Nicholas Smith - The Philosophy of Socrates (1999) (A) PDF
Nicholas Smith - The Philosophy of Socrates (1999) (A) PDF
Nicholas Smith - The Philosophy of Socrates (1999) (A) PDF
FORTHCOMING
Aristotle, Alan D, Code
Maimonides and Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Daniel Frank
Late Medieval Philosophy, Calvin G. Normore
The Philosophy of Late Antiquity, John Bussanich
Plato, Richard Kraut
The Beginnings of Greek Philosophy,
Allan ], Silverman and Mark Griffith
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCRATES
THOMAS C. B R I C K H O U S E
Lynchburg College
NICHOLAS D. SMITH
Lewis and Clark College
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Published in 2000 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue,
Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hid's
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The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Stan-
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction 1
1.1 Our Purpose, 1
1.2 Interpretive Principles, 3
1.3 Identifying and Solving Scholarly Problems, 6
1.4 Translations and Citations of Passages, 10
v
vi Contents
Glossary 267
References 271
Names Index 277
Subject Index 280
Index of Greek Terms 287
Index of Passages 288
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Preface
IX
x Preface
Thomas C. Brickhouse
Nicholas D. Smith
The Philosophy of Socrates
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Introduction
1
2 Introduction
War II, has been written primarily by specialists for specialists. Those
who are first approaching the study of Socratic philosophy are likely to
derive little from reading these works. In undertaking to write this book,
then, we are trying to provide a comprehensive discussion of Socratic
philosophy that reflects the current state of Socratic scholarship in a way
that will be helpful to someone who is confronting Socrates seriously, per-
haps for the first time. In doing so, we are not trying to "water down"
anything. On the contrary, we want our readers to get a good sense of just
how deeply Socrates' thought penetrated the host of philosophical issues
with which he concerned himself,
As we shall see, the study of Socratic philosophy is, in a sense, the
study of a variety of fascinating puzzles. For one thing, Socrates himself,
at least as he is characterized in the early dialogues, quite intentionally
tried to show people just how puzzling some of the moral notions we
take for granted can be. But in writing about Socrates, Plato sometimes
created puzzles of his own, perhaps because he was trying to capture the
spirit of his friend Socrates, perhaps because he was trying to create a
state of perplexity and wonderment in the reader, perhaps because he
himself was not sure what to say about the topic at hand, or perhaps be-
cause of all of these things. In any case, to understand Socratic philoso-
phy, we need to resolve a host of problem areas. During the course of this
book, we offer our own solutions to these problems, solutions that we
hope will also give our readers some substantial assistance in under-
standing aspects of Socratic philosophy that might seem very obscure.
Our focus is on helping the reader identify what the problem areas are
and on explaining what the interpretive options are for dealing with
them. Our goal in this respect is to assist our readers in finding their way
through what would otherwise seem like a bewildering variety of con-
flicting interpretations that different scholars have proposed. No doubt,
sometimes our readers will come to the conclusion that the various solu-
tions offered by scholars are the result of a misunderstanding of the text
under consideration. But if the readers' experience is like ours, they will
see that carefully wrought scholarly interpretations and arguments can
sometimes be mistaken in ways that shed important new light on what is-
sues are at stake, on how certain assumptions lead one into interpretive
and philosophical errors.
Perhaps the most important result that conies from, seriously consider-
ing different interpretations is that they so often help the student of So-
cratic philosophy better appreciate both the complexity of the philosoph-
ical problems that Socrates addressed and the subtlety and philosophical
sophistication of his responses. Of course, we often disagree with other
scholars' interpretations of Socratic philosophy. But we have more often
found that in considering the views of others, we have learned some-
Introduction 3
L2 Interpretive Principles
As we noted above, an understanding of Socratic philosophy requires
working through the interpretations of writings about Socrates that have
come down to us from antiquity. They are all writings that are about a
character called Socrates. The evidence we have to work with, even the
evidence provided by a single source such as Plato, is often seemingly
conflicting and confusing. In trying to reach a sound interpretation, we
must attend to different sorts of concerns and must often make judgments
about which criteria and principles of scholarly adequacy must be ap-
plied. There are no "mechanical" or automatic formulas for us to apply.
This does not mean, however, that formulating the interpretation is
purely "creative" or "just a matter of opinion"a kind of intellectual
"free-for-all" in which any interpretation is as good as any other interpre-
tation. After all, our goal as readers of these texts is to understand
Socrates better and what he believed and why. Unless we think that
everyone understands a text equally well, which is absurd, we must say
that some interpretations are better than others.
This consideration leads to what might be regarded as an obvious crite-
rion of interpretive adequacy, which we might call the Principle of Interpre-
tive Cogency:
Principle of Interpretive Cogency; No interpretation that is itself too
difficult to understand or to interpret can be adequate,
There may be some differences of opinion over what will count as "too
difficult to understand or to interpret," but it is safe to say that any degree
of difficulty in the cogency or comprehensibility of an interpretation
counts against its success,
But let us not forget, either, that interpretations are supposed to be in-
terpretations of something, and if the connection of the interpretation to
the original text is not clear, even if the interpretation is itself clear
enough, then the interpretation cannot be counted as a success. We might
call this the Principle of Interpretive Plausibility.
tually anticipated some later conceptual developments and that this had
not been noticed before because no one had offered a sufficiently intelli-
gent interpretation of the relevant texts. However, the more conceptual
"distance" we find between other Socratic or Platonic views and the one
that appears to be guilty of anachronism., the more suspicious we may
reasonably be about the apparently anachronistic one. On the other hand,
it would not always be unreasonable to speculate about how Socrates or
Plato might have thought about some issue, given how that issue relates
to some other views they obviously did have, especially where what they
would have thought, had they possessed the relevant information, fol-
lows from a view we are confident they did hold. Thus, although it is silly
to speculate about what Socrates actually thought regarding whether one
has a moral right to disobey the rulings of a circuit court bul not to dis-
obey a court of appeals (for that distinction between types of courts was
unknown to him), it may be possible and, indeed, quite interesting, to
consider whether something Socrates did believe would entail a view
about whether disobedience of one court but not the other is morally per-
missible.
However, the more evidence we can gather for the contemporary (con-
temporary, that is, to Socrates or Plato) significance and general accep-
tance of some concept or historical fact, the more we can feel confident in
applying an interpretation to something we find in the text that makes
use of or reference to this concept or historical fact. This is what is called
"contextualizing" interpretation, because it insists on fitting Socrates or
Plato, or both, into their historical and cultural contexts:
Principle of Contextual Coherence: The better a given interpretation fits
the relevant texts to their historical contexts, the more plausible the
interpretation is, all other things being equal,
Just as we found with the Prohibition of Anachronism, and for the same
reasons, the appeal to contextual coherence can also be tricky to apply, for
Socrates and Plato were great innovators, and because they were, they
were able to transcend their historical contexts and the conceptions and
ways of thinking of their contemporaries.
Another principleone mat is often very controversial both in its con-
ception and in its applicationhas been called the Principle of Charity:
The Principle of Charity: Other things being equal, the interpretation that
provides a more interesting or more plausible view is preferable,
It does not necessarily follow that the relevant positions have to be true
for this principle to be satisfied. But it must not be the case that the posi-
tions are understood in a way that makes them silly or so implausible as
to be unworthv of serious consideration. Of course, there are several
6 Introduction
such a case, one might undertake to survey the interpretive options, to ex-
amine the possible meanings, and eventually to offer an interpretation
that purports to provide the kind of understanding of the text or passage
that was not immediately obvious. The same can be said where one finds
a significant lack of understanding of a given, text or passage prevalent in
what others have written about the troublesome passage.
But other ways in which, problem areas can be identified derive directly
from the employment of the principles of adequate interpretation, such as
those articulated in the last section. Consider, for example, the Principle of
Textual Fidelity, which holds that interpretations may not be contradicted
by relevant texts. Sometimes one finds instances in which the relevant
texts seem themselves to contain contradictions, for example, where
Socrates in one passage seems to commit himself to a certain position on a
given topic and in another relevant text or passage seems to hold a con-
flicting position. Many of the most famous problems of interpretation
come from apparent conflicts of this sort, and we will have several oppor-
tunities to introduce readers to such problems in this book. In such cases,
the texts themselves seem to require interpretation in a way that would
violate the Principle, of Textual Fidelity, but the puzzle can be resolved by an
appeal to one or more other interpretive principles.
When conflicting texts are identified, one has several options. One
strategy often used is to attempt to nullify the problem by eliminating one
of the apparently conflicting texts from consideration. There are several
ways of doing this. One might disqualify the text as one that does not
count as relevant within the texts or passages to be considered. As we ar-
gue in Chapter 1, not all of Plato's dialogues should be counted as rele-
vant to the study of Socratic philosophyonly the "early" dialogues are
relevant. Perhaps one of the apparently contradictory texts should be re-
considered as not belonging to this "early" group. Alternatively, one
might argue for some more subtle understanding of one of the apparently
conflicting texts, according to which the appearance of contradiction is re-
moved. This is why we have been discussing these sorts of cases as ones
where the texts seem to conflict or as cases of apparent conflict'scholars
often eliminate the appearance of conflict by explaining how there is no
real conflict, once the texts are more carefully interpreted. Of course, the
more liberal one is in eliminating the appearance of conflict, the more
likely it is that one will face the charge of violating the Principle of Interpre-
tive Plausibility. In other words, one will be seen to be offering an interpre-
tation that removes the appearance of conflict only at the cost of failing to
provide what looks like a relevant or plausible interpretation of one (or
both) of the problem texts. None the less, often a plausible case can be
made for some understanding of the text (perhaps deriving from some
unanticipated application of the Principle of Contextual Coherence) that
8 Introduction
H
12 A Survey of Our Evidence
value of such study and learning is considerable. But our readers should
never forget that our opinions, and all other scholars' opinions, are only
as good as the evidence that supports them. However entertaining or in-
trinsically interesting a scholar's opinions might be, if the other grades of
evidence do not support the scholar's opinions, they are simply worth-
less, as regards the historical facts. We have tried to do our best, in this
book, to avoid writing such worthless opinions about Socrates and his
philosophy, but we leave it to our readers to decide how far we have suc-
ceeded in avoiding such worthlessness!
fluential in Athens. But just how much money his family had is difficult
to say. In one rather famous passage, Plato suggests that Socrates' mother
was a midwife (Theaetetus 149a). If so, the fact that she had any occupa-
tion at all tells us that the family was not well to do, for in the Athens of
Socrates' day only relatively poor women would have worked outside
the home.5 All others were virtually confined to the home, where they
were expected to manage the household and to have children. Unfortu-
nately, Plato's remark about Phaenarete's occupation is not confirmed by
any other of our sources, and the context in which it is made suggests that
Plato may not have intended the remark to be taken seriously.
We have even less reason to trust the story that Sophroniscus, Socrates'
father, was a stonecutter, or perhaps even a sculptor. Of course, if Sophro-
niscus did have skill in working with stone, he would have commanded a
reasonably good income in the years following the end of the Persian
War, for the great building projects that ensued must have created
tremendous demand for skilled stoneworkers. But the claim that Sophro-
niscus was a stoneworker does not come from any of our earliest sources,
and their silence on this point makes it impossible to say with any confi-
dence how Sophroniscus earned a living or even if he needed to work for
a living. We might think that we can infer that Sophroniscus was a sculp-
tor from the fact that two writers claimed that a group of statues near the
Acropolis were actually made by Socrates himself. Since it is reasonable
to assume that Socrates did leant his father's trade, for that is the sort of
occupational instruction most male children in Athens received, it would
follow that Sophroniscus was in all likelihood a sculptor, too. Unfortu-
nately, the authors of these reports lived hundreds of years after Socrates'
death,6 and although they may have sincerely believed what they were
told about the creator of the statutes they were shown in Athens, we have
no very strong reason to accept what they wrote on this point.
Our principal sources are also silent about Socrates' youth, though we
can form a fairly dear, if general, idea of what it was like on the basis of
wrhat we know about the history and sociology of the Athens of Socrates'
youth, Socrates' childhood was spared the hardships of war. He was
born some ten years after the end of the Persian War and was in his for-
ties when the Peloponnesian War, the war between Athens and Sparta
and their various allies, broke out. There is no reason to think that the
early education of Socrates was in any way exceptional. No doubl, his
mother and other women who may have been living in the household
told him the familiar folktales and stories about the gods and Homeric
heroes. How much or what kinds of instruction otitside the home
Socrates received is more difficult to say, for there was no publicly sup-
ported education in Socrates' Athens. However, most Athenians, even
those with relatively meager incomes, did arrange for some kind of
18 A Survey of Our Evidence
schooling for their male children, and instruction from a professional tu-
tor was neither difficult to obtain nor expensive. There is little reason to
doubt Plato's suggestion (Crito 50d-e) that Socrates' father saw to it that
Socrates was educated in "music and gymnastics," as were most Athe-
nian boys. Included, in an education in music were such things as ele-
mentary grammar, reading, arithmetic, and elementary musical theory.
"Gymnastic education" included not only the exercises that we usually
associate with that term but also wrestling, boxing, running, and hurling
the javelin.7 It is also Ekely that Socrates was instructed by his father and
any older male relatives in civic institutions and the duties of citizenship.
Finally, as discussed earlier, before Socrates passed from boyhood to
manhood, he would probably have been given instruction by his father
in his father's craft or trade.
Bui: as profound as these changes were, none could have affected the
young Socrates more than the emergence of the practice of calling into
question the moral values that Athenians had accepted for so long. The
Athenians of Socrates' day assumed, just as their ancestors had assumed,
that the best life one could have required the acquisition of what was
called virtue, or excellence (arete). Excellence was not a terribly compli-
cated notion. To have arete, one had to excel in devotion to one's family,
city, and the city's gods. A truly good person succeeded in doing great
things for the city, strictly obeyed its laws, honored parents and ancestors,
scrupulously paid homage to the gods by strictly obeying the conven-
tions governing prayer and sacrifice. The good person never doubted that
the gods were the superiors of mortals in intelligence and strength. Even
many of nature's most powerful forces were bounded by the will of the
gods, 'These were values one did not need schooling to acquire. Every fa-
ther was deemed to be responsible for teaching them to his children, and
every citizen was responsible for seeing that the law punished those who
violated this understanding of the requirements of morality.
However, by the middle part of the fifth century B.C., as Socrates was
entering manhood, Athens and the rest of the Greek world witnessed the
emergence of a new breed of teachers, the Sophists. Our knowledge of
these professional teachers is not all that we would like it to be, for much
of the information we have about the Sophists conies from Plato, who
made little attempt to disguise his contempt for sophistic education and
some of the most prominent and influential Sophists of Socrates' day. For-
tunately, a number of excellent recent studies of the Sophists, relying on
various other sources, have helped to lessen our need to rely so heavily
on Plato.8 In any case, it seems clear that the Sophists, some of whom
traveled from city to city, lectured about a variety of subjects, some quite
esoteric and specialized. They often charged substantial fees, and conse-
quently, only the sons of Athens's wealthier families were able to attend
their lectures. Some of the Sophists, apparent!}/, acquired great reputa-
tions for their wisdom and, as a result, amassed enormous personal
wealth,
We may divide the Sophists into two broad groups. Some, men like
Anaxagoras, were sometimes referred to as "nature-philosophers." They
typically professed theories about such fundamental questions about na-
ture as "Is there a basic substance out of which everything else is com-
posed?" "Why does change in, nature occur?" or "What is the shape of the
universe?" Many of their views strike us today as little more than crude
speculation. But insofar as they sought naturalistic explanations for nat-
ural phenomena, they undermined the traditional explanations of natural
change in terms of what the gods ordained. Because they questioned the
traditional role of the gods as the governors of the universe, the nature-
20 A Survey of Our Evidence
end of the Persian threat to Greece, Athens took the position of leadership
in a confederacy of cities and islands, perhaps as many as two hundred at
one point.11 The Delian League, as it was initially called, was originally
formed to provide for its members' mutual protection in the event of a re-
newed Persian threat to the region. At its inception, all of the members
were equal. But because Athens's large and powerful navy was left intact
when the Persians retreated and because there was no other member to
rival Athens's military power or prestige, the Athenians gradually as-
sumed control of the Delian League, which meant that economic and mil-
itary policies that governed members tended to favor Athens. In time,
members were forced to pay what amounted to a tax to Athens, ostensi-
bly to pay for protection from any future Persian threat, but in reality the
money collected went to support Athens's increasingly expensive ap-
petite for civic adornments and military domination. Eventually, Athens
moved the treasury of the Delian League from the island of Delos to
Athens for "safekeeping."
Once it became clear that the Delian League really existed only to
serve the economic and military interests of Athens, some member is-
lands tried to leave it. To block such attempts and perhaps to keep oth-
ers from getting similar ideas about leaving the league, Athens put
down these revolts with the full force of its navy. If the case of Samos
was typical,12 those who challenged Athenian dominance were reduced
to being mere subjects of Athens, The decision of Pericles and his demo-
cratic allies in the Assembly to glorify the city of Athens at the expense
of its formerly trusting allies fully demonstrated the truth that power
corrupts.
According to the historian Thucydides, Sparta did not really recognize
the full extent of Athenian political and military ambitions until it wit-
nessed Athens's willingness to use its power to crush any opposition to
its wishes.
TT..1 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesuin War 1.118.2:
It was in these times [the period after the end of the Persian War] that the
Athenians established their more unyielding rule and they advanced their
power to greatness. But when the Spartans saw this, they did not thwart it,
except for a short time, but instead they remained undisturbed most of the
time, since they did not quickly go to war unless they were forced to and
they were bringing an end to their own internal wars. But before long the
power of the Athenians was clearly on the rise, and they were choking their
allies. Then when, the situation was no longer tolerable, they made war on
the exalted Athenians, but attempting it in the most zealous way with the
most destructive force which they were able to assemble.
A Survey of Our Evidence 23
As a result in 431 B.C. the two great Hellenic powers, Athens and Sparta,
began a death struggle that continued off and on until 405 B.C. When the
fighting finally stopped, Athens had been thoroughly defeated. In the end,
Athens's treasury had been exhausted and. its navy, which had been the
source of the city's military power, had been all but destroyed. The judg-
ment of history has not been kind to Athens during this period, for its ruth-
less imperialistic practices and voracious appetite for wealth led to the
most egregious excesses. But whether Socrates would have agreed that his
city's cause was unjust is difficult to say. Aristophanes sometimes jokes that
Socrates may have been sympathetic to the Spartans, and Xenophon con-
sistently represents him as hostile to certain features of Athenian democ-
racy.13 However, there is no reason to doubt Plato's claims that Socrates re-
mained in the city and fought, probably in the ranks of the hoptite class,14
on behalf of the city. In fact, Plato reports that Socrates took part in three
major campaignsPotidaea (in 432 B.C.), Delium (in 424 B.C.), and Am-
phipolis (in 422 B.C.) and that he distinguished himself for his endurance in
the face of great hardship in the first and for his great courage in the sec-
ond. Even if Plato exaggerated Socrates' fierce courage on the battlefield
and phenomenal ability to endure hardship, it is unlikely that Plato would
have so conspicuously mentioned Socrates' presence in these campaigns
had Socrates not actually been there and fought bravely.
Socrates' role in one of the most wrenching episodes in Athenian his-
tory, however, in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, is more contro-
versial. When Athens surrendered to Sparta, the Athenians were offered a
remarkably generous peace accord, according to which Athens would con-
tinue to have political independence, provided that the Athenians agreed
not to engage in further military or defensive buildup. Within a year of
signing the accord, however, Athens violated one of the provisions by at-
tempting to rebuild its defensive walls. Using this as a pretext, a Spartan
general forced Athens to abandon the democracy in favor of an oligarchy
that was known as the "Thirty" (or sometimes, the "Thirty Tyrants"). The
Thirty remained in power only a brief time (roughly eight months), but
during their reign, the Thirty committed an ctppalling number of atrocities
in their efforts to consolidate and increase their power. Many of those who
were loyal to the democracy of Athens went into exile and, were able to or-
ganize themselves into a fighting force sufficient to overthrow the Thirty
before a full year was out. But Socrates did not leave Athens during the
reign of the Thirty, and although both Plato and Xenophon (as well as
other later writers) tell us that Socrates came into dangerous conflict with
the Thirty, some scholars have found Socrates' decision to remain in the
city a sign that his political sympathies may have been disloyal to the
democracy. We consider this issue in more detail in Chapter 6.
24 A Survey of Our Evidence
Charmides was Critias's cousin- see Plato's Charmides 154a-b). These two
men, too, were well known to have been Socrates' friends, and though
under different circumstances, they also proved themselves to be traitors
to the city, like Alcibiades. Critias is generally regarded as the leader of
the bloody Thirty Tyrants, and Charmides was also one of this group. We
shall have more to say about these three when we discuss Socrates* poli-
tics in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say now, though, that at least some of those
who enjoyed Socrates' company turned out to be very bad men indeed.
Meletus, the son of Meletus, of the deme of Pttthos wrote this Indictment and
takes this oath against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of Alopece: Socrates
is guilty of not believing in the gods that the city believes in, and of introduc-
ing other, new divinities; and he is guilty of corrupting the youth. The
penalty is death.
Although Meletus was the one who actually brought the charges
against Socrates, he was supported in the prosecution by two other Athe-
nians, Anytus and Lycon. In their capacity as assistants, or sunegoroi, Any-
tus and Lycon helped prepare the case against Socrates and, cilong with
Meletus, gave speeches supporting the charges. It is unfortunate that no
version of what any of these men actually said against Socrates has come
down to us.23
There is virtually nothing known about Meletus and Lycon other than
their participation in the prosecution of Socrates. We do have a little inde-
pendent information about Anytus. A master tanner by occupation, he
appears to have been, in the words of one commentator, "one of the two
or three leading statesmen of the time."24 Anytus was associated with the
moderate democratic faction in Athens and must have been working dili-
gently to restore the traditional democratic institutions in the chaos that
28 A Survey of Our Evidence
his counterpenalty and that the jury would agree to the less harsh way of
bringing an end to what they saw as Socrates' corruptive influence on the
young.
If Plato's version is to be believed, Socrates began by telling the jury
that even though they had just convicted him, he still regarded himself as
Athens's greatest benefactor, a fact that, he said, merited his receiving
"free meals in the Prytaneum," an honor reserved for Athens's greatest
heroes (Apology 36d-37a), He then went on patiently to explain why he
would not offer any of the counterpenalties the members of the jury were
probably expecting him to offer. Imprisonment or imprisonment until a
fine could be raised were out of the question, since each would have pre-
vented him from carrying out his "service to the god," The same reason-
ing precluded the possibility of going into exile. In Plato's account,
Socrates told the jury that if his fellow Athenians could not endure his
manner of questioning others, surely people in other cities would not en-
dure it either. Going from one city to the next, never welcome anywhere,
he says, would be an intolerable life (Apology 37e-d).
Socrates did, however, offer a counterpenalty.28 According to Plato, he
initially offered to pay a fine of one mina, which was equal to 100 silver
drachmas, well over a pound of silver. He said that, being a poor man,
that was all he could afford to pay. That amount was raised to thirty mi-
nas by Plato himself and three of" Socrates' friends,29 Many scholars have
assumed that Socrates' initial offer and even the subsequent offer were in-
significant, perhaps even insulting amounts and Socrates must have
known that the jury would not accept either offer. The latter point may
wrell be true, for Socrates had already explained that his mission wrould
require that he return to his questioning of others if he were released and
he must also have known that the jury would not convict him of a crime
and then release him to go back to doing the very thing that they had just
determined by their vote to be a serious crime. But the first pointthat
even the thirty minas was insignificant and could not have been offered
as a serious alternativeis mistaken.30
First, we must keep in mind that Socrates had already explained that
he would not enter prison voluntarily until an even larger fine was
raised. Thus, his friends must have been able to produce the thirty minas
immediately. But second, and more importantly, thirty minas was
roughly the equivalent of eight and one-half years' wages for a typical
Athenian workerand actually something like twice as much as his ju-
rors were making in pay for their service as jurors. Seen in this light, the
counterpenalty Socrates offered could not very well have been seen by
the jury as insulting or trivial. Finally, recall that Socrates had made it as
clear as he could that he had acted as he had all of those years not be-
cause he enjoyed antagonizing people but because he thought he was or-
32 A Survey of Our Evidence
dered to engage his fellow citizens in philosophy by the god. This was a
duty from which he could not release himself. Assuming, as we think we
must assume, that Socrates thought piety required that he do as the god
had commanded him, he must have tried to do everything in Ms power,
short of doing anything unjust, to continue to serve the god. His duty to
continue to carry out his mission, then., together with his commitment to
have the jury decide the case in the way that would serve justice and his
conviction that he was utterly innocent of the charges, forces us to con-
clude that Socrates could not have been indifferent to the outcome of the
trial.
Even less plausible is the view sometimes advanced (presumably at
least partly on the basis of Xenophon's testimony) that Socrates was actu-
ally trying to goad the jury into convicting him,. On the contrary, the logic
of Plato's version of the speech, with the emphasis it places on Socrates'
refusal ever to abandon his mission, requires Socrates' trying to gain his
acquittal in a way that did no damage to his principles.
Of course, Socrates was unsuccessful and the jury voted, by what mar-
gin we cannot say with certainty, to condemn him to death, the penalty
Meletus called for.31 Ordinarily, the penalty would have been carried out
the next day. But if Plato is to be believed, the sentence was actually de-
layed for a period of time because the Athenians were in the midst of
their annual festival to commemorate the return of the legendary Theseus
to Athens and, it was illegal for any executions to take place during this
commemoration. Assuming that Plato is to be believed on this point, the
delay in executing Socrates is perhaps further evidence that neither
Socrates' prosectttor nor the king-archon expected Socrates to offer to pay
a fine as his counterpenalty, which, therefore, all but insured his execu-
tion upon conviction. Had either Meletus or the king-archon realized how
uncompromising Socrates was about his duty to the god to philosophize,
one or the other would very probably have scheduled the trial for another
time.
In any case, Plato tells us that the brief reprieve allowed Socrates to
spend Ms final days engaging in philosophical discussion with Ms
Mends. On his last day, when he was brought a cup containing hemlock
extract, a powerful poison, he drank it without hesitation. Plato tells us
that as the poison was starting to take effect, Socrates spoke his final
words to his old friend Crito: "We ought to make a sacrifice to Aesclepius.
See to it and do not forget" (Phaedo 118a). Aesclepius was the god who
looked out for those who practice the art of healing. Socrates' final re-
mark, then, was that he regarded the end of his life actually to be a bless-
ing. Of course, Plato's account of Socrates' final moments is probably
apocryphal, intended to portray the philosopher's bravery in the face of
uncertainty. But it is likely that whatever his actual last words were, he
A Survey of Our Evidence 33
was unworried about what death held for him, for he told those jurors
who voted for his acquittal: "No harm comes to a good man in life or in
death, nor are his affairs neglected by the gods" (Apology 41c-d).
Consider, young man, all that come with this thing self-control, what pleasures
you will have to turn your back onsex, women, gambling, feasting, drink-
ingwhy is life worth, living if you are bereft of these things? And, what about
your natural needs: Well, suppose you commit adultery or you seduce some-
one, and you get caught. [Tf you. are a follower of self-control], you're ruined.
You're not able to speak on your behalf. But by following me, you do what
your nature tells youplay and laugh, and think nothing is ever disgraceful.
A Survey of Our Evidence 35
puts his desire to die to escape the infirmities of old age ahead of exhort-
ing others to pursue virtue, would have won the devotion of so many
young philosophers. Unless it can be shown how manipulating the jury
into putting him to death somehow serves the aims of virtue, Xenophon's
account of the stance Socrates took at his trial and why he took it is not to
be believed. At any rate, neither Xenophon nor Plato gives us any reason
for supposing that Socrates suffered from any noticeable loss of his facul-
tieshe may have been seventy years old at the time of his trial, but noth-
ing in Plato or Xenophon reveals any lack of vigor or energy on Socrates'
part. Accordingly, for this reason as well, Xenophon's "explanation" that
Socrates wished to die at this time, because of impending old age, does
not ring true.
The third work of Xenophon centering around a person named
"Socrates" bears the same name as one of Plato's most famous works,
the Symposium. Although the two works obviously share a number of
features that could not very well be coincidental, it is impossible to say
with absolute confidence which was written first. Most commentators,
however, now think that Plato's is more likely to have been the original
and that Xenophon was in some sense inspired by the Platonic work
rather than the other way around. Like the Platonic work, Xenophon's
Symposium centers around the speeches Socrates and his acquaintances
give on a common theme, in this case, what each has done to promote
the welfare of the city. That Xenophon's is not representing some scene
that actually took place seems clear. But it is also clear from the number
of ways Xenophon's descriptions fit well with those of Plato34 that both
men wrere in a position to know when they were describing accurately
and that Xenophon was trying in earnest to provide an account of how
his friend comported himself among his friends. Although Xenophon's
Symposium provides us with yet more evidence that at least one of our
principal sources was trying to capture the historical Socrates,
Xenophon's Symposium, at best, tells us in the most general, terms about
some of the historical Socrates' most basic commitments.
The fourth work, the Memorabilia, can be divided into two parts of un-
equal length; The first part is an explicit defense of the historical Socrates
against the charges he faced in 399 B.C. The second and by far longer part
is a loose collection of Xenophon's reminiscences about Socrates. Like the
first part, it is clearly intended to portray Socrates in a favorable light,
though Xenophon says he is doing so not to answer any specific charges
but to show that Socrates "benefitted his companions, revealing himself
as he was in what he did, and by what he discussed with them," (Memora-
bilia 1.3.1). Xenophon's account of Socrates' character is sometimes rich in
detail and often accords well with what other sources say about Socrates.
A Survey of Our Evidence 41
He educated his body and soul in a way of living in which anyone who fol-
lowed it, unless he were a spirit, would lead a courageous and safe life and
would not worry about his needs. He lived so cheaply that one does not
know if anyone could do so little that it would not handle what Socrates
needed to be satisfied. He needed only such food that gave him pleasure. And
for this he was so prepared that his appetite was the seasoning. Any drink
was pleasant to him because he did not drink if he was not thirsty. But if he
was invited and wanted to go to dinner, he guarded without difficulty against
what is the most common temptation for most people, to be filled beyond
one's limit. He counseled those who were not able to do this to guard against
what persuades them to eat when they are not hungry and to drink when
they are not thirsty. For they destroy the stomach, and the head, and the soul.
By what sort of proof did they try to show that? He was often seen sacrificing
iit home, and often at the common altars of the city, and he didn't hide his
use of divination. It was commonly reported that Socrates says that he was
guided by a divine sign. It was from this they seemed to me to charge him
with introducing new divinities. But he introduced nothing newer into the
city than any of the others, who believe in divination and use birds, oracles,
omens, and sacrifices. They understand that it is not the birds and the people
they happen to meet who know what benefits those who use divination, but
that it is the gods, who are giving signs through them; and that's what
Socrates thought, too.
Later, Xenophon closes his remarks about Socrates' attitude toward reli-
gion as follows.
T1.7 Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1,19-20:
42 A Survey of Our Evidence
I am amazed at how the Athenians were at that time persuaded that Socrates
was not temperate regarding the gods, for he neither said nor did anything
that constituted impiety about the gods, but he said and did those things
which anyone by saying and doing them would be and would be thought
most pious.
But it is also amazing to me that some were convinced that Socrates cor-
rupted the youth. He was in the fullest control of all human beings of his
passions and appetites, and he had the most endurance when, it came to heat
and cold and every hardship, and he was trained to need moderation so that
he needed quite little and was easily satisfied. Since he was this sort of per-
son, how did he make others impious, lawbreakers, gluttons, philanderers,
and weak, and soft with regard to hardship? On the contrary, he stopped
many of them and created a desire for virtue, giving them hope that if they
cultivated themselves, they would be good and noble. And yet he never un-
dertook to be a teacher of this, but rather it is evident that by being the sort of
person he was, he made those with whom he spent his time hope that by im-
itating him they would become such a person, too. Moreover, he did not fail
to care about his body and he did not approve of those who did neglect
theirs. He rejected overexertion and then overeating, whereas he approved
of sufficient exertion that the soul enjoys. He said that such was conducive to
ii healthy disposition and the care of the soul. He was neither pretentious nor
a showoff about fine garments or shoes, or his way of living, nor did he en-
dow his friends with a love of money. He kept the desires of others in check,
he did not create his own desire for money . . . he was confident that those of
his companions who demonstrated what he approved would be his friend
and friends with each other throughout their entire lives. How could such a
man corrupt the youth, unless concern for virtue is corruptive?
Socrates said, tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphi?
And he said, yes, by god, twice.
And did you take note of the inscription somewhere on the temple,
"Know Thyself"?
Yes.
And did you pay attention to the inscription or did you take heed of it and
try to figiire out who you are?
No, by god, I didn't, he said. 1 think 1 know this well enough already. I
think I could scarcely know anything else if I did not know myself.
Do you think one knows himself if one knows only his name, or is he like
those who buy horses who do not think they know what they want to know
before they consider whether the horse is docile or hard to train or strong or
weak or whether it is quick or slow and how he is with respect to all the
other things that make a horse useful or useless, that is, does the one who
knows himself in considering what sort of usefulness he has as a human,
does he know what his powers are?
It seems to me, then, that one who does not know what his own powers
are does not know himself.
Is it obvious, he said, that through knowing themselves men enjoy many
good things, and through being mistaken about themselves, they suffer
many evils? Those who know themselves know what is useful for them and
grasp what is in their power and what is not, and by doing what they under-
stand they are able to do, they acquire what they need and do well, and
avoiding what they do not understand, they avoid doing what is evil. By be-
ing iible to test other men, and through their acquaintance with other men,
they acquire good things and guard, against e v i l s . . . .
