just cause
and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal. The employer has the onus of proving with
clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence the validity of the dismissal.
Facts:
Armando Aliling and Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) entered into an employment
contract. Under the terms of the contract, Alilings regular status shall be determined on the basis of his
performance. Barely a month after, Manuel F. San Mateo e-mailed Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the
latters work performance. Joseph R. Lariosa sent a letter to Aliling to report to the Human Resources
Department and explain his absence from September 20 to 25. Aliling responded two days after and denied
being absent on such days, he presented his timesheet to prove his claim. Alilings explanation came with a
query regarding the withholding of his salary from September 11 to 25. Later on, in a letter dated September
27, Aliling expressed his resignation. However, WWWEC failed to take action so Aliling requested for
reinstatement. Lariosa replied on October 1 informing Aliling that his case is still in the process of being
evaluated. Lariosa again wrote Aliling to advise him of the termination of his services due to non-satisfactory
performance during his probation period. Aliling filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Aribiter, NLRC,
and CA ruled that Aliling was illegally dismissed because he was not informed, at the time of his engagement,
of the reasonable standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee.
Issue:
Whether Armando Aliling was illegally dismissed
Ruling:
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Yes. Lariosas letter betrayed managements intention to dismiss the petitioner for alleged
unauthorized absences. Aliling was in fact made to explain and he did so satisfactorily. But WWWEC
nonetheless proceeded with its plan to dismiss the petitioner for non-satisfactory performance, although the
corresponding termination letter did not even specifically state Alilings non-satisfactory performance, or that
Alilings termination was by reason of his failure to achieve his set quota. In order for the quota imposed to be
considered a valid productivity standard and thereby validate a dismissal, managements prerogative of fixing
the quota must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of its interest. The duty to prove good faith,
however, rests with WWWEC as part of its burden to show that the dismissal was for a just cause. WWWEC
must show that such quota was imposed in good faith. This WWWEC failed to do.
WWWEC also failed to comply with procedural due process. The adverted memo dated September 20,
2004 of WWWEC supposedly informing Aliling of the likelihood of his termination and directing him to
account for his failure to meet the expected job performance would have had constituted the charge sheet,
sufficient to answer for the first notice requirement, but for the fact that there is no proof such letter had been
sent to and received by him.
Reinstatement
ALEXANDER B. BANARES v. TABACO WOMEN'S TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE (TAWTRASCO),

represented by DIR. RENOL BARCEBAL, ET AL.
Reinstatement presupposes that there shall be no demotion in rank and/or diminution of salary,
benefits and other privileges. If the position previously occupied no longer exists, the restoration shall be to a
substantially equivalent position in terms of salary, benefits and other privileges.
Facts:
Banares was the general manager of Tabaco Women's Transport Service Cooperative (TAWTRASCO)
until its management terminated his services. Banares filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
monetary claims before the Labor Arbiter. Judgment is rendered declaring Banares to have been illegally
dismissed. Eventually, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, in which petitioner waived a
portion of his monetary claim, specifically his backwages. In turn, TAWTRASCO reinstated the petitioner.
However, barely a week into his new assignment in Virac terminal, Banares has not reported for work.
Banares in a letter-reply to management, stated that the reason for not reporting for work is that the
reinstatement effected is an artificial kind of return-to-work order. Banares filed a complaint against
TAWTRASCO for non-payment of salaries and withholding of privileges before the LA which was granted.
TAWTRASCO appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal. The CA on the other hand found
TAWTRASCO to have fully reinstated Banares to his former post and that he abandoned his work when he
stopped reporting to his Virac terminal assignment.
Issue:
1. Whether there is a genuine reinstatement of petitioner to his former position
2. Whether petitioners refusal to report to work at the Virac terminal constitutes abandonment
Ruling:
1. No. Management has a prerogative to transfer an employee from one office or station to another
within the business establishment, as long as there is no resulting demotion or diminution of salary
and other benefits and/or the action is not motivated by consideration less than fair or effected as a
punishment or to get back at the reinstated employee. In this case, the "reinstatement" of Banares as
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general manager of TAWTRASCO, was not a real, bona fide reinstatement in the context of the Labor
Code and pertinent decisional law. First, TAWTRASCO directed Banares to report to the Virac
terminal with duties and responsibilities not befitting a general manager of a transport company.
Second, TAWTRASCO did not even provide him with a formal office space.
2. No. For abandonment to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for
work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been
a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. As
reflected above, the reinstatement order has not been faithfully complied with. And varied but
justifiable reasons obtain which made Banaress work at the Virac terminal untenable. To reiterate,
there was a lack of a viable office: no proper office space, no office furniture and equipment, no office
supplies. This is not to mention Banaress board and lodging privilege which he was deprived of
without explanation.
Preventive Suspension
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC, MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA v. JOSE LENI Z.
SOLIDUM and JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO,
AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA
G.R. Nos. 197836 and 197763, December 07, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company's property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.
FACTS:
Smart hired Solidum as Department Head of Smart Prepaid/Buddy Activations. Solidum later on
received a Notice to Explain charging him with acts of dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence stating
that he violated various company policies. He was charged with several offenses and was placed in preventive
suspension for 30 days. In a letter, Soldium denied the charges against him. The continued audit investigation
found that he was guilty for more offenses and thus, he was placed under preventive suspension again for 10
days. He was given an opportunity to present his stand as Smart sent the documents he requested so he can
prepare an explanation but then he refused to accept them, thus, he was placed under an additional 10 days
of preventive suspension. The company wished to remove him for breach and trust and confidence. A Notice
of Termination was served on him. Solidum filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal with money
claims before the NLRC claiming his suspension and termination were without just cause and due process.
The labor arbiter declared that the extended period of suspension without pay was illegal and that Solidum
was unjustly dismissed from work without observance of procedural due process. He stated that the ground
for his dismissal is untenable as Solidum is not a managerial employee. Smart appealed to the NLRC but it was
denied for having been filed out of time. Smart, in its MR, claimed that they filed it on time as they received
the Labor Arbiters decision at a later date. The NLRC granted the motion. The NLRC reversed the labor
arbiters decision which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Solidums 2nd preventive suspesion is valid
(2) Whether Solidum is a managerial employee and can be validly dismissed for loss of trust and
confidence.
RULING:
(1) Yes. The 2nd preventive suspension is valid
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While the Omnibus Rules limits the period of preventive suspension to thirty (30) days, such time
frame pertains only to one offense by the employee. However, if the employee is charged with another
offense, then the employer is entitled to impose a preventive suspension not to exceed 30 days specifically for
the new infraction. A fresh preventive suspension can be imposed for a separate or distinct offense. An
employer is well within its rights to preventively suspend an employee for other wrongdoings that may be
later discovered while the first investigation is ongoing.
(2) Yes. Solidum is a managerial employee.
Solidum denies that he is a managerial employee by stating that just because he directed
subordinates and had a large salary, it does not mean that he was a managerial employee. Solidum denies
having the power to lay down and execute management policies.
However, Solidum does not deny having "the authority to devise, implement and control strategic
and operational policies of the Department he was then heading." This is clearly the authority to lay down and
execute management policies. The CA affirmed these findings. Thus, the NLRC and the CA correctly found that
Solidum was a managerial employee. As such, he may be validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence.
Constructive Dismissal
EXOCET SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES CORPORATION AND/OR MA. TERESA MARCELO
v. ARMANDO D. SERRANO
G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014, Velasco Jr., J.
Temporary off-detail or the period of time security guards are made to wait until they are transferred
or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not
exceed six months.
Facts:
Exocet is engaged in providing security personnel to its clients. By virtue of its contract with JG
Summit, Exocet assigned Armando Serrano as close-in security for various officers. 11 years after, Serrano
was relieved by JG Summit. For more than six months after he reported back to Exocet, Serrano was without
any re-assignment. Serrano then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Exocet with the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter found that Serrano, while not actually dismissed, was placed on a floating status
for more than six months and so, was deemed constructively dismissed. Acting on Exocets motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC deviated, finding that Serranos termination was due to his own fault and failure to
accept a re-assignment. The NLRC removed the award for backwages but proceeded to affirm in toto the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The CA however, found Serrano to have been constructively dismissed.
Issue:
Whether Serrano was constructively dismissed
Ruling:
No. The floating status situation was considered by this Court as a form of temporary retrenchment
or lay-off. It is that period when security guards are in between assignments or when they are made to wait
after being relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one.
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The Court has applied Article 292 of the Labor Code by analogy to set the period of temporary lay-off
to a maximum of six months. Consequently, the DOLE issued DO 14-01, providing in Section 6.5 in relation to
Sec. 9.3, that the lack of service assignment for a continuous period of six months is an authorized cause for
the termination of the employee, who is then entitled to a separation pay equivalent to half month pay for
every year of service. The Employer shall still serve a written notice on Serrano and the DOLE one month
before the intended date of termination. However, Serranos lack of assignment for more than six months
cannot be attributed to Exocet because the latter had already offered Serrano a position in the general
security service since there were no available clients requiring positions for VIP security. It was only Serrano
who declined the position because it was not the post that suited his preference.
Certification Election
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION AND DIRECTOR HANS LEO
CACDAC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its
membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection
with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws,
among other documents.
Facts:
On March 21, 2000, S.S. Ventures Labor Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election in behalf
of the rank-and-file employees of S.S. Ventures with the DOLE. Of the 542 signatures, 82 of which belong to
terminated SS Ventures employees on the basic documents supporting the petition. The certification election
was successful and the Union obtained a Certificate of Registration. On August 21, 2000, SS Ventures sought
to cancel the Unions Certificate of Registration alleging that the 82 signatures belonging to terminated
employees were obtained through fraud, and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether the Unions Certificate of Registration must be cancelled
Ruling:
No. According to Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, the grounds for cancellation of Certificate of
Registration of a Union is the commission of Fraud and Misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the Unions constitution and like documents. After a labor organization has filed the necessary
registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to check if the
requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been complied with. The issuance to the Union of
Certificate of Registration necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting
documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v. COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES
UNION (EREU)
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Any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of
independent labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership.
Facts:
Eagle Ridge Employees Union (EREU) filed a petition for certification election. The employer opposed
the petition on the ground of misrepresentation and fraud in connection with the adoption of its constitution
and the numerical composition of the union.
The employer alleges that EREU declared having 30 members in the application when the minutes
only show 26 members. It also alleged that one signature in the ratified constitution was forged. The
employer further contended that five employees already withdrew from the union. EREU, on the other hand,
asserts bona fide compliance with the registration requirements.
Issue:
Whether there was fraud in the application of the union
Ruling:
No. The members of the EREU totaled 30 employees when it applied on December 19, 2005 for
registration. The Union complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under
Art. 234(c). The Union has sufficiently explained the discrepancy between the number of those who attended
the organizational meeting showing 26 employees and the list of union members showing 30. The difference
is due to the additional four members admitted two days after the organizational meeting as attested to by
their duly accomplished Union Membership forms. Consequently, the total number of union members, as of
December 8, 2005, was 30, which was truthfully indicated in its application for registration on December 19,
2005.
As aptly found by the BLR Director, the Union already had 30 members when it applied for
registration, for the admission of new members is neither prohibited by law nor was it concealed in its
application for registration. Eagle Ridges contention is flawed when it equated the requirements under
Art. 234(b) and (c) of the Labor Code. Par. (b) clearly required the submission of the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of workers who participated in the meetings, while par.
(c) merely required the list of names of all the union members comprising at least 20% of the bargaining
unit. The fact that EREU had 30 members when it applied for registration on December 19, 2005 while only
26 actually participated in the organizational meeting is borne by the records.
The right of employees to self-organization and membership in a union must not be trammeled by
undue difficulties. When the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been admitted as union
members, it is enough to establish the fact of admission of the four that they had duly signified such desire by
accomplishing the membership form. The fact that the Union owing to its scant membership, had not yet fully
organized its different committees evidently shows the direct and valid acceptance of the four employee
applicants rather than deter their admission as erroneously asserted by Eagle Ridge.
Union Security Clauses
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ALABANG COUNTRY
CLUB INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES UNION, CHRISTOPHER PIZARRO, MICHAEL BRAZA, and NOLASCO
CASTUERAS
G.R. No. 170287, February 14, 2008, J. Velasco, Jr.
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In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer
needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for
the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the
unions decision to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an
employee based on the CBAs union security provision.
Facts:
Pizarro, Braza and Castueras were officers of Alabang Country Club Union. They were expelled from
the union for alleged malversation of union funds. The union invoked the Security Clause of the CBA which
provided for a maintenance of membership shop, and demanded that the Club dismiss private respondents.
The Club required the three respondents to show cause in writing, and called private respondents for an
informal conference inquiring about the charges against them. Nonetheless, after weighing the verbal and
written explanations, the Club dismissed private respondents. Private respondents challenged their dismissal
in an illegal dismissal complaint.
Issue:
Whether respondents were illegally dismissed
Ruling:
No The three respondents were expelled from the after due investigation for malversation of Union
funds. The Union properly requested the Club to terminate respondents. In compliance with the Unions
request, the Club reviewed the documents submitted by the Union, requested said respondents to submit
written explanations, and afforded them reasonable opportunity to present their side. After it had determined
that there was sufficient evidence, the Club dismissed them from their employment.
Unfair Labor Practice of Employers
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, REV. FR. ROLANDO
DE LA ROSA, REV. FR. RODELIO ALIGAN, DOMINGO LEGASPI, and MERCEDES HINAYON
Whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP, it is the burden of the
alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence. Such principle finds justification in the fact
that ULP is punishable with both civil and/or criminal sanctions.
Facts:
Two groups were claiming to be the University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU): the Gamilla
Group and Mario Group. The latter is led by Atty. Eduardo J. Mario, Jr., the incumbent president of the
union while the former is led by Gil Gamilla who was elected as its president during a convocation held on
October 4, 1996. The Mario Group filed a complaint for ULP against the UST with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC. It also filed a complaint with the Office of the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE praying for the nullification
of the election of the Gamilla Group as officers of the USTFU. The said election was declared null and void. On
the other hand, the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC issued a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground
that USTFU failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that indeed UST was guilty of ULP. The acts
of UST which USTFU complained of as ULP were the following: (1) allegedly calling for a convocation of
faculty members which turned out to be an election of officers for the faculty union; (2) subsequently dealing
with the Gamilla Group in establishing a new CBA; and (3) the assistance to the Gamilla Group in padlocking
the USTFU office.
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2016
Issue:
Whether UST is guilty of unfair labor practice
Ruling:
No. Whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP, it is the burden
of the alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence. Such principle finds justification in
the fact that ULP is punishable with both civil and/or criminal sanctions.
The Memorandum issued by the Secretary General of UST does not support a claim that UST
organized the convocation in connivance with the Gamilla Group. In no way can the contents of this
memorandum be interpreted to mean that faculty members were required to attend the convocation.
Respondents could not have been expected to stop dealing with the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of
the Mario Group that the former was not validly elected into office. As the CA ruled correctly, until the
validity of the election of the Gamilla Group is resolved with finality, respondents could not be faulted for
negotiating with said group. As to the padlocking of the USTFU office, the mere presence of Justino Cardenas,
Detachment Commander of the security agency contracted by the UST, cannot be equated to a positive act of
"aiding" the Gamilla Group in securing the USTFU office.
Petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP. The onus probandi falls on the
shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor
cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably
failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
Illegal Strike
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, (NLRC-2ND DIVISION), HON. COMMISSIONERS: VICTORINO CALAYCAY, ANGELITA
GACUTAN, and RAUL AQUINO, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TAKESHI FUKUDA, and
DAVID GO
G.R. Nos. 158798-99, October 19, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz: (1) [when it]
is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a
valid strike]; or (3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its
objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the
Labor Code]; or (5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or
order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or (6) [when it] is contrary
to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
Facts:
TMPCWA filed a petition for certificate election among the rank-and-file employees of Toyota Motor
Phil. Corp (TMPC), herein private respondent with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) to
be considered its sole and legitimate Union of TMPC. The NCMB decided in favor of TMPCWA. TMPC appealed
to the DOLE Secretary. During the pendency of the appeal, TMPCWA submitted its CBA proposals to TMPC but
the latter refused to negotiate on the ground that there is a pending appeal as regards the legality of being the
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sole and legitimate union of TMPCWA on behalf of TMPCs employees. This prompted TMPCWA to hold
numerous strikes which resulted to huge losses on the part of TMPC. This prompted TMPC to file a petition to
declare the strike illegal against TMPCWA with the NLRC praying that the erring Union members be
dismissed from employment.
The NLRC held for TMPC. On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Now,
TMPCWA assails the decision of the CA on the ground that the strikes and protest undertaken by TMPCWA
was an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress
of grievances. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the strikes undertaken by TMPCWA were legal
Ruling:
No. The Unions position is weakened by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold rallies.
Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the
concerted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the excuse that they will hold
a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices. The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard their
rights against any abuse which the med-arbiter may commit against their cause. However, the Union failed to
advance proof that the med-arbiter was biased against them. The acts of the med-arbiter in the performance
of his duties are presumed regular. The decision not to work for two days was calculated to cripple the
manufacturing arm of Toyota. The ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to acknowledge the Union as
the sole bargaining agent of the company.
The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE
30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved
by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven
days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with
them renders the strike illegal. The intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote
report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy
objectives embodied in the law.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-
APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth
Division), THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC.,
owner and operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V. ALVEZ
Public officials entrusted with specific jurisdictions enjoy great confidence from this Court. The
Secretary surely meant only to ensure industrial peace as she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In this
case, we are not ready to substitute our own findings in the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion on her part.
Facts:
National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter
(Union) is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel).
The Union submitted its CBA negotiation proposals to the Hotel but the parties failed to arrive at mutually
acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock and unsuccessful conciliation, a strike vote
was conducted by the Union on which it decided that it would wage a strike.
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The Union held a general assembly where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly
shaven heads. The next day more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel
prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming
Standards. In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. For this reason
the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three
restaurants.
The Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and subsequently
dismissing them for violation of the duty to bargain in good faith and violation of the Hotel's Grooming
Standards and commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike. The Union filed with the NCMB a Notice of
Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting.
The Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified the case to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration. The NLRC held that the concerted action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts
were committed by the Union. The CA affirmed the rulings of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether the Union conducted an illegal strike
Ruling:
Yes. Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission
(G.R. Nos. 158798-99, October 19, 2007), we cited the various categories of an illegal strike, to wit: (1) when it
is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions;
or (2) when it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites
of a valid strike]; or (3) when it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit
an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or (4) when it employs unlawful means in the pursuit
of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art.
264(e) of the Labor Code]; or (5) when it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or (6)
when it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is
liable for conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons:
First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted
action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action.
The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a
five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch clients. In view of the Union's collaborative effort to violate
the Hotel's Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the Hotel to choose between allowing its
inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of its reputation, or to refuse
them work, even if it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in either way
would disrupt the operations of the Hotel.
The act of the Union was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a
calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage to the Hotel's finances or its reputation. The
Union's concerted violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and
disruption of the Hotel's operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.
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Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the
CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout" provision. The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining deadlock
in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-
quoted "no strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding.
Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not
only violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain
in good faith.
Liability of ordinary workers
MADGALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOPERATIVE v.

KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LGS
G.R. No. 191138-39, October 19, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J.
For union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of their
employment. But for union members who participated in a strike, their employment may be terminated only if
they committed illegal acts during the strike and there is substantial proof of their participation.
Facts:
Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS, Magdala Multipurpose and Livelihood Cooperative (KMLMS) is the
union operating in Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative and Sanlor Motors Corp. KMLMS filed a
notice of strike on March 5, 2002 and conducted its strike-vote on April 8, 2002. However, KMLMS only
acquired legal personality when its registration as an independent labor organization was granted on April 9,
2002. Thereafter, on May 6, 2002, KMLMS, now a legitimate labor organization (LLO) staged a strike where
several prohibited and illegal acts were committed by its participating members. On the ground of lack of
valid notice of strike, ineffective conduct of a strike-vote and commission of prohibited and illegal acts,
petitioners filed their Petition to Declare the Strike of May 6, 2002 Illegal before the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Board (RAB) and prayed that the officers and members of respondent KMLMS who participated in
the illegal strike and who knowingly committed prohibited and illegal activities, respectively, be declared to
have lost or forfeited their employment status.
LA, NLRC, and CA ruled in favor of petitioners but ruled that only 34 workers to have lost their
employment status.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in refusing to declare as having lost their employment status the rest of the
union strikers who have participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts
Ruling:
Yes. The May 6, 2002 strike was illegal, first, because when KMLMS filed the notice of strike on March
5 or 14, 2002, it had not yet acquired legal personality and, thus, could not legally represent the eventual
union and its members. And second, similarly when KMLMS conducted the strike-vote on April 8, 2002, there
was still no union to speak of, since KMLMS only acquired legal personality as an independent LLO only on
April 9, 2002 or the day after it conducted the strike-vote.
In refusing to declare the other strikers as dismissed, the appellate court found that not all of the
photographs in evidence sufficiently show the strikers committing illegal acts and that the identification of
said strikers is questionable considering that some were still identified even when their faces were
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indiscernible from the photographs. We, however, cannot agree with the appellate courts view that there is
no substantial proof of the identity of the other 72 striking union members who committed prohibited and
illegal activities. The prohibited and illegal acts are undisputed. It is only the identity of the striking union
workers who committed said acts that is the crux of the partial modification prayed for by petitioners.
The petitioners have substantially proved the identity of 72 other union members who committed
prohibited and illegal acts during the May 6, 2002 illegal strike, thus:
First, the photographs submitted by petitioners show the identities of the union members who
committed prohibited and illegal acts. Second, the identities of these union members were substantially
proved through the eyewitness of petitioners who personally knew and recognized them. Thus, the identities
of these 72 other union members who participated in the strike and committed prohibited and illegal acts are
not only shown through the photographs, but are also sufficiently supported, as earlier cited, by police blotter
certifications, a criminal complaint for grave coercion, and affidavits of several workers and a proprietor.
Absent any exculpating circumstance, they must all suffer the same fate with the statutorily provided
consequence of termination of employment.
Procedure and Jurisdiction
MARTICIO SEMBLANTE and DUBRICK PILAR v. COURT OF APPEALS, 19th DIVISION, now SPECIAL
FORMER 19th DIVISION, GALLERA DE MANDAUE / SPOUSES VICENTE and MARIA LUISA LOOT
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards
from the Labor Arbiters decision. However, the rule may be relaxed considering the substantial merits of the
case and to prevent miscarriage of justice.
Facts:
Marticio Semblante and Dubrick Pilar filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Spouses Vicente
and Maria Luisa Loot. They alleged that they were hired as the official masiador and sentenciador of the
cockpit in 1993. However, in 2003, they were denied entry. Respondents denied that petitioners were their
employees and alleged that they were associates of respondents independent contractor, Tomas Vega. They
claimed that petitioners have no regular working time or day and that they are free to decide for themselves
whether to report for work or not. They were only issued identification cards to indicate that they were free
from the normal entrance fee. On June 16, 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners were illegally
dismissed. Respondents counsel received the decision on September 14, 2004 and within the 10-day appeal
period, he filed the respondents appeal with the NLRC, but without posting a cash or surety bond. It was only
on October 11, 2004 that respondents filed an appeal bond. NLRC initially denied but subsequently reversed
itself on the postulate that the appeal was meritorious and the filing of an appeal bond, although belated, is a
substantial compliance with the law. The CA ruled that an exceptional circumstance obtains in the case at
bench which warrants a relaxation of the bond requirement as a condition for perfecting the appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly entertained the appeal although the appeal bond was filed late
Ruling:
Yes. While respondents had failed to post their bond within the 10-day period, it is evident that
petitioners are NOT employees of respondents. Respondents could never have dismissed petitioners, legally
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or illegally, since respondents were without power or prerogative to do so because they are not petitioners
employers. The rule on the posting of an appeal bond cannot defeat the substantive rights of respondents to
be free from an unwarranted burden of answering for an illegal dismissal for which they were never
responsible.
Appeal to NLRC

G.R. No. 203355, August 18, 2015, Velasco Jr., J.
The NLRC has wide discretion in determining the reasonableness of the bond for purposes of perfecting
an appeal.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with NLRC Regional Arbitration alleging in their
complaint that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil using the same
machineries and with the same owners and management, thus, in circumvention of their security of tenure.
Executive Labor Arbiter Santos (ELA Santos) found that petitioners had been illegally dismissed and ordered
their reinstatement and the payment of PHP1,006,045.87 corresponding to the petitioners full backwages
less the amount paid to them as their respective separation pay. Respondents filed their Notice of Appeal
with Appeal Memorandum along with a Verified Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC and posted 60% of
the award ordered by the LA, or PHP 603,627.52, as their appeal bond. The NLRC denied respondents
Verified Motion to Reduce Bond for lack of merit and so dismissing their appeal for non-perfection,
prompting respondents to file a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Appeal Cash
Bond with corresponding payment of additional cash bond but the same was denied. Hence, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA held that private respondents had substantially complied with
the rule requiring the posting of an appeal bond equivalent to the total award given to the employees.
Issue:
Whether there was substantial compliance with the rule requiring the posting of an appeal bond
Ruling:
Yes. On the issue of perfecting the appeal, the CA was correct when it pointed out that Rule VI of the
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that a motion to reduce bond shall be entertained upon the
posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
In Garcia v. KJ Commercial (G.R. No. 196830, February 29, 2012), the SC explained: The NLRC has full
discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-day
period within which to perfect an appeal. In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce
bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day
period to perfect an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground
and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the
motion, the appellant may still file a motion for reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the
Rules. If the NLRC grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground
and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the
motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final and executory. In any case, the rule that the filing
of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute.
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The Court may relax the rule under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve
controversies on their merits. These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of substantial
justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the
case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved. In this case, the NLRC had
reconsidered its original position and declared that the 60% bond was reasonable given the merits of the
justification provided by respondents in their Motion to Reduce Bond, as supplemented by their Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Appeal Cash Bond. The CA affirmed the merits of the
grounds cited by respondents in their motions and the reasonableness of the bond originally posted by
respondents. This is in accord with the guidelines established in McBurnie v. Ganzon (G.R. Nos. 178034 &
178117 G R. Nos. 186984-85, October 17, 2013) where this Court declared that the posting of a provisional
cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal is sufficient
provided that there is meritorious ground therefor.
Jurisdiction of NLRC
ESTRELLITA G. SALAZAR v. PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., and /or LEONORA FONTANILLA

The NLRC, in aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, has the authority under Article 218 (d) of the
Labor Code to correct or amend any error committed by a labor arbiter.
Facts:
Salazar was terminated from her employment due to alleged falsification of company records. Salazar
denies receiving Duplicators termination letter. The Labor Arbiter held that the dismissal was for a just cause
but the company breached the twin-notice requirement as provided by law. It ordered Duplicators to pay the
indemnity of PhP10,000.
However, on appeal, the NLRC ruled that there was no dismissal but due to strained relationship,
Duplicators is liable to pay separation pay instead of paying the indemnity imposed by the LA. Salazar now
questions the deletion of the indemnity.
Salazar claims that the NLRC should not have deleted the award of indemnity in her favor since both
Duplicators and Fontanilla did not interpose any appeal from the Decision of Labor Arbiter Caday and hence,
no affirmative relief could be granted to said respondents.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC violated the rule in labor cases that an appellee cannot be awarded any
affirmative relief
Ruling:
No. Petitioner's first ground in her Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC stated that Labor
Arbiter Caday's ruling that she was not illegally dismissed was erroneous. In resolving this issue, the NLRC
overturned Caday's finding of petitioners valid dismissal, and instead concluded that there was no
termination of petitioners employment. As a consequence, the NLRC had to recall the award of PhP10,000.00
indemnity imposed by Arbiter Caday although not prayed for by Duplicators since the said award was
inconsistent with the finding that petitioners employment subsisted. Without petitioners dismissal, there
can be no legal basis for the indemnity; hence, Duplicators is not obliged to comply with the two-notice
requirement. Petitioner has no reason to complain that she was deprived of monetary benefits since the
NLRCs Decision did not actually benefit Duplicators as the PhP14,095.76 separation pay granted to petitioner
is certainly greater than the PhP10,000.00 indemnity deleted by the NLRC.
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G.R. No. 203355, August 18, 2015, Velasco Jr. J.
Res Judicata does not bar the filing of complaints for illegal dismissal.
Facts:
Due to alleged dwindling capital, respondent wrote the Director of the DOLE Region IV-A a letter
regarding New ANJHs impending cessation of operations and the sale of its assets to respondent NH Oil Mill
Corporation, as well as the termination of thirty-three (33) employees by reason thereof. Petitioners received
their respective separation pays, signed the corresponding check vouchers and executed Quitclaims and
Release before Labor Arbiter Melchisedek A. Guan (LA Guan). LA Guan then declared the labor dispute
between New ANJH and petitioners as dismissed with prejudice on ground of settlement.
Petitioners however, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with NLRC Regional Arbitration alleging
in their complaint that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil using the
same machineries and with the same owners and management, thus, in circumvention of their security of
tenure. Executive Labor Arbiter Generoso V. Santos (ELA Santos) found that petitioners had been illegally
dismissed and ordered their reinstatement and payment of full backwages less the amount paid to them as
their respective separation pay. In a Resolution, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision and ordered the
dismissal of petitioners complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Orders issued by LA Guan under
the doctrine of res judicata. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA declared that
the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal was already barred by res judicata.
Issue:
Whether the complaint for illegal dismissal was already barred by res judicata
Ruling:
No. For res judicata to apply, the concurrence of the following requisites must be verified: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there isbetween the first and the second
actionsidentity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The third requisite is not present. The
Orders rendered by LA Guan cannot be considered as constituting a judgment on the merits. The Orders
simply manifest that petitioners are amenable to the computations made by the company respecting their
separation pay. Nothing more. They do not clearly state the petitioners right or New ANJHs corresponding
duty as a result of the termination. The fourth requisite is also absent. While there may be substantial identity
of the parties, there is no identity of subject matter or cause of action. In SME Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman (G.R. No.
184517, October 8, 2013), the SC held that the acceptance of separation pay is an issue distinct from the
legality of the dismissal of the employees. The conformity of the employees to the corporations act of
considering them as terminated and their subsequent acceptance of separation pay does not remove the taint
of illegal dismissal. Acceptance of separation pay does not bar the employees from subsequently contesting
the legality of their dismissal, nor does it bar them from challenging the legality of their separation from the
service. In the absence of the third and fourth requisites, the appellate court should have proceeded to rule
on the validity of petitioners termination.
Remedies
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DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC v. ALBERTO J. RAZA

Motions for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the NLRC should be filed within ten
calendar days from receipt of decision.
Facts:
Daikoku hired respondent Alberto J. Raza as company driver, eventually assigning him to serve as
personal driver to its president, Mamuro Ono. Alberto, after being let off by Ono, took the company vehicle to
his own place in Makati City. When asked where he parked the car the night before Alberto lied. Alberto
thereafter received a show-cause notice. He submitted his written explanation of the incident, apologizing
and expressing his regret. Daikokus General Affairs Manager ordered Alberto dismissed from the service.
Dishonesty and other work related performance offenses appeared in the corresponding notice of
termination as grounds for the dismissal action. The Labor Arbiter ordered Daikoku to reinstate Alberto and
to pay backwages. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed Daikokus appeal for failure to perfect it in the manner and
formalities prescribed by law but reinstated the same on Daikokus motion for reconsideration on May 31,
2006. However, for Daikokus failure to reinstate Alberto pending appeal, the NLRC ordered the payment of
Albertos backwages. The CA denied Daikokus appeal.
Issue:
Whether Daikokus motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed
Ruling:
Yes. Daikoku admitted receiving a copy of the May 31, 2006 NLRC resolution on June 16, 2006,
however he only filed its motion for reconsideration on July 3, 2006, or 17 days after the receipt. As provided
in Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC 2005 Rules of Procedure, motions for reconsideration of any decision,
resolution or order of the Commission should be filed within ten calendar days from receipt of decision.
Procedural rules may be relaxed but only on valid and compelling reasons. The bare invocation of the interest
of substantial justice line is not some magic wand that will automatically compel the Court to suspend the
procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot
be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction of Med Arbiters
TEMIC SEMICONDUCTORS, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, et al. v. FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, et

al.
G.R. No. 160993, May 20, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
TSIEU and Dimaano never raised the issue of any monetary or property claims before the Office of the
NCR-RD and before the proceedings with the Hearing Officer. Much less did they raise this issue on appeal before
the BLR when such was not granted. TSIEU and Dimaano's failure to do so is fatal to its claims insofar as the
enforcement of the appealed order is concerned. They cannot now assert such claims in the enforcement of said
final and executory order.
FACTS:
TSIEU is the accredited bargaining agent for rank-and-file employees of Temic Telefunken
Microelectronics (Phils.), Inc. and is an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW). During the
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incumbency of Dimaano as president of TSIEU, the collective bargaining negotiations resulted in a deadlock
which prompted the Dimaano-led union to hold a strike. The Secretary of DOLE issued a return-to-work
order, leading to a split between employee-union members who returned to work and those who continued
to strike, as led by Olivia Robles and Dimaano, respectively.
The two groups of TSIEU conducted separate elections where in Robles and Dimaano were elected by
their respective factions. The result of both elections were communicated to the National Capital Region
Regional Director (NCR-RD) of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), but only the election result of TSIEU-
Dimaano were noted and certified by the Vice President for Political Affairs of FFW. The governing board of
FFW, in an emergency meeting, decided to place TSIEU under its receivership, despite Dimaanos objection as
a member of the same and on the ground that the twin elections resulted in a crisis of leadership. Dimaano
resigned from all of her positions in the FFW.
TSIEU and Dimaano filed the instant case against FFW before the NCR-RD of the BLR for Declaration
of Nullity of Receivership. The RD granted the same on the ground that FFW had no authority to put TSIEU
under receivership. The appeal before the BLR was dismissed. The BLRs resolution became final and
executory and a writ of execution was issued on September 18, 2000. The NCR RD of BLR issued an order
directing the sheriffs to lift the notices of garnishment on the ground that there was a need for prior
determination of the actual amounts due to TSIEU. Later on, the BLR voided its prior writ of execution and
notices of garnishment. The CA affirmed the BLR resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of execution granting the turnover of properties and remittance of monetary claims
was within the terms of the final and executory order sought to be enforced
RULING:
No. The receivership of TSIEU ordered by private respondents has been duly nullified. The bone of
contention is: What level does the declaration of nullity of receivership extend? A scrutiny of the March 24,
1998 Order of the NCR RD clearly bears out that what had been granted thereat was the nullification of the
receivership of TSIEU by FFW, no more and no less. The fallo of the March 24, 1998 Order unequivocally
granted merely the nullification of the receivership. The disquisitive part, body, or ratio decidendi of the
March 24, 1998 Order--as distinguished from the fallo or dispositive portion--where the findings of fact and
law, the reasons, and evidence to support such findings including the discussions of the issues leading to their
determination are drawn from, likewise obviously did not include the claim for properties and the remittance
of any monetary claim.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS
G.R. NO. 142351, November 22, 2006, Velasco, Jr. J.
While a formal trial or hearing is discretionary on the part of the Labor Arbiter, when there are factual
issues that require a formal presentation of evidence in a hearing, the Labor Arbiter cannot simply rely on the
position papers, more so, on mere unsubstantiated claims of parties.
Facts:
Bienvenido Aricayos assisted in managing St. Martin Funeral Homes without compensation. When
Amelita took over as manager of the company, she found out that St. Martin had arrearages in the payment of
taxes, but company records show that payments were made. Because of this, Amelita dismissed Aricayos from
managing St. Martin's business.
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Aricayos filed a case for illegal dismissal. The NLRC remanded the case to the LA to determine if there
is an employer-employee relationship.
St. Martin insists that the Labor Arbiter actually concluded that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties considering the memoranda, position papers, and the documentary evidence
presented in support of their respective positions.
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court can make a determination of the presence of an employer-employee
relationship between St. Martin and Aricayos based on the evidence on record
Ruling:
No. The issue submitted for resolution is a question of fact which is proscribed by the rule
disallowing factual issues in appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is explicit in Rule
45, Section 1 that petitions of this nature shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth. St. Martin would like the Court to examine the pleadings and documentary evidence extant on the
records of the Labor Arbiter to determine if said official indeed made a finding on the existence of the alleged
employer-employee nexus between the parties based on the facts contained in said pleadings and
evidence. Evidently, this issue is embraced by the circumscription.
Even if we would like to relax the rule and allow the examination of the documentary evidence as an
exception to the general rule, we are precluded by the abject failure of petitioner to attach to the petition
important and material portions of the records as would support the petition prescribed by Rule 45, Section
4. St. Martin asks us to find out if the Labor Arbiter was correct in concluding that respondent Aricayos was
not in its employ; but committed the blunder of not attaching to the petition even the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter sought to be reviewed, the NLRC Decision, the position papers and memoranda of the parties filed
with the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of petitioners employees, and other pieces of evidence that we can
consider in resolving the factual issue on employment. Without these documents, petitioner cannot be given
the relief prayed for.
Even with the inadequate information and few documents on hand, one thing is clear that the Labor
Arbiter did not set the labor case for hearing to be able to determine the veracity of the conflicting positions
of the parties. On this point alone, a remand is needed.
There are certain admissions by petitioner St. Martin that should have prodded the Labor Arbiter to
conduct a hearing for a more in-depth examination of the contrasting positions of the parties, namely; that
respondent helped Amelitas mother manage the funeral parlor business by running errands for her,
overseeing the business from 1995 up to January 1996 when the mother died, and that after Amelita made
changes in the business operation, private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in
the management of St. Martin. These facts could have been examined more in detail by the Labor Arbiter in a
hearing to convince himself that there was indeed no employment relationship between the parties as he
originally found.
DANILO OGALISCO v. HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, INC.

