I.

PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS *Negligence omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
A. New Civil Code Art. 1157 the persons, of the time and of the place

Art. 1557. Obligations arise from: LAW, CONTRACTS, QUASI Tests of Determining Negligence
CONTRACTS, ACTS OR OMISSIONS PUNISHED BY LAW; AND - Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to
QUASI-DELICTS whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
Obligation Ex Lege (Law) must be expressly or person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
impliedly set forth and cannot be presumed course about to be pursued?
Obligation Ex Contractu (Contract) must be complied
with in good faith; it is the law between parties Causal Connection Between the Fault or Negligence and the
- Neither party may unilaterally evade his obligation in Damage
the contract UNLESS 1) contract authorizes it; 2) - There must be a clear evidence that the cause of the
Other party assents damage is the fault or negligence of the defendant.
- Parties may freely enter into any stipulations, - The fault or negligence of the defendant is the proximate
provided they are not contrary to la, morals, good cause of the injury of the plaintiff
customs, public order or public policy
Obligation Ex Quasi-Contractu (Quasi-Contract) If there is a pre-existing contract
juridical relation resulting from lawful, voluntary and - The proper cause of action is breach of contract or culpa
unilateral acts, which has for its purpose the payment of contractual
indemnity to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched - Exception: Contract of Carriage (In here, the basis of the
or benefited at the expense of another liability is the deliberate and malicious violation of the
- ACT giving rise to a QC must be lawful, voluntary contract)
and unilateral
- Kinds: Can there be a TORT or QUASI-DELICT in Breach of Contract?
a) Negotiorum Gestio unauthorized - Gen. Rule: NO
management; arises whenever a person - Exception: However, the existence of the contract does
voluntarily takes charge of the agency or not bar the commission of a tort by one against the other
management of anothers abandoned business and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act
or property without the latters authority that breaks the contract may also be a tort, the contractual
b) Solutio Indebiti undue payment; arises relations of the parties does not bar the recovery of
when a person unduly delivers a thing through damages
mistake to another who has no right to demand
it Interference with Contractual Relations
- It constitutes torts when a person induced another to
Obligatons Ex Maleficio or Ex Delicto (Delicts) violate the latters contract with a third person
- Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable Cases where Art. 2176 is not applicable
- Scope of Liability a) Where there was a pre-existing contractual relation of
a) Restitution employer and employee between the parties
b) Reparation for the Damage Caused b) When the fault or negligence is punished by law as a
c) Indemnity for Consequential Damages crime
- Effects of Acquittal in Criminal Case c) If the action for quasi-delict is instituted after 4 years
a) When due to reasonable doubt no civil liability d) When the injury suffered is the result of a fortuitous event
b) When due to exempting circumstances there e) If there is no damage or injury caused to another party
is a civil liability
c) When there is preponderance of evidence
there is civil liability Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
- Crimes without Civil Liability article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
a) Contempt from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
b) Insults to persons in authority recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
c) Gambling defendant
d) Violations of Traffic Regulations
Obligaton Ex Quasi-Delicto or Quasi Maleficio (Quasi- Kinds of Negligence
Delict) an act or omission arising from fault or a) Criminal violation of the criminal law
negligence which causes damage to another, there being b) Civil distinct and separate negligence which is CA or
no pre-existing contractual relations between parties QD of ancient origin, having always its own foundation
- Elements: and individuality, separate from criminal negligence
a) There must be an act or omission
b) There must be fault or negligence attributable Modes of Enforcing Civil Liability Due to Fault or Negligence
to the person charged The injured party has the option to:
c) There must be damage or injury a) Pursue a criminal action which includes the claim for civil
d) There must be a direct relation of cause and liability arising from the crime based on Art. 100 of the
effect between the act arising from fault or RPC; or
negligence and the damage injury (proximate b) Pursue an independent civil action based on QD under
cause) Arts. 2176-2194 of the NCC
e) There is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties General Rule: The acquittal of the accused will not necessarily
exonerate him from civil liability. The civil liability arising from CA or
QD was never intended by la to be merged in the criminal action.
B. New Civil Code, Arts. 2176 to 2194 The criminal prosecution is not a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil rights.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, Exception:
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage 1. when it declares that the facts from which the civil liability
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual might arise did not exist
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed 2. when it is declared that the accused is not the author of
by the provisions of this chapter. the crime
3. when the judgment expressly declares that the liability is
- It covers all wrongful acts or omissions as long as they only civil in nature
are not constitutive of breach of contract or not punishable 4. where the civil liability is not derived or based on the
as offenses either under RPC or SL criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
5. where the acquittal is based on a reasonable doubt
Elements of Quasi-Delict (Culpa Aquiliana) 6. where the civil action has prescribed
a) Damage to the plaintiff
b) Negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant or Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also
some person for whose acts, he must respond was guilty; applicable to QD
and
c) Connection of cause and effect between such negligence Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
and damage performance of every kind of obligation also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
*Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury according to the circumstances
*Fault condition where a person acts in a way or manner contrary
to what normally should have been done ; breach of statutory duty Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligation
or other act omission which gives rise to a liability in torts or would consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
give rise to the defense of contributory negligence by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
 place. When negligence shows BF, the provisions of Arts. - Not applicable to the bodies of water
1171 and 2201, par 2, shall apply.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is - Allows the recovery to plaintiff who happened to have
to be observed in the performance, that which is expected been negligent also, provided the defendant has the last
of a good father of a family shall be required. opportunity to avoid the incident but failed to do so
- There must be negligence on the part of both parties
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, - Also called the Humanitarian Negligence Doctrine, it
or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the being an exception to the rule on contributory negligence.
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, It proceeds from the precepts of humanity and natural
no person shall be responsible for those events which justice
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen were - Elements:
inevitable. a) Plaintiff is placed in danger by his own
negligent acts and he is unable to get from such
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate situation by any means
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But b) Defendant knows that the plaintiff is in danger
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate and knows or should have known that the
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff was unable to extricate himself
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the therefrom
damages to be awarded. c) Defendant had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident through the
Proximate Cause exercise of ordinary care, but failed to do so,
- is the adequate and efficient cause as in the natural order and the accident occurred as a proximate
of events, and under the particular circumstances cause of such failure.
surrounding the case, would necessarily produce the - Not applicable-
event. a) Collapse of a building or structure
- Is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, b) When the claim or demand of the injured passenger
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the is the enforcement of the carriers contractual
injury and without which the result would not have obligation to bring him safely to his destination
occurred c) When the injury or accident cannot be avoided by
- It is not necessarily the immediate cause, it is necessarily application of all means at hand after peril has been
the nearest time, distance or space discovered

