3.

Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

Republic of the Philippines

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195534

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,
- versus -
SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

EDUARDO GONZALES,
June 13, 2012
Appellant.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review the judgment of conviction for murder of Eduardo Gonzales (appellant) in the decision dated July 28,
2010 of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03840. The CA affirmed the decision[2] dated
January 5, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case
No. 2814 whose decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused EDUARDO GONZALES,
having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his act was justified, GUILTY of the
crime of Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused
Eduardo Gonzales is directed to pay the heirs of the victim Eligio Donato the sum of P20,000.00
as actual damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[3] (italics
ours)

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3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

The Facts

The appellant and his brother, co-accused Edmundo Gonzales,[4] were charged with murder under a criminal
information which alleged conspiracy, evident premeditation and treachery in the killing of Eligio Donato (victim).

The records[5] show that the victim went to the house of the appellant at the invitation of Edmundo. When the
victim arrived, he was met by the appellant who was armed with a .22 caliber firearm. The appellant and
Edmundo immediately fired at the victim six (6) times, hitting him three (3) times - in the arm, in his left thigh and
in his left chest.[6] The victim expired before he could receive medical treatment.

The appellant denied the charge and claimed that he had acted in self-defense. He narrated that he was at his
house watching television when the victim suddenly arrived, armed with a short firearm. The victim shouted
invectives at the appellant and threatened to kill him. When efforts by the appellant to pacify the victim proved to
be futile, the appellant retrieved his own firearm inside his house. A struggle for the possession of the appellants
firearm then ensued between the appellant and the victim which caused the appellants gun to discharge three
times; thus, hitting the victim.

The RTC found the prosecutions version more consistent with the physical findings that the victim was not shot
at close range, in the absence of powder burns on his skin.[7] The RTC rejected the appellants self-defense
theory in the absence of evidence of unlawful aggression. The RTC ruled that the appellant was guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, given the manner and the means employed in attacking the
unsuspecting victim, leaving him no time or opportunity to resist.[8]

In due course, the appellant appealed his judgment of conviction with the CA, contending that the RTC committed
reversible errors in the appreciation of the evidence, namely: (1) in giving weight and credence to the highly
inconsistent and questionable testimony of the prosecution eyewitness; (2) in disregarding the justifying
circumstance of self-defense; and (3) in finding that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation attended the killing.

The CA rejected the appellants arguments and affirmed the RTCs decision holding that the prosecution
eyewitness account of the shooting was straightforward, categorical and without any established ill-motive. The
CA also held that the eyewitness testimony was compatible with the physical evidence showing that the
appellant, not the victim, started the attack. The CA agreed with the RTC that the killing was qualified by treachery
since the attack was executed in a manner that rendered the victim defenseless and unable to retaliate. [9] The
CA did not rule on whether evident premeditation was present in the victims killing.

The Issue

On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Courts Ruling

We find no reversible error in the CAs decision and affirm the appellants conviction for murder.

The Claim of Self-Defense

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, implies the
admission by the accused that he committed the acts which would have been criminal in character had it not
been for the presence of circumstances whose legal consequences negate the commission of a crime. By
invoking self-defense in this case, the appellant admitted that he shot the victim. With this admission, the burden
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3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

of evidence shifted to the appellant to prove that he acted in accordance with the law. The appellant, in this
regard, must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to relieve him of any criminal liability:

First, unlawful aggression;

We find that the appellant failed to discharge this burden.

(a) Unlawful aggression

The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense.[10] In other words, no
self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent
or repel.[11] In People v. Dolorido,[12] we held that unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected
or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The unlawful aggression may constitute an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury upon the accused.[13] In case of a threat, it must be
offensive and strong, positively showing the x x x intent to cause injury.[14]

In this case, the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is patently absent. The records fail to
disclose any circumstance showing that the appellants life was in danger when he met the victim. What the
evidence shows is that the victim was unarmed when he went to the house of the appellant. Likewise, there was
also no evidence proving the gravity of the utterances and the actuations allegedly made by the victim that would
have indicated his wrongful intent to injure the appellant.

We note that the appellants claim of self-defense was even disproved by the narration of his own witness, Teofilo
Posadas, who came into the scene to witness the ongoing attack by the appellant on the victim. As Posadas
testified:

Q Mr. Witness, how did you know Mr. Witness that it was Eligio Donato shouting at Eduardo
Gonzales Anggapo lay Balam [You have no more bullet]?
A When Eduardo fired his gun in the air twice, maam.

Q Which came first Mr. Witness, Eduardo Gonzales firing his gun in the air twice or Eligio Donato
shouting at Eduardo Gonzales Anggapo lay Balam?
A The firing in the air, maam.

xxxx

Q By the way Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while ago that Eduardo Gonzales fired his gun in the
air twice, did you notice what kind of gun did (sic) Eduardo Gonzales used [in] firing two
gunshot or two shots in the air?
A [.]22 caliber long barrel, maam.

Q And how did you know that Eduardo Gonzales fired a [.]22 caliber gun or a long barrel gun?
A I saw that gun before while he was using it in targeting fish and birds, maam.

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3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

Q So Mr. Witness did Eligio Donato and Eduardo Gonzales get near each other?
A Yes, maam.

Q What did they do when they got close [to] each other, Mr. Witness?
A They scuffled over the possession of the gun, maam.

xxxx

Q When they were scuffling over the possession of the gun, what happened Mr. Witness?
A The gun fired, maam.
xxxx

Q How many gun burst did you hear Mr. Witness?