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Factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC are accorded respect and finality when supported by
substantial evidence, which means such evidence as that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
Facts:
Danilo Ogalisco was employed by respondent Holy Trinity College as a regular faculty member. In
1997, the school through its vice president, called his attention to a widespread rumor that he was having an
illicit affair with Mrs. Crisanta Hitalia, a married co-teacher. In 1998, he received an invitation to attend an
investigation to be conducted by a panel appointed by the school president. He attended the investigation, but
was deeply surprised when instead of having an investigation regarding the complaints against the school, it
became an investigation against him. He received a copy of the minutes of the investigation and was given
until 7:30 p.m. the next day to answer the charges against him. Petitioner timely submitted his comment.
Nevertheless, the panel recommended his termination. Consequently, Holy Trinity College terminated his
services.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint but nevertheless awarded PhP 17,460 to petitioner as indemnity for the schools failure to afford
petitioner due process. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC likewise affirmed the Decision of the labor arbiter
and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
However, the CA also dismissed the petition and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was validly dismissed
Ruling:
Yes. The labor arbiter, NLRC, and CA unanimously found that petitioner was validly dismissed.
Petitioner, however, failed to show any extraordinary circumstance why this Court should disturb the factual
findings of the labor arbiter which were affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. Indeed, substantial evidence is
extant on record that showed convincingly the extra-marital affair of petitioner with his co-teacher, Hitalia.
Hence, petitioners termination is valid and legal under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Social Welfare Legislation (P.D. 626)
SSS Law (R.A. No. 8282)
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and
ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents."
Facts:
Due to the death of John Colcol, an employee of Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., Bernardina P.
Bartolome, Johns biological mother filed a claim for death benefits with the Social Security System (SSS).
However, the SSS La Union office denied the claim and ruled that Bartolome is not entitled to death benefits of
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Colcol because she is no longer considered as the parent of John Colcol as he was legally adopted by Cornelio
Colcol. On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the decision of SSS. The ECC
ruled that the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the
claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the biological mother is entitled to receive the benefits
Ruling:
Yes. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. Rule XV, Sec.
1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviated from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of
the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" as "legitimate parents."
When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance. Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase
"dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent
parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent
parents" to mean legitimate parents, it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants."
Employees Compensation
JESSIE V. DAVID, represented by his wife, MA. THERESA S. DAVID, and children, KATHERINE and
KRISTINA DAVID v. OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., and/or MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES
It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his
work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very
least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.
Facts:
Jessie David entered into a Contract of Employment with OSG Manila for its principal Michaelmar as
Third Officer of its crude tanker. Prior to embarkation, David was declared fit for further sea duty. While
onboard the ship, he suffered intolerable pains on his left foot. He was diagnosed with lipoma on the upper
left leg with a possible calcaneus spur on the left foot., but found to be fit for work. After his return to the
country, David was referred to Dr. Lim, OSG Manilas company-designated physician. The MRI showed a mass
on his left foot. Reports from Dr. Lim and Dr. Pena of Metropolitan Medical Center showed that the soft tissue
sarcoma was caused by exposure to certain chemicals. Despite the non-conclusive findings of both doctors,
OSG Manila issued a certification stating that David has been given a permanent disability Grade 1 by the
Marine Medical Services of the hospital. David underwent chemotherapy but the company refused to
shoulder his expenses. He filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits and damages. The
Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in his favor, finding the certification binding on the company. The CA reversed
the ruling. David argues that the illness was presumed work-related and it is up to the company to overcome
such presumption.
Issue:
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Whether the illness was work-related, thus entitling David to disability benefits
Ruling:
Yes. Deemed incorporated into the contract of employment are the provisions of the 2000 POEA-
Standard Employment Contract. Sec. 20(B) provides that illnesses not listed in Sec. 32 are disputably
presumed as work-related. David suffered from malignant fibrous histiocytoma (MFH) in his left thigh. MFH
is not one of the diseases enumerated under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC. This disputable presumption works in
favor of the employee pursuant to the mandate under EO 247 under which the POEA-SEC was created: "to
secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance
therewith" and "to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Hence, unless contrary
evidence is presented by the seafarers employer/s, this disputable presumption stands.
David showed that part of his duties as a Third Officer of the crude tanker M/T Raphael involved
"overseeing the loading, stowage, securing and unloading of cargoes." As a necessary corollary, David was
frequently exposed to the crude oil that M/T Raphael was carrying. It has been regarded that the hazardous
chemicals in crude oil can possibly contribute to the formation of cancerous masses. David has provided more
than a reasonable nexus between the nature of his job and the disease that manifested itself on the sixth
month of his last contract with respondents.
This reasonable connection has not been convincingly refuted by respondents. On the contrary,
respondents do not deny the functions performed by David on board M/T Raphael or the cargo transported
by the tanker in which he was assigned. The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine the
liability of an employer for the illness suffered by an employee under the POEA-SEC is not proof beyond
reasonable doubt but mere substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
TRANSOCEAN SHIP MANAGEMENT (PHILS.), INC., CARLOS S. SALINAS, and GENERAL MARINE SERVICES
CORPORATION v. INOCENCIO B. VEDAD
G.R. Nos. 194490-91, March 20, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other
favorable to the overseas workers, the balance must be tilted in their favor consistent with the principle of social
justice.
Facts:
Inocencio B. Vedad was a seafarer employed by Transocean. Inocencio's employment under the
POEA-SEC was for a 10-month period and he was deployed and went on board M/V Invicta after the required
pre-employment medical examination (PEME) which gave him a clean bill of health.
Before the expiry of his 10-month contract, Inocencio was repatriated for medical reasons because
while on board M/V lnvicta he fell ill and experienced fever, sore throat and pain in his right ear. He
underwent medical examination with the finding of ''chronic suppurative otitis media right CSOM(R) with
acute pharyngitis, with mild maxillary sinusitis," for which he was prescribed antibiotics and ear drops with
the recommendation of a follow-up examination of the CSOM(R). He underwent tonsillectomy but was later
found by a histopathology report to be suffering from cancer of the right tonsil. Inocencio was advised to
undergo chemotherapy and linear treatment at a cost of P500, 000, which Transocean and General Marine
promised to shoulder. Inocencio started with the procedure but could not continue due to the failure of
Transocean and General Marine to provide the necessary amount. Inocencio filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter praying for total permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance.
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The Labor Arbiter awarded permanent total disability benefits plus attorneys fees while dismissing
all other claims. The Labor Arbiter, applying Section 20 of the POEA-SEC, ruled Inocencio's tonsil cancer to be
presumptively work-related. The NLRC vacated that of the Labor Arbiter and awarded sickness allowance
equivalent to 120 days salary and reimbursement of Inocencio's medical expenses. The CA modified the
NLRCs decision by setting aside the award of sickness allowance but affirming the grant of reimbursement of
medical expenses.
Issues:
1. Whether Inocencio is entitled to sickness allowance and reimbursement of his medical expenses
2. Whether Inocencio is entitled to permanent total disability benefits
Ruling:
1. Yes. Inocencio got ill with what appeared to be tonsillitis while on board M/V lnvicta, for which
he was treated at a foreign port where the ship docked. His malady still continued despite the treatment as he
was, in fact, repatriated before the end of his 10-month contract on medical grounds.
Inocencio is entitled to receive sickness allowance from his repatriation for medical treatment, which
is equivalent to his basic wage for a period not exceeding 120 days or four months. The fact that Inocencio's
sickness was later medically declared as not work-related does not prejudice his right to receive sickness
allowance, considering that he got ill while on board the ship and was repatriated for medical treatment
before the end of his 10-month employment contract. He is entitled to sickness allowance pending
assessment and declaration by the company-designated physician on the work-relatedness of his ailment.
When the assessment of the company physician is that the ailment is not work-related but such assessment is
duly contested by the second opinion from a physician of the seafarer's choice, then pending the final
determination by a third opinion pursuant to the mechanism provided under the third paragraph of Sec.
20(B) (3), the seafarer is still entitled to sickness allowance but not to exceed 120 days.
2. No. Tonsil cancer or tonsillar carcinoma is not work-related. The NLRC and the CA correctly
ruled on this issue. It is not included in the list of occupational diseases. Inocencio carried the burden of
showing by substantial evidence that his cancer developed or was aggravated from work-related causes. As
both the NLRC and the CA found, he had nothing to support his claim other than his bare allegations.
In determining whether or not a given illness is work-related, it is understandable that a company-

designated physician would be more positive and in favor of the company than, say, the physician of the
seafarer's choice. It is on this account that a seafarer is given the option by the POEA-SEC to seek a second
opinion from his preferred physician. And the law has anticipated the possibility of divergence in the medical
findings and assessments by incorporating a mechanism for its resolution wherein a third doctor selected by
both parties decides the dispute with finality, as provided by Sec. 20(B) (3) of the POEA-SEC.
Inocencio, however, failed to seek a second opinion from a physician of his choice. The company-
designated doctor's certification must prevail. In the absence of any duly medically proven work-relatedness,
Inocencio cannot be accorded permanent total disability benefits.
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Deans
Circle 2016
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
POLITICAL
LAW
Political Law (Cases Penned by J. Velasco) Deans
Circle 2016
Table of Contents
Constitutional Law 1 ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances ................................................................................................... 2
Delegation of Powers ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
State Principles and Policies ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Legislature .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Presidency .......................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Judiciary .............................................................................................................................................................................. 9
Constitutional Commissions...................................................................................................................................... 11
Commission on Elections ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Commission on Audit ............................................................................................................................................. 13
Local Governments ....................................................................................................................................................... 14
National Economy and Patrimony .......................................................................................................................... 15
Constitutional Law 2 ...................................................................................................................................................... 16
The Bill of Rights and the Fundamental Powers ................................................................................................ 16
Due Process..................................................................................................................................................................... 17
Equal Protection ............................................................................................................................................................ 18
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence ............................................................................................... 19
Freedom of Expression, Right to Assembly and Academic Freedom .......................................................... 20
Freedom of Religion ..................................................................................................................................................... 21
Eminent Domain............................................................................................................................................................ 22
Contract Clause .............................................................................................................................................................. 24
Citizenship....................................................................................................................................................................... 27
Administrative Law, Public Officers and Election Law .................................................................................. 28
Public Officers ................................................................................................................................................................ 28
Election Law ................................................................................................................................................................... 29
Public Corporation ......................................................................................................................................................... 36
Powers and Functions of the Local Government ................................................................................................ 36
Conversion ...................................................................................................................................................................... 38
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
BAYAN MUNA, AS REPRESENTED BY REP. SATUR OCAMPO, REP. CRISPIN BELTRAN, AND REP.
LIZA L. MAZA v. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND BLAS F.
OPLE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
legislators is premised upon the doctrine of separation of powers. Absent any clear contravention of the
law, the courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid.
Facts:
On 2003, then Ambassador Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to DFA proposing the terms
of the non-surrender bilateral agreement bet USA and RP. The RP, represented by then DFA Sec. Ople,
agreed with the US proposals. Such Agreement provides that current or former government officials
or employees or military personnel of one party present in the territory of the other shall not be
surrendered to any international tribunal, absent the express consent of the first party, and unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council. Bayan Muna imputes grave abuse of
discretion to respondents and prays that the Agreement be struck down as unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly.
2. Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for
concurrence, contravenes the Rome Statute and other treaties.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, as expressed in Art II of the 1987
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements,
which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. Hence, the Non-Surrender
Bilateral Agreement in the exchange note is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.
2. No. An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great
respect. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent any clear contravention of the law,
the courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
SM LAND, INC. V. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
Administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the
rule-making power granted by statute, have the force and effect of law.
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Facts:
Pursuant to RA No. 7227, the BCDA opened for disposition and development its Bonifacio
South Property. SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the
development of the lot which was accepted by the BCDA. However, the BCDA clarified that its act
should not be construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture agreement with SMLI but
only constitutes an authorization to conduct detailed negotiations with SMLI and iron out the terms
and conditions of the agreement. Afterwards, a Certification was issued by the BCDA and signed by
both parties. BCDA prepared for the conduct of a Competitive Challenge. In furtherance thereof, the
agency issued Terms of Reference. Consequently, SMLI was required to post a proposal security in
the amount of PhP 187 million, following the prescribed procedure outlined in the TOR and the
NEDA JV Guidelines. Instead of proceeding with the Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded
with SMLI stating that it will welcome any voluntary and unconditional proposal to improve the
original offer. In turn, SMLI increased the total secured payments with an upfront payment. Without
responding to SMLIs new proposal, the BCDA sent a memorandum to the OP categorically
recommending the termination of the Competitive Challenge. Alarmed by this development, SMLI
urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge as agreed upon. However, the BCDA
terminated the Competitive Challenge altogether.
Issue:
Whether or not the BCDA gravely abused its discretion in terminating the Competitive
Challenge.
Ruling:
Yes. SMLI has the right to a completed competitive challenge pursuant to the NEDA JV
Guidelines and the Certification issued by the BCDA. The reservation clause adverted to by the
respondent cannot, in any way, prejudice said right. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of
the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution
of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in EOs. Through Section 5 of EO 109,
Section 8 of EO 109-A and now Section 8 of EO 423, the President effectively delegated her inherent
executive power to issue rules and regulations on procurement to her subordinate executive
officials, her alter egos. Pursuant to said repeated directives from no less than the Chief Executive, the
NEDA issued the JV Guidelines providing the procedures for the coagulation of joint ventures
between the government and a private entity. In this regard, attention must be drawn to the well-
established rule that administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated
pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statute, have the force and effect of law.
DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS),
REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the Department of Health, Region VIII, and FLORA DELA PEA
Provisionary orders of the Ombudsman are immediately executory. The Ombudsman has the
power to ensure compliance with imposition of penalties pursuant to his administrative disciplinary
authority.
Facts:
The petitioner, Gobenciong, was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman after an

investigation made upon a complaint filed against him by respondent Dela Pena. The petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner having been denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner now
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contends that the Ombudsman does not have the power to investigate, prosecute and discipline
public officers. Hence, RA 6770 is unconstitutional as it constitutes an undue delegation of power.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority, is

unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. RA 6770 provisos granting investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary powers to the
Ombudsman are not unconstitutional. The espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is
untenable. It is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of
sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. he Office of the
Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate
as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however,
left it to Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own action. And so it was
that RA 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec. 15(1) thereof, the Ombudsman to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of cases [of which he has
primary jurisdiction.
STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA

BAY
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it
is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.
Facts:
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC against several
government agencies, among them the MMDA, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay. They also prayed that MMDA et al. be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the
concerned residents of Manila. MMDA et al. filed an appeal before CA arguing that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of
funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, MMDA et al. also asserted that the cleaning of
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. CA sustained the
decision of RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to
the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
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2. Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.
Ruling:
1. No. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal
provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep
the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be
a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
2. Yes. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. The MMDAs duty in this regard is
spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA which states that
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse
and recycle solid waste. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be
noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well.
LEGISLATURE
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA)
The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Facts:
SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and PDEA from enforcing
paragraphs (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that it is constitutionally infirm because it
imposes an additional qualification for a senator- mandatory drug testing. Pimentel Jr. and Atty.
Laserna Jr. also seek the nullification of said law, including the COMELEC Res. No. 6486 which
implements the former.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Res. No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator.
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Ruling:
Yes. It is unconstitutional because it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates

any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
Thus, COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo P.
Espina, Salvador P. Vallares, Joselito A. Moraleda, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 177857-58 January 24, 2012, Velasco Jr., J.
The general principle of taxation is that tax levied for special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out of such purpose only. It cannot be treated as private funds to be disbursed or
invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities.
Facts:
Republic Act 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer
the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF) which imposes a levy on every sale of copra. The seller was
issued Cocofund receipts for levy of such sales. The fund was placed under the disposition of Cocofed,
the national association of coconut producers having the largest membership. The Philippine
Coconut Authority also had its share of the coco levy funds. When martial law started in 1972, several
presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut industry through collection and use of the
coco levy fund, two of which are:
PD 961 and PD 1468 which both provide that the CCSF and CDIF shall not be construed as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the government. The intention is for
the said funds to belong to coconut farmers in their private capacities.
It is a contention that PD 961 and PD1468 is unconstitutional because the funds collected by
PCA are in the nature of a special fund which should be disbursed only for the special purpose for
which it is collected.
Issue:
Whether or not the PDs issued are unconstitutional for declaring the funds which the PCA is
authorized to collect or as part of the funds of the government.
Ruling:
Yes, the mandate of PDs are unconstitutional. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes
and can only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of
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stocks to be given for free to private individuals. The coco levy funds were exactions with the end
goal of developing the entire coconut industry, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues
received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned
by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale
behind the imposition of taxes or levies. Furthermore, Article VI, Section 29 (3) provides that all
money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact
mandated, by these PDs. Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468
are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the
distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund a special fund of
the government to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) v. COMELEC represented by CHAIRMAN

BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR.
G.R. No. 172103, 13 April 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2%
threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats. In
order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Rounding off may result
in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law.
Facts.
Petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa,
filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation entreating the COMELEC en banc to recognize their
entitlement to an additional seat and that their second nominees be immediately proclaimed. They
based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 147589 & 147613,
November 20, 2003, 416 SCRA 304.) applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786, & 136795, October 6, 2000, 342
SCRA 244) however resolved to deny CIBACs motion following the simplified formula of the
Commission.
Issue.
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner CIBAC
an additional seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system.
Held.
NO. It is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2%
threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other
qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans: The only basis given by the law is that a
party receiving at least 2% of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first
party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latters number of seats and so on.
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties
are entitled to, based on proportional representation. In simplified form, it is written as follows:
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Additional seats for concerned party = (No. of votes of concerned party/No. of votes of the first
party) x No. of additional seats allocated to first party. The above formula does not give an exact
mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be
entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual
mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that
provided by the law.
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not
entitled to an additional seat. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less
than one, then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate
from our ruling in Veterans that in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number
is necessary. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.
PRESIDENCY
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL,
Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010, Velasco, J.
The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
Facts:
Lourdes Rubrico, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by
armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short), and
brought to and detained at, the air base without charges. But even after her release, the harassment
continued that led to the filing of criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct. However, in the said case
nothing happened.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents including
President Gloria Macapgal-Arroyo to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the
petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping
qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. The CA, however, dismissed
the petition and dropped President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Ruling:
No. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. The President may not be sued
during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the
President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
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Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
JUDICIARY
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) VS. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, 178193, 180705 February 11, 2010, Velasco, J.
The Court is not empowered to review and go into the wisdom of the policy decision or choices
of PCGG and other executive agencies of the government absent any grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) filed a motion for the conversion
of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A" and "B" common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC),
registered in the name of Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies (hereunder
referred to as SMC Common Shares), into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares. Oppositors-
intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their plea for reconsideration on the following submission or
issues: The conversion of the shares is patently disadvantageous to the government and the coconut
farmers, given that SMCs option to redeem ensures that the shares will be bought at less than their
market value.
Issue:
Whether or not the contentions of the oppositors are shall be given credence.
Ruling:
NO. The conversion may be viewed as a sound business strategy to preserve and conserve
the value of the governments interests in CIIF SMC shares.
Due to the nature of stocks in general and the prevailing business conditions, the
government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), chose not to
speculate with the CIIF SMC shares. It is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power
of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has control over all
matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or, in this case, sequestered assets
under the administration of the PCGG. Surely, such control is neither legislative nor judicial. Well
settled is the rule that the courts cannot inquire into the wisdom of an executive act but must respect
the decision of the executive department, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 171101 November 22, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J.
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The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes. It extends to rules and regulations issued by
the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-
legislative in nature.
Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs
Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there
are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the
right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the
effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that
have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have
produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine
should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the
Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to
retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the
option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III,
MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS v. SENATOR JINGGOY E.
ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT
On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
Facts:
Pursuant to a resolution directing the Labor Committee to investigate, in aid of legislation,

the liability for plunder of the Former President Ramos and others for the illegal investment of
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OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain Project, Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc.,
received from the Committee an invitation to attend at a public hearing to be conducted for the said
purpose. His request to be excused was denied by the Committee. Petitioners then filed the instant
petition which seeks to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from
compelling petitioners to appear before it. In a manifestation with urgent plea for a TRO, Romero
raised, among others, that when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource
person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry. Petitioners claim that the subject
matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject matter of the Committees inquiry is sub judice.
Ruling:
No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. In this case, the subject matter of the senate inquiry is no longer sub judice for the reason that
the Court has denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of its decision filed by Chavez. Even
assuming that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance would
not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative
purpose. (See Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704, October 17, 2006)
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes.
On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the
application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as
tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;
and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial
legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the
Constitution. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons
to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ROQUE VS. COMELEC

The COMELEC shall be responsible for the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
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Facts:
The enactment of Republic Act No. 8436 in 1997 authorized the adoption of an automated
election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. In 2007, RA
9369 was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. Petitioners claim that the conclusion
of the automation contract constitutes an abdication on the part of Comelec of the constitutional
mandate that the Comelec shall be responsible for the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
(Section 2, Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution)
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract abandons the

constitutional mandate that the COMELEC shall be responsible for election law enforcement.
Ruling:
No. The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for
the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission
devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to
their operation. As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators
would provide assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of
the day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
Moreover, the RFP (Request for Proposal or otherwise known as Terms of Reference),
which forms an integral part of the automation contract, has put all prospective bidders on notice of
Comelecs intent to automate and to accept bids that would meet several needs, among which is a
complete solutions provider which can provide effective overall nationwide project management
service under COMELEC supervision and control, to ensure effective and successful implementation
of the [automation] Project.
FELICIANO LEGASPI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO D. GERMAR, AND ROGELIO P.

SANTOS JR.
G.R. No. 216572, April 19, 2016
COMELEC divisions has the authority to decide election cases. Their decisions are capable of
attaining finality, without need of any affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC
en banc.
FACTS:
Germar, Santos and Esquivel were among the candidates fielded by the LP to vie for
positions in Norzagaray, Bulcan during the 2013 elections. Legaspi on the other hand was the NUP
bet for Mayor in the same town. Germar and Santos were the winning candidates. Legaspi moved for
the suspension of their proclamation with the COMELEC for their alleged vote buying but to no avail.
The First Division and Special Division of the COMELEC ruled to disqualify Germar and Santos. The
COMELEC en banc had a 3-2 vote in the disqualification of the LP bets which did not reach the 4 vote
requirement. A rehearing was made in which the COMELEC en banc took another vote but still failed
to get a 4 vote thus dismissing Legaspis complaint.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC divisions decisions can attain finality.
RULING:
YES. The decisions of the COMELEC divisons can attain finality.
Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC divisions the authority to
decide election cases. Their decisions are capable of attaining finality, without need of any affirmative
or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en bane. And while the Constitution requires that
the motions for reconsideration be resolved by the COMELEC en banc, it likewise requires that four
votes must be reached for it to render a valid ruling and, consequently, to GRANT the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents. Hence, when the private respondents failed to get the four-
vote requirement on their motion for reconsideration, their motion is defeated and lost as there was
NO valid ruling to sustain the plea for reconsideration. The prior valid action - the COMELEC Special
First Division's October 3, 2013 Resolution in this case - therefore subsists and is affirmed by the
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Dennis A. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar

Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution does not prohibit promotional appointment as
long as the Commissioner has not served his full term of seven years, and the appointment shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the Commissioners term.
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Guillermo N.

Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven years starting
February 2, 2004 to February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, she appointed Reynaldo A.
Villar (Villar) as a third member of COA for a term of seven years starting from February 2, 2004, to
February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth
year of Villar as commissioner, the latter was designated acting chairman of the COA from February
4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008 Villar was appointed and nominated as
Chairman of the COA. The Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve
chairman for the unexpired portion of his term as commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Herein
petitioner opposes Villars appointment saying that such appointment is invalid under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. He said that reappointment of any kind within the COA be it for the
same position (Commissioner to Commissioner) or for an upgraded position (Commissioner to
Chairman) is a prohibited appointment and therefore a nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not Villars appointment is invalid under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution.
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Ruling:
No, Villars appointment is not prohibited under the Constitution. The Constitutional provision
provides: The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years,
and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. The provision, on its face, does
not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the
commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of
Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term
to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). There is nothing
in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to
Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA

G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be

considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
Facts:
For 4 successive regular elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed
as winner one Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then
came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time
in seeking the formers disqualification to run, predicated on the 3-consecutive term limit rule.
COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the
RTC to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised. RTC declared Abundo
ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he has already served 3 consecutive terms.
COMELECs 2nd division and en banc affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms.
Ruling:
No. As stressed in Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the
three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term. An elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position
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after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the
prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official
after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth
term, immediately following the third.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time
shall not, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-
term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption
as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or
causes.
The almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is
and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. It cannot be overemphasized that pending
the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary
constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. In other words, during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office,
Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence,
even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position such declaration would not
erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors
office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board

GR Number 166910, October 19, 2010, VELASCO, JR., J.
The term franchise includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the
form of statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise
has been delegated by Congress.
Facts:
PD 1112 created the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), vesting it with the power to enter into
contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority to operate a
toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and adjust it
from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the
North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the
PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX.
Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government
Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with private
entities without going into public bidding. In 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities
executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension
projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its
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franchised areas. Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South
Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects.
Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a
and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power to
issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate the toll
facility/system.
RULING:
Yes. The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with
authority to operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given
power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12,
Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate
public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as
contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987
Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may
validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue 159883
franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA)
To impose a mandatory drug test on the accused would violate his right to privacy and right to
self-incrimination.
Facts:
SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and PDEA from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm.
For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or
an employee deemed undesirable. And for a 3rd, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions. Pimentel Jr. and Atty. Laserna Jr. also seek the
nullification of said law, including the COMELEC Res. No. 6486 which implements the former.
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Issue:
Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), and (f)of Sec. 36, RA 9165 is unconstitutional for
violating the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause, thus constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:
No, paragraphs (c) and (d) is constitutional. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c) and
(d), for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is
a random and suspicion less arrangement. The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution,
as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals.
Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and
(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and
non-discriminatory. In the case at bar, the SC is of the view and so holds that the paragraph (c) and
(d) are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Yes, paragraphs (f) is unconstitutional. SC finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
"randomness" and "suspicion less." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their
will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
DUE PROCESS
GONZALO S. GO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS and OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 172027 July 29, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J.
Vested rights can only be deprived through due process of law.
FACTS:
Gonzalo Go Jr. was promoted to the position of Chief Hearing Officer (Chief, Legal Division),
with a salary rate of PhP 151,800 per annum. The promotion was to the position of Attorney VI,
Salary Grade (SG)-26. However, Department of Budget and Management (DBM), informed the
then DOTC Secretary of the erroneous classification in the Position Allocation List of the DBM of two
positions in his department, one of which is in the LTFRB (formerly BOT). Go wrote the DBM to
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question the summary demotion or downgrading of his salary grade from SG-26 to SG-25. The DBM
reminded Go that based on the departments standards and criteria formulated, the division chief of
bureau-level agencies, like the LTFRB, is allocable to Attorney V, SG-25. Following the denial of his
MR, Go appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP dismissed Go's appeal. His petition was
also denied by the CA via Rule 43 on procedural grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether the reallocation of rank resulting in the downgrading of position and diminution of
salary was valid.
RULING:
No. Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments of his position as
Attorney VI, SG-26. And being an incumbent to that position, he has, at the very least, an equitable
right to receive the corresponding salary and emoluments attached thereto. The summary demotion
to a lower salary grade, with the corresponding decrease in salary and emoluments after he has
occupied his current rank and position, goes against his right to continue enjoying the benefits
accorded the position and which his predecessors must have been receiving. His right thereto has
ripened into a vested right, of which he could be deprived only by due process of law, but which we
believe he was denied through the summary reallocation. With the view we take of this case, Go was
neither apprised nor given the opportunity to contest the reallocation before its summary
implementation.
EQUAL PROTECTION
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056 December 21, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class.
Facts:
There were twenty-four (24) cityhood bills that were not acted upon in the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was signed into law amending Sec. 450 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160) increasing the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from
P20M average annual income to P100M locally generated income. During the 13 th Congress, sixteen
(16) out of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, their individual cityhood
bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the municipality covered
from the P100M income requirement imposed by RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by
Congress and eventually lapsed into law. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
Petitioners sought to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. It is contended that the
grant of exemption from the P100M income requirement to only the 16 municipalities is
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the sixteen (16) cityhood laws are valid and constitutional.
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Ruling:
Yes. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention,
the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt
from the PhP100 million income criterion. .
The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon
factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to
legislate is the right to classify, necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal
protection clause.
The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending
cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other
municipalities aiming for cityhood. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after
what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPOUSES MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA v. ST. THERESAS
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES
Without proof that the subject photographs are placed within the ambit of their protected zone
of privacy, one cannot insist that there is an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.
Facts:
Pictures of Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara , clad only in their undergarments, were uploaded
by Angela Tan on her Facebook profile. Escudero, a computer teacher at STCs high school
department, learned that some students posted pictures online, dressed only in brassiers. Escudero
then reported the matter to Rose Tigol, STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. After an
investigation, STC found Julia, Julienne and other identified students to have violated the rules
proscribed by the schools student handbook. These identified students claimed that they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials in the conference they attended. The students
then were barred from joining the commencement exercises as a penalty.
Despite the issuance of a TRO, STC still barred the sanctioned students from participating in
the graduation rites. The petitioners then filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Wirt of Habeas Data.
However, the RTC dismissed the petition for failure to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the minors can invoke their right to informational privacy.
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Ruling:
No. Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about
themselves. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such
as here, where the defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that
would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students Facebook friends, STC did not violate the minors right to privacy, as it was the minors
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA
CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,
MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010, Velasco
The welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens
patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
Facts:
Eliseo Soriano made the following remarks in his program, Ang Dating Daan: Lehitimong
anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di
ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
The one referred by Soriano is Michael Sandoval, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo and a regular
host of the TV program, Ang Tamang Daan. The MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang
Dating Daan program for 20 days.
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension order was unconstitutional for it amounts to
abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint.
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Ruling:
No. The Court rules that the government's interest to protect and promote the interests and
welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on
petitioner's prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.
Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt,
was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is
unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in
regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time
television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986
proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of
speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such
action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive
words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language
of FCC, a pig in the parlor. Public interest would be served if the pig is reasonably restrained or even
removed from the parlor.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA
CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,
MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.
Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech.
Facts:
Eliseo Soriano made the following remarks in his program, Ang Dating Daan: Lehitimong
anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di
ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
The one referred by Soriano is Michael Sandoval, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo and a regular
host of the TV program, Ang Tamang Daan. The MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang
Dating Daan program for 20 days. It is the contention of the petitioner that the statement was made
in the exercise of his religious freedom.
Issue:
Whether or not the words he uttered were only said in the exercise of his religious freedom.
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Ruling:
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come within
the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as
follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any

particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came
out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them
the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context
show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious
conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements
respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of
name-calling and foul-language discourse. Hence, his speech cannot be protected by the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
EMINENT DOMAIN
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and CIELO OUANO
MARTINEZ v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU;
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) v. RICARDO L. INOCIAN, in his
personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, et. al.
G.R. No. 168770 & G.R. No. 168812, February 9, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires.
Facts:
The following are two (2) consolidated cases whereby the respective owners and
successors-in-interest. They pray for the reconveyance of their respective properties subjected to
expropriation in favor of the government for the expansion of Lahug Airport for public use. Their
claim for reconveyance is based on the alleged promise of the National Airport Corporation (NAC),
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authoritys (MCIAA) predecessor agency, that should the Lahug
Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport, they are assured the right to repurchase their land.
When the Lahug Airport was closed and transferred its operations with MCIAA, the latter
refused to honor the said agreement. Hence, Ouanos and Inocians filed their respective complaints
against the latter. MCIAA averred that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged
verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their landholdings is already
barred by the Statute of Frauds. Hence, this petition was filed.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Ouanos and Inocians have the right to repurchase their properties
pursuant to the verbal agreement with the governments negotiating team assuring them of its
reacquisition should the public purpose for which the properties were used ceases.
Ruling:
Yes. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its
continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of
course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of
the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also
dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in
this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. They must
likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots
and the monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as
private owners, were benefited thereby.
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA represented by BARANGAY CAPTAIN

ISMAEL GUTIERREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA SINDAYAN
G.R. No. 150640, 22 March 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.
The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses Jose Magtoto III
and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 117674-R.
Claiming that respondents property was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road,
petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents land into Barangay Sindalans feeder
road. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that the expropriation was for a private purpose, that
is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner
deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation
was for the benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road
being proposed to be built across the respondents land was to serve a privately owned subdivision
and those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision.
Issue:
Whether or not the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain was for a public
purpose.
Held:
No. While the number of people who use or can use the property is not determinative of
whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual milieu of the case reveals that the
intended use of respondents lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not
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exercisable in common. Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the subdivisions owner who
will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction
with his development permit and license to sell from the HLURB, and also be relieved of spending his
own funds for a right-of-way. In this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners are able
to go to the barrio road by passing through the lot of a certain Torres family. Thus, the inescapable
conclusion is that the expropriation of respondents lot is for the actual benefit of the Davsan II
Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.
The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just
compensation. Taking an individuals private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by
a higher good which is public use and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without
these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but
would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals basic right to
property as well.
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION AND RIZAL

COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL;
SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM;
ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG,
NOEL MALLARI, AND JULIO SUNIGA AND HIS SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. AND WINDSOR ANDAYA
Taking in eminent domain cases also occurs when agricultural lands voluntarily offered by a
landowner are approved for CARP coverage through SDOs.
Facts:
The SC denied the petition for review of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), but ordered that the
original qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) be still given the option to
remain as stockholders of HLI. The said stock distribution option (SDO) was revoked upon motion for
reconsideration, and the SC ordered compulsory acquisition in favor of the farmers.
On Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution, HLI argues for the impropriety of the
revocation of the SDO. But should the option stays revoked, HLI argues that the just compensation
should be pegged at 2006 (the time when the lands were placed under compulsory acquisition due to
HLIs failure to perform its obligations under the Stock Distribution Program). This was opposed by
the Alyansa, which argued for the revocation of the SDO, and pegged the just compensation at 1989
(the time when the Stock Distribution Program was approved).
Issue:
Whether or not the SDO should remain revoked, and just compensation pegged at 1989.
Ruling:
Yes. Just compensation should be pegged at 1989. Just compensation for the property should
be based at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the PARC. The time of taking
does not only mean the time when the landowner was deprived of the use of his property, or when
the title was issued to the Republic or the beneficiaries. Taking also occurs when agricultural lands
voluntarily offered by a landowner are approved for CARP coverage through SDOs. The approval by
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the PARC of the SDO takes place over the notice of coverage ordinarily issued for compulsory
acquisition, and is considered as the operative act to determine the time of taking.
In this case, Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), the original owner of the Hacienda
Luisita agricultural lands, voluntarily ceded its ownership over the said lands to HLI (a corporation
with a personality distinct from Tadeco), to comply with CARP through the SDO scheme. Hence, when
the PARC approved for CARP coverage the said conveyed lands subject to the SDO scheme in 1989,
the said date is also construed as the time of taking for purposes of determining just compensation.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

G.R. No. 171101, 05 July 2011, En Banc, Velasco Jr., J.
The non-impairment protection is applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts of contracts
by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties.
Facts:
The original farm worker beneficiaries (FWB) chose to become stockholders of Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. (HLI) by reason of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 93%
of the FWBs agreed to the Stock Distribution Option Agreement which became the basis of the Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC). In their
agreement the parties agree among others that 33.296% of the outstanding capital stock of HLI that
has to be distributed to the FWBs under the SDP. Also that HLI shall within a reasonable time
subdivide and allocate among the qualified family-beneficiaries. The FWBs through their
representatives sought to have the agreement revoked alleging that HLI did not perform their
obligations as required under the agreement. The PARC adopted the resolution of the DAR and
revoked the agreement between the FWB and HLI.
Issue:
Whether or not PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLIs SDP and whether such
revocation violate the non-impairment of contract clause.
Ruling:
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLIs
posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. Such power or
authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic
postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. To deny
PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same
agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be
without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations between and
among parties is deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannot successfully be
resisted by force of the non-impairment guarantee. There is no impingement of the impairment
clause, the non-impairment protection being applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts of
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. Impairment
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obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existing remedies for the enforcement of
the rights of the parties. Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already
in effect at the time of the contract execution.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and ANTONIO P. GANA v. OLONGAPO

MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC. and TRIPLE CROWN SERVICES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 146184-85, G.R. No. 161117, G.R. No. 167827, January 31, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of awarding government
contracts, is to ensure that the people get maximum benefits and quality services from the contracts.
More significantly, the strict compliance with the requirements of a public bidding echoes the call for
transparency in government transactions and accountability of public officers. Public biddings are
intended to minimize occasions for corruption and temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of
government authorities in awarding contracts.
Facts:
Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services, Inc. (TCSI) were
among the five contractors of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) which had janitorial and
maintenance service contracts covering various areas in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA). Before their service contracts expired, the MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P. Gana,
then General Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI informing them that their contracts
would no longer be renewed. TCSI and OMSI suggested that a public bidding be conducted and that
the effectivity of its service contract be meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared.
Notwithstanding, MIAA granted the concession to a new service contractor, Gana and
Goodline Staffers & Allied Services, Inc. (Goodline) pursuant to Sec. 1(e) of EO 301, series of 1987,
entitled Decentralizing Actions on Government Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records
Disposal. Thus, OMSI and TCSI sought for injunctive writs before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against MIAA and Goodline which were granted. The RTC declared null and void the negotiated
contract awarded to Goodline and the resolution of the MIAA board which authorized Gana to
negotiate the award of service contract, and ordered the holding of a public bidding on the janitorial
service contract.
MIAA and Gana appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) but it was denied on the ground
that EO 301 refer only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment, and do not
refer to other contracts, such as lease of equipment, and that in the same vein, supplies in Sec. 1(e) of
EO 301 only include materials and equipment and not service contracts, which are included in the
general rule of Sec. 1. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not MIAA in the context of this case, can be barred from entering into negotiated
contracts after the expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI.
Ruling:
Yes. We cannot agree with the contention of MIAA and Gana that the exceptions to the public
bidding rule in Sec. 1 of EO 301 cover both contracts for public services and for supplies, material,
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and equipment. Their reliance on Sec. 1(e) of EO 301 for the award of a service contract for janitorial
and maintenance services without public bidding is misplaced.
This Court explained the rationale behind EO 301, upholding the general rule that contracts
shall not be entered into or renewed without public bidding, thus:
Executive Order No. 301 explicitly permits negotiated contracts in particular

identified instances. In its preamble, it adverted to the then existing set-up of a centralized
administrative system . . . for reviewing and approving negotiated contracts . . ., and to
the unsatisfactory character thereof in that such centralized administrative system is
not at all facilitative particularly in emergency situations, characterized as it is by red
tape and too much delay in the processing and final approval of the required
transaction or activity; hence, the need to decentralize the processing and final
approval of negotiated contracts . . . It then laid down, in its Section 1, guidelines for
negotiated contracts thenceforth to be followed. While affirming the general policy that
contracts shall not be entered into or renewed without public bidding.
CITIZENSHIP
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are (1) Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Facts:
When he was seven years old, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa acquired American citizenship when
his father became a naturalized American citizen. When he arrived in the Philippines in 1995, he was
admitted as a balikbayan. Thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of the BID. The
Consul General of the US Embassy requested the deportation of Tabasa on the ground that a standing
warrant for several charges has been issued against him and that his passport has been revoked.
Tabasa filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA. As ordered, the BID presented Tabasa
before the CA. However, Tabasa filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171, and that because he is now a
Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. The CA denied
Tabasas petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
thus cannot be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien.
Ruling:
No. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a.) Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b.) Natural-born Filipinos
including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
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Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available
only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity,
and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had
renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate
under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for
repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all
acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On
their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their
parents. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The
privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the
petition for repatriation.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAWS
PUBLIC OFFICERS
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ISABEL A. SIWA, STENOGRAPHER, METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, MANILA
A.M. No. P-13-3156, November 11, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
Failure to submit the TSNs within the period prescribed by law constitutes gross neglect of
duty- an offense classified as a grave offense even if committed only once.
Facts:
A letter-complaint against Siwa alleged that she has been engaged in lending activities and in
the discounting of checks. She claimed that the business of rediscounting checks is a legitimate
business; that her business transactions occurred outside office premises; and that she never
neglected her duty as a court stenographer. The investigating judge recommended that she be
directed to explain why she still has pending transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) despite having
already availed of optional retirement. The Court then found Siwa administratively liable for
engaging in the business of lending and discounting of checks. OCA then directed Siwa to comment
on her alleged failure to submit the TSNs. But, Siwa had already moved to the US, without completing
the clearance required for her retirement. OCA recommended that Siwa be adjudged liable for gross
neglect of duty, for her failure to submit the TSNs, despite an administrative circular providing that
"all stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to
the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken.
Issue:
Whether or not Siwa is liable for gross neglect of duty from failure to submit the TSNs.
Ruling:
Yes. In Absin v. Montalla, which is on all fours applicable in this case, the Court held:
The failure to submit the TSNs within the period prescribed under Administrative
Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect of duty is
classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense
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pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service.
As a stenographer, he should realize that the performance of his duty is essential to

the prompt and proper administration of justice, and his inaction hampers the
administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary. Public office is a
public trust, and he has without a doubt violated this trust by his failure to execute
his duty as a court stenographer.
But in lieu of dismissal, which may no longer be imposed due to her retirement, as a penalty
for the offense, all her retirement benefits are forfeited.
ELECTION LAW
ROQUE VS. COMELEC

The legislative intent in RA 8436 is for the May 2010 electoral exercise to be fully automated,
regardless of whether or not pilot testing was run in the 2007 polls.
Facts:
The enactment of Republic Act No. 8436 in 1997 authorized the adoption of an Automated
Election System (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. However, the
following elections were not able to adopt the AES. In 2007, RA 9369 was passed authorizing anew
the Comelec to use an AES. Pursuant to the law, Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC)
caused the publication in different newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid for
the procurement of goods and services to be used in the automation project.
Among the submitted bids, only the joint venture of TIM and Smartmatic was declared as the
single complying calculated bid. Petitioners question the validity and seek to nullify the Comelec-
Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract contending Comelec did not conduct any pilot
testing of the PCOS machines in violation of RA 8436 as amended by RA 8369.
Issue:
Whether or not pilot testing of the PCOS machines is necessary for the 2010 electoral
exercise to be fully automated.
Ruling:
NO. Sec. 6 of the amended RA 8436, as couched, therefore, unmistakably conveys the idea of
unconditional full automation in the 2010 elections. A construal making pilot testing of the AES a
prerequisite or condition sine qua non to putting the system in operation in the 2010 elections is
tantamount to reading into said section something beyond the clear intention of Congress, as
expressed in the provision itself.
The provisions of the clearly conveys that the [AES] to be used in the 2010 elections need
not have been used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of its capability need not be in a
previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the success and capability of the PCOS may be in an
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electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction. As determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system had been
successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada;
and New York, USA, albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider. But then, RA 9369
does not call for the winning bidder of the 2010 automation project and the deploying
entity/provider in the foreign electoral exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law
incidentally require that the system be first used in an archipelagic country or with a topography or a
voting population similar to or approximating that of the Philippines.
JAIME C. REGIO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONNIE C. CO

It is only when the protestant has successfully discharged the burden of proving that the re-
counted ballots are the very same ones counted during the revision proceedings, will the court or the
Commission, as the case may be, even consider the revision results.
Facts:
Petitioner Regio and private respondent Co, among other candidates, ran in the October 25,
2010 barangay elections for the position of punong barangay. Regio was proclaimed winner for the
contested post of punong barangay. Co then filed an election protest before the MeTC. During the
preliminary conference, there was a revision of ballots which indicated a substantial recovery on the
part of Co. During his turn to present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision committee report,
showing that he garnered the highest number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the
elections were tainted with irregularities. Despite it, the trial court declared Regio as the duly-elected
punong barangay. Aggrieved, Co filed an appeal before the COMELEC but it dismissed the appeal
noting that Co failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved. Co
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong
barangay.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC erred in ruling that private respondent had successfully
discharged the burden of proving the integrity of the ballots.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court summarized the standards to be observed in an election contest predicated
on the theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of the voters due to alleged
irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots. These guiding standards are:
(1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election
returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care
which precludes the opportunity of tampering and suspicion of change, abstraction or
substitution;
(2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a
manner is on the protestant;
(3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such
substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that
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the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode
of achieving that end;
(4) It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of
law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or likelihood
thereof shifts to the protestee; and
(5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of COMELEC that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as
reflected in the election returns. In the same case, the Court referred to various provisions in
the Omnibus Election Code providing for the safe-keeping and preservation of the ballots,
more specifically Secs. 160, 217, 219, and 220 of the Code.
In the case at bar, Respondent Co cannot simply rely on the alleged absence of evidence of
reports of untoward incidents, and from there immediately conclude that the ballots have been
preserved. What he should have presented are concrete pieces of evidence, independent of the
revision proceedings that will tend to show that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings
were the very same ones counted by the BETs during the elections, and the very same ones cast by
the public. Without presenting to the court any evidence outside of the proceedings, respondent Co
as protestant may simply claim that the ballot boxes themselves are the proof that they were
properly preserved.
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA v. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014, Velasco, J.
The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before
the substitution was made. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First
Division since this only entailed a change in the Divisions composition of magistrates.
Facts:
Petitioner Villarosa and respondent Festin were rival candidates for the mayoralty post in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 2013 elections where Festin initially won. Since the
accuracy of the vote count was disputed, a physical recount of the ballots was conducted. RTC
rendered a Decision declaring the proclamation of respondent Festin void. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted by the RTC.
Aggrieved, Festin elevated the case to COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief. The COMELEC, acting through its First Division, issued an Order requiring petitioner
to file his answer to the petition. To petitioners surprise, on April 10, 2014, COMELEC granted
private respondents request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC Decisions execution
pending appeal. What petitioner considered questionable was that the injunction was issued by a
newly-constituted Special First Division, which was allegedly formed due to the absence of several
COMELEC commissioners who, at that time, were personally attending to the concerns of the
overseas absentee voters abroad. Petitioner points out that the special division was constituted only
on April 8, 2014 through Resolution No. 9868 and was composed of only two members, Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreo, with the former presiding.
Issue:
Whether or not the Special First Division has jurisdiction to issue an injunction.
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Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to petitioners claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special
First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case
between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and
temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case,
merely indicates that the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity
or via substitution.
The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it
before the substitution was made. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the
Special First Division since this only entailed a change in the Divisions composition of magistrates.
Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If anything, it was only petitioners naivety
that misled him into interpreting the designation of the division as a "special" one, meaning it is
distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also mistaken in claiming that the jurisdiction was
eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division from the Special First Division by ruling on the motion
to quash since the First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.
MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE P. PAYUMO III

