Kocku von Stuckrad

Esoteric Discourse and the European History

of Religion
In Search of a New Interpretational Framework

O ften, when people nowadays talk of esotericism, they are using

this word either as more or less synonymous with New Age, or as
a term for movements that are based on a secret wisdom that is only ac
cessible to an inner circle of initiates. In academic discussions, however,
during the past fifteen years, a field of research has been established that
critically engages these assumptions and applies the term esotericism
in a very different way, namely as a signifier of a number of currents in
Western culture that have influenced the history of religions in manifold
ways. New Age and secret initiatory knowledge are but two aspects of
these traditions, and certainly not the most important ones.
In this essay, I will reflect on the various scholarly approaches to the
concept of Western esotericism. I will propose an analysis that takes in
to account the manifold pluralisms that have shaped Western culture
not only in modernity. I will argue that the academic study of Western
esotericism should be understood as part and parcel of a broader analy
sis of European history of religion, with all its complexities, polemics,
diachronic developments, and pluralistic discourses. To make this point,
however, I will first have to introduce the concepts of pluralism with re
gard to European religion and culture. Only after I have established this
analytical framework, I will be able to put the study of Western esoteri
cism into this picture.

European History of Religion: Complexities and Pluralisms

If we are to write the history of religions in Europe, there are basically

two options. The first possibility is what I call an additive historiography,
in which the main religious traditionsChristianity and its denomin
ationsare described side by side with the historical developments of
the other religions in Europe, mainly Judaism and Islam. This is the
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traditional form of approaching the history of religions in Europe; it ul

timately leads to a church history with some sort of appendix that con
siders the minor traditions that have existed more or less in the shadow
of the mainstream Christian religion.
In recent debates, a different approach has been suggested, which
can be called integrative and which describes the history of religions in
Europe from the perspective of religious pluralism. Quite against the
common assumption that European history of religion is the history of
Christianity and its confessional schisms, scholars of religion have be
gun to focus on the specific dynamics of inter-religious dependency as
a common denominator of European culture. Religious pluralism is a
characteristic of European history since ancient times, and not only in
modernity (Kippenberg & von Stuckrad 2003a: 12635; Kippenberg &
von Stuckrad 2003b). It is the presence of alternatives that has shaped
Western culture. What has also been distinctive is the presence of one
particular religious institutionthe Roman Churchthat intended to
take control over all aspects of the lives of people, legitimizing its au
thority with reference to a transcendental order (see Benavides 2008).
Hence, it is the tension between actual alternatives and attempts at nor
matization and control that created the dynamics of religious develop
ment in Europe.
These alternatives include all three scriptural religions. Even during
those times in which Islam was not institutionalized in Western Europe,
it existed as an ideological alternative to Christianity or Judaism, as did
Judaism to Christianity. It was part of a shared field of discourse. This
marks the difference between plurality and pluralism: whereas plural
ity stands for a simple coexistence of different religious traditions, plu
ralism denotes the organization of difference. Religious options alternative
to ones own are known, are a matter of negotiation, and constitute an
element of ones own identity. In constructing the other, both parties
form a discursive unit. The organization of difference then materializes
in ecclesiastical councils, confessional literature, constitutions, social
group-formation,1 and in political and juridical systems. In his master
ful history of medieval Europe, Michael Borgolte notes: If we want to
understand Europe historically, we will have to acknowledge that its
multiplicity has not led to a pluralism of indifference, but that its cultur

1 These groups frequently transgress religious boundaries. For instance, the

Platonic Academy and the humanist Republic of Letters are ideal construc
tions of an intellectual community that attract scholars with different religious
persuasions.

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al formations were adjusted, changed, and rejected in continuous mu-

tual reference (Borgolte 2006: 10, my translation; cf. von Stuckrad 2008).
But not only are the scriptural religions players on these fields: old
and new forms of the pagan, polytheistic past, as well as religious tradi
tions that are related to the names of Hermes Trismegistus or Zoroaster,
likewise influenced the dynamic processes of European intellectual and
religious history.2 Esotericism illustrates how Christians (and others)
became interested in alternative descriptions of the cosmos and of his
tory that became part of their own identities, either within or beyond
scriptural religions.
From a perspective of cultural studies this interlacing does not ap
ply to the religious system alone. There is a second form of pluralism
involved in European intellectual history. In two programmatic articles,
Burkhard Gladigow has argued that it is the mutual dependency of re
ligious, philosophical, scientific, and political reflections that character
ize the European history of religions (Europische Religionsgeschichte,
in contrast to the history of religions in Europe). It directly affects the
academic study of esotericism when he writes:

In the course of many centuries, philosophy and philologies pre

sentedor revivedtraditions that no longer or never had carriers
[Trger] (in the Weberian sense), traditions that were transmitted only
in the medium of science. Renaissance, Humanism and Romanticism
took their alternatives to occidental Christian culture mainly from
the sciences. A revived Platonism could subsequently be closely tied
to Christianityor it lived on as theory of magic and irrationalism
right into the eighteenth century; Gnostic schemes and ideas of
redemption could interfere with Asian religions that were imported
through philologies; a monism could melt into a Christian pantheism
or constitute a new religion. (Gladigow 1995: 29, my translation.)

In 2006, Gladigow has further elaborated this concept. He argues that

a process of professionalization and pluralization due to new trends in

2 Take Zoroastrianism as an example: in his seminal Rezeptionsgeschichte of the

figure of Zoroaster in Europe, Michael Stausberg addresses Zoroastrianism
which was present in Europe as mere imaginationin such a way that in
addition to the analysis of the European view on Zoroaster from outside (Fremd
geschichte) the question of the religious or historical implications and explica
tions of this process of reception must always be taken into account (Stausberg
1998: 22, my translation).

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philology and historiography has led to an inclusion and probing of

religious alternatives since the Renaissance. He now gives special atten
tion to the process of professionalization of religion that tests historic
al and philological methods on non-Christian sources. This leads, sec
ondly, to a pluralization of the religious field. This process culminates
in the Renaissance with a new density of intellectual communication in
Europe, and in all of Europe.

A Renaissance prince that buys the Corpus Hermeticum and pays

for its translationlater to become a canonical text of religious
currents of the most varied disciplinesmay be seen as a charac
teristic of the new phase of religious options in Europe. Not only
do the positive, institutionalized religions receive the attention
they deserve, but also the undercurrents, repressed patterns,
heresies, alternatives, which could explicitly or implicitly com-
pete with Christianity. (Gladigow 2006b: par. 1, my translation.)

This is an apt description of the complex dynamics that have shaped

Western identities since late medieval times. My own understanding
of the European history of religion and the place of esotericism within
it owes a lot to Gladigows nuanced position. At two points, however,
I would like to qualify his interpretation. First of all, Gladigow over
rates the Renaissance as the birthplace of modernity. As with all labels
for historical eras, the Renaissance is a matter of construction, which
characterizes, usually in hindsight, a specific period as something
unique, as an event sui generis, highlighted in a longer time-span due
to its particular qualities. The Renaissance as the rebirth of the ancient
world is an invention of special significance for the history of esoteri
cism, as many scholars tend to speak of a kind of watershed between
the early periods of (proto-) esotericism and its actual formulation in
the Renaissance. This notion of the Renaissance as a distinct period, like
that applied to the Enlightenment, has come under fire in recent years,
as it stems from a nineteenth-century construction. Although it is true
that for the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century the introduction
of Hermetic philosophy was a decisive new step, we should not forget
that Hermeticism had been a crucial element of Islamic philosophy and
science throughout the Middle Ages, which also influenced Western
European debates.3

3 A prominent example is the Illuminism of Suhraward. For a concise over

view of the vast Hermetic literature prior to the Renaissance cf. also the entries

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A second qualification of Gladigows characterization of the Euro

pean history of religion should be made with reference to Neoplatonism.
Again, Gladigow is right when he says that the revival of Neoplatonic
philosophy in Europefirst in Pletho and Ficino, later by the Cambridge
Platonists (Gladigow 2006b: par. 4 and 12)led to an opposition to es-
tablished religious positions and that it provoked alternatives to Chris
tian understandings. But the discrepancy between Platonism and Aristo
telianism has in fact never been that strong. The PlatoAristotle Debate
is a singular event of the Renaissance, and we should not adopt this
binary position uncritically (Monfasani 2002; von Stuckrad 2005a: 49
52). What we find in the sources is a dynamic mixture of Platonism and
Aristotelianism, transformed contingently in various philosophical and
political contexts.