44 A Survey of Our Evidence
Euthydemus said, you can be sure that it is clear to me that one must work
hard to know oneself.
ued for over half a century. On the basis of such differences in the dia-
logues, there has come to be a fairly broad agreement among commenta-
tors (though never without dissent) that based on similarities in style and
thematic content, three fairly distinct groups emerge, with a number of
dialogues, apparently, marking transitions between groups. In recent
years, the validity of dividing the dialogues into groups has been bol-
stered by careful, computer-assisted analysis of Plato's style of writing.36
Of course, this much would not tell us the order in which the three
groups were written. But if we assume that the laws, which was unfin-
ished, was written toward the end of Plato's career and the Apology was
written relatively early in Plato's career, we can order the groups chrono-
logically as follows:
The late group; Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws.
We should note that most scholars have given up on trying to order the
dialogues within a period chronologically. Moreover, the fact thai Plato's
dialogues can be grouped in this way does not, by itself, tell us whether
any of the groups contains dialogues with a character named "Socrates"
who was intended by Plato to represent the views of the historical
Socrates. That the views of the historical Socrates can be found in the
pages of Plato's early and first transitional stage dialogues, however, is
the conclusion defended by Gregory Vlastos, the most Influential figure
among those who have seriously searched for the historical Socrates,37
Vlastos detailed a number of differences between the character Socrates
(whom Vlastos calls "Socrates,,") in the early and first transitional dia-
logues and the character Socrates (whom. Vlastos caEs "Socratesm") who
came later. Although some of these differences had long been noted be-
fore, Vlastos's work showed just how many and striking these differences
really are. If Vlastos is right, there are ten salient characteristics of the
Socrates of the early and first transitional groups (Socrates,,) that are miss-
ing from the subsequent groups.
46 A Survey of Our Eindence
(Socrates speaking) [In our earlier discussions] we stated, and often re-
peated, if you remember, that everyone must practice one of the occupations
in the city for which he is naturally best suited.
(Glaucon responds) Yes, we did keep saying that
Moreover, we've heard many people say and have often said ourselves
that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's
own.
A Survey of Our Evidence 47
Yes, we have,
Then, it turns out that this doing one's own workprovided that it comes
to be in a certain wayis justice.
Plato's Apology, there is no reason to think that Socrates actually held any
of the conversations Plato writes about.'10 Even if we are persuaded by
Vlastos's argument, we can say at best only that the historical Socrates
probably did hold the doctrines we find him defending in the early dia-
logues of Plato and that the historical Socrates is not entirely lost in the
darkness of ages gone by. But neither can we say we really know what this
philosopher, who inspired so many to take up the philosopher's life, re-
ally believed,
Although we shall refer to "Socrates" and "his views" in what follows,
we are really exploring the views of Plato's Socratese, the Socrates of
Plato's early dialogues. To what extent Plato's character expresses the
views of the historical person, we do not presume to say beyond what we
have just speculated. But as we hope to show, Plato's Socratese maintains
a fascinating and powerful philosophy, one that is well worth our careful
attention regardless of its faithfulness to the views of the great philoso-
pher and Plato's friend of the same name.
Notes
1. The most recent published collection of Plato's works includes not only all of
the dialogues now generally regarded as authentic (called the "canonical dia-
logues") but also all of the dubia and spurts, which are noted as such. See Cooper
(1997).
2. Aristotle, Forties 1447bll.
3. For an interesting, though somewhat speculative, discussion of some of the
Socratic writings, see Clay (1994), 26-32,
4. Whether we can draw inferences about Aeschines' views from the small frag-
ments that remain of his writings remains a topic of scholarly dispute. Those in-
terested in a detailed defense of the position that we can draw such inferences
should consult Kahn (1994), 87-106.
5. For more on the status of women in fifth-century B.C. Athens, see Roberts
(1984), 22-26.
6. The two authors in question, are Pausanius (1.22.8,9,35.2) and Diogenes Laer-
tius (2.19). Both of these writers lived and wrote in the middle of the third century
A.D.
7. An excellent discussion of elementary education in fifth-century B.C. Athens
can be found in Roberts (1984), 94-101.
8. Excellent detailed discussions of the sophistic movement in Athens and of in-
dividual sophists can be found in Guthrie (1971b) and Kerford (1981).
9. Plato is not the only Socratic writer who claims that Socrates once took a seri-
ous interest in nature-philosophy. Diogenes Laertius says that Socrates was at one
time the pupil of Archelaus, a fifth-century B.C. nature-philosopher (2.16, 2.19,
and 2.23) and reports other testimony that Socrates had been the pupil of
Anaxagoras, another fifth-century B.C. nature-philosopher (2.19). As we have
seen, however, we have no good reason to accept any of Diogenes' specific claims.
50 A Survey of Our Eindence
10. In Plato's Cratylus (384a-c), however, Plato may well be simply joking when
he has Socrates say that he, Socrates, could afford only Prodicus's one-drachma
course.
11. For an excellent brief discussion of the rise of the Athenian Empire, see
Roberts (1984), 82-93,
12. Thucydides, The History of the Pdoponnesian War, 1.17.3.
13. See Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.6.26, 3,14, 3.7.5-9, and 3.9.10. We discuss
Socrates' attitude toward Athenian democracy in Chapter 6.
14. The fact that Socrates served in the army as a hoplite, a heavily armed sol-
dier, certainly suggests that he was not impoverished, at least at the time of the
Battle of Delium in 424 B.C. (see Plato, Symposium 220e-221a), for the full armor
was relatively expensive and Athens's truly poor could not afford to serve as hop-
lites. On the other hand, it is possible that the armor may have been a gift from
someone, though were this true, it is odd that no one refers to it.
15. For a more detailed discussion of Socrates' appearance, see Brickhouse and
Smith (1989), 14-15.
16. We believe that this can be inferred from the fact that Aristophanes' Clouds,
the play in which one of the central comic characters is named "Socrates," was
first performed in 4.23 B.C. Calling the character in the play "Socrates" would not
have been amusing had not the historical Socrates already gained a reputation in
Athens as a somewhat eccentric intellectual.
17. See Roberts (1984), 22-24.
18. Myrto is mentioned only in later, and hence unreliable sources. Reference to
the marriage is made in Diogenes Laertius (2.26), Plutarch, Aristeides 27, and
Athenaeus 555D-556A. More credible sources, however, say nothing about the
woman.
19. We discuss Socrates' daimonion in greater detail in Sec. 7.4.
20. We can infer this from the fact that Plato tells us (Apology, 38a) that he was
one of the four persons who were willing to put up a substantial sum of money
for Socrates to pay as a fine after his conviction and that had he not been ill, he
would have been present when Socrates was executed (see Phaedo 59b).
21. The story of Socrates saving the life of Akiblades during the campaign at
Potidaea is recounted in Plato's Symposium 220d-e.
22. We have good reason to think that this statement of the charges is accurate
because it very closely resembles the statement we find in Plato's Apology (24b-c).
As we argue below, Plato would have known what the actual charges were and
would have no reason to change them in his version of Socrates' speech.
23. For reasons we explain further in Chapter 6 (see Sec. 6.3.4), it is important
not to confuse the Accusation of Socrates attributed to Polycrates with any of the
speeches made at the actual trial.
24. Burnet (1924), 99.
25. According to A. E. Taylor, the legislation of 403 B.C. also called for the com-
plete recodification of the laws, a process that was not completed until 401-400
B.C. See Taylor (1953), 102-103. This may explain why Anytus did not move
against Socrates earlier.
26. At about the time of Socrates' trial, jurors were paid three obols a day, not a
large sum but enough to allow laborers to take time off from work to serve on ju-
A Survey of Our Evidence 51
ries, which many apparently did. For more on this point, see MacDowell (1978),
34-35.
27. In Xenophon's version of the story, when questioned about Socrates, the or-
acle announced that no one was "more free, more just, or more temperate" (Apol-
ogy 14). Xenophon makes no attempt to show how the oracle may have influenced
Socrates to do anything that led to his trial, however,
28. In Plato's account, at least According to Xenophon's version, Socrates re-
fused to offer a counterpenalty, on the ground that doing so would be tantamount
to an admission of guilt. According to Xenophon, Socrates actually wanted to be
convicted, and executed, since he had decided that at his age, his life could only
become a misery of poor health and loss of faculties, and it would be better to die
as a martyr than to live into such decrepitude.
29. In the much later account given by Diogenes Laertius, Socrates first offered
to pay a small fine (Diogenes reports two different versions of the actual amount)
but then changed his mind and offered free meals in the Prytaneum as his actual
proposal. Several aspects of Diogenes' account of the end of the trial, however, are
inconsistent
30. A detailed account of the purchasing power of thirty minas can be found in
Brickhouse and Smith (1989), 225-234.
31. Diogenes Laertius reports that the margin of votes going against Socrates
was actually greater in the second vote than in the first, the vote to convict (2.42).
This requires the very unlikely supposition, however, that some of those who
were prepared to allow Socrates to go entirely unpunished (by finding him inno-
cent in the first vote) somehow decided to condemn him to death in their next
vote. Some evidence, from Plato, can be given for supposing that the second vote
was exactly the same as the first vote, which makes more sense. See Brickhouse
and Smith '(1989), 231-232.
32. Brickhouse and Smith (1989), 16.
33. This point is developed in Arrowsmith (1969), 6.
34. For more on this point, see Guthrie (1971 a), 24.
35. See, for example, Plato's description of Socrates' master)' of his appetites in
the Symposium 219b-220c.
36. A good introduction, to employment of "styiometric" technique is Brand-
wood (1992).
37. Vlastos (199:1), 45-106.
38. There are many passages in Plato in which Socrates professes to lack wis-
dom. See, for examples, Apology 20c, 21 d, 23b; Charmides 165b-c; Euthyphro 5a-c,
15c; Laches 186b-c; Lysis 212a; Republic 1.337e. We discuss Socrates' many dis-
avowals of knowledge in Chapter 3.
39. For searching criticisms of Vlastos's account, see ]. Beversluis (1993), and.
Debra Nails (1993).
40. The Apology may well be an exception, for as we have noted, Plato (and others
who wrote about the trial) may have thought that what Socrates said to the jury
should be written down. But even if that was part of Plato's motivation in undertak-
ing to write the Apology, his version presumably only captures the substance of what
Socrates said at his trial. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is nothing said
or done in. Plato's Apology thai could not have been said or done at the actual trial.
52 A Survey of Our Eindence
Suggested Readings
53
54 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
not. First, those who employ the "Socratic method" of teaching already
know all of the answers to their questions and simply try to lead or guide
their students, via the questions, to these answers. But in Plato's dia-
logues, every time the issue comes up, Socrates explicitly denies knowing
the answers to his own questions.
T2.1 Charmides 165b-e:
SOCRATES: But now answer me a short question about that; it's a fine
thing you reminded me. Just now someone got me badly stuck
when I was finding fault with parts of some speeches for being
foul, and praising other parts as fine. He questioned me this way,
really insultingly: "Socrates, how do you know what sorts of things
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 55
are fine and foul? Look, would you be able to say what the fine is?"
And I, I'm so worthless, I was stuck and I wasn't able to answer
him properly. As I left the gathering I was angry and blamed
myself, and I made a threatening resolve, that whomever of you
wise men I met first, I would listen and learn and study, then
return to the questioner and fight the argument back. So, as I say,
it's a fine thing you came now. Teach me enough about what the
fine is itself, and try to answer me with the greatest precision
possible, so I won't be a laughingstock again for having been
refuted a second time.
MEMO: Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? Are we to
report this to the folk back home about you?
SOCRATES: Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have
never yet met anyone who did know.
MEMO: How so? Did you not meet Gorgias when he was here?
SOCRATES: I did.
MEMO: Did you then not think that he knew?
SOCRATES: I do not altogether remember, Meno, so that 1 cannot tell
you now what I thought then. Perhaps he does know; you know
what he used to say, so you remind me of what he said. You tell me
yourself, if you are willing, for surely you share his views.
Today, when we say that someone uses the "Socratic method," we as-
sume that the person is teaching (or at least attempting to teach) some-
thing, that is, the person is attempting to lead, or guide to an understand-
ing of some subject that they do not have. Socrates not only invariably
denies being a teacher (T2.7, T2.8; see also T2.3, above), he also often
claims to engage those he proposes to question not as their teacher but as
their student (T2.9, T2.10, T2.ll; see also T2.4, T2.5, T2.6, but compare
T2.2, above) and says not that he gives those he questions new knowl-
edge or understanding but only reveals to them their lack of such knowl-
edge or understanding (T2.12, T2.13, T2.14).
T2.7 Apology 19d (immediately follows T7.7):
(Socrates speaking} If you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach
people and charge a fee for it, that is not true either,
SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, that I'm telling the truth when I say that
I'm persistent in questioning wise people. It may be that this is the
only good trait I have and that all the others I have are quite
worthless, I make mistakes as to the way things are, and don't
know how they areI find it sufficient evidence of this that when I
am with one of you who are highly regarded for wisdom, and to
whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I show myself to know
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 57
was only confusion, ignorance, or pretense. But each of these points raises
several questions.
(Socrates speaking) ... Don't be too hard on us, Thrasymachus, for if Pole-
marchus and I made an error in our investigation, you should know that we
did so unwillingly. If we were searching for gold, we'd never willingly give
way to each other, if by doing so we'd destroy our chance of finding it. So
don't think that in searching for justice, a thing more valuable than even a
large quantity of gold, we'd mindlessly give way to one another or be less
than completely serious about finding it. You surely mustn't think that, but
ratheras I dothat we're incapable of finding it. Hence, it's surely far
more appropriate for us to be pitied by you clever people than to be given
rough treatment.
When he [Thrasymachus] heard that, he gave a loud, sarcastic laugh. By
Heracles, he said, that's just Socrates' usual irony. 1 knew, and I said so to
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 59
these people earlier, that you'd be unwilling to answer and that, if someone
questioned you, you'd be ironical and do anything rather than give an an-
swer.
That's because you're a clever fellow, Thrasymachus.
of irony may be deceived, of course; but deception must not be the in-
tended aim of the ironist, in Vlastos's view. But deception, he claims, is at
the heart of the original Greek uses of eironeia. He goes on to note, how-
ever, that what begins as a secondary use in Greek does not seem to have
the same implication, and in this use, eironeia is better understood as
something more like "pretending," where the connotations do not have to
be especially negative. Ylastos even credits the figure of Socrates himself
(and "Socratic irony") with the eventual elimination of the original pri-
mary use of eironeia as deception in favor of the secondary use, turning
eironeia into a high form of playful pretense/ so that by the time Cicero in-
vents the Latin form of the word (ironia), the connotations are ones of "ur-
banity, elegance, and good taste."8
Missing from Vlastos's characterization of the differences between
"irony" and, eironeia are what we might call examples of "mocking" irony,
in which there is an intent to deceive.9 In some cases, after all, ironies are
designed to be detected only by those with "inside information": Imagine
members of a secret club of racists struggling to hold in malicious laugh-
ter as they watch one of their leaders hyperbolically praise the virtues of
interracial marriages to an unsuspecting antiracist audience. We do not
have to suppose that the "victims" of such an irony must be "utter fools"
to miss the "joke," though perhaps the most perceptive might begin to
feel that something is amiss. The whole point of this category of ironies is
to amuse the "inside" audience by mocking the victim or target of the
irony, who is not "in on the joke." One can easily imagine similar cases
where such ironies are not for anyone's sake but the ironistwhere the
only one "in on the joke" is the one making the "joke." The "joke" and its
intention remain the same; the only difference is that now the intended
audience is reduced to one: the one engaging in irony.
At any rate, we cannot simply assume, from the fact that Thrasymachus
refers to Socrates' "well-known eironeia" that he means to say that Socrates
says things other than he means or believes, intending no deception. It
seems more likely that Thrasymachus really is accusing Socrates of mali-
cious trickery that has the direct intention of deceptionhe thinks Socrates
is mock-modest, not genuinely modest; he thinks that Socrates' profession
of ignorance is simply a pose intended to entrap his interlocutors into an-
swering his questions. But if this is what Socrates' "well-known eironeia"
consists in, we must not take Thrasymachus's accusation to refer to "irony"
in our sensewe wouldn't call simple mock-modesty "irony" at all. Of
course, Thrasymachus may think it is more complicated than thishe may
also take Socrates to be engaging in what we have called mocking irony,
feigning modesty while also attempting to ridicule others.
This is still different from other forms of deception. There are many rea-
What Socrates Does, and How He Does It 61
sons for deception; The confidence artist (or "con man") deceives in, order to
trick victims out of money or other valuables; the professional magician de-
ceives as a kind of performance for those deceived to enjoy; the teller of
"white lies" deceives in, order to spare the feelings of those deceived. The
mocking ironist, however, deceives as a kind of sport or joke, where the
main (or perhaps the sole) point of the deception is to have a laugh (out-
ward or inward) at the expense of the one deceived. The mocking ironist en-
joys and finds a kind of humor in the position in which the irony has put the
victimin so far as "knowledge is power," the mocking ironist leaves the
victims in a powerless state, in contrast to the ironist's own empowerment.
If we are to understand Socrates as an ironist, it is important to be as
clear as we can about what sort of irony we take him to be engaging in,
and we have noted one form of irony that seems closer to the negative
connotations of the Greek concept of eironeia. Is this, then, what we
should understand Socrates as doing? This question actually has two
sides: (1) Is this what Thrasymachus is accusing Socrates of doing, and (2)
regardless of whether or not Thrasymachus is accusing Socrates of this,
does Socrates do this?
The first question may be answered simply by looking at what Thrasy-
machus is complaining about, Thrasymachus thinks that Socrates is try-
ing to gain an unfair advantage in his conversations. He may also worry
that one intended product of Socrates' tactics will be that everyone gets a
malicious laugh at Thrasymachus's expense. But the main focus of
Thrasymachus's complaint makes it clear that he thinks of the situation
more as if Socrates were cheating at a high-stakes game in which the loser
will suffer a certain degree of humiliation in defeat (indeed, when
Thrasymachus is himself defeated, his humiliation is evident; see Republic
1.350c-d). Thrasymachus never accuses Socrates of finding humor in his
adversary's defeat; instead, Thrasymachus thinks that Socrates dishon-
estly uses unfair tactics just to avoid being defeated himself (this under-
standing is confirmed when Thrasymachus again criticizes Socrates'
manner of arguing at 340d, 341a). Thus, it is not mocking irony that we
find at the heart of Thrasymachus's complaintthough Thrasymachus
clearly thinks that Socrates is not being sincere. Thrasymachus's real com-
plaint, as we see at the end of T2.16, is that Socrates is cheating by refus-
ing to say what he really believes.
Another instance of this sense of eironeia may be found in the Apology.
T2.17 Apology 38a (immediately precedes T2.21):
Socrates is not imagining that the jury thinks he would say such things as
ironies or jokes or merely to have a kind of mocking laugh at their ex-
pense. Socrates thinks that they would suppose he was just trying to de-
ceive them,
But Thrasymachus is not the only one who accuses Socrates of eironein,
and in at least one other case, there is the strongest sense that Socrates'
eironeia is for the sake of a kind of mockery.
T2.18 Symposium 216d-e:
(Alcibiades speaking) You can't imagine how little he cares whether a person
is beautiful, or rich, or famous in any other way that most people admire. He
considers all these possessions beneath contempt, and that's exactly how he
considers all of us, as well. In public, I tell you, his whole life is one big
gamea game of irony.
We are not likely to find any clearer accusation of what we have been call-
ing mocking irony than this.
Moreover, if we return to the episode with Thrasymachus, it turns out
that there may even be some element of mocking irony in what Socrates
says. Notice that the last thing that Socrates does before Thrasymachus
makes his accusation is to characterize himself as inept and to say that he
deserves only pity, and then the first thing he does after Thrasymachus's
accusation is to heap praise on Thrasymachus for his wisdom. Might not
Thrasymachus's accusation simply be the result of a misunderstanding of
something that Socrates really is doing that is out of the ordinary? Thrasy-
machus might sense that in characterizing himself as inept and pitiable,
Socrates was, in part, actually mocking others, including especially
Thrasymachus himself.
There are very good reasons, other than Alcibiades' characterization of
Socrates, to suppose that Socrates makes a habit of this sort of irony, even
if we understand it as charitably as we can and suppose that those whom.
he deceives in this way richly deserve the mockery inherent in Socrates'
deception. Look again at those cases in which Socrates claims to want to
have others teach him. In some cases, the malicious or mocking irony is
fairly gentle, as we see in T2.4 and in T2.6, But in others, it is almost fero-
cious, as it is with Euthyphro in T2.9 and T2.14 and with Hippias in T2.5,
T2.10, and T2.ll.
The fact is that Socrates has a very low opinion of what he calls "human
wisdom.."
T2.19 Apology 23a-b (immediately follows T2.15 and immediately pre-
cedes T2.20);
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 63
Recall that in T2,6 Socrates goes so far as to say that he has never met any-
one who knew what virtue Is, Accordingly, we would expect from his low
opinion of human wisdom that any time we find Socrates calling one of
his interlocutors "wise," attributing knowledge to him, or saying that he
hopes to become the other's "student," what we have called mocking
irony is at work. In fact, not one of our texts conflicts with this expecta-
tion. And Socrates' mockery seems to increase in sharpness in proportion
to the interlocutor's presumptuousness. Those guilty of the most extreme
or dangerous pretensions (such as Euthyphro and Hippias) are given the
most lavish ironical praise. Those whose presumptions are more innocent
Socrates only gently teases with his mocking irony.
We have thus found at least one form of irony that Socrates commonly
uses, which we have called mocking irony. We began our inquiry into So-
cratic irony by asking whether or not Socrates' profession of ignorance
was an example of irony of some sort, as Thrasymachus seemed to as-
sume. What we have found, however, is that Thrasymachus may have
sensed such irony, but if so, he misunderstood it as something else. The
one form of irony we have found Socrates usingmocking ironydoes
nol fit the Socratic profession of ignorance. There does seem, to be clear
mocking irony when Socrates calls others wise or "recognizes" them as
ones who have the knowledge that he, himself, claims to lack. But the
mockery does not work by his own disclaimer of such things; the irony is
in the mocking compliments and flattery Socrates lavishes on others. So
Socrates is not guilty of mock-modesty; his modesty is genuine. His
praise of others, however, is often mock-praise and not at all sincere
there is mockery in such praise.
At least part of the irony in Socrates' mock-praise of others is in the con-
trast between the customary Socratic disclaimers of knowledge and wis-
dom, on the one hand, and the acknowledgments of others' knowledge
and wisdom, on the other. But notice that such a contrast does not require
us to assumeas Thrasymachus seems to assumethat Socrates actually
supposes that he possesses the knowledge and wisdom, he claims to lack,
whereas his interlocutors lack the knowledge and wisdom they claim to
have. The contrast works, instead, by highlighting the interlocutor's pre-
sumption that there is some significant contrast of knowledge and wis-
dom between Socrates and the interlocutor. It is this presumption that
64 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
nize such wisdom in others. Recall that what we call the Principle of Char-
ity, which requires an interpretation to provide a view that is as interest-
ing and as plausible as possible, makes inconsistency in our texts or inter-
pretations unacceptable, other things being equal.
It tarns out that there are some texts in which Socrates seems to claim to
have knowledge and others in which he seems to grant that others also
have knowledge. Indeed, these texts and the obvious problems they cre-
ate both for Socrates' profession of ignorance and for what he says about
others' lack of knowledge and wisdom will be the focus of our discussion
in the next chapter. Thus, we cannot provide any final decision on
whether or not Socrates' profession of ignorance is sincere until we have
solved these problems. But we can now note that the standard reason
given to explain why Socrates would lie when he professes ignorance
seems not to provide an adequate interpretation of these professions. We
said earlier that one reason Socrates might lie about his own knowledge
would be to entrap unsuspecting interlocutors into answering his ques-
tionsfeigning ignorance so that they would be willing to "educate"
him. This, however, conflicts with what we call the Principle of Interpretive
Plausibility, which requires that an adequate interpretation must unprob-
lematically and plausibly account for the text(s) it proposes to interpret,
The problem is that Socrates sometimes makes his customary disclaimer
of knowledge and wisdom when there is no possibility that in doing so he
might be luring some interlocutor into the relevant kind of trap. Specifi-
cally, the profession of ignorance is at the heart of Socrates' defense in his
first speech in the Apology (see 20c, 21d, 23b), a circumstance in which
none of those to wrhom he is making his profession (the jurors) could pos-
sibly have been lured into a discussion with Socrates. If Socrates is being
dishonest in these cases, then, it must be for some other reason.
Problems of this same sort also arise if we imagine that Socrates' pro-
fession of ignorance is some form of irony other than mocking irony
(which, we have argued, it does not seem to be). For it to be direct (or
wrhat Vlastos calls "artless") irony, Socrates would have to be saying the
exact opposite of what he means, where the reversal of meaning is in-
tended to be transparent. But again this does not seem to be a plausible
option, especially when he makes the profession of ignorance central to
his defense in the Apology. Too often, such a reversal of meaning is any-
thing but obvious, and the profession itself seems easily taken (both by
Plato's reader and by Socrates' audience) to be sincere.
But there was another form of irony we have recognizedthe form we
found in Mae West's "explanation" of why she turned down Gerald
Ford's dinner offer at the White House: "It's an awful long way to go for
just one meal." Even if we detect the irony, we recognize it as "riddling"
irony, for her real reasons for not going to the dinner are not only not
66 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
Socrates pronounces what are probably his most famous words in his sec-
ond speech to the jurors, in the Apology.
T2.21 Apology 38a (immediately follows T2.17):
(Socrates speaking) I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss
virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing
and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for
men....
Socrates has devoted his life-at least since he received the oracle about
his wisdomto this "mission" and to leading what he calls "the exam-
ined life." But despite this, and all his years of effort, his wisdom contin-
ues to be "worthless," In disclaiming wisdom and knowledge, we sug-
gest, Socrates tells nothing but the truth; but there is tragic irony in this
truth. It is the same tragic irony we find in the oxymoron Socrates uses to
68 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
(Socrates speaking) This much I ask from them; when my sons grow up,
avenge yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you,
if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for
virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are nobody. Reproach
them as I reproach you, that they do not care for the right things and think
they are worthy when they are not worthy of anything. If you do this, I shall
have been justly treated by you, and my sons also.
Does Socrates really wish his jurors would do this to his sons? Of course
he does; but he knows that there is no chance at all that they will do as he
has asked. In telling the truth as he sees it, his words resonate with tragic
irony.
Many scholars have been very eager to find various "ironies" in the
words and actions Plato gives to Socrates, and often the interpretations
that feature such alleged ironies are very appealing and subtleindeed,
as appealing and subtle as irony itself can be. But we have suggested that
the more subtle and "ironical" the interpretation is, the more it risks
putting us in a position of losing any objective grounds for accepting any
interpretation over any other. As soon as some interpreter claims that
Plato's Socrates does not really mean what he has said, therefore, one
should insist that the interpreter explain how this claim can still retain the
principles of interpretation that require us to take what the text itself says
very seriously and as straightforwardly as possible. We have suggested
that our principles of interpretation are not violated by finding mocking
irony in Socrates' praise of others' knowledge and wisdom. However, we
are also strongly inclined to think that our interpretive principles require
us to see no dishonesty and only the tragic form of irony in Socrates' dis-
claimers of knowledge and wisdom. If this is so, then at least one feature
of Socrates' claim not to be a teacher is that he does not think of himself as
knowing anything worth teaching to others. We return to this issue in the
next chapter, for some passages in our texts seem to provide contrary evi-
dence.
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 69
There are three groups that might be seen as Socrates' students. The
most obvious group, which we have already mentioned, includes
Socrates' interlocutors, the men he actually "examines" with his ques-
tions. The Athenian general, Nicias, gives his view of what it means to be
subjected to Socratic "examination" in Plato's Ijiches.
T2.23 Laches 187e-lS6a:
(Nicias speaking) You don't appear to me to know that whoever comes into
close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation must
necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different
in the first place, keep on being led about by the man's arguments until he
submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present
manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to
this questioning, you don't realize that Socrates will not let him. go before he
has well and truly tested every last detail.
tened (see, for example, Anytus, in Plato's Mem) 94e-95a; Socrates char-
acterizes this result as common at Apology 22e-23a), Even where we find
Socrates succeeding in his "mission," Plato's readers would recognize a
certain instability in Socrates' "successes," for the most obviously suc-
cessful cases of this sort are not men whose eventual careers turned out
particularly well: Charmides later became a member of the notorious
Thirty who briefly overthrew the Athenian government in a bloody oli-
garchic revolution; Athens's terrible defeat at Sicily in the Pelopon-
nesian War is credited to Nicias; Laches ended up being charged with
embezzlement of public funds. It would be unreasonable to fault
Socrates because these men did not turn out better. After all, some must
have been blindly arrogant before they met Socrates, and it is highly un-
likely that such men would have changed their impression of their own
worth after only one meeting with Socrates, Even those who spent con-
siderable time with him may have done so only because they found his
interrogations amusing. Thus, when they left his company to go on to
other pursuits, they quickly returned to their habits of failing to exam-
ine their beliefs about how to live. If we count only Socrates' interlocu-
tors in Plato's dialogues, we find little evidence of success even in his
most "negative" mode of "teaching/' in which he reveals others' igno-
rance to them.
Socrates mentions yet another group that might qualify as his "stu-
dents" in some sense; those, especially the younger men, who watch as
Socrates practices his "mission" on those who are reputed to be wise.
Socrates talks about such "witnesses" in the Apology.
T2.24 Apology 23c-d (part of longer quote in T7.10; immediately follows
T2.20; see also T2.13):
(Socrates speaking) The young men who follow me around of their own free
will, those who have the most leisure, the sons of the very rich, take pleasure
in hearing people questioned; they themselves often imitate me and try to
question others, I think they find an abundance of men who believe they
have some knowledge but know little or nothing,
In a later passage in the Apology (at 34a), Socrates lists Plato himself as
one of those who has spent time with Socrates in this way. Might Socrates
count as a teacher to those who watched him question others? It seems
impossible to deny that Plato would regard Socrates as a kind of teacher,
and through Plato, Socrates made contact with yet another group: those
of us who read Plato's dialogues. In reading Plato, does Socrates not also
become our teacher? There is at least some reason to think that the stu-
dents in Plato's Academya school founded and run by Plato in
Athenswere required to read and discuss these dialogues.
72 Wliat Socrates Does, and How He Does It
Bui: what did Plato and Socrates' other younger followers learn from
him, and what do Plato's readers learn? This question is remarkably diffi-
cult to answer, and any answer is likely to be unsatisfactory to some. Af-
ter Socrates' death, several very different philosophical movements trace
at least some of their principles back to Socrates: the Cynics; the Cyre-
naics; the Skeptics; the Stoics; and, of course, Plato and the members of
his Academy. Moreover, the accounts of Socrates we get from those who
spent time with him, as we said in Chapter 1, vary widely and make ex-
tremely problematic the whole idea of giving some positive account of
"Socratic teachings." In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we discuss ways in which
Plato's Socrates, at least, would claim that whatever we learn in our con-
tact with him, we really get from ourselves, more than from him. Perhaps
this is the truth, of the matter, which would explain why his most immedi-
ate followers did not form a unified group of thinkers. It would also help
to explain the great diversity of opinions about Socrates among scholars
today.
In T2.21, we found Socrates advocating what he calls the "examined
life." In Socrates, we find a man so exceptional and so relentlessly dedi-
cated to the life of inquiry that we are inclined to call him a "teacher" be-
cause our own attitudes toward philosophy as a lifelong commitment are
changed, deepened, and amplified through our contact with Socrates.
Even if all we "learn" from Socrates is to value reasoned inquiry much
more than we ever did before, it is fair to call him an important teacher.
But we should realize that it was not this kind of teaching Socrates ever
denied doing, and when we think of him, as a teacher of this sort, we do
not thereby regard him as being what he claimed not to be.
(Socrates speaking)... as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease
to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to
What Socrates Does, and How He Does It 73
any one of you whom I happen to meet: Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a cit-
izen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and
power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth,
reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give
thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul? Then, if
one of you disputes this and says he does care, 1 shall not let him go at once
or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do
not think he has attained the goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach
him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and
greater importance to inferior things. I shall treat in this way anyone I hap-
pen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens
because you are more kindred to me. Be sure that this is what the god orders
me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than my service
to the god. For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and
old among you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or
as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you: "Wealth.
does not bring about excellence, but excellence brings about wealth and all
other public and private blessings for men, both individually and collec-
tively.""
say. And 1 cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of
these people, as I never promised to teach them anything and have not done
so. If anyone says that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard
anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not
telling the truth.
ironical only in the tragic sense. But Socrates is also the one who claimed
that the "unexamined life is not worth living" (in T2.21). Is the only bene-
fit of "the examined life" what Socrates calls "human wisdom" (in T2.19),
namely, the understanding that one's actual "wisdom" is "worthless"? Or
does Socrates think that "the examined life" can also bring positive bene-
fits as well?
Scholars have divided over this question. What has come to be known
as the "nonconstructivist" position12which claims that Socrates does
not take his characteristic questioning of others to do any significant
"constructive" work in discovering or deriving positive philosophical
doctrines-may seem to be obviously correct, Socrates thinks that he con-
tinues to be ignorant, despite a life of searching for wisdom. He claims his
"mission" in life has been to expose the pretense of wisdom for the igno-
rance it invariably is. Moreover, and perhaps most important, Socrates'
elenchos (the Greek word that Socrates often usesand scholars now al-
ways useto refer to Socrates* questioning might be translated as "cross-
examination"), his own style of philosophizing, is purely negative: He
"examines" others by having them say what they think they know, and
then, by asking his questions, Socrates identifies other beliefs they have
that are not consistent with their original claim,.
But Socrates makes several claims about what he does that also seem to
point to a more constructive aspect of his use of the elenchos. At the be-
ginning of 2,2.1, we gave two such examples (in T2.25 and T2.26), where
Socrates seems to be prepared to defend certain positive positions in a
more constructive way. And yet his practice of philosophy, at least as we
find him in the pages of Plato, is limited to the construction of elenctic ar-
gumentsarguments that seem only to yield negative conclusions.
