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    135561-1983-People v. City Court of Manila

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    mceline19
    The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the dismissal of a homicide charge against a defendant. The defendant had already been prosecuted for and convicted of serious physical injuries for a car accident where the victim later died. The Court held that prosecuting the defendant for homicide after conviction of the other charge would constitute double jeopardy. While normally a new charge can be brought if facts change, here the victim died before the first prosecution so jeopardy had already attached. One justice concurred, noting the first prosecution seemed hastily done to prevent a homicide charge, but the record did not conclusively prove fraud.

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    135561-1983-People v. City Court of Manila

    Uploaded by

    mceline19
    95 views4 pages
    The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the dismissal of a homicide charge against a defendant. The defendant had already been prosecuted for and convicted of serious physical injuries for a car accident where the victim later died. The Court held that prosecuting the defendant for homicide after conviction of the other charge would constitute double jeopardy. While normally a new charge can be brought if facts change, here the victim died before the first prosecution so jeopardy had already attached. One justice concurred, noting the first prosecution seemed hastily done to prevent a homicide charge, but the record did not conclusively prove fraud.

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    The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the dismissal of a homicide charge against a defendant. The defendant had already been prosecuted for and convicted of serious physical injuries for a car accident where the victim later died. The Court held that prosecuting the defendant for homicide after conviction of the other charge would constitute double jeopardy. While normally a new charge can be brought if facts change, here the victim died before the first prosecution so jeopardy had already attached. One justice concurred, noting the first prosecution seemed hastily done to prevent a homicide charge, but the record did not conclusively prove fraud.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    95 views4 pages

    135561-1983-People v. City Court of Manila

    Uploaded by

    mceline19
    The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the dismissal of a homicide charge against a defendant. The defendant had already been prosecuted for and convicted of serious physical injuries for a car accident where the victim later died. The Court held that prosecuting the defendant for homicide after conviction of the other charge would constitute double jeopardy. While normally a new charge can be brought if facts change, here the victim died before the first prosecution so jeopardy had already attached. One justice concurred, noting the first prosecution seemed hastily done to prevent a homicide charge, but the record did not conclusively prove fraud.

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    FIRST DIVISION

    [G.R. No. L-36342. April 27, 1983.]

    THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE CITY COURT


    OF MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO GAPAY y MALLARES,
    respondents.

    Solicitor General for petitioner.


    Mario F. Estayan for respondents.

    SYLLABUS

    1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CASE AT BAR.


    Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an oense cannot he
    charged again with the same or identical oense though the latter be lesser or
    greater than the former. However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, the rule
    of identity does not apply when the second oense was not in existence at the
    time of the rst prosecution. for the reason that in such case there is no
    possibility for the accused, during the rst prosecution, to be convicted for an
    oense that was then inexistent. Where after the rst prosecution a new fact
    supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character
    of the oense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a
    new and distinct oense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy, if
    indicted for the new oense. The victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the
    information was led, and the accused was arraigned two (2) days after, or on
    October 20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence
    was, therefore, led on October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was
    already in jeopardy.
    GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
    1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; PRINCIPLE
    APPLIED TO CASE AT BAR. Where an accused was charged with serious
    physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the same day the victim of the
    accident died, the ling of a second information charging the accused of homicide
    after his conviction of the rst charge constitutes double jeopardy warranting the
    dismissal of the subsequent charge as there was no new fact supervened after
    arraignment and conviction of the accused.

    RESOLUTION

    RELOVA, J : p

    CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com


    This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City
    Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless
    imprudence led against private respondent, Francisco Gapay y Mallares, in
    Criminal Case No. E-505633 on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court
    held that the private respondent having been previously tried and convicted of
    serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the
    victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.
    The question presented in this case is whether a person who has been prosecuted
    for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may
    be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the
    oended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suered.
    In Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, this Court held that "where after the rst
    prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
    changes the character of the oense and, together with the facts existing at a
    time, constitutes a new and distinct oense, the accused cannot be said to be in
    second jeopardy if indicted for the second oense." However, the trial court held
    that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does not apply in the case at bar in view of
    this Court's ruling in People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, that Article 365 of the
    Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury. The
    trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the
    accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a
    dierent resulting injury.
    In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day,
    October 18, an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
    was led against private respondent driver of the truck. On the same day, the
    victim Diolito de la Cruz died. LLjur

    On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious
    physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to
    one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving
    sentence.
    On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was
    led against private respondent.
    On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private
    respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence
    case on the ground of double jeopardy.
    Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an oense cannot be
    charge again with the same or identical oense though the latter be lesser or
    greater than the former. However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, supra,
    the rule of identity does not apply when the second oense was not in existence
    at the time of the rst prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no
    possibility for the accused, during the rst prosecution, to be convicted for an
    oense that was then inexistent. "Thus, where the accused was charged with
    physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for
    homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy." Stated
    dierently, where after the rst prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
    defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the oense and,
    CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
    together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
    oense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
    new oense.
    As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the information was
    led, and the accused was arraigned two (2) days after, or on October 20, 1972.
    When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore,
    led on October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already in
    jeopardy. cdll

    In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on
    October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal led an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing
    and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that
    the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be
    amended." Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim Diolito dela Cruz
    died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident and the arrest of the
    respondent Gapay" (P. 103, Rollo) and that on October 20, 1972, the accused was
    arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached
    and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused.
    ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the lower court is armed.
    SO ORDERED.
    Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
    Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.

    Separate Opinions
    GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

    I am constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that the
    arraignment, while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspicious
    circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanery
    sucient to sustain a nding that the State was denied due process (Cf. Silvestre
    v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10).
    The incident happened on October 17, 1972. The information for serious physical
    injuries through reckless imprudence was led on October 18, 1972. The victim
    of the accident died on the same day. LLphil

    Knowing the volume of the caseload in the City Court of Manila and the
    inevitably slow pace of work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of
    cases with the Fiscal or before the various salas, it is most surprising that the
    accused could have been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for the charge of serious
    physical injuries only three days after the incident, two days after the ling of
    the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The accused does
    not appear to have been a detention prisoner necessitating his immediate
    arraignment right after the ling of the information. The only sensible conclusion
    to draw from the above circumstances is that the accused was hastily made to
    plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a charge for homicide even
    before it could be led. In such a case, there would be a triing with the
    CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
    processes of justice and a collusive eort amounting to fraud or deceit to deprive
    the State of its authority to prosecute an accused for the correct oense. While
    this conclusion is most likely, it remains speculative, however, because we have
    a criminal case before us. The records fail to show what were the results of an
    investigation, if any was conducted to ascertain why the assistant city scal's
    suspicions were not aroused when the case was hurriedly set for arraignment,
    contrary to the usual procedures in the Manila City Court. Either the assistant
    city scal was naively new to the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he
    connived with the accused, in which case remedial measures are called for. At
    any rate, I concur in the armance of the order of dismissal in line with the
    many protections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accused in
    criminal prosecutions.
    Vasquez, J., concur.

    CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

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