Analytical Tools for Interpretation

The construction of European history as monolithically Christian has

been very influential during the past 200 years (see Perkins 2004; von
Stuckrad 2006). Master narratives, even if they are based on historically
dubious material, are capable of creating structures of power and soci
etal realities. In fact, that is what makes a narrative a master narrative!
The condensation of thought-patterns into social and historical struc
tures is a key element of discourse theory.
Because of their often vague usage, the concepts discourse and
field are in need of some explanation. I apply the term discourse in
the way Michel Foucault and others have described it, i.e. as the totality
of certain thought-systems that interact with societal systems in mani
fold ways.4 Discursive formations conceptualize the impact of and
mutual dependency between systems of interpreting the world and pro
cesses of institutionalization and materialization. Talking of discursive
happenings elucidates the fact that discourses are themselves practices
that influence non-discursive elements. Discursive relations are always
power-relations, which means that the term discourse refers not only to
contents of frameworks of meaning, but also to instruments of power.5

Hermetic Literature I: Antiquity, Hermetic Literature II: Latin Middle Ages,

and Hermetic Literature III: Arab, in Hanegraaff et al. 2005: 487533.
4 As a useful overview, see Engler 2006. On Foucault see Carrette 2000.
5 For the fact that scholars today are also players in fields of discourse, see von
Stuckrad 2003a.

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Another important concept is the notion of fields, which I apply in the

way Pierre Bourdieu has coined it:

I define a field as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations

between positions objectively defined, in their existence and in the
determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institu
tions, by their present and potential situation . . . in the structure of
the distribution of power (or capital) whose possession commands
access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as
by their objective relation to other positions. (Quoted from Jenkins
2002: 85.)

The field, hence, is a structured system of social positions, occupied either

by individuals or institutions, the nature of which defines the situation
for their occupants. Hence, a field is not an object but a structure of relations
that is in constant change and motion (see Bourdieu 1992 and 1996).
A third concept that I apply regularly in my analysis is the term inter
ference. This term stems from natural sciences and refers to the fact that
one and the same physicalor, in our case, culturalenergy mediates
through various lenses or prisms and is becoming visible in different
cultural systems. In other words: the interferential patterns (on which
see Tenbruck 1993: 35; Gladigow 1995: 29) that we observe in religion
and other cultural domains are part of a shared field of discourse.
The terms discourse, field, network, transfer, juncture, interference,
etc. are important analytical tools to come to terms with the dynamics of
the European history of religion and culture, as well as with the function
of esotericism within this framework. My position here can be seen as a
deconstruction of strategies of singularization (see Smith 2004; Gladigow
2006a) and the formulation of an alternative model of interpretation
that is informed by poststructuralist theory and based on pluralism, ac
knowledging the fact that the Other is continuously produced by the
Own and thus part of a shared field of discourse.
To sum up, we can formulate three assumptions that are essential for
the approach I am suggesting here: first, religious pluralism and the ex
istence of alternatives are the normal case, rather than the exception, in
the history of Western culture; second, Western culture has always been
characterized by a critical reflection on religious truth claims and the
interaction between different cultural systems (such as religion, science,
art, literature, politics, law, economics, etc.); third, competing ways of
attaining knowledge of the world is a key to understanding the role of
esotericism in Western discourse.

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The Place of Esotericism in European Culture

I will now turn to the place of esotericism within this conceptual frame
work. My point is that the study of Western esotericism will only bear
fruit if it is linked to the general characteristics of Europeanand, for
modernity, to North American6cultural history. The power of inter
pretation in esotericism research depends on the ability to integrate
various aspects of cultural analysis and interdisciplinary approaches in
our model of explanation.
Esotericism still is a controversial term. Despite the fact that dur
ing the past fifteen years a cornucopia of contributions has led to the
emergence of the research field of Western esotericism, scholars are
still far from agreeing on definitions of esotericism. This does not mean
that there is also fundamental disagreement about the currents and
historical phenomena that scholars think of when they apply the term
esotericism. Most scholars share the opinion that esotericism covers
such currents as Gnosticism, ancient Hermetism, the so-called occult
sciencesnotably astrology, (natural) magic, and alchemy, Christian
mysticism, Renaissance Hermeticism, Jewish and Christian Kabbalah,
Paracelsianism, Rosicrucianism, Christian theosophy, illuminism, nine
teenth-century occultism, traditionalism, and various related currents
up to contemporary New Age spiritualities. All these currents are re
flected in the recent Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism (2005),
which indeed represents the state of the art in esotericism research. The
Dictionarys editor in chief, Wouter J. Hanegraaff, notes that esoteri
cism is understood not as a type of religion or as a structural dimen
sion of it, but as a general label for certain specific currents in Western
culture that display certain similarities and are historically related
(Hanegraaff 2005b: 337). This, of course, is a very vague description.
Even if scholarsfor pragmatic or other reasonsagree on historical

