AquinoAdminCases Final
AquinoAdminCases Final
AquinoAdminCases Final
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
In 19933, the CDF was further modified such that the release of
funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first
time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
In 19994, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three
separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap
Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision
requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release
of funds.
Special Provision
1. Use and release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects as indicated under Purpose 1: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be
released directly to the implementing agency concerned upon prior consultation with the
respective Representative of the District: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the herein allocation may
be realigned as necessary to any expense category: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That no amount shall
be used to fund personal services and other personal benefits. (Emphases supplied)
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV8 of PD No.
1869,9 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
and is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the
Corporation from this Franchise shall be immediately set aside and allocated to fund the following
infrastructure and socio-civil projects within the Metropolitan Manila Area:
(a) Flood Control
(b) Sewerage and Sewage
(c) Nutritional Control
(d) Population Control
(e) Tulungan ng Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification
(g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects; provided, that should the aggregate gross
earning be less than P150,000,000.00, the amount to be allocated to fund the above-mentioned
project shall be equivalent to sixty (60%) percent of the aggregate gross earning.
In addition to the priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects with the Metropolitan Manila
specifically enumerated above, the share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings
derived by the Corporate from this Franchise may also be appropriated and allocated to fund and
finance infrastructure and/or socio-civic projects throughout the Philippines as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Proceedings:
10 Carvajal, Nancy, " NBI probes P10-B scam," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 12, 2013
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/443297/nbi-probes-p10-b-scam> (visited October 21, 2013).
11 Pursuant to Office Order No. 2010-309 dated May 13, 2010.
12Carvajal, Nancy, Malampaya fund lost P900M in JLN racket, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July
16, 2013 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/445585/malampaya-fund-lost-p900m-in-jln-racket> (visited
October 21, 2013.)
ISSUES:
Procedural issues
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy, (b) the issues
raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous
decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel system.
Substantive issues
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the
constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and
balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and
the laws allowing for their utilization are currently existing and
operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.
The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from
deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave
violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter
of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a
definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality to guide the bench,
the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
Remedial Law
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle
states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,
between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand,
the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule
that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
Constitutional Law
The Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a)
the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be
treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with.
Justice Brion
Justice Brion agrees with the majoritys view on the
unconstitutionality of the PDAF, but hold that the first part of Section 8
of P.D. No. 910 relating to funds used for energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects is
constitutionally infirm for being a discretionary lump sum
appropriation whose purpose lacks specificity for the projects or
undertakings contemplated, and that denies Congress of its
constitutional prerogative to participate in laying down national policy
on energy matters.
CONCURRING OPINION:
Justice Carpio
Justice Carpio concur to declare Priority Development
Assistance Fund, of Republic Act No. 10352 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for violating the separation of powers, negating the President's
constitutional line-item veto power, violating the constitutional duty of
Congress to enact a line-item General Appropriations Act, and
violating the requirement of line-item appropriations in the General
Appropriations Act as prescribed in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Further, the last phrase of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910,
authorizing the use of the Malampaya Fund for such other purposes
as may hereafter be directed by the President, and the phrase in
Section 12, Title IV of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended,
authorizing the President to use the government's share in
PAGCOR's gross earnings to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects as the President may determine, are likewise
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being undue delegations of
legislative power.
Justice Leonen
The phrase for such other purposes as may hereafter directed
by the President" has, thus, been read as all the infinite possibilities
of any project or program. Since it prescribes all, it prescribes none.
Justice Leonen concurs with the ponencia in treating this portion of
Section 8, Presidential Decree No. 910, which allows the
expenditures of that special fund "for other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President," as null and void.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
15 1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the
authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49
(Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their
provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in
the use of savings.
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issue
1. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;"
2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
3. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause,
(2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators;
RULINGS:
Procedural Issue:
It was further held that the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition are the proper actions for directly assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other
executive issuances implementing the DAP, contrary to the
contentions of the respondents.
Substantive Issues:
The Court declared the following acts and practices under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No.
541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
Issue No. 1
It was held that the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is
not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
Issue No. 2
There is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment
of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there
will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
The DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since
the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP,
funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle
of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.
Issue No. 3
There is no violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that
the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground
alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant
a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial
of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by
parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties
would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated
against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the
requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and
fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection
occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The
requirement was not met here.
Issue No. 4
Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In
this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.
Issue No. 5
The Court held that the doctrine of operative fact is applicable
in this case. Such doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. It nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general
rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use
must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot
be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is
resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to
cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that
will permit its application.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DISSENTING OPINION:
First, I am of the view that the Court should not make a broad and
sweeping declaration of unconstitutionality relative to acts or
practices that were not actually proven in this case. Hence, I limit the
declaration of unconstitutionality to the three admitted cross-border
transfers of savings. To rule otherwise would transgress the actual
case and controversy requirement necessary to validly exercise the
power of judicial review.