George Grote, perhaps the best known of the nineteenth-century English-
speaking Platonists, claims that Socrates' endorsement of various positive
views, on the one hand, and his elenchos, on the other, were unrelated;
"The negative cross-examination, and the affirmative dogmatism,, are . . .
two unconnected operations of thought: one does not lead to, or involve,
or verify, the other."13 The problem with this position is obvious, how-
ever. For one thing, Socrates would have to hold his positive views
some of which, as we shall see, are quite counterintuitiveas a matter of
sheer dogmatism.
A more promising account was also advanced in the nineteenth cen-
tury by Eduard Zeller, who claimed that Socrates did his philosophical
work by "deducing conceptions from the common opinions of men."14
Zeller's thesis has also been endorsed by several contemporary scholars,
at least partly because this form of argumentation, known generally as
"dialectical argumentation," has a distinguished history in Greek moral
thought and becom.es the basic form for Aristotle's method of inquiry in
76 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
ethics. However, there are at least two major problems for this thesis as
well, for Socrates both shows a complete lack of respect for "the common
opinions of men" and seems very willing to rely on premises that he rec-
ognizes are directly contradictory to what is commonly believed,
T2.27 Crifo 44c-d {= T7.25):
SOCRATES: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the
majority think? The most reasonable people, to whom one should
pay more attention, will believe that things were done as they were
done.
CRITO: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the
opinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clear that the
majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils if
one is slandered among them.
SOCRATES: Would that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for
they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would,
be fine, but now they cannot do either. They cannot make a man
either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly.
SOCRATES: One should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man,
whatever injury one has suffered at his hands. And Crito, see that
you do not agree to this, contrary to your belief. For 1 know that
only a few people hold this view or will hold it, and mere is no
common ground between those who hold this view and those who
do not, but they inevitably despise each other's views.
If Socrates thought mat his own views had to conform to "the common
opinions of men," he would have to retract everything he says in T2.25,
T2.26, T2.27, and T2.28, where he advances positions that conflict with
those of most others. Of course, some of the premises from which
Socrates derives his own views may also be what most people think. But
Socrates never holds a view because most people hold. it.
A more recent constructivist account, offered by Richard Robinson,
characterizes the logical form, of the elenchos as consisting in reducing
some stated hypothesis to self-contradiction.15 As "negative" as this may
sound, it is actually a very powerful proof procedure for the negation of
the "stated hypothesis," so if Socrates' views derive from a method that
does this, it would, seem that every elenctic argument provides a decisive
proof for the falsehood of every position Socrates targets for refutation
and, hence, for the truth, of the negation of each of the targeted positions.
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 77
Unfortunately, there are also at least two problems with this view: (1) It
does not accurately represent the way that Socrates' elenctie arguments
actually work (which we will describe in detail in the next section), and
(2) it conflicts with Socrates' attitudes toward Ms own conclusions, which
at least in. some cases seem deeply skeptical (see T2.41, T2.42, T2.43, and
T2.44, below).
* (1) The Interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which Socrates considers false and
targets for refutation.
* (2) Socrates secures agreement to further premises, say, if and r (each of
which may stand for a conjunct of propositions). The agreement is ad hoc:
Socrates argues from (if, r), not to them.
* (3) Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q & r entail not-p.
* (4) Socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true, p false.16
T2.32JRepwWicl.345b:
(Socrates speaking) . . . first, stick to what you've said, and then, if you
change your position, do it openly and don't deceive us.
(Socrates speaking) Please don't answer contrary to what you believe, so that
we can come to some definite conclusion.
(Thrasymachus speaking) I could make a speech about it, but, if I did, 1 know
that you'd accuse me of engaging in oratory. So, either allow me to speak, or,
if you want to ask questions, go ahead, and I'll say, "All right," and nod, yes
and no, as one does to old wives' tales.
(Socrates speaking) Don't do that, contrary to your own opinion.
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 79
According to Vlastos, in the Gorgias, Plato makes clear that he himself has
become disturbed over how the standard elenchos could ever possibly
achieve the desired results, that p is proved false and that not-p is proved
true. In the pte-Gorgias dialogues, all Socrates could reasonably have ex-
pected to show with the standard elenchos is that his interlocutor (and
Socrates himself, if he, too, accepts all of the premises of Ms argument)
must consider p false and not-p true, given their mutual but undefended
beliefs in premises q and r. For Vlastos, the signal that Plato in the Gorgias
intends to place the standard elenchos on firmer ground is to be found in
the strength of the claims Socrates makes about the outcome of elenctic
arguments. For the first time, Vlastos says, Socrates can be found claim-
ing to have "proved" a proposition true.
T2.36 Gorgias 479e (part of longer quote at T2.46):
[A] Whoever has a false moral belief will always have at the same
time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false belief.21
[B] The set of elenctkally tested, moral beliefs held by Socrates at any
given time is consistent.22
(Socrates speaking) I think it's better to have my lyre or a chorus that 1 might
lead out of rune and dissonant, and have the vast majority of men disagree
with me and contradict me, than to be out of harmony with myself, to con-
tradict myself, though I'm only one person.
Of course, strictly, this passage says only that Socrates would not wish to
hold inconsistent beliefs- it does not actually affirm that he has achieved
his wish. But Vlastos claims that Socrates has reason to make such an af-
firmation because of his long experience with elenctic arguments:
The consistency of the set is being inferred from its track-record in Socrates'
own experience: in all of the elenctic arguments in which he has engaged he
has never been faulted for inconsistency. This is a very chancy inference, for
the results of elenctic argument are powerfully affected by the argumenta-
tive skill of the contestants; since that of Socrates vastly exceeds that of his
interlocutors, he is more effective in finding beliefs of theirs which entail the
negation of their thesis than are they when, trying to do the same to him. So
his undefeated record need not show that his belief-set is consistent; it may
only show that its inconsistencies have defied the power of his adversaries to
ferret them out. Socrates could hardly have been unaware of this unavoid-
able hazard in his method. This must contribute to the sense of fallibility
which, 1 believe, is the right clue to his profession of ignorance.24
that it requires that the beliefs to which Socrates can refer, in the interlocu-
tor 's own belief set, which entail the negation of some false belief Socrates
has targeted for elenctic refutation, must all be true. On what basis could
Socrates decide that all of the relevant beliefs are true ones? Vlastos's an-
swer, in the end, is that Socrates can feel confident that these beliefs
(those, that is, that supply the additional premises q and r, from which
not-p follows) are true because Socrates himself also holds these beliefs. If
this were true, we should not find Socrates using premises unless he is
willing in every case to affirm the truth of those same premises (or at
least, his own belief in their truth),
However, we all too often find Socrates perfectly willing to use
premises his interlocutor willingly affirms, which we have at least some
reason to suppose that Socrates himself does not believe. Consider, for ex-
ample, the way Socrates argues with Euthyphro at 6a and following in
the Euthyphro.
T2.38 'Euthyphro 5e-6b:
EUTHYPHRO: .., These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best
and roost just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father
because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn
castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me
because I am, prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They
contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about
me.
SOCRATES: Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant
in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like that being said
about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I
do wrong. Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge of such
things, share their opinions, then we must agree with them,, too, it
would seem. For what are we to say, we who agree that we
ourselves have no knowledge of them? Tell me, by the god of
friendship, do you really believe these things are true?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, and so are even more surprising things, of
which the majority has no knowledge.
In this passage, Socrates makes it clear that he does not share the same be-
liefs about the gods that Euthyphro holds, and yet we also find Socrates
ready and willing to use Euthyphro's beliefs as premises in the ensuing
argument, which, in fact, ends up in inconsistency precisely because of
the premises that Euthyphro didand Socrates did notbelieve (see Eu-
thyphro 8a-b). A similar argument, perhaps, may be found in the Protago-
ras (351c-358c), where Socrates relies on the identification of goodness
82 What Somite Does, and How He Does It
SOCRATES: ... the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever
it may lead him.
(Socrates speaking) That's harder, and It Isn't easy now to know what to say.
If you had declared that injustice is more profitable, but agreed that it is a
vice or shameful, as some others do, we could have discussed the matter on
the basis of conventional beliefs. But now, obviously, you'll say that injustice
is fine and strong and apply to it all the attributes we used to apply to justice,
since you dare to include it with virtue and wisdom.
(Thrasymachus speaking) You've divined my views exactly,
(Socrates speaking) Nonetheless, we mustn't shrink from pursuing the ar-
gument and looking into this, just as long as I take you to be saying what you
really think. And I believe that you aren't joking now, Thrasymachus, but are
saying what you believe to be the truth.
sion unless we could be very sure that each premise of that argument was
one that Socrates himself believed. There are cases where Socrates seems
clearly to express his own opinions, as we have already said, and there
are other cases where Socrates introduces premises in ways that make it
seem plausible to suppose that he does accept such premises as true. But
such cases are not frequent or common enough for us to feel much trust in
the idea that Socrates thinks he typically proves the truth of some conclu-
sion he reaches.
At any rate, precisely because there are cases in which Socrates is willing
to use as premises certain of his interlocutor's beliefs that Socrates thinks
are false, we cannot help but be skeptical about whether Socrates really
would be prepared to assume anything as strong as [A], Surely, Socrates
practices the clenches in a way that always finds him attempting to secure
agreement to premises (if and r) mat will be revealed as inconsistent with
the interlocutor's initial thesis (p). But because Socrates often suspects that
these premises are (also) false, all he may have strong evidence for, from his
long history of elenctic argumentation, is a far weaker version, of [A]:
[A*] Whoever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time some
other (true or false) beliefs entailing the negation of that false belief.
Any argument, however, that relies on some (other) false beliefs to entail
the negation of some original false belief cannot qualify as a proof of the
sort Vlastos finds in our texts.
If we turn to Vlastos's principle [B], we confront several texts that seem
to picture Socrates in ways that directly conflict with Vlastos's account.
Socrates often not only professes ignorance, as we have already seen (see
T2.12, T2.13, T2.14), but also sometimes says he is perplexed and con-
fused about the issues he is discussing.
T2.41 Mem 80c:
SOCRATES: ... I myself do not have the answer when 1 perplex others,
but I am more perplexed than anyone when I cause perplexity in
others.
No one who speaks about himself in this way could simply assume that all
of his beliefs were true, or even consistent (see also Protagoras 361a-d).
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 85
Recall that it was Socrates' claim in T2.37 that led Vlastos to identify
what he called "the problem of the Socratic elenchus," which was how
Socrates could take himself to be proving anything with arguments that
used premises whose own truth was unsecured.25
T2.36 Gorgias 479e (repeated):
Earlier, Socrates made very clear what he meant in making this claim
and what it is that he is seeking to accomplish with Polus,
T2.45 Gorgias 475e-476a:
Notice how Socrates repeatedly reminds Polus that the "proof" they have
achieved is conditioned upon their earlier agreements. Moreover, when
Polus shows that he has found Socrates' alleged "proof" anything but
convincing, Socrates immediately makes his customary offer to have
Polus disavow some premise he had agreed to earlier (see T2.35).
T2.47 Gorgias 480e (immediately follows T5.24):
From the way Socrates conceives of his "proof," therefore, it is clear that
he does not take himself, in his argument with Polus, to have demon-
strated anything as simply and conclusively true; he has only revealed
to Polus the consequences of various premises to which Polus was at
least initially willing to agree, and he is ready to have Polus disavow
those premises and make very different claims. This is hardly the be-
havior of anyone who takes himself as having "proved" anything in a
way that would give rise to what Vlastos calls "the problem of the So-
cratic elenchus," It seems, then, that "the problem of the Socratic
elenchus" is not a problem at all, unless we overestimate considerably,
and thus misunderstand, the strength of Socrates' claim, in T2.37 to
have "proved" something to Polus. Of course, it may well be that
Socrates actually does accept each of the premises of his argument with
Polus, in which case the argument would also provide Socrates with
deductive support for the conclusion. Indeed, Socrates never gives us
any reason to doubt this. But even so, such a "proof" would not give
rise to what Vlastos has called "the problem, of the elenchus," for
Socrates' commitment to the truth of these premises may not be a mat-
ter of unconditional conviction, so much as a matter of quite provi-
sional acceptanceacceptance that he would gladly submit to critical
scrutiny, and that he could well, imagine changing, if good reasons for
doing so were presented.
Accordingly, there is no special reason to suppose that Socrates counts
any of his arguments as "proofs" in the unconditional sense assumed in
Vlastos's account. But does this mean that Socrates only exposes inconsis-
tencies in his interlocutors' belief systems, as the nonconstructivist
claims? Does Socrates achieve no constructive results in his lifelong expe-
rience with elenctic argument?
What Socrates Does, and How He Does H 87
tent belief set (p, q, r), should be jettisoned for the sake of consistency in
his beliefs. Socrates, however, may be in a much better position than his
interlocutors in this case, for as Vlastos also notes, Socrates has spent a
substantial part of Ms life engaging in elenctic arguments with others. In a
famous passage in. the Gofgins, Socrates makes his customary disclaimer
of knowledge but then reveals that his experience in argument has shown
him something none the less:
T2.48 Gorgias 509a (part of longer quote at T3.8):
SOCRATES: ... I don't know how these things are, but no one I've ever
met, as in this case, can say anything else without being ridiculous.
Throughout the Gorgias, we find Socrates making claims and arguing for
certain positions, which are then challenged by his interlocutors. Each
new challenge Socrates turns aside, despite the fact that each new chal-
lenge comes with a somewhat different set of premises. No doubt,
Socrates has encountered many different belief sets while pursuing his
"mission" in Athens, but in T2.48 he shows that no matter what else oth-
ers have believed, certain beliefs (in this case, the belief that it is better to
do than to suffer injustice) have always turned out to get those who be-
lieved them into the kind of trouble that Callicles (Socrates' interlocutor
at this point in the Corgias) now finds himself in. Thus, Callicleslike
Socrates' other interlocutorsmay find himself in perplexity and not
know which of his beliefs he should give up; but Socrates, given his expe-
rience with elenctic argument, feels quite confident that it is the original
thesis that is the problem.
In the next chapter, we consider the issue of whether enough experi-
ence of the relevant sort would be sufficient for Socrates to claim to know
what his elenchos, over time, shows in this way. For now, it is enough to
say that extensive experience with elenctic argument, which allows him
to examine many different belief sets for consistency, can generate con-
structive resultsthat is, reasons to accept certain propositions and to re-
ject others. Moreover, in the Crito, we find Socrates arguing in a way that
makes explicit reference to convictions he has derived from his discus-
sions with others,
T2.49 Crito 49a-b:
all, is the truth such as we used to say it was, whether the majority
agree or not, and whether we must still suffer worse things than
we do now, or will be treated more gently, that nonetheless,
wrongdoing is in every way harmful and shameful to the
wrongdoer? Do we say so or not?
CRITO: We do.
SOCRATES: So one must never do wrong,
This text, and ones like it, make it much easier for one not only to dis-
cern what Socrates' philosophical beliefs are but also to recognize that
their source is none other than "our serious discussions," to which
Socrates has devoted his life. Although Vlastos was wrong to think that
Socrates regarded his elenctic arguments as proofs, his noneonstmetivist
critics have also been wrong to overlook the value of the elenchos as a
way to do philosophy in a constructive way, discovering and securing
those doctrines and principles that it is best for one to believe and that re-
veal themselves as generating consistent, rather than inconsistent, sets of
philosophical beliefs. The picture we have offered here for the construc-
tive work of the elenchos is not deductive but is, instead, an inductive
one. Socrates learns from the regularities of many experiences, observing
many examples of arguments and making what is called an induction
from his observations. We believe, moreover, that this not only provides
the most adequate interpretation of the texts but also gives a fairly accu-
rate picture of how philosophy continues to do its work even today. But
that is a topic for a different book,
As for that son of Clinias [Alcibiades], what he says differs from one time to
the next, but what philosophy says always stays the same, and she's saying
things that now astound you, although you were present when they were
said. So, either refute her and show that doing what's unjust without paying
what is due for it is not the ultimate of all bad things, as I just now was say-
ing it is, or else if you leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog, the god of the
Egyptians, Callides will not agree with you, CallicJes, but will be dissonant
with you all your life long.
When one first reads this passage, one might find it puzzling in several
ways: (I) How does Socrates know what "philosophy" says? (2) Socrates
has not yet established that Callides has inconsistent beliefs, for Callides
at this point in the Gorgias has only just started talking with Socrates, so
how can Socrates say that if Callides leaves what "philosophy" says un-
refuted, then Callides will not agree with Callides and "will be in conflict
in [his] whole way of living"? (3) Why does Socrates think that a conflict
in Callicl.es' belief system is tantamount to a conflict in Callides' "whole
way of living"?
Given what we have already said, we are in a position now to answer
the first two of these questions quite easily, Socrates has devoted his life
to a "mission" of testing others with the elenchos, and as a result of this,
he is in an excellent position to know what "philosophy" says. Socrates
knows what "philosophy" says because he is in a position to see how his
elenctic arguments always seem to come out, regarding certain positions.
And Socrates can claim that Callides has an inconsistent set of beliefs, just
on the basis of the one claim he has made, becauseunless Callides can
refute what philosophizing has shown Socratesthe one claim Callides
has made is one of those that Socrates has come to recognize as always
and only found within, an inconsistent belief set. Let us turn, then, to the
third of our puzzles: Why is an inconsistent belief set tantamount to a
conflict in Callides' "whole way of living"?
tain weapons makes one powerful, but Socrates and Polus agree that
there is no genuine power unless one has the intelligence to use the tools
of power in such a way as to gain what one truly wants. Thus, even the
possession of such weapons is not sufficient for true power, if, for exam-
ple, one stupidly uses them in wavs that are self-destructive or self-
defeating. To put it another way, a loaded gun in the hands of a child
might make the child dangerous but will not truly make the child powerful:
The child might use the weapon in a way that the child thinks is best but
not use it in a way that will achieve what the child really wants..
Having won this point, however, Socrates is now in a position to make
the distinction that had initially confused Polus: Even if rhetoric will win
one certain opportunities in the cities, it will only follow that rhetoricians
can do whatever they think is best. They will not necessarily do what they
truly want, because they may not have the intelligence to make the correct
judgments, wherein what they think is best really is always the same as
what they want. What everyone wants, Socrates gets Polus to agree, is
whatever is best for them (Gorgias 468a-c). Accordingly, everyone does
what they think is best for them. The problems come when what one
thinks is best for one is not what is really best. In cases such as these, one is
revealed as not powerful, for one does not do what one wants,
The importance of this argument, for our present purposes, is in the
recognition that everyone does what they think is best for them. Here is
where we find the justification for Socrates' tentative diagnosis of Calli-
cles as having a conflict in his "whole way of living." Socrates and Polus,
and then Socrates and Callicles, dispute whether it is better to do or to
suffer injustice. Socrates' position is that he wants neither of these but
would prefer to suffer than to do injustice. Polus and Callicles state that
they would rather do than suffer injusticeindeed, both seem to think
that being unimpeded in doing injustice would be best of all (even better
than Socrates' highest preference, which was neither to do nor to suffer
injustice). This is not some minor point, one unlikely to have any conse-
quence in the way these men lead their livesit is such a bask issue of
preference and life goals that it is sure to have profound and perhaps
even daily effects on the ways in which, these men will live. But Socrates
is convinced that his philosophizing has shown, him that the view Polus
and Callicles have endorsed is one that no one can ever fit into a consis-
tent set of beliefs.
Everyone acts on the basis of what they believe is best for them. If
Socrates is right, however, some significant part of what Polus and Calli-
cles believe is best for them is in conflict with their belief that it is better
to do than to suffer injustice. If these beliefs form the basis for horn' they
will live, then this inconsistency in their beliefs will inevitably yield deep
conflicts and confusions in the way these men will live. Accordingly,
92 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
Socrates warns Callides that unless he can refute the view that philoso-
phy has revealed to Socrates, Callides will be in conflict in his "whole
way of living,"
2.3.3 Self-Knowledge
Socrates goes even further than this, however. Not only does he diagnose
those who disagree with the positions he has discovered through philoso-
phy as being in conflict in their lives, but he also claims that they can be ex-
posed as sharing Socrates' positions even when they begin by denying that
they do. Several times, in his discussion with Polus, Socrates attributes be-
liefs to Polus that Polus himself seems prepared quite vigorously to deny.
T2.51 Gorgias 466d-e:
SOCRATES: ... I say, Polus, that orators and tyrants have the very least
power in their cities, as I was saying just now, for they do just
about nothing they want to, though they certainly do whatever
they see most fit to do.
POLUS: Well, isn't this having great power?
SOCRATES: No; at least Polus says it isn't.
POLUS: I say it isn't? I certainly say it is!
SOCRATES: By . , ., you certainly don't! since you said that having
great power is good for the one who has it.
POLUS: Yes, I do say that.
Socrates perceives that one of the things Polus is affirming implies the
opposite of one of the other tilings Polus is affirming, and Polus does not
see this (yet). And Socrates goes even further than this: He is prepared to
predict what Polus will dowhich position he will abandonwhen he
conies to recognize the conflict in his positions. And not just Polus:
Socrates is willing to make claims about what everyone will decide, if only
they thought about these issues carefully.
T2.52 Gorgias 474b:
SOCRATES: For I do believe that you and I and everybody else
consider doing what's unjust worse than suffering it, and not
paying what is due worse than paying it.
POLUS: And I do believe that I don't, and that no other person does,
either. So you'd take suffering what's unjust over doing it, would
you?
What Socrates Does, and How He Does It ft?
I say that it is the greatest good for a human being to discuss virtue every
day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing
myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for a human
being....
94 What Somites Docs, and How He Does It
to say that they had. learned it from Socrates? No; now that we under-
stand the significance of Socrates' insistence on the '"say what you be-
lieve' requirement," we can see that anyone who learned anything in con-
versation with Socrates would ultimately be learning it from themselves,
for it would be their own views they would discover. If Socrates' interlocu-
tors benefit from having been examined by Socrates, it is true that they
have learned something because of Socrates; But for Socrates' skillful and
relentless questioning, they would not have learned what they did. But
they have learned nothing from Socrates, at least not in the sense in which
we would ordinarily say that someone learned something from a teacher.
Moreover, for Socrates, it is one thing to undertake to persuade someone
of something and quite another to teach them something.
T2.53 Gorans 454c-d:
for Socrates supposes that he has no knowledge for others to learn from
him.
Notes
rumconstructivist (Benson 1995), however, has shown that all the texts support the
more modest claim that such theses are only what Socrates' arguments with his
interlocutor have led to. This is a much more modest claim, because it may well
be that an argument leads to a certain conclusion only because one or more of the
premises is faulty, such that if the faulty premise were removed or fixed, the same
conclusion would not be supported,
26. Here, we deviate from the translation given in Cooper (1997), which has
"convinced" and "conviction." The Greek word (pepisteukenai) does not require as
high a level of cognitive commitment as "convinced" and "conviction" seem to
denote, and Socrates' distinction seems to require that the relevant results can be
neither reliable nor stable. Donald J, Zeyl's translation (in Cooper 1997} no doubt
uses "convinced" and "conviction" here to reserve "persuasion" for peithein,
which the passage goes on to say is produced both in those who have learned and
in those who have been "convinced," We do not mean to argue that the Zeyl's de-
cision was inappropriate; we have modified the translation only to clarify the dif-
ference Socrates intends between the products of the two kinds of persuasion; be-
lief versus knowledge.
Suggested Readings
On Socratic Irony
As with, nearly every aspect of Socratic philosophy, the most widely cited recent
study is by Vlastos (1991, ch. 1). A critique of Vlastos's account of Socratic irony
may be found in Brickhoust; and Smith (1993), especially 397-401.
Socrates on
Knowledge and Ignorance
99
100 Socrates on Knowledge and Ignorance
Thus, at least when it comes to "trivial things," it turns out that Socrates
actually knows "many things." Moreover, it is not just Socrates who can
know "trivial things"; apparently anyone can know things of this nature.
T3.2 Ion 532d-e:
SOCRATES: ... As for me, I say nothing but the truth, as you'd expect
from an ordinary man. I mean, even this question I asked you
look how commonplace and ordinary a matter it isthe sort of
thing that anyone could know.1
We might feel a little easier about the apparent conflict between this pas-
sage and Socrates' customary profession of ignorance if we focus on his
disclaimer that the "many things" he and others might know are all "triv-
ial" things. We have good reason to think that it was not just any knowl-
edge that Socrates claims he and others lack. After all, in one of the clear-
est expressions of his profession of ignorance, Socrates allows that some
people do have some knowledge. However, those who have such knowl-
edge do not qualify as wiser than Socrates, for if they did, Socrates would
be mistaken in his understanding of the famous oracle, referred to in the
Apology (20e-23b) about his "wisdom." Whatever wisdom these other
people have is offset by a kind of ignorance that makes them, on balance,
less wise than Socrates.
T3.3 Apology 22c-e:
Finally, T went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically
nothing, and 1 thought that I would find that they had knowledge of many
fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things 1 did not know, and to
that extent they were wiser than I. But, gentlemen of the jury, the good crafts-
men seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets: each of them, because
of his success at his craft, though! himself very wise in other most important
pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I
asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether 1 should prefer to be as I am,
with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both. The answer I
gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage to be as I am.
topics, that is, that we find him always discussing in Plato's early dia-
logues. At any rate, if it is knowledge and wisdom about these matters
that Socrates is referring to in making his own disclaimer of knowledge
and, wisdom and in denying knowledge and wisdom to others, then his
claim to know "many things, though trivial ones" in T3.1 and his recogni-
tion that others may know certain "trivial things" in T3.2 do not conflict
with his disclaimers, as long as we suppose that no moral matters are in-
cluded among the "trivial things" that Socrates and others know.
But even if we can escape conflict with these texts, we also find Socrates
occasionally claiming and granting others claims to morally significant
knowledge. No doubt, Socrates' most famous knowledge claim, appears
in his first speech in the Apology, where he begins with what looks like his
customary declaration of ignorance but then suddenly contrasts this ig-
norance with something he does know,
T3.4 Apology 29b (partially overlaps with T6.21 and T7.20):
It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that 1 differ from
the majority of men, and if 1 were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in
anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things
in the underworld, so I do not think I have. I do know, however, that it is
wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or
man. I shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know, whether they
may not be good rather than things that I know to be bad.
Nor is this the only place where Socrates is ready to claim moral knowl-
edge. Although it is not specific, it seems inescapable that Socrates thinks
of himself as knowing that some things are bad, when he considers what
sort of penalty to offer in his second speech in the Apology.
T3.5 Apology 37b (part of longer quote at T4.22):
What should I fear? That 1 should suffer the penalty Meletus has assessed
against me, of which I say I do not know whether it is good or bad? Am I
then to choose in preference to this something that I know very well to be an
evil and. assess the penalty at thai?
not serious when he talks about what he knows and what he does not
know,
T3.6 Euthydemus 296e-297a:
(Socrates speaking) Euthydemus-how shall I say I know that good men are
unjust? Come tell me, do 1 know this, or not?
Oh yes, you know it, he said.
Know what? said I.
That the good are not unjust.
Yes, I've known that for a long time, I said. But this isn't my question
what I'm asking is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?
Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.
Then this is something 1 do not know, I said.
Socrates, we see, gladly affirms that he not only does know but has
known "for a long time" that the good are not unjust, and we find him ar-
guing from that premise that it must be that he does not know that the
good are unjust.
Finally, Socrates also seems to recognize that others, too, can have cer-
tain sorts of morally significant knowledge. The most famous example of
this kind of concession may be found in the Gorgias.
T3.7 Gorgias 512a-b (part of longer quote at T4.19):
But if a man has many incurable diseases in what is more valuable than his
body, his soul, life for that man is not worth living, and he won't do him, any
favor if he rescues him. from the sea or from prison or from, anywhere else.
He knows that for a corrupt person it's better not to be alive, for he necessar-
ily lives badly.
ically begin with what is called the "JTB" or "Justified True Belief" ac-
count of knowledge, which holds that some knower (S) knows some
proposition or information (p) just in ease:
(i) p is true,
* (ii) S believes that p is true, and
(iii) S is justified in believing that p is true.
In fact, few epistemologists these days accept that this traditional analysis
is adequate, but many believe that all that is needed for an adequate con-
ception of knowledge is some revision or clarification of these condi-
tionsparticularly the third one concerning justification. Most epistemol-
ogists now agree that knowledge is a species of belief (as per condition
[ii]), but there is quite a bit of controversy over what is necessary in addi-
tion to true belief (now generally identified as "warrant") that will make
the true belief an example of knowledge rather than mere belief.
This quick foray into epistemology serves to clarify precisely how the
concept of knowledge Socrates has in mind when he disclaims knowl-
edge is actually very different from, the concept so evident in contempo-
rary epistemological debates. For one thing, the kind of knowledge
Socrates grants to the craftsmen is not (or at least is not obviously) propo-
sitional or informational knowledge. The craftsmen have a kind of
knowledge and. wisdom that Socrates lacks in, so far as they have "success
at [their] craft," Even if (as seems obvious) this kind of knowledge
"know-how," "skill," or "craft knowledge"might not be possible with-
out some examples of prepositional knowledge (the craftsman must
know that a certain tool is for cutting), it is not clear that "know-how" can
be understood entirely in terms of the knower's possession of some speci-
fiable bits of information, which can be put into prepositional form.
Know-how is exemplified, we tend to think, in the performance of certain
sorts of activities and in the production of certain sorts of products. The
connections between such performances and productions are so essential
that without them, we would be inclined to disqualify any claim to such
know-how. Of course, a very careful analysis would have to take into ac-
count that a person with such know-how might possess it even when that
person was not actually performing such ctctivities and not actually pro-
ducing such products (such as when sleeping). Even with the relevant
qualifications, we would expect any adequate analysis to feature some
conditions that required the one with know-how to have the right sorts of
abilities or capacities to do and to produce the right sorts of things. It is not
clear that any sort of prepositional knowledge would suffice to guarantee
the satisfaction of such requirements. For example, just because one
knows that a certain tool is for cutting, it does not follow that one knows
Socrates on Knowledge and Ignorance 107
how to cut with the tool in question; just because one knows that a certain
kind of wood is best for making chariot wheels, it does not follow that
one would know how to make good chariot wheels from such wood, and
so on.
Moreover, it is hardly obvious that craft knowledge or know-how is a
species of belief, though as we shall see, Socrates thinks that at least
some prepositional knowledge is required for the species of know-how
he considers moral wisdom to be. We certainly do think that skills can
vary in degree. The apprentice is not as skilled as the master craftsman,
even if the apprentice does have some skill, and even master craftsmen
may vary in the fineness or completeness of their skills. In contrast, it
does not seem that prepositional knowledge comes in degree. Instead, it
seems to be "all-or-nothing": With respect to any given proposition or set
of propositions, either one has knowledge or one lacks it. Nor do wre re-
gard differences in skill as differences between having know-how or
craft knowledge, on the one hand, and having only "belief-how" or
"craft belief," on the other. We may or may not be willing to say that an
apprentice has know-how, or craft knowledge, depending upon how
closely the apprentice approximates a master; Socrates, however, seems
willing to say that people have craft knowledge only when they can
prove to be error-free (Euthydemus 279d-280a). But regardless of whether
we require standards as high as Socrates does, something that falls short
of know-how or craft knowledge is not to be understood as some sort of
belief, which is shared by both apprentice and master, where only the
master has what it takes to convert this belief into knowledge. In this
wray, too, then, know-how or craft knowledge looks quite different than
prepositional knowledge,
One kind of knowledge Socrates is prepared to recognize as a form of
wisdom, then, is craft knowledge. Those with such knowledge have a
kind of expertise, and for this reason, scholars have sometimes called the
sort of knowledge Socrates is interested in "expert knowledge,"2 It is not
unreasonable to suppose that all experts typically have some substantial
prepositional knowledge applicable to their fields of expertise, and as we
have noted, Socrates thinks this is true of anyone who would qualify as a
moral expert. It is unreasonable, however, to suppose that anyone who
has only such prepositional knowledge qualifies as an expert. For exam-
ple, we might suppose that an expert mechanic would know that a cer-
tain car was not running properly. The car's owner might also know
thisafter all, this is why the owner would take his car to the mechanic in
the first placebut just knowing this does not make the owner an expert
mechanic. It follows from this, however, that not every example of prepo-
sitional knowledge qualifies as the sort of knowledge that Socrates says
that he and all others lack.
108 Socrates on Knowledge and Ignorance
Socrates does not say whether he regards himself as knowing that it is bet-
ter to suffer than to do injustice. He has what he calls "reasons of iron and
adamant" for thinking that it is so, but he also allows that perhaps "you
[Callicles], or someone more forceful than you" might "undo" the bind-
ings of such arguments. Contemporary philosophers divide over the
question of fallibility in one's reasons for believing, in order to know that
something is true. Depending upon whether Socrates is an "infallibilist"
(one who holds that the justification or warrant for a true belief must be
infallible, for knowledge) or a "fallibilist" (one who allows a certain degree
of fallibility in the justification or warrant, for knowledge), he might or
might not be prepared to claim to know that it is better to suffer than to do
injustice, given reasons of the sort he claims to have in this case. But
Socrates is not focused on the issue of whether or not he knows that it is
better to suffer than to do injustice; he attends only to the fact that he does
not know "how these things are."
There is a significant difference here. One need not be a trained scientist
to know that E = MC2, One can have such knowledge without having
mastered or even studied all of the physics that goes into the truth of this
equation. One may not have any know-how at all with respect to physics.
But lacking this know-how, one is in no position to know why E = MC2, or
in other words, why it is or how it is that E = MC2. Take another example.