G.R. No. 216691; July 21, 2015; VELASCO, JR., J.
The reglementary period for instituting an election period should be reckoned from the actual
date of proclamation.
Facts:
Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race of
Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local elections. In the polls conclusion,
Garcia was proclaimed winner for having garnered 31,138 votes as against Payumos 13,202. On May
27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest with the RTC in Balanga, Bataan (RTC), on the ground of
the alleged prevalence of fraud and irregularities in all the clustered precincts of Dinalupihan,
amplified by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines unreliability, casting doubt on the
results of the counting and canvassing of votes.
Garcia contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary period is from the actual
date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters that Garcia was
proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming arguendo that it was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia
insists the proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on the
printed COCP he received.
Issue:
Whether or not Payumos election protest was filed out of time.
Ruling:
YES. As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of
the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears on the
printed COCP. Payumos reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be sure,
Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary only for purposes
of transmitting the results to the next level of canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning
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candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have been lowered are
concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling.
Jurisprudence have established that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is
mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives
the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor
brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality
but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over
the case.
ERNESTO BATALLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TEODORO BATALLER

G.R. No. 184268, September 15, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.
In the appreciation of the ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the
intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty (Intent Rule). Where the name
of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office
for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said candidate (Neighborhood Rule).
Facts:
Petitioner Batalla, and private respondent Bataller, were candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay. During the count, Batalla garnered 113 votes while Bataller garnered 108
votes. Consequently, Batalla was proclaimed the Punong Barangay winner. Bataller afterwards filed
an election protest and claimed misappreciation of seven ballots. MCTC rendered its Decision finding
that Batalla and Bataller had garnered an equal number of votes. Section 240 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides for the drawing of
lots in case of a tie of two or more electoral candidates garnering the same or equal highest number
of votes, with the proclamation as winner of the candidate favored by luck. Batalla disagreed with
the findings of the trial court in appreciating the five protested ballots in favor of Bataller
Issue:
Whether or not the five protested ballots were correctly appreciated by the MCTC as votes
for Bataller, resulting into a tie between the contenders.
Ruling:
No. Only three ballots to be credited to Bataller. After a scrutiny of the five (5) contested
ballots subject of Batallas instant position, we rule that three (3) ballots marked as Exhibits A, E, and
G were properly appreciated and credited in favor of Bataller under the neighborhood rule and intent
rule. On the other hand, the ballots marked as Exhibits B and C are stray ballots.
In Exhibit A ballot, the intent rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that in the appreciation of
the ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it
could be determined with reasonable certainty. Hence, the intention of the voter to vote for Bataller
is unequivocal from the face of the Exhibit A ballot. The ballot in question should be liberally
appreciated to effectuate the voters choice of Bataller.
The ballot marked as Exhibit E was properly credited in Batallers name under the
neighborhood rule where the Court applied the same rule and credited to the candidates for Punong
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Barangay the votes written on the first line for kagawad with the spaces for Punong Barangay left
vacant.
The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a candidate is not
written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a
candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually applied in
consonance with the intent rule which stems from the principle that in the appreciation of the ballot,
the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be
determined with reasonable certainty.
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009,
VELASCO, JR., J.
The choice of PCOS by Comelec was not a spur-of-moment affair, but the product of honest-to-
goodness studies, consultations with CAC, and lessons learned from the ARMM 2008 automated
elections.
Facts:
Congress passed RA 9369 which authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election
system. On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, and TIM and Smartmatic , signed the Contract for the
automated tallying and recording of votes cast nationwide. Petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens,
filed a petition to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of
the terms of the Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its subcontractors.
Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in Section 5
of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an automated election system before deploying
it nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1)
the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities" under
RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only failed to submit relevant documents during the
bidding but also failed to show "community of interest" as required.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in awarding the 2010 elections automation project to
private respondents tim and smartmatic.
Ruling:
No. Congress has chosen the May 2010 elections to be the maiden run for full automation.
And judging from what the Court has heard and read in the course of these proceedings, the choice of
PCOS by Comelec was not a spur-of-moment affair, but the product of honest-to-goodness studies,
consultations with CAC, and lessons learned from the ARMM 2008 automated elections. With the
backing of Congress by way of budgetary support, the poll body has taken this historic, if not
ambitious, first step. It started with the preparation of the RFP/TOR, with a list of voluminous
annexes embodying in specific detail the bidding rules and expectations from the bidders. And after a
hotly contested and, by most accounts, a highly transparent public bidding exercise, the joint venture
of a Filipino and foreign corporation won and, after its machine hurdled the end-to-end
demonstration test, was eventually awarded the contract to undertake the automation project. Not
one of the losing or disqualified bidders questioned, at least not before the courts, the bona fides of
the bidding procedures and the outcome of the bidding itself.
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Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an
afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the
terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave
abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And surely, the
winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner.
HECTOR T. HIPE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MA. CRISTINA L. VICENCIO

G.R. No. 181528; October 2, 2009; VELASCO, JR., J.
COMELEC is created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs.
Facts:
Petitioner Hipe and respondent Vicencio were candidates for the mayoralty post in
Catubig, Northern Samar in the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvass proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Catubig, Northern Samar (MBOC), Vicencio petitioned for the
exclusion of seven election returns on the grounds that they were prepared under duress, threats,
intimidation or coercion; and that the election was marred by massive vote buying, widespread
coercion, terrorism, threats, and intimidation, preventing voters from voting, so that the said returns
did not reflect the will of the electorate.
The MBOC ruled in favor of Vicencio and excluded the seven election returns adverted to.
Petitioner Hipe filed a notice of appeal arguing that the written petition to exclude the election
returns was filed out of time, and that the grounds used to exclude the questioned returns were not
proper for a pre-proclamation controversy, were not supported by credible evidence, and were
beyond the jurisdiction of the MBOC. The Second Division of COMELEC dismissed the appeal for
being filed out of time. Petitioner Hipe filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the COMELEC En
Banc resolved to deny petitioner Hipes Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged
Resolution dismissing petitioner Hipes appeal for being filed out of time.
Ruling:
No. Even if the Court would entertain petitioner Hipes appeal from the decision of the MBOC
on the questioned election returns, the Court still rules in favor of respondent Vicencio. The
COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on record, upheld the findings of the MBOC
to exclude the subject election returns on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors. What exactly these documents and evidence are upon which the COMELEC based
its resolution, and how they have been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this
Courts scrutiny. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts
of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.
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DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEERES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELQUIADES A. ROBLES

G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, Velasco, J.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over elections relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Facts:
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY paty-
list. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers, without re-
election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. On March
2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAYs nominees for the 2007
elections. Earlier, however, petitioner Hans Christian Seeres, holding himself up as acting president
and secretary-general of BUHAY, also filed a Certificate of Nomination.
Seeres, in his Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates of Nomination, claims that the
nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to the expiration of the
latters term as party president. COMELEC proclaimed BUHAY as a winning party-list organization
and declared through a July 19, 2007 Resolution Robles as the duly authorized representative of
BUHAY. On July 23, 2007, Seeres filed a Petition for Certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC. Seeres also contends that Robles, acting as BUHAY President and nominating
officer, as well as being the Administrator of the LRTA, was engaging in electioneering or partisan
political campaign, hence, in violation of Civil Service Law and Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by Seeres is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
No. A plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to
Seeres. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over elections relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Since Seeres failed to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from
receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of Robles Certificate of Nomination, said
Resolution of the COMELEC has already become final and executory. Thus, this petition has now
become moot and can be dismissed outright. And even if we entertain the instant special civil action,
still, petitioners postulations are bereft of merit.
PUBLIC CORPORATION
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP)

G.R. No. 169913, June 08, 2011, J. Velasco, Jr.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 2264, amending the Local Government Code.
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Facts:
Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land. When Hilaria
died, the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses filed an action for reversion of
title against Deleste in 1963. While the case was pending in 1972, PD 27 was issued which mandates
that agricultural lands be awarded to farmers. Certificates of Land Transfers was then awarded in
favor of the private respondent-farmers. In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313,
reclassifying the subject property as residential. Because of this, the heirs of Deleste filed with
DARAB a petition seeking to nullify private respondents' CLTs. The Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) declared the CLTs as void in view of the subsequent reclassification of the
subject property into a residential land, and the violation of petitioners' constitutional right to due
process of law. Conversely, DARAB reversed the ruling of PARAD on the ground that the city
ordinance has not been approved by the HLURB.
Issue:
Whether LGUs have the power to classify lands and whether petitioners right to due process
was violated.
Ruling:
YES. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into
non-agricultural lands. Pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 2264, amending the Local Government Code,
municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. In this case, since the subject
property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance
No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an "agricultural land, and is therefore outside
the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, Velasco Jr., J
In the exercise of police power under the general welfare clause, the local government, through
the mayor, has the power to order the demolition of an establishment.
Facts:
Island West Cove Management Philippines, to which Petitioner Aquino is working as the
President and Chief Executive Officer, applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the
application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel,
covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the DENR.
However, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the "no build zone. There was no action taken by the
Municipality despite Aquinos appeal. EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Coves hotel was then issued. Respondents thereafter demolished the improvements. The Petitioner
argued that since the area is a forestland, it is the DENRand not the municipality of Malay that has
primary jurisdiction.
Issue:
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Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
demolition of the property.
Ruling:
No. The LGU may properly order the hotels demolition. Based on law and jurisprudence, the
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.
Moreover, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a
determination that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council,
qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. Based on law and jurisprudence, the office
of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments No
build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the stability of the grounds
foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water.
CONVERSION
AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
J.V. BAUTISTA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 204371, April 22, 2014, Velasco Jr., J.
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and
its residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan
City into an Highly Urbanized City. Hence, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then
be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Facts:
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, was issued by the President proclaiming
the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991." Pursuant to such
proclamation, COMELEC issued a minute resolution which provided that only those registered
residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. Petitioner, Aurelio Umali, then
Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a verified motion for reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed
conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. Hence,
all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City. However, his motion for reconsideration was denied by COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not only the qualified registered voters of Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Ruling:
No. The qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija can participate in
the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
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The phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 means the qualified voters not only
in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly
affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by
Cabanatuan Citys gain of independence. It reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the province. Also,
the said conversion will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the
province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC. The residents of the city will cease to be political
constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latters population. It will likewise reduce the
provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in
shares in local tax collections. A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy
from the province is a threat to the latters economic viability.
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija
and its residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered
voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA v. NATIONAL

ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 187107 January 31, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
The power of reorganization includes the power of removal. However, for a reorganization to be
valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio.
Facts:
Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation. Under PD 269, the NEA
Board is empowered to organize or reorganize NEAs staffing structure.
Thereafter, Resolutions Nos. 46 and 59 was enacted and all the NEA employees and officers are
considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant.
Hence, This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the implementation of
Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration (NEA)
Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of Administrators (NEA Board).
Issue:
Whether the NEA Board had the power to pass Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 terminating all of its
employees.
Ruling:
Yes. Under of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees
shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a
law enacted by Congress.
Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not
include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEAs manpower complement. Such
contention is erroneous.
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Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof

by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of ones position through
removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the
bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio.
Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Boards powers and
may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith. The fact that the NEA Board resorted to
terminating all the incumbent employees of NPC and, later on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that
ground alone, vitiate the bona fides of the reorganization.
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Deans Circle
2016
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
REMEDIAL
LAW
Remedial Law (Cases Penned by J. Velasco) Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
General Principles............................................................................................................................................................. 4
Nature of the Philippine Courts .................................................................................................................................. 4
Principle of Judicial Hierarchy ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Doctrine of Non-interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability ......................................................................... 5
Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Over the Subject Matter ................................................................................................................................................. 6
Meaning of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter ............................................................................................. 6
Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction....................................................................................................................... 7
Jurisdiction of Courts ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
Supreme Court ............................................................................................................................................................. 8
Court of Appeals ....................................................................................................................................................... 10
Sandiganbayan ......................................................................................................................................................... 11
Regional Trial Courts.............................................................................................................................................. 12
Sharia Courts ............................................................................................................................................................ 13
Civil Procedure ................................................................................................................................................................. 14
Cause of Action............................................................................................................................................................... 14
Meaning of Cause of Action .................................................................................................................................. 14
Failure to State Cause of Action ............................................................................................................................... 15
Parties to Civil Actions ................................................................................................................................................ 17
Pleadings.......................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Complaint ................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Answer ........................................................................................................................................................................ 20
Counterclaims ........................................................................................................................................................... 21
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping ............................................................................. 22
Allegations in a Pleading ....................................................................................................................................... 28
Amendment ............................................................................................................................................................... 29
Summons ......................................................................................................................................................................... 30
Motions ............................................................................................................................................................................. 32
Motion to Dismiss .................................................................................................................................................... 32
Pre-Trial ........................................................................................................................................................................... 37
Notice of Pre-Trial ................................................................................................................................................... 37
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Appearance of Parties; Effect of Failure to Appear ...................................................................................... 38

Alternative Dispute Resolution ................................................................................................................................ 38
Trial ................................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Consolidation or Severance of Hearing or Trial ............................................................................................ 41
Judgments and Final Orders ...................................................................................................................................... 43
Summary Judgment ................................................................................................................................................ 43
Rendition of Judgments and Final Orders ....................................................................................................... 44
Post-Judgment Remedies ........................................................................................................................................... 49
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration ....................................................................................................... 49
Appeals in General .................................................................................................................................................. 50
Modes of Appeal ................................................................................................................................................ 52
Issues to be Raised on Appeal ............................................................................................................................. 53
Perfection of Appeal ............................................................................................................................................... 54
Appeal from Judgments or Final Orders of the RTC..................................................................................... 55
Review of Final Judgments or Final Orders of the Ombudsman.............................................................. 56
Execution, Satisfaction, and Effects of Judgments.............................................................................................. 57
Discretionary Execution ........................................................................................................................................ 58
Issuance and Contents of a Writ of Execution................................................................................................ 59
Provisional Remedies .................................................................................................................................................. 61
Preliminary Attachment ........................................................................................................................................ 61
Preliminary Injunction........................................................................................................................................... 62
Receivership .............................................................................................................................................................. 66
Special Civil Actions ..................................................................................................................................................... 68
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolution of the COMELE and COA ................................ 68
Application of Rule 65 under Rule 64 ............................................................................................................... 68
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus ............................................................................................................ 69
Expropriation ............................................................................................................................................................ 71
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer ............................................................................................................. 71
Contempt ......................................................................................................................................................................... 74
Special Proceedings........................................................................................................................................................ 75
Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Person, Venue and Process ............................................................... 75
Letters Testmentary and of Administration ........................................................................................................ 76
Writ of Habeas Corpus ................................................................................................................................................ 77
Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors ...... 77
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Criminal Procedure ........................................................................................................................................................ 78

Prosecution of Offenses .............................................................................................................................................. 78
Venue of Criminal Actions.......................................................................................................................................... 79
Preliminary Investigation .......................................................................................................................................... 80
Arrest ................................................................................................................................................................................ 81
Arrest Without Warrant, When Lawful............................................................................................................ 81
Bail ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 84
Nature .......................................................................................................................................................................... 84
Motion to Quash ............................................................................................................................................................ 86
Double Jeopardy....................................................................................................................................................... 86
Trial ................................................................................................................................................................................... 87
New Trial or Reconsideration................................................................................................................................... 88
Evidence............................................................................................................................................................................... 89
General Principles......................................................................................................................................................... 89
Admissibility of Evidence ........................................................................................................................................... 89
Positive and Negative Evidence ............................................................................................................................... 92
Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence ............................................................................................................. 96
Presumptions ................................................................................................................................................................. 97
Disputable Presumptions...................................................................................................................................... 97
Quantum of Evidence .................................................................................................................................................. 98
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt........................................................................................................................ 98
Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions ................................................................................................................ 99
Object (real) Evidence ...............................................................................................................................................100
Chain of Custody in relation to Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act ...............100
Documentary Evidence .............................................................................................................................................105
Best Evidence Rule ................................................................................................................................................105
Testimonial Evidence ................................................................................................................................................108
Credibility and Competency of a Witness......................................................................................................108
Examination of a Witness ...................................................................................................................................110
Admissions and Confessions..............................................................................................................................111
Offer and Objection ....................................................................................................................................................112
Offer of Evidence....................................................................................................................................................112
Special Proceedings..................................................................................................................................................... 113
Writ of Kalikasan.........................................................................................................................................................113
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Miscellaneous Topics.................................................................................................................................................. 114
General Principles
Nature of Philippine courts
Principle of judicial hierarchy
CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA AND SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BALATASAN, BULALACAO,

ORIENTAL MINDORO v. MAYOR ENRILO VILLAS AND BRGY. KAGAWAD LIWANAG HERATO AND
MARLON DE CASTRO, MANAGER, PINAMALAYAN BRANCH, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Principle of Hierarchy of Courts should be observed in filing a petition for certiorari.
Facts:
In the 2007 Barangay Elections, Constancio Mendoza obtained the highest number of votes
and was proclaimed as Punong Barangay of Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. However, the
losing candidate for the same position, Thomas Pajanel, filed a petition for Quo Warranto with the
MTC which subsequently disqualified Mendoza. Thus, Comelec declared Liwanag Herato as the
Punong Barangay having obtained the highest number of votes for Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza
appealed to the Comelec. While the appeal was pending, the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Bulalacao, Enrilo Villas, issued a memorandum directing all department heads of the Municipal
Government to act only on documents signed or authorized which Herato signed or authorized.
Thereafter, the Municipality of Bulalacao advised the Land Bank of the Philippines not to honor any
transactions which Mendoza has entered on behalf of Barangay Balatasan pursuant to the
memorandum of Mayor Villas. Aggrieved, Mendoza filed a petition for Mandamus with Damages and
prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was dismissed.
He then filed a petition directly with the Supreme Court but failed to cite under what rule under the
Rules of Court the said petition was based.
Issue:
Whether or not Mendozas petition with the Supreme Court was proper.
Ruling:
No. If the petition is to be treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petition must be dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely. The principle of hierarch of
courts should be applied. Verily, a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In this case, there are no special and important reasons that petitioners cite to justify their
direct recourse to this Court under Rule 65.
On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under
Rule 45 when only questions of law are raised, as in this case. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v.
Tomas that Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be appealed to the Supreme
Court through a petition for review by certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts, whenever
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authorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact. Thus, the Court shall
exercise liberality and consider the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45. In ArtisticaCeramica,
Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowners Association, Inc., citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court
noted that with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, it has the
discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.
Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
ROMBE EXIMTRADE (PHILS.), INC. and SPOUSES ROMEO PERALTA and MARRIONETTE
PERALTA vs. ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK
There is no interference by one co-equal court with another when the case filed in one involves
corporate rehabilitation and suspension of extrajudicial foreclosure in the other.
Facts:
Rombe Eximtrade (Phils), Inc. (Rombe) filed a Petition for the Declaration of a State of
Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan with the RTC (RTC A) which
then issued. RTC A then issued a stay order suspending the enforcement of all claims against Rombe.
The SEC and other creditors of Rombe opposed the petition. Thereafter, RTC A dismissed the petition
for rehabilitation of Rombe and lifted the stay order in its favor because it found out that Rombe
misrepresented its financial status in its petition for suspension of payments. On the other hand,
respondent Asiatrust initiated a foreclosure proceeding against Rombes properties. However, it was
prevented by the issuance of TRO and injunction by another RTC (RTC B) which was filed by Rombe.
The CA later annulled the TRO and injunction issued by the RTC Branch B, saying that the petition for
TRO and injunction interfered with and set aside the order of RTC Branch A, which dismissed the
petition for rehabilitation of Rombe.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of TRO by RTC Branch 15 affected the order of dismissal of the
petition for rehabilitation filed by Rombe with RTC Branch 7.
Ruling:
No. The rehabilitation case is distinct and dissimilar from the annulment of foreclosure case,
in that the first case is a special proceeding while the second is a civil action. A civil action is one by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress
of a wrong. Strictly speaking, it is only in civil actions that one speaks of a cause of action. A cause of
action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Thus, in the
annulment of foreclosure case, the cause of action of Rombe is the act of Asiatrust in foreclosing the
mortgage on Rombes properties by which the latters right to the properties was allegedly violated.
Indeed, the two cases are different with respect to their nature, purpose, and the reliefs
sought such that the injunctive writ issued in the annulment of foreclosure case did not interfere
with the rehabilitation case. The purpose of the rehabilitation case and the reliefs prayed for by
Rombe are the suspension of payments because it "foresees the impossibility of meeting its debts
when they respectively fall due," and the approval of its proposed rehabilitation plan. The objective
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and the reliefs sought by Rombe in the annulment of foreclosure case are, among others, to annul the
unilateral increase in the interest rate and to cancel the auction of the mortgaged properties. Hence,
being dissimilar as to the nature, purpose and reliefs sought, the order granting the injunctive writ in
the annulment of foreclosure case did not interfere with the order dismissing the rehabilitation
petition and lifting of the stay order issued by RTC Branch 7.
Jurisdiction
Over the subject matter
Meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all
of the parties.
Facts:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company(CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund(CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy
on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund
was Philippine Coconut Administration(PCA). Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the
PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
And per Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the
72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA
with 129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining
Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the
authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUBs capital stock. In all, from the
"mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as
follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided
amended compalints including the shares allegedly acquired by Cojuangco by virtue of the PCA
agreements.
Ruling:
Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory
conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor
will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted. From the allegations, it is fairly
obvious that they partake, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of
sequestered shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic
complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by
taking undue advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use,
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conversion or diversion of government funds or property. Prima facie ill-gotten falls within the
unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Republics averments in the amended complaints, particularly those detailing the
alleged wrongful acts of the defendants, sufficiently reveal that the subject matter thereof comprises
the recovery by the Government of ill-gotten wealth acquired by then President Marcos, his cronies
or their associates and dummies through the unlawful, improper utilization or diversion of coconut
levy funds aided by P.D. No. 755 and other sister decrees. President Marcos himself issued these
decrees in a brazen bid to legalize what amounts to private taking of the said public funds.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO,

JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO R. SALENGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 136433, December 6, 2006, Velasco
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.
Facts:
Paciencia Regala was the owner of a fishpond which was leased by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Faustino Mercado, to Eduardo Lapid, who, in turn, subleased it to Rafael Lopez. Meanwhile, Ernesto
Salenga was hired to be the fishponds watchman. Claiming that he was not paid his salaries, Salenga
filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest. A
TRO was issued by Provincial Adjudicator, Ilao, Jr. Antonio Baltazar (the nephew of Mercado)
contended that the case filed by Salenga was not an agrarian dispute, because the latter was not an
agricultural tenant but a mere watchman.
Issue:
Whether or not the case be considered as an Agrarian Dispute.
Ruling:
Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Given that
respondent Salengas complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations
that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it,
clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations
characterize an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever defense asserted in an answer or motion to
dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent
upon the allegations of the defendant.
Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS
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Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction continues to the final
conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
dispute in another court or tribunal unless the statute provides for retroactivity.
Facts:
A criminal case was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Rico Lipao and
Rickson Lipao for violating section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The information filed
alleged that the latter illegally possessed 160 bundles of firewood without securing license issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) the penalty of which is prisin
correccional in its medium period (imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months) and prisin correccional in its maximum period (imprisonment from 4 years, 2 months and
1 day to 6 years). Before the RTC rendered its Judgment, RA 7691. The new law expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including civil penalties arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the passage of RA 7691 ipso facto relieved the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear
and decide the criminal case against the two accused.
Ruling:
No. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of
the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was
pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional
Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.
Jurisdiction of courts
Supreme Court
STAR ELECTRIC CORPORATION vs. R & G CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING, INC.
G.R. No. 212058, December 07, 2015
The Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts, subject to certain
exceptions.
FACTS:
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Star Electric entered into a Construction Contract with R&G where it undertook the
installation of electrical, plumbing, and mechanical works in Grami Empire Hotel payable via
progress billing method. R&G refused to pay Star Electrics progess billings despite repeated
demands thus Star Electric informed R&G that it would not continue to work unless paid. The next
day, Star Electric recieved a letter from R&G that it was terminating its Contract with them claiming
that most delivered breakers were second-hand and the rough-in materials were installed
improperly. The overall progress of work has also been paid with according to R&G as per the
downpayment. Thereafter, Star Electric filed a complaint with the RTC to collect the unpaid billings.
According to R&G, they refused to pay the progress bills because Star Electric was allegedly guilty of
delay and unacceptable workmanship that they even had to contract with CP Giron and PTL Power to
repair the alleged defective work of Star Electric.
The RTC ruled in favor of Star Electric finding that R&G's allegation of defective works as
self-serving and considered petitioner to have faithfully performed its obligations in accordance with
the Construction Contract. The CA reversed the RTCs decision petitioner's work was, indeed,
defective and that the materials it installed in the building were substandard. On the other hand,
respondent likewise violated its obligations under the Construction Contract when it entered into
agreements with CP Giron and PTL Power without giving petitioner the opportunity to repair its
defective work. Being both guilty of breach of contract, the CA declared that each party should bear
its own loss. Hence, Star Electric filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to resolve questions of facts in this case.
RULING:
Yes. It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45, the
Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this rule is not
absolute. Jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by
the Supreme Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (5)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (7) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (8) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. Further, it appears
that the appellate court manifestly overlooked undisputed facts which, when properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. With the foregoing exceptions to the general rule present in this
case, the resolution of this petition through a review of the facts is in order.
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ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE LIZARES v

GONZALO DIZON, RICARDO GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, ROBERTO DIZON,
EDILBERTO CATU, HERMINIGILDO FLORES, CIPRIANO DIZON, JUANARIO MANIAGO, GORGONIO
CANLAS, ANTONIO LISING, CARLOS PINEDA, RENATO GOZUN, ALFREDO MERCADO,
BIENVENIDO MACHADA, and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, REGION III
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
Facts:
Deceased Encarnacion Vda De Panilio (Panlilio) is the owner of various tracts of land located
in Pampanga. Several tenant-farmers, herein private respondents, were planting rice plant upon the
aforementioned tracts of land. On January 20, 1988, Panlilio executed an affidavit which states that
she has placed under the coverage of PD 27 the vast tracts of land without and exception and
therefore be later sold to the tenant-farmers tending the same. Thus pursuant to the January 20
affidavit, Emancipation Patents (EP) were issued to the tenant-farmers tending the aforementioned
tracts of land. On December 29, 1986 Panlilio died. Thereafter George Lizares (Lizares) herein
petitioner and administrator of the estate of Panlilio filed a complaint for cancellation of the EP
issued to the tenant-farmers on the ground that Panlilio executed a subsequent affidavit dated
February 3, 1977 effectively revoking the prior affidavit executed last January 20 of the same year.
The complaint was filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
The PARAD ruled that the affidavit executed on Feb. 3, 1977 and dismissed the complaint,
which was affirmed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and which
was further affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to review the factual findings by the
PARAD, DARAB and the CA.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not tasked to calibrate and assess the
probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again. However, in rare
occasions, exceptions are allowed. One exception is when there are competing factual findings by the
different triers of fact, such as those made by the quasi-agencies on the one hand and the CA on the
other, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as well as the submissions of the
parties, and resolve the factual issues. In this case, however, there is coalescence in the findings of the
appellate court with that of the two quasi-judicial agencies below the PARAD and DARAB on the issue
of the authenticity of the affidavit.
Court of Appeals
DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.

G.R. No. 154885, 24 March 2008, Second Division, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
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The CA may validly review and even overturn such conclusion of the facts by the CIAC when the
matter of its being adequately supported by substantial evidence duly adduced on record comes to the
fore and is raised as an issue.
Facts:
Diesel and UPSI entered into a Construction Agreement for the construction of UPSI Building.
Under the agreement, Diesel is obliged to pay, in case of unjustifiable delay, to pay UPSI liquidated
damages in the amount of one-fifth of one percent of the total project cost for each calendar day of
delay. Diesel sent a letter notice to UPSI stating that the Project has been completed. UPSI however
disregarded the notice, and refused to accept delivery of the contracted premises claiming that Diesel
abandoned the project unfinished. UPSI also refused to pay the unpaid balance of the contract price.
Diesel then filed a complaint before the CIAC to compel UPSI to pay the unpaid balance of the
contract price. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Diesel. The CA modified the ruling of the CIAC,
granting UPSI liquidated damages which it reduced from the unpaid balance of the contract price.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA may annul the findings of a highly specialized agency such as CIAC.
Ruling:
Yes. The CA was correct in holding that it may validly review and even overturn such
conclusion of the facts by the CIAC when the matter of its being adequately supported by substantial
evidence duly adduced on record comes to the fore and is raised as an issue.
The CA did not cast aspersion on the competence let alone the bona fides of the members of
the Arbitral Tribunal to arbitrate. In context, what the appellate court said, is that the said members
do not really enjoy a special advantage over the members of the CA in terms of fleshing out the facts
from the evidence on record. The fact remains that the CA stands justified in reviewing the CIAC
decision.
Sandiganbayan
Rodolfo Cuenca and Cuenca Investment Corp vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government
G.R. Nos. 159104-05, October 5, 2007, Velasco, Jr. J
Under Sec. 2 of EO 14, The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such
cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof.
Facts:
UHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Independent Realty Corporation. Cuenca and his family
holdings (CIC) negotiated and reached an agreement with respondents IRC and UHC that the Cuenca
would purchase all the shares of stock and subscription rights of IRC in UHC which he would transfer
all of his shares to PNCC, Sta. Ines and Resorts Hotel Corporation which Cuenca is a controlling
stockholder to UHC. The instant controversy between Cuenca and respondent IRC was overtaken by
dramatic political events. President Marcos was ousted in a bloodless revolution and left behind an
unbelievably large amount of funds and assets that were sequestered by the new government of
President Aquino through PCGG. Respondent PCGG directed the President of IRC, to dissolve all the
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boards of directors of IRCs fully-owned subsidiaries. Cuenca filed a complaint against IRC and UHC
before the RTC to compel IRC to transfer all its stock and subscription rights in UHC to them or order
IRC and UHC to return and re-convey to them all the assets and shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and
Resort Hotels that they had transferred to UHC. IRC and UHC filed motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction claiming that the exclusive jurisdiction was lodged in the Sandiganbayan and not
in the RTC and on the ground of litis pendentia as Cuenca had a pending case filed by respondent
PCGG before the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case which involved respondent UHC and
several other corporations beneficially owned or controlled by Cuenca for and in behalf of the
Marcoses. Cuenca argued that UHC was not sequestered, and even if it was sequestered, the trial
court still has the jurisdiction to hear the case for rescission of contract or specific performance.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction over PGCC cases
Ruling:
Yes. Under EO 14, Section 2: The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all
such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof. Thus, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has
jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case
involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no importance.
The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and
their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate
that all incidents affecting the UHC shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over the UHC
must be addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon
split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted effort,
more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.
Regional Trial Courts
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, namely: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA and ZOEY G.

BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO and WELHILMINA LINDO; and HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN,
namely: MA. LOURDES DAQUIGAN, IMELDA CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA DAQUIGAN and
CORSINO DAQUIGAN, REBECCA QUIAMCO and ANDRES QUIAMCO, ROMULO LORICA and DELIA
LORICA, GEORGE CAJES and LAURA CAJES, MELIDA BANEZ and FRANCISCO BANEZ, MELANIE
GOFREDO, GERV ACIO CAJES and ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO SEGOVIA and VERGINIA SEGOVIA,
ELSA N. SAM, PEDRO M. SAM and LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ and MINA MENDEZ, HELEN M.
BURTON and LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO and BIENVENIDA JACINTO, IMELDA
DAQUIGAN, LEO MA TIGA and ALICIA MATIGA, FLORENCIO ACEDO JR., and LYLA VALERIO
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained.
Facts:
In 1991, Alfredo Bautista, petitioner's predecessor, sold to several vendees a free patent land
he inherited. In 1994, he filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC of
Lupon, Davao Oriental anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA)
141. Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement
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which was approved by the said court. However, the other respondents moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase
having the value of P16,500 is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling. The RTC then dismissed
the complaint finding that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the subject
property exceeds 20 thousand pesos.
Issues:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ruling:
Yes. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, the Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. (See Rusell v. Vestil, 304 SCRA
738, March 17, 1999)
The instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. Bautista filed
a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of free patent. It is clear that
his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one
of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. Having fully participated in all stages of the case,
and even invoking the RTCs authority by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer
assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their participation
in the case, they are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a
ground for the dismissal of the action.
Sharia Courts
SULTAN YAHYA JERRY M.TOMAWIS, Petitioner, versus HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A.
PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR, Respondents.
BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application
to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts.
Facts:
Private respondents filed with the Sharia District Court (SDC) an action for quieting of title of
a parcel of land against Tomawis who argued that the regular courts have jurisdiction over the case.
The respondent judge asserted that SDC has original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the
RTC by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
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Whether or not SDC can validly take cognizance of the case
Ruling:
Yes. The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of
the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land, are within the SDCs jurisdiction to
grant. A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of
general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in
PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Sharia courts. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only
existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a
special law that only applies to Sharia courts. We have held that a general law and a special law on
the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if
possible, with a view to giving effect to both. In the instant case, we apply the principle generalia
specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the
special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. We must read and construe
BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile
the two laws. In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the
concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set
up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the
allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In the instant case, private
respondents petition in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the concurrent original jurisdiction
of the SDC.
Civil Procedure
Cause of action
Meaning of cause of action
ST. MICHAEL SCHOOL OF CAVITE, INC. AND SPOUSES CRISANTO S. CLAVERIA AND GLORIA M.
CLAVERIA v. MASAITO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC.
G.R. No. 166301, 29 February 2008, Second Division, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more specifically, Art. 649 of the
Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is payment of proper indemnity;
and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate.
Facts:
St. Michael together with four other homeowners filed a complaint against Masaito for
easement of right-of-way because Masaito threatened to fence off and close the only gate of the
school which serves as both the entry and exit points for the entire school population. According to
Masaito, the initiatory pleading does not aver the first to basic requirements for the establishment of
a legal easement of right-of-way. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
Issue:
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Whether or not petitioners complaint constitutes a sufficient cause of action for a complaint
for easement of right-of-way.
Ruling:
For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more specifically, Art. 649 of
the Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is payment of proper
indemnity; and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate.
The Complaint, first, asserts that petitioners have a right to an easement of right-of-way that
cuts across respondents property; second, it refers to respondents correlative obligation not to fence
off and close the single gate which is used as the only entry and exit points of the school population;
and third, it refers to respondents expansion and excessive terms and conditions, constituting the
acts violating petitioners right. Hence, the Complaints material allegations are enough to entitle
petitioners to a favorable judgment if these are assumed to be true.
Failure to state a cause of action
ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL V. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC.