Last, I find that the remedy in this case is not solely judicial but largely
legislative in that imperative reforms are needed in, among others,
the limits of Section 38, the definition of savings, the transparency of
the exercise of the power to augment, the safeguards and limitations
on this power, and so on. How this is to be done belongs to Congress
which must balance the State interests in curbing abuse vis--vis
flexibility in fiscal management.
SEPARATE OPINION:
He further averred that the DAP also violates the prohibition on cross-
border transfers enshrined in Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. No less than the DBM Secretary has admitted that the
Executive transferred funds to the COA and the House of
Representatives. The OSG has also expressly admitted in its
Memorandum of March 10, 2014 that the Executive transferred
appropriations to the COA, the House of Representatives and the
COMELEC. The Executive transferred DAP funds to augment the
PDAF, or the unconstitutional Congressional Pork Barrel, making the
augmentation also unconstitutional.
x-----------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
16http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
The justice who shifted his vote from the first majority to the
second majority agreed with the observations of Justice Carpio with
respect to the defect of the SPA and noted that it was a jurisdictional
defect. The pivotal justice who shifted his vote, added that, anyway,
the defect could easily be remedied by petitioners who in 10 minutes
could simply amend the SPA to reflect condition (ii).
After the discussion, the Court, voting 7-6, ruled that petitioners
had failed to comply with the second condition imposed by the 15
November 2011 Resolution for the issuance of a TRO.
PROCEEDINGS:
2. Was there compliance with the 2nd condition of the TRO? If there is
none, should the TRO be suspended in the meantime?
RULINGS:
The moment she flies out of Philippine air space, our countrys
ability to enforce its laws will now be subject to the wishes of a foreign
government. A PhP2 Million Peso bond is crumbs for one who, if
proven, has actually obtained multiples more from the countrys
coffers. Neither will the appointment of a substitute replace the
effective justice that can be enforced only when a State has physical
custody of a person who has been proven guilty of violation of the
state laws. A conviction against her may lie as a formal judgment, but
there may effectively be no service of sentence. That is of course, all
premised on the theory that petitioners may ultimately be convicted
for one of the crimes for which they are charged. That result can only
add to the very long saga of our peoples desperate attempts to try to
redeem its self-respect by showing to the world that contrary to the
common observation of outsiders, impunity is not allowed to reign in
this country. Should the Court contribute to such possible despair by
not waiting for the oral argument on 22 November 2011 before
issuing a TRO?
The Court voted 76 (1) that there was no compliance with the
2nd condition of the TRO. But it nonetheless voted by the same 7-6
margin (2) that there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on
the TRO of the noncompliance by petitioners with the 2ndcondition.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
DISSENTING OPINION:
17 http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/
Accordingly, I vote to (1) defer action on petitioners prayer for a
temporary restraining order, (2) require respondents to file their
Comments on or before 21 November 2011, (3) hold oral arguments
on 22 November 2011 at 2 oclock in the afternoon, and (4) decide
whether to issue a temporary restraining order immediately upon the
conclusion of the oral arguments.
18 http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/
This, to me, is an unequivocal testimony to the presumption of
validity accorded to Department Circular No. 41 and the Watchlist
Order issued pursuant to its provisions, considering that the TRO was
issued not because of the supposed infringement on Mr. Arroyos
right to travel but because of the DOJs clear deviation from the
provisions of Department Circular No. 41. Under Section 2 of the
Circular, it is only in the following instances that a Watchlist Order can
be issued against any person: (a) there is a criminal case pending
against him before any court within this jurisdiction; (b) there is a
criminal case against him pending preliminary investigation, petition
for review or motion for reconsideration before the DOJ or any of its
prosecution offices; and (c) the Secretary of Justice deems it proper
motu proprio or upon the request submitted by any government
agency, commission, task force or similar offices created by the
Office of the President under Republic Act No. 9208 in connection
with an investigation it is conducting and/or in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. Evidently, that there was a
restraint on Mr. Arroyos right to travel per se is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality against the Circular
such that what moved the Court to rule in Mr. Arroyos favor was the
dubiety of whether an investigation conducted by the Senate may be
a ground to issue a Watchlist Order.
On the other hand, if it was the petitioners right to life and the
threat posed thereto by the assailed issuances that was foremost in
the majoritys mind when they decided to issue the TRO, there would
have been no basis to issue a TRO in Mr. Arroyos favor as there is
nothing in his Petition where it was alleged that his right to life was
being threatened or endangered. In his earlier Petition, Mr. Arroyo
was invoking for his right to travel in his earlier Petition. It is no
different in this present Petition; only that, the Watchlist Order he is
now attacking as unconstitutional is based on his being preliminarily
investigated by the DOJ-COMELEC Fact Finding Committee.
However, the issuance of a Watchlist Order on this ground is allowed
under the Circular; thus, the basis for the Courts issuance of a TRO
in Mr. Arroyos first Petition does not exist in this case. If the
infringement of his right to travel was not enough for this Court to
issue a TRO in Mr. Arroyos first Petition, it is certainly confounding
as to why it is different in this case.
It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion
of the court taking cognizance thereof. In the present case, however,
where it is the Government which is being enjoined from
implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity,
such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution.
IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to: (a) defer action on the prayer for
a TRO; (b) order the public respondents to Comment on the
consolidated Petitions on or before November 21, 2011; and (c) set
the case for oral arguments on November 22, 2011 at 2:00 p.m.; and
(d) immediately after the conduct and conclusion of the oral
arguments, resolve the issue of whether or not a temporary
restraining order may be issued.
When this matter was called this morning, it was clear that not
one among the members of this Court was suggesting that petitioners
have no constitutional rights that this Court must vigilantly protect. No
19 http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/
one was saying that petitioners should not be granted any remedy.
The bone of contention before the Court was, simply, whether to
allow public respondents their right to due process by giving them the
right to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of five
(5) days immediately after which oral arguments were to be heard
and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) immediately
decided, as suggested by the minority, or, to deny respondents such
right by presuming fully the correctness of all the allegations of the
petitions, and thus grant the prayer for TRO. On this matter, the vote
of this Court was 8-5 denying the right of public respondents to be
heard before the grant of petitioners prayer for a TRO.
The court must face the risk of flight for it cannot evade the
question that is uppermost in the minds of many if the request for
TRO by petitioner is her desire to evade the investigatory and judicial
process regarding their liability for certain alleged criminal acts. If the
risk of flight is high, then this Court must adopt either of the following
approaches: (1) deny the right to travel, or (2) allow travel subject to
certain restrictions.
IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to: (a) defer action on the prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order; (b) order the public respondents to
Comment on the consolidated Petitions no later than 21 November
2011; and (c) conduct oral arguments on 22 November 2011 at 2:00
p.m. Immediately thereafter, the prayer for a temporary restraining
order will be decided.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
20 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/resolutions/2011/december20 11/199034_velasco.htm
At any rate, on November 15, 2011, petitioners complied with
conditions (i) and (ii) and, as a result, the Office of the Clerk of Court
issued the TRO pursuant to the November 15, 2011 Resolution. The
presumptive validity of the TRO must be recognized, albeit the
original special power of attorney accorded Atty. Topacio was
determined later to be non-compliant.
21 https://www.scribd.com/document/77632912/Brion-Separate-Opinion
On November 15, 2011, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) in favor of the petitioners. In the special En
Banc meeting of November 18, 2011, Justice Antonio T. Carpio
brought to the attention of the Court the petitioners failure to comply
with the second condition, specifically with the appointment of a legal
representative with full authority to receive summons and other court
process during their absence. The legal representative was merely
capacitated to produce, not receive summons. As a result of the
observation, the Court issued another Resolution stating that
xxxx
The first was the question of whether indeed there had been
failure to comply. The second was the effect of this failure if there had
been such a failure.
The answer to the second question flows from the first and also
from the express terms of the TRO. By its express terms, the TRO
was immediately executory, subject to automatic lifting if failure at
compliance takes place. In other words, the TRO was to be
immediately effective particularly during the five-day period of the
petitioners compliance with the conditions. My vote, therefore, had
likewise to be in the negative, subject to the failure to comply with the
condition within the five-day compliance period.
One. It is not true that the Court or the Chief Justice has
declined to promulgate Justice Serenos dissenting opinion, following
the vote taken in the case on November 29, 2011. She agreed to
submit her dissent not later than December 1. But she did not.
Neither did she ask the Chief Justice and the other members of the
Court for additional time to submit her dissenting opinion.
Consequently, the Court promulgated its November 29 Resolution in
the case without Justice Serenos promised dissenting opinion. The
Court did not deny her the right to have her opinion promulgated
together with the main Resolution. She broke agreement by not
submitting it on the date set for it.
I may have suggested the point sometime during the debate but
I recall withdrawing it when I realized that the TRO did not subject its
issuance and effectivity to petitioners prior or immediate compliance
with such conditions. Indeed, the collective recollection of the majority
of the Justices who did not join Justices Carpio and Serenos dissents
is that the vote was taken to conclude categorically that the non-
compliance did not suspend the force and effect of the TRO.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
23 The Presidential Commission on Good Governance vs Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, Roberto
S. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, Julita Benedicto, Lourdes Rivera, Miguel V. Gonzalez, Pag-Asa
San Agustin, Bennet Thelmo, Exequiel B. Africa, Rocio R. Torres, Marciano Benedicto, Romulo
Benedicto, Zacarias Amante, Francisca C. Benedicto, Jose Montalvo, Jesus Martinez, Nestor
Mata, Alberto Velez, Richard de Leon, Zapiro Tanpinco, Leopoldo Vergara, Dominador
Pangilinan, Rodolfo Arambulo, Rafael Sison, Placido Mapa, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Don M. Ferry,
Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Ramon Monzon, Generosa C. Olazo, Cynthia Cheong, Ma. Luisa E.
Nograles, and Jose Africa docketed as Civil Case No. 0034
24 Ibid.
25 Id.
Complaint as ceded, or to be ceded to the government. It also agreed
to extend absolute immunity to Benedicto, members of his family, and
the officers and employees of the listed corporations such that no
criminal investigation or prosecution would be undertaken against
them for acts or omissions prior to February 25, 1986.