6 The question of whether American cultural and religious history shares the
characteristics of European culture, is much debated. While some scholarsno
tably Burkhard Gladigow and Christoph Auffarthregard American cultural
history as a subchapter of the European history of religion, in my view the
differences are in fact enormous. It is only since the second half of the twenti
eth century that we can talk of a shared cultural and religious space here, par
ticularly through the reception of American New Age culture in Europe. For
early modernity and also for Romanticism, the characteristics found in Europe
should not be transferred to North America.

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currents that they want to study under the rubric of esotericism, it

will be important to answer questions such as the following: what is
the rationale behind the selection of currents? Why do we need a gen
eral analytic term to study phenomena that are apparently quite diverse
(as, e.g., Hermeticism, Paracelsianism, or New Age)? Is it sufficient to
justify the selection with reference to the fact that this entire domain
was severely neglected by academic research until far into the 20th cen
tury (Hanegraaff 2005a: ix)? What about other currentssuch as an
cient and medieval theurgy, Islamic and Jewish mysticism, or Romantic
Naturphilosophiethat likewise display certain similarities and are his
torically related to currents seen as belonging to Western esotericism?
These questions do not undermine the pragmatic reasons for making
selections. Rather, they indicate a need to constantly reflect on the biases
and presuppositions that underlie academic interpretation.
Let us have a closer look at dominant approaches to Western esoteri
cism today. Following the ancient usages of the term, scholars often re
ferred to the esoteric as something hidden from the majority, as a secret
accessible only to a small group of initiates. But many of these teachings
had in fact never been concealed, and in the twentieth century they even
gained wide currency in popular discourses, so that to characterize eso
tericism as secretive and elitist proved misleading (see Faivre 2000).
The most influential alternative understanding of esotericism was
put forward by Antoine Faivre. He claimed that the common denomin
ator, or the air de famille, of those currents referred to as esoteric tradi
tions was a specific form of thought (French forme de pense); a certain
vagueness of this concept notwithstanding (see the critique in McCalla
2001: 4434), Faivre regards the form of thought as a characteristic
way of approaching and interpreting the world. Faivre developed his
characteristics from a certain set of early modern sources that comprise
the occult sciences (astrology, alchemy, and magic), the Neoplatonic
and Hermetic thinking as it was shaped in the Renaissance, Christian
Kabbalah, (mainly Protestant) theosophy, and the notion of a prisca theo
logia or philosophia perennis. According to this view, the eternal truth had
been handed down through the ages by extraordinary teachers and phil
osophers such as Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, and Pythag
oras.
In 1992, Faivre put forward his heuristic thesis that the esoteric form
of thought consists of four intrinsic, or indispensable, characteristics,
accompanied by two relative characteristics, which are not essential
but which nevertheless occur very often. Faivre insists that only those
currents are correctly labelled esotericism that show all four intrinsic

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characteristics, even if in different emphases (see Faivre & Needleman