What is dismissible via a motion to dismiss is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action
and not lack of cause of action.
Facts:
Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the latters wife, executed a SPA
constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property. Pursuant to her
authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to New Vista
Properties, Inc. a parcel of land. A decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of
land it paid for and occupied was being claimed by Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute
Sale. New Vista first filed a notice of adverse claim followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title
before the RTC.
Before Alipit and Vitangcol could answer, New Vista filed an amended complaint, appending
thereto a copy of the 1989 deed of absolute sale De Guzman, as agent authorized agent of the Alipits,
executed in its favor. Thereafter, Vitangcol filed a motion to dismiss, followed by a similar motion
interposed by Maria Alipit which New Vista countered with an opposition. Unlike in its original
complaint, New Vistas amended complaint did not have, as attachment, the June 18, 1989 SPA. It,
however, averred that Clemente and Maria Alipit had ratified and validated the sale of the lot by their
having delivered possession of said lot to New Vista after receiving and retaining the purchase price
therefor.
Issue:
Whether the Amended Complaint, with the June 18, 1989 SPA submitted by petitioners
Vitangcol duly considered, sufficiently states a cause of action.
Ruling:
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Yes. Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion
to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can
only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action. The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits
the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When
a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as
rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.
New Vistas threshold contention that De Guzmans SPA to sell should not be considered for
not having been incorporated as part of its amended complaint is incorrect since Vitangcol duly
submitted that piece of document in court in the course of the hearing on the motion to
dismiss. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in considering said SPA relative to the motion
to dismiss the amended complaint.
BF CORPORATION v. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 177161 June 30, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It
has three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to
respect the right of the plaintiff, and (3) a breach of the defendants duty.
Facts:
BF Corporation, Tokyu Construction Co., Lt., and two other corporations formed the MTOB
Consortium, a distinct corporation, for purposes of bidding for the construction of the NAIA II
Project. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) awarded the contract to MTOB
Consortium. The members of the consortium soon had serious business differences, including
division of the contract price. This prompted BF Corporation to file a complaint against the other
members of the consortium to receive what it alleges to be its share in the project. BF Corp. also filed
a complaint against MIAA to enjoin it from directly paying Tokyu, but later dropped MIAA upon
amendment.
When the NAIA II Project was nearing completion, BF Corp. filed a second complaint against
Tokyu et al. for its proportionate share of the money based on the consortium agreement. BF Corp.
also asked to have MIAA be re-impleaded as party-defendant so it could obtain complete relief.
Issues:
Whether or not BF has a cause of action against MIAA.
Ruling:
No. A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It has three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the
defendant to respect the right of the plaintiff, and (3) a breach of the defendants duty.
In this case, BF Corp. failed to show the acts or omissions of MIAA that would constitute a
violation of BF Corp.s rights. In the first place, there is no contractual relations between MIAA and BF
Corp. The agreement over the NAIA Terminal II Project was between MIAA and MTOB Consortium, as
the contractor. From the start, MIAA recognized MTOB Consortium as a corporation with a distinct
personality from its component corporations. Second, the reliefs prayed for by BF Corp. are based on
the consortium agreement, which is a contract among BF Corp. and the other members of the
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consortium. MIAA is not privy of, and is therefore a stranger to the consortium agreement. If BF Corp.
wants its share in the consortium, its recourse is against MTOB Consortium, not MIAA.
Parties to civil actions
SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA NG 53 HEKTARYA represented by ELVIRA BALADAD v. WILFREDO

MOSQUERA, ROSARIO R. ROMAN, DANILO RELUCIO, and EDGARDO GUEVARRA
A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Facts:
Petitioner is an association of farmer-beneficiaries duly recognized by the DAR. They alleged

that that its members had been cultivating the disputed land for many years prior to the effectivity of
the CARL. Respondents, on the other hand, are the registered owners of three parcels of land located
in Macabud, Rizal. Petitioner alleged that in 1994, the landholding was sold to respondents without
any DAR clearance, in violation of Section 6-D of CARL. Respondents applied for exemption from the
coverage of CARL based on its provision in Sec. 10, that is, the property is above 18% slope and unfit
for cultivation. The Executive Secretary set aside DARs initial order denying the application and thus
exempted the property from CARL coverage. The case subsequently reached the CA where it ruled
that petitioner was not a real party-in-interest and had no legal standing to sue. The CA followed the
ruling in Fortich v. Corona, where it was enunciated that the petitioner, not being actual grantee of
the land but mere qualified beneficiary, has no legal standing to sue and is not the real party in
interest.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are real parties-in-interest in this case.
Held:
No. According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. The Supreme Court stood by its ruling in Fortich v. Corona that farmer-beneficiaries, who
are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-interest. In Fortich, the farmers who
intervened in the case were mere recommendees. In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan
are mere qualified beneficiaries of CARP. The certification that CLOAs were already generated in
their names, but were not issued because of the present dispute, does not vest any right to the
farmers since the fact remains that they have not yet been approved as awardees, actually awarded
lands, or granted CLOAs.
HERITAGE PARK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION(HPMC) v. CIAC and ELPIDIO UY, doing

business under name and style of EDISON DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION(EDC)
A transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, the
original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred
to it.
Facts:
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Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated by the Bases Conversion Development
Authority(BCDA) to develop the Heritage Park. PEA engaged the services of Uy under EDC, in an
agreement. EDC undertook to perform all landscaping works on the Heritage Park, to be completed
within 450 days. Due to delays, the contract period was extended to 693 days. Among the causes of
delay was PEAs inability to deliver to EDC 45 hectares of the property due to the existence of
squatters and a public cemetery. EDC instituted a Complaint seeking to collect from PEA damages.
PEA executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Heritage. Heritage filed a petition for
prohibition/injunction with TRO against the CIAC and EDC, claiming that when PEA transferred its
rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage, the CIAC lost its jurisdiction, and that is is an
indispensable party to the CIAC case.
Issue:
Whether or not Heritage is an indispensable party to the CIAC case thus its non-inclusion in
the proceedings violated its right to due process.
Ruling:
No. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow parties that disagree with
the decision of a judicial tribunal to annul the same through the expedient of transferring their
interests or rights involved in the case.
Moreover, Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an indispensible party to the case
and that it was not included in the case before the CIAC. Being a transferee of the interests of PEA
over the Project during the pendency of the case before the CIAC, it is bound by the proceedings in
like manner as PEA. A transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-
in-interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the
property was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an indispensible party as it would in any event
be bound by the judgment against his predecessor. This would follow even if it is not formally
included as a defendant through an amendment of the complaint. Hence, the non-inclusion of
Heritage in the proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as Rule 3 of Section 19 of the ROC
specifically allows the proceedings to proceed with the original parties while binding the transferee.
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Pleadings
Complaint
VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN, YAO SHIONG SHIO, OSCAR MANUEL, RAMON LINAN, PAZ Y. FLORES, for and
on their own behalf, and SIXTO O. RACELIS, for and on behalf of ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND
MINERAL CORPORATION v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, REV. EMETERIO BARCELON, S.J.,
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., AMPARO BARCELON, ANTONIO CAGUIAT,
RAMON A. PEDROSA, JAIME L. LEDESMA, SIMPLICIO J. ROXAS, VALERIANO FUGOSO, WILFREDO
SAARES, ULTRANA MINERALS CORP., INDEPENDENT REALTY CORP., PERFORMANCE
INVESTMENT CORP., MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., FABIAN VER, PIEDRAS
PETROLEUM CORP., and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134458 August 9, 2007 VELASCO, JR., J.
Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of
the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant.
FACTS:
Petitioners Yao Shiong Shio, Oscar Manuel, and Ramon Linan filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of PCGG Deed of Sale, Sequestration Orders, Prayer for Issuance of TRO
and/or Preliminary Injunction and Appointment of Receiver, with Damages against respondents. The
petition was denied, thus, petitioners filed an amended complaint but later filed Notice of Dismissal
of both the original and amended complaints which were approved by the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a new complaint which was identical to the prior amended complaint.
The Sandiganbayan denied the prayer for a preliminary injunction. Petitioners then filed their Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint seeking to state more fully their averments in express terms
which were only implied from the ultimate facts in their original Complaint. The Sandiganbayan
denied admittance of petitioners amended complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
admission of petitioners proposed amended complaint.
RULING:
No. Sec. 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides: Every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form
the basis of the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions
of the defendant.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that the real objective of petitioners in amending the
complaint is to supply the missing or omitted date which omission had resulted in the denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. In short, what the court a quo found is
that the whole exercise of amending the complaint is not to correct or enhance the alleged ultimate
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facts in the original complaint but to supply evidentiary support to their prayer for injunction. Being
merely evidentiary facts, the proposed amendments then are unnecessary to justify admission by the
Sandiganbayan.
Answer
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

A plaintiff should not be made to suffer for the respondents failure to file an answer and
concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by dismissing or remanding the case for
further reception of evidence.
Facts:
Macalinao is a card holder of a BPI credit facility. Upon failure of Macalinao to pay for its
balance when it became due, BPI demanded payment of 3% per month interest and an additional 3%
per month penalty charge. After the summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner Macalinao and her husband, they failed to file their Answer. Thus, respondent BPI moved
that judgment be rendered in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
was granted. The MTC ruled in favor of BPI. Macalinao claims that the basis of the re-computation of
the CA was not the amount of the principal obligation. Thus, this allegedly necessitates a re-
examination of the evidence presented by the parties. For this reason, Macalinao further contends
that the dismissal of the case or its remand to the lower court would be a more appropriate
disposition of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case shall be dismissed.
Ruling:
No. Based on the records, the summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner Macalinao and her husband on May 4, 2004. Nevertheless, they failed to file their Answer
despite such service. Thus, respondent BPI moved that judgment be rendered accordingly.
Consequently, a decision was rendered by the MeTC on the basis of the evidence submitted by
respondent BPI.
Thus, respondent BPI should not be made to suffer for petitioner Macalinao's failure to file
an answer and concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by dismissing or
remanding the case for further reception of evidence. Significantly, petitioner Macalinao herself
admitted the existence of her obligation to respondent BPI, albeit with reservation as to the principal
amount. Thus, a dismissal of the case would cause great injustice to respondent BPI. Similarly, a
remand of the case for further reception of evidence would unduly prolong the proceedings of the
instant case and render inutile the proceedings conducted before the lower courts.
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Counterclaims
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC. and
SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. and LEONIZA * F. REYNOSO
G.R. No. 200567; June 22, 2015; VELASCO, JR., J.
A claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a
deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim.
Facts:
Respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. (CPR Promotions) obtained loans from
petitioner MBTC from February to October 1997, covered by fifteen (15) promissory notes (PNs) all
signed by respondents, spouses Reynoso, as Treasurer and President of CPR Promotions,
respectively. To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage on
separate dates. Thereafter, on December 8, 1997, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety
agreement binding themselves solidarily with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR
Promotions may have obtained from petitioner MBTC, including those covered by the said PNs, but
not to exceed PhP 13 million. Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to
file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. Notwithstanding the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total amount of PhP 13,614,000, petitioner MBTC
alleged that there remained a deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges as
stipulated and agreed upon in the PNs and deeds of real estate mortgages. Despite petitioners
repeated demands, however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed
an action for collection of sum of money against respondents. The RTC Makati City ruled in favor of
petitioner. The CA however, reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
the plaintiff-appellee Metrobank to refund or return to the defendants-appellants spouses Reynoso
the amount of PhP722,602.22 representing the remainder of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.
Petitioner asserts that the CAs grant of a refund valued at PhP 722,602.22 plus legal interest
of six percent (6%) in favor of respondents is erroneous for two reasons: first, respondents never set
up a counterclaim for refund of any amount;18 and second, the total outstanding obligation as of
February 10, 1998, to which the full amount of the bid prices was applied, is PhP11,216,783.99 and
not PhP 12,891,397.78, which was used by the CA in its computation.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering MBTC to refund the or return to the defendants-
appellants spouses Reynoso the amount of PhP722,602.22 representing the remainder of the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim. A counterclaim is

compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action
before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. It is
evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis--vis the amount due should be
interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the
mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is
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needed in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily
bar the other since these two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be
fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the
same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it
would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence.
In this case, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorneys fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the
recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their
Appellants Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents belated assertion proved fatal to
their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently,
respondents claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MONDRAGON LEISURE AND RESORTS

CORPORATION, et al.
The test to determine whether forum shopping exists is whether the elements of litis
pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Facts:
Petitioner, a GOCC authorized to develop the Clark Special Economic Zone, entered into a
Lease Agreement with respondents, covering the area now known as Mimosa Leisure Estate.
Petitioner made a written demand on Mondragon to pay rental arrears within 30 days from receipt
of the demand; otherwise, the Lease Agreement would be terminated. Mondragon filed before the
Angeles City RTC an action for specific performance with prayer for injunctive reliefs pendente
lite against petitioner entitled Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation, et al. v. Clark Development
Corporation (First Mondragon Case). In said case, Mondragon sought for a judicial writ for the
parties dispute on the rental arrearages to be submitted to arbitration. The trial court granted a TRO
and later, a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner, in the interim, from terminating the
Lease Agreement and taking over the Mimosa Estate. The case eventually reached the SC where the
parties executed a Compromise Agreement, which this Court incorporated in its Resolution. On
November 12, 1999, Mondragon filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Specific Performance
before the Angeles City RTC, Branch 60, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 9596
entitled Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation, et al. v. Clark Development Corporation (Second
Mondragon Case). Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second Mondragon case
alleging (1) that Mondragon is guilty of forum shopping; (2) that petition was barred by prior
judgment; and (3) petition stated no cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that there was no forum shopping and allowed
continuance of the Second Mondragon Case when in fact res judicata had already set in.
Held:
Yes. The test to determine whether forum shopping exists is whether the elements of litis
pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
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other. Res judicata means a matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by
judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or
order must be one on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and parties; and (4) between the first and second actions, there must be identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the first requirement of identity of parties was
met. As regards the rights asserted and reliefs sought, we depart from the findings of the CA and hold
that there existed an identity of causes of action and reliefs based on the same objective standard
enunciated in the aforecited cases. Mondragon had only one objective in filing the two cases, that is,
the perpetuation of its lease.
Rodolfo M. Cuenca v. Hon. Alberto P. Atas

G.R. No. 146214, October 5, 2007
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending
in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Facts:
Rodolfo Cuenca was an incorporator, President, and Chief Executive Officer of the then
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), now PNCC and was granted a
franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113 to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities of the
North and South Luzon Expressway. In the course of its operations, it incurred substantial credit
obligations from both private and government sources up to the point that it could not settle its
maturing and overdue accounts with various GFIs. Thereafter, President Marcos issued a letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 1295 directing the creditor GFIs to convert into CDCPs shares of stock. It issued
shares and increased its authorized capital stock. It was renamed as PNCC later on and became a
government-acquired asset corporation. Cuenca filed a complaint before SEC to determine and
declare whether the GFIs were registered stockholders of PNCC, their respective number of shares,
and averred that some GIFs refused to cancel and never did cancel the loans in their books as
payments for the shares.
Despite the pendency of SICD SEC Cuenca filed a Third Amended Complaint before the RTC
for the enforcement and compliance of LOI 1295.
Issue:
Whether or not Cuenca is guilty of Forum Shopping
Ruling:
Yes. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum shopping is an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their
processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets.
A close perusal of both the Amended Complaint in SEC and the Amended Complaint in Civil
Case shows that both cases are derived from the same factual issues involving substantially the same
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parties. Although the actions seem to be different, yet it can be seen that there is a splitting of a cause
of action. While, on one hand, the Amended complaint in SEC was for the determination whether the
GFIs are indeed stockholders of PNCC and their respective number of shares, and on the other, Civil
Case was for the enforcement and compliance of LOI 1295, yet both actions involved substantially
the same parties, stemming from the same factual antecedent of the debt-to-equity conversion
mandated by LOI 1295 and involved the same cause of action that Cuenca anchors both complaints,
that is, that LOI 1295 was not fully implemented. The Supreme Court rejected Cuencas pretense that
no identity exists between Civil Case and the SEC, both of which substantially involve the same
parties, having the same cause of action and which stem from the same factual antecedents. The fact
remains that in Civil Case No. 95-1356, Cuencas prayed for the enforcement and compliance of LOI
1295, the same relief he could have asked for in the instant case before the SEC proceedings below.
Thus he is guilty of Forum Shopping.
CATALINA L. SANTOS, represented by her attorney-in-fact, LUZ PROTACIO and DAVID A.

RAYMUNDO v. PARAAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Facts:
Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. (PKE) filed a complaint for breach of contract with
damages against the petitioners. The trial court and CA dismissed the complaint. However, the SC
reversed the order of dismissal and held that the lessor Catalina Santos should have offered the
property first to the lessee PKE for P9M before selling it to a third person. The case was remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. In their Joint Answer with Counterclaims, petitioners alleged
that the purchase price of P9M had been offered to PKE. PKE moved that this allegation be stricken
off on the ground of res judicata, since the SC already made a finding of fact that petitioners failed to
offer the property to PKE for P9M. PKEs prayer and motion for reconsideration were denied, thus
prompting it to file its first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
PKE moved for the cancellation of the pre-trial of the civil case on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for certiorari before the CA. The motion was again denied and PKE was
ordered to present the statement of its case in the pre-trial but it refused. As a result, the complaint
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. PKEs motion for reconsideration and appeal were denied.
Hence, PKE filed its second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling:
No. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
In the case at bar, there is no identity of transactions, facts and issues in the first and second
CA Petitions. The first CA Petition questioned the May 18 and June 11, 1998 Orders of the Makati City
RTC relative to the striking out of the allegations made by petitioners Santos and David in their
answer. The second CA Petition, on the other hand, questions the Orders of the RTC relative to the
dismissal of the Civil Case No. 91-786 for non-suit and the denial of the Notice of Appealevents
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which transpired after the filing of the first CA Petition. The causes of action are clearly distinct.
Although private respondent PKE alleged in both petitions that there was grave abuse of discretion of
the acting presiding judge, that prayer alone does not imply that there are similar facts, issues, and
causes of action.
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.
Facts:
Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation granted 20% discount to senior citizens and treated the
same as deductions from the gross sales instead of treating them as tax credit in order to arrive at the
net sales. However, the corporation filed with BIR a claim for tax refund/credit of the full amount of
the 20% sas discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995. Due to the inaction of BIR, the
corporation appealed to CTA in order to forestall the 2-year prescriptive period provided by the law,
but the CTA dismissed the petition. Aggrieved, the corporation elevated the matter to CA which
dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. It held that the person who signed the verification and
certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of petitioner,
failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so.
Issue:
Whether or not the verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed by the
President of the corporation without the approval of the Board of Directors is a sufficient compliance
with the rules.
Ruling:
Yes. The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the
President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel
Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. While the above cases do not provide a
complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules,
the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale
applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the
corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."
In the case at bar, we so hold that the corporation substantially complied with Secs. 4 and 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board resolution has been
submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in Lepanto with the rationale
that the President of petitioner is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition. Third, the President of petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA
at the inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax credit.
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SUBIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC v. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY and

INNOVE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
G.R. No. 185159, October 12, 2009, J. VELASCO JR.
For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to
the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
FACTS:
Subic Telecom and SBMA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for a period of ten
years in 1994. The JVA has an exclusivity clause which provides that as to telecommunication
services this function must be exclusively exercised by Subic Telecom. In 2004 however, months
before the JVA is about to expire, SBMA started accepting applications for Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) as to the telecommunication services. Among the applicants was
Innove Communications, Inc. However, Subic Telecom opposed Innoves application.
Thereafter, when the JVA was already expired, Subic Telecom filed a civil action for specific
performance to extend the JVA. SBMA moved for its dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is litis pendentia in this case.
RULING:
No. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with
respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
In the first case involving the application of Innove, SBMA was not a party but was the quasi-
judicial body hearing the application. In the second case, SBMA was the principal party (defendant)
for specific performance and mandatory injunction, while Innove was impleaded for having been
granted a temporary franchise by SBMA. Thus, as between the administrative case and the civil case,
there was no identity of parties. The remedies Subic Telecom sought in the first case hinge on the
acceptance by SBMA of Innoves application and the consequent proceedings. The second case was
based on and was triggered by the denial by SBMA of Subic Telecoms notices to exercise the renewal
of its alleged exclusivity rights under the JVA which the latter viewed as violation of the formers
contractual obligations under the JVA.
It can plausibly be conceded that both cases, insofar as Subic Telecoms defense in the first
case and cause of action in the second case are concerned, touch and deal with the interpretation of
the pertinent JVA provisions. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that both cases are not based
on the same set of controlling facts, for when Subic Telecom opposed Innoves application, its notices
of renewal to SBMA have not yet been rejected or denied. While, in the second case, its notices of
renewal have already been denied, prompting it to file a suit for specific performance that entailed a
determination by the RTC of the rights of the parties, i.e., primarily those of Subic Telecom and SBMA,
based on the June 29, 1994 JVA through the interpretation of its pertinent provisos. From the
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foregoing distinction, it is clear that there is, as between the two actions, no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for; and the facts whence the reliefs are sought are different.
FORBES PARK ASSOCIATION,

INC. v. PAGREL, INC., PILAR R. DE LAGDAMEO, ENRIQUE B. LAGDAMEO, ATTY. MILA B.
FLORES in her capacity as the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and the Hon. CESAR D.
SANTAMARIA in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145 of the RTC of Makati
The same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in court more than once in
order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the stability of the rights and
status of persons.
Facts:
Members of the Forbes Park Association, Inc. (FPA) agreed to have a deed of restrictions
annotated on their certificates of title (TCTs). Consequently, they organized a meeting to decide on
the extension of their associations corporate existence and the deed of restrictions. But they failed to
muster a quorum. Despite this, the meeting still pursued and majority of the members voted for the
extension of FPAs corporate existence and deed of restrictions annotated on the members TCTs.
Some members filed separate cases before the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) seeking
the annulment of the resolutions passed extending the corporate life of FPA and the Deed of
Restrictions were vitiated for lack of quorum.
FPA filed an application with the Register of Deeds of Makati City for the registration by FPA
of notices of lis pendens over certain Forbes Park lots in connection with consolidated HIGC Cases
but it was denied. The Land Registration Authority and the CA likewise denied FPAs appeal.
Consequently, PAGREL, Inc., represented by Gregorio Araneta III, respondent Pilar R. De

Lagdameo, and respondent Lagdameo, separately filed ex parte petitions with the Makati RTC to
cancel the restrictions over their respective lot titles, claiming that the Deed of Restrictions had
expired. This was granted by the RTC. And, FPA sought for the annulment of the final order of the
RTC before the CA but it was denied on the ground of litis pendentia.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding FPA guilty of litis pendentia.
Ruling:
Yes. The essential elements of litis pendentia are as follows: (1) identity of parties or
representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) reliefs founded
on the same facts and the same basis; and (4) identity of the two preceding particulars should be such
that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
The aforesaid elements are not present in this case. First, there is no identity of parties: the
respondent in the lis pendens case is the Makati Register of the Deeds, and in the PAGREL case, the
respondent is PAGREL. Second, there is no identity of causes of action: One seeks for the annotation
of notices of lis pendens relating to several pending cases, while the other is for re-annotations of the
liens on the titles of lot owners which were canceled. Lastly, there is no identity of reliefs prayed for:
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in the lis pendens case, the prayer is for the annotation of the notice of lis pendence, while in the
PAGREL case, FPA asked for no such relief.
Allegations in a pleading
Casent Realty Development Corporation vs. PhilBanking Corporation

G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007, Velasco, Jr. J
Where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will
be deemed admitted.
Facts:
Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare
Realty Corporation which was payable on June 27, 1985. These promissory notes were assigned to
PhilBanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment. Upon due date Philbanking demanded
payment but despite repeated demands Casent has failed to pay its obligations. Thereby it filed a
collection case against Casent. Casent answered that the complaint stated no cause of action and that
the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which ceded and conveyed its Iloilo properties to PhilBanking
with the intention of totally extinguishing its obligations. It presented a confirmation statement
issued by PhilBanking stating that Casent had no more outstanding loan. PhilBanking has failed to
answer which prompted Casent on filing a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,
pointing out that PhilBankings failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said
documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated Casents obligation covered by the promissory
notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore. PhilBanking subsequently filed an Opposition which
alleged that: (1) the grounds relied upon by Casents in its demurrer involved its defense and not
insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in
evidence and evaluated; and (3) since Philbanking failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters
alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted. Casents claimed that even though it failed to file a
Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule
6, Section 10.
Issue:
Whether or not Casents failure to reply to the answer of PhilBanking constituted an
admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written
instrument and provides the manner of denying it which must be under oath and specifically denies
the instrument otherwise its genuineness and due execution shall be admitted. It is more controlling
than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply which is all the new
matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is
based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since
respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in
resolving the demurrer to evidence. However, admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the
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Dacion excludes the promissory notes. Casents, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to
show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.
Amendment
Irene Marcos-Araneta, Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin v. Court of Appeals,
Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca Benedicto-Paulino
Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. A motion
to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
Facts:
Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto and his associates (Benedicto group) organized Far East
Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC). Both corporations
were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his
name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the
obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene Marcos-Araneta
(Irene) to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene demanded reconveyance of the
65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto group refused to oblige. So, Irene instituted a complaint for the
conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership against the Benedicto group. The
respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the venue is improperly laid. The RTC
granted the motion to dismiss ruling that the action is partly a personal action and therefore the
complaint must filed in the place wherein the plaintiff resides. The complaint was filed in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and it was proven that Irene did not reside therein. Before finality of the decision, Irene
filed an amended complaint adding Daniel Rubio, Orlando Reslin and Jose Reslin as plaintiffs.
According to Irene, the inclusion of additional plaintiffs who reside in Batac, Ilocos Norte cures the
defect of venue. The RTC entertained the amended complaint since Irene, according to the RTC, may
opt to file an amended complaint as a matter of right, and such filing cures the defect in venue. The
CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
Whether or not Irene may file an amended complaint
Ruling:
Yes. According to Sec. 2 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Responsive pleadings are
those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading. The RTC did not err in admitting petitioners amended complaint, respondents not having
yet answered the original complaint when the amended complaint was filed. Irene, by force of said
Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending her underlying reconveyance
complaint. Also, the RTC decision granting respondents motion to dismiss has not yet attained
finality at the time Irene filed her amended complaint.
However, the filing of the amended complaint does not cure the defect in venue. The action is
a personal action. According the Sec. 2 Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one
plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for
determining proper venue. Irene is the real party in interest since she is the beneficiary so entitled to
the avails of the present suit. Not one of her co-plaintiffs can be considered principal parties because
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they are mere representative of Irene. The co-plaintiffs may be residents of Batac, but Irene is the
principal party. She is not a resident of Batac, therefore the venue is improperly laid.
Summons
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009 J. Velasco
The following are the requirements for substituted service of summons to be valid: (1)
Impossibility of prompt personal service; (2) Specific details in the return; and (3) Substituted service
effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or residence; or on a
competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.
Facts:
A forfeiture case (F1) was filed against Garcia to recover unlawfully acquired wealth from
their family as amassed by retired Maj. General Carlos Garcia. It was followed by another forfeiture
case (F2). Prior to F2 but subsequent to F1, the Ombudsman charged the Garcias and three others
with violation of RA 7080. After the filing of F1, the following events transpired: (1) The
corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. Instead
of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of Sandiganbayans lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture., (2) The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to
dismiss and declared the motion as pro forma and without tolling effect on the period to answer.
They declared the Garcias on default., (3) The Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of F1
with the plunder case. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reason that the forfeiture case is not
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of
plunder. (4) The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash F1 on the ground that the
plunder case ousted the Sandiganbayan 4th division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case and that
the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy. Clarita argued that there
was a lack of proper and valid service of summons.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid service of summons.
Ruling:
No. The following are the requirements for substituted service of summons to be valid: (1)
Impossibility of prompt personal service; (2) Specific details in the return; and (3) Substituted
service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or residence;
or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons
was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj.
Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted
service of summons was made.
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It was also held that Garcia did not voluntarily appear before the court, because the
pleadings filed by petitioner were filed solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over her person and that of her three children.
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on

behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no
valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.
Facts:
Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment involving the
wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano committed by the Philippine Military Intelligence Officials
allegedly under the command of Imelda Manotoc. The trial court issued summons at the house of
Manotoc. The summons and copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon the alleged caretaker,
Macky de la Cruz. The trial court declared Manotoc in default for failure to file her Answer. Manotoc
moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her peson due to an
invalid substituted service of summons. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, Manotoc
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA, but said petition was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
Ruling:
No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred
mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant,
for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then
substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service." Hence, it must
faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the
rules. For the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to apply, the Sheriffs
Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons
and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. It must clearly
show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in
the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot
be availed of.
In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr.
Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker"
of petitioner. The Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule
14, Section 8 on substituted service.
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Motions
Motion to dismiss
VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.;

FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FLOVY I. DANCEL; AND
CATALINO L. IBARRA, Petitioners, v. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L.
IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L.
IBARRA, NAMELY CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, AND NARCISO IBARRA, AND THE
SPOUSES RECTO CANDELARIO AND ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a
co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of
shares yet.
Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed away, leaving
them their parents properties. An action for partition was subsequently brought before the RTC.
However, for failure of the parties and their counsels to prosecute despite due notice, the case was
dismissed. In 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against the
respondents. The latter opposed and sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.
The RTC dismissed the petitioners complaint, ruling that the respondent siblings were entitled to
their respective shares and ordered the partition of the subject lots between the plaintiffs and the
defendants-spouses Candelarios. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Aggrieved, petitioners
countered that the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the counterclaim for partition is barred by prior judgment.
Ruling:
No. Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the
right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code. Between dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code,
the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner
through the promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural
rule. This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, the Court held that Art. 494 is
an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice. In the case at bar, since the co-ownership is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent
spouses Candelario, there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the
partition of the property through counterclaim.
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P.L. UY REALTY CORP. v. ALS MANAGEMENT AND DEV. CORP. and ANTONIO S. LITONJUA
G.R. No. 166462, October 24, 2012, VELASCO, J.
Absolute identity of parties is not required for res judicata to apply; substantial identity is
sufficient.
Facts:
PLU(vendor) and ALS(vendee) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage covering a
parcel of land. Subsequently, the parties executed a Partial Release of Mortgage attesting to the
payment by ALS of the first installment. ALS, however, failed to pay the 2nd payment despite
demands. PLU filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage and Annulment of Documents. RTC
dismissed the case for being premature. CA affirmed. PLU again filed a Complaint for Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Rule 68 of the ROC. RTC again dismissed the case for
being premature. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2 cases filed by PLU constituted as res judicata.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the Court may motu proprio dismiss a case
when any of the 4 grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and (d) prescription of action, is present. Correlatively, Secs. 47(b) and (c) of Rule 39
provides for the 2 concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment,
respectively. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the 2 cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the 2 cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
"conclusiveness of judgment" applies.
All the elements of res judicata, as a "bar by prior judgment," are present here. The previous
complaint for foreclosure of mortgage was dismissed by the trial court for being premature. The
dismissal action, when eventually elevated to CA was affirmed and the affirmatory resolution of the
Court becoming final and executory. Further, the element of identity of parties is considered existing
even though Litonjua was only impleaded in the 2nd case. Absolute identity of parties is not required
for res judicata to apply; substantial identity is sufficient. Clearly, the instant complaint must be
dismissed.
RUPERTA CANO and JESUS CARLO GERARD VDA DE VIRAY v. SPS JOSE and AMELITA USI
Res judicata operates as bar by prior judgment if the following requisites concur: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
causes of action.
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Facts:
Lot 733, registered in the name of Mendoza is the subject of this case. Geodetic Engr Fajardo
prepared the Fajardo Plan, in which Lot 733 was divided into 6 smaller parcels of differing size
dimensions: Lot 733(A-F). Mendoza executed 2 separate deeds of absolute sale, the first, transferring
Lot 733-F to Jesus and the 2nd deed conveying Lot 733-A to Sps Viray. Vda. de Viray is the surviving
spouse of Jesus. The subdivision of Lot 733, per the Galang Plan, and the 2 SAs concluded based on
that plan, virtually resulted in the loss of the identity of what under the Fajardo Plan were Lot 733-A
and Lot 733-F. The Sps. Viray and the late Jesus purchased Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F, respectively,
from Mendoza. As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions involving the same
property or portions thereof spawned several suits and counter- suits.
Issue:
Whether or not the last two cases which are reinvidicatory and possessory actions are
barred by res judicata.
Ruling:
Yes. Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing in their cases
supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F cannot now be
deprived of their rights by the expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accion publiciana
and/or accion reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real
property. The third, accion interdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action, namely forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, the issue in both cases being limited to the right to physical possession or
possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or
her pleadings, albeit the court has the competence to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership
but only to address the issue of priority of possession. Both actions must be brought within one year
from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand to
vacate following the expiration of the right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer. When the
dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year, one may avail himself of accion
publiciana to determine the better right of possession, or possession de jure, of realty independently
of title. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily
includes recovery of possession.
Res judicata operates as bar by prior judgment if the following requisites concur: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of causes of action. All the requisites are present in the instant case. The better right to
possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de Viray and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of
land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession
and vindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court has in effect determined that the
conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray
were valid. This determination operates as a bar to the Usis reivindicatory action to assail the
conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the settled issue of
ownership and possession arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses Usi did not directly
seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question in their action for annulment of
the deed sale of sale. But it cannot be gainsaid that said action is closely intertwined with the issue of
ownership, and affects the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The prevalent doctrine is that an
action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the
fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property.
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BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP./HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION v. MONT ANO DIAZ, DOMINGO

TAPAY, and EDGAR H. ARREZA
G.R. No. 213233; August 5, 2015; VELASCO, JR., J.
In cases involving res judicata, the parties and the causes of action are identical or
substantially the same in the prior as well as the subsequent action.
Facts:
Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) the registered owner of Lot No. 27, Block
30, located in Quezon City, and covered by TCT No. 331582. On October 19, 1984, it entered into and
executed a Deed of Sale over the said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo
(Sps. Melgazo), both of whom are now deceased. By virtue of the several deeds of transfer of rights,
Diaz, who got hold of his alleged right from Domingo Tapay, then paid BDC the amortizations due on
the property, amounting to PHP 406,915.15, and BDC issued a permit to occupy the property in favor
of Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements on the property, amounting to PHP 700,000.00. In 1992,
BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz. In 1994, BDC informed Diaz that respondent Edgar
Arreza (Arreza) was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the property
and placed Diazs account in inactive status. To resolve the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz,
BDC filed a complaint for Interpleader against them, before the RTC, Makati City. The RTC ruled that
Arreza had a better right over the property. This decision became final and executory. In 1996, Diaz
filed the present complaint for sum of money against BDC before the RTC, Makati. This was later
amended to include Arreza and Tapay as defendants. Both BDC and Tapay argued that their
respective acts were lawful and done in good faith. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing res
judicata, arguing that the claim of Diaz is a compulsory counterclaim that should have been pleaded
in the Interpleader case. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, which the CA, on certiorari, affirmed.
When the issue reached the SC in G.R. No. 133113 the Court ruled that the claim as against Arreza is
barred by res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal in view of the application of the
doctrine of immutability of judgment in the decision of the court in GR No. 133113.
Ruling:
No. The present claim is not barred by the courts ruling in G.R. No. 133113to the effect
that Diaz can no longer claim reimbursement from Arreza because of res judicatafor his failure to
allege the claim in the interpleader case between them. In G.R. No. 133113, the Court ruled that the
claim against Arreza is barred by res judicata, because of a prior Interpleader case between Arreza
and Diaz. It further ruled that the claim for reimbursement should have been alleged and proved in
the prior case, and failure to do so bars any future action on such claims. In the case at bar, the
essential elements of res judicata are not present. First, the interpleader case was between Arreza
and Diaz. While it was BDC that initiated the interpleader case, the opposing parties in that prior case
is, in fact, Arreza and Diaz. Second, the issues resolved in the interpleader case revolved around the
conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, and not whatever claim either of them may have against BDC.
Thus, there is no identity of parties, nor identity of subject matter, between the interpleader case and
the one at bar.
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ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC. v. ROMY B. BASTOL

G.R. No. 186289, 29 June 2010, J. Velasco, Jr.
These concepts (bar by former judgment and conclusiveness of judgment) of res judicata are
applicable to second actions involving substantially the same parties, the same subject matter, and
cause or causes of action.
Facts:
After being repatriated for having a heart attack while deployed, Bastol had a follow-up
examination with the company-designated physician and sought a second opinion from another
doctor. This prompted him to claim medical disability benefits, illness allowance, medical benefits
for his treatments, moral damages, and attorneys fees gainst OSCI. OSCI countered that Bastol is not
entitled to his indemnity claims for his failure to properly submit himself for treatment and
examination by the company-designated physician, who is the only one authorized to set disability
grades. LA Mayor, Jr. saw no need to conduct formal hearings and ruled that the determination of the
disability degree Bastol obtained during the second opinion examination sufficed. OSCI assailed this
decision, the NLRC issued it July 30, 1999 resolution vacating and setting aside LAs ruling and
remanding the case for further proceedings. LA Lustria ruled in favour of Bastol. On appeal before
the NLRC, it reversed LAs decision and held that it is only the company-designated physician who
could declare the fitness of the seafarer to work; or establish the degree of his disability. The CA
reinstated LA Mayor, Jr.s decision.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the Complaint filed before the LA ought to be submitted for lack of
certification against forum shopping as required by the rules.
2) Whether or not the July 30, 1999 NLRC decision constitute res judicata.
Held:
1) No. OSCIs argument is untenable. For the expeditious and inexpensive filing of
complaints by employees, the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the NLRC provides pro-forma
complaint forms. This is to facilitate the exercise and protection of employees rights by the
convenient assertion of their claims against employers untrammeled by procedural rules and
complexities. To comply with the certification against forum shopping requirement, a simple
question embodied in the Complaint form answerable by yes or no suffices. Employee-complainants
are not even required to have a counsel before they can file their complaint. An officer of the RAB,
duly authorized to administer oaths, is readily available to facilitate the execution of the required
subscription or jurat of the complaint.
2) No. The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. The July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision cannot
and does not constitute res judicata to the instant case. Res judicata has two concepts: (a) bar by
former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. These concepts of the doctrine of res judicata
are applicable to second actions involving substantially the same parties, the same subject matter,
and cause or causes of action. In the instant case, there is no second action to speak of, involving as it
is the very same action albeit the NLRC remanded it to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
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Pre-trial
Notice of pre-trial
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPOUSES ANGELITO PEREZ AND JOCELYN PEREZ

G.R. No. 187640, 15 June 2011, First Division, Velasco, Jr., J.
The notice of pre-trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place of the pre-trial and
to require them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Its
absence, therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings null and void.
Facts:
Spouses Perez obtained a credit line from PNB which was secured by several chattel
mortgages and real estate mortgages. The spouses defaulted on their financial obligations, prompting
PNB to institute extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings over the aforementioned securities. The
spouses filed a complaint for the release of the mortgaged properties. The spouses and their counsel
consistently failed to appear in the proceedings, which caused the RTC to dismiss the case. However,
the CA in an amended decision and reinstated the civil case before the RTC. The RTC issued an order
setting the case for hearing, but on the day of the hearing, only the counsel for Spouses Perez
appeared. Since there was no opposition, the Spouses was allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex
parte in a hearing which the RTC ordered to be considered as a pre-trial conference. The RTC ruled in
favor of the spouses and issued a writ of execution over the properties of PNB.
Issue:
Whether a pre-trial notice is mandatory and, as a consequence, whether the lack of notice of
pre-trial voids a subsequently issued decision
Ruling:
Yes. Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure unequivocally requires that the
notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The notice of pre-
trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place of the pre-trial and to require them to file
their respective pre-trial briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Its absence, therefore,
renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings null and void.
In the case at bar, the order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a hearing and
required PNB to prepare a complete statement of account. The order does not mention anything
about a pre-trial to be conducted by the trial court. The CA aptly held that the Order which declared
the haring to be a pre-trial and allowed the Spouses to adduce evidence ex parte, is void. Similarly, its
ruling that the Decision and all subsequent orders issued pursuant to said judgment are also null and
void, is proper.
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Appearance of Parties; Effect of Failure to Appear
SPOUSES LORETO LEYBA and MATEA LEYBAv. RURAL BANK OF CABUYAO, INC. and ZENAIDA
REYES
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude.
Facts:
Petitioners spouses Loreto and Matea Leyba filed a complaint for Nullification of Real Estate
Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney (SPA) against respondents Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.
(RBCI) and Zenaida Reyes alleging that Matea was made to sign an SPA, granting Reyes the authority
to mortgage the subject land; that Reyes used the SPA to obtain loan from RBCI guaranteed by a real
estate mortgage over the subject land.A pre-trial conference was set for April 1, 2005. Petitioners and
their counsel, however, failed to attend it.
Citing Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
interest to prosecute the case, which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint was proper.
Ruling:
No. It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable
them to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. It is
undisputed that petitioners were present in all the scheduled pre-trial conferences, except for the
last one set on April 1, 2005. The postponement of the pre-trial was made several times upon
agreement by the parties and once upon motion of RBCI. Petitioners claim that they are both advance
in age and that, on April 1, 2005, their blood pressure shot up. They reason that the lack of medical
certificates explaining their medical condition was due to their non-consultation with a physician as
they opted to take sufficient rest instead. The Court noted that the subject matter of the complaint is
to petitioners a valuable parcel of land measuring 259 square meters. Petitioners stand to lose a lot
on account of a mere technicality. They have manifested their interest to pursue the case even on
appeal. They also have adequately explained their failure to attend the pre-trial conference. In the
interest of substantive justice, we allow the petitioners an opportunity to present their side during a
trial on the merits, to obviate jeopardizing substantive justice. This liberality underscores the
importance of an appeal in our judicial grievance structure to give party-litigants the amplest
opportunity for the just disposition of their cause freed from the noose of technicalities.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION (EPCIB) v. RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 182248, December 18, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
The proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of the RTC confirming as arbitral award is an
appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.
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Facts:
EPCIB and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and RCBC, as buyer,
executed a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the purchase of EPCIBs interests in Bankard. Under
the SPA, EPCIB jointly and severally represent and warrant Financial Condition of Bankard. RCBC
paid the balance of the contract price. Thereafter, RCBC informed EPCIB of its having overpaid the
purchase price of the subject shares, claiming that there was an overstatement of valuation of
accounts amounting to PhP 478 million, resulting in the overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus,
RCBC claimed that EPCIB violated their warranty, as sellers, embodied in the SPA and prayed for the
rescission of the SPA, restitution of the purchase price, payment of actual damages and legal interest.
RCBC, in accordance with the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration. The tribunal ruled in favor of RCBC
which later on filed with the RTC a Motion to Confirm Partial Award. EPCIB countered with a Motion
to Vacate the Partial Award. RTC issued the first assailed order confirming the Partial Award and
denying the adverted separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit. From the assailed
orders, EPCIB came directly to this Court through this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not EPCIB erroneously filed an appeal before the SC instead of CA.
Ruling:
Yes. The proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of the RTC confirming as arbitral
award is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known
as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot be set
aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts since any other rule would
make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous
decision of matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an
award fairly and honestly made. Nonetheless, arbitrators cannot resolve issues beyond the scope of
the submission agreement. The parties to such an agreement are bound by the arbitrators award
only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the contract and only if the award is rendered in
conformity thereto. Finally, while a court is precluded from overturning an award for errors in
determination of factual issues, nevertheless, if an examination of the record reveals no support
whatever for the arbitrators determinations, their award must be vacated. In the same manner, an
award must be vacated if it was made in manifest disregard of the law.
BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES -

MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION
Availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial

agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.
Facts:
Benguet Corporation and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims. Thus,
on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its
intention to develop the mining claims. However, the relationship did not go so well, so J.G. Realty
informed Benguet that it was terminating the RAWOP.
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Thereafter, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP
with the Legaspi City Panel of Arbitrators (POA) which cancelled the RAWOP and subsequently
affirmed by Mining Adjudication Board (MAB). Benguet pointed out that the case should have first
been submitted to voluntary arbitration pursuant to its agreement with J.G. Realty.
Issue:
Whether or not the controversy should have first been submitted to arbitration before the
POA took cognizance of the case.
Ruling:
Yes. Availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial
agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.
In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary arbitration is
erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of the defendant, the court or
quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient
and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of
said provision. Hence, POA had no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the
Arbitration Law.
However, estoppel applies in the case at hand. The Court ruled that the jurisdiction of POA
and that of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What Benguet should have
done was to immediately challenge the POA's jurisdiction by a special civil action for certiorari when
POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To redo the proceedings fully participated in by
the parties after the lapse of seven years from date of institution of the original action with the POA
would be anathema to the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. v. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 256 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, and
PACIFIC GENERAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J. (civpro; adr)
Facts:
Korean Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) and Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(PGSMC) entered into a contract whereby the former shall construct a liquefied gas cylinder
manufacturing plant in the Philippines for a total contract price of $1,530,000. PGSMC issued checks
as payment of the contract but were dishonored. Dispute arose between the two parties, with
KOGIES suing PGSMC for BP 22 and PGSMC suing KOGIES for estafa, alleging that it supplied sub-par
quality equipment. Meanwhile, KOGIES insisted that their disputes should be settled by arbitration
as agreed upon in Article 15, the arbitration clause of their contract. Thereafter, KOGIES instituted an
Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB)
in Seoul, Korea pursuant to Art. 15 of the Contract as amended. Subsequently, KOGIES filed a
complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and prayed that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued to restrain PGSMC from dismantling and transferring
the machinery and equipment installed in the plant which the latter threatened to do.
PGSMC filed an opposition to the TRO arguing that KOGIES was not entitled to the TRO since
Art. 15, the arbitration clause, was null and void for being against public policy as it ousts the local
courts of jurisdiction over the instant controversy.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Article 15 of the arbitration clause of the contract is contrary to public
policy and ousted the court of its jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. The Court, reiterating its ruling in LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol Industrial
Construction Groups, Inc., held: Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling
disputes, arbitrationalong with mediation, conciliation and negotiationis encouraged by the Supreme
Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes,
especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the wave of the future in international civil
and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the
parties would be a step backward.
The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has not
been shown to be contrary to any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. There has been no showing that the parties have not dealt with each other on equal
footing. Submission to arbitration is a contract and that a clause in a contract providing that all
matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. Furthermore, the
provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is
part of that contract and is itself a contract.
Trial
Consolidation or severance of hearing or trial
Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank Inc.