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Africa and his heirs may benefit from the
Compromise Agreement entered into between PCGG and Benedicto
being co-defendants of the latter.
RULING:
28 Sandiganbayan Resolution dated July 14, 1999, penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L.
Legaspi with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and (retired Supreme Court Justice) Minita
V. Chico-Nazario concurring.
officers of TRB benefited from it. The Supreme Court conveyed that
the absence of Africa's name from the list of the added beneficiaries
could only mean that he was deliberately excluded from it.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
x-----------------------x
G.R. 196232
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
PROCEEDINGS:
RULINGS:
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
DISSENTING OPINION:
30 sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/september2012/196231
their position that since those in the executive branch are also subject
to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman,
providing the Office of the President with the power to remove would
be an impediment to the fundamental independence of the
Ombudsman.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
x-----------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
PROCEEDINGS:
The first case is G.R. No. 192935 a special civil action for
prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution34 as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and
to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES:
34Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.
RULINGS:
The Court finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues
are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the
public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for
the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than
interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring
about a promised change to the country. The Court takes
cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political
undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but
because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional
duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
DISSENTING OPINION:
Justice Carpio
The President can create the Truth Commission as a public
office in his Office pursuant to his power to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper.8 In such a case, the President is exercising his
delegated power to create a public office within the Office of the
President Proper. There is no dispute that the President possesses
this delegated power.
I differ.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Brion
Two inter-related features of the EO primarily contribute to the
resulting violations. The first is the use of the title Truth Commission,
which, as used in the EO, is fraught with hidden and prejudicial
implications beyond the seemingly simple truth that purportedly
characterizes the Commission. The second relates to the truth-telling
function of the Truth Commission under the terms of the EO.
Justice Bersamin
I find that the Truth Commission replicates and usurps the
duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutionally-created quasi-
judicial body established to investigate and prosecute illegal acts and
omissions of those who serve in the Government.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, which
authorized the COMELEC "to use AES. The COMELEC published a
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the public bidding of the lease with
option to purchase of an AES. COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM
executed the Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election
System.
The COMELEC En Banc, in Resolution No. 8608, 18 resolved
to approve the report/recommendation of the COMELEC Special Bids
and Awards Committee (SBAC) dated June 3, 2009, confirming
Smartmatic-TIM - a joint venture company formed by Smartmatic
International Corporation (Smartmatic) and Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) - as "the bidder with the 'Lowest
Calculated Responsive Bid' [LCRB] and to award the contract for the
automation of the elections on May 10, 2010 to the said joint venture.
The COMELEC was able to implement for the first time the
AES on a nationwide scale during the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections.
The COMELEC partially exercised the OTP when it purchased
920 units of PCOS machines with the corresponding
canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in
certain areas in Basilan, Lanao del Sur, and Bulacan. the COMELEC
received from SmartmaticTIM a proposal letter to "extend the
warranty" of the PCOS machines for three (3) years.The COMELEC's
Law Department issued a memorandum, with subject heading
"Review of the Draft Contract for the 2014 Extension to the Warranty
(Program 1)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing Resolution No. 9922 and in subsequently entering into the
Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1) with Smartmatic-TIM.
RULING:
The court GRANTED the Petition. Accordingly, COMELEC
Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended Warranty Contract (Program
I) are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
PROCEEDINGS:
35 Section 2. Mandate. The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on
the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team
created and referred to in Section 4 hereof. Resolutions finding probable cause for election
offenses, defined and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws shall
be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. For other
offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the
corresponding criminal information may be filed directly with the appropriate courts.
36 Arroyo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.199118, September 18, 2012
37 Refers to the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team.
On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings24 before the Joint Committee, in view of the
pendency of his petition before the Court. Petitioner Abalos, for his
part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam),38 in view of the pendency of his petition brought before
the Court.
RULINGS:
40Section 3 (c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and
other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. x x x
41 Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, on the other hand, provides:
(a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer
finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint
and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8 (c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other
supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
Constitutional Law
While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the
1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus
a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43
of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses.
Statutory Construction
The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to
submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten
(10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use of the
word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the mandatory
character of the rule.42
42 Tan v. Link, G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 479, 490.
October 18, 2011
x----------------------------------------------x
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULINGS:
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following
Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any
change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial
amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.
4. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
is constitutional
43 Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: "Any amendment to or revision of this Organic
Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days
after the approval of such amendment or revision."
The rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision.
RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on
the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the
manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply
an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of
one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of
the previous per station airtime for political campaigns or
advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates television and radio guestings
and appearances.
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUE:
Not more than an aggregate total of sixty (60) minutes of television advertising, whether
appearing on national, regional, or local, free or cable television, and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertising, whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by purchase or donation.
In cases where two or more candidates or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos,
insignias, color motifs, symbols, or forms of graphical representations are displayed, exhibited,
used, or mentioned together in the broadcast election propaganda or advertisements, the length
of time during which they appear or are being mentioned or promoted will be counted against the
airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and the cost of the said advertisement will
likewise be considered as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid for the advertisements
or to whom the said advertisements were donated.
Appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, bona fide news interview,
bona fide news documentary, if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation
of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events, including but not limited to events sanctioned by the Commission on Elections,
political conventions, and similar activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election
propaganda within the meaning of this provision. To determine whether the appearance or
guesting in a program is bona fide, the broadcast stations or entities must show that: (I) prior
approval of the Commission was secured; and (2) candidates and paiiies were afforded equal
opportunities to promote their candidacy. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as
relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon
them under Sections 10 and 14 of these Rules.
Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement contract be furnish to the
Commission thru the Education and Information Department, within five (5) days from contract
signing.
x xxx
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio
appeared and disclosed a confidential information which made the
Chief Justice characterize Jardelezas integrity as dubious.
ISSUES:
RULING:
In the first issue, the Court held that it can assume jurisdiction
and give due course over the case. Under Section 8, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, it states that:
Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative
of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.
As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the issue regarding
the stand that Jardeleza took in a legal dispute do not befit questions
or challenges on integrity as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009. The Chief Justices disagreement with the legal stand of
Jardeleza is not an integrity issue since there was no proven
treacherous intent to defeat the countrys interests or to betray the
Constitution. However, the alleged extra-marital affair and insider
trading posed serious problem as these question the morality of the
petitioner. As the Court has held: immorality has not been confined to
sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the communityand an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.46
In the third issue, while it is true that the JBC proceedings are
sui generis and impressed with discretion, it does not mean that an
applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process
clause may be brushed aside.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
Judicial Review
The Supreme Court has the power to review whether or not the
JBC committed grave abuse of discretion under its expanded
jurisdiction as provided in the 1987 Constitution.
Due Process
Due process is available, thus, demandable as a matter of right
in the JBC proceedings. The sui generis character of such
proceeding is not a blanket authority to do away with due process.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Justice Leonen
Justice Leonen voted to deny the petition. In his dissent, he
pointed that the supervisory power of this court over the Judicial and
Bar Council is mainly administrative. The Court cannot dictate how
such body would decide in the performance of its function.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Peralta
Justice Peralta, like Justice Leonardo-De Castro and Justice
Brion,concurred that the Jardelezas right to due process was violated
as he was not given reasonable opportunity to intelligently answer the
allegations against him.
Justice Brion
Justice Brion supported the Courts decision that it can exercise
its power of supervision over the JBC and it is also its duty to
determine grave abuse of discretion under the expanded jurisdiction
as provided in the 1987 Constitution. He also affirmed that there was
a violation of due process as found in the main decision and other
separate concurring opinions as he was not given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. He opined that the JBC cannot conduct its
proceedings to the extent that it ignores and violates the fundamental
rights of an individual.
January 21, 2015
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
PROCEEDINGS:
(1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question
the notice and letter of the respondents; and
ISSUES:
(1) the COMELEC has the power to regulate the expression made by
the Diocese of Bacolod.
RULING:
The Court held that the size limitations during elections hit at a
core part of expression as the content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
Freedom of Expression
A political opinion voiced through posters or other similar
means by a private individual or entity enjoys a high degree of
protection. It is not under the definition of election propaganda,
unless it is a sponsored one. Imposing a fixed-size requirement upon
such expression is a content-based restraint that bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Justice Brion
In the dissent of Justice Brion, he opined that the subject poster
falls squarely in the definition of the generic term election
propaganda as stated in Section 3 of RA 9006 and Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, and it is well within the regulated
election propaganda in RA 9006 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
since it was posted during the campaign period in front of the
Cathedral within public view, wherein the subject poster contained the
heading "conscience vote" and two lists of senators and members of
the House of Representatives. The first list contained names of
legislators who voted against the passage of the Reproductive Health
Law, denominated as Team Buhay. The second list contained names
of legislators who voted for the RH Laws passage, denominated as
"Team Patay." The "Team Buhay" list contained a check mark, while
the Team Patay list an X mark. All the legislators named in both lists
were candidates during the 2013 national elections and it did not
appear to have been sponsored or paid for by any candidate.
To his mind, the limitations on the size involve a content-neutral
regulation and passed the test on such restriction since the Court has
long settled that the time, place, and manner of speech may be
subject to Government regulation. Since the size of a poster involves
a time, place and manner regulation, then it may be the proper
subject of a government regulation.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Carpio
Justice Carpio concurred in the main decision, however, his
opinion was grounded on the fact that the notices, and the
administrative and statutory provisions on which these are based are
content-neutral regulations of general applicability repugnant to the
Free Speech Clause. He opined that it was apt to strike down not
only the COMELEC notices but also Section 6(c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, dated 15 January 2013 (Resolution 9615), the
regulatory basis for the COMELEC notices, and Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (RA 9006), the statutory basis for Resolution
9615, as content-neutral regulations may also fail the constitutionality
test if the incidental restriction on freedom is greater than is essential
to the furtherance of the preferred government interest.
Justice Perlas-Bernabe
Justice Perlas-Bernabe concurred with the decision, but
expressed disagreement that the restriction is a content-based one.