Nearly everyone knows that the engines in cars are in front of the passen-
ger compartment (under the hood) and not behind it (in the trunk). (A
few models are exceptions to this general rule.) But only experts in auto-
motive engineering or mechanics really know why it is or how it is that
most cars have their engines in the front rather than the middle or rear.
Most of us know that ivy clings to the walls of buildings but do not know
why or how it does this.
Socrates on Knowledge and Ignorance 109
SOCRATES: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two
of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious
actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious
and all pious actions pious through one form, or don't you
remember?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Well, then, teach me what this form itself is, so that 1 may
look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours
or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.
jects the specific examples Euthyphro advances; and we find him behav-
ing the same way in other dialogues, where he seeks definitional knowl-
edge and an interlocutor offers only examples of the moral property in
question (see, for example, Laches 190e-191b). Socrates does not always
simply grant that the specific examples given by his interlocutors are accu-
rate ones, nor should we simply assume that he would count his interlocu-
tors' or his own cognitive state, regarding such examples, as cases of
knowledge that these were examples of the relevant sort. (Surely, Socrates
would deny that Euthyphro knows that it is pious for him to prosecute his
father, for example! Again, one cannot have prepositional knowledge of
what is falsesee T3.6.) Our point is only that Socrates seems uninter-
ested in such specific claims of propositional knowledge; he is interested
in a different sort of knowledge, one that he professes nol to have,
It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from
the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in
anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things
in the underworld, so I do not think I have. I do know, however, that it is
wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or
man. 1 shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know, whether they
may not be good rather than things that I know to be bad.
What should I fear? That I should suffer the penalty Meletus has assessed
against me, of which I say 1 do not know whether it is good, or bad? Am, I
then to choose in preference to this something that I know very well to be an
evil and assess the penalty at that?
(Socrates speaking) Eulhydemushow shall I say I know that good men are
just? Come tell me, do I know this, or not?
Oh yes, you know it, he said.
Know what? said I.
That the good are not unjust.
Yes, I've known that for a long time, I said.
(Socrates speaking) He knows that for a corrupt person it's better not to be
alive, for he necessarily lives badly,
fine? And when you're in a state like that, do you think it's any
better for you to live than die?"
It is easy enough to see why one might take this passage to commit
Socrates to (PD), Socrates is imagining being challenged by someone to
justify his making judgments about what is fine when he is not able to say
what the fine is. It is certainly tempting to think that what lies behind
such a challenge is a commitment to (PD), according to which Socrates
cannot know "whose speechor any other actionis finely presented or
not" unless he knows what the fine is.
However, several things about this passage should make us just a little
bit cautious about attributing too much to Socrates. To begin with,
Socrales is imagining what someone might say in issuing a challenge to
him, so Socrates himself provides the formulation of the challenge. But
we should not necessarily suppose that any degree of failure to meet the
challenge is tantamount to complete defeat, either. Should we attribute to
Socrates, for example, the view that anyone who cannot say what fine-
ness is would be better off dead?
Indeed, how would Socrates answer the challenging question, "And
wrhen you're in a state like that, do you think it's any better for you to live
than die?" Presumably, he would acknowledge that, yes, he was, indeed,
ignorant of what fineness is. He could then explain that even though "the
unexarruned life is not worth living for men" (Apology 38a [T2.20]), it is
none the less true that the "examined life" ivas worth living and then ex-
plain that he was, indeed, living an "examined life," In other words, it is
not only possible, it is, in fact, very likely that Socrates would reject what
appears to be the presumption behind this challenge.
The same sort of possibility exists with the other part of the challenge
Socrates imagines here. "How will you know whose speechor any
other actionis finely presented or not, when you are ignorant of the
fine?" This question challenges Socrates' ability to judge fine speeches or
other fine things. But we do not need to accept what might appear to be
the presumption behind this challenge, that without knowing what fine-
ness is, we could never know that any speech was finely presented or that
anything was fine. Socrates might well reply that without knowing what
fineness is, he could never count as an expert judge of fine things. But to
concede that much is not at all to concede that he is incapable of knowing
that anything at all is fine. As we argued in the last section, he might
know about some fine things, as ordinary people do, without being an ex-
pert- Socrates' imaginary challenger, then, makes the challenge to warn
Socrates that he has no right to act as if he is an expert about fineness. But
just because one is not an expert, it does not follow that one has no
knowledge at all in the relevant area.
116 Socrates on Knowledge and Ignorance
Recall (from T3.6) that Socrates does claim to know that good people are
not unjust Socrates therefore does know something about justice and
Socrates on Knowledge and Ignorance 119
goodness. But he does not have the kind of knowledge that he wants, and
without that kind of knowledge there will remain many, many things he
would like to know about justice and virtue and happiness that he does
not know. And. he is sure that if he can ever come to have knowledge of
definitions, all the rest he would like to know will follow.
Notes
Suggested Readings
Socratic Values
123
124 Socratic Values
SOCRATES: With seafarers, too, and those who make money in other
ways, the thing they're doing at the time is not the thing they
wantfor who wants to make dangerous and troublesome sea
voyages? What they want is their being wealthy, the thing for the
sake of which, I suppose, they make their voyages. It's for the sake
of wealth that they make them.
POLUS; Yes, that's right.
SOCRATES: Isn't it just the same in all cases, in fact? If a person does
anything for the sake of something, he doesn't want this tiling that
he's doing, but the thing for the sake of which he's doing it?
Polus: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now is there anything that isn't either good nor bad, or,
what's in between them, neither good nor bad?
POLUS: There can't be, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Do you say that wisdom,, health, wealth,, and the like are
good, and their opposites bad?
POLUS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And by things which are neither good nor bad you mean
things which sometimes partake of what's good, sometimes of
what's bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting or walking,
running or making sea voyages, or stones and, sticks and the like?
Aren't these the ones you mean? Or are there any others that you
can call neither good nor bad?
POLUS: No, these are the ones.
SOCRATES: Now whenever people do things, do they do these
intermediate things for the sake of good, ones or the good ones for
the sake of the intermediate ones?
POLUS: The intermediate ones for the sake of the good ones, surely.
would make a sea voyage, which is itself neither good nor bad. We do not
try to explain why we pursue what we assume is good by citing that it
will achieve what is neither good nor bad.
Of course, the good that is the immediate aim of some particular desire
might itself be desired not for what it is but for its usefulness in achieving
some other good. For instance, we might seek to help a stranger in trouble
in order to be well thought of by others, and we might wish to be well
thought of by others in order to make our parents happy. In this case, we
regard the immediate goal of our action as a means to some further end,
which is in turn valued as a means to some yet further end. But as
Socrates points out in the Lysis, if this way of explaining action is to make
sense, there must be at least one thing that we desire for its own sake and
not merely for the sake of something else. There, Socrates uses the expres-
sion "being friend to something for the sake of something" to express the
idea of wanting something as a good for the sake of some further good.
T4.2 Lysis 219c-d:
Socrates stops short of saying that there is a single "first friend," that is,
a single first principle for the sake of which we do everything.2 To this
point, all Socrates establishes is that whenever we desire something for
the sake of something else, there must be something that we desire for its
own sake. Were there not something that we desire for its own sake, the
"something elses" we were pursuing would be an infinite regress, so the
idea that we desire for the sake of something else would be unintelligible.
But as Socrates goes on, it appears that he thinks there must be a single
first principle.
126 Socratic Values
(Socrates speaking) When we talk about all the things that are our friends for
the sake of another friend, it is clear that we are merely using the word
"friend," The real friend is surely thai in which all these so-called friendships
terminate.
Nowhere in the Lysis does Socrates tell us what this single friend is "in
which all other friends terminate," but as we shall see, Socrates has an
opinion about the matter.
Even if Socrates thinks that what is good for us is only being just to or
helping others, it is clear that he thinks that the reason we are just to oth-
ers can only be that doing whatever it is we are doing is good for us.
We can perhaps see more clearly that this is Socrates' view of rational
motivation by turning to a famous passage in the Meno, Here, we see
Socratic Values 127
Socrates explaining to Meno why he, Meno, does not really believe that
anyone ever pursues what they perceive as an evil,3
T4.5 Mmo 77e-78b (= T5.17):
(Socrates speaking first, with Meno responding) Well then, those who you
say desii'e bad things, believing that bad things harm their possessor, know
that they'll be harmed by them?
Necessarily.
And do they not think that those who are harmed are miserable to the ex-
tent that they are harmed?
That too is inevitable.
And that those who are miserable are unhappy?
I think so.
Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy?
I don't think so, Socrates.
No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such. For
what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them?
You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants what is bad.
Socrates' explanation of why no one wants what is bad once the person
recognizes that it is bad is really very straightforward. Bad things harm
their possessor and no one wants to be harmed because being harmed
makes one (to that extent) miserable and no one wants to be miserable.
But if Socrates thinks, as the context suggests he does, that happiness and
misery, good and evil, and benefit and harm, are exclusive pairs, we can
infer that Socrates thinks that just as people do not desire what they be-
lieve to be evil because evils move them in the direction of misery, so all
people desire what they believe to be good because they will be made
happier thereby and everyone wants to be made happier. We can now see
why Socrates values virtue. He values it because its possession will make
the possessor happier. Socrates, then, thinks that virtue pays and that be-
ing immoral never pays.
to offer an explanation of why and how being moral always makes one
better off. The influence his theory had on his Greek-speaking philosoph-
ical successors was enormous, for although they differed with Socrates
about what happiness itself is and exactly how it is related to being moral,
each of them, in one way or another, accepted his twin claims that our
own happiness is always everyone's ultimate goal and that moral excel-
lence always makes us better off with respect to that ultimate goal.
The Greek word ordinarily translated as "happiness" is euduimonia,
which is why scholars ordinarily call Socrates' approach to ethics an ex-
ample of "eudaimonism." One is committed to eudaimonism by accept-
ing what we might call the Principle, of Eudaimonism:
Principle of Eudaimonism: Happiness is everyone's ultimate goal, and
anything that is good is good only insofar as it contributes to this goal.
Socrates' conviction that people desire happiness (and its equivalents,
living well and doing well) as their ultimate goal and deske everything
else that they desire because they think it will contribute to their happi-
ness is, therefore, plainly an example of the eudaimonistic approach to
ethics. It is interesting that in saying that happinessone's own happi-
nessis our ultimate goal, Socrates does not take himself to be making a
deep or controversial philosophical claim. Not only does the principle
seem to Socrates to be obviously true, but it seems obviously true to oth-
ers when he brings it up. As a result, nowhere do we find him arguing for
the Principle of Eudaimonism.
T4.6 Euthydemus 278e:
(Socrates speaking) Do all men wish to do well? Or is this question one of the
ridiculous ones that I was afraid of just now? I suppose it is stupid even to
raise such a question, since there could hardly be a man who would not wish
to do well.
No, there is no such person, said Clinias,
Well, then, I said, the next question is, since we wish to do well, how are
we to do so? Would it not be through having many good things? Or is this
question still more simple-minded than the other, since this must obviously
be the case too?
Although Socrates thinks that virtue pays by always being good "for
us," it is not clear at this point in precisely what way it is good for us,
Socrates may think that it benefits its possessor by actually being a part of
happiness. If so, we would say that Socrates thinks of virtue as a compo-
nent or a constituent good. On the other hand, Socrates might think that
virtue is beneficial because, and only because, it somehow causes its pos-
sessor to be better off with respect to happiness. In this case, though
Socratic Values 129
virtue is always a good, its goodness resides in its causal power to pro-
duce something else that makes its possessor happy. If it is its power to
cause happiness that makes virtue a good, then he regards it as what
philosophers call an instrumental good.
(Socrates speaking) Would you say, Protagoras, that some people live well
and others live badly?
Yes.
But does it seem to you that a person lives well, if he is distressed and in
pain?
No, indeed.
Now, if he completed his life, having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to
vou to have lived well?
130 Socratic Values
Later, toward the end of this part of the dialogue, Socrates sums up
what they have found.
T4.8 Protagoras 356e-357b (immediately follows T5.22):
(Socrates speaking) Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say 1 am, you will
not harm me more than yourselves. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm
me in any way; he could not harm me, for 1 do not think it is permitted that a
better man be harmed bv a worse.
Socratic Values 133
Although it is always cited by those who endorse the idea that virtue is
sufficient for happiness, this passage is less helpful than it is typically
claimed to be, for Socrates leaves open the possibility that the virtuous
could be the victim of all sorts of devastating evils caused by norunoral
sources.
A second passage in the Apology, however, is typically read as closing
off just this possibility. Here, Socrates is trying to encourage those jurors
who voted for his acquittal that good people need not fear death.
T4.10 Apology 41c-d (= T7.4):
(Socrates speaking) You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentle-
men of the jury, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be
harmed either in life or in death and that his affairs are not neglected by the
gods.
But this passage also falls short of endorsing the sufficiency of virtue
for happiness, however. Even if we simply assume that the good person
Socrates refers to is the virtuous person9 and also that Socrates means to
claim that the virtuous person can never suffer any evils at all, all that fol-
lows from what he says is that the virtuous person will never be miser-
able. But, of course, from the fact that the virtuous cannot be miserable, it
does not follow that they are always happy. Moreover, we cannot simply
assume that Socrates thinks that someone who possesses one good,
namely, virtue, and who suffers no evils is happy, without begging the
question regarding whether virtue really is sufficient for happiness,
Two other passages seem, to offer even more explicit support for the
claim that the possession of virtue is always, by itself, enough to guaran-
tee the happiness of its possessor. Consider the following exchange be-
tween Socrates and, the Sophist Thrasyrnachus in Book 1 of the Republic,
Socrates has just gained the admission from Thrasymachus that the func-
tion of the soul is "taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like"
(353d). Socrates then proceeds to draw the following inference regarding
virtue and happiness.
T4.ll Republic 1.353d-354a:
(Socrates speaking) And don't we also say that there is a virtue of a soul?
(Thrasymachus speaking) We do.
Then, wilJ a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is de-
prived of its peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?
It's impossible,
Doesn't it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things badly
and that a good soul does all these things well?
It does.
134 Socratic Values
Now, we agreed that justice is a soul's virtue, and injustice its vice?
We did.
Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an unjust
one badly.
Apparently so, according to your argument.
And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy, and anyone who
doesn't is the opposite.
Of course.
Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.
sity thesis. In the first, Socrates has been verbally sparring with young Po-
lus, who thinks he can refute Socrates' claim that being just is always bet-
ter than being unjust merely by pointing to the life of the king of Persia,
who was widely envied for the enormous pleasures he enjoyed,
T4.13
POLUS: It's obvious, Socrates, that you won't even claim to know that
the Great King is happy,
SOCRATES: Yes, and that would be true, for \ don't know how he
stands in regard to education and justice,
POLUS: Really? Does all happiness depend, on that?
SOCRATES: Yes, Polus, so I say anyway, I say that the admirable and
good person, man or woman, is happy, but that one who's unjust
and wicked is miserable,
If "all happiness depends on justice," then no one is happy who lacks jus-
tice.
The second passage occurs later in the same dialogue, after Socrates
has shown that the best life cannot be one of enjoying limitless pleasures,
as Socrates' new opponent, Callicl.es, had been urging.
T4.14 Gorgias 507c-e:
(Socrates speaking) . . . So this is how 1 set down the matter, and 1 say that
this is true. And if it is true, then a person who wants to be happy must evi-
dently pursue and practice self-control. Each of us must flee away front lack
of discipline? as quickly as his feet will carry him, and. must above all make
sure that he has no need of being disciplined, but if he does have that need,
either he himself or anyone else in his house, either a private citizen or a
whole city, he must pay his due and. must be disciplined, if he's to be happy,
This is the target which ! think one should look to in living, and in his actions
he should direct all of his own affairs and those of his city to the end that jus-
tice and self-control will be present, in one who is to be blessed.
Since, for reasons we give in the next chapter, Socrates believes that any-
one who possesses justice and self-control must also possess the other
virtues (piety, courage, and wisdom) as well, and so be completely virtu-
ous, Socrates seems to be committing himself to the view that virtue is re-
quired for happiness. No one can be happy without possessing virtue,
Let us now turn to the third way in which virtue seems to be a unique
component of happiness. According to the sovereignty of virtue thesis,
Socrates holds the commonsense view that happiness can have more than
136" Socratic Values
one component good and that the more component goods one has, the
happier one isprovided of course that one is virtuous. Thus, although
virtue is sufficient for happiness according to the sovereignty of virtue
thesis, someone who possesses virtue and some other component good is
happier than someone who possesses only virtue without the other good.
Moreover, virtue is the power by which something that would otherwise
not be a good at all is transformed into a good. Consider the following
reason Socrates gives his jurors for making the acquisition of virtue their
first concern.
T4.15 Apology 30a~b (part of longer quote at T2.25):
(Socrates speaking) Well then, what kinds of existing things are good for us?
Or, perhaps this isn't a difficult question and we don't need an important
personage to supply the answer because everyone would say that to be rich
is goodisn't that so?
Very much so, he [Clinias] said.
And so with, being healthy, and handsome, and having a sufficient supply
of the other things the body needs?
He agreed.
And again, is it clear that noble birth, and power, and honor in one's coun-
try are goods.
He agreed.
Then which goods do we have left? I said. What about being self-con-
trolled and just and brave? For heaven's sake tell me, Clinias, whether you
think we will be putting these in the right place if we class them as goods or
if we refuse to do so? Perhaps someone might quarrel with us on this point
how does it seem to you?
They are goods, said Clinias.
Socratic Values 137
Very well, said 1, And where in the company shall we station wisdom?
Among the goods, or what shall we do with it?
Among the goods.
Now be sure we do not leave out any goods worth, mentioning.
I don't think we are leaving out any, said Clinias.
But I remembered one and said, Good heavens, Clinias, we are in danger
of leaving out the greatest good of all!
Which one is that? He said.
Good fortune, Clinias, which everybody, even quite worthless people,
says is the greatest of the goods.
(Socrates speaking) And also, I said, with regard to using the goods we men-
tioned firstwealth and health and beautywas it knowledge that ruled
and directed our conduct in relation to the right use of all such things as
these, or some other thing?
It was knowledge, he [Clinias] said.
Then knowledge seems to provide men. not only with good fortune but
also with, well-doing, in every case of possession or action.
He agreed.
Then in heaven's name, 1 said, is there any advantage in other possessions
without good sense and wisdom? Would a man with no sense profit more if
he possessed and did much or if he possessed, and did little? Look at it this
way: if he did less, would he not make fewer mistakes; and if he made fewer
mistakes, would he not do less badly, and if he did less badly, would he not
be less miserable?
Yes, indeed, he said.
And in which case would one do less, if one were poor or if one were rich?
Poor, he said.
And if one were weak or strong?
Weak,
And if one were held in honor or dishonor?
In dishonor.
And if one were brave and self-controlled would one do less, or if one
were a coward?
A coward.
Then the same would be true if one were lazy rather than industrious?
He agreed.
138 Socratic Values
And slow rather than quick, and dull of sight and hearing rather than
keen?
We agreed with each other on all points of this sort.
So, to sum up, Qinias, 1 said, it seems likely that with regard to all of the
things we called good in the beginning, the correct account is not that in
themselves they are good by nature, but rather as follows: if ignorance con-
trols them, they are greater evils than their opposites, to the extent that they
are capable of complying with a bad master; but if good sense and wisdom
are in control, they are greater goods. In themselves, however, neither sort is
of any value.
It seems, he said, to be just as you say.
Then what is the result of our conversation? Isn't it that, of the other
things, no one of them, is either good or bad, but of these two, wisdom is
good and ignorance bad?
He agreed.
According to T4.17, Socrates thinks that the items other than wisdom
that can be good are, in themselves, neither good nor bad. They are bad
things for their possessor if their possessor is ignorant But if their posses-
sor is wise, those same items are goods because wisdom ensures that they
will be advantageous to their possessor. Thus, when Socrates says at the
end of T4.17 that only "wisdom is good and ignorance bad," he means
that only wisdom is always good, just because of what it is and only igno-
rance is always bad just because of what it is. Everything else that is good
or bad is so depending on whether it is used through wisdom or igno-
rance. In short, anything other than wisdom that is good has its goodness
dependent on the agent's wisdom. Beauty, power, and the other items
mentioned by Socrates in T4.16 and T4.17 can be good. But they can also
be bad. Whether they are beneficial or damaging to the well-being of their
possessor depends entirely upon whether their possessor is wise or igno-
rant.
We are now in a position to see why Vlastos thinks that this should be
called Socrates' sovereignty of virtue thesis. Vlastos takes the various
items that have been transformed into goods by wisdom to be components
of happiness. Moreover, they augment the happiness that wisdom or
virtue secures just by itself, but only because virtue ensures that they ac-
tually benefit their possessor. Bui virtue differs from the various items
that can become goods in another way as well. Riches and power can al-
ways be taken away by others. Beauty can turn to ugliness by accident or
disease. The respect of others depends on what others believe about you,
so even the most respected people can quickly become objects of derision.
The sufficiency of virtue thesis, however, ensures that even if these other
goods are lost, owing to the vicissitudes of human life, virtue by itself en-
Socratic Values 139
sures that the virtuous person will, be happy. Moreover, the necessity of
virtue thesis ensures that no amount of other things could ever be worth
more than virtue by itself.
4.2.3 A Problem:
Is Virtue Really Sufficient for Happiness?
As we have seen, there are a number of passages that can be plausibly
cited in support of the sufficiency of virtue thesis, according to which
nothing can make individuals less than minimally happy as long as they
possess virtue. But there are two texts in which Socrates seems to be say-
ing the opposite. In the first, Socrates is discussing with his friend Crito
whether we should concern ourselves with what most people say about
how to take care of the body or whether wre should listen, instead, only to
the person with the relevant expertise, the physician.
T4.18 Crito 47d-48a (immediately precedes T6.6):
It is the first part of this passage that presents the problem for the suffi-
ciency of virtue thesis. Although wisdom guarantees that the virtuous
person will never do what is wrong, it cannot protect the person from
ever falling victim to a debilitating and, painful disease so terrible that it
would make the virtuous person prefer to be dead. But there is no reason
to think that such a disease would necessarily destroy the virtuous per-
140 Socratic Values
son's virtue,12 After ail, bearing in mind that Socrates thinks of virtue as a
kind of knowledge, there is no reason to think that Socrates believes that
the possession of a diseased body somehow necessarily makes the soul
ignorant in the relevant way. But since having a life that is not worth liv-
ing is incompatible with happiness and vet is compatible with virtue, this
passage would appear to show that Socrates does not think virtue by it-
self is enough to make its possessor happy.
Socrates makes the same point toward the end of the Gorgias when he
points out to Callides that a ship captain who saves someone from death
may or may not have done a good thing, for the ship captain never knows
which of his passengers he has benefited when he conducts them safely
across the sea. That is why the thoughtful ship captain does not demand a
great reward for the safe passage.
T4.19 Gorgias 511e-512b:
(Socrates speaking),, . And the man who possesses this craft [of sailing] and
who has accomplished these feats, disembarks and goes for a stroll along the
seaside and beside Ms ship with a modest air. For he's enough of an expert, 1
suppose, to conclude that it isn't clear which ones of his fellow voyagers he
has benefited by not letting them drown in the deep, and which ones he has
harmed, knowing that they were no better either in body or soul when he set
them ashore than they were when they embarked. So he concludes that if a
man afflicted with serious incurable physical diseases did not drown, this
man is miserable for not dying, and has gotten no benefit from him. But if a
man has many incurable diseases in what is more valuable than his body, his
soul, life for that man. is not worth living, and he won't do him any favor if
he rescues him from the sea or from prison or from anywhere else. He knows
that for a corrupt person it's better not to be alive, for he necessarily lives
badly
or. plenty to drink but didn't drink any, would we derive any advantage
from these things?
Certainly not, he said.
Well then, if every workman had all the materials necessary for his partic-
ular job but never used them, would he do well by reason of possessing all of
the things a workman requires? For instance, if a carpenter were provided
with all his tools and plenty of wood but never did any carpentry, could he
be said to benefit from their possession?
Not at all, he said.
Well then, if a man had money and all of the good, things we were men-
tioning just now but made no use of them, would he be happy as the result
of having these good things?
Clearly not, Socrates.
So it seems, I said, that a man who means to be happy must not only have
such goods but must use them too, or else there is no advantage in having
them.
You are right.
Then are these two things, the possession of good things and the use of
them, enough to make a man happy, Clinias?
They seem so to me, at any rate.
If, I said, he uses them rightly, or if he does not?
If he uses them rightly.
In this passage, we learn that it is not the mere possession of goods that
makes one happy; it is the right employment of those goods. If so, the
sovereignty of virtue thesis is guilty of what philosophers caE a "category
mistake," for it claims that happiness, as Socrates conceives it, consists of
various component goods, whereas in T4.20, we learn that Socrates thinks
of happiness as the right employment of the right possessions. But if so, it
is also a mistake to think that for Socrates, virtue is valuable just for what
it is. Its value resides solely in its power as a craft after all. The value of
virtue is its power to produce the right sorts of action, which presumably
is the characteristic product of virtue.
It is important to notice that if we understand the Socratic conception of
happiness as consisting of right activity we can avoid saddling Socrates
with a morally questionable view of how the various items he lists in
T4.16 as potential goods contribute to happiness. It follows from that sov-
ereignty of virtue thesis that not only are we happier, according to
Socrates, when we possess more things such as money and honor when
they are accompanied by wisdom but we are even happier still when we
possess more of those things. Provided that one is morally wise, the richer
one is the better off one is; the more powerful one is, the better off one is,
and so forth. We are left, however, with utterly no explanation of why
Socratic Values 143
The reason that the unjust person who escapes punishment has the
worst life of all, as Socrates later tells Callicles in the Gorgias (507c), is that
such a person is bound to "do badly and so be miserable." Because living
unjustly is misery and since virtue ensures that one will never live un-
justly, virtue guarantees that one will never be miserable,
surely is, then, at least sometimes, Socrates says that virtue indemnifies
its possessor against the loss of happiness, in which case, Socrates is com-
mitted, at least sometimes, to the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happi-
ness. Moreover, one might argue that T4.ll and T4.12 could not be
plainer: Both claim that the virtuous person will always live well,
But before we convict Socrates of inconsistency on such an important
matter, let us look more carefully at the passages that seem to favor the
sufficiency thesis. Notice that both T4.9 and T4.10 appear in the Apology.
Let us consider, then, yet another passage that also appears in the same
work. When it becomes time for Socrates to tell the jury what sort of
counterpenalty he thinks he deserves, he states that there are some things
he cannot propose because they would be evils,
T4.22 Apology 37b-c:
Since I am, convinced that I wrong no one, I am not likely to wrong myself, to
say that I deserve some evil and to make some such assessment against my-
self. What should I fear? That I should suffer the penalty Meletus has as-
sessed against me, of which 1 say that 1 do not know whether it is a good or
bad? Am I to choose in preference to this something that 1. know very well to
be an evil and assess the penalty at that?
it is, even virtue can be lost through disease or accident that has a cata-
strophic effect on one's abilities to know, think, or reason. Even the most
virtuous person might have a devastating stroke, or get Alzheimer's dis-
ease, or be the victim of a horrible accident. Such events would obviously
be evils, for if wisdom is lost, virtue itself is lost. Thus, when Socrates says
in T4.10 that "a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death," he
can mean only that no evil conies to one's soul as long as one remains
morally upright (as Socrates himself did). Socrates' message to the jurors
who voted for his acquittal, then, seems to be this: Although even virtu-
ous people are always in danger of losing their virtue through some form
of misfortune, they can be sure that as long as they are virtuous, no one
and nothing can harm their most precious possession, which is their soul,
Bui even if the reading of T4.9 and T4.10 we are suggesting is correct,
we have not yet shown that Socrates has a coherent conception of the re-
lationship between virtue and happiness. Are not T4.ll and T4.12, one
might ask, clear and unequivocal endorsements of the sufficiency of
virtue thesis? We think not. Before we concede that Socrates' position on
the value of virtue is just hopelessly confused, perhaps we should ask
whether in saying that the virtuous person will always live well, Socrates
is saying (1) those who possess virtue are bound to be happy regardless of
what circumstances they find themselves in, or (2) that virtuous people
are bound to be happy provided they have at least the minimal number of
nonmoral items of the sort mentioned in T4.16 that are necessary for vir-
tuous action. If Socrates means (1), then his remarks about the relation-
ship between virtue and happiness are simply contradictory after all.
Plainly, there can be no clearer violation of the Principle of Charity in inter-
pretation than this! However, if Socrates really intends (2), his remarks
are not inconsistent, but one might begin to wonder if (2) really satisfies
the Principle of Interpretive Plausibility and the Principle of Textual Fidelity,
But in the dialogues in which T4.ll and T4.12 appear, the Gorgias and the
Republic, respectively, the issue between Socrates and his opponents is
wrhether justice is more valuable than injustice, not whether justice is suf-
ficient for happiness. Thus, relieving his interlocutors of their false view
of the value of injustice does not require that Socrates hold (1), as op-
posed to (2). Moreover, since T4.19, which also appears in the Gorgias, im-
plies that virtuous people can suffer evils that would make their lives not
worth living, we should attribute (2) to Socrates rather than convicting
him of an obvious contradiction about such an important matter within a
single dialogue. Finally, if (2) is the preferred interpretation of T4.ll, we
should assume that (2) also gives us the proper interpretation of T4.12,
the passage in Republic 1, since there seems to be no good reason to think
that Socrates is making different points in the two passages. Since (2) is,
then, a plausible understanding of what Socrates has to say in all of these
Socratic Values 147
tion to Hades once we are dead, where only good judges "sit in judg-
ment."13 The idea seems to be that good people have nothing whatever to
fear from good judges. But migration to Hades, Socrates goes on, will be
especially wonderful for him because good judges will never prevent him
from, questioning and. testing those who are there.
T4.23 Apology 41a-c (partially repeats, then continues T7.23);
Again, what would one of you give to keep company with Orpheus and
Musaetis, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times if that is true.
It would be a wonderful way for me to spend my time whenever I met
Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telemon, and any other of the men of old
who died through an unjust conviction, to compare my experience with
theirs. 1 think it would be pleasant. Most important, 1. could spend my time
testing and examining people there, as I do here, as to who among them is
wise, and who thinks he is and is not. What would one not give, gentlemen
of the jury, to examine the man who led the great expedition against Troy or
Odysseus, or Sisyphus, and innumerable other men and women one could
mention. It would be an extraordinary happiness to talk with them, to keep
company with them, and to examine them.
because
Yet surely Socrates says what he does in T4.10 to reassure those jurors in
the audience that no harm can come to his soul. If so, Socrates believes
that
But (5) obviously contradicts (1), Somewhere, then, one might argue, our
thinking about Socrates' view of the value of virtue has gone wrong.
We believe that this attempt to find a contradiction in the view we are
attributing to Socrates rests on a non sequitur. Specifically, we think that
the mistake is in inferring (5) from (4), We think the inference does not fol-
low because we think that Socrates draws a sharp distinction between be-
ing a good person, on the one hand (that is, a person who possesses many
right beliefs both about what sorts of policies to follow in one's life and
many right beliefs about what actions are the right ones to perform, in
particular circumstances), and a virtuous person, on the other hand (a
person with the moral qualities Socrates is convinced that he lacks). Our
reasons for thinking that Socrates is prepared to accept (1} and so deny (5)
are precisely those we examined in Chapter 2, where we argued that
Socrates sincerely believes that he lacks moral wisdom and that he be-
lieves that virtue is a form of moral wisdom,. What we must now show is
that there is good reason to think that Socrates recognizes moral goodness
as a moral category distinct from virtue.
To begin with, in spite of the fact that he lacks wisdom, Socrates' speech
to the jury makes it clear that he considers himself vastly superior to most
of his fellow Athenians. He claims, for example, to be the only Athenian
alive to have always acted in such a way as to aim, at what is best (Corgias
521dT6.2). In one respect, his moral superiority derives from the fact
that unlike so many others in Athens, he is convinced that the best thing
one can do to improve one's life is to engage in philosophical examina-
tion.
T4.24 Apology 38a (part of longer quote at T2.21):
To the extent that most of his fellow Athenians fail to live by this precept,
they are at riska very substantial riskof pursuing goals that will turn
out disastrously for them. Because Socrates thinks that engaging in philo-
sophical examination, as he has done so scrupulously throughout so
much of his life, is the best way to root out false moral views, he has rea-
son to think that he is morally superior at least to most people. Even
though he lacks virtue just as they do, he is dedicated to living a moral
life as none of them are.
Not only does Socrates think that he is trying to lead a morally faultless
life, but according to the Apology, he believes that he has actually sue-
Socratic Values 151
Socrates plainly sees himself has someone who has done the city enor-
mous good and who has done no one any harm. If so, he has good reason
to think he is a good person, morally superior to all others he has encoun-
tered even though he lacks virtue,
life would have been happier had. he succeeded in his search for virtue,
Moreover, if, as seems likely, Socrates thinks that the gods do possess
moral wisdom and since they do riot need the sorts of things such as mor-
tals need to engage in virtuous activity, then he also thinks that the lives
of the gods are supremely happy. If this is right, even though he sees him-
self as a good person, Socrates has good reason to prize and to seek
virtue, and to think that one who had virtue would be vastly better off
than he has managed to be.
Third, Socrates is well aware that he is not like other people in that he
has a divine voice, a daitnonion, that frequently steers him away from
evils, large and small,15 For this reason, the fact that he has led a life that is
free of injustice is the result of guidance that is simply not available to
others. Where Socrates is turned away from evil by his divine sign, others
can only rely on their ability to reason, and the best sort of reasoning
about moral matters is that done by virtuous people. Thus, Socrates has
good reason to do what he says in the Apology he has always doneex-
hort others to make themselves "as wise as possible," for if and only if
they attain virtue can they be assured of acting rightly.