Contributory Negligence Res Ipsa Loquitor

- Act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the - The thing or transaction speaks for itself
part of the person injured which, concurring with the - Conditions to be met for RIL to apply:
defendants negligence is the proximate cause of the a) The accident was of such character as to
injury warrant an inference that it would not have
- To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it happened except for defendants negligence
must be shown that he performed an act that brought b) The accident must have been caused by an
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
impending danger to health and body management or control of the person charged
- Omission of the diligence required by the circumstances with the negligence complained of
by virtue of which a person could have avoided injury to c) The accident must not have been due to any
himself voluntary action or contribution on the part of
- It requires foreseeability of harm to oneself the person injured
- A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a Principal Defenses in Actions Based on Negligence
matter of law. a) Emergency Rule one who suddenly finds himself in
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
Effects of Contributory Negligence consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
a) There can be no recovery for damages impending danger is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
b) A plaintiff is barred from recovering the damages for loss adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may have
or injury caused by the negligence of defendant only been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
when plaintiffs negligence is the sole legal cause of the finds himself is brought about by his own negligence
damage, or the negligence of the plaintiff and some b) Assumption of Risk - a voluntary assumption of a risk
persons other than the defendants was the sole cause of of harm arising from the negligent conduct of the
the damage defendant; it presupposes an intentional exposure to a
c) If the plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former known peril
may recover, but the amount of his recover may only be c) Contributory Negligence when the plaintiffs own
such proportion of the entire damage plaintiff sustained negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
as the defendants negligence bears to the combined injury, he cannot recover damages
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant. d) Volenti Non Fit Injuria - to which a person assent is not
esteemed in law as injury; one is not legally injured if he
Doctrine of Comparative Negligence has consented to the act complained of or was willing that
- The negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant are it shall occur
compared for the purpose of reaching an equitable
apportionment of their respective liabilities for the Rules in the Application of Comparative Negligence
damages caused and suffered by the plaintiff a) Pure Comparative Negligence Rule - the plaintiff can
recover from the defendant regardless of the extent of the
Test to Determine Proximate Cause negligence of the former
a) Foreseeability Test where the particular harm was b) Arkansas Comparative Negligence Rule the plaintiff
reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the defendants can recover if his negligence is lesser in degree than that
misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof of the defendant. If the combined negligence of both
b) Natural and Probable Consequence Test where the parties falls on 50/50 basis, plaintiff cannot recover.
defendants liability is recognized only if the harm or injury
suffered is the natural and probable consequence of his Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
act or omission complained of not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
c) Sine qua non test where the defendants conduct will persons for whom one is responsible.
not be considered as proximate cause of the event if the
event just the same would have occurred without it The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
d) Cause and Condition Test test where a distinction is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
made between the active cause of the harm or injury and in their company.
the existing conditions upon which that cause operated. If
the defendant has made a passive static condition, which Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
made the damage possible, he is not liable incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
Assumption of Risk
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
Attractive Nuisance likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
- One who maintains on his premises dangerous service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to occasion of their functions.
attract children in play and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a assigned tasked, even though the former are not engaged in the
trespasser in the premises. business or industry.
 States Imputed Liability only liable for acts imputed for the
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the acting as special agents
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what Exception: When the State engaged in private business or
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. enterprise, it becomes liable as an ordinary employer
*Special Agent one who receives a definite and fixed order of
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall commission, foreign to the exercise of the ordinary duties of his
be liable for damages caused by their pupil and students or office
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Imputed Liability of Teachers and Heads of Schools
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the General Rule: When the school is academic, the responsibility of
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. of such students
Exception: In the case of arts and trades, it is the head hereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable
Principle of Vicarious Liability or Imputed Liability one is not Reddendo Singula Singulis. Teachers should apply to the word
only liable for his own quasi-delictual acts but also for those persons pupils and students, and heads of establishment of arts and
for whom he is responsible under the law trades to the word apprentices
Limited Liability of the School. The students must be in the school
Child and Youth Welfare Code, Art. 58 Parents and guardians when the tortious act was committed
are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their -A student is in the custody of the school authorities as
parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within
its premises, whether the semester has yet begun or has already
Basis of Vicarious Liability; Pater Familias ended.
*Art. 2180 is not respondeat superior, which under American - As lomg as it can be shown that the student is in the
Jurisprudence means that the negligence of the servant is school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student right, the
conclusively the negligence of the master. responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
*Basis of such liability: in loco parentis and are called upon the
*Basis: Principle of Pater Familias. The reason for the masters to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child
liability is negligence in the supervision of the subordinates. The
master; however, will be freed from liability if he can prove that he
had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
the damage. or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered of the satisfaction of the claim.
*Bahia vs Litonjua: The responsibility imposed by this article arises
by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
the persons made responsible under the article, derived from their parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage litem is pending

*Actual Torfeasor is not exempt from liability. The minor, ward, Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever make use of the
employee, special agent, pupil, students and apprentices who same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
actually committed the delictual acts are not exempted by law from may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
personal responsibility. They may be sued and made liable alone as the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
when the person responsible for them or vicarious obligor proves person who has suffered damage.
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or when
the minor or insane person has no parents or guardians. In the latter *Wild Beast Theory: The true rule of law is that the person who for
instance, they are answerable with their own property. his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril,
*Nature of Responsibility of Vicarious Obligor. Direct and and if he does not so, is prima facie answerable to all the damages
primary; he is solidarily liable with the tortfeasor. His responsibility which is the natural consequence of the escape
is not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against
the negligent tortfeasor.The h *Exceptions to the Rule of Liability of the Possessor
1. If the damage was caused by a force majeure
*Reason for VL of Parents. It is a necessary consequence which 2. If the damage was caused by the fault of the plaintiff or person
imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping injured
them in their company, educating them in proportion of their means, 3. If the damage was caused by the act of a third person
while on the other hand, gives them the rights to correct and punish
them in moderation Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
Exception: proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
a family to prevent damage the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
*Liability of the Mother. 1) Death or Insolvency of the father. If the reckless driving or violating traffic regulations or at least twice within
mother was impleaded as a co-defendant of the father or was the next preceding two months.
impleaded alone while the husband is still well and alive, may move
to dismiss the case filed against her for being premature If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article
2180 are inapplicable.
*Absence of the Father. not mentioned in the law. If he is absent
under Arts. 390-391, the mother will be the one who is vicariously Rationale: to cope with the alarming increase of vehicular mshaps
liable. s
-This article has also been applied to a calesa mishap where it was
*VL Liability of Parents; Requisites held that the owner of the calesa who was not in the calesa at the
1. The child is below 21 years. RA 6809: reduced the legal age to time of the incident is not liable for the acts of his cochero
18, nonetheless the fact than the child is already emancipated
2. The child committed a tortious act to the damage and prejudice Liability of a Car Owner:
of another person *If present in the car If the causative factor for the accident was
3. The child lives in the company of the parent concerned whether the drivers negligence, the owner of the car, who was present in the
single or married car, is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exercise of due diligence, but did not do so
*If not present in the car The driver was negligent. The injured
Requisites of Employers Liability under Art. 2180, (4) party may still sue the car owner under Art. 2180, par. 5 for imputed
1. Employee was chosen by the employer personally or through liability. The car owner may avail himself of the defense of not having
another exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
2. The service is to be rendered in accordance with orders which the damage.
employer has the authority to give at all times
3. The illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason Pater Familias The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the
of the functions entrusted to him servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction
by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
Primary Liability and Subsidiary Liability of Employers The prevent injury or damage
injured party has 2 options in pursuing the civil liability of the
employer for the acts of his employees Effect when Driver is found negligent Once a driver is proven
*Civil Action: the liability of the employer is direct, primary and negligent in causing damage, the law presumes the vehicle owner
solidary, if he proves the negligence of the employee equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving
*Criminal Action: The liability of the employer is subsidiary if the proper selection employee as a defense. Malfunction or loss of
offender was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt break is not a FE.
Effect of Ratification of Tortious Act of Driver or Employee
The employer is still liable if he ratifies the tortious acts or takes no *Injunction may be resorted to in order to prevent damage or
step to avert the damage injury

Art. 2192. If damages referred to in the two preceding articles

Art. 2185. Unless there is a proof to the contrary, it is presumed that should be the result of ant defect in the construction mentioned in
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of Art. 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
said article, within the period therein fixed.
*A person driving a motor vehicle who was violating any traffic
regulation at the time of the accident is presumed to be negligent. It Prescriptive period = 15 years from the time the cause of action
is rebuttable presumption. has accrued

Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part

Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
government office a bond executed by a government controlled falling from the same.
corporation or office, to answer for damages to third person. The
amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent Head of the Family usually the father; in his absence, the mother
public official. *Obligation: to supervise the members of the family; co-responsible
with the actual tortfeasor
Motor Vehicle Bond no IRR, but the car owner cannot renew the *Nature of Liability absolute and exclusive
registration of his car without first securing an insurance against TPL *Purpose of the Absoluteness of the Article
1. to compel the head of a family to see to it that no dangerous things
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of food stuffs, drinks, toilet are placed on the window sills and other parts of the dwelling place
article and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused which may be thrown or fall by the accident
by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual 2. to compel him to supervise the members of the family or guests
relation exists between them and the consumers. from doing acts or activities which may result in the throwing or
falling of things from their house or dwelling
Principle of Strict Liability in Torts means that the proof of 3. to relieve the victim of the difficult burden of identifying the
negligence is not necessary. It applies even if the defendant persons who caused the throwing or falling of the injurious thing
manufacturer or processor has exercised all the possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product. Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
*Requisites: for a quasi-delict is solidary.
1. The defendant is the manufacturer or processor of
foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods involved *It applies if there is joint tortfeasor
2. The defendant used noxious or harmful substances in *Nature of Liability: civil liability arising from quasi-delict
the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drink or toilet articles
and similar goods *Joint Tortfeasors include all persons who command, instigate,
3. Plaintiff used or consumed such product unaware of promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, air or abet
the injurious condition of the product the commission of a tort, or who approve of if after it is done for their
4. Plaintiffs injury or death was caused by the product benefit. They are each others principals
used or consumed
5. The forms of kinds of damages suffered and the
amount thereof II. DEFINITION