G.R. No. 190462 & G.R. No. 190538, November 17, 2010, Velasco, JR, J.
The purpose of consolidation of cases is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court.
Facts:
SCP is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and distribution of cold-rolled

and galvanized steel sheets and coils. During its operations, SCP encountered and suffered from
financial difficulties and temporary illiquidity, aggravated by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. And
shortage in working capital and reduced operating capacity compounded its problem. As a result,
SCP was unable to service its principal payments for its liabilities. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., which
accounted for 27.45% of the total liabilities of SCP, filed a creditor-initiated petition to place the SCP
under corporate rehabilitation pursuant to the provisions of Section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation entitled In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel
Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of
the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. BDO-EPCIB included its proposed rehabilitation plan in the said
petition. Rehabilitation Court approved the rehabilitation and likewise appointed Atty. Santiago T.
Gabionza, Jr. as the Rehabilitation Receiver for SCP. SCP did not oppose the petition but instead filed
its own counter rehabilitation plan and submitted it for the consideration of the Rehabilitation Court.
Other creditors filed their respective comments on the petition. Atty. Gabionza submitted his
recommended rehabilitation plan. The said plan contained the salient features of the rehabilitation
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plans separately submitted by SCP and BDO-EPCIB, as well as his own comments. RTC approved
Rehabilitation Plan.
Therefrom, several creditors went to the CA via separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari
including IPFI. The petitions of SCP and IPFI were eventually consolidated under CA-G.R. SP No.
101732. However, the CA denied BDO-EPCIBs motion to consolidate with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732. As
to CA-G.R. SP No. 101881, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it has also been consolidated
with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732 in a Resolution issued by the CA. CA issued the assailed decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101881, ordering the termination of the rehabilitation.
SCP argued that the CA deviated from its own Internal Rules when it failed to consolidate the
four (4) appeals arising from the same decision of the rehabilitation court. BDO-EPCIB refutes SCPs
arguments by saying that the consolidation of cases is only discretionary, not mandatory, upon the
court.
Issue:
Whether or not consolidation of cases was proper
Ruling:
Yes. Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court. The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse,
prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court. In short,
consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. It
contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in the
avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more
cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.
In the instant case, all four (4) cases involve identical parties, subject matter, and issues. In
fact, all four (4) arose from the same decision rendered by the Rehabilitation Court. As such, it
became imperative upon the CA to consolidate the cases. Even though consolidation of actions is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and normally, its action in consolidating will not be
disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, in this instance, we find that the CA gravely
erred in failing to order the consolidation of the cases. By refusing to consolidate the cases, the CA, in
effect, dispensed a form of piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the multiplicity of suits.
Such action is not regarded with favor, because consolidation should always be ordered whenever it
is possible.
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Judgments and Final Orders
Summary Judgments
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. DUVAZ CORPORATION

Where the pleadings tender an issue, that is, an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for a
presentation of evidence, summary judgment is not proper.
Facts:
In a Construction Contract entered into by D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) and Duvaz Corporation
(Duvaz), DMCI undertook to construct the foundation of the Alfaros Peak for Duvaz. After the
completion of the project, DMCI claimed that substantial amount of the contractual price remained
unpaid. Later, Duvaz filed a petition for the declaration of a state of suspension of payments with the
SEC for its assets are insufficient to covers its entire matured obligation. The SEC granted such
petition prompting DMCI to file with the RTC Makati City a petition for the annotation of contractors
lien on the property of Duvaz. The Makati City RTC later granted the petition for annotation of DMCIs
contractors lien on the property of Duvaz.
Later, DMCI filed a collection suit against Duvaz. In its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims, Duvaz specifically denied DMCIs averment that it owes the latter a sum of money and
further set up affirmative defenses against DMCI such as serious defects in the construction of the
building and cost for rectification works. Thereafter, DMCI moved for summary judgment, alleging
that Duvaz is already estopped from questioning his liability as the same is already settled in the case
decided by Makati City RTC and in the reply it sent to DMCI. Furthermore, DMCI contends that the
Makati City RTCs order in LRC Case No. M-3839 is, under the principle of res judicata, conclusive
upon Duvaz.
Issue:
Whether or not summary judgment is proper.
Ruling:
No. Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary
judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
In this case, genuine issues exist. DMCIs posture on estoppel is untenable. Far from
containing an admission of liability, Duvazs Answer contained a specific denial of petitioners claim.
Be that as it may, the answer in Civil Case No. 99-1354 diluted any admission, if there were indeed
admissions, made in the SEC and LRC cases and, as the CA put it, engenders a cloud of doubt as to
the certainty of the facts as alleged. Such doubt should be resolved against the grant of the motion
for summary judgment. When faced with a motion for summary judgment, should resolve doubts in
favor of the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all favorable inferences.
DMCIs contention that the Makati City RTCs order in LRC Case No. M-3839 is, under the
principle of res judicata, conclusive as between it and Duvaz as regards the contractors claim for the
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unpaid balance against Duvaz strikes the Court as a bit incredulous. LRC Case No. M-3839, to stress,
was an action to annotate a contractors lien, not a collection suit where the purported debtor is
expected to present its defenses and counterclaims, if there be any, to defeat the suitors claim.
With the parties conflicting postures on, among others, the issues of estoppel, prescription,
and DMCIs liability and Duvazs corollary right for damages arising from the alleged mal-execution of
the construction works, the only way to ascertain whose position jibes with facts on the ground is
obviously through the presentation of evidence by the parties in a full blown trial on the merits. This
is as it should be for any doubt as to the propriety of the rendition of a summary judgment must be
resolved against it. With the tender of genuine issues before it, the RTC acted properly, and within its
sound discretion, in denying petitioners motion for summary judgment.
Rendition of Judgments and Final Orders
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et. al. v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS

OFMANILA BAY, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
Final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also
those matters actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Certainly, any activity that
is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Facts:
In 2008, the Supreme Court (SC) rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering
various government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different
capacities. Having failed to file any motion for reconsideration, the said Court Decision has become
final and executory. To implement the Decision, the Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to
receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the said
agencies and to monitor its execution. However, due to the absence of specific completion dates
within which to accomplish the assigned tasks given to the agencies, the Committee recommended
that time frames be set for the said purpose. However, the said agencies viewed this as an
encroachment on the power and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolutions issued to implement the SC Decision in G.r. Nos. 171947-18
are encroachments on the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of
the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part
of the adjudicative function of the Court. While additional activities are required of the agencies like
submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the
execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged but also those matters actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
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Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed
by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases. With the final and executory judgment in the MMDA
case, the writ of continuing mandamus issued means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full
compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full
execution of the judgment.
Dominador A. Mocorro, Jr. v. Rodito Ramirez

G.R. No. 178366 July 28, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law
Facts:
Acting on the petition on the issue as who, between Dominador Mocorro and Rodolfo Azur, is
entitled to operate a cockpit in Caibiran, Leyte, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) rendered
a decision granting Dominador the right to operate such cockpit to expire on December 31, 1991, to
which he was issued a registration certificate. As Dominador sought to renew his certificate, Rodito
Ramirez, the Mayor of Caibiran, refused to renew his certificate. Dominador found out that another
permit was issued in favor of Rodolfo. As a result, Dominador filed with the RTC a suit for injunction
against Rodito and Rodolfo to enjoin the operation of the cockpit, which was granted by the trial
court.
The RTC entitled Dominador to actual damages in the sum Php 2000 for every Sunday of each
week from August 2, 1992 from the time Rodolfo started to operate his cockpit. A writ of execution
was then issued in favor of Dominador. Subsequently, herein respondent Rodito filed an Omnibus
Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution on the ground that it imposes an incomplete judgment
because the Writ failed to state a date where their liability will terminate. To cure the defect, the
sheriff determined that June 22, 2001 is the termination date of their liabilities. RTC then denied the
Omnibus Motion. As the RTC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration, he interposed a
petitioner for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA entertained the petition setting aside the
decision that respondent and Rodolfo are liable to actual damages since the decision does not state
where their liability will end and thus the exact amount cannot be determined. Dominador opposed
the CA decision stating that it amounts to a modification of a final judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA decision setting aside the RTC decision awarding actual damages
violates the immutability of a final judgment
Ruling:
Yes. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification
is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration
of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must
reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for
all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who
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exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be
struck down.
SPOUSES RODRIGO COLOSO and ELISA COLOSO, represented by their son FREDERICK COLOSO
v. HON. SECRETARY ERNESTO V. GARILAO, et al.
G.R. No. 129165 October 30, 2006, Velasco, Jr. J.
A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
Facts:
Petitioner Spouses Coloso converted their 300-hectare land into a subdivision. Thus, they
notified the Ravago Group, the agricultural leasehold tenants of a 50-hectare portion of the property,
of the conversion of the said land into a residential subdivision. For failure to agree on the
disturbance compensation, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment before the then CFI, acting as a
Court of Agrarian Relations, which ruled in favor of petitioners, which the CA affirmed. There being
no appeal, said decision became final and executory. Meanwhile, Prior to the issuance of the said
decision, the DAR already issued an Order approving the conversion of the subject land into a
residential subdivision, including the land occupied by Ravago Group, and certified that said tenants
were not recipients of Land Transfer Certificates (LTCs). Several motions for execution of the subject
decision were filed by petitioners. Unknown to petitioners and the court, the Ravago Group were
issued LTCs. Hence, the CAR granted the motion for execution which was subsequently set aside
based on the issuance of LTCs. A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA by petitioners which
the CA granted.
Petitioners filed a petition for exemption from the CARP coverage of parcels of land of the
subject 300-hectare land. The then DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order dismissing the petition on
the ground that the CAR had no jurisdiction to order or authorize the conversion of the subject land
into a residential subdivision. The lands covered by the said order of conversion were also declared
subject to CARP coverage.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment of a trial court, which has become final and affirmed by the
Court, be disregarded by the DAR Secretary.
Ruling:
No. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The CAR February 8, 1972 Decision became final in 1975 after the Court of Appeals affirmed
the CAR Decision on May 22, 1975. More than thirty (30) years have passed and up to now said
Decision has not yet been executed. It is about time that the Colosos enjoy the fruits of victory which
is the end all of litigation. The public respondent DAR Secretary should respect the CAR Decision and
implement the conversion of the 26.5-hectare lot to give life and meaning to the final judgment.
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Courts should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.
FACTS:
with the RTC a complaint for recovery of property with damages against their uncle, Tirso, who in
turn, filed a complaint for partition and damages with receivership against his stepmother Pendejito
and all his step-siblings, alleging that the judicial settlement of the intestate estate of his mother, is
null and void.
The RTC consolidated the two cases and held that the heirs of Benjamin have been deprived
of their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth share due their father from the intestate estate
of their grandmother, Soledad D. Monteroso. The thus ordered partition and accounting. Petitioners
took exception of the fact that the trial court granted relief and remedies not prayed for by the
parties such as partition and accounting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in ordering partition and accounting.
RULING:
Yes The Philippine judicial system requires courts to apply the law and grant remedies when
appropriately called for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the discretion
to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. Equity has been defined as justice outside
law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded
on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for
application where there is law.
In the instant case, a disposition only ordering partial partition and without accounting, as
petitioners presently urge, would be most impractical. Courts have been cautioned against being
dogmatic in rendering decisions, it being preferable if they take a complete view of the case and in
the process come up with a just and equitable judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice. Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire controversy
in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.
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ANASTACIO TUBALLA HEIRS, NAMELY: JULIANA TUBALLA, AGUSTIN TUBALLA, AND HERMAN
TUBALLA v. RAUL CABRERA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 179104, 29 February 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no longer be modified in any respect
are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, and (3) void judgments.
Facts:
Anastacio Tuballa filed a complaint against Cabrera Enterprises, Inc for the recovery of
possession of a parcel of land. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Tuballa. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and had become final and executory. Tuballa filed a manifestation before the
court pointing out a typographical error in the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision which
indicated Lot No. 6597 instead of Lot No. 5697. The RTC issued an order stating that it had no power
to correct the decision of the CA. The CA also ruled that it had no power or authority to correct the
said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the correction of the typographical error in the dispositive portion is
warranted.
Ruling:
Yes. As a rule, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A
final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law,
rules, and regulations. The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no longer be
modified in any respect are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
In this case, what is to be corrected is a mere clerical error, hence it falls under one of the
exceptions, warranting a correction of the typographical error in the dispositive portion.
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Post-Judgment Remedies
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
SM LAND INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ARNEL PACIANO
CASANOVA, GR NO. 203655, SEPTEMBER 7, 2015, J. VELASCO JR.
The Court has taken a conservative stance when entertaining second motions for
reconsideration, allowing only those grounded on extraordinarily persuasive reasons and, even then,
only upon express leave first obtained.
Facts:
BCDA move for a second motion for reconsideration. Respondent-movants remain adamant
in claiming that the assailed rulings of the Court would cause unwarranted and irremediable injury
to the government, specifically to its major beneficiaries, the Department of National Defense (DND)
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). However, in this second motion for reconsideration
they merely reiterate matters already decided by this court. Further, the facts provided that this
second motion for reconsideration was filed after the finality of the courts decision.
On the other hand DNP and AFP move to be allowed to intervene in the case on the basis of
the profit that they could have received from the contract between SMLI and BCDA.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not BCDAs move for a second motion for reconsideration be granted?
2) Whether or not DNP and AFP has a right to intervene?
Ruling:
1) No. The concurrence of the following elements are required for a second motion for
reconsideration to be entertained:
a. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher
interest of justice;
b. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;
c. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its
Divisions, at least three (3) members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case
to the Court En Banc; and
d. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Bancsactual membership must
be mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted.
Unfortunately for respondent-movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case
at bench. To begin with, there are no extraordinarily persuasive reasons in the higher interest of
justice on which the instant second motion for reconsideration is anchored on. Based on the records,
the second motion for reconsideration is a mere rehash, if not a reiteration, of respondent-movants
previous arguments and submissions, which have amply been addressed by the Court in its August
13, 2014 Decision, and effectively affirmed at length in its March 18, 2015 Resolution.
2) No. In the case at bar, the DND and AFP moved for intervention on the ground that they
are the beneficiaries of the proceeds from the project to be undertaken by the BCDA. Obviously, this
right to the proceeds is far from actual as it veritably rests on the success of the bidding process,
such that there will be no proceeds that will accrue to their benefit to speak of if the project does not
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push through. All the applicants have then, at best, is an inchoate right to the proceeds of the
development of the property in litigation. Said inchoate right, contradistinguished with vested rights
that have become fixed and established, are still expectant and contingent and, thus, open to doubt or
controversy. Consequently, the said right does not constitute sufficient legal interest that would
qualify the DND and AFP, in this case, to intervene. And in any event, regardless of the presence or
absence of sufficient legal interest, the Comment in Intervention filed does not contain any new issue
that has not yet been resolved by the Court in its Decision and Resolution. Hence, there is no cogent
reason to grant the motion for intervention and to admit DND and AFPs comment.
Appeals in general
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division)

and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
G.R. No. 178933, September 16, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J. (civpro, appeal from interoluctory
orders)
Interlocutory orders cannot be appealed.
Facts:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate
the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, MakatiCity. Instead of filing a
Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12,
2005. Private respondent then filed her Notice of Appeal and subsequently filed her Record on
Appeal on January 23, 2006. In denying due course the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its
Order dated, ruled that the appeal taken by Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court denying
the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final
Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on Appeal had
been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an Interlocutory Order which is
not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
Ruling:
Yes. The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC is an Interlocutory Order, not subject to an appeal.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees
appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec.
1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order
is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having
to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal.
The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such
interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
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ERNESTO BATALLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TEODORO BATALLER, G.R. No. 184268,
September 15, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.
It is true that the verification requirement was not complied with, but such procedural lapse
pales in the face of the manifest error in the dismissal of Batallas appeal by the Comelec First Division
when the Comelec En Banc had already issued Resolution No. 8486, granting an appellant in this case,
Batalla 15 days within which to pay the additional fee of PhP 3,200, with which he had already
complied.
Facts:
Petitioner Batalla, and private respondent Bataller, were candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay. During the count, Batalla garnered 113 votes while Bataller garnered 108
votes. Consequently, Batalla was proclaimed the Punong Barangay winner. Bataller filed an election
protest and claimed that there was a misappreciation of seven ballots. MCTC rendered its Decision
finding that Batalla and Bataller had garnered an equal number of votes. Aggrieved, Batalla timely
filed his Notice of Appeal of the decision elevating the election protest before the Comelec. The
Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal for Batallas failure to pay the appeal fee. Aggrieved
further, Batalla elevated before the Comelec En Banc the above Order of the Comelec First Division by
filing his Motion for Reconsideration followed by a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration on April 30, 2008. The Comelec En Banc issued the second assailed Order affirming
the Comelec First Divisions earlier Order dismissing the appeal for Batallas failure to pay the appeal
fee and, moreover, denying his motion for reconsideration for his failure to verify the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Batallas appeal ought to be given due course despite the procedural
infirmities of belated payment of the appeal fee and the non-verification of his motion for
reconsideration.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Comelec grievously erred and gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed and denied petitioners appeal. In the instant case, we find that Batalla already perfected
his appeal by filing his Notice of Appeal and by paying the PhP 1,000 appeal fee, pursuant to A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC, within the five-day reglementary period, to the MCTC; and by paying the additional
appeal fee of PhP 3,200 to the Comelec Cash Division on March 5, 2008. Consequently, the Comelec
First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Batallas appeal and, likewise, so did
the Comelec En Banc in not correcting this error by denying Batallas motion for reconsideration.
Fairness and prudence dictate that the Comelec En Banc should have recognized Batallas
compliance with clarificatory Resolution No. 8486 when it resolved his motion for reconsideration
and should not have merely denied it on the procedural ground of non-verification. It is true that the
verification requirement was not complied with, but such procedural lapse pales in the face of the
manifest error in the dismissal of Batallas appeal by the Comelec First Division when the Comelec En
Banc had already issued Resolution No. 8486, granting an appellant in this case, Batalla 15 days
within which to pay the additional fee of PhP 3,200, with which he had already complied.
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Modes of Appeal
HARRY G. LIM v. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, ANTONIO H. CERILLES,

ROSELLER DELA PEA, and the COURT OF APPEALS
It is beyond the ambit of the Supreme Court to review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, provided there is no grave abuse of
discretion.
Facts:
Harry Lim filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against Cerilles and Dela Pea for violation
of Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In a Resolution, the Graft Investigation Officer recommended the
filing of charges against Cerilles and dela Pea. Upon review, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved
the dismissal of the aforesaid resolution for lack of probable cause. Petitioner then appealed to the
Office of the Preseident. Pending appeal to the OP, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA which dismissed the same. Now, petitioner filed with the SC a petition under Rule
45 arguing that the Ombudsman committed serious reversible error in dismissing his complaint for
lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether an appeal under Rule 45 may be given due course to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in determining whether probable cause exists.
Ruling:
No. An appeal under Rule 45 should be limited to questions of law only, not questions of
facts. The main issue of whether probable cause exists that will warrant the filing of the appropriate
complaint is a question of fact. In this case, resolving the issues presented by petitioner, however,
would require a review of the factual findings of the Ombudsman. Thus, it is beyond the ambit of this
Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before it. However, while the Ombudsmans discretion in determining the existence
of probable cause is not absolute, nevertheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was
gravely abused to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this Court. In this respect,
petitioner fails.
This Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination of
the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse of discretion.
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Issues to be Raised on Appeal
LORETO BOTE v. SPOUSES ROBERT VELOSO and GLORIA VELOSO

G.R. No. 194270, December 3, 2012, VELASCO, JR., J.
A party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.
Facts:
Gloria was awarded a residential lot at the Dagat-Dagatan Project and she constructed a 2-
storey house on the property awarded to her and then leased the house to Bote. For Botes failure to
pay, spouses Veloso filed a Complaint. As reflected in the Pre-Trial Order, the parties agreed that the
complaint would only be one for sum of money and no longer for recovery of possession of the
subject property. RTC ruled in favor of Bote. CA modified the RTC decision and ordered a proper
determination of the value of the controverted residential house constructed by Gloria and for its
reimbursement of such amount.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in considering and passing on the new issue that the spouses
Veloso were builders in good faith.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court limits the questions that may be raised on
appeal. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor
raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. This principle forbids the parties
from changing their theory of the case. The settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the
case or his cause of action on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to
decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to
adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.
Nevertheless, such rule admits of an exception as enunciated in Canlas v. Tubil(G.R. No.

184285, 2009) to wit: When the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory, as in this case, the Court may give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues
raised therein. However, the instant case does not fall under this exception. To stress, the issue of
whether or not the spouses Veloso were builders in good faith is a factual question that was never
alleged, let alone proven. It was only on appeal that the spouses Veloso belatedly raised the issue that
they were builders in good faith. Justice and fair play dictate that the spouses Velosos change of their
theory of the case on appeal be disallowed.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PUREGOLD DUTY FREE, INC.

G.R. No. 202789, June 22, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
It is well settled that matters that were neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the
proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal and are barred by estoppel. To allow
the contrary would constitute a violation of the other party's right to due process, and is contrary to the
principle of fair play.
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Facts:
Puregold had been issued Certificate of Tax Exemption pursuant to Sec. 5 of EO 80.
In Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torre, however, the Court annulled the adverted Sec. 5 of EO 80. Then
Deputy Commissioner issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice regarding unpaid VAT and excise tax
on wines, liquors and tobacco products imported by Puregold. The latter protested the assessment.
Pending the resolution of Puregold's protest, Congress enacted RA 9399, which provides that
availment of the tax amnesty relieves the qualified taxpayers of any civil, criminal and/or
administrative liabilities arising from, or incident to, nonpayment of taxes, duties and other charges.
Puregold availed itself of the tax amnesty. However, it received a formal letter of demand from the
BIR for the payment of the deficiency VAT and excise taxes. In its response-letter, Puregold requested
the cancellation of the assessment on the ground that it has already availed of the tax amnesty under
RA 9399. Puregold filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. The CTA 2nd Division denied CIR's MR.
The CIR filed a Petition for Review with the CTA en banc which was also denied. The CIR's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus, the CIR filed with this Court the present petition which
introduced an entirely new matter, i.e., based on its Articles of Incorporation, Puregold's principal
place of business is in Metro Manila for which reason it cannot avail itself of the benefits extended by
RA 9399.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegation of the CIR regarding the principal place of business of
Puregold can be considered on appeal.
Ruling:
No. During the proceedings in the CTA, the CIR never challenged Puregold's eligibility to
avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9399 on the ground that its principal place of business, per its
Articles of Incorporation, is in Metro Manila and not in Clark Field, Pampanga. Neither did the CIR
present the supposed Articles of Incorporation nor formally offer the same in evidence for the
purpose of proving that Puregold was not entitled to the tax amnesty under RA 9399. Hence, the
Court cannot take cognizance, much less consider, this argument as a ground to divest Puregold of its
right to avail of the benefits of RA 9399. In any event, assuming arguendo that petitioner's new
allegation can be raised on appeal, the same deserves short shrift. RA 9399, as couched, does not
prescribe that the amnesty-seeking taxpayer has its principal office inside the Clark Special Economic
Zone. It merely requires that such taxpayer be registered and operating within the said zone, stating
that registered business enterprises operating x x x within the special economic zones and freeports
created pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, as amended, such as the Clark Special
Economic Zone x x x may avail themselves of the benefits of remedial tax amnesty herein granted.
Perfection of Appeal
SPOUSES CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

G.R. Nos. 154211-12, 158252, 166200, 168272, 170683, 173392, June 22, 2009, VELASCO, JR.,
J.
The rule on payment of docket fees as mandatory in the perfection of an appeal, is relaxed by
the higher interest of justice and fair play.
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Facts:
E.O. No. 385 and E.O. 431 delineated the Batangas Port Zone (BPZ) and placed it under the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) for administrative jurisdiction. On July 10, 2000, the RTC issued the
first compensation order, which pegged the just compensation at PhP 5,500 per square meter. lleging
that almost all of the group members were of advanced age, the trial court, upon motion, issued the
July 24, 2000 Order that granted the execution pending appeal. The RTC however denied PPAs
Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-payment of appeal fee. Furthermore, the Record on Appeal
and Motion for Reconsideration were also denied. The CA allowed the appeal of PPA and nullified the
questioned RTC orders. Petitioners assailed that the July 10 compensation Order has already attained
finality.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal may be allowed despite the finality of the compensation order.
Ruling:
Yes. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is, as a rule, mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. However, the technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in view of the
attending policy considerations in the interest of justice and equity. In the case at bar, the Court rules
that the public interest and the higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that PPAs appeal
should be allowed. The trial judge should have permitted the appeal to prosper in view of the billions
of pesos of taxpayers money. Moreover, there is a wide disparity between the fair market values of
the lots ranging from PhP 2.10 to 3.50 per square meter based on the tax declarations. The sharp
increase in the total amount of compensation from PPAs offered price of PhP 500 per square meter to
PhP 5,500 per square meter or an increase of 1,000% also made PPA rethink if the project is still
viable.
Appeal from Judgments or Final Orders of the RTC
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM PASIMIO, GR NO. 205590, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015, J.

VELASCO JR.
The parties in Rule 41 appeal proceedings may raise questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law.
Facts:
Pasimio filed a case for collection of a sum of money pursuant to the bank deposits she had
with PNB. PNB however, after presenting several notarized documents and promissory notes
presenting the loans secured by the deposited amount refused to deliver back the deposited amount
in light of the compensation when Pasimio failed to pay those loans.
The RTC rendered a decision by relying on the statements of Pasimio that she was defrauded
in signing pro forma forms which serves as evidence of her loans to the bank. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and denied PNBs claim with respect to questions of facts, because the CA said
that it is not a trier of facts.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in refusing rules on factual issues.
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Ruling:
Yes. Section 9 of Bates Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, categorically states that the CA has, inter alia, the power to try cases,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. It is also worthy to note that the appellate court's
reliance on the factual findings of the trial court is hinged on the latter's firsthand opportunity to
hear the witnesses and to observe their demeanor during the trial. However, when such findings are
not anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of documents that are
available to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on the trial courts factual
findings finds no application.
The CA's regrettable cavalier treatment of PNB's appeal is inconsistent with Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court and with the usual course of judicial proceedings. Thus, in insisting that it is not a trier
of facts and implying that it had no choice but to adopt the RTC's factual findings, the CA shirked from
its function as an appellate court to independently evaluate the merits of this case. To accept the CA's
aberrant stance is to trivialize its review function, but, perhaps worse, render useless one of the
reasons for its institution.
Review of final judgments or final orders of the Ombudsman
FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

represented by HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO; and PNP-CIDG, represented by DIR. EDUARDO
MATILLANO
In administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMBs decision should be taken to the
CA under Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed.
Facts:
Flor Gupilan-Aguilar and Honore Hernandez were among the personnel of the Bureau of
Customs against whom an investigation was conducted by PNP-CIDG. According to the investigation,
there is a wide variance between Aguilars acquired assets and what she spent for her four-year
overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other, finding that she has violated R.A. 1379 in
relation to R.A. 3019 and 6713. She was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez
was charged too with the same offenses. The Ombudsman created an investigating panel which then
conducted administrative proceedings on the complaint. Aguilar was placed under preventive
suspension for six months. She was found guilty by the investigating panel. In a supplemental
decision, Hernandez was likewise found guilty. Aguilar and Hernandez moved for but were denied
reconsideration. Petitioners went to the CA on petition for review under Rule 43. The CA affirmed the
decision of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not a Rule 43 petition to assail the findings or decisions of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is proper.
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Ruling:
Yes. The nature of the case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) determines the
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party and with which court it should be filed. In
administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMBs decision should be taken to the CA under
Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction had, after due investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty and meted the corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the
proper mode of appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies.
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
HERNAN C. DALIDA v. SPOUSES ELISEO NAGUIT AND ALICIA NAGUIT

The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment where supervening events bring about
a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there
is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances.
Facts:
Astra Builders Enterprises Corp. acting through its minority stockholder, Hernan Dalida
instituted a derivative suit for accounting/receivership with TRO against Sps. Naguit, Equitable PCI
Bank, and 3 of Astra's clients based on Eliseo Naguit's unauthorized withdrawal of corporate funds
while he was president of Astra. Eliseo and Equitable PCI Bank were impleaded to account for the
withdrawal. It was also alleged that there was a great danger that Astras may be lost unless a
receiver is appointed. The TRO was based on the compelling need to direct Astra's clients to stop any
payment in favor of Astra through Eliseo. The parties filed a compromise agreement subject to the
terms and conditions stated in it. The agreement asked for the dismissal of the derivative suit and
criminal complaints. Moreso, that upon full payment, Dalida would transfer his 28 shares in Astra.
The RTC ruled that Eliseo and Astra are jointly and severally liable to pay Dalida Php 7,000,000 in 4
installments. The RTC granted Dalida's Motion for Execution but Spouses Naguit filed an Urgent
Motion to Recall/Quash Writ of Execution and a MR alleging that Astra had no funds hence, both
motions were denied. Spouses Naguit filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which sustained the
assertion of the spouses that supervening events Astras loss of revenues - after the approval of the
compromise agreement made it impossible for them to comply. Dalida filed a petition for review
raising the issue of the impropriety of the stay of the execution, that only for the most compelling
reasons may the execution based on a compromise agreement be stayed.
Issue:
Whether or not the stay of the execution is improper.
Ruling:
Yes. The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment where supervening events bring
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or
where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances. However, the reason put forward by respondents is insufficient to merit a stay of
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execution. Nowhere in the compromise agreement is it stated that the obligation to pay is
conditioned upon Astra's receipt of the payment due from its projects with other companies.
Respondent Eliseo Naguit cannot renege on his obligation under the agreement by claiming an
inability to pay. It would be an anathema to the orderly administration of justice if such an easy
excuse is entertained to abrogate a final decision based on a compromise agreement. Neither is there
any supervening event which materially and substantially altered the situation of the parties such
that execution would be unjust and inequitable. The compromise agreement has the force of law
between the parties unless it is void, there is a vice of consent, or there is forgery, or if the terms are
so palpably unconscionable, none of which applies in this case.
Discretionary Execution

J.
Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply
to eminent domain proceedings.
Facts:
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) for administrative jurisdiction. On July 10, 2000, the RTC issued the
first compensation order, which pegged the just compensation at PhP 5,500 per square meter. lleging
that almost all of the group members were of advanced age, the trial court, upon motion, issued the
July 24, 2000 Order that granted the execution pending appeal. The RTC however denied PPAs
Notice of Appeal, Record on Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. The CA allowed the appeal of
PPA and nullified the questioned RTC orders. Petitioners assailed that the July 10 compensation
Order has already attained finality.
Issue:
Whether or not execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation proceedings.
Ruling:
No. PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties. PPA is a government
instrumentality charged with carrying out governmental functions through the management,
supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the country. It is an attached agency of the
Department of Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505. Ergo, they are exempt from
execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal. Funds of PPA partake of
government funds, and such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory
grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its properties, being government properties, cannot
be levied via a writ of execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot
grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence
that government properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly.
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Issuance and Contents of a Writ of Execution
DANILO L. PAREL v. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO

The writ of execution may be appealed in certain cases.
Facts:
Simeon owned a two-story house in Baguio City while he allowed Danilo and his parents to
live on the ground floor of the house since his wife was the elder sister of Danilos father, Florentino.
Simeon needed the whole house, so he asked Danilo and his parents to vacate the premises, but they
remained. This prompted Simeon to institute an action for recovery of possession and damages. On
the other hand, Danilo contended that the land on which Simeons house was constructed was in his
father Florentinos name, thus, making them co-owners of the property.
The RTC ruled in favor of Danilo which decision was overturned by the CA. Thereafter,
Simeon prayed for the Issuance of Writ of Execution. However, Danilo interposed that his payment of
monthly rental should onlyile be computed from April 1988 to March 1994 since he vacated the
premises on April 1994. The RTC issued the writ and subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration of Danilo. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC may be appealed.
Ruling:
Yes. The following are the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed: 1) the writ
of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making
execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from
execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; 5)
the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of
elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus. The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact
that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would
make execution inequitable or unjust. We find that Danilos situation merits a relaxation of the rules
since special circumstances are involved that is to determine if his allegation were true would allow a
final resolution of the case. The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into
consideration the circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending
issue regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity
to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before
issuing the writ of execution in the instant case.
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ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN

Well-settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment
or not.
Facts:
Complainant was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in an unlawful detainer case.
After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co-defendants. Therefrom, Rafols, through
complainant, appealed the case to the RTC. Pending appeal, the court issued an order granting the
motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. Complainant sought reconsideration but the
motion was denied. Upon the implementation of the writ of execution, an argument took place
between complainant and respondent. The former claims that he has a pending motion for
reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of execution, but the latter said that the motion has
already been denied. And since no Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the
implementation, respondent claimed that he is legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty of
enforcing the writ. Complainant countered that he has not yet received a copy of the denial of the
motion, rendering the execution premature. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with the
execution of the judgment and in enforcing, allegedly uttered words degrading to the reputation of
the complainant. He then filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff for grave
misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is correct in pushing through with the writ.
Ruling:
Yes. Under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made
immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case
may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and
(c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of
the property during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of
these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this
respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal
but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically
follow.
In the case at bar, complainant lost his clients case and appealed to the RTC. His client has
also been periodically depositing rental with the court for the use of the property pending appeal.
However, as ruled by the RTC, the bond filed did not meet the legal requirements because first and
foremost, the bond posted was a property bond, not cash nor surety. Furthermore, Rafols did not
own the property he posted as bond and besides, it was also not issued in favour of the plaintiff in the
ejectment case. Because of the non-compliance with the requirements under the above-quoted rule,
the execution of the judgment was not effectively stayed. The only exceptions to non-compliance are
the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant
from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening
events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make
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the execution inequitable. But whether or not these obtain in the case at bar is an issue best left to the
court that issued the writ of execution.
Given the above circumstances, there was no legal impediment preventing respondent
sheriff from performing his responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed to
comply with the requirements under the Rules, Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful detainer case
is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution.
Provisional Remedies
Preliminary attachment
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTATE OF ALFONSO LIM, SR., ALFONSO LIM, JR., TEODORA
Q. PENA, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, TAGGAT INDUSTRIES, INC., PAMPLONA
REDWOOD VENEER, IMC., SOUTHERN PLYWOOD, WESTERN CAGAYAN LUMBER, ACME
PLYWOOD, VETERAN WOODWORK, INC., SIERRA MADRE WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., AND
TROPICAL PHILIPPINES WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC.
For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the applicant
must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought.
Facts:
The Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint averring that Alfonso Lim, Sr. and
Alfonso Lim, Jr., acted in unlawful collusion with the Marcoses, and took undue advantage of their
relationship with the latter. The Republic then prayed for the reconveyance of all funds and property
acquired by them in abuse of right and power through unjust enrichment. When Lim, Sr. passed
away, his estate filed a motion to lift the sequestration over certain real properties. Such motion was
opposed by the Republic alleging that the sequestered lots stand as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment the Republic may obtain against the estate of Lim, Sr. The Sandiganbayan then lifted
the sequestration order. The estate of Lim, Sr. then filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
Republics evidence did not prove or disprove that the defendants on their own or in concert with the
Marcoses, amassed ill-gotten wealth. The Republic also filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Wirt of
Preliminary Attachment against respondents in the amount of its claims, to counter the effects to the
lifting of the sequestration order. However, the Sandiganbayan, stating that bare allegations of the
commission of fraud by respondents in incurring the obligations are not sufficient for the granting of
the writ of preliminary attachment, denied the motion. The Sandiganbayan also denied respondents
demurrer to evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
Ruling:
No. For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the
applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought.
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The Court ruled that the Republic has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating
the commission of fraud committed by the respondents as a condition sine qua non for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment. The main supporting proving document of the Republic was
unqualifiedly admitted in evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It is incongruous, therefore, for the
Sandiganbayan to deny the writ of preliminary attachment when the pieces of evidence on record
which it used and based its findings and conclusions in denying the demurrer to evidence were the
same ones which demonstrate the propriety of the writ of preliminary attachment. The denial of the
prayed writ, thus, evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan.
Preliminary injunction
ST. JAMES COLLEGE OF PARAAQUE; JAIME T. TORRES, represented by his legal

representative, JAMES KENLEY M. TORRES; and MYRNA M. TORRES v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
G.R. No. 179441 August 9, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J
The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant
which should be protected.
FACTS:
Spouses Jaime (now deceased) and Myrna Torres, owned and operated St. James College,
defaulted in their loan of PhP25, 000,000 secured by REM in favor of EPCIB. The bank made a
counter proposal on the xrestructuring of the loan. Jaime Torres chose and agreed to pay the equal
annual amortizations of PhP 6,100,000 payable every May. However, they failed to pay. Thereafter,
partial payment was accepted by the bank. Spouses again issued a check as partial payment. By
letter, EPCIB again reminded Spouses that its receipt of the check payment is without prejudice to
the banks rights considering the overdue nature of Spouses loan. The Spouses ordered stop payment
of the check. The bank demanded full settlement of spouses loan which was unheeded. And so the
bank filed a Petition for Sale to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property. However, RTC
issued an Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Spouses. On appeal, CA nullified
and set aside the RTC orders.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.
RULING:
No. The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the
applicant which should be protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity, an extraordinary
peremptory remedy which can be availed of only upon the existence of well-defined circumstances.
In this case, contrary to what the RTC ruled, there was no urgent necessity to issue the writ
to protect the rights and interest of petitioners as owners. First, they could participate in the
foreclosure sale and get their property back unencumbered by the payment of the obligations that
they acknowledged in the first place. Second, a foreclosure sale does not ipso facto pass title to the
winning bidder over the mortgaged property. Petitioners continue to own the mortgaged property
sold in an auction sale until the expiration of the redemption period. Third, petitioners have one year
from the auction sale to redeem the mortgaged property. The one-year redemption period is another
grace period accorded petitioners to pay the outstanding debt, which would be converted to the
proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the requisites under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 3135, as
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amended, for the redemption of a property sold in an extrajudicial sale, also in accordance with Sec.
78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1828. It is only upon the
expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtors having made use of their right of
redemption, does ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the purchaser or winning
bidder.
ISABEL JAEL MARQUEZ et al. v. THE PRESIDING JUDGE ISMAEL B. SANCHEZ et al.
G.R. No. 141849, J. Velasco, Jr.
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant
which should be protected.
Facts:
Marcial Marquez was an incorporator and officer of Lucena Entrepreneur and Agri-
Industrial Development Corporation(LEAD). LEAD applied for an agricultural loan with DBP secured
by real estate mortgages (REM) of two properties by its principals. An additional loan was obtained
after problems were encountered during the initial loans implementation. This additional loan was
secured by a REM undertaken by Marcial Marquez and his wife. For having defaulted on its
contractual obligations, DBP demanded LEAD and its principals to settle their outstanding loan
obligation otherwise it would institute the necessary legal action to protect its interest, including
appropriate actions to foreclose the mortgaged properties. With the inaction of LEAD and its
principals, DBP was compelled to file an application for foreclosure sale of the REMs constituted to
secure its loan with DBP. Thereafter, the ex officio provincial sheriff issued a notice of extra-judicial
sale to satisfy the mortgaged indebtedness. Marquez, however, instituted the instant action for
damages, cancellation of mortgage and certiorari with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order to forestall the foreclosure. On the scheduled day of foreclosure,
the presiding judge granted the TRO. Subsequently, during the scheduled hearing, Marquez prayer
for injunctive writ was denied and the foreclosure sale proceeded.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court's refusal to grant the injunction against the threatened extra-
judicial foreclosure sale constitutes grave abuse of judicial discretion.
Held:
No. The requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the
following: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; (2) there
is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Petitioners have failed to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Hence, the trial court did not commit any manifest abuse in denying the writ.
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should
be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly
provided by law. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It
should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence
of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary
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compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case
within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS AND LA FLOR DE LA ISABELA, INC. v. HON.