Like Justice Carpio, she opined that the restriction is a content-
neutral one and, thus, the proper test to be applied is whether a
substantial government interest is required for its validity.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
RULING:
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending
certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such
changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that
would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute
a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same
terms.
G.R. No. 221697
x-----------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
47 Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, pp. 15-16; COMELEC First Division Resolution
dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139
(DC), p. 2.
48 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 22.
Manila. The couple flew back to the U.S. two days after their wedding
to settle there.
PROCEEDINGS:
51 Contreras' petition is a petition for cancellation of Grace Poe's COC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code which states that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
by May 9, 2016. Contreras contended that the reckoning period for
computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from
July 18, 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the Bureau of Immigration.
ISSUES:
52The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was concurred in by
Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon. Presiding
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.
3. Whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made
in the certificate a false material representation; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC can decide the qualification
or lack thereof of petitioner as a presidential candidate
RULINGS:
COMELEC
SUPREME COURT
Issue on citizenship
Circumstantial Evidence
The petitioners physical attributes also prove that she has typical
Filipino features: as to her height, nasal bridge, eyes, shape of her
face, and color of her hair.
Legislation
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the
"Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
53Article 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of
the Philippines, which took effect on August 4, 1988.
Generally accepted principles of International Law
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
Issue on residence
The Court held that petitioner's claim that she will have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.
a. provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members; and
b. the provisions of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which
provides that the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.
The Court emphasized that while the said tribunals which have
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution, there is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
DISSENTING OPINION:
COMELEC Jurisdiction
On "Natural-Born Citizens"
Justice Carpio stressed that it was the intent of the framers of the
1935 Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as only those who
were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born to fathers who
were Filipino citizens -nothing more and nothing less. He reiterated
that, under the 1935 Constitution, only children whose fathers were
Filipino citizens were natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were
born of alien fathers and Filipino mothers were not considered
natural-born Filipino citizens, despite the fact that they had a blood
relation to a Filipino parent. Since a natural-born citizen is a citizen
by birth who need not perform any act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, then those born of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers and who had to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, an overt act to perfect citizenship, were not considered
natural-born Filipino citizens. Those whose parents are neither
Filipino citizens or are both unknown, such as in the case of
foundlings, cannot be considered natural born Filipino citizens.
Justice del Castillo contends that the Comelec did not gravely
abuse its discretion or exercise its judgment in a whimsical or
capricious manner as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the cancellation of and denying due course to petitioner's
2015 COC.
56 The oath of allegiance to the United States that naturalized Americans take states:
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore
been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the
law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when
required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when
required by the Jaw; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; so help me God.
57 409 Phil. 633 (2001).
According to him, what must not be overlooked is that there are
pieces of evidence showing that from May 24, 2005 to July 18, 2006
petitioner was an alien on temporary sojourn here. It should be
emphasized that after petitioner abandoned the Philippines as her
domicile and became a naturalized U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001,
the U.S. became her domicile of choice.
1. The review power of this Court relative to the present petitions filed
under Rule 64 vis-a-vis Rule 65 both of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is limited to the jurisdictional issue of whether or
not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
3. All the four petitions filed, inclusive of the Tatad Petition, subject of
the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC, adduced ultimate facts
establishing the cause of action for a petition based on Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC);
6. Petitioner Poe obtained dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
by misrepresenting in the Bureau of Immigration that she is the
biological child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that the
Bureau was misled into believing that "[petitioner Poe] was a former
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino
parents," which is a false factual averment not an erroneous legal
conclusion; and (it) the said order was not signed by the
Commissioner of the BI as required by Department of Justice (DOJ)
Regulation;
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
59 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2015/toc/january.php
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_206666
_2015.html, last visited: March 8, 2017
Comelec. Risos- Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that
former President Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office
because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. She
relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation
to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
While the case was pending before the Court, on May 13, 2013,
the elections were conducted as scheduled and former President
Estrada won the mayoralty race and he was proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
PROCEEDINGS:
The case involve (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April
1, 2013 and April 23, 2013, Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively, in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a
Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he
prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City
of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas (former President Estrada) disqualification to run
for and hold public office.
ISSUES:
RULINGS:
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
D) The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make
the pardon conditional.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Thus, I dissent."
61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/
2015/january2015/206666_mendoza.pdf, last visited: March 8, 2017
punitive aspect of criminal laws. As it turned out, no direct showing
suggests that the pardon was conditional.
For a condition to be operative, the condition must appear on
the face of the document. The conditions must be clear and specific.
The reason is that the conditions attached to a pardon should be
definite and specific as to inform the person pardoned of what would
be required.20 As no condition was patently evinced in the document,
the Court is at no liberty to shape one, only because the plain
meaning of the pardons text is unacceptable for some waylaid and
extraneous reasons. That the executive clemency given to Estrada
was unaccompanied by any condition is clearly visible in the text of
the pardon.
Justice Brion concur with the ponencia 's conclusion that the
pardon granted to respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada (or Erap for
brevity) by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (or PGMAfor brevity)
restored his rights to run for and hold public office and to vote.