*Contractual relationship between the manufacturers or processors

and consumers is not necessary A. Tort
- Commission of an act by one, without right, whereby
*Effect of Contract between Manufacturer or Processor with another receives some injury, directly or indirectly in
Plaintiff: Plaintiff is not precluded from filing a suit based on breach person, property or reputation
of warranty whether express or implied. The principle applies. The - A wrong independent of a contract or as a breach of duty
consumers cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his which the law, distinguished from a mere contract, has
contract, with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it imposed
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be - It is a wrong, and a wrong is a tortious act
between the seller and immediate buyer or attached to and
accompanying the product into consumers hands. B. Torts vs Quasi-Delict
- QD is a term designated by the Code Commission to refer
Options on Remedies. The ff are the plaintiffs remedies if he to those obligations which do not arise from law,
desires to pursue a complaint against the manufacturer or contractso or quasi-contracts or criminal offenses
processor: because this term nearly corresponds to Roman
1. Theory of Strict Liability in Torts Classification of obligations and is in harmony with the
2. Fault or Negligence nature and kind of liability
3. Breach of Warranty - it rejected the use of term, Tort , which is broader because
4. Crime anchored on the violation of the FDA act wherein in the general plan of the Philippine legal system,
the enforcement of which the doctrine of absolute criminal liability intentional and malicious acts with certain exceptions are
may be applied governed by RPC
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his Naguiat vs NLRC
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms
and poison except when the possession or use thereof is Petitioner: Sergio F. Naguiat under the name and style of Sergio F.
indispensable in his occupation or business. Naguiat Ent., Inc., & Clark Field Taxi, Inc
Respondent: NLRC, National Organization of Workingmen and its
* There is a rebuttable presumption that he is negligent when the members, Leonardo T. Galang
death or injury results from the defendants possession of Citation: 269 SCRA 564
dangerous weapons or substances. Date of Promulgation: March 13, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by FACTS:
reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public Clark Field Taxi Inc (CFTI) held a concessionaires contract
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. with the Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAEFS) for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for Sergio Naguiat CFTIs president; Antolin Naguiat CFTIs
the damages resulting from its total or partal collapse, if it should be VP
due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Like Sergio Naguiat Enterprises, a trading firm, CFTI was a
family-owned corporation
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages
Individual respondents previously employed by CFTI as
caused:
taxi cab drivers
1. By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
- During their employment, they were required to pay a
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
daily boundary fee of US$26.50 for those working from
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place.
1am-12nn; and US$ 27 for those working from 12nn to
2. By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to person or property
12mn
3. By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not
- All the incidental expenses were also accounted against
caused by force majeure
them + gasoline expenses
4. By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
- They worked for at least 3-4 times a week, depending on
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the
the availability of taxi cabs
place.
 - They earned not less than US$ 15 daily Corporation Code: 5) To the extent that the stockholders are
- In excess of that amount, they were also required to make actively engage(d) in the management or operation of the
cash deposits to the company which they could lter business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders
withdraw every 15 days shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among
Due to the phase out of the US military bases in PH, from which themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for
Clark Base was not spared, AAEFES was dissolved, and the corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably
services of the individual respondents were officially adequate liability insurance.
terminated on November 26, 1991 Corporate Tort no definite scope; but TORT, consists in the
AAFES Taxi Drives Association (Union)- through its violation of a right given or the omission of the duty imposed by
President, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations with law. Tort is a breach of legal duty
regard to the separation benefits that should be awarded in CFTI failed to comply with its law imposed duty or
favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was
separated drivers will be given PhP 500 for every year of actively engaged in the management or operation of the
service as severance pay. business should be held personally and solidarily liable
Most of the drivers accepted the said amount in December Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable
1991-January 1992, but the individual respondents herein No evidence that he participated in the management operation
refused to accept theirs of the business
Individual Respondents through National Organization of No Denial of Due Process
Workingmen which they subsequently joined after disaffiliating Although Sergio and Antolin were not impleaded parties to the
themselves with AAFES Union, filed a complaint against complaint, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
Sergio Naguiat and his company, AAFES with Mark Hooper as jurisdiction of LA when they filed a position paper in their
Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Union with respective capacities
Eduardo Castillo as President, for payment of separation pay
due to termination/phase out Albenson Enterprises vs CA
Complaint was further amended to include additional taxi
drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI Petitioner: Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap and Benjamin
with Antolin Naguiat as VP and Gen. Manager, as party Mendiona
respondents Respondents: CA and Eugenio Baltao
- Allegations: Citation: 217 SCRA 16
1. They were regular employees of Naguiat Date of Promulgation: January 11, 1993
enterprises although their application were Ponente: Bidin, J
approved by CFTI
2. They have been assigned to Naguiat FACTS:
Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI
and that the former managed, controlled and September, October and November 1980 Enterprise
supervise their employment delivered to Guaranteed Industries located at 3267 V. Mapa
3. They were entitled to separation pay based on Street, Sta. Mesa Manila, the mild steel plate which the latter
their latest daily earnings of US$ 1 for working ordered
16 days a month Albenson was given a Pacific Banking Corp check with No.
Position Paper submitted to the LA, petitioners claimed the 136361 in the amount of PhP 2, 575 and drawn against the
fff: account of E.L Woodworks
1. The cessation of CFTI was due to great financial When the check was presented for payment, it was
losses and lost business opportunity resulting from dishonored. Reason: Account Closed
the phase out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Albenson through counsel traced the origin of the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP- dishonored check
US Military Base Agreement - From the records of SEC, it was discovered that the
2. Admitted that CFT had agreed with the drivers union president of the Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
through Pres. Castillo who claimed to have had the mild steel plates was one Eugenio Baltao
blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of - Upon inquiry Albenson was also informed by the Ministry
union members, to grant its taxi driver-employees of Trade and Industry that E.L Woodworks, a single
separation pay equivalent to PhP 500 for every year proprietorship business was registered in the name of one
of service Eugenio Baltao, and also upon verification with Pacific
Labor Arbiter Findings: Banking Corp, the signature of Baltao on the check was
1. Individual complainants were regular workers of verified
CFTI An extrajudicial demand was then given to Baltao to replace
2. Ordered CFTI to pay 12k for every year of service for or make good the check, but he denied issuing such. He also
humanitarian consideration setting aside the said that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and could have not
earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers transacted business with Albenson.
union of PhP 500/year of service Feb. 14, 1983 - Albernson filed at OPP Rizal for violation of
3. At the time of the ceased operations, CFTI was BP 22 against Baltao
profitably earning and the cessation of its business Complaint Benjamin Mendiona (employee) was the
was due the untimely closure of Clark Air Base affiant
NLRC: It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake,
1. Modified the LA by granting separation pay to the his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
private respondents establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the
2. Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and very same business address of Guaranteed.
son at the same time the President and Vice- September 5, 1983 Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an
President and General Manager, respectively, Information against Eugenio Baltao for violation of BP 22.
should be joined as indispensable party whose Fiscal claimed that he had given him an opportunity to submit
liability is joint and several. evidence, but failed to do so
MR of petitioners denied; hence they filed this Petition with Baltao claimed ignorance of the complaint against him. He
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that he has not been
given the opportunity to be heard during the preliminary
Separation Pay investigation
Petitioners stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base Jan. 30, 1984 Fiscal Mauro Castro reversed the findings of
because of the phase out of the US Military presence; and not Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated Baltao, for the ff reasons:
due to any great financial loss because petitioners taxi - The signature on the check was not Baltaos
business was earning profitably at the time of closure - No showing of the records of PI
Individual Respondents were entitled to separation pay - Baltao did not actually receive a notice of said
National Organization of Working Mens Personality to Represent investigaton
Individual Respondent-Employees Fiscal Sumawa was castigated by Fiscal Casto for failing to
Petitioner is in estoppel for not having seasonably raised this exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties,
issue before LA or NLRC thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly
Liability of Petitioner-Corporations and their Officers notified of the complaint against him, and of the requirement to
Naguiat Enterprise is not the indirect employer of the individual submit counter evidence
respondents much less a labor only contractor Because of the unjust filing, Baltao filed a complaint for
Sergio Naguiat in supervising the taxi drivers and determining damages against Albenson, Jesse yap and Benjamin
their employment terms, was rather carrying out his Mendiona, its employee
responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat RTC QC the check is drawn against the account of E.L
Enterprises is as separate corporatipn that is not involved at all Woodworks not of Guaranteed industries of which Baltao used
in the taxi business to be President --- ordered Albenson to pay Baltao damages:
CFTI was the actual and direct employer of the respondents (Actual 133, 350) ; (Moral 1M) ; (Exemplary 200k);
CFTI President, Sergio Naguiat is jointly and severally liable for (Attorneys Fees 100k)
the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees, CA reduced the moral damages from 1M to 500k and AF
as he was the one who actively managed the business from 100k to 50k
 Albenson, Yap and Mendiona - filed this instant petition, Petitioner: Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano in their capacity as
alleging that the court erred in: ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased
1) Cause of action is not based on malicious Respondents: Reginald Hill, minor and Marvin Hill, as father and
prosecution, but one for abuse of rights under Art. 21 natural guardian of said minor
2) Hitting and in effect maligning with an unjust criminal Citation: 77 SCRA 98
case was, without more, a plain cause of abuse of Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1977
rights by misdirection and was therefore actionable Ponente: Barredo
by itself, and which became inordinately blatant and
grossly aggravated when Baltao was deprived of his FACTS:
basic rights to notice and a fair hearing in the so- Reginald Hill minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
called PI caused the death of Agapito, son of Pedro. He lives with his
3) No evidence father, Marvin, with whom he was living and getting
4) Holding the petitioner corp, Yap and Mendiona subsistence
jointly and severally liable without basis in law and in Pedro and Patricia filed a criminal case against Reginald
fact but he was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mstake
5) Award of damages without evidence Elcano then filed a case for damages against Marvin based
Petitioners Contention: on Art. 2180 at CFI QC
1) The case filed was for malicious prosecution, not for Defendants filed for Motion to dismiss, with ff grounds:
damages 1. Present action is against and a violation of Rule 107, Sec.
2) 1 of RoC
2. Action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final or
Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of Abuse in res judicata
of Rights under Art. 19 3. No cause of action bc Marvin as relieved as guardian of
Sets standards which may be observed in the exercise of ones Reginald through emancipation of marriage
rights and duties MTD denied by the trial court
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform MR granted
with Art. 19 and resulted to damage to another person, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held The acquittal of Regibnald Hill in the criminal case has not
responsible extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence the acquittal is not a
Elements: 1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is bar to the instant action against him
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or The separate individuality of a quasi-delict under the CC has
injuring another been fully recognized, even with regard to a negligent ac for
When the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
Eugenio Baltao is not the same as the Eugenio Baltao the convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such
defendants are dealing with, said defendants ran afoul of Arts. conviction, he could have been sued for his civil liability arising
19-21 when they still pursue a criminal case from his crime
Defendants not having been paid the amount certainly had the In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
right to complain, but the right is limited by certain constraints. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights. founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