It is important to remember that the divine assistance Socrates receives
does not provide him with an absolute safeguard against wrongful ac-
tion. Although the daitnonion has come to him ever since he was a child,
Socrates is careful not to say that it always warns him. away whenever he
is about to do something evil. Thus, Socrates cannot infer from the silence
of the daimoniott that whatever it is that he is thinking about doing is actu-
ally permissible. Whenever the daimonwn fails to interfere and warn him,
Socrates must rely on his own power to discover whether he is acting
rightly. On those occasions when he lacks divine assistance and so must
reason for himself about what he ought to do, Socrates can never be en-
tirely confident that he has reached the right conclusion. Even though
Socrates' daitnonion allows him to avoid moral errors that others who lack
virtue would likely fall into and even though his own powers to reason
about how he ought to act are doubtless considerably more powerful
than those of others who lack virtue, Socrates is still vulnerable to moral
mistakes of the sort the virtuous person would not make. In an important
sense, then, Socrates has been lucky when he reaches the end of his life
and realizes that he has managed to have harmed no one. We can say that
"as it turns out," Socrates' life has been happy. Even with the assistance of
his divine warning and even with his commitment to reasoning about
how he ought to act, Socrates could have had no rational expectation that
his life would be free from, error. In this respect, his life stands in sharp
contrast to the virtuous person's, whose wisdom would allow such a per-
son unerringly to discern right from wrong and so live a life of right activ-
ity. Once again, then, Socrates has reason to exhort others, who lack his
Socratic Values 153
divine guidance, to pursue virtue and to pursue it himself until the Athe-
nians take Ms life away.
Notes
1. In fact, as we shall see below, Socrates denies that wealth and health are al-
ways good. He does, however, think that wisdom is always good, though he is
not trying to make that point in this passage in the Gorgias.
2. Aristotle is making the same point, it appears, in bk. 1, ch. 2 (1.094a18-22) of
the Nicomachean Ethics.
3. We discuss the full implications of this passage for Socrates' moral psychol-
ogy in Chapter 5.
4. The most influential recent defense of this position can be found in Irwin
(1977), 102-114, and (1995), 78-94.
5. This is the position Irwin takes regarding the Gorgias in Irwin (1977), 115-131,
and (1995), 111-117.
154 Socratic Values
Suggested Readings
tos's} can be found in Zevi (1982). We argued that Socrates thought that virtue
was necessary but not sufficient for virtue, in Brickhouse and Smith (1987), We
later changed our minds about the necessity of virtue for happiness, arguing that
good activity was both necessary and sufficient for happiness but that virtue was
neither necessary nor sufficient, in Brickhouse and Smith (1994, ch. 4),
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5
Protagoras is quick to respond, saying that the individual virtues are re-
ally just parts of a single thing, virtue. Socrates immediately points out
that Protagoras's answer is ambiguous, since it is not clear in what sense
the various virtues are parts. Once the problem is pointed out, Protagoras
leaves no doubt about how he thinks it is to be resolved.
T5.2 Protagoras 329d-330b (immediately follows T5.1):
By no means, since many are courageous but unjust, and many again are
just but not wise.
[ . . . ] And does each have its own unique power or function? In the anal-
ogy to the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ear, nor is its power or func-
tion the same, and this applies to the other parts as well: They are not like
each other in power or function or in any other way. Is this how it is with the
parts of virtue? Are they unlike each other, both in themselves and in their
powers or functions? Is it not clear that this must be the case, if our analogy
is valid?
Yes, it must be the case, Socrates,
tus. Although wisdom is not the same thing as the other virtuesre-
member, according to the equivalence thesis, all of the individual
virtues are different pieces of knowledgewisdom makes the unity of
the virtues possible, first, because wisdom is a necessary condition for
the possession of anv of the other virtues, and second, because wisdom
is sufficient for the possession of each of the others as well. Thus, on
Vlastos's understanding of Socrates' position, one cannot be courageous
or temperate, for example, unless one is also wise, and if one is wise, one
will be courageous and temperate as well. Still, wisdom, courage, tem-
perance, and the other individual virtues are each separate and distinct
powers of the soul.
Perhaps the strongest part of Vlastos's defense of the equivalence thesis
is its indictment of its principal rival, the identity thesis. First, Vlastos
bids us to consider Socrates' response to Euthyphro's attempt to teach
Socrates the definition of piety by citing a single example.2
T5.3 Euthyphro 6d-e (= T3.10):
SOCRATES: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two
of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious
actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious
and all pious actions pious through one form, or don't you
remember?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Tell roe then what this form, itself is, that 1 may look upon
it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's
that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.
Here Socrates is making two points: (1) that all pious acts are pious
through their possession of the same propertyor what Socrates calls a
"form"and (2) that the proper account of what that property is would
enable Socrates to identify correctly any and all instances of piety. Pre-
sumably, Socrates would say that the same two points apply to all of the
other individual virtues as well. Vlastos cites this passage because he
thinks that it would be absurd for Socrates to assert these two points and
to maintain the identity thesis, for that would entail that merely by learn-
ing the proper account of what piety is, Socrates would also be able
thereby to identify correctly all instances of all of the other virtues. It
would follow that from knowing what it is that makes pious acts pious,
one would able to say whether Socrates' behavior at the Battle of Deliurn,
for example, constituted an act of courage!
A second problem with the identity thesis, according to Vlastos, has to
do with the implication of the identity thesis that all of the individual
Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation 161
virtue names have the same definition.3 Vlastos thinks we should take se-
riously Socrates' suggestion to Euthyphro that the definition of justice is
broader than the definition of piety.
T5.4 Euthyphro 12e-d (immediately follows T5.8):
This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether where there is piety
there is also justice but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the
pious is a part of the just. Shall we say that, or do you think otherwise?
Were Socrates to think that all of the individual virtues have the same de-
finition, then one should be able to substitute any one virtue name for any
other virtue name without changing the meaning of a sentence. For exam-
ple, one would have to say that the sentences "Socrates is courageous"
and "Socrates is just" have the same meaning, on the hypothesis that
courage and justice are synonyms. But as Vlastos points out, we can see
that the hypothesis is absurd if we try to make the substitution of "jus-
tice" for "piety" in T5.4. The substitution would be nonsense, for justice
cannot be both a part of itself and distinct from the rest of justice, which is
precisely what Socrates says holds between piety and justice.
If Vlastos is right, the final argument of the Laches (197e ff.) presents yet
another problem for the identity thesis.4 Up to this point, Socrates has
been engaged with Laches and Nicias in an unsuccessful search for an ac-
count of what courage is. The argument, too long to quote in its entirety,
can be summarized as follows,5 It begins with Socrates reminding Nicias
of his earlier assertion that
(4) The knowledge of past evils, the knowledge of present evils, and the
knowledge of future evils is the same knowledge (198d-199a).
162 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
(5) Courage is the knowledge of past, present, and future goods and evils
(199b-c).
But since
(6) Anyone who has knowledge of all goods and evilspast, present, and fu-
turehas complete virtue (199d),
(7) Courage is not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue (199e), which di-
rectly contradicts (1),
Once the problem is out in the open, Socrates concludes that Nicias and
he have not discovered what courage is,
Vlastos is right in thinking that the argument itself only shows that we
cannot accept both (1) and (7) if the sense in which courage is said to be a
part in (1) contradicts the sense in which courage is said to be the whole
of virtue in (7). Nonetheless, we should not be persuaded by Vlastos's
claim that (7) is what Vlastos terms an "outrage to common sense" and
that Socrates expects us to see that (7) is outrageous.6 After all, many of
Socrates' most basic views are thoroughly at odds with what most people
think is plainly true. What we do find telling in favor of Socrates' accep-
tance of (1) is the fact that Plato has Socrates explicitly state that he,
Socrates, agrees with Nicias that courage is one of several parts of the
whole of virtue.
T5.5 Inches 198a-b:
of "justice" but the meaning of "justice" does not include the meaning of
"piety" and thus that when it is true to describe someone as a "just per-
son/' we are not thereby describing that individual as a "pious person,"
though, as a matter of fact, the just person will always turn out to be a pi-
ous person and vice versa, because what makes someone a just person
and what makes someone a pious person, according to the identity thesis,
is in fact the same thing, namely, moral knowledge,
But there is good reason to think that when Socrates refers to the "parts
of virtue" he does not simply mean that the individual virtue terms have
different definitions. In the Euthyphro, Socrates tried to bring Euthyphro
to an understanding of the notion of what it is to be "a part of" with the
following examples.
T5.8 Euthyphro 12c (immediately precedes T5,4):
SOCRATES: It is not right, then, to say that "where there is fear there is
also shame," but that where there is shame there is also fear, for
fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is a part of fear, just as
odd is a part of number, with the result that it is not true that
where there is number there is also oddness, but that where there
is oddness there is also number.
view, simply had not thought through how the individual virtues are re-
lated to each other and to the whole of virtue or that he had some reason to
represent the views of the character "Socrates" in one way in the Protagoras
and in a different way in other early dialogues in which "Socrates" en-
dorses the notion that each of the individual virtues are "parts."7 The for-
mer option is clearly the less attractive since it violates what in the intro-
duction to this book we called the Principle of Charity, for it implies that
Plato simply missed an obvious and important inconsistency.
Concerning the second option, as we argued in Chapter 1, we believe
that compelling evidence can be drawn from the corpus for the hypothesis
that Plato's philosophical views did not simply change as he matured but
actually underwent a number of radical transformations. These changes in
Plato's philosophical outlook can be seen most clearly in the differences in
philosophical doctrine between the early- and middle-period dialogues.
But as we also pointed out in Chapter 1, the developmentalist reading of
the Platonic corpus rests on two important claims: First, mere are a number
of apparent doctrinal developments between the early- and middle-period
works and, second, Aristotle, who was in an excellent position to know,
consistently refers to the doctrines we find in the middle and late periods as
Plato's. The problem with trying to solve apparent inconsistencies in doc-
trine within the early-period writings by trying to distinguish develop-
ments within the early period itself is the absence of supporting evidence.
At the very least, we would want some additional evidencedrawn from
passages other than those that bear on the unity of the virtuesthat Plato
began actually to modify what he recognized as Socratic viewpoints in the
early dialogues. Without such additional evidence, we believe that we
should look further for a way to reconcile Socrates' apparent commitment
to the identity thesis in the Protagoras with those passages in which he
seems equally committed to the nonidentity of the individual virtues either
with each other or with the whole of virtue.
(Socrates speaking): It seems to me that our discussion has turned on us, and
if it had a voice of its own, it would say, mockingly, "Socrates and Protago-
168 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
ras, how ridiculous you are, both of you. Socrates, you said earlier that virtue
cannot be taught, but now you are arguing the very opposite and have at-
tempted to show that everything is knowledgejustice, temperance,
couragein which case, virtue would appear to be eminently teachable. On
the other hand, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, as Protagoras has
been trying to say, then it would clearly he unteachable. But, if it turns out to
be wholly knowledge, as you now urge, Socrates, it would be very surpris-
ing indeed if virtue could not be taught."
Even though it is clear that Socrates has been "attempting to show that
everything is knowledge," his position still leaves room for the individual
virtues to be distinguished from each other and from the whole of virtue,
To see why, let us return for a minute to the two analogiesthe parts of
the face analogy and the pieces of gold analogywhich we see Socrates
presenting to Protagoras as different ways of understanding the relation-
ship between the individual virtues and the whole of virtue. It is signifi-
cant that Socrates presents the two analogies as if he thinks they are the
only reasonable candidates. Although Socrates does not actually say that
he believes that the parts of gold analogy is apt, it is reasonable to infer
that is precisely what he does believe. Otherwise, Socrates would be open
to the charge that he was being disingenuousby offering Protagoras a
false alternative, which actually hides some other option that Socrates
himself finds more apt. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that at the end
of the dialogue, after it has been shown that Protagoras made a mistake in
defending the parts of the face analogy, Socrates believes that the parts of
gold analogy is instructive.
It is also significant that the parts of gold to which Socrates refers can
be distinguished from each other in terms of their "greatness and small-
ness" (Protagoras 329d). Socrates does not say, "Isn't it true that what peo-
ple call the individual virtues are really just one tilinglike a single lump
of gold?" Our point here is that the analogy Socrates* himself apparently
endorses leaves some room for distinguishing individual virtues. How,
then, might they be distinguished?
pline and subdiscipline. We might think, in other words, that for Socrates,
an individual virtue, such as justice, stands to the whole of virtue in the
way that microeconomics stands to economics.8 We believe that this way
of understanding the relationship, however, is a mistake. As we have ar-
gued previously,'-' we believe that this analogy fails to fit the parts of gold
analogy. Our concern is that there is no guarantee that mastery of one
subdiscipline, such as microeconomics, ensures mastery of any of the
other subdisciplines, such as welfare economics, managerial economics,
or macroeconomics. Although there is no doubt considerable overlap
among the various subdisciplines of economics, we believe that expert
practitioners in one subdiscipline frequently (and accurately) claim to
have little or no expertise in any of the other subdisciplines, much less
about every one of the other subdisciplines. But expertise in each, of the
different moral areas with which the individual virtues are concerned is
precisely what is required by Socrates' commitment to the parts of gold
analogy.
You could tell me in far fewer words, if you were willing, the sum of what 1
asked, Euthyphro, but you are not keen to teach me, that's clear. You were on
the point of doing so, but you turned away. If you had given that answer, I
should now have acquired from you sufficient knowledge of the nature of
piety.
Here we see that different products imply different crafts. But might not
the same knowledge have different applications and so result in different
products?10 If so, what it is to be a craft, for Socrates, is not simply to be a
certain sort of knowledge but to be a certain sort of knowledge of the pro-
duction of some specific result, which is consistent with the same body of
knowledge being constitutive of two or more different crafts. To use an
example that we have used before,11 consider the way coastal navigation
and surveying stand to each other and to that body of knowledge called
triangulation.12 Notice first that coastal navigation and surveying are not
subdisciplines of triangulation. Yet each differs from triangulation and
from each other. The difference, however, is only in the different problems
they cire employed to solve: Coastal navigation locates a point at sea rela-
tive to a point on land and surveying takes the measurements of plots of
land. But notice also that although the problems the two are designed to
solve are sufficiently different to warrant our calling them by different
names, they are essentially the same problem1?, which is why we say of both
that they are really just examples of triangulation at work. In order to do
coastal navigation, one does not need any additional and special exper-
tise over and above what is required for surveying, and vice versa.
It should be clear at this point why we think Socrates can claim, on
the one hand, that all of the virtues are really the same thing and that
the individual virtues are distinct parts of virtue as a whole, on the
other. In saying that all of the virtues are the same thing, Socrates does
not mean that they cannot be distinguished in any sense from each
Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation 171
(Socrates speaking first, with Callicles replying) So, it's when a certain order,
the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it that it makes each of
the things that are, good?
Yes, I think so.
So, also a soul which lias its own order is better than a disordered one?
Necessarily so.
But surely one that has order is an orderly one.
Of course it is.
And an orderly soul is a self-controlled one.
Absolutely,
So a self-controlled soul is a good one. I for one can't say anything beyond
that, Callicles, my friend.
172 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
tells us that what constitutes courage is the same thing that constitutes all
of the virtues, the knowledge of good and evil.
If what we have said here is correct, Socrates' view of how the virtues
are related to each other and to the whole of virtue will continue to strike
many as paradoxical. Our goal has not been to remove the air of paradox
from what he says. Instead, we have tried to show that what is attributed
to Socrates throughout the early dialogues forms a consistent account.
His view preserves what common sense demands, namely, that the indi-
vidual virtues be seen as distinct from each other, and what he thinks
philosophical reflection also demands, namely, that each of the virtues is
really constituted by the same thing, moral wisdom. That he chooses to
express what he thinks in such a paradoxical way is exactly what we
would expect. Socrates was never one to make matters easy. On the con-
trary, wrhat Socrates says about the unity of the virtues is an excellent ex-
ample of how he intentionally brings out the confusions he finds in the
minds of those who converse with him in order to draw them into serious
reflection about what he sees as the most important of all matters, virtue.
Come now, Protagoras, and reveal this about your mind: What do you think
about knowledge? Do you go along with the majority or not? Most people
think this way about it, that it is not a powerful thing, neither a leader or a
ruler. They do not think of it in that way at all; but rather in this way: while
knowledge is often, present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge but
rather something elsesometimes desire, sometimes pleasure, sometimes
pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being ut-
terly dragged around by all these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does
the matter seem like that to you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a
fine thing capable of ruling a person, and if someone were to know what is
good and bad, then he would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than
as knowledge dictates, and intelligence would be sufficient to save a person?
[ . . . ] You realize that most people aren't going to be convinced by us. They
174 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
maintain that most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they
know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have asked them the reason
for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are over-
come by pleasure or pain or are being ruled by one of the things I referred to
just now.
Let us imagine some college roommates who know they have a philos-
ophy quiz the next day and who say that they know that studying tonight
would be the best thing for them to do and that even if they heard that
there was to be a party tonight they would not go. But later, when they ac-
tually hear that there is a party, they put down their books and attend it,
saying that their desire to go to the party just "got the better of them."
Their knowledge of what they should, have done, most people will say, is
just no match for the strength of their desire for the enjoyment they think
the party will provide. Their knowledge, most people will say, is being
"dragged about as if it were a slave."
Socrates thinks that most people are misdescribing what takes place
when they fail to do what they have said they recognize to be best for
them, for he thinks that knowledge is a "lordly thing" that can never be
overcome by a stronger passion or desire. As we consider why* Socrates
would think this, it is important to keep in mind that in denying that peo-
ple ever act contrary to their knowledge of what is best, Socrates is deny-
ing that they ever act contrary to their knowledge of what is best for them-
selves. This is called Socrates' "prudential paradox," It follows from the
prudential, paradox that those who know what is good for themselves
will do it, assuming mat they have the requisite opportunity to act. This
doctrine is sometimes stated as the aphorism often attributed to Socrates:
"To know the good is to do the good." But Socrates also believes that
those who know what is just, that is, what is morally right, and who
know that doing what is morally right is always better for the one doing
it, will always do what is morally right. This is called Socrates' "moral
paradox," Like the prudential paradox, many" people would initially be
inclined to dismiss what Socrates says on the ground that it is perfectly
obvious that people frequently know what morality requires of them and
that they would be better off doing what morality requires, but they fail
to do it even though they had ample opportunity to do so because some
competing desire not to do it was just too strong.
pie," According to Socrates, most people not only think that desire cart
overcome knowledge but also think that pleasure is the good and pain is
the evil, a view usually referred to as hedonism. Being overcome by a
stronger desire for pleasure, Socrates thinks, is what most people would
say is the most common cause of akrasia.
T5.15 Protagoras 355b-d:
(Socrates speaking) Just how absurd this is [knowledge of what is better be-
ing overcome by a desire for pleasure] will become very dear, if we do not
use so many names at the same time, "pleasant" and "painful," "good" and
"bad"; but since these turned out to be only two things, let us call them by
two names, first "good" and "bad," then later, "pleasant" and "painful," On
that basis, then, let us say that a man knowing bad things to be bad, does
them all the same. If then someone asks us: "Why?" "Having been over-
come," we shall reply, "By what? By what?" he will ask us. We are no longer
able to say "by pleasure," for that has taken on its other name, "the good" in-
stead of "pleasure"so we will say and reply that "he is overcome ...." "By
what," he will ask. "By the good," we will say "for heaven's sake!" If by
chance the questioner is rude he might burst out laughing and say: "What
you are saying is ridiculoussomeone does what is bad, knowing that it is
bad, when it is not necessary to do it, having been overcome by the good.
"So" he will say, "within yourself, does not the good outweigh the bad or
not?" We will clearly say in reply that it does not; for if it did, the person
whom we say is overcome bv pleasure would not have made any mistake.
"In virtue of what," he might say, "does the good outweigh the bad or the bad
the good? Only in that one is greater and one is smaller, or more and less."
We could not help but agree. "So clearly then," he will say, "by 'being over-
come' you mean getting more bad things for the sake of fewer good things."
That settles that, then.
Most people, then, think that in doing what they know is contrary to
their interest, people want to do wrhat is evil. But when one examines the
explanation of weakness that most people givethat those who are
weak-willed are "overcome by pleasure"the substitution of "good" for
"pleasure," which follows from most people's acceptance of hedonism,
allows us to say that "people sometimes do what they know to be evil
and so act from a desire for evil because they are acting from, a desire for
what is good," But as Socrates points out, this is sheer nonsense. One can-
not be motivated to do something by a desire to do what one takes to be
evil and also be motivated to do that same thing by a desire for what one
takes to be good. Since most people, hi Socrates' view, are not likely to
give up their commitment to hedonism, he concludes that it is their belief
in the possibility ofakmsia that they must give up.
176 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
(Socrates speaking and Polus responding) And don't we also put a person to
death, if we do, or banish him and confiscate his property because we sup-
pose that doing these things is better for us than not doing them?
That's right,
Hence, it is for the sake of what's good that those who do all these things
do them?
I agree.
Because he is so sure that we always act for the sake of what we take to
be good for us, Socrates is confident that Meno is mistaken when Meno
says, in a passage we looked at in Chapter 4, that there are people who do
what they recognize to be bad for them.
15.17 Meno 77e-78b (= T4.5):
(Socrates speaking first, with Meno responding) Well then, those who you
say desire bad things, believing that bad things harm their possessor, know
that they'll be harmed by them?
Necessarily,
And do they not think that those who are harmed are miserable' to the ex-
tent thai they are harmed?
That too is inevitable,
And that those who are miserable' are unhappy?
I think so.
Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy?
I don't think so, Socrates.
No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such. For
what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them?
You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants what is bad.
Socrates OK Wisdom and Motivation 177
Now, no one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad;
neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one be-
lieves to be bad instead of to the good. And when he is forced to choose be-
tween one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to
choose the lesser.
POLUS: Surely the one who's put to death unjustly is the one who's
both to be pitied and miserable,
SOCRATES: Less so than the one putting him to death, Polus, and less
than the one who's justly put to death.
POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?
SOCRATES: It's because doing what's unjust is actually the worst thing
there is.
POLUS: Really? Is that the worst? Isn't suffering what's unjust still
worse?
SOCRATES: No, not in the least.
POLUS: So you'd rather want to suffer what's unjust than do it?
SOCRATES: For my part, I wouldn't want either, but if it had to be one
or the other, I would choose suffering over doing what's unjust.
178 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
Because the prudential paradox guarantees that anyone who does what
is bad for him fails to recognize that it is bad for him and because, as we
see in T5.19, Socrates thinks that doing injustice is the worst of all evils,
Socrates must think that those who do what is unjust do not understand
that what they are doing is really harming themselves. If they did, they
would not have done it. As we learned in T5.17, no one wants to be mis-
erable.
(Socrates speaking and Meno responding) Do you know why you wonder,
or shall I tell you?
By all means tell me.
It is because you have paid no attention to the statues of Daedalus, but
perhaps there are none in Thessaly.
What do you have in mind when you say this?
That they too run, away and escape it* one does not tie them down, but re-
main in place if tied down.
So what?
To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a
runaway slave, for it does not remain, but is worth much if tied down, for Ms
works are very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opin-
ions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they
do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from, a
man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by
(giving) an account of the reason why . . . . After they are tied down, in the
first place they become knowledge and then they remain in place. That is
why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge dif-
fers from correct opinion in being tied down.
If one really knows something, Socrates thinks, nothing can persuade one
to change1 one's mind so that one thinks that one had previously been
mistaken and did not know. This is why Socrates thinks that knowledge
is a "lordly thing" and cannot be "dragged about as if it were a slave." Be-
cause our students changed their minds about whether going to the party
would be a good thing, they did notin spite of what they saidreally
know that they would be better off staying in to study. They merely be-
lieved that they should. They held what Socrates calls in T5.20 a "true
opinion." What they believed prior to hearing about the party, however,
could not have been knowledge, for had it been, it would have guided
their action accordingly.
everyone always acts on the basis of one sort of desire, what is usually
called a rational desire, or a desire for what one takes to be one's own
good. Indeed, many commentators have assumed that this is the only sort
of desire that Socrates recognizes,14 and the authors of this book also used
to think this was so.15 But we now think that Socrates is committed to the
existence of a second sort of desirea nonrational sort of desirenamely,
the desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain. After all, something
made our students change their minds about whether they should stay in
or go to the party, and it was not something they reasoned about, nor was
it merely finding out that there was a party. What makes someone who
sincerely believes smoking is bad for health go ahead and light up a ciga-
rette? That Socrates does think there are such desires is evident from the
following passage in the Laches. Here, Socrates is requesting that Laches
give him a definition of courage that will explain the various instances of
courage.
T5.21 Laches 191d-e:
(Socrates speaking) And I wanted to include not only those who are coura-
geous in warfare but also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones
who show courage in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again
I wanted to include not only those who are brave in the face of pain and fear
but also those who are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by
standing their ground or running awaybecause there are some men, aren't
there. Laches, who are brave in matters like these?
It is clear that Socrates thinks that the desires to avoid pain and to pur-
sue pleasure exert motivational influences on us that are independent of
what we think is good; otherwise, he would not think that the courageous
have been successful in their "fight" to act courageously. Socrates' lan-
guage here suggests that he thinks that a nonrational desire has the
power to overcome us. But since we always act for the sake of what we
take to be good, nonrational desire must be a causal power to make us be-
lieve that the pleasurable object to which we are attracted (or the painful
object from, which we are repelled) is good. Like perception and reason,
appetite itself can make our beliefs "move around like the statu.es of
Daedalus."
In Chapter 2, we explained why Socrates thinks the elenchos will not
generate moral knowledge, for it cannot completely certify the correct-
ness of any of the practitioner's beliefs. But now we see that Socrates has
an additional reason for exhorting the pursuit of virtue. Belief, as we see
in T5.20, is not "tied down" and so is always apt to "move around."
Virtue, by contrast, is stable. Its possessor can be confident that what is
known will, not appear to be true at some times and false at others. Virtue
Socrates OK Wisdom and Motivation 181
allows its possessor to see pleasure and pain for what they are. When a
particular pleasurable object is good, the virtuous person recognizes it as
such and pursues it. But when a particular pleasurable object is merely
pleasurable, the virtuous person recognizes it as such, too, and does not
pursue it Given the causal power of pleasure and pain to alter beliefs
about the good, we can see why Socrates would think that there is noth-
ing more valuable to us than virtue, the power always to recognize what
is really good and really evil. In the following passage taken from the Pro-
tagoras, Socrates has just pointed out how often perception can lead to
mistaken beliefs about what is large and small.
T5.22 Protagoras 356d-e (immediately precedes T4.8):
(Socrates speaking) If then our well-being depended upon this, doing and
choosing large things, avoiding and not doing the small ones, what would
we see as our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement or the
power of appearance? While the power of appearance often makes us wan-
der all over the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the same
things and regretting our actions and choices with respect to things large and
small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make the appearances lose
their power by showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly
rooted in the truth and would save our life.
Those who lack the "art of measurement" are vulnerable to the power
of appearance, for (in Socrates' analogy) they sometimes take what ap-
pears to be large to be large when it is not Of course, Socrates thinks that
our well-being depends upon choosing not the large instead of the small
but the good instead of the bad. Thus, he thinks that those who lack what
is really our "salvation in life"moral virtuewill sometimes mistake
what appears to be good for what is good. If we are right, their mistake
owes to the fact that what satisfies our appetite for pleasure and our aver-
sion to pain appears good to us unless that appearance is corrected by
knowledge. Thus it is that Socrates can say that those who lack our "sal-
vation in life" "wander around," "change their minds," and "regret"
what they do. Lacking knowledge of what is best, they succumb to the
power of what appears good. After their appetite has been satisfied, and
they no longer see what they have pursued as pleasurable, they "change
their minds" about whether it was really good after all and regret what
they have clone. Those who possess the knowledge of good and evil
"our salvation in life"are never fooled by what merely appears good,
for it "makes the appearances lose their power by showing us the truth."
Consequently, virtuous people pursue in their actions and choices what is
really good and find that they do not subsequently change their minds.
They have nothing to regret.
182 Socrates on Wisdom and Motivation
Notes
1. Vlastos (1981), 221-269, 418-423. Others who have defended versions of the
equivalence thesis include O'Brien (1967), 129, n, 16; Kraut (1984), 258-262; and
Santas (1964), The most influential version of the identity thesis is advanced by
Penner (1973), 35-68, Others include Frwin (1977), 86-90, and Woodruff (1976),
101-116, whose versions of this general view feature some differences from Pen-
ner's. This is plainly not the place for us to attempt a very specific review of the
subtleties of each of the many scholarly arguments on this issue.
2. Vlastos (1981), 226-227.'
3. Ibid., 227-228.
4. Ibid., 266-269.
5. The argument outlined here follows roughly Vlastos's way of construing the
argument. See ibid., 266.
6. Vlastos (1981), 267. Vlastos goes on to give other reasons for thinking that
Socrates actually rejects (7); see 267-268.
7. This suggestion has been made by Devereux (1992), 788-789.
8. This is the example used by Richard Kraut to illustrate the relationship be-
tween the whole and the parts of virtue. See Kraut (1984), 261-262.
9. Brickhouse and Smith (1994), 70, and Brickhouse and Smith (1997a), 320.
10. A very similar strategy was adopted by Ferejohn (1982), 1-21, who points
out that "the powers to perform different actions can be grounded in a single
property"(18). We wish to acknowledge that Ferejohn reached what we think is
the right view well before we did and we regret that we did not recognize that fact
until it was recently pointed out to us, after we had published essentially the same
view much later, in Brickhouse and Smith (1997). See also Ferejohn (1983-1984),
377-388.
11. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), 70-71, and (1997a), 321-323.
12. As we have noted in our earlier works, the example was suggested to us by
H. B. Miller, who may not agree that we are correctly applying the example to the
whole of virtue-parts of virtue relationship. Ferejohn uses the example of "the
power to ride motorcycles" and the "power to ride snowmobiles" to show how
two things can be "contingently identical,"
13. On this point, we are in. agreement with Santas (1971), 269.
14. For example, Irwin (1977), 78, and (1995), 52-53, 116; Vlastos (1991),
148-154.
15. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), chap. 3, and (1997b). Our views about
Socrates* theory of motivation and, especially, Socrates' recognition, that there are
both rational and nonrational desires have changed, largely because of an impor-
tant recent argument by Daniel Devereux (1995),
Suggested Readings
is Penner (1973). An excellent account of the reasoning behind both positions can
be found in Devereux (1992), which also provides an interesting argument that
the view of the unity of the virtues in the Protagoras and in the Ladies cannot be
reconciled and that the former may express what was essentially Socrates' posi-
tion and the latter Plato's own view of the unity of the virtues. Ferejohn (1982) de-
fends a way of reconciling the strong support for the identity thesis provided by
the Protagoras with the strong support for the equivalence view found in other
early dialogues. A similar account can be found in Brtckhouse and Smith (1994)
and'(1997a).
Socrates on Motivation
The standard view, that Socrates believes that adult human beings have only ra-
tional desires, is defended in Irwin (1977) and (1995). Brickhouse and Smith (1994)
recognize the possibility of nonrational impulses in Socratic philosophy. The best
challenge to the standard view is Devereux (1995), which provides an argument
that has influenced our presentation in this chapter,
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6
'185
186 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
It may seem strange that while I go around and give advice privately and In-
terfere in private affairs, 1 do not venture to go to the assembly and there ad-
vise the city. You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. I
have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition.
This began when. I was a child. It is a voice, and. whenever it speaks it turns
me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do
anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs,
and 1 think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, gentlemen of the jury,
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 187
that if 1 had long ago attempted to take part in politics, 1 should have died
long ago, and benefited neither you nor myself. Do not be angry with me for
speaking the truth; no man. will survive who genuinely opposes you or any
other crowd and prevents the occurrence of many unjust and illegal happen-
ings in the city. A man. who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a
public, life if he is to survive for even a short time.
These are not the words of a man dedicated to engaging in political "af-
fairs." We will return to Socrates' strange reference to his "divine or spiri-
tual sign" (Ms so-called daimonion) in the next chapter, but for now it is
enough to see that he has two reasons not to engage in political "affairs":
His daimonion opposes it, and such activity would actually be ill suited to
his pursuing his moral mission in Athens.
Given, such a ringing condemnation of the moral prospects of politics, it
is astonishing to find Socrates, in another passage, apparently claiming to
be more political than his fellow Athenians.
T6.2 Gorgias 521d:
I believe that I'm one of a few Atheniansso as not to say I'm the only one,
but the only one among our contemporariesto take up the true political
craft and practice the true politics.
It does not take subtle analysis to see how and why T6.1 and. T6.2 ap-
pear to conflict. But the appearance of conflict, in this case, is easily re-
moved, once we look more closely at the context of Socrates' remarks in
the two passages. There is genuine conflict here, notice, only if what
Socrates takes to be "truly the political craft" and "the true politics," in
the Gorgias passage, is the same as what he means by "public affairs," in
the Apology passage, and what he takes as the practitioner of "the true po-
litical craft," in the Gorgias, to be the same as the one who leads a "public
life," in the Apology. It is quite plain, however, that these identifications
should not be made.
served on the presiding committee of the Council (in 406 B.C.), and in the
Gorgias, he mentions a time when he actually served as the Council presi-
dent.1 But these positions were part of an Athenian's actual responsibili-
ties as a citizen, and Socrates would have been assigned to the Council it-
self by a random selection (many of Athens's most important political
positions were assigned by lot, including this one), and he would have
been put on the presiding committee and made president as a part of the
normal rotation of duties, to which all Council members were subject.