62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence
/2015/january2015/206666_brion.pdf, last visited: March 8, 2017
He likewise agree with the ponencia that Erap's pardon
complied with the requirements under Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Specifically, Erap's pardon contained an
express restoration of his rights to vote and to hold public office and
an express remission of Erap's perpetual absolute disqualification
brought about by his conviction for plunder. These rights are
subsumed under the phrase "civil and political rights" that PGMA
expressly restored in Erap's pardon.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the
TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he
will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer
(STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his
control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English
class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and
based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher
did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class
started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a
student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said
class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was
in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state
that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the
OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their
examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was
ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction
was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because
of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students
with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot
be considered a class; Cudia could just have stated all that instead
of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
PROCEEDINGS:
Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and
Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary
restraining order (TRO).
ISSUES:
63CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of
the PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of
communication, and good life.
Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its
findings.
RULINGS:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is
whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution,
that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to
determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that
judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of
policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs
is not an absolute rule.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its
academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it has
the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings,
Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really
warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie
and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a
gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to
what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he
agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus,
while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable
and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
Constitutional Law
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are
merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The
reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the
investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. As held in Cario v. Commission on Human
Rights and a number of subsequent cases, the CHR is only a fact-
finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not
empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or
controversies.
September 16, 2014
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay,
arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay
for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. At 2:20 a.m. on
January 17, 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs64, about
80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the
incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
64 Declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle,
the global center of marine biodiversity.
65 U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift in a Press Statement on January 20, 2013
http://manila.usembassy.gov/pressphotoreleases2013/navy-commander-expresses-regret-
concerning-uss-guardian-grounding.html; and US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K.
Thomas, Jr. in a meeting with DFA officials on February 4, 2013.
66 "Joint Statement Between The Philippines And The United States On The USS Guardian
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine
respondents."
PROCEEDINGS:
The Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental
laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military
ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
RULINGS:
The Supreme Court Denied the Petition for the issuance of the
privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also agreed with the Respondents that the Petition
has become moot because the salvage operation sought to be
enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished.
No, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the
issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners
claim, the US government could not be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit. Further, the US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who have
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since
the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require
remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus,
the principle of State Immunity in correlation with the principle of
States as sovereign equals par in parem non habet non imperium
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.
The Court fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. The Court said that they expect the
US to bear international responsibility under Article 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time
ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a
Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the
global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS.
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE:
Locus standi
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question." It is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result"
of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a
generalized grievance." The rule on standing is a procedural matter
which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. The liberalization of standing first
enunciated in Oposa vs Factoran68, insofar as it refers to minors and
68JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows
the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature."
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO,
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993.
CONCURRING OPINIONS:
69 Supra.
the parties to bring suit can readily be seen through the allegations
made in their petition.
1. Is the act of the foreign national or entity an act jure imperii, such
that it can be considered an act of state entitled to immunity, or an act
jure gestionis, in which case it is to be considered a private act?
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the Executive Department
committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.
RULING:
The Court held that the Executive Department did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in not espousing the claims of the
petitioners.
The Court also held that the State is not under any international
obligation to espouse the petitioners claim. The individual must be
able to convince the government as for the reason to bring an action
where the latter would assert the right involved on behalf of the
former against another state. In such instance, the right invoked is no
longer that of the individual, but that of the State. The Internal Court
of Justice stated in the Barcelona Traction:
The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by
international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is
acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if
means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to
protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to
demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with
corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.71
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
RULINGS:
I. The Court said that, the reason why those who challenge the validity
of a law or an international agreement are required to allege the
existence of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. 73 But aside from general
statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right,
and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, they
fail to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. The Petitioners failed
to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would
be violative by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so,
the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens'
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements.
73 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, supra note 114, at 265; Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra
note 93, at 893
74 Bayan v. Zamora, supra note 23.
III. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In
a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an
institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates
constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of
the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to
maintain the suit.
IV. Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of
transcendental importance 75 which justify setting aside the rule on
procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the
very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which
provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of
paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine
whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Department.
.
The Supreme Court said that EDCA is not a treaty by an
Executive Agreement and which does not the concurance of the
Senate. An agreement base on the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States of America and the Philippines.
75 Petition of Saguisag et al., pp. 21-22, rol/o (G.R. No. 212426, Vol. I), pp. 23-24; Memorandum
of Saguisag et al., pp. 15-17, rollo (G.R. No. 212426, Vol. II), pp. 985-987; Petition ofBayan et al.,
pp. 6, rollo (G.R. No. 212444, Vol. I), pp. 8; Memorandum ofBayan et al., pp. 19, 23, rollo (G.R.
No. 212444, Vol. I), pp. 583, 587
76 Frinston Lim, Authorities believe Abu Sayyaf behind abduction of Filipina, 3 foreigners, 22
DISSENTING OPINION:
77 Joel Locsin, NDRRMC: Yolada death toll hits 6,300 mark nearly 6 months after typhoon, 17
April 2014, GMA NEWS ONLINE
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/357322/news/nation/ndrrmc-yolanda-death-toll-hits-6-
300-mark-nearly-6-months-after-typhoon> (last accessed 3 December 2015).