Baltaos conducting business in the same building he and includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which by law
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check Atty. Hill is not free from his responsibility to Reginald though he has
was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good already been emancipated by marriage
faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the Art. 399 states that emancipation by marriage of the minor is
provincial fiscal. not really full or absolute
Respondent is not entitled for claim of damages under malicious Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
prosecution shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It
Elements: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in encumber real property without the consent of his father or
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
malice It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
2nd and 3rd element were lacking in this case behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
Petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by well- parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
founded anxiety to protect their rights them from causing damage to third persons
The mere act of submitting a case for the authorities for It is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
Though petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in his son.
determining the liability of private respondent for dishonored
check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to Virata vs Ochoa
bad faith warranting an award for damages
Case is founded on a case of mistaken identity, and were not PETITIONERS: Candida Virata
considered to be in bad faith. It could have been corrected only Tomas Virata
if Eugenio Baltao filed his counter-affidavit Manolito Virata
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right Ederlinda Virata
to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may Napoleon Virata
not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously Aracely Virata
Respondent is not also entitled to actual damages Zenaida Virata
No proof as to the medical treatment expenses incurred for the Luzminda Virata
alleged nervous breakdown Pacita Virata
No proof as to the business losses caused by the unjust Evangelina Virata
litigation RESPONDENTS: Victorio Ochoa
The court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess Maximo Borilla
work as to the amount The Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable 7th Judicial District, Branch V
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, stationed @ Bacoor, Cavite
profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved, DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. L46179
otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no PROMUL. DATE: January 31, 1978
damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA PONENTE: Fernandez, J.
488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for
respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages FACTS:
in favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof. September 24, 1975 ARSENIO VIRATA died as a result of
Attorneys Fees cannot also be awarded having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay
Reason: no malicious prosecution City by a passenger jeepney driven by MAXIMO BORILLA and
registered in the name of VICTORIO OCHOA.
Elcano and Elcano vs Hill and Hill o Borilla is the employer of Ochoa.
o For the death of Arsenio, an action for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was instituted on
 September 25, 1975 against Borillo in CFI of Rizal, in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the
at Pasay City (Crim. Case No. 3162-P). related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
August 27, 1984 the trial court DISMISSED the civil case for
At the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12, lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
1975, Atty. Julio Francisco (priv. prosec.), made a made a ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the
the driver on his criminal liability. Rules of Court which provides that criminal and civil
o On February 19, 1976, Atty. Julio Francisco filed a actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
motion in said criminal case to withdraw the separately, but after the criminal action has been
reservation to file a separate civil action. commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
o On June 29, 1976, the heirs of Arsenio again judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
reserved their right to institute a separate civil action.
On July 19, 1977, they commenced Civil No. B-134 APPELLATE COURT (February 17, 1986)
in the CFI of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch V, for damages o AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court.
based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo and o A motion for recon filed the petitioners was DENIED
the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio. by the Appellate Court in its reso on May 19, 1986.
o On August 13, 1976, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another ISSUE: WON the petitioners can claim damages for the destruction
action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between caused by the respondents waterpaths and contrivances based on
the same parties for the same cause. Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts
o On September 8, 1976, CFI of Rizal, Pasay City, in The petitioners can claim damages by reasons of the destruction
their decision on Crim. Case No. 3162-P, acquitted caused by the waterpaths and contrivances
accused Maximo on the ground that he caused an All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
injury by name accident. (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
o On January 31, 1977, CFI Bacoor, Cavite, granted (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
The heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
based on QD against Borillo and Ochoa by the plaintiff.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and
may choose between an action under the Revised Penal contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to
Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligent act. negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same damages.
negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
a separate civil action for damages against the owner and corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and
the causal connection between the act and the damage, with
driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The
no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties
acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without
Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict. The limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT
Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. xxxx Although we recognize the
right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
two different sources of obligation. care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
Andamo vs CA the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
PETITIONERS: Natividad V. Andamo for the injury or damage suffered.
Emmanuel R. Andamo
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court Wylie vs Rarang
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 74761 PETITIONERS: M.H. Wylie
PROMUL. DATE: November 6, 1990 Capt. James Williams
PONENTE: Fernan, C.J. RESPONDENTS: Aurora I. Rarang
The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 74135
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo PROMUL. DATE: May 28, 1992
o Owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La FACTS:
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. AT THE NAVAL BASE.
o WITHIN THE LAND of the religious corporation were o February 1978, petnr M.H. Wylie was the assistant
waterpaths and contrivances, which ALLEGEDLY: administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was
inundated and eroded petitioners land, the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in
caused a young man to drown, Subic Bay, Olongapo City.
damaged petitioners crops and plants, o Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise
washed away costly fences, control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
endangered the lives of petitioners and their Wylie, in his capacity as the asst. admin. officer, supervised the
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, publication of the Naval Base stations Plan of the Day
and (POD), which featured important announcements,
exposed plants and other improvements to necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to
destruction. military personnel. One of its regular features was the action
July 1982 petitioners instituted a criminal action before RTC line inquiry.
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against EFREN MUSNGI, February 3, 1978 the POD published, under the NAVSTA
ORLANDO SAPUAY and RUTILLO MALLILLIN, officers and Action Line Inquiry, the ff:
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by Question: I have observed that Merchandise
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Control inspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming
Penal Code. for their own benefit things they have confiscated
February 22, 1983 petitioners filed another action action from Base Personnel. The observation is even more
against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as
as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same mention Auring who is in herself, a disgrace to her
court. division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In
March 11, 1983 - respondent corporation filed its answer to the lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the
complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware
injunction. of this malpractice?
o April 26, 1984 - the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other
action, issued an order suspending further hearings personnel are prohibited from appropriating
 confiscated items for their own consumption or use. to the commanding officer for approval and that he approved
Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate it.
area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM
evidence custodian controls access to these The grant of rights, powers and authority to the US under the RP-
containers. US Bases Treaty does not cover immunity of its officers from crimes
and torts
Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost
their meals at their worksite due to heavy workload. Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name
Complaints regarding merchandise control guards Auring if the article will be published. The petitioners,
procedure or actions may be made directly at the however, were NEGLIGENT because under their direction,
Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and they issued the publication without deleting the said name.
necessary action. Specific dates and time along with Such act or omission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be
details of suspected violations would be most deemed part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which
appreciated. Telephone 4-3430/4-3234 for further ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of petitioners act,
information or to report noted or suspected PR suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded
irregularities. Exhibits E & E-1. feelings and social humiliation, especially so, since the article
was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their
o Aurora Rarang was the Auring being referred to personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused the
here, as she was the only one with that name in the Private Respondent.
Office of the Provost Marshall, which was
conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978,
petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology C. Culpa Acquiliana vs Culpa Criminal
for the inadvertent publication. - A crime is an offense against the public pursued by the
sovereign
Rarang instituted an action for damages in the CFI of Zambales - Tort is a private injury which is pursued by the injured
against Wylie, Capt. James Williams, and the US Naval Base. party
She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages,
and P50K attorneys fees. o Criminal punishment is to vindicate states
o RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted interest an deter crime
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel o Tort Liability is to vindicate the individual
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and victim and the rights and to reinforce public
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt standards of behavior
and ridicule. Today, a single act might constitute both a crime
o the libel was published and circulated in the English and a tort
language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base
personnel. Phoenix Construction vs Carbonel
Wylie, Williams, and the Naval Base filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ff grounds:
o 1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
their official functions as officers of the US Navy and CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
are immune from suit COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
o 2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
government which cannot be sued without its Ponente: FELICIANO, J:
consent
o 3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. FACTS:
o MOTION DENIED.
*In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m.
TRIAL COURT private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he
o the acts of Wylie and Williams werent official acts of lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-
the US government in the operation and control of and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
the Base but personal and tortious acts which are marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening,
exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
country cant be sued in the court of another country Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
without its consent. Thus their acts werent Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
imputable against the US government but were done his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
in their individual and personal capacities his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
o They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and
exemplary damages, and P30K attorneys fees.
o However, the suit against the US Naval Base was *He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford
dismissed. dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The
dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
APPEAL Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand
o Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a
from suit since the publication was made in their person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was
official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic.
that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause
the publication. *The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb)
o Rarang also appealed as she wasnt satisfied with in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
the award. way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION - Rarang was front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the
damages. permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
PETITION FOR REVIEW tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too
o they made the publication in the performance of their late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
and were, therefore, immune from suit for their bridge dentures.
official actions.

*Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First

Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand,
or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavez v. countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
Sandiganbayan). own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without
commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in the a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
chain of command from the offensive publication and it would due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything
which goes wrong on the base. However, in this particular *The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against
case, the records show that the offensive publication was sent Phoenix and Carbonel.
*Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the D. Cupla Acquiliana vs Culpa Contractual
trial court but modified the award. - Tort is distinguished from a breach of contract in that the
latter arises under an agreement of the parties, whereas
the tort is ordinarily a violation of a duty fixed by law
No curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately
although it may sometimes have relation to obligations
after the accident nor was any found in his car
growing out of or coincident with a contract
Dionisio just alleged that it was misplaced
He was unable to probe possession of a valid curfew pass and
Construction Devt Corp of the PHL vs Estrella
that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such pass that night
The relevance of a possession or non-possession of a curfew
pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
related issues: whether he had purposely put out his headlights PHILIPPINES,petitioner,
before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly vs.
arrest by the police for travelling onset of curfew without a valid REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE
pass PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA
Patrolman Cuynos testimonies were admissible. TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and DATINGUINOO, respondents. G.R.
suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night No. 147791 September 8, 2006
is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time.
FACTS:
The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible
as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by
the trial court. *On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her
Ssubstantial weight should have been ascribed to such granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a
testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have BLTB bus bound for Pasay City.
purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the
Phoenix dump truck *Their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in
Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights before he reached the the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their
intersection seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them. They
But, he succeeded in switching his lights on again at bright split regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the
bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were
seconds before contact with the dump truck
Dionisio was negligent at the night of the accident brought to the Makati Medical Center where the doctors diagnosed
He was hurrying home and driving faster than he should have their injuries to be as follows:
been
He extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella - Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd,
Gen. Lacuna and Gen. Santos and thus did not see the dump Lacerated wound, chin, Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg,
truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3
lance
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher - Extensive lacerated wounds,
dump truck was parked, and in other words, the negligence of right leg posterior aspect popliteal area
Carbonel and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
There as a reasonable relationship between Carbonels Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
negligence on the hand and the accident, and respondents antero-lateral compartment of lower leg. Fracture, open
injury comminuted, both tibial.
The collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers negligence *Respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB,
The truck drivers negligence is far from being a passive and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the
static condition, but an indispensable and efficient cause. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that
The collision would have not occurred if the dump truck was Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and
not parked askew without any warning lights or reflector BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic
devices. The improper parking created an unreasonable risk of laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a
injury for anyone driving down Gen. Lacuna St., and for having good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
so created the risk, the truck driver must be held responsible employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it
lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave
Keeton: danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to
P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they
suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock,
one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they
may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure to are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that expenses.
reason.
Dionisios negligence was only contributory
He may recover damages as the immediate and proximate *CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-
cause of the injury as the truck drivers lack of due care and party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance,
negligence Inc. (Phoenix).7
Doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence *On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding
on the part of his employer, Phoenix in supervising its employees CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable. The trial court held that
properly and adequately BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary
The circumstance that Phoenix allowed its truck driver to bring diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must
the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
done early in the morning, when coupled with failure to show provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
any effort of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies
dump truck is parked hen away from the company premises, is or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has
an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents to their
Phoenix destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage
Claims of Damages while its failure to rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable
In view of substantial justice, 20-80 is the ration of the to respondents for the breach.
allocation of damages.
Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary *Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be owned bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed that
borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time of
needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the selection or
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut thus
costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is making it and its driver liable to respondents.
of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel
*Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the *The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating
trial court, respondents moved that the decision be reconsidered but the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as
was denied. Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction.
which affirmed the Seeing thus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated
attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his
The case filed is an action for cupla aquiliana or quasi-delict proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided
It may be instituted against the employer for an employees act with each other.
or omission
The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is
*Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of
direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due
the deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of
Petitioner failed to prove that it exercised due diligence of a good
Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their
father in the selection and supervision of Payunan
respective drivers praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation
Petitioner is solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual damages
expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two
suffered by the respondents because of the injuries sustained
buses were filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Payunan was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as
shown in the sketch of the police investigator
The owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common *Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same and Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care
Rule of Liability applies. The bus company, its driver, the and diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all
operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were interposed counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims
jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or their against each other.
heirs
Petitioner and its driver are jointly and severally liable for moral
damages; hence, there could be no double recovery *After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants
Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed sole
Claims of Moral Damages
responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and
80k was reduced to 50k, so as to commensurate the damage
ordered them jointly and severally to pay damages to the
inflicted
plaintiffs. Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed from
Exemplary Damages
the decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court
May be awarded if the defendant acted with gross negligence
which affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower
Petitioners driver was driving recklessly at the time its truck
court as earlier stated.
rammed the BLTB bus
Petitioner who has direct and primary liability for the negligent
conducts of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the *Hence, this petition to review by certiorari of defendant BLTB
selection and supervision of its employees assigning a lone error, to wit: THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
20k COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING THAT THE ACTIONS OF
Attorneys Fees PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE BASED ON CULPA
Ordinary Concept: AF is the reasonable compensation paid to CONTRACTUAL. (p. 12, Rollo). It is argued by petitioners that if the
a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered. intention of private respondents were to file an action based
Basis: Agreement on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage, they could
Extraordinary Concept: AF is an indemnity for damages have done so by merely impleading BLTB and its driver Pon. As it
ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. was in the trial court, private respondents filed an action
Basis: Art. 2208 ; payable to the client UNLESS, there is an against all the defendants basing their action on culpa aquiliana or
agreement that the same shall be given to the lawyer as an tort.
additional compensation
AF was correctly awarded; 30% of the total amount recovered
Petitioners liability is anchored on both culpa contractual an culpa
Total amount adjudged shall earn 6% interest per annum from the acquiliana
date of judgment of the trial court until finality of its judgment The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of 3
and injuries of 2 passengers of DLTB was the negligence of
CDCPs claim against Phoenix had already prescribed the driver of BLTB bus who recklessly operated and drove said
Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera, as he was negotiating the
to this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to ascending bend of the highway which was divided into 2 lanes
the insurance company concerned a written notice of by a continuous yellow strip
claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries Driver of BLTB admitted that the continuous yellow strip is a no
sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of overtaking zone
claim must be filed within six months from date of the accident, Armando Pons Employer is also liable
otherwise, the claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit for Pon = primarily liable
recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought in BLTB = primary, direct and immediate, in view of the fact that
proper cases, with the Commissioner or Courts within one year the death or injuries to its passengers was through the
from denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action negligence of its employee, and such liability does not cease
shall prescribe even upon proof that BLTB exercised all the diligence of a good
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
notice of claim must be filed within six months from the date of employees
the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six The common carriers liability for the death or injuries to its
months from the date of the accident, its claim has already passengers is based in its contractual obligation to carry its
prescribed. passengers safely to their destination
BLTB is solidarily liable with its driver even though the liability
of the driver arose from a QD while that of the bus company
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Corp vs IAC from a contract
The proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of the
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO driver of BLTB
PON, petitioners, He recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where
overtaking is not allowed by traffic rules and regulations
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the
DE PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON express obligation to transport the passengers to their
SALES and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES, respondents. destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with
a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the
G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988 fault or negligence of the carrier