When Socrates says that he has not pursued "public affairs," therefore,
he is not claiming not to have taken on the ordinary allotment of civic du-
ties, as was legally required of all Athenian citizens. He means, instead,
that he has not stood for election (for example, as a generaloddly, one of
the few elected positions in Athens's democracy), has not volunteered his
opinions in formal addresses to the Athenian populace (for example, and
mainly, in the Assembly, where most of Athens's "political affairs" were
carried out and where all laws and official policies and other state deci-
sions were enacted),
In the Gorgias, Socrates is attacking the claim made by his sophistical
interlocutors thai rhetoric, as practiced by politiciansthat is, by those
leading the very kind of life he proclaims himself not to have led, in the
Apologyis a kind of craft knowledge (see Chapter 3, for discussion). At
464b-465e in that dialogue, Socrates distinguishes two branches of the
political craft (the judicial and the legislative, which deal with correction
and prevention of wrong, respectively) and contrasts these to what he re-
gards as mere imitations of these: rhetoric and sophistry, respectively. Ac-
cordingly, rhetoric and sophistry are not craft knowledge, after all, but
mere pretenders, impostors that mimic but have none of the actual merits
of the crafts they ape.
This claim, however, is shocking to Socrates' interlocutors in the Gor-
gias, for these men, like most Athenians, simply identify the rhetorical life
with the political life. Socrates makes this clear when he distinguishes this
sort of life with one like his own, spent in the pursuit of philosophy.
T6.3 Corgias SOGc:
(Socrates speaking) For you see don't you, that our discussion's about this
(and what would even a man of little intelligence take more seriously than
this?), about the way we're supposed to live. Is it the way you urge me to-
ward, to engage in these manly activities, to make speeches among the peo-
ple, to practice oratory, and to be active in the sort of politics you people en-
gage in these days? Or is it a life spent in philosophy?
The political life, in the context of this contrast, is a life, Socrates says,
that substitutes pleasure for any genuine good. Philosophy seeks to
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 189
garchic factions2 hi time and in some way or ways was (rightly) perceived
as supporting the violent overthrow of Athene's democracy.3
Four kinds of evidence are usually cited by those who see Socrates as
an opponent of democracy: (1) Socrates openly criticizes several of the
most basic tenets of Athens's democratic ideology; (2) Socrates is also
openly scornful of prominent Athenian democratic leaders, past and
present; (3) Socrates' own Mends and associates, as we find them identi-
fied in Plato's dialogues, include several of the most notorious figures in
Athens's troubled political landscape, and finally (4) there is ancient evi-
dence for supposing that Socrates' trial was not, as the formal charges
might suggest, about a religious issue but was actually politically moti-
vated. In this section, we consider these four issues, in order.
(Socrates speaking) Tell me, my good sir, who improves our young men?
(Meletus) The laws,
That is not what I am asking, but what person who has knowledge of the
laws to begin with?
These jurymen, Socrates,
How do you mean, Meletus? Are these able to educate the young and im-
prove them?
Certainly,
All of them, or some but not others?
All of them.
Very good, by Hera. You mention a great abundance of benefactors. But
what about the audience? Do they improve the young or not?
They do, too.
What about the members of the Council?
The Council-members, too.
But Meletus, what about the assembly? Do members of the assembly cor-
rupt the young, or do they all improve them?
They improve them.
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 191
All the Athenians, it seems, make the young into fine good men, except
me, and I alone corrupt them. Is that what you mean?
That is most definitely what I mean,
You condemn me to a great misfortune. Tell me: does this also apply with
horses do you think? That all men improve them and one individual cor-
rupts them? Or is quite the contrary true, one individual is able to improve
them, or very few, namely, the horse-trainers, whereas the majority, if they
have horses and use them, corrupt them? Is that not the case, Meletus, both
with horses and all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus
say so or not. It would be a very happy state of affairs if only one person cor-
rupted our youth, while the others improved them.
SOCRATES: We should not then think so much of what the majority will
say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and
injustice, the one, that is and the truth itself. So that, in the first place,
you were wrong to believe that we should care for the opinion of the
many about what is just, beautiful, good, and their opposites.
In these passages, and others like them (see also Protagoras 319a-328d,
Meno 92d-94e), Socrates shows that he finds no credibility in the idea that
the majority can teach anything of value to the youth and no special value
192 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
in majority rule or in the opinions of the many who would make the rules
in a democracy. He often characterizes the majority of people as morally
whimsical (see, for example, Crito 48c) and thoughtlessly ignorant on
even the most basic moral issues (see, for example, Crito 49c), disparaging
even the mode of discourse one would use to garner majority support for
some opinion, which, Socrates says, is "worthless, as far as the truth is
concerned" (Corgios 471e, see T6.7, below).
Given Socrates' contrasts of the ignorant "many" with the expert "few,"
it is understandably tempting to see, in Socrates' words, the ideology of
the oligarchic revolutionaries, who sought to overthrow Athens's democ-
racy and replace it with a government by a "few" (our word, "oligarchy"
comes from the Greek words otigos, "few," and arch?, "rule"). It is a temp-
tation, however, that we should resist Notice how Socrates characterizes
the "few" to whom we should defer on important issues: He contrasts the
ignorance of the many with the knowledge of the few. To whom was
Socrates referring, when he refers to these "few"Athens's oligarchic
revolutionaries? If so, then the oracle that proclaimed Socrates the wisest
of men (see Apology 21a-23b) was lyingfor now it seems there are at
least some "few" who are wiser than Socrates! Either that, or Socrales re-
gards himself as one of these "few" who have the knowledge the many
lack, in which case he is lying when he explains the meaning of the oracle
in this way: "This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates,
understands that his wisdom is worthless" (see T2.19).
In Chapter 2, we considered and rejected the claim that Socrates' own
profession of ignorance was insincere, and in Chapter 3, we showed how
Socrates might allow that people might have some kinds of knowledge
without contradicting the oracle about Socrates, for the only kind of
knowledge he recognizes in himself or anyone else falls far short of wis-
dom. This being so, however, it follows that there are, in fact, no specific
living "few" to whom Socrates could advocate giving political power, in
preference to the ignorant majorityfor any few he might select would
be no less ignorant than the majority. It is one thing to say that majority
rule is no way to get at the truth of an issue and quite another to say that
there is some minority in Athens who can give us such truth. It is one
thing to say that the majority of people corrupt the youth and quite an-
other to say that some specific minority in Athens do not corrupt them
and instead have the expertise to improve them. It is one thing to say that
the opinions of the majority of people are morally worthless and quite an-
other to say that there is some minority in Athens whose opinions are
morally wise. Socrates most certainly makes the first claims in each of
these pairs; but he would have to make the second claims in each pair to
count as being a supporter of the oligarchic faction in Athens. Instead, he
denies the second claims in the pairs with no less vehemence than that
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 193
with which he affirms the first claims, It is one thing to be a critic of de-
mocratic ideology and quite another to be an advocate for an oligarchic
overthrow of Athens's democracy. Socrates' views about the majority and
majority rule make him the former but not the latter,
We have also seen how Socrates does not count wealth as in any way
making its possessor any better than those who lack it, unless, of course,
its possessor also has virtue (see our discussion in Chapter 4, and. Apology
3GbT2.25), His scorn for the very superiority claimed by the oligarchs,
then, shows that Socrates would have no respect for the oligarchic ideol-
ogy, which held that political power should be reserved for those who are
"better" than others in virtue of their wealth and property. The entire ba-
sis of the oligarchic factions' claims to power, then, was for Socrates no
basis at all.
Nicias was the famous Athenian general (generals, recall, were elected
officials); Pericles was the quintessential democratic leader in Athens
(also elected general many times) in the fifth century B.C. These men, and
their families, Socrates says, would be willing to provide the sort of per-
jury that "many reputable people" are prepared to give in court battles
(especially when these are against political enemies).
T6.8 Gorgias 516c-d (immediately precedes T6.9):
SOCRATES: Now as Homer says, the just are gentle, What do you say?
Don't you say the same?
CALLICLES: Yes.
194 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
Elsewhere, Socrates also singles Pericles out as one who failed to teach
his sons to be virtuous (Meno 92d-94e). In the same passage, Socrates also
singles out Pericles' democratic rival, Thucydides (son of Melesiasnot
the historian), for failing to teach his sons virtue, as is the earlier democra-
tic leader, Aristeides. It seems that Socrates has nothing good to say about
Athens's most famous democratic leaders.
But, as we found with his criticisms of both democratic and oligarchic
ideologies in Athenian politics, it is one thing to be critical of a given public
official and another thing to be an advocate for some existing rival leader.
Hie fact is that just as Socrates is plainly critical of certain democratic lead-
ers, he also holds the favorites of the oligarchic movement up for the exact
same sorts of criticism. Here is what he says about several other famous
Athenian political leaders, just after showing his scorn for Pericles:
T6.9 Gorgias 515d-e (immediately follows T6.8):
SOCRATES: Let's go back to Cimon. Tell me: didn't the people he was
serving ostracize him so that they wouldn't hear his voice for ten
years? And didn't they do the same thing for Themistocles,
punishing him with exile besides? And didn't they vote to throw
Miltiades, of Marathon fame, into the pit, and if it hadn't been for
the prytanis6 he would have been thrown in? And vet these things
would not have happened to these men if they were good men, as
you say they were.
Cimon, we see, comes in for the exact same criticism as Pericles. But Ci-
mon's hostility to the development of Athenian democracy was notori-
ous.7 Miltiades was Cimon's father. Themistocles, however, was aligned.
with the democrats.
Socrates' criticisms of political leaders betray no bias toward any
known faction of that time. Indeed, he seems actually to be careful to hold
well-known political rivals up for the same criticisms each time. When he
says that past leaders only made the Athenians wilder and less controlled
(T6.8 and T6.9), he includes two famous democrats and two famous anti-
democrats. When he says that such leaders cannot teach their own sons,
he mentions the famous political rivals Pericles and Thucydides in. the
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 195
The accuser said that he taught his companions to despise the established
laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none
would choose a pilot or a builder or a flutist by lot, nor arty other craftsman
for work in which mistakes are far less dangerous than mistakes made in
statecraft. Such sayings, he argued, led the young to despise the established
constitution, and made them violent.
196 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
Some of those whom Socrates supposedly corrupted, this way are later
named by "the accuser."
T6.ll Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.12:
His accuser argued thus: Having become associates of Socrates, Crilias and
Alcibiades did great evils to the city.
Isocrates probably wrote this speech soon after Polycrates' own appeared.
Even some fifty years after the trial, however, Polycrates" charges were
being repeated.
T6.13 Aeschines Rhetor, Against Tirnarchus 173:
(Addressed to an Athenian jury) You put Socrates, the sophist, to death be-
cause he was shown to have educated Critias.
Several questions need to be sorted out at this point. The first one is
easy: Does the evidence we get from Plato associate Socrates with notori-
ous men? Certainly, it does. But what follows from this? Answers to ques-
tions about the implications of Socrates' associations are much more diffi-
cult to give decisively, even if scholarship has not always recognized,
much difficulty in coming to all sorts of conclusions about Socrates.
So far, we have considered, whether Plato's texts gave support to the
claim that Socrates was implicated in Athens's partisan political up-
heavals and have found such a mix of evidence that it seems impossible
to place Socrates in any specific faction. His notorious associations, more-
over, do not provide any clearer evidence of partisan bias. As "the ac-
cuser" of Xenophon's Memorabilia so clearly recognizes in T6.ll, even the
most notorious of Socrates' associates were aligned with, different factions
in Athenian politics, and the same can be said for all of the "criminals and
traitors" who make up the remainder of Socrates' interlocutors and com-
panions. Whatever its notoriety, no single factional group is recognizable
within this collection of characters, Socrates' friends and interlocutors
come from all of the different factionsand range from violent oligarchic
revolutionaries like Critias to democrats, such as Chaerophon, who died
attempting to restore the democracy in the civil war against Critias and
the other members of the Thirty (Socrates' friend Chaerophon actually re-
ceived the famous Delphic oracle about Socrates; see Apology 21 a ff.}.
Even the most notorious of these men gained, their notoriety in very dif-
ferent ways and from misdeeds of several different kinds.
Perhaps the most reasonable thing to do in the face of such evidence is
to try to look a little more closely at how Socrates interacts with the "crim-
inals and traitors" with whom we find him consorting in Plato's early di-
alogues. In doing this, we maintain, a very different picture emerges.
Socrates, after all, is a man whose style is to refute those with whom he
talks, Plato's Socrates can hardly be said to support, flatter, or encourage
the (always later) crimes and misdeeds and evil plots of these "criminals
and traitors." Invariably, instead, we find Socrates deflating the smug arro-
gance of these men, showing them that they do not know what they think
they know, showing them (and those witnessing the conversations) that
they do not have the wisdom they pretend to have, andas is so explic-
itly the case with Euthyphro, whose foolish presumption has led him to
do what all recognize as a ghastly impietyshowing them, that without
such knowledge and wisdom, their most excessive and unconventional
plans are morally and rationally indefensible. Plato's Socrates is hardly a
man who hatches plots with these "criminals and traitors." Instead, he
seems to be a man whose philosophical interactions would tend to have a
dampening effect on such men, if only they would pay better attention to
the shortcomings Socrates is trying to point out. Finding Socrates "guilty
198 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
passed (in the aftermath of the restoration of the democracy, after the final
removal of the Thirty from power) that called for a complete recodifica-
tion of Athens's laws. According to the terms of this agreement, an
amnesty was put into place, according to which no one except the surviv-
ing members of the Thirty themselves could be prosecuted for crimes al-
leged to have been committed during their brief hold on power, or before
that; only crimes alleged to have been committed after the restoration of
the democracy, under the laws as recodified in accordance with the recon-
ciliation agreement, could be prosecuted.
It has been widely claimed that this general amnesty made it impossi-
ble to prosecute Socrates directly and explicitly on the basis of the politi-
cal prejudice alleged to have been the trite motivation for his trial, for all
of the associations and activities that formed the basis of the alleged polit-
ical prejudice against Socrates came from before the general amnesty. In-
stead, then, his prosecutors were said to have chosen the charge of impi-
ety and to have prosecuted on that basis, but no oneincluding the
jurywas actually fooled into thinking that this was the real issue at
hand. But one very unfortunate consequence of this view is that it renders
Plato's own account of the trial in the Apology highly suspect, for Plato's
Socrates makes no explicit mention of any political bias against him and
seems dedicated to addressing the religious issue instead. Moreover, the
actual prosecutor we do meet in that work, Meletus, seems quite vehe-
mentif not entirely clearheadedin defending his religious animus
against Socrates. Of course, this could be (and has been) taken as evi-
dence either that Plato was not giving an honest account of the historical
trial or that Socrates either evaded or at least did not bother to try to make
an effective defense against what he had to know were the real charges
and prejudices against him, namely, the political ones. Either way, Plato's
Apology becomes largely irrelevant to the actual historical facts of the
casea most unhappy result from the point of view of the interpretive
Principle of Charity, as discussed in the introduction to this book! More-
over, it is even more worrisome mat the evidence on which this assess-
ment is made is even more cissailable and dubitable (as later, as coming
from, a rhetorical, display) than Plato's work itself, which may not be his-
torically compelling but which nevertheless remains the most proximate
and most consistent evidence we have,
At any rate, this argument about the prosecutorial subterfuge1, required
by the amnesty of 403-402 B.C., has been revealed as simply mistaken.
First of all, the argument ignores the fact that the amnesty continued to al-
low prosecutors (and defendants, for that matter) to recall all sorts of per-
ceived infractions and misdeeds that occurred during and before the
Thirty's reign as evidence in open court13 The amnesty ruled out only le-
gal charges whose sole basis was crimes alleged to have occurred prior to
200 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
If anyone subverts the democracy at Athens, or holds any office when the
democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians and
shall be killed with impunity, and his property shall be confiscated and one-
tenth of it shall belong to the Goddess; and he who kills or helps to plan the
killing of such a man shall be pure and free from guilt....
But as many readers have noticed, Socrates seems to create just such a
lack of harmony for himself when he talks about what a person ought
never to do in the Apology and what a person ought never to do in the
Crito.
T6.16 Crito 51b-c:
On the one hand, in the Crito, Socrates appears to be saying that it is never
just to disobey civil authority, "in war and in courts and everywhere"; on
the other hand, in the Apology (in court) he seems entirely prepared to dis-
obey the jury, if its members were to requke him to stop philosophizing.
The problem in these two texts is obvious and has become perhaps one of
the most famous problems in Socratic scholarship, usually known as "the
Apobgy-Crito problem,,"
ers to compare with the other proposed solutions and the relevant texts to
judge its adequacy for themselves.
Let us begin by breaking down our options in a logical way. We start
by noting that there are two main options here: We can accept that there
is a genuine conflict in the texts, or we can not accept this. Each of these
options contains other options; If we accept that there is a conflict, we
can either decide that either Socrates or Plato (or both) was simply un-
aware of the conflict or that, if aware of it, did not have any way of solv-
ing it. In this view, Plato simply represents the problem, whether aware
of it or not and gives us no way to get out of it. This result clearly offends
what we have called the Principle of Charity; it may, however, be what the
texts and the failures of proposed solutions drive us to. But as we said in
the introduction, we should be very wary of accepting this sort of con-
clusion without giving all proposed solutions very serious consideration
first, precisely because such a negative conclusion is so blatantly unchar-
itable.
But a similarly negative solution might be offered in a much more
charitable way. We might accept that there is a genuine conflict here but
suppose that Socrates or Plato (or both) was not only aware of the con-
flict but created this conflict for some specific reason, wrhichif only we
can identify that reasonwould be edifying for us to recognize. This
option allows for proposing an indefinite number of possibilities: Per-
haps Socrates or Plato (or both) wished to show that this is an in-
tractable problem for all human existence, a tragically inescapable con-
flict of equal but opposed absolute moral duties; perhaps Socrates did
not bother to style his conversations in a way that took consistency be-
tween conversations seriously; perhaps Plato did not write his dialogues
in such a way as to expect his readers to compare them in the way we
are doing here; or perhaps we should reconsider whether both Apology
and Crito belong to Plato's early-period group, and in this conflict, Plato
was announcing a departure from Socrates' philosophy, replacing it, on
this issue at least, writh his owrn; and so on. The placement of Plato's
Apology and Crito in Plato's early-period group, however, is as well es-
tablished as any of the dialogues in this group, so that an argument for
taking one of these two dialogues out of the group is not really an op-
tion. The problem with all the other "constructive conflict" views is that
they seem to fly in the face of all of the texts in which Socrates shows the
highest regard for consistency and never once (unless it is in this unique
conflict!) gives us any reason to think that there are specific inconsisten-
cies in reasoning that we cannot overcome, if we lead "the examined
life."
T6.18 Gorgias 482b-c (= T2.37; immediately follows T2.50):
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 203
SOCRATES: .... I think it's better to have my lyre or a chorus that I might
lead out of tune and dissonant, and have the vast majority of men
disagree with me and contradict me, than to be out of harmony with
myself, to contradict myself, though I'm only one person.
Now, maybe this passage can also be given some subtle reading, but at
least on the face of it, Socrates does not here seem, to be the sort of" man
who thinks there are tragically inescapable inconsistencies confronting
human existence, nor does he seem to suppose that his personification of
"Philosophy herself" recognizes any such inconsistencies. Accordingly,
we are not inclined to any theory that either separates the dialogues or
portrays Socrates or Plato as philosophers who are unconcerned withor
who feel tragically trapped bywhat they actually do recognize as philo-
sophical inconsistency.
This result, then, puts us back to the original position: We must either
accept that there is a genuine conflictwhich we must now suppose ei-
ther Socrates or Plato (or both) were not aware ofor else we must deny
that "the Apology-Crito problem" is a genuine conflict. But we cannot sim-
ply deny that it is a conflict and be done with it; we roust have some rea-
son for denying this. We must shoulder the burden of proof and show
why it is not a genuine conflict. Most interpreters have taken this ap-
proach, and have offered a wide variety of proposed solutions to the ap-
parent problem.
An attempt to solve the problem in the more positive way can take sev-
eral general forms: One could accept the apparent meaning of the Apology
text and hold, that Socrates would be quite ready to disobey legal author-
ity in some cases (at least the case he seems to have in mind in the Apol-
ogy) but then come up with some interpretation to "soften" the effect of
the Crito text in such a way as to provide an understanding of what
Socrates says there that does not conflict with his apparent willingness, in
the Apology, to disobey legal authority. Or one could accept the apparent
meaning of the Crito text and hold that Socrates would never find disobe-
dience of legal authority morally acceptable but then come up with some
interpretation to "soften" the effect of the Apology text in such a way as to
show that he is not really willing to disobey legal authority, despite ap-
pearances to the contrary. Or one could attempt to work the problem
from, both sides, as it were, by "softening" the effects of both texts in such
a way as to find some position they can both be understood as consistent
with. Let us see what kinds of considerations have been brought to bear
in trying to "soften" the two sides of this problem. Because most scholars
have tended to attack the problem by reinterpreting the Crito, we begin
with this passage.
204 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
as taking a position very like the ones taken by Ghandi or Martin Luther
King, namely, that certain very restricted forms of disobedience to the
laws were the best ways to persuade government to change unjust laws.
Socrates, in this view, would disobey a court order to cease philosophiz-
ing as a kind of persuasive civil disobedience and would thus be consis-
tent with the doctrine he announces in the Crito even if he were to dis-
obey the court order.
This interpretation, however, seems to face the problem that civil dis-
obedience, as a form of persuasion, requires that the disobedience is
clearly conceived and represented as a form of protest against the rele-
vant law, with an eye to changing it. In this way, it is different from what
we might call "simple disobedience," in which one elects simply to dis-
obey the law (for whatever reason), but not as part of a strategy to have
the offending law changed or repealed. But nothing in the Apology pas-
sage suggests that Socrates would be disobeying the imagined court or-
der as a form of protest against the court order (or for that matter, against
some other law or legal command). He simply says that he will obey the
god more than the jurors and would therefore disobey. Now, we can
imagine, perhaps, that Socrates would, wish that the court order be modi-
fied or rescinded, and wre can easily imagine what his arguments for such
modification or nullification would be. But what is missing in what
Socrates says in the Apology is what is absolutely essential to civil disobe-
dience as a form of persuasion: that the disobedience he vows would be
his way of protesting the court order and would be a part of his effort to
have that order (or some other legal command) changed or reversed. But
Socrates does not say that he would seek to have the court order changed
or reversed; he simply says that he would not obey it. As such, it clearly
looks as if his vow, in the Apology, is not a vow to commit persuasive civil
disobedience but is, rather, a vow to commit simple disobedience,
A different conception of persuasion, which allows for some disobedi-
ence to legal authority, is offered by Richard Kraut.18 According to Kraut,
the Greek word for "persuade" had what is called a "conative sense," ac-
cording to which one actually "persuades" when one makes a sincere at-
tempt to persuade and not just when one actually succeeds in convincing
those one seeks to convince. One can be said to be "building" a house, for
example, even if one never actually succeeds in finishing the house. One
can be said to be "writing" a book, even if the book is never completed.
Thus, "build" and "write" have conative senses. Similarly (in. Greek and
in English), one could claim that Socrates, in his first speech, was "per-
suading" the jury, even if, as it turns out, the jury was not, in the end, per-
suaded (now using the nonconative sense of the verb). By seeing the rele-
vant form of the Greek word, in the troublesome passage in the Crito, as
the conative sense of "persuade," Kraut allows that Socrates would not be
206 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
the obligation to obey their superiors. This, then, puts us back to the tradi-
tional understanding of "persuade" in Socrates' doctrine: To avoid obedi-
ence to some law, one must succeed in convincing the state to change the
law, so that one can obey the law as changed. In other words, Socrates
says that one should always obey the lawwhich is why one must (suc-
cessfully) persuade the law to change if one does not wish to follow the
dictates of the (present) law.
(Socrates speaking) . . . if, as I say, you were to [let me goj on those terms, I
would say to you: "Gentlemen of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend,
but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as 1 draw breath and am
able, 1 shall not cease to practice philosophy ...."
Socrates does not simply vow to disobeyhe lets his jurors know that
he would disobey only because he has the highest possible duty a human
being can have, which in this case requires that he disobey: his mission on
behalf of the god. In effect, then, the Apology passage explicitly specifies
what duty "trumps" Socrates' duty to obey legal authority: He must al-
ways obey legal authority unless divine authority makes some opposing
command. This exception does not come up in the Crito passage, because
the kind of case Socrates and Crito have in mind there does not raise the
issue of conflict between divine and human law. Accordingly, Socrates an-
nounces his doctrine of legal obedience in the Crito in a way that specifies
no exceptionsfor even though exceptions to the doctrine do exist, none
are pertinent to the issue Crito and Socrates are considering in their dis-
cussion.
20$ Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
One question this view must answer, however, is how Socrates can be
so certain that the divine command Socrates finds absolutely compelling
does not, in fact, apply to the question of whether Socrates should (ille-
gally) escape from jail. After all, if he would disobey a court order to stop
philosophizing on religious grounds, why also should he not disobey a
court order to stay in Athens and be executed, when obedience, surely,
will bring about an even more certain end to Ms philosophical mission!
But even if Socrates can produce evidence for distinguishing the two
cases, the view that Socrates sees religious law as a higher authority than
civil law is not well supported by the text of the Crito, where Socrates ar-
gues as if obedience to civil law is one's religious duty.
16.19 Crito 50e-51b (repeated in part):
Socrates makes his appeal in this passage just before announcing his
doctrine of legal obedience in the name of divine authority. Thus, it is not
as if Socrates does not have the role of divine authority in mind in making
his declarationand any potential for conflict that such authority might
cause; rather, Socrates seems to think that divine authority lends unquali-
fied support to the authority of civil law. If Socrates saw the two as poten-
tially in conflict, why would he talk as if divine law supported civil law?
Another hierarchical approach is given by R. E. Allen,22 who argues
that we need to see Socrates' announcement of his doctrine in the Cn'to as
conditioned upon the overriding point the specific issue in question is
supposed to address, namely, Socrates' view that it is never morally ac-
ceptable to do injustice,
T6.20 Crito 49c (partially repeats T2.28):
SOCRATES: One should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man,
whatever injury one has suffered at his hands.
It would have been a dreadful way to behave, gentlemen, if, at Potidaea, Ain-
phipolis and Delium [famous battles In which Socrates took part}, I had, at the
risk of death, like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had
elected to command had ordered me, and then, when the god ordered me/ as 1
thought and believed, I had. abandoned my post for fear of death or anything
else. [ . . . ] It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I dif-
fer from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than any-
one in anything, it would be in this, that, as 1 have no adequate knowledge of
things in the underworld, so I do not think I have. 1 do know, however, that it
is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or
man. I shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know, whether they
may not be good rather than things that I know to be bad.
In this passage, only a few lines before he makes his vow to disobey the
jury, Socrates seems unready to recognize exceptions to a moral duty to
obey the commands of legal human authorities. Either sort of disobedi-
enceto god or manappears to qualify, in Socrates' eyes, as shameful.
210 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
ally would disobey legal authority. Of course, the jury is a legal authority
in some senseit does have the authority to do some things; but since the
jurors would not be acting legally if they made such a condition in
Socrates' case, if he did disobey, as he says he would, he would not be in
conflict with, even an absolute duty to obey legal authority. To be a gen-
timely legal authority, the jurors would have to avoid making commands
that went beyond their legal authority.
But this does not go far enough, and we have been criticized for not
taking the next step and noticing that even if the jury could not make
such a provision, surely other Athenian legal authorities were in a position
to do so,24 For example, what would Socrates do if the Athenian Assem-
bly passed a law banning philosophizing? This question assumes two
things: first, that it would, be legally unproblematic for the Assembly to
pass such, a law, and second, that we are in a position to know what
Socrates would do in the face of such a law. The first assumption raises
important questions about the legal system, that was in place in 399 B.C.
We are convinced, however, that at least one thing stands in the way of
this imaginary law's unproblematic application to Socrates' own case:
Socrates makes the case for philosophizing on the basis of pietyhe
claims his philosophizing is a mission given him, by the god. But we
know that there was a prior law (prior, that is, to the imaginary one that
Socrates would be confronted with, in this scenario) against impiety, for it
was on the basis of a perceived violation of this law that Socrates was put
on trial. If Socrates believes that piety requires him to philosophize and
the law requires him to be pious, then the law requires him to philoso-
phize. If some new law requires him, to cease philosophizing, then
Socrates would have every reason to suppose that the laws were issuing
contradictory commands. As we put the point in an earlier book, "when
two laws contradict one another, even the most steadfast adherent to civil
authority cannot find a way to comply with both."25 Notice, moreover,
that what is at issue is not whether others accept that philosophizing is
Socrates' pious duty but only whether Socrates himself accepts this. As
long as he does accept it, the law against impiety and the imaginary law
against philosophizing would conflict, from Socrates' point of view. In
such a case, he could not avoid violating at least one of the conflicting
laws, but such a violation could not be counted as evidence against even
an absolute commitment to a duty to obey the law, such as the Crito seems
to call for.
We said that there were two assumptions behind the objection to our
stipulation about the jurors' lack of legal authority to make the condition
Socrates imagines, in the Apology passage, and we have been questioning
the first one. The second assumption is that we could know what Socrates
would do in the face of such a law being passed. His commitment to phi-
212 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
Do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; no man will survive who
genuinely opposes you or any other crowd and prevents the occurrence of
many unjust and illegal happenings in the city.
Notice that Socrates talks here about "unjust and illegal happenings in
the city," as if there were two distinct possibilitiesincluding unjust
things that happen to be legal (even if they should not be). But the inter-
pretation we have developed so far recognizes no exceptions to the doc-
trine that one must obey legal authority: Only if one can persuade the au-
thority to change the relevant command can one not obey the command.
But mis dot's amount to a doctrine of "obey or obey/' since even the "per-
suade" option requires obedience. The problem is this: What if one tries
to persuade legal authorities to change some unjust command and then
fails? If disobedience is never acceptable, according to "obey or per-
suade," then is it not simply inevitable that there will be some cases in
which a citizen is required to obey an unjust law or legal command? And
if this is so, it would seem that Socrates' philosophy contains a conflict af-
ter all: According to "obey or persuade," one would have to obey an un-
just law or legal command; and according to the absolute prohibition
against doing injustice, one would have to disobey an unjust law or legal
command. If we are going to count ourselves as solving the notorious
"Apology-Crito problem," then, we must also find our way out of this ap-
parent conflict.
Let us return to the Crito. Recall that just before he announces his "obey
or persuade" doctrine, Socrates compares citizens to children and slaves:
214 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
quired. But to take this view, Socrates must believe that a citizen who acts
under the command of legal authority cannot be assigned the blame for
the commanded act. Instead, just as it does with children and slaves, the
blame must fall on the commanding authority or authorities, If so, it fol-
lows that the apparent conflict between Socrates' prohibition of injustice
and his "obey or persuade" doctrine does not arise, for Socrates can con-
sistently say that one who obeys even an unjust command or law will not
commit injustice, any more than would a child or slave in obeying parent
or master, respectively. In the case of commanded injustice where the one
commanded is so completely subservient to commanding authority, the
one commanded is relieved of responsibility; the wrong that is done is
only and completely the responsibility of the commander. This does not
mean that the one commanded is relieved of all responsibility. It would be
consistent, for example, for Socrates to hold the citizen responsible for
failing to attempt persuasion in cases in which the citizen perceives some
legal command as unjust. His doctrine, after all, is "obey or persuade,"
and it is not implausible for Socrates to think that it is every citizen's duty
to attempt always to persuade everyone all the time that the best course
of action (politically and otherwise) is the just course of action. Thus, we
do not need to think of him as someone who endorses "blind" or unques-
tioning obedience.
Even if we try to solve the problems we have confronted in this section
in the way that we have suggested, a last challenge is still possible. As we
noted in the Introduction, the Principle of Charity requires that, all other
things being equal, interpretations should always seek to provide views
that are interesting and plausible. It might now be argued that the view
this interpretation attributes to Socrates is a view so morally flawed that
he cannot reasonably be said to have held it. Such a critic might now say
that it is hardly charitable to Socrates to make him out to endorse blind
obedience to legal authority, including the commission of the most un-
speakable atrocities. Few modern moralists would be willing to say that
citizens have no responsibility for what they do under legal command;
compliance with evil laws and legal authorities is itself morally culpable,
we tend to believe.
But in trying to assess this criticism of the view we are attributing to
Socrates, it is important to understand that the Principle of Charity re-
quires, first, that those who think our interpretation is unacceptable owe
us a more plausible account of what the relevant texts say about Socrates'
view of who should have the final authority to make the kinds of laws
and judgments that the state must make. Second, the Principle of Charity
does not requires that we always choose the interpretation that best fits
our own convictions. Again, this principle guides us, "all things being
equal," between two competing interpretations. If the Principle of Textual
216 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
(Socrates speaking on behalf of the Laws, addressing himself) You must ei-
ther persuade it [the city] or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever
it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds . . . .
SOCRATES: One should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man,
whatever injury one has suffered at his hands.
If such penalties are evils, horn1 can he advocate the use of such punish-
ments? There appears, then, to be a tension between the inteUectualism. so
evident in the Apology, for example, and the forms of punishment
Socrates elsewhere endorses, and there also appears to be a tension be-
tween his claims that one should never harm another, his calling certain
forms of punishment harms, and his endorsing such punishments
nonetheless as (at least in some cases) just.
not do it. But not everyone is a good judge of what they are doing, and
not everyone realizes that all evil is bad for those who do it. There can be
two different forms of misapprehension in wrongdoing, therefore: (1)
One could do the wrong or evil, thinking that it was right or good, or (2)
one could do the wrong or evil, falsely supposing that the wrong or evil
would benefit the wrongdoer. In the first case, plainly the best corrective
would be to show the wrongdoer that the action really is wrong or evil.