1992: xixxx; Faivre 1994: 119). (1) The idea of correspondences is a crucial
characteristic because it refers to the famous hermetic notion of what is
below is like what is above. In the wake of the micro-macrocosm idea
of ancient philosophy and religion, esotericists view the entire cosmos
as a theatre of mirrors, an ensemble of hieroglyphs to be deciphered
by adepts. Astrology, magic, and spiritual alchemy all partake in this
kind of interpretation. (2) The concept of living nature views nature as
a whole as a living being, permeated by an interior light or hidden fire
that circulates through it. Nature can be read like a book, but also in
teracted with through active participation, for instance in magical acts
(magia naturalis in Renaissance parlance). (3) Imagination and mediations
are complementary notions, referring on the one hand to imagination
as an organ of the soul and the importance of focused concentration
in magical work; mediation means the contact with intermediary enti
ties that serve as informants and messengers to the absolute truth. The
important role of angels, (ascended) masters or divine figures in the
process of revelation can also be described as mediation. (4) The experi
ence of transmutation expresses the idea that adepts of esoteric tradition
undergo a profound process of transformation and rebirth. Faivre al
ludes to the alchemical doctrine of death-and-rebirth to illuminate the
spiritual processes within the adept.7 The two relative characteristics
are (5) the praxis of concordance, or the search for reference systems that
show the common denominator of all spiritual traditions (similar to the
idea of philosophia perennis), and (6) the notion of transmission, or the initi
ation of an adept by a teacher or a group.
The past fifteen years have shown that this typological approach, de
veloped from concrete historical material, is very helpful in understand
ing the connections among seemingly diverse traditions, e.g. the philos
ophy of nature, mysticism, Hermeticism, Gnosis, astrology, magic, and
alchemy. In addition, Faivres operational definition of esotericism (see
McCalla 2001: 443) helped to overcome the simplistic dichotomiesof
religion versus science, magic versus religion, and esotericism versus
Enlightenmentthat had so often distorted earlier understandings of
the complexities of Western culture (see also Neugebauer-Wlk 1999).

7 The difficulties with the notion of spiritual alchemy and its making up to rep
resent alchemy in general (mainly through the religionist psychology of C. G.
Jung) are discussed in Principe & Newman 2001.

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At the same time, it is a characteristic of heuristic, operational defini

tions that they are subject to critique and change. One problem is the
fact that Faivre does not always consistently employ his own typology.
On the one hand, he describes currents as esoteric that do not fit all of
his characteristics (e.g. Mesmerism, which shows only one characteris
tic, namely the idea of living nature); on the other hand, he excludes cur
rents that nicely match his typology but fall beyond his scope of interest,
such as Suhrawards medieval Islamic philosophy. More importantly,
Faivre generates his typology from a limited set of sourcesoriginat
ing mainly from Renaissance Hermeticism, Naturphilosophie, Christian
Kabbalah, and theosophyand thus deliberately excludes aspects
of the history of European religion that other scholars view as deci
sive for a contextual understanding of esoteric currents.8 In doing so,
he excludes antiquity, the medieval period, and above all modernity.9
He marginalizes Jewish, Muslim, and pagan traditions, all of which
heavily influenced European esotericism. In the twentieth century,
Buddhism and Hinduism have also left their imprint on Western esoteri
cism. If we follow Faivres typology, we end up in a circular argument:
since esotericism is defined as a form of thought, nothing outside that
form of thought can be esotericism (McCalla 2001: 444). Although he
himself would disagree, Faivres typology in fact best fits what I would
call Christian esotericism in the early modern period or, to borrow
Monika Neugebauer-Wlks phrase, Western esotericism in a Christian
context.10
Although many scholars in the field of Western esotericism pay lip-
services to Antoine Faivres approach, and his enormous effort for the
establishment of the field notwithstanding, there are almost no scholars
who apply Faivres typology without significant changes and adjust

8 On Faivres arguments against a comparative study of esotericism that runs

the risk of claiming a universalessentialistesotericism see Faivre 2000:
esp. pp. 1025; but cf. Hanegraaff 1995: 1214.
9 Correspondences, for instance, have a different meaning in the Renaissance
and in twentieth-century magic. Another problematic term is magic: Wouter
J. Hanegraaff (2003) compared the Renaissance magia naturalis and the disen
chanted magic of the twentieth century. As a conclusion, it is apparent that
simple typological approaches to this shifting field of identities and strategies
miss the point because they pretend a common denominator that is not found
in the sources.
10 Neugebauer-Wlk 2003: 160. Faivres religionist languageparticularly in his
early writingsis pointed out by McCalla 2001: 4447.