Gutierrez vs Gutierrez
Ponente: PARAS, J.:
Petitoner: Narciso Gutierrez
FACTS: Respondent: Bonifacio Gutierrez, Maria V. De Gutierrez, Manuel
Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, And Saturnino Cortez
Citation:G.R. No. 34840
*The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna
Date of Promulgation:September 23, 1931
Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for brevity) driven by Armando Pon
Ponente: MALCOLM, J..
and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company
(Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the
highway traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the FACTS:
afternoon of August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death
of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of
several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other
all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046. on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the
municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal.
 The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno,
was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation
was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs.
of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for
Manuel Gutierrez. damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and
At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/
the mother, together will several other members of the Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio
Gutierrez family, seven in all, were accommodated therein. Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging
that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P
A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and
alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson
was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila.
and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of
amicable settlement.
The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-
Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to
medical attendance for a considerable period of time, and dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was
which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
properly. petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned
Respondents are guilty of negligence order dismissing the case, and a motion for the
Bonifacio is an incompetent chauffeur, as he was driving in an reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal,
excessive rate of speed petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring
On approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of
contributed negligence to the accident respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the
The guarantee given by the father at the time the son was benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in
granted with license to operate a motor vehicle made the father dismissing the case.
responsible for the acts of his son
Jointly and severally liable for 5k The argument that the judgment on the compromise agreement
under the cause of action based on QD is not a bar to the cause of
Joseph vs Bautista action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable
Cause of Action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act
Petitoner: Luis Joseph or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
Respondent: Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, Patrocinio Perez, Antonio primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan, Alberto Cardeno And Lazaro omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
Villanueva when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several
Citation:G.R. No. L-41423 separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is
Date of Promulgation:February 23, 1989 only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action
Ponente: REGALADO, J. regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of
FACTS: the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person
The generative facts of this case as culled from the written In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
submission of the parties, are as follows: sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck
single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action
with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73.
On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant against the different respondents through the appropriate
Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from remedies allowed by law
Pangasinan. Respondents are solidarily liable
Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck The claim that there was an agreement entered into between
at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way the parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such
fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. payment made by the other respondents, the case shall
While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either
At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes
B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as
Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro agreement
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in
the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the First PHL Intl Bank vs CA
cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to
ram a mango tree.
Facts: In the course of its banking operations, the defendant
As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his
legs. Producer Bank of the Philippines acquired 6 parcels of land with a
total area of 101 hectares located at Don Jose, Sta. Rosa, Laguna
The following proceedings thereafter took place: and covered by TCT No. T-106932 to T-106937. The property used
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent to be owned by BYME Investment and Development Corporation
Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a which hd them mortgaged with the bank as collateral for a loan. The
breach of contract of carriage and against respondents plaintiff originals, Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo wanted to
Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
purchase the property and thus initiated negotiations for that
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and purpose. In the early part of August 1987 said plaintiffs, upon the
never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he suggestion of BYME investments legal counsel, Fajardo met with
acquire ownership thereof in the future. defendant Mercurio Rivera, manager of the property management
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, department of the defendant bank. The meeting was held in
filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto pursuant to plaintiffs plan to buy the property. After the meeting,
Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
plaintiff Janolo, following the advice of defendant Rivera made a
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not
ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether formal purchase offer to the Bank through a letter dated August
respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who 30,1987. Negotiations took place and an offer price was fixed at
was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents P5.5million. During the course of the negotiations, the defendant
Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan. bank was placed under conservatorship and a new conservator was
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim appointed to which the name has been refused to recognize. A
against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in derivative suit has been filed against Rivera for the damages
the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein
suffered from the alleged perfect contract of sale involving the 6
impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional
alternative defendant. parcels of land.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru Issue: Whether or not a derivative suit may lie involving the bank
their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid and its stockholders.
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P
1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of Held: No. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a
claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz:
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he hold stock in
order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable
of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones, to be sued or hold judgment or verdict
the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder Test for Determining Forum Shopping: exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
is regarded as a nominal party with the corporation as the real party
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other
in interest.