Q After you heard two (2) or more gun burst Mr. Witness, what happened to Eligio [Donato], if
any?
A He fell down, maam.[15]

The testimony of Posadas reveals that: first, the appellant who was armed met the victim; second, while at a
distance, the appellant fired twice at the victims direction; and third, the appellant fired at the victim when the
latter tried to take away his firearm.

Posadas testimony, taken together with the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Eduardo Rodriguez,[16] provides
a clear picture on how the unlawful aggression was initiated by the appellant, not by the victim. The unlawful
aggression started when the appellant immediately fired at the victim as the latter alighted from a tricycle and
continued when the appellant fired at the victim six (6) times. The assault ended when the appellant fired at the
victim when the latter tried to take away his firearm.

More importantly, Posadas testimony was even corroborated by the physical evidence that should clearly defeat
the claim of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, in that: first, it was only the victim who was wounded
in the assault; and second, the physical evidence showed that the victim had three (3) gunshot wounds thereby
indicating that he had already been shot by the appellant when he tried to gain possession of the appellants
firearm.

(b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the victims attack

The second requisite of self-defense could not have been present in the absence of any unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. However, even granting that it was the unarmed victim who first acted as the aggressor,
we find that the means employed by the appellant in repelling the attack - the use of a firearm, the number of
times he fired at the victim and the number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim - were not reasonably
necessary. On the contrary, we find that the number of gunshot wounds reveals a clear intent to kill, not merely
to repel the attack of the unarmed victim.

(c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant

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3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

The records disclose that the struggle between the victim and the appellant occurred after the appellant fired at
the victim. In other words, the third requisite was not established given the sufficient provocation by the appellant
in placing the victims life in actual danger. Thus, any aggression made by the victim cannot be considered
unlawful as it was made as an act of self-preservation to defend his life.

In addition to the above considerations, the appellants claim of self-defense was also belied by his own conduct
after the shooting. The records show that the appellant went into hiding after he was criminally charged. [17] He
also stayed in hiding for four (4) years and could have continued doing so had it not been for his arrest. [18] Self-
defense loses its credibility given the appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities
about the incident.[19]

Credible Eyewitness Testimony

As the appellant failed to prove that he had acted in self-defense, he effectively admitted to the unlawful shooting
and the unlawful killing of the victim. Accordingly, we no longer need to examine the issue relating to the
credibility of the prosecution witness testimony. We reiterate, however, that the findings of the trial court on
matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies will not be disturbed on appeal unless
some weight and serious facts or circumstances have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so
as to materially affect the disposition of the case.[20] Under the circumstances, we find no compelling reason to
deviate from this rule.

The Nature of the Killing

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that [a]ny person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty ofmurder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua,
to death if committed with x x x treachery. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the crime committed was murder,
taking into account the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The CA held:

As established on record and as found by the trial court, the victim lost that opportunity to
defend himself because of x x x appellants unexpected attack. [The victim], who was
then unarmed, was alighting a tricycle when x x x appellant suddenly shot him.
Such swiftness of the attack even made it physically impossible for [the victim] to run for
his safety. Clearly, the killing of [the victim] was attended by treachery which qualifies the crime
to murder.[21] (emphases supplied)

We agree with the CAs findings. There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[22] The two elements that must be proven to establish treachery are: (a) the employment of means of
execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving
the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.[23] The two elements are present in this case.

The first element was established by the prosecution eyewitness testimony showing the sudden attack by the
appellant on the unsuspecting victim who had just alighted from a tricycle. The victim was then unarmed and
had no opportunity to defend himself.
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3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

The second element was established by the prosecution eyewitness testimony showing that the appellant
deliberately and consciously adopted a pre-conceived plan on how to kill the victim. The evidence showed that
the unsuspecting victim was first lured in going to the house of the appellant by Edmundo. The appellant who
was armed waited for the arrival of the victim. Afterwards, the appellant immediately fired at the victim.

The Penalty and the Civil Liability

The CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances established.[24] We find that the prosecution failed to establish that the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation was present in the case. The prosecution failed to prove the concurrence of the following
requisites to establish evident premeditation: (1) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. The prosecution failed to prove how and when the plan to kill the victim was planned and determined.[25]

With respect to damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, they being consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[26] In People of the
Philippines v. David Maningding,[27] we ruled that when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts should be P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P 50,000.00 as moral damages.

However, we modify the CAs decision on the other awards of damages.

In accordance with current jurisprudence, we delete the award of P20,000 as actual damages and, in its stead,
award P30,000.00 as temperate damages.[28] We also award the heirs of the victim compensatory damages for
the loss of the victims earning capacity, there being testimonial and documentary evidence on record to support
the award.[29] The wife of the victim testified that the victim was 36 years old and was a soldier receiving a monthly
salary of more than P9,000.00. The victims pay slip was also presented, showing his earnings of P9,576.00 a
month.[30] The award of compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity is computed using the following
formula:

Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income -living expenses (50% of
gross annual income) [31]

Under this formula, we award to the heirs of the victim the amount of P1,685,184.48 as compensatory damages
for the victims loss of earning capacity, calculated as follows:

x = 2(80-36) x [P 114,912.00 57,456.00]

= 29.33 x P 57,456.00

= P 1,685,184.48

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3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a) Justifying circumstances (Article 11) Self Defense / unlawful aggression

Finally, we also award P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, since
the killing was attended by treachery.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision
dated July 28, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03840. Appellant Eduardo Gonzales is
found guilty of murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of Eligio Donato the following sums:

1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2) P1,685,184.48 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;

3) P30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;

4) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

5) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)