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ments. Thus, alternative interpretations of esotericism have been sug

gested. Among these, Wouter J. Hanegraaffs deserves special attention.
In recent publications, he has developed his idea of a Grand Polemical
Narrative that according to him underlies the formation of the set of
currents that today is regarded as esotericism by most scholars. As he
put it in 2005:

[T]he field of study referred to as Western esotericism is the historic

al product of a polemical discourse, the dynamics of which can be
traced all the way back to the beginnings of monotheism. Moreover,
it is in the terms of this very same discourse that mainstream Western
culture has been construing its own identity, up to the present day.
This process of the construction of identity takes place by means of
telling storiesto ourselves and to othersof who, what and how
we want to be. The challenge of the modern study of Western eso
tericism to academic research ultimately consists in the fact that it
questions and undermines those stories, and forces us to see who,
what and how we really are. Instinctive resistance against the break
ing down of certainties implicit in such (self)knowledge is at the very
root of traditional academic resistance against the study of Western
esotericism. (Hanegraaff 2005c: 226; italics in original.)

Hanegraaff bases his analysis on the concepts of mnemohistory that

Jan Assmann has developed. This involvesas he argues in a subse
quent article of 2007what he calls a complex pattern of cultural and
religious interactions based upon a deep structure of conflict between
the dynamics of two mutually exclusive systems: monotheism and cos
motheism, and all that they imply. The logical incompatibility of the two
systems has led to an endless series of creative attempts to overcome
it (Hanegraaff 2007: 120). Hanegraaff now focuses particularly on the
discourse of images in the grand polemical narrative. This is because,
as Hanegraaff sees it, [i]n these developments the status of images has
always been crucial, because they are basic to the very nature of cos
motheism, whereas their rejection is fundamental to the very nature of
monotheism (Hanegraaff 2007: 120).
As a consequence, Hanegraaff even suggests a characterization of
esotericism on the basis of these considerations. If we accept (a) that
the grand polemical narrative indeed is operative, (b) that monotheism
and rationalism are the major pillars of Western identity, and that (c)
both have problems with images,

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it may not be too far-fetched to see a positive secondary response to

the power of images as a major characteristic of Western esotericism.
In doing so, we may make a cautious first step from a merely indirect
definition of Western esotericism toward a direct one. We can make
a further step by suggesting that specific persons and currents are
more likely to end up being perceived as belonging to the other if
for whatever reasonthey exhibit substantial resistance against the
normative drift of the dominant polemical narratives, and develop
perspectives tending toward cosmotheism and toward a perception
of truth as inherently mysterious and accessible only by a supra-
rational gnosis. . . . [I]f it is correct that Western culture defines its
identity on a monotheistic and rationalist foundation, it is reason
able to assume that to the extent that someone tends more strongly
toward their theoretical opposites, he runs a larger riskstatistically,
one might sayof finding himself and his ideas or practices censured
and relegated to the domain of the other. (Hanegraaff 2007: 1312.)

That Hanegraaff is turning away from typological approaches based

on content and ideas and that he instead explores the structures that
underlie European history of culture is interesting and opens new per
spectives. However, in my view the construction of what is pathetically
called a Grand Polemical Narrative is misleading. Claiming complex
ity in the study of European history and religion certainly is correct; but
the simplification and reduction to an imagined polemical narrative is
the opposite of complex analysis.
To begin with, falling back on Assmanns conceptualization of mono
theistic and cosmotheistic mnemohistory comes with a price. The
problem here is the vague differentiation, inherent in Assmanns inter
pretation, between historical data and tools of interpretation. Although
mnemohistory is presented as independent of actual historical devel
opments, its initial introduction, according to Jan Assmann, is directly
linked to historical instances, from the first monotheistic concepts of
Akhenaton to the supposed imposition of exclusive monotheism by
biblical Judaism (Assmann 2003). It can easily be demonstrated that this
description does not correspond to the actual historical development.
Consequently, Peter Schfer calls Assmanns exclusive monotheism
an exaggerated straw man that historically never existed.11 A similar

11 Die Kategorie des Monotheismus, die Assmann postuliert, ist eine Abstraktion
bzw. genauer ein Popanz, den es historisch so nie gegeben hat und dessen ge