In the face of the damaging admissions taken from the complaint in Vda de Severo et at., vs Go et al.
the second case, petitioners, quite strangely, sought to deny that the
second case was a derivative suit, reasoning that it was brought not Petitoner: Julita T. Vda. De Severo, Antoniete Severo, Bernadit
by the minority shareholders, but by Henry Co. etal. who not only Severo, Ricardo Severo, Jr. And Marisol Severo
hold or control over 80% of the outstanding capital stock, but also Respondent: Luningning Feliciano Go And Joaquin Go, And The
constitute the majority in the board of directors of petitioners bank. Honorable Court Of First Instance Of Samar, Branch V
Citation:G.R. No. L-44330
That being so, then they really represent the bank, so whether they Date of Promulgation:January 29, 1988
sued derivatively or directly, there is undeniably an identity of Ponente: BIDIN, J.
interest/entity represented.
FACTS:
In addition to the many cases, where the corporate fiction has been Ricardo Severo was an employee of herein private
regarded, we now add the instant case, and declare herewith that respondents Luningning Feliciano Go and Joaquin Go, first as
baker of 'Joni's Cakes and Pastries," an enterprise owned by
the corporate veil cannot be used to shield an otherwise blatant
respondents and finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. Shareholders, February 16, 1972.
whether suing as the majority in direct actions or as the minority in On the latter date, unidentified armed men forcibly took away
a derivative suit, cannot be allowed to trifle with court processes and/or carnapped the car owned by respondents and driven
particularly where, as in this case, the corporation itself has not been by Ricardo Severo who, in his efforts to resist the carnappers,
remiss in vigorously prosecuting or defending corporate causes and was shot and killed by the latter.
in using and applying remedies available to it. To rule otherwise Up to now, the parties responsible for Severo's death have
not been Identified nor apprehended.
would be to encourage corporate litigants to use their shareholders
On September 18, 1974, herein petitioners, the widow and
as fronts to circumvent the stringent rules against forum shopping. minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an action against
respondents-employers before the trial court for "Death
From the facts, the official bank price, at any rte, the bank placed its Compensation and Damages" in the total amount of
official, Rivera is a position of authority to accept offers to buy and P74,500.00.
negotiate the sale by having the offer officially acted upon by the On November 18, 1974, private respondents filed a motion to
bank. The bank cannot turn around and say, as it now does, that dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent Court
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action but the same
what Rivera states as the banks action on the matter is not in fact was denied by respondent Court in its order dated January 9,
so. It is a familiar doctrine, the doctrine of ostensible authority, that 1975.
if a corporation on knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
agent, to do acts within the scope of apparent authority, and thus by the trial court. On May 3, 1975, private respondents filed
holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, their answer traversing the material allegations of the
the corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt complaint and raised as special affirmative defenses that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of the petitioner
with the corporation through such agent, he estopped from denying
and that the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of
his authority. action.
During the pre-trial on January 16, 1976, private respondents
A bank is liable for wrongful acts of its officers done in the interest again filed a motion to dismiss reiterating their allegation that
of the bank or in he course of dealings of the officers in their the lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of petitioner
representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of their and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
authority. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of Petitioners filed a reply (opposition) dated February 5, 1976
contending that their claim is not for compensation under the
confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds they my thus
Workmen's Compensation Act but for damages under Article
be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of their employment; 1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence, cognizable by
nor will it be permitted to shrink its responsibility for such fraud even the regular courts.
through no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. Accordingly, The respondent court, acting on the latest motion to dismiss,
a banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the issued an order dated April 6, 1976 stating that petitioners'
representation is made in the course of its business by an agent cause of action falls within the purview of the Workmen's
acting within the general scope of its authority even though, in the Compensation Act and the proper forum was the Workmen's
Compensation Commission.
particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and It declared itself without jurisdiction following Our ruling in the
attempting to perpetrate fraud upon his principal or some other case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41
person, for his own ultimate benefit. SCRA 267, to wit:
The Court after a careful consideration of the
Section 28-A of BP 68 merely gives the conservator power to revoke grounds in the defendants' motion, and
contracts that are, under existing law, deemed not to be effective considering the allegation of the complaint
describing their main cause of action, which is
i.e void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the
a claim for death compensation and damages,
conservator merely takes the place of a banks board of directors. is of the opinion and so holds that this Court has
What the said board cannot do such as repudiating a contract no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The
validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority the plaintiffs' right to relief being derived on an
conservator cannot do either. accident resulting in death of Ricardo Severo,
an employee of the defendants, while engaged
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping. in the performance of the task assigned to him,
this Court is devoid of statutory competence to
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of pass upon the subject matter of the plaintiffs'
interest and parties between the first case and the second case. claim, as of the time the cause of action accrue,
There is identity of interest because both cases sought to have the falls within the purview of the Workmen's
agreement, which involves the same property, be declared Compensation Act as amended and, therefore,
unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even the proper form (sic) was the Workmen's
though the first case is in the name of the bank as defendant, and Compensation Commission, thru its regional
the second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still offices under the Department of Labor, a body
forum shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the empowered to act upon all claims for
bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from the compensation for death, injury or sickness.
agreement it entered into with Demetria et al. Thus our Supreme Court in the case of Ciriaco
Robles vs. Yap Wing, No. L-20442, Oct. 4,
The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum shopping, 1971 ruled:
which originated as a concept in international law, the principle of Before the enactment of Republic Act No.
forum non conveniens was developed. The doctrine of forum non 722(Amending Act. No. 3228), which took
conveniens provides that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may effect on June 20, 1952, claims for
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most compensation under the Workmen's
convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded Compensation Act were cognizable by the
from seeking remedies elsewhere. regular courts, but since then, as provided in
Forum Shopping (Blacks Dictionary): occurs when a party Section 46 thereof as amended, 'the
attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or Workmen's Compensation shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
 compensation under the Workmen's by a wooden seat which came off after being
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the unscrewed. It took three persons to safely
Supreme Court. ... In relation to this, Section 5 remove her from this position. She was in great
of the Act provides that the rights and remedies pain and could not move.
granted by this Act to an employee by reason o The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not
of a personal injury entitling him to see the curve until it was too late; he said he
compensation shall exclude all other rights and was not familiar with the area and he could not
remedies accruing to an employee, his have seen the curve despite the care he took in
personal representatives, dependents or driving the bus, because it was dark and there
nearest of kin against the employer under the was no sign on the road.
Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury. o He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He
allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per
The claim for compensation of the petitioners based on the NCC hour, but it was too late.
does pertain to the jurisdiction of regular couts November 3, 1984
The court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and o Lingayen police investigated the incident then
remedies granted by the Workmens Compensation Act filed a criminal complaint at Lingayen RTC
The employee or his heirs have the choice of action and against the driver, Porfirio Cabil.
corresponding relief either an ordinary action for damages o Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano
before the regular courts or special claim for compensation P1,500.00 for the damage to the latters fence.
under the WCA o On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance
Petitioners have opted to seek their remedy before the the case against petitioners Fabre was
regular courts dismissed.
Their demand is predicated on the employers liabilitu for the Respondent Amyline Antonio
death of their employee o was seriously injured; brought this case in the
RTC of Makati.
Fabre Jr vs CA o As a result of the accident, she is now suffering
from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed
Petitioners: Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil from the waist down.
Respondents: Court of Appeals, The Word for The World Christian o During trial she described the operations she
Fellowship, Inc., Amyline Antonio, John Richards, Gonzalo underwent and adduced evidence regarding
Gonzales, Vicente V. Que, Jr., Icli Cordova, Arlene Gojocco, Alberto the cost of her treatment and therapy.
Roxas Cordero, Richard Bautista, Jocelyn Garcia, Yolanda o Immediately after the accident, she was taken
Cordova, Noel Roque, Edward Tan, Ernesto Narciso, Enriqueta to the Nazareth Hospital in Ba-ay, Lingayen but
Locsin, Francis Norman O. Lopez, Julius Caesar Garcia, Rosario it was not adequately equipped so she was
Ma. V. Ortiz, Marietta C. Clavo, Elvie Seniel, Rosario Mara-Mara, transferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the
Teresita Regala, Melinda Torres, Marella Mijares, Josefa town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives
Cabatingan, Mara Nadoc, Diane Mayo, Tess Plata, Mayette Jocson, however, the x-ray taken showed that the
Arlene Y. Mortiz, Liza Mayo, Carlos Ranario, Rosamaria T. Radoc damage to her spine was determined to be too
and Bernadette Ferrer severe to be treated there.
Docket No.: G.R. No. 111127 o She was therefore brought to Manila, first to the
Date of Promulgation: July 26, 1996 Philippine General Hospital and later to the
Ponente: Mendoza, J. Makati Medical Center where she underwent
an operation to correct the dislocation of her
FACTS: spine.
Petition for review on certiorari. April 17, 1989 RTC Makati Decision
Petitioners o No convincing evidence was shown that the
o Spouses Fabre were owners of a 1982 model minibus was properly checked for travel to a
Mazda minibus which was used as bus service long distance trip and that the driver was
for school children which they operated in properly screened and tested before being
Manila. admitted for employment. Indeed, all the
o The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom evidence presented have shown the negligent
they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two act of the defendants which ultimately resulted
weeks; job was to take school children to and to the accident subject of this case.
from the St. Scholasticas College in Malate, Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World
Manila. Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline
November 2, 1984 Antonio were the only ones who adduced
o Respondent Word for the World Christian evidence in support of their claim for damages,
Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the Court is therefore not in a position to award
petitioners for the transportation of 33 members damages to the other plaintiffs.
of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
Union and back in consideration of which hereby renders judgment against defendants
private respondent paid petitioners the amount Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio
of P3,000.00. Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and
o The group was scheduled to leave on 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o clock in the said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and
afternoon; several members of the party were severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:
late, the bus left Tropical Hut at the corner of 1) P93,657.11 as
Ortigas Avenue and EDSA at 8:00 o clock in the compensatory and actual damages;
evening. 2) P500,000.00 as the
o Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
reasonable amount of loss of
o Usual route to Caba, La Union was through
Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at earning capacity of plaintiff
Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Amyline Antonio;
Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being 3) P20,000.00 as moral
his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a damages;
detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, 4) P20,000.00 as exemplary
Pangasinan. damages; and
o At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon
5) 25% of the recoverable
a sharp curve on the highway, running on a
south to east direction, which he described as amount as attorneys fees;
siete; road was slippery because it was raining, 6) Costs of suit.
causing the bus, which was running at the The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but
left road shoulder. dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on
o The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign
the ground that they failed to prove their respective
along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of
its left side, coming to a full stop only after a damages as follows:
series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the 1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
road. 2) P600,000.00 as compensatory
o A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and damages;
smashed its front portion. 3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
o Several passengers were injured.
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
o Private respondent Amyline Antonio was
thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down 5) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
 o The Court of Appeals sustained the trial Street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina,
courts finding that petitioner Cabil failed one of its passengers.
to exercise due care and precaution in A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence
the operation of his vehicle considering was filed against Avorque (criminal case No. 22775 of the
CFI Manila), to which he pleaded guilty on September 9,
the time and the place of the
1953.
accident. The Court of Appeals held that The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved their right
the Fabres were themselves to file a separate action for damages, and on June 16,
presumptively negligent. 1953, brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque
and Appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner
and operator of the jeepney in question.
Petitioners were negligent Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any
The relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in answer; while Defendant Cresencia answered,
origin and nature; nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract disclaiming liability on the grounds:
may be also tort 1. that he had sold the jeepney in question on October
Cabil drove the bus negligently while his employer, Fabres, 14, 1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat;
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection 2. that the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by one
and supervision of their employee buyer after another, until the vehicle was purchased
It was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was on January 29, 1953 by Rosario Avorque, the
raining, and, as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it absolute owner thereof at the time of the accident.
was dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that In view of Cresencias answer, Plaintiffs filed leave and
there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that was allowed to amend their complaint making Rosario
Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and Avorque a co-Defendant; and the latter, by way of
only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 answer, admitted having purchased the aforesaid
meters ahead jeepney on May 31, 1953, but alleged in defense that she
By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given was never the public utility operator thereof.
the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was The case then proceeded to trial, during which, after
Cabils first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his the Plaintiffs had presented their
vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony that the evidence, Defendants Guillermo Cresencia and Rosario
vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be Avorque made manifestations admitting that the former
running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per was still the registered operator of the jeepney in question
hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed. in the records of the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public
Cabre was negligent in the selection and supervision of employees Service Commission, while the latter was the owner
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by thereof at the time of the accident; and submitted the
finding that the applicant possessed a professional drivers case for the decision on the question of who, as between
license. The employer should also examine the applicant for the two, should be held liable to Plaintiffs for damages.
his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due The lower court, by Judge Jose Zulueta, held that as far
diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the as the public is concerned, Defendant Cresencia, in the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of eyes of the law, continued to be the legal owner of the
employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as jeepney in question; and rendered judgment against him,
actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance jointly and severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for
with the rules. P6,000 compensatory damages, P30,000 moral
Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, damages, P10,000 exemplary damages, P10,000
apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving nominal damages, P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs,
for school children only, from their homes to the St. while Defendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from
Scholasticas College in Metro Manila. They had They had liability.
tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could Defendant Cresencia appealed.
remember the names of the children he would be taking to
school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a
long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Cresencia is liable to the Commission and the public for the
Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and consequences incident to the operation of jeepneys, also to the
supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente
presumption of negligence on the part of an employer hired him Medina resulting from the reckless imprudence of the driver,
only after a two-week apprenticeship. Brigido Avorque
Fabres did not have to be engaged in the business of public Sale of the jeepned was admittedly without the approval of
transportation for common carriers to apply Public Service Commission; hence, Guillermo continues to be
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, liable
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying The law requires the approval of the Public Service
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege
water, or air for compensation, offering their services to pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the
the public. certificate issued to the grantee; and that if property covered