VIRGILIO A. SEVANDAL, AS DIRECTOR AND DTI ADJUDICATION OFFICERS, ATTY. RUBEN S.
EXTRAMADURA, AS HEARING OFFICER OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, TABAQUERIA DE FILIPINAS, INC., AND GABRIEL RIPOLL, JR.
In order that an injunctive relief may be issued, the applicant must show that: (1) the right of
the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is
material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
Facts:
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas or Tabacalera owned registered trademarks and

authorized La Flor de la Isabela to manufacture tobacco products using the trademarks. Gabriel
Ripoll, former employee of Tabacalera, organized Tabaqueria de Filipinas, also engaged in the
manufacture of tobacco products. Tabacalera and La Flor then filed a complaint with the DTI alleging
that Tabaqueria deliberately sought to adopt the Tabacalera trademarks to confuse the public into
believing that the Tabaqueria cigars are the same or related with the Tabacalera products. They also
sought the issuance of preliminary order against Ripoll. Tabaqueria and Ripoll opposed the issuance
of injunctive relief as the petitioners failed to establish the elements required for the issuance
thereof. DTI issued a TRO and then ruled that there was no similarity in the general appearance of
the products of the parties and that the consumers would not be misled. DTI partially granted the
petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the petitioners
asserted that the DTI committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant their prayer for
injunctive relief. However, the CA denied the appeal, ruling that the dismissal of infringement of
trademarks and unfair competition renders petitioners right to an injunctive relief doubtful.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
No. In order that an injunctive relief may be issued, the applicant must show that: (1) the
right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. All of these elements must concur and the absence of even one of them
would be fatal in petitioners application for the writ.
In this case, there is no urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage to petitioners. They failed to present one iota of evidence in support of their allegations.
They failed to present evidence that indeed their sales dropped by an alleged 25% and that such
losses resulted from the alleged infringement by the respondents. Without presenting evidence to
prove their allegations, petitioners arguments cannot be given any merit. Thus, due to the absence of
the third requisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, petitioners application for the
injunctive writ must already fail.
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BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD and CHUCHI FONACIER v. HON. NINA G.
ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, in her capacity as Regional Trial Court Judge of Manila, Branch 28;
RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC et. al.
G.R. No. 184778; October 2, 2009; VELASCO, JR., J.
The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Facts:
The Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
conducted examinations of the books of the respondent banks. Thereafter, SED sent separate letters
to the Board of Directors of each bank, informing them that the SED found that the banks failed to
carry out the required remedial measures. The banks noted none of them had received the Report of
Examination (ROE) which finalizes the audit findings. Thus, the respondent banks filed a complaint
for nullification of the BSP ROE with application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before
the RTC. The RTC ruled that the banks were entitled to the writs of preliminary injunction prayed for,
holding that the banks are entitled to copies of the ROEs.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.
Ruling:
No. The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an unwarranted interference

with the powers of the Monetary Board. Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 refer to the appointment of a
conservator or a receiver for a bank, which is a power of the Monetary Board for which they need the
ROEs done by the supervising or examining department. The writs of preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court hinder the MB from fulfilling its function under the law. The actions of the Monetary
Board under Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on
petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE LEISURE AND RETIREMENT AUTHORITY (PLRA) v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, AND PHILIPPINE
RETIREMENT AUTHORITY ASSOCIATION (PRAMA)
G.R. No. 156303, December 19, 2007, J. Velasco
Where a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction will result in a premature resolution
of the case, or will grant the principal objective of the parties before merits can be passed upon, the
prayer for the relief should be properly denied.
Facts:
PLRA was created to develop and promote the Philippines as a retirement haven. In 1989, 12
principal retirees of PLRA organized and registered with SEC the Phil. Retirement Authority
Members Association, Inc. (PRAMAI). In 1994, Atty. Collado, a principal retiree of PLRA, registered
with SEC another association, the PRAMA. PRAMAI was one of the incorporators of PRAMA.
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Afterwards, PRAMA executed several MOAs with PLRAs short-listed banks. In the MOAs, the banks
agreed to pay PRAMA a marketing fee of one-half () of 1% of the total outstanding balance of the
principal retirees deposits in the listed banks.
In its August 2000 issue of PRAMA Updates, some derogatory allegations and remarks were
leveled against PLRA. PRAMA claimed that its external auditor found that about 40% of PRAMAs
member-retirees had not paid their annual membership duties. PLRA accused PRAMA of sowing seed
of discontent and suspicion among PLRAs principal retirees, and of breach of the MOA. The Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), opined that PLRA could unilaterally rescind the MOA
because PRAMA violated such MOA.
PRAMA thus sought a preliminary injunction which was granted by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is proper.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted provided that 1) the applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; 2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
and 3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In the this case, nowhere in the MOA does it show that PLRA was legally bound to collect the
membership dues for PRAMA. In short, the arrangement to let PLRA collect the membership fees for
PRAMA was merely an accommodation to PRAMA that PLRA could terminate at will. The collection
scheme was not a contractual obligation. The membership fees are for the operations of PRAMA, not
for the benefit of PLRA. The purpose of the ancillary relief is to keep things as they peaceably are
while the court passes upon the merits. Where a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction
will result in a premature resolution of the case, or will grant the principal objective of the parties
before merits can be passed upon, the prayer for the relief should be properly denied. Allowing
PRAMA to receive all monies remitted to it through a preliminary mandatory injunction would result
in PRAMA obtaining what it prayed for without trial on its merits.
Receivership
JULIO A. VIVARES and MILA G. IGNALIN v. ENGR. JOSE J. REYES

The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution
and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is
imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be
averted.
Facts:
When Severino Reyes died, his children Jose Reyes and Torcuato Reyes had an oral partition
of the inherited properties left by their father and appropriated to the said properties to themselves.
When Torcuato died, his will was admitted for probate. Petitioner Vivares and Ignalin was
designated as the executors of the will and they go after Jose Reyes believing that Torcuato did not
receive his full share of the inheritance from Severino. What the executors are contesting are the
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properties that were still in the name of Severino and not those that already transferred to Jose and
Torcuato. The petitioners filed a motion for receivership of the properties alleging that Jose sold to
third parties the properties and transferred into his name the common properties and made it
appear that some of the properties were no longer part of Severinos estate.
The RTC granted the petition for receivership and appointed Salantin as the receiver. On the
other hand, Jose Reyes opposed such appointment since he did not have the opportunity to present
his evidence and claimed that he was denied due process. Reyes subsequently filed a petition to
cancel the notice of lis pendens covering the property of certain Elena Unchuan. The RTC denied the
petition but the same was reversed by the CA upon motion of Reyes. Thereby cancelling the notice of
lis pendens and discharging the receivership. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of receiver is justified
Ruling:
No. The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme
caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that
there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought
to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should
not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the
facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to
as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant. In Descallar v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the appointment of a receiver is not proper where the rights of the parties, one of whom is
in possession of the property, are still to be determined by the trial court.
It was also held that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper. The
determination whether the property of Unchuan is a part of Lot subject of the litigation and whether
that portion really belongs to Unchuan are matters to be determined by the trial court. Consequently,
the notice of lis pendens stays until the final ruling on said issues is made.
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Special Civil Actions
Review of judgments and final orders or resolution of the Comelec and COA
Application of Rule 65 under Rule 64
LEO Y. QUERUBIN, MARIA CORAZON M. AKOL, AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON J. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, AND JOINT
VENTURE OF SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDING B.V. AND JARLTECH
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY PARTNER WITH BIGGEST EQUITY SHARE,
SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION, ITS GENERAL MANAGER ALASTAIR JOSEPH JAMES WELLS,
SMARTMATIC CHAIRMAN LORD MALLOCH-BROWN, SMARTMATIC-ASIA PACIFIC PRESIDENT
CESAR FLORES, AND ANY OR ALL PERSONS ACTING FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE JOINT
VENTURE
G.R. No. 218787, December 08, 2015, Velasco, J.
The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of constitutional
commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is
not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise of
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
FACTS:
The COMELEC released bidding documents for the Lease of Election Managment System and
Optical Scan System. to beused in the 2016 election. Smartmatic JV responded to the call and
submitted its bid for the project as well as other comanies. During the opening of the bids,
Smartmatic JV informed the BAC of the COMELEC that one of its partners, SMTC, had a pending
application with the SEC to amend its AOI. Smartmatic JV and another company, Smartmatic later on
was declared that Smartmatic was eligible for their vid. Later on, at the conduct of post-qualification,
the BAC, disqualified Smartmativ JV for failure to submit valid AOI and the demo unit did not meet
the technical requirements. Smartmatic moved to reconsider this but ws denied thus they filed a
Protest witht he COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of Smartmatic and found
that it met the requirement neede for the project. The petitioner then questioned the sufficiency of
what Smartmatic has sent with the Supreme Court via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 64 is the proper remedy.
RULING:
No. The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of
constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme
Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the
commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC, this
would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its
authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of elective offices. Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the
procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be read in the same sense
that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the
exercise of its administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy.
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The instant petition revolves around the issue on whether or not Smartmatic JV is eligible to
participate in the bidding process for the COMELEC's procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark
readers. The case does not stem from an election controversy involving the election, qualification, or
the returns of an elective office. Hence, Rule 64 is not the proper remedy.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
FRANCISCO MOTORS CORP. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO RAQUIZA

G.R. No. 117622-23 October 23, 2006, Velasco, Jr. J.
The Court has consistently held that where the error sought to be corrected neither relates to
the courts jurisdiction nor involves grave abuse of discretion, review of the error through certiorari will
not be allowed. This rule, however, admits exceptions.
Facts:
Spouses Alano entered into a Contract of Legal Retainer with Antonio Raquiza wherein it
was agreed that Raquiza would be paid his attorneys fees equivalent to 30% of the properties in
litigation. However, Raquiza was dismissed without justifiable cause. Hence, he was allowed to
intervene in the civil cases with respect to his claim for attorneys fees. The RTC ruled against
Raquiza but was reversed by the CA which held that Raquiza is entitled to 30% pro indiviso interest
in all the properties in litigatigation, which were transferred to Francisco Motors Corp (FMC). The
Decision became final and executory and a writ of execution was subsequently issued by the trial
court. However, FMC moved to quash the writ of execution alleging that it is a buyer in good faith,
which was later on granted.
Raquiza filed a Motion to Enforce his Motion to Execute which was denied on the ground
that the decision sought to be enforced had become final and executory after the lapse of five years.
Hence, Raquiza filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court, which was remanded to the CA. The
CA granted the petition stating that FMC was bound to recognize the attorneys liens, although not
inscribed in the title, and held that Raquizas petition for certiorari was proper.
Issue:
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that where the error sought to be corrected neither
relates to the courts jurisdiction nor involves grave abuse of discretion, review of the error through
certiorari will not be allowed. This rule, however, admits exceptions such as (1) when it is necessary
to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, (2) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment, (3) where there may be danger of failure of justice, (4) where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, (5) where the issue raised is one purely of law,
(6) where public interest is involved, and (7) in case of urgency.
In this case, the number of years alone that the private respondent had devoted in enforcing
his claim, that is, almost half a century to date, exceptionally calls for certiorari as a more speedy and
adequate remedy. The availability of other legal remedies cannot prevent the recourse to certiorari
when these remedies would be slow and inadequate to effectively dispense justice in favor of the
private respondent.
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FERNANDO C. PARMA, JR., v. THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON and
MAYOR LOURDES SEAR.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Fernando Parma was a councilor while Lourdes Sear was the incumbent municipal mayor.
Parma, together with the vice mayor, followed up the release by PCSO of a PhP 50,000.00 donation
solicited by the Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc, to defray the cost of their medical mission.
They made another official trip for the same purpose from June 21 to 26, 2004. Before each trip, they
drew the usual cash advances, and upon their return, such were liquidated. The liquidation process
required the submission of the statement of actual itinerary and the certificate of appearance or
attendance. The mayor alleges that the two submitted spurious certificates of attendance. Sear filed
with the Ombudsman the first Complaint-Affidavit, charging the two with falsification of official
documents. Sear filed a second Complaint-Affidavit for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Sear filed a third complaint-affidavit solely against Parma, charging him with
falsification of official document and a fourth one for the same crime and offense charged in the first
and second complaint. Parma failed to file his counter-affidavit, thus the Ombudsman issued on
August 17, 2005 a Resolution finding probable cause to charge Parma for the crime of falsification of
official document. He was found guilty of dishonesty. On November 30, 2005, the Ombudsman issued
a Joint Order denying Parmas MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the August 17, 2005
Resolution and the November 30, 2005 Joint Order.
RULING:
No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be
considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the act was performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, the imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman
cannot be sustained in the instant case because, Parma veritably latches his case on the lame
argument that had the Ombudsman duly considered its findings on the second and third complaint, it
would have found no reason to give due course to the fourth one. However, the cases are rooted on
different causes of action and, hence, would require a dissimilar evidentiary proof to sustain a finding
of probable cause or rebut any such finding. The second complaint, which was dismissed, has no
direct bearing on the instant case as the two cases have distinct causes of action. In net effect, the
dismissal does not have the effect of res judicata. Similarly, the third complaint for falsification,
dismissed by the Ombudsman, does not have direct bearing on the instant case because it pivots on
an alleged spurious certificate of attendance for a February 2 to February 7, 2004 trip while this case
involves a June 14 through June 19, 2004 trip.
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Expropriation

J.
The appropriate standard of just compensation as provided in RA 8974 is a substantive matter

that should be applied prospectively.
Facts:
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) for administrative jurisdiction. On August 15, 2000, an RTC Order
was issued fixing the just compensation at PhP 5,500 per square meter. The RTC directed PPA to
release 10% of the zonal value deposited to the lot owners. Thereafter, the defendant lot owners filed
a motion for partial reconsideration claiming payment of 100% of the zonal value under RA 8974 and
claiming further that AO 50 did not apply. The RTC granted the motion and ordered PPA to
immediately release 100% of the zonal valuation of the properties.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8974 is the law that should apply on the deposit or provisional payment
in expropriation.
Ruling:
No. What is applicable is Rule 67, Sec. 2 of which provides for the deposit or initial payment
of the total assessed value of the expropriated property. On the other hand, RA 8974 which became
effective only on November 26, 2000 or after a year from the filing of the civil case, cannot be applied
retroactively for being a substantive law. In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon, the Supreme Court held
that the appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof and
the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural matter. In the
factual setting therefore, the RTC can either order a deposit equal to the total assessed value of the
lots in question, as reflected in the tax declarations of the subject lots; or, in the alternative, order the
level of deposit as proposed by PPA, as it correctly did through the order pegging the deposit
equivalent to 10% of the offered amount for the expropriated lots pursuant to Sec. 2 of AO 50.
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
FLORA N. FLORES, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, JOSE NAVARRO

AND ERLINDA NAVARRO v. SPOUSES LUCAS AND ZENAIDA QUITALIG
In actions for forcible entry, only prior possession de facto and deprivation thereof by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth needs to be proved.
Facts:
Flora and her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of an untitled lot since 1950.
In 2004, the Sps. Quitalig entered and constructed a fence around the subject lot, believing that the
said lot belongs to them. After the ouster of Floras agents from the property, she then filed a
complaint for forcible entry against the Sps. Quitalig.
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The MTC ruled for the Sps. Quitalig after finding that Flora failed to prove her claim of
ownership over the subject lot. The RTC reversed after finding that Flora and her predecessors were
the prior possessors of the lot; and that the parties claim of ownership should be threshed out in a
separate action. The CA reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry should be granted, regardless of the issue of
ownership.
Ruling:
Yes. Owing to the summary nature of an action for forcible entry, courts should resolve the
issue of possession, avoiding, as a rule, the issue of ownership. In actions for forcible entry, only prior
possession de facto and deprivation thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth needs
to be proved. Naturally, the complainant may recover such possession even from the owner himself.
In any case, the issue of ownership can be properly resolved in a separate and more appropriate
proceeding.
Here, Flora through her agents and her predecessors-in-interest have prior possession over
the lot, and it was established that the Sps. Quitalig unduly deprived Flora of her possession. Hence,
the complaint should be granted.
LOURDES DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MELBA TAN TE,
Respondents.
An ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, is a specie of unlawful

detainer cases
Facts:
The Reyes family had been leasing their land to Lourdes Dela Cruz for over 40 years. When a
fire gutted the dwelling of Lourdes, the Reyes family made several verbal demands for her to vacate
the lot, but she refused.
The subject lot was eventually bought by Melba Tan Te who filed an ejectment complaint
against Lourdes. In turn, Lourdes argued that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed from petitioner's forcible entry.
Issue:
Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Yes. Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te's ejectment
complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz was
a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the legal
possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house, the
Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot
and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses
however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to
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respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to their
subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to
eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of
demand. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was instituted
well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the nature of the
complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan
Te's complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
SPOUSES VIRGINIA G. GONZAGA and ALFREDO GONZAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO

AGAN, and ROWENA AGAN
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complaint must contain two mandatory allegations: (1)
prior physical possession, possession de facto, not possession de jure, of the property by the plaintiff; and
(2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Facts:
Sps. Gonzaga are the registered owners of a residential lot where they decided to construct a
house. When they went to inspect the lot, they discovered that a shanty belonging to Sps. Agan had
been built thereon. They then filed a Complaint against respondents for Forcible Entry. On appeal,
the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the spouses failed to prove prior actual physical
possession, thus they should have not commenced an action for forcible entry but an accion
publiciana suit.
Issue:
Whether the proper remedy is forcible entry in case the rightful owner of property failed to
prove prior actual possession.
Ruling:
No. For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complaint must contain two mandatory
allegations: (1) prior physical possession, possession de facto, not possession de jure, of the property
by the plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. The purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession. The person claiming rightful possession cannot be permitted to exclude the actual
possessor and thereby disturb social order and violate individual security. The burden of instituting
an action to try the property right is upon he who claims rightful possession. Clearly then,
complainants in forcible entry cases must allege and eventually prove prior physical possession. Else,
their cases fail, as here.
The proper remedy in the instant case is to file an accion publiciana case which differs from a
forcible entry action in that it does not require prior physical possession in order to prosper.
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Contempt
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON K. ILUSORIO,

MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A. BISUA, and ATTY. MANUEL R.
SINGSON
Litigants do not have the unbridled freedom in expressing their frustration or grievance in any
manner they want and their respective acts may constitute indirect contempt when found to be a
deliberate act to bring the court or judge into disrepute.
Facts:
Erlina Ilusorio filed various manifestations and motions in relation to her appeals from the
decision of the CA denying the petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband, Potenciano
Ilusorio. First, Erlinda Ilusorio moved for its reconsideration. She followed this with a Motion to Set
Case for Preliminary Conference. An Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Clarification was filed
thereafter. The Court once again denied the MR and resolved to expunge from the records her
repetitive motions, with the caveat that no further pleadings shall be entertained. However,
represented by Dela Cruz Albano & Associates, she sought leave to file an urgent MR. Moreover, she
addressed two letters to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Another letter was given where she
called the decision in the case Ramon K. Ilusorio v. Baguio Country Club, appalling, unilaterally brazen,
and unprecedented. To the Petitioners, filing of redundant motions and pleadings, along with
Erlindas act of writing the aforementioned letters, constitutes contemptuous disrespect and
disobedience or defiance of lawful orders of the Court. The publication of On the Edge of Heaven, a
book carrying Erlinda Ilusorios name as author and which contained her commentaries on the
aforesaid habeas corpus case was also alleged to be contemptuous.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorios various manifestations, motions and letters including her
authorship of On the Edge of Heaven may be considered contemptuous.
Ruling:
Yes. With regard to Erlindas authorship of the On the Edge of Heaven, she is found guilty of
indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is a deliberate act to bring the court or judge into disrepute. Her
statements pose a different threat to the Courts repute. Statements such as Was justice sold? and
How can the highest court of our land be a party to the break up of my family and, disregarding the
Family Code, when taken together went beyond the permissible bounds of fair criticism. While most
of her statements were in the form of questions instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the
same: they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend to undermine
the confidence of the public in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land. Litigants, no matter
how aggrieved or dissatisfied they may be of courts decision, do not have the unbridled freedom in
expressing their frustration or grievance in any manner they want. However, the various motions
and manifestations filed by Erlinda Ilusorio which neither contained offensively disrespectful
language nor tended to besmirch the dignity of the Court are not contemptuous. The letters to the
Chief justice were also found not to be contumacious in character, but only a sleigh but sub-rosa
attempt to influence the letter-addressee.
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Special Proceedings
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons, Venue and Process
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez]

and SALVADOR A. OROSCO v. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the
CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY
Recourse to administration proceedings to determine who the heirs are is sanctioned only if
there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-

Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the
RTC. Petitioner Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her daughter Emelinda and
her son-in-law on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was
only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the ground that (1) with
regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not
therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina did
not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the titling of
such property. Aggrieved, respondents now contend that issues on heirship must be made in
administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on

petitioners allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must
be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action.
Ruling:
No. It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to
administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring
administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it
defined during the pre-trial.
There appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the
inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding
for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio. In light of the
admission of respondents spouses Gualvez that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not
the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over
the subject land, it is with more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary
superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina.
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Letters Testamentary and of Administration
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, vs. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREO, Respondents.
The trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator, however, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles.
Facts:
Spouses Engracia and Florentino Manungas had no children so they adopted Samuel Avila.
Florentino died intestate. Samuel predeceased his adoptive mother, and he was survived by his wife
Sarah who renounced her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia. The
property was distributed in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino to Engracia and Ramon,
acknowledged by Engracia as the natural son of Florentino. The RTC then appointed Parreo, the
niece of Engracia, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
Engracia, through Parreo, instituted a case for illegal detainer and damages against Spouses
Diosdado Salinas Manungas, who claims to be the illegitimate son of Florentino. A summary
judgment in favor of Engracia was rendered. Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor, alleging that
being an illegitimate son of Florentino, he is an heir of Engracia. Parreo opposed because Diosdado
was not an heir or even a creditor of Engracia and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate. The RTC
appointed Parreo as the administrator, then it subsequently reversed itself and appointed Diosdado
as the special administrator. The CA revoked his appointment and reinstated Parreo.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the CA in revoking the appointment of Diosdado and the
subsequent reinstatement of Parreo as the special administrator is correct.
Ruling:
Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court. The
statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, and the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of
special administrator. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and
the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the
person to be appointed. While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives
of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a
special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. Given this
duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to
appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. The
trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo. To reiterate, the subject of
the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. The evidence on record shows that
Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latters
estate.
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Writ of Habeas Corpus
Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors (A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC)
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA v. RAQUEL

M. CADA-DEAPERA
G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014, Velasco, J.
The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of
the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital
Judicial Region. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ of
habeas corpus issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Facts:
Respondent Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of
habeas corpus seeking petitioner Militante to produce before the court respondent's biological
daughter, minor Criselda and to return to her the custody over the child. RTC granted the same. Since
the writ cannot be served despite diligent efforts, RTC-Caloocan directed the Sheriff to serve the alias
writ upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC-Caloocan acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was
served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
Ruling:
Yes. The National Capital Judicial Region consists of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. In view thereof, it is
indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family
court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City.
Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or
the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH

G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007 VELASCO, JR. J.
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
FACTS:
Spouses Agnes and Franklyn Hirsch started to have marital problems. One day, Agnes came
to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklins permission for her to
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bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter
discovered that neither Agnes nor their minor daughter Simone would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA. The said court granted Franklin joint
custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes MR was denied. She went to the SC to set aside the
decisions of the CA, and to issue a TRO/injunction on the execution and implementation of the
assailed rulings of the CA which was denied. Upon Agnes MR, the SC issued a TRO and awarded the
sole custody of the minor, Simone, to Agnes.
ISSUE:
Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor
child to both parents.
RULING:
Yes. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all
questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable
to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable
or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mothers custody.
Thus, the sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch was awarded to the mother, Agnes
Gamboa-Hirsch.
Criminal Procedure
Prosecution of Offenses
People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Salazar

G.R. No. 181900, October 20, 2010, Velasco, JR, J.
By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once
it has been instituted in court.
Facts:
AAA who was only 12 years old at the time the crime was committed was raped by the
Salazar twice. AAA was the daughter of BBB whom Salazar was cohabiting with. Salazar was
thereafter charged with two counts of statutory rape. Thereafter, AAA purportedly executed an
Affidavit of Desistance wherein she stated that she was not raped by accused-appellant Salazar and
that she no longer intends to pursue the cases filed against accused-appellant Salazar. During the
hearing, she explained that her own mother forced her to execute the affidavit upon threat of harm.
RTC convicted the accused with two counts of statutory rape but CA modified it by 2 simple rapes
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because AAA has failed to present evidence that she was a minor when the crime was committed.
Accused-appellant Salazar claims that the instant case should have been dismissed by the trial court,
considering that AAA had executed an affidavit of desistance exonerating accused-appellant from the
crimes charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance is a sufficient evidence to acquit Salazar
Ruling:
No. As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and

reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because
it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be
repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. An affidavit of desistance or
pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. In the
present case, private complainant lost the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape
charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and must therefore continue to be
heard by the court a quo.
Indeed, the Affidavit of Desistance of private complainant is highly suspect. Apparently, she
executed it on the basis of a consideration of P5,000, which was later increased to P100,000. After
her testimony had been rendered, however, Salazar refused to pay the amount agreed upon, thereby
prompting her to recant the Affidavit. She had stated therein that the accused is indeed innocent of
the crimes charge[d] since in truth, he never molested me sexually as charged. Such statement was a
mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility, much less truth. More likely,
it emanated not from this young girls mouth, but from a trained legal mind. Moreover, while she
affirmed her Affidavit on the stand, she also declared, on clarificatory question from the judge, that
she was 14 years old when she was molested and raped by Salazar. These facts raise doubts as to the
reliability of her statements in her Affidavit.
Venue of Criminal Actions
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEPITO NEVERIO

G.R. No. 182792, August 25, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J. (crimpro, territorial jurisdiction)
For the court to acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case, the offense or any of its essential
elements should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Facts:
Two Informations were filed against Pepito for the commission of rape against AAA, a
mentally deficient lass. During trial, Pepito did not present any evidence but instead filed a Demurrer
to Evidence with Leave of Court. In Pepitos Motion to Dismiss with Demurrer to Evidence, he faults
AAA for her failure to state the place where the alleged crime happened. He maintains that the
identification of the place where the crime was committed was necessary for vesting the court with
jurisdiction over the case.
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Issue:
Whether or not the identification of the place where the crime was committed was necessary
for vesting the court with jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
No. For the court to acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case, the offense or any of its
essential elements should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This
territorial jurisdiction of the court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information.
In this case, the October 17, 2001 Informations clearly indicated that the acts of rape were committed
in Barangay Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur. During trial, prosecution evidence showed that the
molestations happened in AAAs house. And as testified by AAAs mother, their house was situated in
Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Thus, AAAs inability to state her address in her testimony was
trivial. Understandably, this failure was due only to her mental deficiency.
Preliminary Investigation
GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR, and NOR-RHAMA J.
INDANAN
G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
The presumption of innocence, and all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of
preliminary investigation. It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the
commission of a felony, only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent
and material are considered.
Facts:
One day, shortly after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb exploded
near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives in Batasan Complex which
was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle parked near the entrance stairs of the
South Wing lobby. Thereafter, the police officers raided an alleged ASG safehouse at Parkwood Hills,
Payatas, Quezon City leading to the arrest of several persons, one of which was Ikram Indama, who
was the driver of petitioner Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he said that
he heard Salapuddin ordering a person to kill Rep. Akbar of Basilan.
The prosecution later on included Salapudding in the complaint for murder and multiple
frustrated murder based on the affidavits of Ikram. Later on, the Secretary of Justice issued a
resolution on April 23, 2008 excluding Salapuddin from the charges for the complex crime of murder
and frustrated murder modifying the supplemental resolution of the investigating panel.
Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed on May 13, 2008 a petition for
certiorari before the CA questioning the Secretary of Justice's April 23, 2008 resolution. In its ruling
dated August. 6, 2008, the CA set aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice stating that the
totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and material
support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case was proper.
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Ruling:
No. Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it
demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the
records, however, show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed
out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably
relevant, this is not the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated
in the commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot
be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice.
Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddins complicity to the
crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or
his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila. It must be shown that the
person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. In fact,
mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to
cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy. There must be positive and conclusive factual
evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy, and not simple inferences, conjectures and
speculations speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence.
Arrest
Arrest Without Warrant, When Lawful
People of the Philippines v. Sulpicio Sonny Boy Tan y Phua

G.R. No. 191069, November 15, 2010, Velasco, JR, J.
Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court states the instances when the person to be arrested is
actually committing an offense, the peace officer may arrest him even without a warrant. However, a
warrantless arrest must still be preceded by the existence of probable cause.
Facts:
SPO2 Geronimo, SPO1 Quilala, PO3 Avendano, and PO1 Cruz of the Makati City Philippine
National Police (PNP) conducted a manhunt operation against a suspect in a robbery case involving
Korean nationals along P. Burgos, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City. While on board their civilian
vehicle, they chanced upon a male individual selling certain items to two foreigners. They heard him
say, Hey Joe, want to buy Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra? Curious, they inquired and the male individual
told them that he was selling Viagra and Cialis, while, at the same time, showing them the contents of
his bag which yielded 120 tablets of Valium 10. The male individual, who later turned out to be Sonny
Boy, was immediately searched and placed under arrest, after which they informed him of the nature
of his apprehension and of his constitutional rights. Sonny Boy was then brought to the office of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF), where the items recovered
from him were marked and inventoried by PO1 Cruz. The items were turned over to the duty
investigator.
In contrast, Sonny Boy interposed the defense of denial. He maintained that he was merely
watching cars as a parking boy along P. Burgos when two men suddenly held and invited him for
questioning. They asked him if he knew any drug pushers and, if he did, to identify them. When he
was unable to do so, they charged him for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
Issue:
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Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. One of the instances where warrantless arrest may be effected by a police officer is
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense (Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court).
Undoubtedly, the case at bar falls under Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113, that is, when the person to be
arrested is actually committing an offense, the peace officer may arrest him even without a warrant.
However, a warrantless arrest must still be preceded by the existence of probable cause. Probable
cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
charged.
In this case, the arresting officers had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest in view of
the fact that they themselves heard accused-appellant say, Hey Joe, want to buy Valium 10, Cialis,
Viagra? which, in turn, prompted them to ask accused-appellant what he was selling. When accused-
appellant showed them the items, they identified 120 tablets of Valium 10, a regulated drug. The
police officers then became obligated to arrest accused-appellant, as he was actually committing a
crime in their presencepossession of a dangerous drug, a violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165.
Therefore, it is without question that the warrantless search and arrest of accused-appellant are legal
and valid.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO MANLANGIT y TRESBALLES

It is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require
a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest," in line with the provisions of Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court.
Facts:
The Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 4 office received an information that a
certain "Negro", which turned out to be respondent Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes (Manlangit),
was selling prohibited drugs along Col. Santos Street at Brgy. South Cembo, Makati City. Accordingly,
a buy-bust team was formed. MADAC operative Wilfredo Serrano (Serrano) was designated as the
poseur-buyer. Upon reaching Brgy. Cembo the informant approached Manlangit and convinced the
latter that Serrano wanted to purchase shabu. Manlangit then went inside his house and later
reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, which turned out to be
Shabu. Manlangit handed over the plastic sachet to Serrano who, in turn, gave Manlangit the marked
money. After the consummation of the sale, the buy-bust team then proceeded to arrest Manlangit.
Manlangit was found guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal use of dangerous drugs.
Manlangit argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
emphasized that the buy-bust operation was conducted without first conducting a surveillance or
test buy to determine the veracity of the report made by the informant. He also assailed the fact that
despite knowledge of his identity and location, the buy-bust team failed to secure even a search
warrant.
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Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Manlangit beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to accused-appellants challenge to the validity of the buy-bust operation, the
Court categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior surveillance or test buy is not required for
a valid buy-bust operation, as long as the operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus:
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of
the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court
has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police
operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for
prior surveillance. In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who
was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance
before they undertook the buy-bust operation.
The warrantless search was also valid. Under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113, a person may be
arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO3 SANGKI ARA Y MIRASOL et al.

One of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court is when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
Facts:
After receiving an information that three suspected drug pushers contacted the informant
for a deal involving shabu, a buy-bust team was immediately formed. The team went to the school
and waited for the car of the alleged pushers. The sale of shabu was consummated inside the vehicle.
Upon the signal of the poseur-buyer, SPO3 Sangki Ara, Mike Talib and Jordan Musa were arrested.
The RTC and the CA convicted SPO3 Ara, Talib and Musa of violation of Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165).
Issue:
Whether or not the buy-bust conducted leading to the warrantless arrest and seizure was
valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation
has long been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed
as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an offense. A buy-bust
operation can be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of planning for such
operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such operation. It is
unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the
objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of
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the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court is when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELIZABETH MARCELINO y REYES

G.R. No. 189278 July 26, 2010 VELASCO JR. J.
From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the
arrest illegal.
FACTS:
SPO1 Dela Cruz was part of a team that conducted a test-buy on to verify a report of
Elizabeth engaging in illegal drug activities. When this was confirmed, a buy-bust operation
ensued. RTC held her guilty of the offenses charged, illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited
drugs. Elizabeth contended that after the two test-buys, the police officers certainly had sufficient
time to secure both a search warrant and a warrant of arrest but failed to do so. She argueed that a
buy-bust operation should never be used as a cover for an illegal warrantless search and arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in affirming Elizabeth's conviction.
RULING:
No. A buy-bust operation is a circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule
113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. It is a valid form of entrapment, as the idea to commit a crime
comes not from the police officers but from the accused himself. The accused is caught in the act and
must be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a
warrant does not make the arrest illegal.
Also, it was held that the illegal drug seized was not the fruit of the poisonous tree. The
seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126,
Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows
that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.
Bail
Nature
GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III v. JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262, February 9, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
A judge cannot verbally grant bail (Constructive bail) to the accused who is not yet charged
and did not file an application or petition for its grant.
Facts:
Gaudencio Pantillo is the brother of the homicide victim in a pending criminal case under the
sala of Judge Victor Canoy. When Pantillo attended the criminal cases inquest proceedings, he was
informed that the accused, Ronald Perocho was released from detention. Pantillo proceeded to the
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City Police station and was informed that Perocho posted bail and was released based on a verbal
order of Judge Canoy. The latter ordered the Clerk of Court to accept as deposit the amount of bail
and to earmark its official receipt. Consequently, Pantillo went to the Office of the Clerk of Court to
request for the copy of the information which served as basis for the approval of bail but was
informed that no information has yet been filed in court. Hence, Pantillo filed a letter-complaint with
the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Canoy for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse
of authority and appearance of impropriety. In his defense, Judge Canoy invoked the constitutional
right of the accused to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which does not require that a person be charged in court before he or she may apply for bail. To his
mind, there was already a constructive bail given that only the papers were needed to formalize it. It
would be unreasonable and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused.
The Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued his evaluation and recommendation
on the case. In his evaluation, the Court Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply
with the documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail. Hence, this petition was
filed.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Canoy may verbally grant bail (Constructive bail) to the accused who
is not yet charged and did not file an application or petition for its grant.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in
custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held. In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for
the grant of bail with the RTC. Despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge
verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of
Rule 114.
Also, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the amount of bail
recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial,
city or municipal treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally
ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash
deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day.
Worse, respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the
conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon
receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the police
escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release. In sum, there was no written
application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.
As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as constructive bail,
there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court
may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another.
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Motion to Quash
Double Jeopardy
SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING & CO., INC., v.

HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., in his capacity as PRESIDING
JUDGE of RTC-MANILA, BR. 24, and ELIDAD KHO, VIOLETA KHO, and ROGER KHO,
G.R. No. 163741 August 7, 2007 VELASCO, JR., J.
The courts should not blindly follow the resolutions issued by the DOJ. On the contrary, it should
determine on its own whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.
FACTS:
An Information for unfair competition was filed against Elidad, Violeta, and Roger, all
surnamed Kho. The Khos filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which
initially upheld the Information but subsequently dismissed the same. The prosecution filed with the
RTC a Motion to Withdraw Information which was granted.
Meanwhile, the DOJ granted Summervilles Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the
Prosecutor to file the Information. The RTC ruled that the revival of the case is now barred by double
jeopardy. Summerville filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA. The latter held that
double jeopardy had set in and that Judge Eugenio cannot be faulted for dismissing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is double jeopardy.
RULING:
No. At the outset, the Court held that courts should not blindly follow the resolutions issued
by the DOJ. On the contrary, it should determine on its own whether there is probable cause to hold
the accused for trial. In this case, it can be readily seen from the October 24, 2001 Order of Judge
Eugenio, granting the withdrawal of the Information, that the trial court glaringly failed to conduct its
own determination of a prima facie case, and simply adopted the September 28, 2001 Resolution
issued by the Secretary of Justice.
However, double jeopardy has not set in in this case. Since the Court held that the October
24, 2001 Order granting the withdrawal of the Information was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or
termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and acquittal of the accused in
the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy
has not set in.
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Trial
JIMMY T. GO v ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO

The matter of deciding who to present as a witness for the prosecution is not for the defendant
or the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor.
Facts:
Jimmy Go (Go), herein petitioner, filed a criminal case for estafa against Alberto Looyuko
(Looyuko), herein respondent, alleging that the latter misappropriated the stock certificates
belonging to Go by converting the said shares of stocks for his own (Looyukos) personal benefit by
causing the transfer of the aforementioned stock certificates to Looyukos name after receiving the
aforementioned stock certificates in trust from Go. Thereafter, during the pendency of the criminal
case, the prosecution on behalf of Go, wanted to present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of
the prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need for the testimonies of the aforementioned
witnesses. This prompted Go to file a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess in jurisdiction by not allowing the
prosecutions witnesses to testify for their case.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court gravely abused its discretion in disallowing the prosecutions
witnesses to testify.
Ruling:
Yes. The matter of deciding who to present as a witness for the prosecution is not for the
defendant or the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. It cannot be
overemphasized that the trial court must accord full opportunity for the prosecution, more so in
criminal cases, to adduce evidence to prove its case and to properly ventilate the issues absent patent
showing of dilatory or delaying tactics. The reason is obvious: it is tasked to produce and adduce
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Sans such evidence, a dismissal of the criminal case on a
demurrer to the evidence is proper. In the case at bar, there was no showing that the presentation of
the three (3) witnesses previously approved by the trial court would be dilatory and manifestly for
delay.
First, the testimony of the witnesses would bolster and tend to prove whatever fact the
prosecution is trying to establish. Second, the superfluity of a testimony vis--vis what has already
been proven can be determined with certainty only after it has been adduced.
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New trial or Reconsideration
FRANCISCO L. BAYLOSIS, SR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 152119, August 14, 2007, VELASCO, JR., J.
In granting a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence
presented must be in actual existence and unknown to the party even if a judgment had been rendered
before.
FACTS:
Francisco Baylosis was charged of the crime estafa for having feloniously misappropriated
for his own use and benefit the amount of 118, 181.71php in his capacity as custodian/ warehouse
supervisor of Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Incorporated (PCPPI). The RTC found him guilty of the
crime charged. Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision, but the trial court denied
it. He then filed his Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, a Motion for New Trial with the CA. In his motion, he
begged the CA to consider the affidavit of a certain Zenaida C. Aya-ay, the Credit and Collection
Manager of PCPPI. Said affidavit stated that the accused had a remaining balance of only PhP
21,981.71 which he owed PCPPI. He prayed before the CA to remand the case to the RTC for new
trial, and that he be allowed to change his previous plea of not guilty to guilty. However, the CA
denied Baylosis Motion for New trial. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in denying his Motion for New Trial filed under Section 14, Rule 124 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULING:
No. In granting a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence presented must be in actual existence and unknown to the party even if a judgment had
been rendered before. This should be the case because otherwise, how could it be discovered
evidence when it did not in fact exist previously during trial?
In this case, petitioner presented as a ground for its motion the testimony of Aya-ay, the
Credit and Collection Manager of PCPPI, who stated in an affidavit that his liability to PCPPI had been
cut down to a mere PhP 21,981.71. However, it is obvious that the same affidavit cannot be executed,
much less produced, during the trial since the payments were made after judgment or after the fact.
Hence, the same could hardly be classified as newly discovered evidence.
MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ERNESTO G. PESCADERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction
becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment.
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Facts:
In 1999, an audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the period starting July 27,
1998 up to May 23, 1999 was conducted in the Provincial Government of Sulu. The COA Special Audit
Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances, and
benefits, among others. Pursuant to such findings, three informations were filed by the Ombudsman
against Munib Estino, then Acting Governor, and Ernesto Pescadera, the Provincial Treasurer during
Estinos stint. The said charges involve malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the Revised
Penal Code and two violations of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan, in the consolidated
criminal cases, convicted both Estino and Pescadera for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for
failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial
government employees of Sulu but acquitted them as to the other charge for the same violation. As to
the charge of malversation of public funds, the Sandiganbayan exonerated Estino but convicted
Pescadera for failure to remit the GSIS contributions of the provincial government employees.
Issue:
Whether or not a remand of the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of
conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
Petitioners defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they
submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted
budget. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears
to that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In
their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented
the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was the
nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998
reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from presenting
pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget
because the prosecutions evidence was confined to alleged nonpayment of RATA under the 1999
budget. Hence, a new trial is proper.
Evidence
General Principles
Admissibility of Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO PABOL

G.R. No. 187084 October 12, 2009 J. Velasco
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.
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Facts:
AAA was on her way to school, passing buy the lower portion of the house of Pabol. AAA met
Pabol on the way. Pabol suddenly struck her on the right side of her face causing her to fall. Pabol
hugged her from behind, sat her on his lap and struck her breast with a piece of stone. Pabol covered
her mouth when she shouted for help and at that point she fell unconscious. She woke up two hours
later finding that she sustained wounds on her face, both of her ears were sliced, her blouse was open
and traces of blood in her panty and she experienced pain between her legs when urinating. BBB,
AAAs elder sister saw AAA return home and asked what happened to her and AAA said that Pabol
inflicted wounds upon her face. She was brought to the hospital for treatment and it was found that
AAA received multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. BBB also saw bloodstains on AAAs panty
and they found out that she was no longer a virgin and later found as well that she had intercourse
through force most likely when she was unconscious. AAA testified that she did not answer all
questions truthfully on the PI out of embarrassment and she admitted that she did not notice of Pabol
undressed himself, removed her panty or inserting his penis into her vagina. When caught, Pabol
gave a partial denial and denied allegations of rape but admitted that he hit AAA.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence was enough to prove the guilt of Pabol.
Ruling:
Yes. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the

circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial
evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
In this case, the prosecution has successfully established the following circumstances and
facts that, when taken together, very well constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, to
wit: (1) appellant having met AAA on the latters way to school and hitting her on the face; (2) the
positive identification of appellant as the person she met while she was on her way to school; (3)
appellant then hugging AAA from behind, sitting her on his lap and striking her breast with a piece of
stone; (4) AAA shouting for help and appellant covering her mouth; (5) appellant hitting AAA until
she lost consciousness and then dragging her body to the side of the road; (6) AAA waking up two
hours later to discover that her ears had been sliced, her blouse opened, and her underwear stained
with her own blood; (7) AAA feeling pain in her private part after the incident; and (8) AAA
sustaining hymenal laceration. Given the foregoing circumstances, there is no other conclusion that
we can make with moral certainty other than that appellant raped the victim.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . FEDERICO LUCERO

Circumstantial evidence shall be sufficient for conviction when the following requisites are
complied with: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
The accused was charged of the crime of rape with homicide of certain AAA. The prosecution
witnesses identified the accused as the one who entered and went out of the room of AAA as they are
familiar with the accused because they were neighbors. They also corroborated each others
testimony that the victim had a stab wound in her breast but was declared dead on arrival when
brought to the hospital. Moreover, the medico legal testified that he found several stab wounds and
contusions and hymenal lacerations on the body of the victim. On the other hand, the accused
testified that he was only made to admit the killing of AAA by the police officer who arrested him and
that he was denied of the constitutional rights accorded to an accused. He also claimed that he was
maltreated and tortured b the police and detainees.
The RTC found no evidence of maltreatment and torture and found the accused guilty of the
crime charged which decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence relied upon by the lower courts are enough to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. The confessions made by the accused without the presence of his counsel and the
evidence that was adduced without proper search warrant are violations of the constitutional rights
of the accused, hence inadmissible. However, there are still evidence sufficient to sustain the
accuseds conviction. Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, circumstantial evidence shall be sufficient for conviction when the following requisites are
complied with: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, setting aside the inadmissible evidence, even though there was no one
who actually saw the commission of the crime of rape and the killing of the accused, the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to conclude that the accused committed the crime and
such testimonies were consistent with each other. Therefore, such circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to justify the conviction of the accused.
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Positive and negative evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. PEPING