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vagueness in the distinction between historical reality and mnemohis

torical construction is found in Hanegraaffs approach, too. For instance,
he claims that as a matter of historical fact paganism is and always has
been part of what we are (Hanegraaff 2005c: 234; italics in original; see
also the passage quoted above).
But even if we accept that mnemohistory is independent from actual
history, there must be sufficient historical evidence for the existence of
such a memory (a problem noted by Schfer 2005: 212). But many of
the currents within the field of Western esotericism have in fact never
been simply neglected, marginalized, or banned as dangerous; they all
have a complex and changing history in many different contexts.12 If
there is an effective polemical othering in Western history, this process
unfolded as late as the eighteenth through twentieth centuries. Put dif
ferently, Western culture, including its memories, does not only have a
problem with images and idolatry, but has also notoriously been fascin
ated by images.13 In my view such a dialectical interpretation does fit the
evidence much better: European cultural history is characterized by a
dialectic of rejection and fascination vis--vis those currents that modern
scholars regard as belonging to esotericism. What can be dubbed the
strategies of distancing is a discursive happening that took place dur
ing the past 300 years.
Analyzed with the instruments of discourse theory, what Hanegraaff
describes is actually a discursive formation, i.e. the concretization of
discourses in institutions, such as the university and its specific re
search programs.14 We do not need the catchy term of Grand Polemical
Narrative to see that point. And we also do not need to fall back on an
ultimately problematic construct of memories of idolatry and monothe

dchtnisgeschichtlicher Wert auerordentlich zweifelhaft ist (Schfer 2005:

223). Schfer also correctly notes the anti-Semitic potential of the distinction
between monotheism and cosmotheism (eine historische Fiktion, die auch
gedchtnisgeschichtlich nicht gerettet werden kann; p. 24); see Schfer 2005:
2539. A critical response to Assmanns Egyptological assumptions is found in
Quack 2004.
12 This is true for Hermeticism, astrology (which has always beenat least to
some extentan accepted science), alchemy, Freemasonry, or Kabbalah. Even
for natural magic a more nuanced picture has to be applied.
13 I analyzed one topic of this dialecticthe emergence of modern Western sha
manismin von Stuckrad 2003b.
14 This, by the way, includes the modern scholars who act in university contexts
that are a product of a new evaluation of European histories and identities.

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ism to see the polemical structure of such a discourse. Perhaps Gustavo

Benavidess observation is correct and none of these attempts at con
trolling the discourse has ultimately been successful in European his
tory. Benavides notes that the large-scale processes that we see active
in European cultural history seem to have functioned as homeostatic
mechanisms. And he concludes that in a seemingly inexorable man
ner, processes that seemed to push in one direction ended up generating
a counter-pressure, thus bringing about their own demise (Benavides
2008: 110). In other words, if there ever was a grand polemical narrative,
it created the very powers that worked against it.

Esoteric Structures

As a response to these ongoing discussions, I argue for a model of eso

tericism that is capable of describing the dynamic and processuality of
identity formation, as well as the discursive transfers between religions
and societal systems. To begin with, and harking back to Bourdieus
understanding of fields, esotericism for me is not an object but a
structure. Furthermore, if the construction of traditions or religions
are themselves tools of identity formation,15 we cannot stick to those
constructions as an historical basis of defining esotericism. We will have
to look at the discourses involved in the construction of traditions and
identities (on the following, see von Stuckrad 2005a).
On the most general level of analysis, we can describe esotericism as
the claim of absolute knowledge. From a discursive point of view, it is
not so much the content of these systems but the very fact that people
claim a wisdom that is superior to other interpretations of cosmos and
history. What is claimed here, is a totalizing vision of truth that cannot
be subject to falsification, a master-key for answering all questions of
humankind. Not surprisingly, the idea of absolute knowledge is closely
linked to a discourse of secrecy, but not because esoteric truths are re
stricted to an inner circle of specialists or initiates, but because the dia
lectic of concealment and revelation is a structural element of secretive
discourses.16 Esoteric knowledge is not necessarily exclusive, but hid

15 On a critical evaluation of the term tradition in the study of religion see von
Stuckrad 2005b.
16 Valuable for this discussion is Wolfson 1999; see particularly Wolfsons intro
duction to the volume.