Such individuals need the sort of moral education by which they can be-
come better judges of right and wrong. Clearly, the best way to do this
would be to lead the "examined life," as Socrates exhorts his jurors to do
in the Apology (38a [T2.20]). In the second case, the best corrective would
be to show the wrongdoer how and why it is that wrongdoing is injurious
to the wrongdoer, just as Socrates does with Polus in the Gorgias. Thus, for
both of the possible sorts of ignorance and error, which are the root causes
of all evil, the best corrective would appear to be to subject the wrongdoer
to Socratic examination, or something like it.
fering that frustrated and diminished their ability to carry out their
wrongdoings befell them,
We are now in a position to see why what might well count as a wrong
or harm for one person would not he a wrong or harm for another: Penal-
ties such as imprisonment or banishment, which would take away one's
freedom of movement or expression, for example, would be wrong and
harmful to Socrates because his actions aim at what is good for himself
and his fellow Athenians. This is why he says such punishments would
be evil and harmful (to him) in the Apology. To one who perpetrates evils,
however, the loss would be right and beneficialnot only for those who
might otherwise become victims of the prevented evils but also for those
who would otherwise have done the evil deeds. This, then, is how we can
resolve the apparent tension between Socrates' sometimes calling such
punishments harmful and som.eti.mes saying that they are just, despite his
claim that we should never do what is harmful. Imprisonment and ban-
ishment that we inflict upon the wicked are not only not wrongs; they are
not harms to them.
It's financial management, then, that gets rid of poverty, medicine that gets
rid of disease, and justice that gets rid of injustice and indiscipline,
SOCRATES; Now, wasn't paying what's due getting rid of the worst
thing there is, corruption?
POLUS: It was.
SOCRATES: Yes, because such justice makes people self-controlled, I
take it, and more just. It proves to be a treatment against corruption.
by the time we find Socrates speaking with Callicles, a distinct and .inde-
pendent form of motivationone that is independent of the desire for
benefitis introduced, namely, desire for pleasure (and the corresponding
aversion to pain). In this view, Plato is, in the Gorgias, working his way to-
ward the even more complex psychology of the Republic and Ph&adrus,
which provide three distinct forms of motivation: the rational; the thumotic,
or spirited; and the appetitive. In this view, Plato's Socrates abandons his
denial of akrasia in the last part of the Gorgias. But by relying on this al-
leged change in the conception of motivation between the discussion with
Polus and the one with Callicles, one might find a solution to the problem
of punishment by supposing that Socrates would regard painful forms of
punishment as effective precisely because they work on the wrongdoer's
independent desire for pleasure. In this view, the work these forms of pun-
ishment performs is to "chasten" the wrongdoer's appetite for pleasure by
bringing it under the control of the rational motivational element.
One serious disadvantage this view confronts is that it characterizes the
Gorgias as advancing two distinct and incompatible theories of human mo-
tivation without any clear signal from Plato that there has been such a shift.
This seems obviously to run afoul of the Principle of Charity as well as the
Principle of Textual Fidelity, both of which tell us not to accept inconsisten-
cies, if at all possible. But even if Plato did introduce a new theory of moti-
vation in the discussion with Callicles, it does not help us to solve the prob-
lem of punishment Socrates' endorsement of various punishments occurs
within argumentative contexts in which the alleged new theory of motiva-
tion has not yet been introduced. Recall that the problematic passages with
which we began this section (T6.23 and T6.24) occur in the Crito and. in the
discussion with Polus, which comes earlier in the Gorgias than the discus-
sion with Callicles, in. which the "new thet^ry" is allegedly introduced.
What such interpretations miss is that what the supposedly "new" the-
ory "introduces" in the discussion with Callicles has actually been there
all along. Socrates* view, we claim, is not (what we regard as the absur-
dity) that human beings have no motivational impulses other than the de-
sire for benefit but. that such impulses (which Socrates typically refers to
as "appetites") can never lead one to act against what one thinks is best
for one.29 But even if scholars have seen a "development" in Plato's phi-
losophy where there was none, they were not entirely wrong about how
to explain Socrates' acceptance of painful forms of punishment Let us
now see why this is so.
the wrongdoer. If we are right, Socrates thinks that all vice manifests itself
in the pursuit of the wrong sort of pleasures. As we have seen, people
may have unruly appetites for pleasure and aversions to pain, but for
these to lead to wrongdoing, according to Socrates' intellectualism, the
wrongdoers must take such pleasures to be beneficial, thinking that by
having them they will be better off.
Socrates' frequent comparisons between vice and disease suggest that
he thmks that just as illness inflames the body and keeps it from function-
ing well, so vice infects the soul and keeps it from performing its function
of ruling and taking care of things well (Republic 1.353e). For Socrates,
vice consists, in part, in a false belief that certain sorts of pleasures ought
to be pursued. Such a disastrous belief may be formed by listening to the
advice of the wrong people. But if coining to acquire the worst sort of
character were only a matter of taking the wrong people too seriously,
Socrates would have no reason to say, as he does in the Gorgias, that vice,
unless treated, becomes "protracted and cause[s] [one's] soul to fester in-
curably" (480b).
We can explain the notion of a belief becoming ingrained in this way,
however, if we think that Socrates takes the satisfaction of certain ap-
petites, in the experience of some pleasures, to have the powrer (1) to cause
the agent to think that pleasures of that sort are good and (2) to hinder, or
even to prevent, rational thinking about the agent's good. Because of (2),
Socrates thinks of harmful pleasures as like intoxicants. If this is right, the
danger of listening to Callicles is very real, for he may well persuade one
to believe that a life of violent pleasures is good. And because of (1), as we
wrould expect, it is even worse to act on Callicles' advice and to partake of
the most violent pleasures.
Our appetites provide us with basic motivations requked for our sur-
vival, and, so they are not all bad. But our appetites do not at all distin-
guish between which of their satisfactions will genuinely benefit us and
which will actually do us damage. All of us, Socrates thinks, have ap-
petites for pleasuresincluding pleasures we should not pursue. The
more one actually does pursue and experience these pleasures, the more
one's appetites for such pleasures become accustomed to achieving their
goals and the more these appetites will come to demand and expect satis-
faction. In short, "feeding" such desires nourishes them and makes them
stronger. On the contrary, however, if these appetites are controlled at all
times, their power to interfere with, our "better" judgment will be mini-
mized. If they are allowed to grow out of control, however, the only solu-
tion is to do whatever will help us to shrink them again.
If punishment is actually to cure one who has become convinced, that
the most violent pleasures me beneficial, then the wrongdoer must first
be freed, from, the intoxicating control that pleasureand the engorged
224 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
appetites that aim at pleasure-has, Socrates might well suppose that the
infliction of pain for an act of wrongdoing has precisely that effect, as a
kind of antidote. Thus, after suffering the pain of the whip, for example,
the thief's appetites for the wrong sorts of pleasures are diminished, hav-
ing been "chastened" by the sharp pain of the whipping, and the thief
will be left better able to consider soberly whether stealing is the better
course to take. Of course, here we must ask why Socrates would count
this as a "cure," for surely the thief may still expect to profit from future
thefts and that circumstances might be such that future punishments, re-
gardless of how severe, are worth the gain.
If we recall Socrates' analogies between medicine and physical train-
ing, on the one hand, and legislation and criminal justice, on the other
(see Corgias 517e ft), we can see that Socrates does not have to suppose
that the "cure" of punishment must make the wrongdoer into someone
who never could or would perform injustice again. To do this, punish-
ment would have to make the wrongdoer virtuous. But Socrates has seen
no evidence that even the most assiduous pursuit of philosophical in-
quiry, as he conceives it, can achieve that.
In our view, Socrates thinks that punishment "cures" the wrongdoer
and "rids" the wrongdoer of injustice, not by replacing the wrong concep-
tion of the good with another conception, or even by replacing the wrong
conception with the belief that it is wrong, but rather by loosening the grip
harmful pleasure has on the soul, thereby creating an openness to question
what the good is. If so, when Socrates says that punishment should "cure,"
he does not mean that the wrongdoer is somehow indemnified against all
future wrongdoing. There is nothing about the experience of the pain of
punishment that would prevent thieves from listening to and being per-
suaded by someone to think that they should engage in crime again.
Moreover, even after punishment, wrongdoers will continue to have ap-
petites for pleasures, the satisfaction of which would, once again, drive
them, back to unreflective lives of vice. But unless they suffer the pain of
paying the penalty for their crimes, they will continue to think, mindlessly,
that the pleasures for the sake of which they steal are the greatest benefits
they can possess. If this is correct, by seeing how to solve the problem of
punishment in Socratic philosophy, we learn something of the first impor-
tance about Socrates' conception of vice. Vice is not merely false belief
about how to live; it is false belief about how to live that is itself not en-
tirely open to reason. And at the root of this evil, we find our appetites,
which seek pleasure and are indifferent to what is really good for us. Un-
less, therefore, we are diligent in controlling them, we run the risk that our
ability to make rational judgments will be damaged or lost
We can now see how Socrates could distinguish between those who
have mistakenly concluded that a life of vicious pleasure seeking is good
Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy 225
but who have not yet experienced such pleasures, and those who have ex-
perienced violent pleasures and, thus, mindlessly think they are good.
The former may yet be improved by Socratic discussion, for even if their
appetites have been quickened, they have not yet begun to wreak their
havoc on these individuals' ability to reason. In discussion with Socrates,
therefore, they may yet reach another, more judicious, conclusion on the
basis of what seems most reasonable to them. Those who have already
given themselves to the wrong pleasures, however, need punishment, for
only the pain of punishment for a specific act of wrongdoing will free
them from the control of their bloated appetites, ft also follows from this
account that not even Socrates is immune from being taken over by his
appetites, should he, through some mistake or misfortune, happen to ex-
perience an especially intoxicating pleasure, Socrates is wiser than others
in part because he realizes that such pleasures are to be avoided. But even
this "human wisdom" gives him no special power to overcome pleasure's
effect on the mind once tine mind has experienced it. Only the kind of
knowledge he lacks could give hint full indemnity against such a disaster.
The souls of those who merely believe violent pleasure is good are in
danger: Given this false belief about the good, it is likely that they will
pursue violent pleasure, with the subsequent result that their appetites
will be further inflamed, to the point that they will no longer be capable
of reflecting soberly about the good. Nevertheless, until actually sam-
pling the pleasure they value, such people are still capable of being ruled
by reason and, hence, are not yet vicious. The souls of vicious people, by
contrast, already suffer the harm of being incapable of reasoning about
how best to live, a harm to which those with mere false beliefs about the
good are, as yet, merely liable. Corporal punishment may help vicious
people to see why they should not pursue violent pleasure. But because
corporal punishment actually frees the soul from the distorting influences
of the appetites, it removes the harm that constitutes vice and so can truly
be said to cure the wrongdoer.
Finally, it does not follow from the fact that punishments aim at curing
the one punished tltat they can always do so. Pleasures may vary in the ef-
fect they have on the souls of those who experience them,. Moreover, if left
untreated, the hold that pleasure has over a soul will tend to grow increas-
ingly strong. If so, that grip may become so strong that no amount of pun-
ishment can release the soul. Such people are doomed mindlessly to re-
main, convinced that the wrong sort of pleasure is good; no amount of pain,
can make them question their conviction. In effect, their appetites have so
maimed their reason that they have become irremediably irrational,
We are now in a position to see why, in the great myth at the end of the
Gorgias, Socrates states that punishment can be appropriate in either of
two wavs.
226 Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
There is tragedy here: For some, the only benefit of proper punishment
must go to others, not to the wrongdoers themselves. Even the gods can-
not correct what has been ruined by the most egregious wrongs.
Proper punishment for wrongdoers, then, falls far short of what we
might conceive as an ideal. Those punished may be made better, but
much of what made them go wrong to begin with may remain with them.
In endorsing punitive "corrections," Socrates did not imagine that such
corrections were ideal solutions to the problem, of wrongdoing. But his
dim view of even his own powers of correction, which aimed for higher
goals, left him, realistically, with no clearly better option than those the
state legally provided. His pessimism about the human capacity to be
made good, however, was not worsened, or confused by a contradictory
position regarding the goals and methods of criminal corrections. Punish-
ment was, for Socrates, not a problem for the coherence of his views but a
necessary feature of the human condition. It was an instrument for the re-
mediation of evils, which, though they could become ruinous, could
never, in all likelihood, be wholly eliminated.
Notes
time, and not just two: an oligarchic one and a democratic one. Strauss (1987), for
example, counts "a minimum of six leading factions" in Athens, which would
align and disaltgn on different issues. Scholars who have counted Socrates as an
oligarchic sympathizer have; not, to our knowledge, ever tried to tie Socrates to
any of these actual factions. Without evidence for such a tie, however, we find the
claim that Socrates was a significant figure in Athens's factional politics highly
speculative, at best Our argument in this section, at any rate, will show that the
evidence generally cited for this speculation, does not, in any case, support the
speculation.
3. This is the principal thesis of I. F. Stone (1988). Although the book is beauti-
fully written throughout, we believe it is confused about the relevant evidence.
Although we do not detail these mistakes in what follows, we should point out
here that Stone has not been alone in making the mistaken assessments he did. In
many instances, he actually repeats (unknowingly) errors made by a number of
more careful scholars before him.
4. It is easy to forget, however, how exclusive it was nonetheless: Of something
over a quarter of a million people living in Athens during this period, perhaps
only 10 percent were included in Athens's political life at any time. The remainder
were citizen women (who were granted special protections and privileges but
could not actually participate in government) and children, resident foreigners,
and slaves of both sexes, all of whom were entirely excluded.
5. Socrates is referring to the fact that "near the end of his life, they [the Atheni-
ans] voted to convict Pericles of embezzlement and came close to condemning
him to death, because they thought he was a wicked man, obviously" (Gorgias
516a).
6. The title of the council's presiding committee member.
7. See Bury (1962), 328.
8. Chrousf (1957), esp. 69-100.
9. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994), 174, n. 85.
10. For a detailed but perhaps not entirely reliable account of Alcibiades' infa-
mous career, see Plutarch's Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans, s.v. Alcibiades.
11. Critias is characterized as the leader in Xenophon's account (see Hettcnica
2.3-4; Memaralnlia 1.2); in Aristotle's Politics (V.5.4.1305b26), it is Charicies who
was the leader. That Critias was one of the Thirty Tyrants, in any case, is certain.
12. Mogens Herman Hansen, in a letter to N. D. Smith, February 2,1987.
13. As Loaning (1981) puts it: "It was permissible to cite the conduct of an indi-
vidual under the oligarchy at scrutinies and other processes in the way of charac-
ter evidence" (vii; repeated verbatim on 203). The same can be said for anything
alleged to have occurred prior to 403 B.C.
14. See MacDowell (1978), 176.
15. Ibid., 174.
16. In the bracketed phrase here and immediately following, we modify the
translation that appears in Cooper (1997), which has the text say "we acquit you."
The Greek does not explicitly state that the jurors would release Socrates, in this
hypothetical case, by legal acquittal. Accordingly, we prefer our version, which is
as vague as the Greek.
17.Wo0z!ey(l979).
22$ Socrates' Politics and Political Philosophy
Suggested. Readings
to do only what is just, Our argument in Brickhouse and Smith (1989) is that
Socrates would not recognize any conflict between the duty to obey the law and
his duty to philosophize, on the ground that he counted his duty to philosophize
as falling under the legal requirement to act piously. In Brickhouse and Smith
(1994), we argue that there could be no conflict between obedience to the law and
the requirement that one always act justly, on. the ground that Socrates would al-
ways conceive of obeying the law as an. example of acting justly. In the case where
the law itself commanded some injustice, the law (or those who passed it) would
be guilty of the injustice, whereas the obedient citizen would act justly by obeying
the law and thus be blameless for the injustice commanded by the unjust law.
Socrates on Punishment
The rejection of retaliation in the early dialogues is discussed in Vlastos (1991).
The comprehensive attempt to treat Plato's philosophy of punishment in a sys-
tematic way is Mackenzie (1981). Brickhouse and Smith (1997b) review the rele-
vant literature on this topic and attempt to show why Socrates' theory of motiva-
tion not only is compatible with his endorsement of corporal punishment but, in
fact, requires it. The view we present in this chapter, however, modifies the ac-
count we gave in that article (see this chapter, note 29, and Chapter 5, note 15).
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7
23!
232 Socrates and Religion
uals and religious practices themselves, which are often only loosely and
somewhat problematically tied to that mythology. Moreover, because
these rituals and practices had both public (civil or legal) and private (fa-
milial or personal) elements which in many ways have significantly dif-
ferent characteristics and which often seem entirely unrelated to one an-
otherit ends up being very difficult to make any general claims about
the religion of Socrates' culture and thus very difficult for us to situate
Socrates within that religion in any very precise way. Most of all, it is dif-
ficult for us to assimilate the religion in which we must situate Socrates to
modern religious views.
Because Greek religion is so alien to the modern mind, the ways in
which religion influenced Socrates' life and philosophy are also likely to
be very difficult for us to assess and are, in any case, almost surely inap-
plicable to our own Eves or philosophical concerns. But just as religion
and philosophy overlap (and sometimes conflict) today, so they did in
Socrates' culture and time, and this is why no account of Socratic philoso-
phy could be complete without a careful look at the connections between
Socrates' philosophy and his religion, especially at those points where we
might find influences passing from one to the other.
Perhaps the most obvious and troubling connection of this sort is in the
undisputed historical fact that Socrates was tried, convicted, and exe-
cuted on a religious charge: impiety. The three specifications of this
charge were that he did not believe in the gods the city believed in, that
he invented new spiritual things, and that he corrupted the young,3 As
we said in the last chapter, until recently, most scholars believed that the
religious charges did not really represent the real motives behind the
prosecution, which, we used to be told, were primarily political. If this
were right, we would not need to worry about the actual charges, what
they might have meant, or whether they fit the actual case of Socrates, for
the answer to all such questions would simply be that they provided a
conveniently legal mask to conceal, the real motives. But we argued in the
last chapter that this "political" interpretation of the trial has now largely
been abandoned by scholars, because the evidence has recently been
shown not to support this interpretation. This, however, requires us to re-
turn to the religious nature of the charges and to take them seriously. But
what did they mean, and what could have motivated them, and why
were a majority of the jurors convinced that Socrates was guilty of them,?
One could, of course, be prosecuted for some private religious outrage
or sacrilege, but in fact absolutely every one of our ancient sources tells us
that it was Socrates' philosophizing that led, in some way, to his legal
troubles. For this reason, if we are to comprehend the events that brought
his life to an end, we must look as closely as we can at what Socrates' reli-
gious views and practices were and at how these might have been repre-
Socrates and Religion 233
sented in his philosophizing, in order to see what might have aroused his
prosecutors to bring him to trial and his jurors to find him guilty. We re-
view the claims made by several scholars in recent years, suggesting that
Socrates was, in some sense, guilty of the religious charges against him,
but we argue that these claims are unpersuasive. Instead, we argue in
Section 7,2 that Socrates' life ended because of a certain "tragic irony" of
the sort we described in Chapter 2: Despite having been one of the fore-
most (and most formidable) intellectual opponents of the Sophists, in his
prosecutors' and jurors' eyes, he was identified with the very philoso-
phers he so vigilantly opposed and was tried, convicted, and condemned
to death for beliefs that he did not hold, for teachings that he never en-
dorsed and always rejected. His was an odd example, then, of mistaken
identitythe Athenians correctly saw that he was an intellectual, but
they were entirely mistaken about what sort of intellectual, he was.
Socrates' prosecutors charged him with disbelief in the gods recog-
nized by the Athenians, whereas in his defense, Socrates retorts that the
very activities that led to his being charged with such disbelief were, as a
matter of fact, nothing less than a mission given him by the god of Delphi.
Accordingly, far from being impious, Socrates characterizes his life as a
model of piety! But many of those who have read Socrates' account of the
origin of this religious mission he claims to have been given by the god
have not been satisfied with it, because Socrates seems to have concluded
that he was given a mission without actually ever receiving anything that
looks like a command from the god. We take this problem up in Section
7,3.
Plato and Xenophon both agree that the second specification of the
impiety charge against Socratesthat he invents new spiritual things
was motivated by Socrates' claim to having had "since childhood" (Apol-
ogy 31d) what he calls a "divine sign/' or "voice," or even more vaguely, a
"divine something"4 (the Greek here would be daimomon ti, which is why
scholars now customarily call this "divine something" "Socrates* daimo-
nion") that would oppose him when he was about to do something wrong
(Apology 31d, 40a, 40c). The questions here are obvious, and we discuss
them in Section 7.4: What was this thing, and did this very spooky and ir-
rational-sounding phenomenon have any influence on Socrates as (other-
wise, at least) a man of reason?
We end the book with a look at what Socrates thought about how life
comes to an end, in death. On the one hand, in his defense speech,
Socrates claims that it is "the most shameful ignorance" to think that one
knows what death holds (Apology 29b), and yet elsewhere we find him
making very confident claims about what the afterlife is like, claims that
seem to lend some support for various ethical views he holds. We con-
sider in Section 7,5 whether this represents a tension in his philosophy,
234 Socrates and Religion
and whether his views of the afterlife cohere with his own other religious
positions and with those of his culture and time.
being a man who (in contrast to so many of his fellow Athenians) has al-
ways sought to care about wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of
his soul, by attaching the highest value to the most important things
and much lower value to inferior things, caring always most of all for
virtue (see Apology 29e-30a, 31b) and fighting for justice (see 32a), de-
spite having lived a life dedicated to his service to the god (see Apology
22a, 23b, 28e-29a, 30e-31b, 33c). Socrates seems to do his best, in his de-
fense to the jury, to leave them with the strongest possible impression
that he is a man who is as concerned as a man can be never to do any-
thing wrong, and yet the frequent activity of his daimonion shows that,
nonetheless, he continues to find himself all too often on the verge of
doing some wrong he had not recognized as such (or he would not be
on the verge of doing it and in need of the daimonion's admonition).
Given Socrates' low opinion of human wisdom, perhaps his proneness
to error should come as no great surprise. But even if Socrates does not
say that his daimonion detects and warns Socrates every time he is about
to make such errors, at least it does this "frequently." Accordingly, the
source of this daimonic warning plainly knows vastly more than this
"wisest of men" about what is right and what is wrong, and it is vastly
superior to Socrates in recognizing what Socrates should and should
not do. Here again, then, we find that Socrates appears to be deeply
committed to the enormous intellectual superiority of divinity, relative
to human beings.
The superiority is not simply intellectual. Recall that in Chapter 5, we
discussed how it was that Socrates believed wisdom is wisdom of what is
good and evil and that anyone who knows what is good will desire it.
The wisdom of the gods is not different in kind. This, then, explains why
Socrates, in a rare direct and unconditional affirmation, proclaims that the
gods are not only our greatest benefactors but also our only benefactors.
T7.3 Euthyphro ISa:
SOCRATES: But tell me, what benefit do the gods derive from the gifts
they receive from us? What they give us is obvious to all. There is
for us no good that we do not receive from them . . . .
(Socrates speaking) You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentle-
men of the jury, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be
harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the
gods.
236" Socrates and Religion
What would be left of her [Aphrodite] and of any of the other Olympians if
they were required to observe the stringent norms of Socratic virtue which
require every moral agent, human or divine, to act only to cause good to oth-
ers, never evil, regardless of provocation? Required to meet these austere
standards, the city's gods would have become unrecognizable. Their ethical
transformation would be tantamount to the destruction of the old gods, the
creation of new oneswhich is precisely what Socrates takes to be the sum
and substance of the accusation at his trial,8
(Socrates speaking) There have been many who have accused me to you for
many years now, and none of their accusations are true. These I fear much
more than I fear Anytus and his friends, though they, too, are formidable.
These earlier ones, however, are more so, gentlemen; they got hold of most of
you from childhood, persuaded you and accused me quite falsely, saying
that there is a man called Socrates, a wise man, a student of all things in the
sky and below the earth, who makes the worse argument the stronger. Those
who spread that rumor, gentlemen, are my dangerous accusers, for their
hearers believe that those who study these things do not even believe in the
gods.
gesting to Euthyphro there is not that it was his refusal to believe in im-
moral gods that got him into trouble but the fact that people who heard of
his rejection of immoral gods and fanciful stories from the poets drew the
mistaken inference that Socrates did not believe in the gods at all. That is,
because Socrates could not believe stories about the gods such as the ones
that so captivate Euthyphro, people thought Socrates had to be an atheist.
Thus, as he says in 11.1, it is the belief that he is an atheist that got him
into trouble,
T7.7 Apology 19a-d (immediately precedes T2.7):
(Socrates speaking) Let us then take up the case from the beginning. What is
the accusation from which arose the slander in which Meletus trusted when
he wrote out the charge against me? What did they say when they slandered
me? I must, as if they were my actual prosecutors, read the affidavit they
would have sworn. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of wrong-
doing in that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the
earth; he makes the worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these
same things to others. You have seen this yourself in the comedy of Aristo-
phanes [the Clouds], a Socrates swinging about there, saying he was walking
on air and talking a lot of other nonsense about things of which I know noth-
ing at all. 1 do not speak in contempt of such knowledge, if someone is wise
in these thingslest Meletus bring more cases against mebut, gentlemen, I
have no part in it, and on this point I call upon the majority of you as wit-
nesses, 1 think it right that all those of you who have heard me conversing,
and many of you have, should tell each, other if anyone of you has ever heard
me discussing such subjects to any extent at all. From this you will learn that
the other tilings said about me by the majority are of the same kind.
Not one of them is true.
Socrates makes it very clear here exactly what he takes to be the dan-
gerous slanders that have led to his being on trial. Notice that he says
nothing about moralizing the gods or about any supposedly odd reli-
gious positions he may or may not have taken in Ms philosophizing. The
issue, as he puts it at least, is that he has been characterized as a word-
twisting Sophist and nature-philosopher.
Moreover, it is not just Socrates who characterizes the problem this
way. Later, when Socrates interrogates Meletus, the actual author of the
charge against him, Socrates gives his accuser a golden opportunity to en-
dorse the exact understanding of the charges that some recent scholars
have urged, but Socrates' actual accuser, at any rate, rejects this under-
standing out of hand and instead makes it very plain that he wishes the
jury to find Socrates guilty of being an atheist.
T7.8 Apology 26b-c:
Socrates and Religion 239
(Socrates speaking) Nonetheless tell us, Meletus, how you say that 1 corrupt
the young; or is it obvious from your deposition that it is by teaching them
not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes but in other new spiri-
tual things? Is this not what you say I teach and so corrupt them?
(Meletus replies) That is most certainly what I do say.
Then by those very gods about whom we are talking, Meletus, make this
clearer to me and. to the jury: 1 cannot be sure whether you mean that I teach
the belief that there are some godsand therefore I myself believe that there
are gods and am not altogether an atheist, nor am I guilty of thatnot, how-
ever, the gods in whom the city believes, but others, and that this is the
charge against me, that they are different. Or whether you mean that 1 do not
believe in gods at all, and that this is what 1 teach to others.
This is what 1 mean, that you do not believe in gods at all.
Socrates and Meletus agree on at least one thing, then, and both "tes-
tify" against the modern view that it was Socrates' moralizing theology
that got him into trouble, Socrates and his accuser both plainly and un-
ambiguously state that the charge, instead, was that Socrates was an athe-
ist. Of course, Socrates and Meletus completely disagree on the matter of
Socrates' guilt: Socrates denies it, whereas Meletus affirms it.
Perhaps what has led so many modern commentators to take a wrong
turn here is, in a way, a certain charitable view of the ancient Athenians.
Surely, one might argue, Socrates' democratic countrymen did not make
it their business to prosecute people on charges for which there is not a
trace of credible evidence! And one might well, find it quite difficult to see
how or why anyone would ever suppose that Socrates was simply an
atheist, whereas we can all agree that there is solid evidence that Socrates
engaged in a certain degree of moralizing theology. By arguing that this
was the concern that was really at work in the charge against Socrates,
modern commentators might suppose they make better sense of the pros-
ecution's case and why that case was successful against Socrates. This un-
derstanding of the charge, of course, also supports these commentators'
own endorsements of the Athenian jurors' final verdict.9
Such commentators, however, simply miss the fact that Socrates actually
does explainin what we think is an entirely plausible wayhow and why
he ended up with the sort of reputation he was given in the slander that he
was an atheist. According to Socrates, his public examinations of other peo-
ple led to their being publicly humiliated, and for this, they hated him. But
when asked to explain why they hated Socrates so much, they found the
standard slanders against intellectuals a convenient way of explaining
Socrates' motives without revealing their apparent confusion. Socrates be-
gins, as we have seen, by articulating what he takes to be the most danger-
ous slanders against him, and he flatly deni.es these (see T7.6 and T7.7). But
240 Socrates and Religion
he realizes that simple denial cannot, by itself, allay the prejudices that have
dogged him for decades.10 Thus, he imagines that his jurors immediately
confront his denials by challenging him to explain how else he could have
gained such a terribleand, it turns out, fatally dangerousreputation,
T7.9 Apology 20c-tl:
(Socrates speaking) One of you might perhaps interrupt me and say: "But
Socrates, what is your occupation? From where have these slanders come?
For surely if you did not busy yourself with something out of the common,
all these rumors and talk would not have arisen unless you did something
other than most people, Tell us what it Is, that we may not speak inadvisedly
about you,"
impious moralizing of the gods? Socrates concludes this portion of his de-
fense not only without mentioning this issue but by insisting that he has
told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, hiding nothing at
all from his jurors' view, and he claims that no matter how much his jurors
might investigate his claimsnow or laterthis is all they would find.
T7.ll Apology 24a-b:
That, gentlemen of the jury, is the truth for you, I have hidden or disguised
nothing. I know well enough that this very conduct makes me unpopular,
and this is proof that what I say is true, that such is the slander against me,
and that such are Its causes. If you look into this either now or later, this is
what you will find.
the god of Delphi, Apollo. Socrates repeatedly claims to his jurors that his
philosophizing is no less than a mission on the god's behalf, a "service"
(Apology 22a, 23b, 30a) or "obedience" (Apology 29d) to the god. On the
one hand, one can readily see how this claim could serve well in a defense
against the charge of impietyfar from being impious, the very activities
that got Socrates in all this trouble were undertaken as part of a religious
mission, ordered by Apollo himself! There could be no reasonable doubt
that Socrates believes in "the gods the city believes in" if his whole life is a
devotion to the god of Delphito whom the Athenians regularly turned
through oracles for advice in private and civic matters.
However, despite the importance of this link to the logical basis of the
defense speech Plato gives to Socrates, several scholars have despaired of
making any sense of the oracle story that would support Socrates' claim
to have a mission in Athens,11 The problem is that on the basis of the way
Socrates relates the oracle story to his jurors, it does not seem at all clear
exactly how Socrates managed to get a divine commandment to philoso-
phize out of what happened between Chaerophon and the oracle,
Chaerophon, recall, went to the oracle and asked if anyone was wiser
than Socrates. The oracle gave the answer "No," This simple denial by it-
self, surely, cannot reasonably be understood as a command for Socrates
to philosophize, especially when the oracle's answer was not even given
to Socrates himself! But the same can be said of what Socrates gets later
on, from his attempts to interpret the oracle. He goes around to those he
supposes have some wisdom that he lacks and finds out either that they
have no such wisdom,and are unaware of their lackor that they have
some minor wisdom (in the case of the craftsmen) but that this minor wis-
dom is outweighed by their far more significant ignorance of what
Socrates calls "the most important things"an ignorance, again, of which
these people are also ignorant. In comparison, to all these people,
Socrates, who finds himself woefully deficient, discovers that Ms defi-
ciency is, indeed, still less than all of those he questions.
But even in Socrates' reaching the conclusion that the god has shown
him that he is the wisest of men only because others are doubly igno-
rantnot only ignorant in the way that he is but also ignorant of their ig-
norance, whereas he is only singly ignorantit does not seem to modern
readers at all obvious how this conclusion reveals that the oracle has
given Socrates a mission. However, Socrates later expands significantly
upon this version of the origin of his mission (which would attribute it ex-
clusively to the oracle given to Chaerophon),
T7.12 Apology 33c (immediately follows T2.13):
So all he [Socrates] could claim to be getting from the daimonion at any given
time is precisely what he calls the daimonion itselfa "divine sign," which al-
lows, indeed, requires, unlimited scope for the deployment of his critical reason to
extract whatever truth it can from these monitions. Thus, without any re-
course to Ionian physiologia, Socrates has disarmed the irrarionalist potential
of the belief in supernatural gods communicating with human beings by su-
pernatural signs. His theory both preserves the venerable view that mantic
experience is divinely caused and nullifies that view's threat to the exclusive
authority of reason to determine questions of truth or falsehood.... [TJhere
can be no conflict between Socrates's unconditional readiness to follow criti-
cal reason wherever it may lead and his equally unconditional commitment
to obey commands issued to him, by his supernatural god through supernat-
ural signs. These two commitments cannot conflict because only 'm/ the use of his
own critical reason can Socrates determine the true meaning of any of these signs,
(Vlastos [1991], 170-171; emphasis in original)
Socrates and Religion 247
Vlastos finds compelling reason for this interpretation from his under-
standing of what Socrates says about himself in the Crito,15
T7.15 Crito 45b:
SOCRATES: , , , [N]ot only now but at all times I am the kind of man
who listens only to the reason16 that on reflection seems best to me.
Of course, Socrates does not make this claim to secure the contrast
Vlastos gets out of it, between reason and a "sign" from his daimonion; in-
stead, Socrates proclaims his fidelity to reason to contrast his own trust in
ratiocination over the commands or opinions of "the many," for whose
views Socrates customarily shows no concern in any case. We should
therefore ask how or if the passage from, the Crito applies to Socrates' con-
ception of his daimonion. Let us begin writh Vlastos's claim that Socrates
"requires unlimited scope for the deployment of his critical reason to ex-
tract whatever truth it can" from his "sign,"
In this case, the voice not only opposes his plan to cross the river but
also stipulates what Socrates must do before he does. The specific "of-
fense agaktst the gods" Is not explicitly identified, but Socrates goes on to
explain how he is able to identify what this offense was.