G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010, Velasco Jr. J
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.
Facts:
This case involves the crime of murder and homicide allegedly committed by Jose Pepito
Combate (Combate) herein accused-appellant, resulting to the death of one Edmund Prayco (Prayco),
and Leopoldo Guiro (Guiro). Sometime in March of 1995, one Jose Tomaro (Tomaro) parked his
passenger jeepney at the garage of Guiros mother somewhere in Negro Occidental. Tomaro then
proceeded to the house of Guiro where Tomaro usually sleeps after driving the jeepney owned by
Guiros parents. Thereafter Tomaro met Prayco and Guiro, who were on their way out. Guiro invited
Tomaro to drink with them but Tomaro declined saying that he was already tired. Tomaro continued
on his way when he heard a gunshot coming from outside. He rushed back outside where he saw
Combate pointing a gun at the already fallen Guiro. When Prayco tried to intervene, Combate also
shot him. After shooting Prayco, Tomaro then rushed to Guiro and pleaded Combate to spare his life.
Instead of heeding his plea, Combate pointed his gun at Tomaro and pulled the trigger but the gun
did not fire. At that instant, Tomaro jumped on Combate and was able to grab the gun from Combate.
This prompted Combate to flee from the scene. Prayco and Guiro later on died. For his defense,
Combate denied that he shot Prayco and Guiro. Combate averred that he was not involved in the
death of Prayco and Guiro and that he fled to another province only because he was stricken with
fear because of what transpired.
The lower court and CA found Combate guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the death of
Prayco and Guiro. Now, Combate comes before the Supreme Court assailing his conviction of the
crimes of murder and homicide. He alleges that he did not commit the crime. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Combate is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Prayco and Guiro
Ruling:
Yes. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial. Accused-
appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to perjure
and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any
consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their testimonies
were not moved by any ill will and bias stands, and, therefore, their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.
Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right after
the incident, an act that is evidence of his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is
competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent
are as bold as lion.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN

G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010, Velasco Jr. J.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when
the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present
at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Facts:
This is a criminal case filed by one AAA, herein private complainant, against Ricky Alfredo y
Norman (Norman), herein accused-appellant, for rape committed by Norman against AAA. Sometime
in 2001, while AAA, with her son BBB, was sleeping in a rented shack somewhere in Benguet, she was
awoken in the middle of the night by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the walls of the shack
directly illuminating her face. She then inquired who the person was, but nobody answered.
Thereafter she lit the gas lamp placed on top of the table and opened the door while her son BBB
stood beside it. As AAA opened the door, she saw Norman holding a flashlight. AAA thereafter invited
Norman to enter the shack but Norman immediately held AAAs hair and ordered her to walk uphill.
Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed Norman was forced to walk uphill while Norman walked behind
her. Upon reaching a grassy portion, Norman ordered AAA to stop walking and boxed her, forcing
AAA to lie down and open her legs. Thereafter, Norman violated AAA not less than three times. Not
contented, Norman inserted a tree branch about 10 inches long inside AAAs vagina. Norman also
inserted the flashlight he had inside AAAs vagina thereafter. After satisfying his lustful desire,
Norman left AAA on the mountain. Because of what transpired, AAA filed a complaint for rape against
Norman.
The RTC and CA found Norman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of
rape. Now, Norman seeks reversal of the aforementioned decisions. Norman invokes the defense of
alibi by averring that he was nowhere near AAA nor the shack of where AAA and BBB were staying
the night when the alleged rape occurred. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of alibi invoked by Norman warrants his acquittal from his
conviction of the crime of rape
Ruling:
No. The accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his
house, which is only about 150 meters away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001.
Significantly, it was also not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present on the
mountain where he allegedly raped AAA at the time it was said to have been committed.
Also, it is a settled rule that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of
positive identification by truthful witnesses. It is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and
positive evidence. Thus, there being no strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome the
testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant. Even if the alibi of
accused-appellant appears to have been corroborated by his mother, Remina, and his sister,
Margaret, said defense is unworthy of belief not only because accused-appellant was positively
identified by AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit
where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her relatives, friends, and comrades-
in-arms, and not by credible persons.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEMIANO DE JESUS and RODELO MORALES

For the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that (a) he was in another place at
the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.
Facts:
Respondents Hemiano De Jesus (De Jesus) and Rodelo Morales (Morales) were charged with
the murder of the victim Armando Arasula y de Torres (Armando). During trial, the witness for the
prosecution, Santiago Arasula (Santiago), the brother of Armando, testified that on the day Armando
died, he, Armando and the two accused had been drinking at the birthday party of a certain Alejandro
Hornillo, but he left earlier than the others. Later that night when Santiago was already home, he
heard his brother Armando shouting Mother, Mother, I was stabbed by Hemiano and Rodelo!".
Consequently, Santiago ran towards Armando and saw him lying on the ground, with the accused still
stabbing him with a gulukan (small bolo). When Santiago reached his brother, Armando was
however already dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellants were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. Santiago testified in a candid and straightforward manner, and the cross-examination
conducted by the defense failed to shake him. Santiago positively identified the men who killed his
brother, as he had known them for at least five years. Santiagos testimony was consistent and clear.
Accused-appellants showed no reason or bias for Santiago to pinpoint them as the perpetrators of
the crime, no motive for the lone eyewitness to falsely accuse them. Thus, the Court adheres to the
established rule that in the absence of evidence showing any reason or motive for the prosecution
witness to perjure himself or herself, the Court can conclude that no improper motive exists, and his
or her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
Accused-appellant Morales raised the defense of alibi. In the light of Santiagos positive
identification and the credibility accorded his testimony by the trial court, the defense of alibi must
fail. As held in People v. Dela Cruz: Appellants denial and alibi are not worthy of belief. It is an oft-
quoted doctrine that positive identification prevails over denial and alibi. Alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Morales testified that at the
time of the killing, he was in his house, not far from the house of the victim, around 20 arms-lengths,
as per his reckoning. There is, thus, the possibility of him being physically present at the place of the
crime; indeed, as per his testimony, he was in the immediate vicinity. He presented no corroborating
evidence to show that he was elsewhere at the time of the killing, nor did he present any witnesses to
his whereabouts. There is only his word that he was not there, against Santiagos credible testimony.
His defense, thus, cannot prosper.
As for accused-appellant de Jesus, he raises the justifying circumstance of self-defense. It is

axiomatic that where an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime.
Accordingly, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused who must then prove with clear and
convincing proof the following elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Although all three elements must
concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense, whether
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complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense to apply.
Even if events had transpired as de Jesus related, he still failed to show that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, or the other elements of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. In fact, he stated it was after he got possession of the bolo that he stabbed Armando.
Thus, the aggression on the part of Armando, if it existed, would have already ceased. As there was no
longer any unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
absent.
Another telling sign of De Jesus guilt is his flight from the scene. Self-defense is not credible
in the face of the flight of the accused from the crime scene and his or her failure to inform the
authorities about the incident.
RENE SORIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 148143 June 30, 2008 Velasco, Jr., J.
Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution eyewitness.
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide of Ernesto Amarillo and
Soledad Ferrer. During trial, the prosecution presented Benjamin Cabansag, a tricycle driver, who
allegedly witnessed that petitioner Soriano that on December 29, 1994, between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30
p.m., upon alighting from a tricycle, kicked the gate as he entered his own house and came out with
an armalite rifle in hand fired shots upwards for about 15 minutes, and then started harassing
passing tricycles. As a consequence, hit Enesto and Soledad who was riding a motorbike. Also hit and
killed was petitioners brother, Loreto Soriano. Petitioner denied the accusations and presented an
alibi. He stated that as 1st Lieutenant of the Philippine Armys 48th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division, he was at his base station in Kalinga. His fellow army officers corroborated his alibi. Carmen
Soriano, a kagawad of Brgy. Pagal and the wife of petitioners uncle, also took the witness stand for
the defense, testifying that the prosecution witness, Benjamin, could not have possibly been at the
situs of the crime inasmuch as she saw him at the wake. In a bid to further discredit Benjamin, the
defense parlayed the existence of bad blood between the Soriano and Cabansag families.
The RTC, finding the prosecutions witnesses against petitioner, as accused below, more
credible and their accounts more tenable, rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the complex
crime of homicide with frustrated homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting the accused.
Ruling:
No. As a rule, alibi is considered with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can easily be fabricated. For alibi to
prosper, the accused must satisfactorily prove (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed and (2) that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In this case, petitioner
alleged being in Camp Boloan, Kalinga, Apayao on the fateful night in question. Assuming the veracity
of this allegation, it would still be not impossible for petitioner to leave the base camp and travel to
and arrive in San Carlos City at about 9:30 p.m. of December 29, 1994.
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As to the documents presented by the accused supporting his theory that he was in Kalinga
Apayao, the Court cannot accord its reliance on the same because alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of prosecution eyewitness. The facility which the accused can secure
documents to bolster his claim that he was not present at the scene of the crime cannot be denied
considering that the sources of such documents are his fellow soldiers many of whom are his
subordinates. Even assuming that the said documents are real, in the face of the clear and positive
testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the crime, the
accuseds alibi dwindles into nothing.
Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL CUASAY

When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the
killing was legally justified.
Facts:
Cuasay with treachery, without any justifiable cause and with the deliberate intent to take
the life of Ansuli with a sharp-pointed instrument thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound on
the chest, causing his untimely demise. Cuasay plead "not guilty" to the charge. Cuasay claimed killing
Ansuli in self-defense. He alleged that the victim suspected him of stealing and because of that, the
victim boxed him 3 times and scolded him. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in not considering the justifying circumstance of self-defense and
the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation in favor of Cuasay.
Ruling:
No. It is important to note that Cuasay admitted stabbing the victim but claimed that he did it
in self-defense. When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show
that the killing was legally justified. Thus, the accused must prove these requisites for self-defense:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused; and (3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel aggression.
The RTC found that Cuasay failed to prove the requisites of self-defense. He alone testified
regarding the alleged fist blows thrown at him by the victim. There was no other testimony to that
effect. For his defense to stand, his testimony must be credible. It is unlikely that the spectators will
continue their business despite seeing the victim hit accused-appellant. It is unnatural for the players
of mahjong and the barangay tanods present to not attempt to pacify them. Cuasay could have
presented at least one of the witnesses who can support his claim of unlawful aggression by the
victim, but he failed to do so. His testimony is not realistic and, therefore, doubtful.
Cuasays alternative claim of passion or obfuscation likewise deserves no credit. To be

entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (1) there should be
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an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act that produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. There was no evidence of
unlawful aggression or any act on the part of the victim that could have caused accused-appellant to
act with passion or obfuscation. He failed to present any witness or proof that would support his
claim. Thus, RTC and CA were correct in overruling the claim for said mitigating circumstance.
Presumptions
Disputable presumptions
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODANTE DE LEON y DELA ROSA

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave offense, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the
credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.
Facts:
A buy-bust team was formed after the police received an information regarding the illegal
activities of Rodante De Leon. The team proceeded to the meeting place where the exchange of
money and one plastic sachet containing shabu between the poseur-buyer and De Leon took place.
De Leon was arrested and was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165). Both the RTC and the CA convicted De
Leon. De Leon questioned the validity of the buy-bust operation and argued that the prosecution
failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence. He contended that the court merely relied on the
disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of the police function.
Issue:
Whether or not the buy-bust operation, allegedly tainted with irregularities, is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous
drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the
part of the police officers. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave
offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SERGIO LAGARDE

For alibi to prosper, the accused persons must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1)
their presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (2) the physical
impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime.
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Facts:
AAA and her mother were at the house of Lolita Lagarde-Sarsosa to attend the death
anniversary celebration of Lolitas mother. Accused-appellant was also present in that occasion,
being the nephew of Lolita. He is also a neighbor of AAA and the father of her classmate. On the same
day, AAA was ordered by her mother to pick a jackfruit. When she was near the tree, she was grabbed
by the accused who dragged her to the copra dryer, undressed her, poked a seven-inch knife, and
inserted his penis into her vagina and made a pumping motion. After the sexual assault, accused just
left her. Not long after, AAA dressed herself up, and returned to the house and told her ordeal to her
mother. AAA and her mother subsequently reported the incident to the officials.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, could only offer denial and alibi as defenses. His
alibi that he spent the afternoon drinking with other visitors does not deserve merit since he was
present in the same house where the victim was. The copra dryer was only 150 meters away from
the house. Accused-appellants alibi miserably fails the foregoing test. His only defense witness, his
relative, Lolita, cannot consistently and convincingly assert that accused-appellant stayed in one
place the whole afternoon. Lolita herself was busy entertaining other visitors while accused-
appellant was outside the house.
Quantum of Evidence (weight and sufficiency of evidence)
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
People of the Philippines v. Mario Villanueva Baga

G.R. No. 189844, November 15, 2010, Velasco, Jr. J.
When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Facts:
PO2 Manlipig received an information about drug peddling activities of a certain Mario Baga.
Thereby they went there all in civilian clothes. At the target area, PO2 Manlapig and the informant
saw the target of the operation who turned out to be accused-appellant Baga. The informant then
introduced PO2 Manlapig to accused-appellant Baga. Thereupon, PO2 Manlapig gave the marked
money to accused-appellant Baga, who, in turn, gave PO2 Manlapig a plastic sachet. PO2 Manlapig
examined the plastic sachet, and when he determined that it contained shabu, he executed the pre-
arranged signal by drawing his gun. The back-up officers then rushed to the scene, joining PO2
Manlapig, and together they arrested accused-appellant Baga and took him to the police station. In
his defense, he strongly denied having sold any illegal drug to the poseur-buyer. He insisted that at
the time of his arrest, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at Kaingin Road on his way to
return some rented VCDs when two men in civilian clothes suddenly accosted him. He asked them
why he was being arrested, but the two told him to do his explanation at the police station. He was
then brought to La Loma Police Station, where he was informed by one of the apprehending officers,
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whom he came to know later as PO2 Manlapig, that charges would be filed against him for sale of
illegal drugs. PO2 Manlapig and informant testified against the Baga. RTC found him guilty of
violation the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which was affirmed by the CA.
Accused-appellant Baga argues that the lower court erred in relying on the testimony of
prosecution witnesses while totally disregarding the version of the defense. He stresses that the
police officers who testified in the case are seasoned witnesses who can deliver practiced testimonies
and parry cross-examination, and, thus, posits that it was the duty of the lower court to minutely
examine said testimonies. He likewise faults the lower court for giving credence to the testimony of
poseur-buyer PO2 Manlapig which is uncorroborated, and points out the alleged contradictory
testimonies of informant and PO2 Manlapig on the role of the former in the buy-bust operation.
Issue:
Whether or not testimonies of PO2 Manlapig and the informant though inconsistent are
sufficient to convict the accused-appellant Baga is guilty of the crime charged
Ruling:
No. As a rule, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule does not apply
where it is shown that any fact of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court. In the instant case, there are circumstances, which, when properly
appreciated, would warrant accused-appellants acquittal.
In this case, there are inconsistent statements of PO2 Manlapig as to whether the buy bust
operation took place, whether the drug that was that was seized was the very same drug presented in
court thereby which clouds doubt to the conviction of Baga. There was also confusion as to who has
custody of the original buy-bust money; and finally, there were inconsistencies on whether a pre-
operation report was actually prepared or not. Summing up all these circumstances, it behooves
Supreme Court is not to blindingly accept the testimony of a lone witness, as we ruled: When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a
matter of right.
Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions
CAYETANO CAPANGPANGAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 150251, November 23, 2007, Velasco. Jr., J.
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof.
Facts:
Capangpangan was charged and convicted with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866. He argued that there is no sufficient proof
that he is not licensed to possess firearms, and that the Certification submitted by the prosecution
came from the PNP in Iligan City and not from the Firearms and Explosives Unit at the PNP in Camp
Crame, the repository of the records for all firearms licenses. Moreover, Capangpangan contended
that said certification is only limited to the Iligan City area and that it was not properly identified
during the trial.
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Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove that Capangpangan had no license to carry
the ammunitions and firearms.
Ruling:
Yes. The essence of the crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the
accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or possess the firearm, as possession itself is not
prohibited by law. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner had no
license or permit to possess the seized contraband. The Certification dated January 23, 1998 issued
by SPO1 Regis, Assistant Team Leader of the 90th Civil Security Team, PNP Headquarters, Iligan City,
pertinently enunciates: This is to certify that as per verification of records filed from this office as of
[sic] Iligan City area, their [sic] is no name of Cayetano "Tano" Capangpangan appears [sic] in
computerized firearm license as of this date.
The contents, authenticity, and import of the above certification were admitted during the
hearing by petitioner, thereby dispensing with the testimony of the issuing officer, SPO1 Regis. Under
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, "[A]n admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made." Clearly, petitioner cannot take a contrary or different position considering
that he has made an express admission of the Certification, which does not require proof and cannot
be contradicted because there is no previous evidence that the admission was made through
palpable mistake. After admitting it, he cannot now assail that said certification has not been
properly identified. Besides, he has had several occasions to present proof that he was licensed to
possess firearms. Yet, even in this late stage he has not.
Object (real) Evidence
Chain of custody, in relation to Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO MANLANGIT y TRESBALLES

Non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
The Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) received an information that a certain
Francisco Manlangit was selling prohibited drugs, so it formed a buy-bust team, with MADAC
operative Wilfredo Serrano being designated as poseur-buyer. After the consummation of the sale,
the buy-bust team then proceeded to arrest Manlangit. Manlangit was convicted of the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal use of dangerous drugs. Manlangit argues that the buy-bust team failed to
comply with the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Sec. 21 of RA
9165. Consequently, he contends that he should be acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the arresting officers to comply with Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 is
fatal to the conviction of Manlangit.
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Ruling:
No. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not
fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility
when a proviso added that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. The same provision clearly states as well, that it must still be shown that there exists
justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been
preserved.
Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His only
contention is that the buy-bust team did not inventory and photograph the specimen on site and in
the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official. However, as ruled by the Court in Rosialda, as
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, even though the procedural requirements provided
for in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. And
as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not broken as established by the
facts proved during trial.
CESAR D. CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The chain of custody is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution and to ensure that
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed.
Facts:
Cesar Castro was charged with illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 11 of RA.
9165. According to the prosecution, SPO2 Nestor Felipe informed the police that he received a phone
call from a concerned citizen that a male person wearing a green shirt and brown maong bought
shabu near the Iglesia ni Cristo. A team of police officers were dispatched to verify the report, and
when they arrived, they saw a male person with the green description. They know him because he
was one of the drug personalities. He was walking with his right hand placed on his pocket and the
police officers were about 10 meters away from him. The police approached him, however, the
accused panic upon recognizing them as policemen and brought something out of his pocket and
threw it at his back. The things thrown by the accused were plastic sachets of shabu, lighter and a
coin. He was arrested. On the other hand, the accused Castro said that he did not have the possession
and custody of the prohibited drugs when he was arrested and that the crucial link in the chain of
custody had not been established. The RTC and CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the crucial link in the chain of custody had been established.
Ruling:
Yes. As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
presentation and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent clams it to be. This is essential to
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obviate the possibility of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the
seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for examination,
and to its presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony
about every link in the chain, however, a testimony about a perfect chain is almost always impossible
to obtain. The record shows that the chain of custody rule has been sufficiently observed. The
prosecution had proved with moral certainty, thru the testimony of one of the apprehending officers,
the evidence custodian, and the forensic officer, that what was seized from accused-appellant was the
very same item presented in court after it was subjected to qualitative examination and was tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. In fine, the prosecution was able to establish that the
identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited drugs have not been compromised
from the time of its seizure at the time and place aforestated to its presentation in evidence as part of
the corpus delicti. The accused denied having possession, however, The very act of throwing away
the sachet, the contents of which were later determined to be shabu, presupposes that accused-
appellant had prior possession of it. Ergo, all the elements of the crime have been met. The conviction
of the accused is affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODANTE DE LEON y DELA ROSA

In Chain of Custody, what is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Facts:
A buy-bust team was formed after the police received an information regarding the
involvement of Rodante De Leon in illegal drugs trade. The team proceeded to the meeting place
where the exchange of money and one plastic sachet containing shabu between the poseur-buyer and
De Leon took place. De Leon was arrested and was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165). Both the RTC and the CA
convicted De Leon. De Leon questioned the validity of the buy-bust operation and argued that the
prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence. He contended that the court merely
relied on the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of the police function.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the alleged confiscated items from the accused-
appellant was duly established.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 need not be followed
as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO3 SANGKI ARA Y MIRASOL et al.

Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the
custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can
render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
Facts:
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After receiving an information that three suspected drug pushers contacted the informant
for a deal involving shabu, a buy-bust team was immediately formed. The team went to the school
and waited for the car of the alleged pushers. The sale of shabu was consummated inside the vehicle.
Upon the signal of the poseur-buyer, SPO3 Sangki Ara, Mike Talib and Jordan Musa were arrested.
The RTC and the CA convicted SPO3 Ara, Talib and Musa of violation of Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165).
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody over the shabu was unbroken.
Ruling:
No. RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require
strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and
the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21,
Article II of RA 9165. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR
relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious
flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JACQUILINE PAMBID y CORTEZ

Non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal. In fact, it has been ruled time and
again that non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative
is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Facts:
An information reached the Station Anti-illegal Drugs (SAID), Quezon City as to the illegal
drug activities of alias "Jack" and "Junior Laurel" in Barangay San Agustin, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Accordingly, a buy-bust team was formed. Subsequently, the buy-bust team proceeded to the house
of alias Jack who was later identified as respondent Jacquiline Pambid (Pambid). When PO2
Collado, the poseur-buyer, saw Pambid, he approached the latter and told her that he was in need of
panggamit. In response, Pambid gave PO2 Collado a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. After PO2 Collado gave Pambid the payment of P200, he executed the pre-arranged signal
and arrested Pambid. Another plastic sachet was recovered from Pambid.
At the station PO2 Collado turned over the money and the plastic sachets to the investigator,
PO1 Estrelles. A request for laboratory examination was then prepared and the plastic sachets were
sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. Subsequently, P/Insp. Banac, Jr.
issued Chemistry Report No. D-1007-03 finding the white crystalline substance to be
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as Shabu. Consequently, Pambid was found guilty of
the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Pambid argues that the RTC erred in admitting the seized dangerous drugs as evidence,
considering that no proper inventory was taken of the seized drugs and that there was a break in the
chain of custody of the evidence.
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Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite non-
compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. No.
9165.
Ruling:
No. Non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal. In fact, it has been ruled time
and again that non-compliance with Sec. 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized
inadmissible. What is imperative is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the
seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
In the instant case, the chain of custody can be easily established through the following link:
(1) PO2 Collado marked the seized sachets subject of the buy-bust with "MBC," his own initials; (2) a
request for laboratory examination of the seized items marked "MBC" was signed by C/Supt.
Wong; (3) the request and the marked items seized were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4)
Chemistry Report No. D-1007-03 confirmed that the marked items seized from accused-appellant
were methylamphetamine hydrochloride; and (5) the marked items were offered in evidence as
Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2." Hence, it is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
drugs were preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNOLD CASTRO y YANGA

G.R. No. 194836, 15 June 2011, First Division, Velasco Jr., J.
Admittedly, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Nonetheless, what is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Facts:
Castro was caught possessing and selling prohibited drugs after a buy-bust operation
conducted by the police. During the buy-bust, the police were able to recover 3 plastic sachets which
the police marked with their initials. These sachets were turned over to the investigator who
prepared and submitted a letter-request for analysis. The forensic chemist made an analysis on the
seized items, which he confirmed were positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in convicting the accused-appelant.
Ruling:
No. Admittedly, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Nonetheless, what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. The integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with. Since Castro failed to discharge such burden, it cannot be disputed
that the drugs seized from him were the same ones examined in the crime laboratory. The
prosecution, therefore, established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
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Here, appellant was brought to the police station immediately after the illegal drugs and
marked money were seized from him. The confiscated substances were marked accordingly, turned
over to the investigator, and submitted to the PNP crime laboratory for analysis. Forensic chemist
tested the substances and after finding them positive for shabu, issued his chemistry report within
24 hours after confiscation of the items. Thus, the trial court correctly upheld the admissibility of the
seized items upon its finding that handling of the sachets was free of any physical distortion.
Documentary evidence
Best Evidence Rule
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORPORATION

The requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original document whenever the original copy has been lost are: 1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.
Facts:
MCMP leased equipment from Monark, covered by a contract. Monark delivered the
equipment to MCMP, which shall be paid within 30 days. Despite the lapse of such period, MCMP
failed to pay the rental fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP, partial payments were made, but
further demands went unheeded. Monark then filed a complaint against MCMP. MCMP alleged in
defense that it had an agreement with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole time that
the leased equipment was in its possession but rather only for the actual time that the equipment
was used although still on the project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this agreement was not
contained in the contract. Monark then presented Peregrino as one of its witnesses, who testified that
there were 2 original copies of the contract, one retained by Monark, and the other copy for MCMP.
He testified that Monarks copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved
futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the contract. MCMP objected to the presentation
of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the contract arguing that there were no diligent
efforts to search for the original copy. MCMP did not present its copy of the contract despite the
directive of the RTC to produce the same. RTC ruled in favor of Monark, and affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Monark is allowed to present secondary evidence to prove the existence of
the contract.
Ruling:
Yes. In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court held that before a party
is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence
of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
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In this case, the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the
testimony of Peregrino that the original contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that
diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained
uncontroverted. Furthermore, MCMPs failure to present the copy of the contract and even explain its
failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption
adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.
EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESOT v. BF CORPORATION

G.R. No. 145842, 145873 June 27, 2008 Velasco, Jr., J.
A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original
is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either
instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
Facts:
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI) and BF Corporation (BF) entered into an
agreement whereby the latter would construct the EDSA Shangri-la hotel. Under their arrangement,
BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work
accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that months progress billing. BF
submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed upon. However, BF did not
re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit
payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into
working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment
Certificates already being processed. Thus, BF filed before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and
damages.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of BF. In its petition before the Supreme Court, ESHRI faulted
the RTC and CA on the matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos.
14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. EHSRI argued that BF, before being allowed to
adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of
the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in allowing the presentation of the photocopied
documents in question.
Ruling:
Yes. A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse
party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to
secondary evidence. Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit:
(1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made
on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4)
ESHRI was not inclined to produce them. Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under
the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the
presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have
been met.
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M.E. HOLDING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 160193, 23 March 2008, Second Division, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
The rule is that the best evidence under the circumstance must be adduced to prove the
allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest. Only when the best evidence cannot be submitted may
secondary evidence be considered.
Facts:
M.E. Holding Corporation is claiming the 20% sales discount it granted to qualified senior
citizens. M.E. treated the discount as deductions from its gross income purportedly in accordance
with RR No. 2-84. However it filed the return under protest arguing that the discount should be
treated as tax credit and not as mere deductions. Due to the inaction of the BIR, M.E. filed an appeal
before the CTA reiterating its position. CTA granted M.E.s petition, but the claimed refund was
reduced due to M.E.s failure to properly support the claimed discount with the corresponding cash
slips. The CA dismissed the petition to it and upheld the decision of the CTA.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred and has deviated from applicable laws and jurisprudence in not
appreciating other competent evidence proving the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens
and merely relying solely on the cash slips
Ruling:
No. Sec. 34 of Rule 132 prescribing that no evidence shall be considered unless formally
offered with a statement of the purpose why it is being offered. In addition, the rule is that the best
evidence under the circumstance must be adduced to prove the allegations in a complaint, petition,
or protest. Only when the best evidence cannot be submitted may secondary evidence be considered.
In this case, the CA was correct in disallowing and not considering the belatedly-submitted
cash receipts to be part of the 20% sales discount for M.E.s taxable year 1995, because the
disallowed cash slips, the best evidence at that time, were not part of M.E.s offer of evidence. While it
may be true that the authenticated special record books yield the same data found in the cash slips,
they cannot plausibly be considered by the courts a quo and made to corroborate pieces of evidence
that have, in the first place, been disallowed. Recall also that M.E. offered the disallowed cash slips as
evidence only after the CTA had rendered its assailed decision. Thus, we cannot accept the excuse of
inadvertence of the independent auditor as excusable negligence. As aptly put by the CA, the
belatedly-submitted cash slips do not constitute newly- found evidence that may be submitted as
basis for a new trial or reconsideration of the decision. The CA surely cannot be guilty of gravely
abusing its discretion when it refused to consider, in lieu of the unsubmitted additional cash slips, the
special record books which are only secondary evidence. The cash slips were the best evidence. The
CA also noted that the offered cash slips were presented only after the CTA had rendered its decision.
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Testimonial Evidence
Competency versus Credibility of a Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MITSUEL L. ELARCOSA and JERRY B. ORIAS

G.R. No. 186539, 29 June 2010, J. Velasco, Jr.
Questions concerning the credibility of a witness are best addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, since it is the latter which is in the best position to observe the demeanor and bodily
movements of a witness. This becomes all the more compelling when the appellate court affirms the
findings of the trial court.
Facts:
One evening, Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias, both members of the CAFGU, entered the
house of Segundina Cruz and requested that supper be prepared for them as they were roving. While
Segundina and Rosemarie were preparing in the kitchen, Elarcosa and Orias fired their guns at Jose
and Jorge Cruz. Segundina ran towards his son while Rosemarie hid in the shrubs. Rosemarie heard
her mother crying loudly and after a series of gunshots, silence ensued. The following morning,
Rosemarie returned to their house where she found the dead bodies of her parents and her brother.
The amount of P40,000 and a certificate of registration of large cattle were also gone. Elarcosa and
Orias were thereafter charged with robbery with multiple homicide. In his defense, accused-
appellant Orias denied the allegations and contend that on the night the incident took place, he was
at the dance hall sponsored by his unit and that he stayed there from 6:00pm until the wee hours of
the morning.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused-appellant due to the incredibility of the
testimony of the star witness, Rosemarie.
2) Whether or not the court erred in not taking into consideration accused-appellant alibi, that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the place of the crime at the time the
same was committed.
Held:
1) No. The assessment of the credibility of a witness is best left to the sound discretion of
the trial court. As found by both the RTC and the CA, the detailed testimony of Rosemarie is clear,
consistent and convincing. Questions concerning the credibility of a witness are best addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, since it is the latter which is in the best position to observe the
demeanor and bodily movements of a witness. This becomes all the more compelling when the
appellate court affirms the findings of the trial court. Thus, we generally defer to the trial courts
assessment, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error. Unfortunately, however, accused-appellant Orias failed to show
any of these as to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the lower court. Further, settled is the
rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine the value or credibility
of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with common knowledge and is
consistent with the experience of mankind. In the instant case, Rosemarie was able to convincingly
testify that she was present when accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa shot to death her brother
and her father in the living room, since during that time, she and her mother were preparing supper
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for accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa in the kitchen, which was only an arms length away from
the living room.
2.) No. Alibi is an inherently weak defense. It bears stressing that for alibi to prosper, it is
not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He
must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. A meticulous review of the records would reveal
that accused-appellant Orias failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave the dance
hall in Barangay Amotay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, which incidentally is the same barangay
where the crime was committed, on the fateful evening. Also, considering that the dance hall is in the
same barangay where the crime was committed, it was not physically impossible for accused-
appellant Orias to be present at the locus criminis at the time the same was committed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEAN MARTIN y SARVIDA @ DENDEN and ROMEO TANOAN y
MACAILIG
As a general rule, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which would have affected the result of the case.
Facts:
Rogelio with his wife, Dolores, and their 2 children, was driving his passenger jeepney.
Rogelio stopped his jeepney at the red traffic light, suddenly, Tanoan approached Rogelio from
behind and stabbed him several times. Martin and Tanoan ran towards Perlita Street. Rogelio was
able to drive the jeepney a little further before he collapsed. Rogelio was pronounced dead on arrival
upon reaching the hospital. Tanoan and Martin underwent inquest proceedings, and were later
charged with the crime of murder. RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses are credible in positively identifying the culprits.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.
In this case, there was no sufficient reason to justify the overturning of the findings of the
RTC and CA. The accuseds reliance on the alleged unfair conduct of the police line-up has no merit.
The records do not bear out any irregularity in the way the police conducted the line-up. Besides, a
police line-up is not required for the proper and fair identification of offenders. What is crucial is for
the witness to positively declare during trial that the persons charged were the malefactors.
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ESPERANZA G. FRONDARINA, joined by her husband, PEDRO A. FRONDARINA, Petitioners, vs

NAPOLEON MALAZARTE Promulgated:
and LAURA P. MALAZARTE, Respondents.
There is no standard by which the weight of conflicting evidence can be ascertained. We have
no test of the truth of human testimony except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and
experience.
Facts:
Spouses Frondarina (petitioners) filed a complaint for forcible entry against Spouses
Malazarte (respondents), alleging that they were the owners of a 450-square-meter lot in Olongapo.
On the other hand, respondents alleged that they bought the lot from Romeo Valencia.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the Frondarinas but was reversed by the RTC, and the latters
ruling was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have a better claim over than the land than respondents.
Ruling:
Yes. The undisputed pieces of documentary proof like the tax declarations, tax receipts, and
miscellaneous sales applications, which antedate those of respondents, unquestionably demonstrate
the truth and factual basis of petitioners claim of possession. Mr. Valencia's testimony for the
respondents, on his alleged occupation of the said lot must give way to the clearly established facts
that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the lot much earlier
than respondents and Mr. Valencia. Under the admitted facts rule, evidence of whatever description
must yield to the extent that it conflicts with admitted or clearly established facts. The Court gives
superior credit to petitioners' witnesses whose testimonies on material points are in accord with
facts already established, rather than to respondents and witness Romeo Valencia whose testimonies
were shown to be false or bereft of weight and credence.
Examination of a Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NESTOR BAJADA y BAUTISTA, VICTOR CALISAY y

LOYAGA, and JOHN DOE
Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-
examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to
the witness being cross-examined.
Facts:
Nestor Bajada, Victor Calisay and John Doe were charged with robbery with. The RTC
convicted them and sentenced them to Death Penalty, taking into consideration the two aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and additional serious physical injury. The CA reversed the decision since
the information failed to specifically allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, hence, it cannot
be appreciated even if proved during trial. The main contention of Bajada was the court erred in
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convicting him and his co-accused based on the testimony in open court of the prosecution witness,
Asaytono and that such testimony is allegedly inconsistent with the December 28, 1999 sworn
statement given to the police and statement given before MCTC Judge Bercales during the
preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the inconsistencies in the sworn statements and testimony of the
prosecution witness Asaytono affects her credibility.
Ruling:
No. The details which she supplied to the police and to the investigating judge are trivial compared to
the testimony she gave in open court. What is important is that in all three statements, i.e., sworn
statement before the police, sworn statement before Judge Bercales, and testimony in open court,
Asaytono consistently and clearly identified Bajada and Calisay as the perpetrators. In this case, the
essential facts do not differ: three men entered and robbed the house of Villamayor and stabbed him
and Asaytono, and Asaytono witnessed the stabbing and recognized two of the accused because she
was familiar with the latters physical attributes.
Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the
cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an
injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to
explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under
which they were made.
Admissions and Confessions
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARY LOU OMICITIN y SINGCO

G.R. No. 188130, July 26, 2010, VELASCO, JR., J.
Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest;
they do not include a partys testimony as a witness in court.
FACTS:
Mary Lou Omicitin separately promised to four persons (complainants herein) that they will
be sent abroad for employment in exchange of sum of money. The complainants paid the required
amount but Omicitin failed to fulfill her promise. Omicitin was arrested in an entrapment
operation. Separate informations were filed charging Omictin with illegal recruitment in large scale
and estafa. RTC found her guilty as charged. CA affirmed the judgment in toto. Omicitin claims that
the prosecution witness, Mr. Anthony Ambrosio, testified that he gave Omicitin the amount of sixteen
thousand (16,000.00) pesos, representing initial payment in consideration of the work abroad. It is
borne on record however, that Anthonys testimony was unsubstantiated by any proof that he made
such payment, i.e., receipts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Ambrosio is self-serving, hence inadmissible.
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RULING:
No. Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the
opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony.
This cannot be said of a partys testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part
of the opposing party for cross-examination.
Offer and Objection
Offer of Evidence
HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG et al. v. SPOUSES LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA
ABELERA, and MARIA VILORIA PASAG
G.R. No. 155483, 27 April 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.
Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of document and titles, recovery of
possession and ownership, reconveyance, partition and damages against respondents. Petitioners
allege a share of over three (3) properties owned by respondents, which formed part of the estate of
petitioners deceased grandparents. The trial of the case commenced on March 19, 1996. On March
9, 1999, petitioners rested their case and were granted ten (10) days within which to submit their
formal offer of documentary exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading within
the required period. Petitioners asked the court to give them more time to submit their offer of
evidence which the court granted but the petitioners again failed to submit the same. On July 27,
1999, petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence, the court however denied the
same for their consistent failure to submit it. Respondent, thereafter, filed a motion to dismiss on
demurrer to evidence which the court granted. The CA, in affirming the ruling of the trial court, held
that petitioners failed to prove their claim by a preponderance of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision
despite the gross negligence of their counsel thus depriving their rights to due process.
Held:
No. The Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings
of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence
and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Strict adherence to the
said rule is not a trivial matter. The formal offer of ones evidence is deemed waived after failing to
submit it within a considerable period of time.
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In this case, the trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived
their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of
time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed
almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners failure to comply with the rule on
admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of
justice.
Special proceedings
Writ of Kalikasan
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, ET. AL. V. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION
Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a
petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
Facts:
FPIC operates two pipelines in which its systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum
requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal. In May 2010,
however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made within the condominium
premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. What started as a two-
drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated
water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents
of West Tower to abandon their respective units and the condo's power was shut down.
West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on
behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. The Court granted the petition. FPIC directors submitted a Joint
Return praying for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the Writ of
Kalikasan. In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents
arising from the same incident or leakage from the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL).
Issue:
1) Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2) Whether or not the TEPO shall be immediately lifted in light of the DOE's issuance of a
certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued commercial operations
3) Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar
contingencies
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Ruling:
1) Yes. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West
Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or
users. As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and
residents of West Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case. The other organizations
in the case at bar are also considered real parties-in-interest. This is so considering that the filing of a
petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental
disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
2) No. The certification from DOE was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by
FPIC of the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need
to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. This will not however render the
lifting of the TEPO for the following reasons, namely (a) the precautionary principle is not applicable
to the instant case; (b) The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's
structural integrity and in fact imposes several conditions for FPIC's compliance; (c) The DOE itself,
in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned agencies, proposed the activities to be conducted
preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and (d) There are no conclusive findings yet on the
WOPL's structural integrity. Moreover, precautionary principle only applies when the link between
the cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the
environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a
link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL is
different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will
cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms.
3) No. Under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is
limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment. A reading of the petition
and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust
fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust
fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the
environment that has presumably already suffered.
Misc. Topics
FEDERICO "TOTO" NATIVIDAD v. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION

BOARD (MTRCB), represented by its
Chairperson MA. CONSOLIZA T. LAGUARDIA; Spouses THELMA J. CHIONG and DIONISIO F.
CHIONG; and MARICHU S. JIMENEA
Although the MTRCB has the power to preventively seize the master copy of a motion picture
pending hearing and final disposition of a case, said preventive seizure of the master copy cannot
however exceed more than 20 days.
Facts:
The subject of the present case is the movie Butakal (Sugapa Sa Laman). The movie was
allegedly based on the true story of two sisters, Jacqueline and Marijoy Chiong of Cebu. The sisters
were kidnapped, raped and killed. The persons responsible for the death of the two sisters were
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convicted by the RTC of Cebu. During the pendency of the said case, Natividad, a movie producer and
director, filed with the MTRCB an application for a permit to exhibit Butakal. The MTRCB issued a
permit authorizing the exhibition of the movie in movie houses. Subsequently however, private
respondents, the spouses Dionisio and Thelma Chiong, and Thelmas sister, Marichu Jimenea
(Chiongs), sent a letter to the MTRCB requesting that they disallow the showing of the movie Butakal.
According to the Chiongs the showing of the film will cause sub judice since the case upon which the
movie was based is still pending before the Court. The MTRCB rejected the request and informed the
Chiongs that it stood by its previous decision allowing the exhibition of the movie.
Subsequently, Natividad received a letter from the MTRCB informing him that the Office of
the President (OP) had directed the MTRCB to designate a Committee to undertake a second review
and to determine if there was a basis for the allegations that the film contains scenes that were
libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of the Chiong sisters and their surviving
relatives. The letter likewise ordered the MTRCB to impose the proper penalties should it find that
the allegations against Natividad were true. Consequently, the Board recalled the Permit to Exhibit
and directed Natividad to submit a second review. The MTRCB likewise ordered that all copies of the
movie be surrendered to it pending the resolution of the case.
The MTRCB refused to return to Natividad the master copy of the movie despite the request
of the latter on the ground that the video tape of Butakal had to remain with the MTRCB until and
after the administrative case filed by the Chiongs is terminated because the video tape was material
evidence in the administrative case. Aggrieved, Natividad filed with the CA a special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus against the MTRCB. The petition was however denied by the CA. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTRCB committed grave abuse of discretion when it confiscated the
master copy of the film.
Ruling:
No. Section 3 of PD 1986 states that: The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers
and duties: (c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television
broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the
preceding paragraph, which in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence [or] of a wrong crime, such as but not limited to:
xxxx (vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person,
whether living or dead; and (vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-
judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are sub-judice in nature.
Furthermore, the MTRCB Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Hearings for the Violations of
PD 1986 provides: Section 7. In the interest of the public and on finding of probable cause, the
Chairman may order, pending hearing and final disposition of the case, the preventive seizure of
offending motion pictures and related publicity materials, and/or suspension of the permit or
permits involved, and/or closure of the erring moviehouse, television network, cable TV station, or
establishment. The Chairman may also order the temporary dismantling or tearing down of public
signs and billboards that are in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1986 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. Temporary orders thus issued shall not exceed more than twenty (20) days from
the date of issuance.
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The above provisions make it clear that the MTRCB cannot preventively seize the master
copy more than 20 days. Thus, the MTRCB erred when it seized and retained the master copy of
Butakal for more than 20 days.
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Deans
Circle 2016
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta

Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
TAXATION
LAW
Taxation Law (Cases Penned by J. Velasco) Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
General Principles of Taxation
Definition and Concept of Taxation ........................................................................................................ 2
Doctrines in Taxation
Kinds of Tax Exemptions ...................................................................................................................... 2
Tax Amnesty ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Construction and Interpretation
Tax Rules and Regulations.................................................................................................................... 5
Scope and Limitations of Taxation
Inherent Limitations
Public Purpose ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Exemptions of Government Entities Agencies and Instrumentalities ................................................... 7
Stages of Taxation
Payment .............................................................................................................................................. 8
Refund................................................................................................................................................. 9
NIRC
Income Taxation
Gross Income..................................................................................................................................... 11
Non-resident Foreign Corporations .................................................................................................... 11
Donors Tax
Sale/Exchange/Transfer of property for insufficient consideration ..................................................... 12
Value-Added Tax
Zero-rated sales of goods or properties and effectively zero-rated sales of goods or properties......... 13
Refund or Tax Credit of Excess Input Tax ............................................................................................ 14
Tax Remedies under NIRC
Suspension of the running of statute of limitations ............................................................................ 15
Refund............................................................................................................................................... 16
Local Government Code of 1991, as amended
Local Government Taxation .............................................................................................................. 18
Real Property Taxation ...................................................................................................................... 19
Judicial Remedies
Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals ............................................................................................. 20
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION
Definition and Concept of Taxation

Coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which, in general, are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of
government and for all public needs. A tax has three elements: a) it is an enforced proportional contribution
from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the
support of the government.
Facts:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, a levy was to be sourced on the sale of copra. Charged
with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA). Like
COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy
decrees, had its share of the coco levy. And per Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the
entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with
14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on
maintaining Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a)
the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUBs capital stock.
Issue:
Whether the cocolevy funds partake of the nature of taxes.
Ruling:
YES. The coconut levy funds were exacted for a special public purpose. Consequently, any
use or transfer of the funds that directly benefits private individuals should be invalidated. Taxation is done
not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and
the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police
power of the State.
Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in
character. It cannot be denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national
economy. It is, therefore, the States concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood
of a significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of
the imperatives of economic stability. The coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed
under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
Doctrines in Taxation
Kinds of Tax Exemption
Express
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ACESITE (PHILIPPINES) HOTEL CORPORATION

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Facts:
Acesite is the owner and operator of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. It leases a part of the
hotels premises to PAGCOR. For January 1996 to April 1997, Acesite incurred VAT from its rental income
and sale of food and beverages to PAGCOR. Acesite thereafter shifted the said tax to PAGCOR by
incorporating it in the amount assessed to the latter but it refused to pay the taxes on account of its tax
exempt status. Acesite thus paid the VAT to the CIR as it feared the legal consequences of non-payment of the
tax. However, Acesite belatedly arrived at the conclusion that its transaction with PAGCOR was subject to
zero rate as it was rendered to a tax-exempt entity. On 21 May 1998, Acesite filed an administrative claim for
refund with the CIR but the latter failed to resolve the same. In resisting Acesites claims for refund, the CIR
contends that the tax exemption refers only to PAGCORs direct tax liability and not to indirect taxes, like the
VAT.
Issue:
Whether PAGCORs tax exemption privilege includes the indirect tax of VAT.
Ruling:
YES. A close scrutiny of PD 1869 clearly gives PAGCOR a blanket exemption to taxes with no
distinction on whether the taxes are direct or indirect. We are one with the CA ruling that PAGCOR is also
exempt from indirect taxes.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMSv.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,

INC.
G.R. Nos. 212536-37, August 27, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
A later law, general in terms and not expressly repealing a prior special law, will not affect the special
provisions of the earlier statute.
Facts:
On June 11, 1978, PAL was granted under PD 1590 a franchise to operate air transport services
domestically and internationally. During the lifetime of its franchise, PAL shall pay the government either
basic corporate income tax or franchise tax based on revenues and/or the rate defined in the provision,
whichever is lower and the taxes thus paid under either scheme shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties and
other fees. On January 1, 2005 however, R.A. No. 9334 took effect which assessed excise taxes against PAL for
the latters February and March 2007 importation of cigarettes and alcoholic drinks. The CTA en banc granted
the claim of PAL for refund.
Issue:
Whether PALs exemption from payment of excise tax has been revoked by RA 9334.
Ruling:
NO. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a later law, general in terms and not
expressly repealing or amending a prior special law, will not ordinarily affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute. The fact that one is special and other general creates a presumption that the special is
considered as remaining an exception to the general.
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Based on PALs franchise, PALs payment of either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax,
whichever is lower, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and
charges, except only real property tax. The phrase "in lieu of all other taxes" includes but is not limited to
taxes that are directly due from or imposable upon the purchaser or the seller, producer, manufacturer, or
importer of said petroleum products butane billed or passed on the grantee either as part of the price or cost
thereof or by mutual agreement or other arrangement."
Tax Amnesty
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PUREGOLD DUTY FREE, INC.