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den. Principally, the revelation of esoteric truths is accessible to every

one, if he or she but follows the prescribed ways and strategies that lead
to the disclosure of hidden knowledge.
Totalizing claims of knowledge can be found in religious debates
from the Gnostic search for self-redemption to Suhrawards school of
illumination to Abraham Abulafias kabbalistic fusion with the divine
to Jacob Bhmes notion of Zentralschau and Emanuel Swedenborgs
conversing with the angelsbut also in philosophical contexts, as the
late antique Middle Platonists or the Renaissance Neoplatonists clearly
reveal. If we look for esoteric structures in scientific discourses, we will
detect them in the work of scientists who do not restrict themselves to
heuristic models or to curiosity about how natural phenomena are to be
explained but who want to unveil the master-key to the world. Such an
esoteric spin is present, for example, in John Dee (sixteenth century)
who experimented with angels in order to learn about the end of the
world; in the attempt of seventeenth-century natural philosophers at
the court of Sulzbach to combine Kabbalah, alchemy, and experimental
science; and even in some currents within contemporary science that
aim at decoding the secrets of the cosmos or to find a Grand Unified
Theory of everything.
The next step in addressing the esoteric structures of Western his
tory of religions is to ask for the specific modes of gaining access to
higher knowledge. Judging from the bulk of esoteric primary sources,
there are two ways in particular that are repeatedly referred tomedi
ation and experience. Here, mediation is understood in the same sense
as Antoine Faivre introduced it into academic language, albeit not as a
typological characteristic of esotericism but as a strategy to substantiate
the claim for secret or higher wisdom that is revealed to humankind.
The mediators can be of a quite diverse nature: Gods and goddesses,
angels, intermediate beings, or superior entities are often described as
the source of esoteric knowledge. Examples are Hermes, Poimandres (in
the Corpus Hermeticum), Enoch, Solomon, the Great White Brotherhood
and Mahatmas of the Theosophical Society, or the guardian angel
Aiwass who revealed higher wisdom to Aleister Crowley in the Liber
AL vel Legis in 1904. From this perspective, it is obvious that the large
field of Channellinga term coined in the context of the so-called
New Age movementis a typical phenomenon of esoteric discourse,
no matter if the channelled source is Seth (Jane Roberts), Ramtha
(J. Z. Knight), or Jesus Christ (Helen Schucman).
In addition toand sometimes in combination withmediation we
can identify the claim of individual experience as an important mode

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of gaining access to secret or higher knowledge. Again, this is promin

ent in the Corpus Hermeticum and subsequent literature, where a vision
indicates the process of revelation. The complex genre of ascension to
higher dimensions of realityin the Hekhalot literature, gnostic tra
ditions, and also in various mystical contexts, through meditation,
trance, or drug-induced altered states of consciousnessbelongs to the
category of experience, as well. Repeatedly, the claim of individual ex
perience of ultimate truth was a threat to institutionalized forms of re
ligion, as the reaction of the Christian churches to these claims clearly
reveal. Furthermore, the mode of experience explains (among other rea
sons) why in early modern times esoteric currents were more openly
embraced by Protestant denominations, especially in the spiritualistic
and pietistic milieus that focused on the formation of an inner church
through personal experience, than in Roman Catholic circles.

Concluding Remarks

Let me come back to the problem of definition. As scholars of religion

we know that it is not a necessary precondition for establishing fields
of research into religion to agree about a proper definition of religion.
Much of the work in religious studies consists exactly of reflection on
definitions and tools of analysis. My basic argument is that esotericism
presents a similar case. If we want to set up an academic field of research,
we will have to extend our understanding of esotericism beyond defi
nitions that arenecessarilylimited to concrete material, cases, and
research focuses. At the same time, we will have to reflect on the implicit
interlacing of various definitions and ask for general cultural dynamics
that these approaches to Western esotericism reveal. The model that I
present here is an attempt to reaching such a common ground. Thus,
the study of esoteric elements in European history of religion generates
a field of research along the lines of Problemgeschichte (history of prob
lems).17 The problems addressed by esotericism research relate to basic
aspects of Western self-understanding: how do we explain rhetorics of
rationality, science, enlightenment, progress, and absolute truth in their
relation to religious claims? How do we elucidate the conflicting plural

17 For the implications of Webers methodological approach on contemporary his

toriography see Oexle 2001: esp. 337.

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ity of religious worldviews, identities, and forms of knowledge that lie

at the bottom of Western culture?
If we answer these questions, perhaps we will not need the term
esotericism any more. If so, we can regard the term esotericism as a
Wittgensteinian ladder that once was necessary to get to a better under
standing of historical processes. If esoteric dynamics are seen as integral
elements of European culture, we can relinquish the term altogether and
will start talking about constructions and identities of Europe and the
West.

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