78 Typhoon Yolanda, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, available at <http://www.gov.ph/crisis-
response/updates-typhoon-yolanda/> (last visited 3 December 2015).
July 5, 2011
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
The Court DENIED the petition of HLI and AFFIRMED the PARC
resolution placing the lands subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory
coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, with
the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs were
given the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. It also excluded
from the mandatory CARP coverage that part of Hacienda Luisita that
had been acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional
issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain.
The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered
not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has
been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other
grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions
originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously
belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance
by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its
revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC
acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the
SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched
and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory
provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved
without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et
al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the
alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.
NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its discretion in revoking
the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory
acquisition and distribution scheme.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA
ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R.
BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The Petitioners argued that even though the statute or the Act
is the governments platform in battling illegal cybercrime activities,
there were 21 sections of the Act violate the constitutional rights,
particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
informations.
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUES:
I. That there were insertions of certain provision that were neither in
the house bill and Senate bill
II. Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one
degree higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.
RULINGS:
I. The Cybercrime Prevention Act went through both house and they
approved it. Any issue concerning the alleged non-compliance with
the governing rules of both houses regarding the committee
insertions have to be internallu resolve by each houses. Separation of
Powers
II. The Law merely makes the commission of the existing crimes
through the internet a qualifying circumstance that raises by one
degree of the penalties corresponding so such crime. Compared to
traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse and its crosses
national boundaries, enjoys the advantage of anonymity. That
Congress may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of
offences as it sees fit.
III. As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not
protected by the Constitution.79 Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those
forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection
and are considered outside the realm of protected freedom. As
explained by the US Supreme Court in Champlinsky v. New
Hampsire:80 It is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. The resort to
personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitutions.
The Court denies with finality all the petitions for reconsideration.
79 Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 41 (1912), cited in Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Rex Book Store, Manila, 2003.
80 9 315 U.S. 568 (1942), cited in Gorospe, R. Constitutional Law: Notes and Readings on the Bill
of Rights, Citizenship and Suffrage, Vol. I, Rex Book Store, Manila, 2006, p. 672.
April 8, 2014
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.
They also insisted that the RH Law is not violative of the one-
subject-one-title rule in the Constitution. It is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood"
and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they were separate.
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
8. Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Court also lifted Status Quo Ante Order It issued on March
19, 2013 as extended by Its Order, dated July 16, 2013, insofar as
the provisions of the RH law, which had been declared as
constitutional.
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
I. Procedural issues
Yes. Most of the petitions were praying for injunctive reliefs, not
declaratory reliefs, and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact,
the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that
refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its
very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions
such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and
post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna
Carta for Women."
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on
this matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life
begins at fertilization.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;
and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness
it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law
to prevail.
No, the provisions of RA 4729 are still in place and the status
quo on the sale of contraceptives is maintained and the Court
believes that there are adequate measures that ensure that the public
has access to contraceptives that have been determined safe
following testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should
ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers
to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the
"Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part
of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the
applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist
abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, RA No. 4729 or the
Contraceptive Act, RA No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and RA No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna
Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery
of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.
No, the Law did not violate equal protection clause and due
process.
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against
the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles and definition of terms of the law.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications
and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods"
are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical procedures.
No, the Court found nothing wrong with the delegation. The
FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the
only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services
and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
Under RA 3720, the FDA, being the primary and sole premiere
and only agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, has the power and competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods.
No, the RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Under paragraph (c) of Section 17, unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGUs. Not only that, but LGUs
are merely encouraged and not compelled to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory.
DISSENTING OPINION:
He further opined that RA No. 10354 protects the ovum upon its
fertilization (without actually saying that life begins here). The issue
then, of whether life begins during fertilization or when the ovum
plants itself on the uterus wall, is covered as this protects at both
stages.
Although the law does not provide a definition of conception, it
has provisions that embody the policy of the state to protect the travel
of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The law states that it will
provide means which do not prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum
as determined by the Food and Drug Administration.
Justice Brion conveyed that the petitions are ripe for judicial
review. The petitions allege actions by the legislature and by the
executive that lie outside the contemplation of the Constitution. A
controversy exists appropriate for this Court's initial consideration of
the presence of grave abuse of discretion: and consequent
adjudication if the legislative and executive actions can be so
characterized.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The TPO was granted but the Petitioner (Garcia) failed to fulfill
and comply with the requirements and the court issued multiple
modified TPO and extensions and the petitioner failed to answer and
provide comment.
PROCEEDINGS:
ISSUES:
RULINGS:
81SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxxx
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse
such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and
freedom movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.
said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several
key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
II. The RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union82, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that
it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not
violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
III. The RA 9262 is not violative of the due process since the essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity that was given to the
petitioners to be heard and submit his defense.