T7.18 Phaedrus 242c-d (continuing 17.17):
low him to leave until he had atoned for the offense his soul had already
sensed. Rather than finding itself in charge of this situation, Socrates' rea-
son finds itself in the service of nonrational signals, whose content and
significance is already largely determined. Reason, in this case, then, en-
joys nothing like "unlimited scope" for its "deployment," as Vlastos has
claimed. Socrates was not at liberty, surely, to deploy Ms critical reason in
such a way as to conclude that he had pleased the gods and could now
cross the river with their delighted blessings!
The Phaedrus, however, is not among the group of Plato's early dia-
logues, so we might regard the way in which this episode is presented
with some suspicion. If we turn to what we find Plato's Socrates saying
about Ms daimonion in the Apology, however, we will also find good rea-
son to suppose that Socrates did view his daimonion with a degree of as-
surance and acceptance that was prior to and thus independent of the ap-
plication of critical reason. Let us first return to what Socrates says about
his daimonion when he tells his jurors about what he takes to be the signif-
icance of its failing to make an appearance,
T7.19 Apology 40a-b:
Plainly, the daimonion cannot explain why it is not making its appear-
ance (at least without making an appearance to do so!}, so Socrates must
use his reason to understand why the daimonion has suddenly become so
reticent in this situation. But the obvious inference is the one that Socrates
makesin this situation, he has done nothing wrong and has undertaken
to say nothing from which the daimonion needed to restrain him,.
Socrates' characterization of horn' frequently and in what situations the
daimonion had made its appearance in the past, however, is very reveal-
ing: He says it would often come even in the middle of something he
might be saying. What should we suppose was Socrates' reaction to the
daimonion's sudden opposition in such cases? Did he simply ignore it and
continue with what he was saying, or did he immediately give in to the
opposition of his sign? Every time we hear of Socrates' daimonion, we find
him only and immediately obeying it, so we must suppose that this
would also have been his reaction when it appeared during something he
Socrates and Religion 251
was saying. Shall we then suppose that Socrates was speaking carelessly
or without any support from his critical reason at such times, or should
we suppose that Socrates was, even at such times, being characteristically
rational (only; in these cases, we must suppose, making some error of
judgment of which he could not be awareor about which he could have
no more than some suspicionuntil the appearance of his daimonion)'? If
we suppose that Socrates was saying something he took to be supported
by reason, at least-as we are suggesting-then each of these cases would
count as his daimonion's opposing his reasons. If so, then there can be no
doubt that Socrates could and did allow his daimonion to overrule some-
thing he was about to say or do on the basis of what he thought were
good reasons,
Bui if Socrates did allow his daimonion to overrule his reasons for hav-
ing formed some intention, then how could he characterize himself to
Crito, as he does at Crito 45b (T7.15), as "the kind of man who listens only
to the reason that on reflection seems best to me"? It was on the basis of
this passage, after all, that so many scholars have supposed that Socrates
would never allow anything supernatural to "trump" critical reason.
There are two things to say about this, however. First of all, despite all
that scholars have made of this passage, Socrates is not contrasting his
trust in reason with his trust in his daimonion in making this claim. In fact,
his daimonion has absolutely nothing to do with, what Socrates is saying
here to Crito. Rather, in this passage, Socrates is characterizing his own
trust in reason as opposed to other people. It is nonetheless true that he
makes this contrast in such a way as to make it sound as though he would
always follow reason over any other consideration, but since the daimo-
nion is not explicitly under consideration here as a competitor to reason,
we cannot draw any secure conclusions about it on the basis of Socrates'
claim to Crito here.
Second, scholars have, we think, simply assumed that Socrates' atti-
tude toward his daimonion would put its promptings in some category
other than "the reason that on reflection seems best to me." Perhaps it is
not entirely plausible to suppose that Socrates would count his daimo-
nion's sudden appearances as the product of "reflection," since they al-
ways seem to come unexpectedly. But Socrates' apparently unhesitating
and immediate obedience to the opposition of the daimonion seems to
show that whenever it does appear on the scene, he immediately counts
its appearance as a decisive reason to desist from what he was about to
say or do. If so, whether or not we count this as a "reason that on reflection
seems best" to Socrates, if seems at least to count as an absolutely com-
pelling reason to desist from what he was about to say or doand, hence,
provides a better reason than whatever reasons he had to carry out what
he originally intended to do. At any rate, precisely because Socrates
252 Socrates and Religion
At the very end of the Apology, Socrates seeks to console those jurors who
voted in his favor and who must therefore suppose that Socrates had been
condemned to death wrongly. He explains to them why they should have
"good hope" for him, even though no one knows what may follow death.
" T7.21 Apology 40c-41a:
(Socrates speaking) Let us reflect in this way, too, that there is good hope that
death is a blessing, for it is one of two things: either the dead are nothing and
have no perception of anything, or it is, as we are told, a change and a relocat-
ing for the soul from here to another place. If it is a complete lack of percep-
tion, like a dreamless sleep, then death would be a great advantage. For I. think
Socrates and Religion 253
that if one had to pick out that night during which a man slept soundly and
did not dream, put it beside the other nights and days of his life, and then see
how many days and nights had been better and more pleasant than that night,
not only a private person but the great king would find them easier to count
compared with the other days and nights. If death is like this I say it is an ad-
vantage, for all eternity would then seem to be no more than a single night. If,
on the other hand, death is a change from here to another place, and what we
are told is true and all who have died, are there, what greater blessing could.
there be, gentlemen of the jury? If anyone arriving in Hades will have escaped
from those who now call themselves judges here, and will find those true
judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadarnanthus and
Aeacus and Triptolemus and the other demi-gods who have been upright in
their own life, would that be a poor kind of change? Again, what would one of
you give to keep company with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I
am willing to die many times if that is true.
The gist of Socrates' argument seems to be this: Either death, is the very
end, in which case it will be like sleeping, which is nothing to fear, or else
it is not the end, in which case the soul will go someplace else. Of course,
all wre have to go on is what the poets say about the afterlife, in which
caseat least in the way Socrates reconstructs the accountSocrates
again has nothing to fear. Either way, then, the jurors should not suppose
that death will be a bad thing for Socrates.
Elsewhere, however, Socrates speaks in ways that leave no doubt that
he accepts the second of the two possibilities that he presented to his ju-
rors. In the Gorgias, for example, Socrates' belief in an afterlife where the
dead will be judged fairly is stated plainly.
T7.22 Gorgias 523a-524a (excerpted):
SOCRATES: Give ear thenas they put itto a very fine account. You'll
think that it's a mere tale, 1 believe, although 1 think it's an account,
for what I'm about to say I wrill tell you as true. As Homer tells it,
after Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto took over the sovereignty from their
father, they divided it among themselves. Now there was a law-
concerning human beings during Cronus' time, one that gods even
now continue to observe, that when a man who has lived a just and
pious life comes to his end, he goes to the Isles of the Blessed, to
make his abode in complete happiness, beyond the reach of evils,
but when one who has lived in an unjust and godless way dies, he
goes to the prison of payment and retribution, the one they call
Tartarus. [ . . . ] Zeus said "... I have already appointed my sons as
judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from
Europe, Aeacus, After they've died, they'll serve as judges [ ... ].
254 Socrates and Religion
Rhadamanthus will judge the people from Asia and Aeacus those
from Europe, I'll give seniority to Minos to render the final
judgment if the other two are at all perplexed, so that the judgment
concerning the passage of humankind may be as just as possible,"
The problem is this: How can Socrates dare to have such well-defined
beliefs about the afterlife if he is so ready to admit that no one knows
what may come after death and that any confidence about this issue must
be counted as "the most blameworthy ignorance"? Do his beliefs about
the afterlife reveal Socrates himself to be guilty of "the most blameworthy
ignorance"?
if you depart after shamefully returning wrong for wrong and injury for in-
jury, after breaking your agreements and commitments with us, after injur-
ing those you should injure least-yourself, your friends, your country and
uswe shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and. our brothers,
the laws of the underworld, will not receive you kindly . . . .
Must we now isolate the Crito, too, and .refuse to see it as one of the dia-
logues we can safely consult in our search for the philosophy of
Socrates?19
Moreover, isolating the Gorgias (or the Crito, as well) raises other ques-
tions. By the time we get to the middle-period dialogues, we find Plato's
Socrates entirely committed to a very different conception of the afterlife
than we find him giving in the Gorgias, the Crito, and, indeed, to either of
the possibilities in the Apology. In the Meno, which most scholars regard
as transitional, we are given arguments that are supposed to give us some
reason for believing that all knowledge is recollection of what our souls
learned in some existence before our (current) lives. This account is ex-
tended in the Phaedo and several other later dialogues, where arguments
and myths are provided that are supposed to show that the soul survives
death and becomes reincarnated, sometimes into different life-forms (see,
for examples, Phaedo Slc-82b, Republic 10.614b-621d). Except that the sub-
sequent lives are given in accordance with merits or faults in the preced-
ing life (thus providing appropriate rewards or punishments for those
preceding lives), this conception of the transmigration of souls has noth-
ing in common with, what Socrates claims to believe in the Gorgias, with
what the Laws say about the afterlife in the Crito, or with what Socrates
recognizes as what the survival of death might be like, in the Apologyall
of which, we contend, represent a single view of the afterlife that plainly
contrasts with what we find in the Meno and in the middle dialogues. On
this ground, then, little is gained by counting the Gorgias among a later
group of dialogues or even as anticipations of them. We propose, accord-
ingly, that it is better to try to explain how Socrates could believe what he
says he believes in the Gorgias and yet argue in the way he does in the
Apology.
SOCRATES: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the
majority think? The most reasonable people, to whom one should,
pay more attention, will believe that things were done as they were
done.
CRITO: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the
opinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clear that the
majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils if
one is slandered among them,
SOCRATES: Would that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for
they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would
be fine, but now they cannot do either. They cannot make a man
either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly.
We must not suppose, therefore, that Socrates counts a belief in the af-
terlife as in any way supported simply on the ground that this belief is
Socrates and Religion 257
generally accepted. But when he says that the belief in the afterlife is
something "we are told," he includes himself and others among those
who are told such stories. The question is, who tells such stories to them,
and, where do they get their ideas?
The answer to this question, we contend, is that it is the poets of Greece
who tell such storiesin particular, those poets who have established the
religious traditions to which Socrates refers in recounting his account of
the afterlife. The poets, recall, are the second group Socrates says he
went to when he searched out the meaning of the Delphic oracle to
Chaerophon, When he questioned them, however, he found that they suf-
fered from a shocking lack of knowledge.
T7.25 Apology 22b-c:
(Socrates speaking) After the politicians, I went to the poets, the writers of
tragedies and dithyrambs and the others, intending, in their case to catch
myself being more ignorant than they. So I took up those poems with which
they seemed to have taken, most trouble and asked them what they meant, in
order that 1 might at the same time learn something from them. I am
ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen, but I must. Almost all the by-
standers might have explained the poems better than their authors could. I
soon realized that poets do not compose their poems with knowledge, but by
some inborn talent and by inspiration, like seers and prophets who also say
many fine things without any understanding of what they say.
(Socrates speaking) You know, none of the epic poets, if they're good, are
masters of their subject; they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they
utter all those beautiful poems. The same goes for lyric poets if they're good:
just as the Corybantes are not in their right minds when they dance, lyric po-
ets, too, are not in their right minds when they make those beautiful lyrics,
but as soon as they sail into harmony and rhythm they are possessed by Bac-
chic frenzy. Just as Bacchus worshippers when they are possessed draw
honey and milk from rivers, but not when they are in their right mindsthe
soul of a lyric poet does this, too, as they say themselves. For of course poets
tell us that they gather songs at honey-flowing springs, from glades and gar-
dens of the Muses, and that they bear songs to us as bees carry honey, flying
like bees. And what they say is true. For a poet is an airy thing, winged and
holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes
out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him.
Socrates, recall, counts the gods as having a kind of wisdom that is far
beyond what human beings can achieve. When these gods speak to us,
using poets, seers, or prophets as their mediums, we must not under-
stand the profundities we receive thereby as having been given their con-
tent by the human mediums through whom the gods have spoken. Even
so, precisely because it is the gods who have thus spoken to us, it would
be impious to doubt the significance or the accuracy of what we have
been toldif only we can understand it rightly.
Earlier in. this chapter, we argued against Gregory Vlastos's claim that
Socrates thought that nothing had any cognitive value unless it was pro-
duced through rational means. In the case of religious phenomena, Vlas-
tos argued, one would still need to interpret them and that would neces-
sarily require the operation of critical rationality. We argued earlier that
Vlastos's claim was too strong in regard to Socrates daimonion, which
seemed to exercise an influence over him that was independent of what
Vlastos would count as Socrates' critical reason. But we think that Vlastos
is right about religiously significant phenomena other than the
daimonionand even with the daimonion, we allowed, only Socrates' rea-
son could provide any detailed explanation of why the daimonion had sig-
naled its opposition.
Inspired poetry and prophecy tell us "many fine things." But we cannot
easily understand what these things tell us. Thus, even when the mes-
sages we have achieved through such means seem very clear, we must
never suppose that we are in a position to claim to know that "what we are
Socrates and Religion 259
told" is true. In the case of stories about the afterlife, we are told won-
drous things about our souls migrating to another place, where at last we
might encounter real judges, whose judgments are the products of wis-
dom rather than prejudice and unjustified opinion. Can we be certain that
such stories are true? We cannot. There surely is (tome truth here, given
where we can suppose these stories come from. But what exactly that
truth might be we do not know. Might death simply be extinction after
all, like an endless sleep? Yes, and here is why: The gist of the afterlife sto-
ries, at least in Socrates' account, is that the afterlife is nothing for a good
person to fear. Indeed, it is something for the good person to look for-
ward to. People fear death, Socrates seems to suppose, because they fear
extinction. But when he reviews what this might be like, he finds that
even this would be a "great advantage." Could the gods tell us this, by
having our poets speak of wronderful experiences in the afterlife? Why
not? If they perceive that these stories will best reassure us about death
and it is such reassurance they wish to convey to us, there is no reason
that they cannot formulate their reassurance in such a way.
When Odysseus does make the trip to Hades, he encounters the ghost
of Achilles, the greatest fighter of all of the Achaians, who makes the
frightening picture even clearer, Achilles wonders how the living
260 Socrates and Religion
Odysseus could "endure to come down here to Hades' place, where the
senseless dead men dwell, mere imitations of perished mortals" (Odyssey
II, 475-476). And when Odysseus complains of his own troubles and pro-
claims Achilles "blessed" because of how well honored he was before his
death and because he now enjoys "great authority over the dead"
(Odyssey 11, 482-486), Achilles, who had been so proud in his superiority
when alive, offers this chilly retort.
T7.28 Homer, Odyssey Book 11, lines 488-491:
terrible punishments for the evil in their souls. On the other hand,
Socrates is convinced that he is a good man, and so his account of the af-
terlife does provide "good hope" for those who, like him, have lived good
lives. And this is all he proposed to offer to those jurors who had voted in
his favor. One might perhaps infer a rather grimmer prospect for at least
some of those who had voted against Socrates!
Two further points can be made. First, we should attend to the fact that
it is not Socrates' expressed intention in his final speech in the Apology to
provide his supporters on the jury with a careful survey of what he takes
to be our state of evidence regarding death and the afterlife. He is, in-
stead, seeking to give them some reason for solace that what has hap-
pened is not a bad thing for him. Even if he does believe in an afterlife, as
we have argued that he does, he does not owe it to his jurors in this con-
text to show why he favors this conclusion over the one, which some of
them may suppose is more likely, that regards death as extinction. Our
conclusion, after all, is that "what we are told" is sonte reason to believe
that there is an afterlife, but it might still be that there is no afterlife and
that death is extinction after all. Accordingly, Socrates allows that death
could be "one of two things" when he seeks to console his jurors. He does
remind them, that "we are told" about an afterlife. But what they make of
this is up to them. Second, and perhaps even more important, we are now
in a position to see even more clearly why Socrates would regard it as
"the most blameworthy ignorance" to fear death, as he says it is in T7.20.
For if what Socrates tells us is true and death is either of the two things he
counts as possibilities, neither one counts as something to be feared. Ac-
cordingly, to act in shameful ways out of a fear of death is truly "the most
blameworthy ignorance."
In this chapter, we have considered Socrates' religious beliefs, and we
have found them to be an interesting mixture of elements from traditional
Greek religion and elements deriving from Socrates' own unique experi-
ences and his understanding of these. Scholars are right to see, in
Socrates, a strong tendency to moralize Greek religion. We have disputed
their claim that this may have provided a motive for his prosecution, con-
viction, or execution. But we find its influence in all of Socrates* religious
professions. But this is only what we should expect of a man dedicated to
achieving a consistency in his own beliefs, one that supports the most
moral life a human being might aspire to.
Notes
1. The oldest known. Hindu document, the Rig Veda, dates sometime between
1400 and 1000 B.C. (see J. Smith [1995], 425). Siddhartha Gautama, who came to be
known as Buddha, was born ca. 566 B.C. (ibid., 135). Judaism is said to have begun
262 Socrates and Religion
as a historical religion with the creation of the Pentateuch sometime in the sixth
century B.C., and most of the Hebrew Bible was written or edited in the period
from 538 to 333 B.C. (ibid., 600),
2. Even the "official" civic festivals recognized in Athens each year gained and
lost new members all the time, with new ones constantly being introduced and
old ones coming to be disregarded and being subsequently dropped from the civil
religious calendar.
3. This is the order of the specifications given in most of the ancient accounts. In
Plato's Apology (24b-c), Socrates gives a different order: corrupting the young, not
believing in the gods the city believes in, and inventing new spiritual things. But
Socrates seems not to be attempting to recite the specifications in their exact order
here but gives them in the order in which he will address them in this phase of his
defense. At any rate, we do not find any particular significance in the order of the
specifications and will maintain the order we are given, in other sources only for
the sake of their greater familiarity.
4. For "sign," see Apology 40c, 41 d; Euthydemus 272s; Republic 6.496c; and Phae-
drus 242b. For "voice," see Apology 31d; and Phaedrus 242c. For "something di-
vine," see Apology 31c-d, 40a; Euthyphro 3b; and. Phaedrus 242b.
5. His deliberate vagueness about the source and. nature of the daimonion sug-
gests that Socrates did not suppose he knew anything very clearly about the dai-
monion, other than that it had some divine source. In his argument with Meletus
(at Apology 27b28a) about the "new divinities" the indictment alleges he in-
vented, Socrates intimates that he believes not only in gods but also quite possibly
in "spirits," which are themselves either gods or the "children of the gods, bastard
children of the gods by nymphs or some other mothers" (27d), and possibly di-
vine heroes, as well (28a).
6. Here we deviate from the Grube translation in Cooper (1997), which turns
Socrates' question into a direct affirmation and which, as we show, creates a con-
flict with the account of the motives for the prosecution that Socrates gives in the
Apology. In the Greek text, it is unambiguously clear, however, that Socrates is ask-
ing a question.
7. See, for examples, Connor (1991), Steinberger (1997), and Vlastos (1991),
chap. 6, A more cautiousand impressively detailedreview of the evidence is
offered in McPherran (1996). McPherran concludes that even if Socrates' moraliz-
ing of the gods was not the basis for the prosecution, it was nonetheless a poten-
tially dangerous issue for Socrates, which could have led at least some of the ju-
rors to vote against him (see esp. 141-174). As our following argument shows, we
think even this weaker conclusion is not warranted by our evidence.
8. Vlastos (1.991), 166. See also Connor (1991), 56; Burnyeat (1997).
9. Burnyeat (1997), Connor (1991), and Vlastos (1991, ch. 6) all concur that
Socrates was guilty of the charge, as they understand it. McPherran (1996, esp.
156-160) says that Socrates was guilty of the charge, conceived in this way but
claims that Meletus simply bungles the case by opting for the interpretation of the
charge as atheism (see T7.8, above), which allows Socrates safely to skirt the more
dangerous issue of his religious moralizing innovations. Had Meletus chosen the
more plausible conception of the charge, however, McPherran thinks that the ju-
rors would have had even more reason to convict Socrates. We obviously agree
with none of these assessments.
Socrates find Religion 263
10. Notice that Socrates mentions Aristophanes' Clouds in T7.7 as evidence for
his claim that these prejudices have been around for some time. Aristophanes'
Clouds was produced in 423 B.C., nearly a quarter of a century before Socrates'
trial in 399 B.C. Obviously, Socrates already had a problematic reputation in
Athens when Aristophanes wrote Ms play, or Ms selection of Socrates as the
stereotypical intellectual would not have seemed, apt. We may assume, then, that
Socrates is right in claiming to have had a bad reputation for a long time before his
trial.
11. See, for examples, Hackforth (1933), 101-104; Montuori (1981), 133-143;
Stokes (1992).
12. See note 3 above.
13. Notice, again, how this differs from the account given by Vlastos and those
who agreed with him (Vlastos [1991], 166. See also Connor [1991], 56; Burnyeat
[1997]). The way Vlastos saw it, it was Socrates' moralizing innovations that were
at issue: "Their [the gods'] ethical transformation would be tantamount to the de-
struction of the old gods, the creation of new oneswhich is precisely what
Socrates takes to be the sum and substance of the accusation at his trial" (Vlastos
[1991], 166). Neither of our two most important proximate sources on Socrates
(Plato and Xenophon) corroborate Vlastos's account that it was moralizing inno-
vation that led to the charge that Socrates invented new divinities.
14. See, for example, Nussbaum (1985), 234-235.
15. See Vlastos (1991), 157; also Reeve (1989), 71-72.
16. Here we modify the Grube translation in Cooper (1997), which gives "argu-
ment" instead of "reason." The Greek word is logos, which can mean either "rea-
son" or "argument" (among other possibilities), but Grube's translation, as we
shall argue, would beg the question about what might count as a "reason" for
Socrates. Vlastos's version"the proposition which appears to me to be the best
when 1 reason about it" (Vlastos [1991], 157) is even more tendentious. Reeve
(1989,72) cites this passage for his uncompromising claim that "Socrates is ... ex-
plicit that the only thing that would convince him . . . is an argument." Under-
stood in this way, this passage has the effect of saying that Socrates would never
be convinced of anythingeven, that he should desist from some course of ac-
tionjust by some "sign" from the daimamon. We do not accept this result.
17. See, for example" McPherran (1996), 266-270.
18. Indeed, it has become fashionable among some scholars to argue that none
of Plato's texts can be compared for consistent points of view with any others.
Each dialogue, it is held, is intended (by Plato) to be read and considered entirely
on its own terms, isolated from any arguments or positions offered in any other
dialogues, which Plato made no attempt to make consistent with one another.
Plainly, we have not taken this interpretative approach seriously in this book, for
we find little plausibility in the claim that Plato would show so little concern for
consistency, and we also believe that such an approach would be more of a hin-
drance than a help in our attempt to understand either Socratic or Platonic philos-
ophy. Accordingly, we confess puzzlement as to why any serious scholars would
find such an approach attractive except to avoid the very challenges of scholarly
interpretation.
19. McPherran seems prepared to flirt with this result (see 1996, 266, n. 61) but
also offers an alternative to it by claiming that we do not have to understand
264 Socrates and Religion
Socrates' reference to the afterlife here as reflecting his own beliefs (1996,
265-266). Socrates is speaking here for the personified Laws of Athens, McPher-
ran points out, and so their reference here may reflect only what Socrates re-
garded as an opinion reflected in Athens's laws. We tend to doubt that this spe-
cific conception of the afterlife could be found as a legal doctrine in Athens's laws,
in which case Socrates' alleged attribution of this conception to the Athenian laws
(while remaining noncommittal himself) is tendentious, at best. Moreover, since
even McPherran seems prepared to accept that everything else the Laws say
(through Socrates) in their speech can safely be attributed to Socrates, his exclu-
sion of this point is unsupportable.
20. This and the following are Lattimore's translations (1965).
21. For a very judicious discussion of the uncertainties and diversities in an-
cient Greek religion, see Parker (1996).
22. Homer, Odyssey 4, 561-568. Other positive possibilities are given or sug-
gested in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, lines 480-482, and in Pindar, Olympian 2,
lines 63-73. For discussion of the possibilities for a blissful afterlife, see Burkert
(1987), 13-15.
23. We infer this from the fact that Odysseus does not need to confront the pos-
sibility that Tei.wsiasthe seer for whom, he searches in the afterlifemight be in
some other, happier place.
Suggested Readings
General
An impressive, comprehensive book on Socrates* religious views and their con-
nections with his philosophy is McPherran (1996). A new book (Smith and
Woodruff, forthcoming) includes articles on the topic by several of the most
prominent scholars, as well as an extensive correspondencenever before pub-
lishedon Socratic religion, among Thomas C. Brickhou.se, Mark McPherran,
Nicholas D. Smith, and Gregory Vlastos.
Smith (1989, sec. 3.1,5) and (1994, sec, 6.2). A view for the most part consistent
with ours can be found in Gocer (forthcoming).
Akrasia The view that one can believe that something is EVIL but pursue it in
spite of that belief. Socrates denies that akrasia. is possible. (See SOCRATIC PARA-
DOXES.)
Aporia The state of confusion in which Socrates' interlocutors find themselves
when elenctic (see ELENCHOS) arguments show that they do not know what they
claimed they knew. Many of Plato's early dialogues are said to be "aporetic" be-
cause they end with Socrates' interlocutors in a state of aparia.
Arete see VIRTUE.
Constructivism The view that the outcome of the ELENCHOS allows Socrates
to draw substantive moral conclusions, including conclusions that bear on, the na-
ture of VIRTUE. As opposed to NONCONSTRUCT1V1SM, which holds that the
ELENCHOS only shows that the interlocutor lacks knowledge. (See 2.2.}
Craft A body of knowledge that enables its possessor to do something or to pro-
duce a product (see ERGON) in a rational, orderly, and unerring manner. People
who possess a craft can teach what they know to others and, thus, can give an ac-
count of how it is that they do or produce what they do. (See KNOWLEDGE.)
Daimonion The divine voice that Socrates claims to have heard throughout his
life (see Apology 31d). When he hears it, it always "turns him away" from some-
thing he is intending to do because what he is intending is wrong (see Apology
40a). Although Socrates is confident that he is being turned away from something
wrong, the daimonion never provides him with the reasons why what he is being
turned away from is wrong, or what is wrong about it. (See 7.4.)
Elcnchos The refutative form of argument with which Socrates is generally asso-
ciated. The premises of the clenches consist of answers the interlocutor gives to
questions, and the conclusion is the contradiction of some claim, the interlocutor
had previously claimed to know. Commentators agree that the elenchos serves a
negative purpose (see NONCONSTRUCTIVTSM). Whether the elenchos plays
more positive roles (see CONSTRUCTIVISM), including exhorting the interlocu-
tor to pursue virtue, is controversial. (See 2,2.)
Ergon That performance or product that is the unique goal of a CRAFT. Health
in the body, for example, is the ergon of the craft of medicine. One craft can be dis-
tinguished from other crafts on the basis of the ergon it produces and with which
it is uniquely associated.
Ettdaitnonia The Greek word usually translated as "happiness." (The opposite
of eudctimonia is atliliot/s: "misery" or "wretchedness,"} Socrates uses this term in-
terchangeably with expressions that mean "doing well" and "living well." (See
Euthydemtis 278e ft?.. Republic 1.354a.)
267
26$ Glossary
that Socrates denies that there are nonrational desires (but see, e.g., Laches 191d-e;
see also 5.3,5).
Obey or persuade The obligation Socrates believes that each citizen has to his or
her city when the citizen believes that city has commanded him or her to do
something unjust. (See 6.3.)
Priority of Definition (PD) The principle that holds that knowledge of the defi-
nition of some quality is a necessary condition of knowing anything at all about
that quality or whether or which things manifest that quality. The claim that
Socrates accepts such a principle is controversial. (See 3.2.)
Prudential paradox The Socratic doctrine that no one ever acts contrary to what
they take to be good. A consequence is that every evil pursuit is the result of the
agent's ignorance that what the evildoer is pursuing is evil. (See 5.3.2.)
Rational desires Desires for what one takes to be good.
Socratic paradoxes Two doctrines to which Socrates is committed that seem-
ingly violate common sense: (1) the view that no one can have any one of the
moral virtues without the others (see UNITY OF THE VIRTUES), and (2) the view
that AKRASIA never occurs (see AKRASIA, MORAL PARADOX, and PRUDEN-
TIAL PARADOX). {See Chapter 5.)
Soul An entity, different from the body or any part of the body, whose function
it is to "manage and rule over" the body (see Republic I.353d). The soul is im-
proved by VIRTUE and harmed by VICE. Socrates thinks that it is possible for the
soul either to cease to exist when the body dies or to leave the body at death. Sev-
eral passages suggest that he thinks the latter is more likely than the former.
Sovereignty of virtue thesis The view attributed to Socrates by Gregory Vlas-
tos, according to which virtue is the chief component of EUDAIMON1A and, as
such, is both necessary and sufficient for EU.DAIMONLA. Other, dependent
goods, however, can make one better off with respect to happiness.
Sufficiency thesis The view often attributed to Socrates that virtue produces
EUDAJMONIA either by causing one to be happy or by being a constituent of
happiness. (See 4.2.2.1-4.2.3.)
Technf See CRAFT.
Unity of virtue One of the SOCRATIC PARADOXES. The Socratic doctrine that
anyone who has arty one of the five commonly recognized virtuespiety, temper-
ance, justice, courage, and wisdomwill have the other four virtues as well. Why
Socrates holds this view is controversial. Some scholars maintain that Socrates
holds the equivalence thesis, according to which each of the virtues is definition-
ally distinct and each is constituted by its own distinctive form of moral knowl-
edge. Nonetheless, anyone who possesses any one the virtues possesses each of
the others as well. Other scholars attribute to' Socrates the identity thesis, accord-
ing to which each of the five virtues is really one and the same thing, namely
WISDOM. (See 5.2.)
270 Glossary
Vice That condition of the soul that causes one to do what is evil. Socrates seems
to have thought that vice is nothing more than ignorance of what is good.
Virtue A condition of a thing that makes it an excellent example of the kind of
thing that it is. In antiquity there was widespread agreement that human virtue is
a very important GOOD, However, there was widespread disagreement about
what human virtue is. Scholars disagree about what Socrates believed human
virtue consists In, though the most widely accepted view is that he thought hu-
man virtue is a form of KNOWLEDGE, specifically, moral WISDOM with respect
to good and evil.
Weakness of will See AKRASIA.
Wisdom Socrates seems to distinguish several senses of the term. One form of
wisdom is "human wisdom," the recognition that when one lacks moral VIRTUE
one does not possess wisdom that "is greater than human" (Apology 23a-b),
Socrates seems to think that a wisdom greater than human, is the wisdom that
constitutes VIRTUE, the wisdom that is identical with craft knowledge of moral-
ity.
References
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Names Index
277
278 Names Index
280
Subject Index 281
Paganism, Socrates and, 231 Poetry: inspired, 258-59; power of, 258
Pain, 174, 226; aversion to, 180, 223; Poets, knowledge of, 256-57
causal power of, 181; infliction of, Political craftsman, 187-89
224 Political life, 188-69; rhetorical life and,
Parmenides (Plato), 45 188
Parts of gold analogy, 164,165,169; Politicians, knowledge of, 257
described, 167-68 Politics, 46; democratic, 189; moral
Parts of the face analogy, 164,165 prospects of, 187; partisan, 195;
PD. See Priority of Definitional Socrates and, 27,186-200,226-27,
Knowledge 228; true, 187,189; virtue and,
Peithein, 97n26 193
Peloponnesian War, 17, 27,185; Politicus (Plato), 45
Alcibiades and, 26; Socrates and, Potidaea, Socrates at, 23, 26, 209
23 Prejudice, 198, 237, 240; political, 199;
Penalties, 69,217,219,220; wisdom and, 259
counterpenalties and, 28. See also Primary sources, 12; assessment of,
Punishment 33-49; testimony of, 16
Persian War, 17,18,22 Principle of Charity, 8,65,93, 99,143,
Persuasion, 95,97n26, 206, 212, 21.6; 146,167,199, 222; criticism of,
disobedience and, 205; obedience 202; described, 5-6; Principle of
and, 204 Textual Fidelity and, 9; Socrates
Phaedo (Plato), 20,45; dialogues of, 255 and,215
Phaedrus (Plato), 45, 222, 250 Principle of Contextual Coherence, 7;
Philebiis (Plato), 45 described, 5
Philosophical life, 49,188; importance Principle of Eudaimonism, described,
of, 26; living, 150,189, 224 128
Philosophizing, 39,74, 90-93, 201, 209, Principle of Interpretive Adequacy, 241
238, 242; as civil disobedience, Principle of Interpretive Cogency,
205; knowledge from, 119; laws described, 3
against, 211, 212; piety and, 211; Principle of Interpretive Plausibility, 7,
as right activity, 147-49; by 9, 65, 66, 99,143,146; described,
Socrates, 30, 229, 232-33; " 3-4
stopping, 208, 210, 21.1, 212-13 Principle of Textual Fidelity; 66,99,
Philosophy, 1; religion and, 232, See 143,146,216,222,241; conflict
also Socratic philosophy with, 64; described, 4; Principle of
Phrontisterion, 35 Charity and, 9; violation of, 7
Ptntsiologia, 246 Priority of Definitional Knowledge
Piety, 34, 56,100,135,158-40,164,165, (PD), 100,101,113,114;
171, 233; defining, 110,1.1.7; justice commitment to, 1.15; Socrates and,
and, 78,161,166; meaning of, 166; 116,117-19,12Qn, 121
philosophizing and, 21.1; Profession of ignorance, 46, 58, 64, 67,
understanding, 117 74,80,83,94; Socrates and, 65, 66,
Plato's Academy, 12; Aristotle at, 48 99-105,120-21,192
Pleasure, 220; desire for, 180,181, 222, Prohibition of Anachronism, 6;
223; goodness and, 81-82; described, 4-5
knowledge and, 132; overcoming Proof, 85-86; arguments and, 85;
by, 174,175; seeking, 180, 224-25 deductive, 87
Subject Index 285
287
Index of Passages