by the franchise is transferred or leased without this requisite
The above article makes no distinction between one whose
approval, the transfer is not binding against the public or the
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods
Service Commission; and in contemplation of law, the grantee
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
of record continues to be responsible under the franchise in
activity (in local idiom, as a sideline).
relation to the Commission and to the public
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise
Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of the criminal case
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the
filed against Brigido and not based on the employers subsidiary
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
liability
excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a
Based on breach of contractual obligation to carry his
good father of the family in the selection and supervision
passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual)
of their employee
No need to prove Brigidos insolvency before damages can be
Damages can be awarded to Amyline Antonio
recovered to the carrier, for in CC the liability of the carrier is
This case falls within Art. 2219 providing for payment of moral
direct and immediate
damages in QD
Award of the nominal damages is untenable
On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract
Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art.
damages
1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabils gross negligence
amounted to bad faith
Aboitiz Shipping vs CA
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also
properly made ABOITIZ v CA
Fabres and Cabil are jointly and severally liable for damages
Petitioner: Aboitiz Shipping Corporation
sustained by the passengers
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, Lucila C.
Viana, Sps. Antonio Viana and Gorgonia Viana, and Pioneer
Emenciana Vda De Medina vs Cresencia
Stevedoring Corporation
Docket No.: G.R. No. 84458
Petitioners: Emerenciana M. Vda. De Medina, Et al.
Date of Promulgation: November 6, 1989
Respondents: Guillermo Cresencia, Et al.
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Docket No.: G.R. No. L-8194
Date of Promulgation: July 11, 1956
FACTS:
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Appeal by certiorari
FACTS: May 11, 1975
o Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V
May 31, 1953
Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San
o A passenger jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila,
2232 (Manila), driven by Brigido Avorque,
smashed into a Meralco post on Azcarraga
 having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the o Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
sum of P23.10. damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to
May 12, 1975 reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the
o Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, latter paid the Vianas.
Manila, and the passengers therein Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for
disembarked, a gangplank having been reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the trial
provided connecting the side of the vessel to court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with
the pier. Instead of using said gangplank gross negligence despite the overwhelming evidence
Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck presented in support thereof.
which was on the level with the pier. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's
o After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the
Stevedoring Corporation took over the liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising
vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
Agreement dated July 26, 1975 between the October 27, 1982 Order of the trial court
third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring o Absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the
Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish
Corporation. a case of negligence against the crane operator
o The crane owned by the third party defendant which the court a quo ruled is never presumed,
and operated by its crane operator Alejo aside from the fact that the memorandum of
Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and agreement supposedly refers only to Pioneer's
one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel liability in case of loss or damage to goods
had disembarked, it started operation by handled by it but not in the case of personal
unloading the cargoes from said vessel. injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly
o While the crane was being operated, Anacleto invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because
Viana who had already disembarked from said its liability stems from a breach of contract of
vessel obviously remembering that some of his carriage.
cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of of the trial court
back to the vessel, and it was while he was except as to the amount of damages awarded to the
pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the Vianas.
place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of ISSUES:
the vessel and the crane. 1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the doctrine
o He was thereafter brought to the hospital where laid down in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is
he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on applicable in the case at bar.
May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according 2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner liable
to the Death Certificate being "hypostatic for damages in the face of the finding of the lower courts
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of that Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory negligence.
the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder". 3. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when
o For his hospitalization, medical, burial and it dismissed petitioner's third-party complaint against private
other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife, respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation instead of
herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00. compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for whatever
Anacleto Viana who was only forty damages it may be compelled to pay to the private
(40) years old when he met said respondents Vianas.
fateful accident was in good health;
average annual income as a farmer HELD:
or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and
of palay annually. respondent Court of Appeals found the victim Anacleto Viana guilty
His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of
and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre
death had been recipient of twenty operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct,
(20) cavans of palay as support or immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
P120.00 monthly.
Because of Anacleto's death,
plaintiffs suffered mental anguish 1. No.
and extreme worry or moral Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed
damages. from the time Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that
For the filing of the instant case, they he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes
had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was
of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. no longer reasonable e and he consequently ceased to be a
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs.
against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. Court of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
Answer to Vianas complaint: Aboitiz denied responsibility
contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer as the until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once
handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
Aboitiz; averred that since the crane operator was not an passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted
employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
the fellow-servant rule. to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-
be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
party complaint against Pioneer imputing liability thereto
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly
the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after
caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was
his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-
an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that
supervision.
the person transported has been carried to his destination if,
Answer to third-party complaint: Pioneer raised the
for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to
defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of action against
claim his baggage.
Pioneer considering
1. that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the
breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
is not a party; It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of
2. that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment
good father of a family both in the selection and the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
supervision of its employees as well as in the place selected by the carrier at the point of destination,
prevention of damage or injury to anyone but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
including the victim Anacleto Viana; time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
3. that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
the direct and proximate cause of his death; reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
4. and that the filing of the third-party complaint from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
was premature by reason of the pendency of alighting from a train, walks along the station platform
the criminal case for homicide through reckless is considered still a passenger. So also, where a
imprudence filed against the crane operator, passenger has alighted at his destination and is
Alejo Figueroa. proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
April 17, 1980 Decision of the trial court premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the
report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been
 shot, and he in good faith and without intent of passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation
engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, subsists.
he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a
thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the passenger's death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or
protection of the railroad company and its agents. negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the
of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers
from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must have of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a
followed the father. However, although the father was still stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this
on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the
hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from
even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner
it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining
the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to
carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely prevent the accident from happening.
its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that
the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as
to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged
entitled to the protection under their contract of presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and
carriage. 14 not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were
rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question
presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the
should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against entry
the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to
such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that
of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that
passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to
case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area.
met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts
existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be
victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is
such a justifiable cause. required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still
business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary
longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it
carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of could definitely have prevented, the former's death. Moreover,
cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has
capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of
the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship Appeals that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in
passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana
disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard
passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a to claim otherwise.
very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically
claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time
entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La 3. No.
Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by
to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the
cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial
passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being
the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had absolved of any liability.
every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in
is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
proving the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their
contention that the death of the passenger was due to the
baggage.
negligence of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory.
victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that
prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its
his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have
consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as
time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-
be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the
went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the
was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common
was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what
admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels we have said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but,
that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the
Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time rationale for our finding on its liability.
of his tragic death.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
2. No. SO ORDERED.
Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their CALALAS v CA
business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe Petitioner: Vicente Calalas
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for Respondents: Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to Francisco Salva
all the circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a Docket No.: G.R. No. 122039
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far Date of Promulgation: May 31, 2000
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost Ponente: Mendoza, J.
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, FACTS:
the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have Petition for review on certiorari
acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court
contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision
prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non- of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and
performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
carry the passenger safely to his destination, 18 which, in the Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its
 August 23, 1989 (10:00 AM) fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
o Respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
college freshman majoring in Physical 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
Education at the Siliman University, took a common carrier the burden of proof.
passenger jeepney owned and operated by There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
petitioner Vicente Calalas. No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage
o The jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
o On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where
passenger off; Sunga gave way to the outgoing there is no relation between him and another party. In such a
passenger. case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is
o An Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function
portion of the jeepney; Sunga was injured. of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar
She sustained a fracture of the "distal as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
third of the left tibia-fibula with severe regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence
necrosis of the underlying skin." required of common carriers with regard to the safety of
Closed reduction of the fracture, long passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases
leg circular casting, and case of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
wedging were done under sedation.
Her confinement in the hospital Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
lasted from August 23 to September business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
7, 1989. observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
certified she would remain on a cast Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
for a period of three months and is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos.
would have to ambulate in crutches 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
during said period. the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
October 9, 1989 Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
o Sunga filed a complaint for damages against passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
diligence required of him as a common carrier.
o Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
of the Isuzu truck. have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third- observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding 1733 and 1755.
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
responsible for the accident. presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi- the care of his passengers.
delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
damage to his jeepney. cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of against petitioners contention.
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-
delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not
diligence required under the Civil Code. properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of
Sunga. the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides:
ISSUE: Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his
Whether or not Calalas is liable on the basis of his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede
contract of carriage to Sunga. the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight,
HELD: obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the
Yes. highway.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the Second, it is undisputed that petitioner driver took in more
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any
contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight
Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in
evidence.
a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
The petition has no merit.
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi- by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, in transporting passengers.
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat" amounted
the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should
to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is not be compensated merely because those passengers
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did
transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging
that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention
well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year
college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the
injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of
that school year. She testified that she had no more
intention of continuing with her schooling, because she
could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major
in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect
already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was
under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured
left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon
also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture
side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical
Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x
has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the
inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover
moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just
and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is
not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages
since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of
carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners admission in open
court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a
nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.
The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

Calalas vs CA