A tax amnesty is designed to be a general grant of clemency and the only exceptions are those
specifically mentioned.
Facts:
As an enterprise located within Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) and registered with the Clark
Development" Corporation (CDC), Puregold had been issued Certificate of Tax Exemption pursuant to Sec. 5
of EO 80, extending to business enterprises operating within the CSEZ all the incentives granted to
enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) under RA 7227. In Coconut Oil Refiners v.
Torre, however, this Court annulled the adverted Sec. 5 of EO 80. Then Deputy Commissioner issued a
Preliminary Assessment Notice regarding unpaid VAT and excise tax on wines, liquors and tobacco products
imported by Puregold. The latter protested the assessment. Pending the resolution of Puregold's protest,
Congress enacted RA 9399, which provides that availment of the tax amnesty relieves the qualified taxpayers
of any civil, criminal and/or administrative liabilities arising from, or incident to, nonpayment of taxes, duties
and other charges. Puregold availed itself of the tax amnesty. However, it received a formal letter of demand
from the BIR for the payment of the deficiency VAT and excise taxes on its importations. In its response-letter,
Puregold requested the cancellation of the assessment on the ground that it has already availed of the tax
amnesty under RA 9399. This notwithstanding, the BIR issued a Final Decision stating that the availment of
the tax amnesty under RA 9399 did not relieve Puregold of its liability for deficiency VAT, excise taxes, and
inspection fees under Sec. 13l(A) of the 1997 NIRC.
Issue:
Whether RA 9399 grants amnesty from liability to pay VAT and excise tax under Section 131 of the
1997 NIRC.
Ruling:
YES. It is worthy to note that Sec. 1 of RA 9399 explicitly and unequivocally mentions businesses
within the CSEZ as among the beneficiaries of the tax amnesty provided by RA 9399. Furthermore, Puregold
enjoyed duty free importations and exemptions from local and national taxes under EO 80, a privilege which
extended to business enterprises operating within the CSEZ all the incentives granted to enterprises within
SSEZ by RA 7227. Hence, Puregold was repeatedly issued tax exemption certificates and the BIR itself did not
assess any deficiency taxes from the time the 1997 NIRC took effect in January 1998. The special income tax
regime or tax incentives granted to enterprises registered within the secured area of Subic and Clark Special
Economic Zones have not been repealed by R.A. 8424. The courts ruling in Coconut Oil cannot be
retroactively applied to obliterate the effect of Section 5 of EO 80 and the various rulings of the former CIR
prior to the promulgation of the Decision in 2005. There is nothing in Sec. 1 of RA 9399 that excludes Sec.
131(A) of the 1997 NIRC from the amnesty. In fact, there is no mention at all of any tax or duty imposed by
the 1997 NIRC as being specifically excluded from the coverage of the tax amnesty. If Congress intended Sec.
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131 of the 1997 NIRC to be an exception to the general grant of amnesty given under RA 9399, it could have
easily so provided in either the law itself, or even the implementing rules.
Construction and Interpretation
Tax Rules and Regulations
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v.BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION (Formerly known as

ELMAS DRUG CO.)
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Facts:
Bicolandia treated the 20% sales discount granted by Republic Act (RA) 7432 to qualified senior
citizens purchasing their medicines as a deduction from its gross income in compliance with Revenue
Regulation (RR) No. 2-94 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Bicolandia filed a claim for tax
refund or credit with the Appellate Division of the BIR. Bicolandia appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period to file a claim for refund pursuant to Sec. 230
of the Tax Code then. Bicolandia questioned RR No. 2-94 which treated the 20% discount as deduction, not as
tax credit under RA 7432, from its gross income or gross sales. The CTA granted Bicolandias claim for refund
and declared that the provisions of RA 7432 would prevail over RR No. 2-94. The CA modified the CTA
decision and issued a tax credit certificate in favor of Bicolandia, in lieu of tax refund.
Issue:
Whether the 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by the respondent pursuant to
RA 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit, instead of a deduction from gross income or gross sales.
Ruling:
YES. Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is still subordinate to R.A. No. 7432, and in cases of conflict, the
implementing rule will not prevail over the law it seeks to implement. It cannot be denied that R.A. No. 7432
has a laudable goal. Moreover, it cannot be argued that it was the intent of lawmakers for private
establishments to be the primary beneficiaries of the law. However, while the purpose of the law to benefit
senior citizens is praiseworthy, the concerns of the affected private establishments were also considered by
the lawmakers. As in other cases wherein private property is taken by the State for public use, there must be
just compensation. In this particular case, it took the form of the tax credit granted to private establishments,
purposely chosen by the lawmakers. The discussions of the lawmakers clearly showed the intent that the
cost of the 20 percent discount may be claimed by the private establishments as a tax credit.
Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is null and void for failing to conform to the law it sought to
implement. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said
law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law.
Note: R.A. No. 7432 has been amended by Republic Act No. 9257, the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act
of 2003." In this, the term "tax credit" is no longer used. This time around, there is no conflict between the law
and the implementing Revenue Regulations. Under Revenue Regulations No. 4-2006, "(o)nly the actual
amount of the discount granted or a sales discount not exceeding 20% of the gross selling price can be
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deducted from the gross income, net of value added tax, if applicable, for income tax purposes, and from gross
sales or gross receipts of the business enterprise concerned, for VAT or other percentage tax
purposes." Under the new law, there is no tax credit to speak of, only deductions.

G.R. No. 160193, March 23, 2008, Second Division, Velasco, Jr., J.
A law necessarily prevails over an administrative issuance.
Facts:
M.E. Holding Corporation is claiming the 20% sales discount it granted to qualified senior citizens.
M.E. treated the discount as deductions from its gross income purportedly in accordance with RR No. 2-94.
However it filed the return under protest arguing that the discount should be treated as tax credit and not as
mere deductions. Due to the inaction of the BIR, M.E. filed an appeal before the CTA reiterating its position.
The CTA held that Sec. 2(i) of RR 2-94 contravenes the clear proviso of RA 7432 prescribing that the 20%
sales discount should be claimed as a tax credit. It also ruled that RA 7432 is a law that necessarily prevails
over an administrative issuance such as RR 2-94.
Issue:
Whether or not M.E. may claim the 20% sales discount as a tax credit contrary to what is provided for
under RR 2-94
Ruling:
YES. The 20% sales discount to senior citizens may be claimed by an establishment owner as tax
credit. RA 7432, the applicable law, is unequivocal on this. The implementing RR 2-94 that considers such
discount as mere deductions to the taxpayers gross income or gross sales clearly clashes with the clear
language of RA 7432, the law sought to be implemented.
It ought to be noted, however, that RA 9257, amending RA 7432, was signed into law, ushering in a
new tax treatment for sales discount purchases of qualified senior citizens of medicines. The establishments
may claim the discounts as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold. Conformably, starting
taxable year 2004, the 20% sales discount granted by establishments to qualified senior citizens is to be
treated as a tax deduction, no longer a tax credit.
Scope and Limitation of Taxation
Inherent Limitations
Public Purpose

Even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for
private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would
contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
Facts:
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R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, a levy was to be sourced from the sale of copra.
Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was Philippine Coconut Administration
(PCA). Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different
coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy. And per Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the
CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included
Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the
stipulation on maintaining Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its
subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUBs capital stock.
Issue:
Whether Cojuangco is entitled to the FUB (UCPB) shares.
Ruling:
NO. The coconut levy funds were exacted for a special public purpose. Consequently, any
use or transfer of the funds that directly benefits private individuals should be invalidated. Taxation is done
not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and
the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police
power of the State.
Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in
character. It cannot be denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national
economy. It is, therefore, the States concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood
of a significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of
the imperatives of economic stability. The coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed
under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
Exemption of Government Entities, Agencies and Instrumentalities
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. CITY TREASURER AND CITY ASSESSOR OF THE CITY OF
MANILA
GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. As an instrumentality of the national government, it is
itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its properties.
Facts:
Respondent City Treasurer of Manila assessed petitioner GSIS of unpaid real property taxes due on
its Katigbak property and Concepcion-Arroceros property for years 1992 to 2002. Respondent thereafter
issued Notices of Realty Tax Delinquency for the subject properties which prompted petitioner to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC Manila. However, the court dismissed the petition and
upheld the validity of the assessments.
GSIS contended that both its old charter, PD No. 1146, and present charter, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act of
1997, exempt the agency and its properties from all forms of taxes and assessments, inclusive of realty tax.
Respondents countered that GSIS may not successfully resist the citys notices and warrants of levy on the
basis of its exemption under RA 8291, real property taxation being governed by RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991.
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Issue:
Whether GSIS, under its charter, is exempt from real property taxation.
Ruling:
YES.Pursuant to Sec. 33 of PD 1146, GSIS enjoyed tax exemption from real estate taxes, among other
tax burdens, until January 1, 1992 when the LGC took effect and withdrew exemptions from payment of real
estate taxes privileges granted under PD 1146. RA 8291 restored in 1997 the tax exempt status of GSIS by
reenacting under its Sec. 39 what was once Sec. 33 of P.D. 1146. If any real estate tax is due to the City of
Manila, it is, following City of Davao, only for the interim period, or from 1992 to 1996, to be precise.
GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the national
government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak
and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. The tax exemption the property of the Republic or its instrumentality
carries ceases only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC of 1991, "beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable
juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost in a sense that status with respect to the
Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficial use to Manila Hotel Corporation, doubtless a taxable
person. Following the "beneficial use" rule, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property,
leased as it is to a taxable entity. The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale,
notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means that the City of Manila has to satisfy its tax claim by
serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and,
in case of nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property.
Stages of Taxation
Payment
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (PSPC) v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

TCCs are immediately valid and effective after their issuance. If the TCCs are considered to be subject to
post-audit as a suspensive condition, the very purpose of the TCC would be defeated as there would be no
guarantee that the TCC would be honored by the government as payment for taxes. Also, the transferee in good
faith and for value who has relied on the Centers representation of the genuineness and validity of the TCC
transferred to it may not be legally required to pay again the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly
declared null.
Facts:
From 1988-1997, PSPC paid part of its excise tax liabilities with Tax Credit Certificates (TCC) which it
acquired through the Department of Finance One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit Center. When PSPC
signified its intent to use the TCCs to pay part of its excise tax liabilities, said payments were approved and
the BIR accepted such as payments. However, on 1998, BIR sent a collection letter to PSPC for alleged
deficiencies excise tax liabilities, alleging that PSPC is not a qualified transferee of the TCCs it acquired from
other BOI-registered companies. CTA en banc ordered PSPS to pay and ruled that the TCCs are subject to the
results of the post-audit done by the Center since their issuance is subject to a suspensive condition.
Issue:
Whether or not the assessment against PSPC for deficiency excise taxes is valid
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Ruling:
NO. A TCC is an undertaking by the government through the BIR or DOF, acknowledging that a
taxpayer is entitled to a certain amount of tax credit from either an overpayment of income taxes or a direct
benefit granted by law. Hence, TCCs are immediately valid and effective after their issuance. If the TCCs are
considered to be subject to post-audit as a suspensive condition, the very purpose of the TCC would be
defeated as there would be no guarantee that the TCC would be honored by the government as payment for
taxes. No investor would take the risk of utilizing TCCs if these were subject to a post-audit that may
invalidate them, without prescribed grounds or limits as to the exercise of said post-audit.
Moreover, any fraud or breach of law relating to the issuance of the TCC by the Center to the
transferor or original grantee is the latters liability. The transferee in good faith and for value who has relied
on the Centers representation of the genuineness and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally
required to pay again the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly declared null. PSPC is a transferee
in good faith hence, it cannot be prejudiced by such.
Refund
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptionsand are to be construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer.
Facts:
Atlas Corporation is a VAT-registered entity. It filed an application for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund for refundable input VAT. It then filed a petition for review with the CTA which denied
the same for insufficiency of evidence to warrant the grant of tax credit or refund. It pointed out that Atlas
failed to submit photocopies of export documents, invoices, or receipts evidencing the sale of goods and
others. On the other hand, Atlas asserted that the documents it presented, coupled with the testimony of its
Accounting and Finance Manager sufficiently proved its case. The CA struck down Atlas contention that it has
sufficiently established the existence of its export sales through the testimony of its Accounting and Finance
Manager, as her testimony is self-serving.
Issue:
Whether Atlas has sufficiently proven entitlement to a tax credit or refund only by submission of a
summary of its invoices.
Ruling:
NO. The summary of invoices or transactions presented by Atlas does not replace the pertinent
invoices, receipts, and export sales documents as competent evidence to prove the fact of refundable or
creditable input VAT. Indeed, the summary presented with the certification by an independent Certified
Public Accountant (CPA) and the testimony of Atlas Accounting and Finance Manager are merely
corroborative of the actual input VAT it paid and the actual export sales. It would not be proper to allow Atlas
to simply prevail and compel a tax credit or refund in the amount it claims without proving the amount of its
claim.
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G.R. No. 160193, March 23, 2008, Second Division, Velasco, Jr., J.
Claims for tax refund / credit are in the nature of claims for exemption. Accordingly, the law relied upon
is not only strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, but also the proofs presented entitling a taxpayer to an
exemption are strictissimi scrutinized.
Facts:
M.E. Holding Corporation is claiming the 20% sales discount it granted to qualified senior citizens.
M.E. treated the discount as deductions from its gross income purportedly in accordance with RR No. 2-84.
However it filed the return under protest arguing that the discount should be treated as tax credit and not as
mere deductions. Due to the inaction of the BIR, M.E. filed an appeal before the CTA reiterating its position.
CTA granted M.E.s petition, but the claimed refund was reduced due to M.E.s failure to properly support the
claimed discount with the corresponding cash slips. The CA dismissed the petition to it and upheld the
decision of the CTA.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred and has deviated from applicable laws and jurisprudence in not
appreciating other competent evidence proving the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens and
merely relying solely on the cash slips.
Ruling:
NO. The CA was correct in disallowing and not considering the belatedly-submitted cash receipts to
be part of the 20% sales discount for M.E.s taxable year 1995. This is as it should be in the light of Sec. 34 of
Rule 132 prescribing that no evidence shall be considered unless formally offered with a statement of the
purpose why it is being offered. In addition, the rule is that the best evidence under the circumstance must be
adduced to prove the allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest. Only when the best evidence cannot be
submitted may secondary evidence be considered. But, in the instant case, the disallowed cash slips, the best
evidence at that time, were not part of M.E.s offer of evidence. While it may be true that the authenticated
special record books yield the same data found in the cash slips, they cannot plausibly be considered by the
courts a quo and made to corroborate pieces of evidence that have, in the first place, been disallowed.
Claims for tax refund / credit are in the nature of claims for exemption. Accordingly, the law relied
upon is not only strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, but also the proofs presented entitling a taxpayer to an
exemption are strictissimi scrutinized.
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NIRC
Income Taxation
Gross Income
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

This fact that the corporation suffered loss does not preclude the corporation from availing of its
statutory right to a tax credit for the 20% sales discounts it granted to qualified senior citizens.
Facts:
Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation is a corporation under Philippine laws which operates two
drugstores under the name of Mercury Drug. The corporation alleged that it granted 20% discount to senior
citizens and treated the same as deductions from the gross sales instead of treating them as tax credit in
order to arrive at the net sales. However, the corporation filed with BIR a claim for tax refund/credit of the
full amount of the 20% as discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not the corporation is entitled to refund or tax credit.
Ruling:
Yes. This court held that private drug companies are entitled to a tax credit for the 20% sales
discounts they granted to qualified senior citizens under RA 7432 and nullified Secs. 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94. It is
true that petitioner did not pay any tax in 1995 since it suffered a net loss for that taxable year. This fact,
however, without more, does not preclude petitioner from availing of its statutory right to a tax credit for the
20% sales discounts it granted to qualified senior citizens. The fact that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1995
will not make the tax credit due to petitioner unavailable. This is the core issue resolved in Central Luzon,
where we ruled that the net loss for a taxable year does not bar the grant of the tax credit to a taxpayer
pursuant to RA 7432 and that prior tax payments are not required for such grant.
Non-resident Foreign Corporations
SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

The general rule is that resident foreign corporations shall be liable for a 32% corporate income tax
(now 30%) on their income from within the Philippines, except for resident foreign corporations that are
international carriers that derive income from carriage of persons, excess baggage, cargo and mail originating
from the Philippines which shall be taxed at 2 1/2% of their Gross Philippine Billings
Facts:
Petitioner South African Airways is an international air carrier having no landing rights in the
country and not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a corporation, branch office, or
partnership. Thus, it is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Petitioner filed a claim for refund with
the CTA for erroneously paid tax on Gross Philippine Billings (GPB) for the taxable year 2000.
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The CTA denied the claim of refund reasoning that petitioner was not liable to pay tax on its GPB
under Section 28(A)(3)(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997. The CTA, however, stated
that petitioner is liable to pay a tax of 32% (30%) on its income derived from the sales of passage documents
in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, as an off-line international carrier selling passage documents through an

independent sales agent in the Philippines, is engaged in trade or business in the Philippines subject to the
32% (30%) income tax imposed by Section 28 (A)(1) of the 1997 NIRC.
Ruling:
YES. To reiterate, the correct interpretation of the above provisions is that, if an international air
carrier maintains flights to and from the Philippines, it shall be taxed at the rate of 2 1/2% of its Gross
Philippine Billings, while international air carriers that do not have flights to and from the Philippines but
nonetheless earn income from other activities in the country will be taxed at the rate of 32% (30%) of such
income.
Petitioner, being an international carrier with no flights originating from the Philippines, does not fall
under the exception. As such, petitioner must fall under the general rule. This principle is embodied in the
Latin maxim, exception firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis, which means, a thing not being excepted must
be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.
Donors tax
Sale/Exchange/Transfer of property for insufficient consideration
THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
The absence of donative intent, if that be the case, does not exempt the sales of stock transaction from
donor's tax since Sec. 100 of the NIRC categorically states that the amount by which the fair market value of the
property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift.
Facts:
In a competitive bidding organized by The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company
(Philamlife), STI Investments, Inc., acquired the Class A shares of Philamlife in Philam Care Health Systems,
Inc. (PhilamCare). Later, Philamlife filed an application for a certificate authorizing registration/tax clearance
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to facilitate the transfer of the shares but was informed that it needed to
secure a BIR ruling in connection with its application due to potential donors tax liability. In compliance
thereto, petitioner requested a ruling that the sale was not subject to donors tax since there was no donative
intent.
Commissioner on Internal Revenue (Commissioner) denied Philamlifes request holding that the
selling price of the shares thus sold was lower than their book value based on the financial statements of
PhilamCare thus donors tax became imposable on the price difference pursuant to Sec. 100 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Issue:
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2016
Whether or not the price difference in petitioners adverted sale of shares in PhilamCare attracts
donors tax.
Ruling:
YES. The price difference is subject to donor's tax. The absence of donative intent, if that be the case,
does not exempt the sales of stock transaction from donor's tax since Sec. 100 of the NIRC categorically states
that the amount by which the fair market value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall
be deemed a gift. Thus, even if there is no actual donation, the difference in price is considered a donation by
fiction of law.
Value-Added Tax (VAT)
Zero-rated sales of goods or properties and effectively zero-rated sales of goods or properties
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ACESITE (PHILIPPINES) HOTEL CORPORATION

Facts:
Acesite is the owner and operator of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. It leases a part of the
hotels premises to PAGCOR. For January 1996 to April 1997, Acesite incurred VAT from its rental income
and sale of food and beverages to PAGCOR. Acesite thereafter shifted the said tax to PAGCOR by
incorporating it in the amount assessed to the latter but it refused to pay the taxes on account of its tax
exempt status. Acesite thus paid the VAT to the CIR as it feared the legal consequences of non-payment of the
tax. However, Acesite belatedly arrived at the conclusion that its transaction with PAGCOR was subject to
zero rate as it was rendered to a tax-exempt entity. On 21 May 1998, Acesite filed an administrative claim for
refund with the CIR but the latter failed to resolve the same.
Issue:
Whether the VAT exempt status of PAGCOR extends to Acesite.
Ruling:
YES. Transactions with a VAT exempt taxpayer is subject to zero rated VAT. While it was proper for
PAGCOR not to pay the 10% VAT (now 12%) charged by Acesite, the latter is not liable for the payment of it
as it is exempt in this particular transaction by operation of law to pay the indirect tax. Such exemption falls
within the former Section 102 (b) (3) of the 1977 Tax Code which exempts services rendered to persons or
entities whose exemption under special laws.
The rationale for the exemption from indirect taxes provided for in P.D. 1869 and the extension of
such exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations are best elucidated from
the 1987 case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco & Sons, Inc., where the absolute tax
exemption of the World Health Organization (WHO) upon an international agreement was upheld. We held in
said case that the exemption of contractee WHO should be implemented to mean that the entity or person
exempt is the contractor itself who constructed the building owned by contractee WHO, and such does not
violate the rule that tax exemptions are personal because the manifest intention of the agreement is to
exempt the contractor so that no contractors tax may be shifted to the contractee WHO. Thus, the
13 | P a g e
2016
proviso in P.D. 1869, extending the exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino
operations, is clearly to proscribe any indirect tax, like VAT, that may be shifted to PAGCOR.
Refund or tax credit of excess input tax
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION (Formerly SOUTHERN

ENERGY QUEZON INC.)
Under Sec. 112(A) of the NIRC, unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal
revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not.
Facts:
MPC sells the power it generates to the National Power Corp. (NPC). It engaged the services of
Mitsubishi Corp. to construct the electrical and mechanical portion of its plant in Pagbilao, Quezon from
1993-1996. Under its charter, NPC is exempt from all taxes direct and indirect. Due to NPCs tax exempt
status, MPC believed that the sale of power generation services to NPC is zero-rated for VAT purposes. It then
filed an application for zero-rating before the CIR. Believing itself to be zero-rated, it was only in 1998 that
MPC paid Mitsubishi the VAT component for the construction. The corresponding progress billings was from
the construction project was from April 1993 to September 1996. MPC filed an administrative claim for
refund for the creditable input VAT paid to Mitubishi on December 10, 1999.
Issue:
Whether MPC is entitled to the refund.
Ruling:
NO. The claim for refund or tax credit for the creditable input VAT payment made was filed beyond
the period provided by law for such claim. The prescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the
official receipt was issued. Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent
transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable
input VAT. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or
transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last
creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third
quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax
credit for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30,
1998. Consequently, MPCs claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC where the claim for refund must be filed within two years after the
payment of the tax are also inapplicable. They only apply to instances of erroneous payment or illegal
collection for internal revenue taxes, and not tax refund for creditable input VAT on zero-rated sales.
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2016
Tax Remedies under the NIRC
Suspension of the running of statute of limitations
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. NEXT MOBILE INC.,

The general rule is that when a waiver does not comply with the requisites for its validity specified
under RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO 01-05, it is invalid and ineffective to extend the prescriptive period to assess
taxes. However, due to its peculiar circumstances, we shall treat this case as an exception to this rule and find the
Waivers valid for the reasons discussed below.
Facts:
Ma. Lida Sarmiento (Sarmiento), respondents (NEXT MOBILE INC) Director of Finance, executed
several waivers of the statute of limitations to extend the prescriptive period of assessment for taxes due in
taxable year ending December 31, 2001 (Waivers).
However, the waiver failed to comply with provisions of RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO 05-01. In the
instant case, the CTA found the Waivers invalid because of the following flaws: (1) they were executed
without a notarized board authority; (2) the dates of acceptance by the BIR were not indicated therein; and
(3) the fact of receipt by respondent of its copy of the Second Waiver was not indicated on the face of the
original Second Waiver. To be sure, both parties in this case are at fault.
Issue:
Whether CIRs right to assess respondents deficiency taxes had already prescribed.
Ruling:
NO. Section 2033 of the 1997 NIRC mandates the BIR to assess internal revenue taxes within three
years from the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the tax return or the actual date of filing of such
return, whichever comes later. Hence, an assessment notice issued after the three-year prescriptive period
is not valid and effective. Exceptions to this rule are provided under Section 222 of the NIRC. Section 222(b)
of the NIRC provides that the period to assess and collect taxes may only be extended upon a written
agreement between the CIR and the taxpayer executed before the expiration of the three-year period
provided it comply with the requisites for its validity specified under RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO 01-05.
Here, it did not comply with the procedure for a valid agreement for the waiver of the statute of
limitations. However, the Court cannot tolerate this highly suspicious situation. In this case, the taxpayer, on
the one hand, after voluntarily executing waivers, insisted on their invalidity by raising the very same defects
it caused. On the other hand, the BIR miserably failed to exact from respondent compliance with its rules. The
BIRs negligence in the performance of its duties was so gross that it amounted to malice and bad faith.
Moreover, the BIR was so lax such that it seemed that it consented to the mistakes in the Waivers. Such a
situation is dangerous and open to abuse by unscrupulous taxpayers who intend to escape their
responsibility to pay taxes by mere expedient of hiding behind technicalities.
It is true that petitioner was also at fault here because it was careless in complying with the
requirements of RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO 01-05. Nevertheless, petitioner's negligence may be addressed by
enforcing the provisions imposing administrative liabilities upon the officers responsible for these errors.
The BIR's right to assess and collect taxes should not be jeopardized merely because of the mistakes and
lapses of its officers, especially in cases like this where the taxpayer is obviously in bad faith.
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2016
Refund
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANKv. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

The probative value of BIR Form 2307, which is basically a statement showing the amount paid for the
subject transaction and the amount of tax withheld therefrom, is to establish only the fact of withholding of the
claimed creditable withholding tax. There is nothing in BIR Form No. 2307 which would establish either
utilization or non-utilization, as the case may be, of the creditable withholding tax.
Facts:
Gotesco Tyan Ming Development, Inc. entered into a syndicated loan agreement with PNB and three
(3) other banks. To secure the loan, Gotesco mortgaged the Ever Ortigas Commercial Complex. For its failure
to pay its obligation, the secured property was foreclosed. As it prepared for the consolidation of its
ownership, PNB withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding taxes equivalent to 6% of the bid price.
In its claim for refund, PNB explained that it inadvertently applied the six percent (6%) creditable
withholding tax rate on the sale of real property classified as ordinary asset, when it should have applied the
five percent (5%) creditable withholding tax rate on the sale of ordinary asset, as provided in Section 2.57.2
(J)(B) of Revenue Regulation No. 2-98 as amended by RR No. 6-01, considering that Gotesco is primarily
engaged in the real estate business.
Issue:
Whether PNB presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to the refund erroneously paid to BIR.
Ruling:
YES. Although PNB was not able to submit Gotescos BIR Form No. 2307, the Court is persuaded and
so declares that PNB submitted evidence sufficiently showing Gotescos non-utilization of the taxes withheld
subject of the refund.
First, Gotescos Audited Financial Statements for year 2003, which it subsequently filed with the BIR
in 2004, still included the foreclosed Ever Ortigas Commercial Complex, in the Asset account Property and
Equipment. As advised by the First Division, Gotesco presented its 2003 ITR along with its 2003 Schedule of
Prepaid Taxwhich itemized in detail the withholding taxes claimed by Gotesco for the year 2003 amounting to
P6,014,433. The aforesaid schedule shows that the creditable withholding taxes Gotesco utilized to pay for its
2003 tax liabilities came from the rental payments of its tenants in the Ever Ortigas Commercial Complex, not
from the foreclosure sale. Further, Gotescos former accountant stated in her Judicial Affidavit that the tax
credits claimed for year 2003 did not include any portion of the amount subject to the claim for refund. First,
she explained that Gotesco could not have possibly utilized the amount claimed for refund as it was not even
aware that PNB paid the six percent (6%) creditable withholding tax since no documents came to its attention
which showed such payment by PNB. As she also explained, had Gotesco claimed the entire or even any
portion of P74,400,028.49, corresponding to the six percent (6%) tax withheld by PNB, the amount appearing
in Gotescos 2003 ITR should have reflected the additional amount of P74,400,028.49.
There is no need for PNB to present Gotescos BIR Form No. 2307, as insisted by the First Division,
because the information contained in the said form may be very well gathered from other documents already
presented by PNB. Thus, the presentation of BIR Form No. 2307 would be in the final analysis a superfluity, of
little or no value. While perhaps it may be necessary to prove that the taxpayer did not use the claimed
16 | P a g e
2016
creditable withholding tax to pay for his/its tax liabilities, there is no basis in law or jurisprudence to say that
BIR Form No. 2307 is the only evidence that may be adduced to prove such non-use.
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2016
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, AS AMENDED
Local Government Taxation
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COLON HERITAGE REALTY CORPORATION

Local fiscal autonomy includes the power of LGUs to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities. By earmarking the income on amusement taxes imposed by the LGUs in favor of FDCP and the
producers of graded films, the legislature appropriated and distributed the LGUs' funds-as though it were legally
within its control-under the guise of setting a limitation on the LGUs' exercise of their delegated taxing power.
Facts:
City of Cebu passed a City Tax Ordinance. Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI
thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing
stadia, and other places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu
City. Almost a decade later, Congress passed RA 9167, creating the Film Development Council of the
Philippines (FDCP). Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax treatment of certain graded films.
Accordingly, FDCP sent demand letters for unpaid amusement tax reward due to the producers of the Grade
"A" or "B" films to several cinema proprietors and operators in Cebu City including Colon Heritage Realty
Corp. Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to remit the said amounts, the
city filed before the RTC a petition which sought the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are invalid for being unconstitutional.
Ruling:
YES. It is apparent that what Congress did in issuing RA 9167 was not to exclude the authority to levy
amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the
income to be received by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the
taxing authority. This is in clear contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall
accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with
their priorities. In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the income
from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance accrue to them,
not even partially, despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly overstepped its
plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative of the fundamental law's guarantee on local
autonomy. Moreover, it is undoubtedly a usurpation of the latter's exclusive prerogative to apportion their
funds, an impermissible intrusion into the LGUs' constitutionally-protected domain which puts to naught the
guarantee of fiscal autonomy to municipal corporations enshrined in our basic law.
It was argued that subject Sec. 13 is a grant by Congress of an exemption from amusement taxes in
favor of producers of graded films. Without question, this Court has previously upheld the power of Congress
to grant exemptions over the power of LGUs to impose taxes. This amusement tax reward, however, is not a
tax exemption. Exempting a person or entity from tax is to relieve or to excuse that person or entity from the
burden of the imposition. Here, however, it cannot be said that an exemption from amusement taxes was
granted by Congress to the producers of graded films. Take note that the burden of paying the amusement tax
in question is on the proprietors, lessors, and operators of the theaters and cinemas that showed the graded
films. Simply put, both the burden and incidence of the amusement tax are borne by the proprietors, lessors,
and operators, not by the producers of the graded films. The transfer of the amount to the film producers is
18 | P a g e
2016
actually a monetary reward given to them for having produced a graded film, the funding for which was taken
by the national government from the coffers of the covered LGUs. Without a doubt, this is not an exemption
from payment of tax.
Real Property Taxation
CITY ASSESSOR OF CEBU CITY v. ASSOCIATION OF BENEVOLA DE CEBU, INC.

All lands, buildings, and other improvements thereon actually, directly and exclusively used for
hospitals, cultural or scientific purposes, and those owned and used by local water districts, and government-
owned or controlled corporations rendering essential public services in the supply and distribution of water
and/or generation and transmission of electric power shall be classified as special.
Facts:
Association of Benevola de Cebu, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit organization which is the owner of
Chong Hua Hospital (CHH). The association constructed the CHH Medical Arts Center (CHHMAC). A Certificate
of Occupancy was issued to the center with a classification of "Commercial Clinic." The city assessor assessed
the CHHMAC building as "commercial" at the assessment level for commercial buildings, and not for special
assessment currently imposed for CHH and its other separate buildingsthe CHH's Dietary and Records
Departments. The association filed with the LBAA for reconsideration, asserting that CHHMAC is part of CHH
and ought to be imposed the same special assessment level that of CHH. The LBAA ruled in favor of the
association stating that it is of public knowledge that hospitals have plenty of spaces leased out to medical
practitioners, which is both an accepted and desirable fact; thus, respondent's claim is not disputed that such
is a must for a tertiary hospital like CHH which decision was affirmed by the CBAA. Likewise, the CA affirmed
the same that the CHHMAC is part and parcel of CHH since the facilities and utilities of CHHMAC are necessary
for the CHH to achieve its purpose.
Issue:
Whether the medical arts center built by the hospital to house its doctors is a commercial
establishment.
Ruling:
NO. We so hold that CHHMAC is an integral part of CHH. It is undisputed that the doctors and medical
specialists holding clinics in CHHMAC are those duly accredited by CHH, that is, they are consultants of the
hospital and the ones who can treat CHH's patients confined in it. This fact alone takes away CHHMAC from
being categorized as "commercial" since a tertiary hospital like CHH is required by law to have a pool of
physicians who comprises the required medical departments in various medical fields. The CHHMAC facility,
while seemingly not indispensable to the operations of CHH, is definitely incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the operations of the hospital.
Given the foregoing arguments, we fail to see any reason why the CHHMAC building should be
classified as "commercial" as it is not operated primarily for profit but as an integral part of CHH. The
CHHMAC, with operations being devoted for the benefit of the CHH's patients, should be accorded the special
assessment. In this regard, we point with approbation the appellate court's application of Sec. 216 in relation
with Sec. 215 of the Local Government Code on the proper classification of the subject CHHMAC building as
"special" and not "commercial."
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JUDICIAL REMEDIES (R.A. No. 1125, as amended, and the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals)
Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
There is no provision in law that expressly provides where exactly the ruling of the Secretary of Finance
under the adverted NIRC provision is appealable to. However, Sec. 7(a)(1) of RA 1125, as amended, addresses the
seeming gap in the law as it vests the CTA, albeit impliedly, with jurisdiction over the CA petition as "other
matters" arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR.
Facts:
In a competitive bidding organized by The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company
(Philamlife), STI Investments, Inc., acquired the Class A shares of Philamlife in Philam Care Health Systems,
Inc. (PhilamCare). To facilitate the transfer of the shares, Philamlife filed an application for a certificate
authorizing registration/tax clearance with the Bureau of Internal Revenue but was informed that it needed
to secure a BIR ruling in connection with its application due to potential donors tax liability. Philamlife
complied however Commissioner on Internal Revenue (Commissioner) denied the request. Appeal to the
Secretary of Finance was unsuccessful which prompted Philamlife to appeal to CA. CA however dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction holding that the it is the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which has jurisdiction
over the issues raised.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the CA Petition for lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:
NO. There is no provision in law that expressly provides where exactly the ruling of the Secretary of
Finance under the adverted NIRC provision is appealable to. However, Sec. 7(a)(1) of RA 1125, as amended,
addresses the seeming gap in the law as it vests the CTA, albeit impliedly, with jurisdiction over the CA
petition as "other matters" arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR.
Even though the provision suggests that it only covers rulings of the Commissioner, it is, nonetheless,
sufficient enough to include appeals from the Secretarys review under Sec. 4 of the NIRC. Indeed, to leave
undetermined the mode of appeal from the Secretary of Finance would be an injustice to taxpayers
prejudiced by his adverse rulings. To remedy this situation, the Court imply from the purpose of RA 1125 and
its amendatory laws that the CTA is the proper forum with which to institute the appeal. This is not, and
should not, in any way, be taken as a derogation of the power of the Office of President but merely as
recognition that matters calling for technical knowledge should be handled by the agency or quasi-judicial
body with specialization over the controversy. As the specialized quasi-judicial agency mandated to
adjudicate tax, customs, and assessment cases, there can be no other court of appellate jurisdiction that can
decide the issues raised in the CA petition, which involves the tax treatment of the shares of stocks sold.
20 | P a g e

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Digested by: DC 2016 Members

Equitable Mortgage ............................................................................................................... 36

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (CIVIL CODE)

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA

Respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga (Gonzaga) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for

Whether or not the ECEC is valid.

ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE LIZARES v

EUSEBIO GONZALES v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL BANK, EDNA OCAMPO,

(2) Whether or not the award of damages in favor of Gonzales is proper.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA

Whether or not a prejudicial question exists.

MARRIAGE (FAMILY CODE)

SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

ERIC U. YU v. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in

2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.

PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

1. Whether or not the subject property is a conjugal.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ et al.

TIRSO MONTEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY v. CELSO OATE

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS(ALU) and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-

Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of laches.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

SM LAND, INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF OBLIGATIONS

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. SPS. LIBRADO RAMOS and REMEDIOS RAMOS

Whether or not a sufficient demand was made by GMC.

KINDS OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ et al.

Whether or not Allied and Metrobank is liable to Lim Sio Wan.

BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES -

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. v. ROSARIO ALZUL

Yes. Imposing 5% monthly interest, whether compounded or simple, is unconscionable.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Coconut Administration(PCA) have the largest membership in the COCOFUND. A

Whether or not the PCA-COJUANGCO agreement is a valid contract.

ANTHONY ORDUA, DENNIS ORDUA, and ANTONITA ORDUA v. EDUARDO J. FUENTEBELLA,

TIRSO MONTEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v ALFREDO ONG

Whether Land Bank should return the amount paid by Ong.

ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS S. YUJUICO, represented by ADMINISTRATORS BENEDICTO V.

Whether or not the parties entered into a contract of absolute sale.

PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUSTS

PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION et al. vs EIB SECURITIES, INC.,