US v. Limsiongco
US v. Limsiongco
US v. Limsiongco
The United States Vs.M. J. Limsiongco, Vicente Yap, Yap Bun, Tan Fong, Sing Joy, Chino
Saya (Alias) Isaias Javier, Lim Liongco, Sing Yang, Lorenzo Pavia And Mariano Tan-Congco
G.R. No. L-16217; October 9, 1920; MALCOLM, J.:
Within the time allowed by the Rules of the Court, counsel for appellants have raised a most
interesting question unconnected with the merits of the particular case, but assailing the very
structure of the court itself. Appellant's motion is based "on the ground that the instant decision was
rendered by a division of the court and not by the body constituted by law for the purpose, and
hence the decisions as rendered, was rendered by a body outside the law and having no power,
authority or jurisdiction to render a final decision in the controversy." In answer, the Attorney-General
submits "that section 138 of the Administrative Code permitting and authorizing the Supreme Court
to sit in division only touches and affects the matter of practice and method of procedure of said
court, which the acts of Congress . . . clearly authorized the Legislature to do."
The portion of the law which authorizes divisions in the Supreme Court is found in section 138 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reading as follows:
SEC. 138. Sessions of court in banc and in divisions. The Supreme Court shall, as a body, sit in banc, but
it may sit in divisions to transact business for which four judges constitute a quorum, and two divisions may sit
at the same time. If the Chief Justice is present, whether in banc or division, he shall preside. In his absence,
that one of the judges attending in banc or in the division shall reside who holds the senior commission.
Six of the judges of the Supreme Court, lawfully convened, shall be necessary to form a quorum for the
transaction of any business involving the admiralty jurisdiction of the court, or for the final disposition of a civil
case in which the amount in controversy exceeds ten thousand pesos or a criminal case in which the
judgment of the lower court imposed death, or imprisonment for more than ten years, or a fine of more than
ten thousand pesos, and the concurrence of five judges, shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment, but when there is a vacancy in said court five judges shall constitute such quorum, and the
concurrence of four shall suffice for the pronouncement of the judgment. In all other case the presence of four
judges shall be sufficient to form a quorum, and the concurrence of three judges for the pronouncement of a
judgment.
In the absence of a quorum the court shall stand ipso facto adjourned until such time as the requisite number
shall be present, and a memorandum showing this fact shall be inserted by the clerk in the minutes of the
court.
ISSUE: whether or not section 138 of the Administrative Code infringes any of these constitutional
provision.
HELD: NO.
We think not. There is but one Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this
Supreme Court which cannot be diminished. The Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it
works in divisions. Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single court. Actions considered in
any one of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The
two divisions of this court are not to be considered as two separate and distinct courts but as
divisions of one and the same court. In the exact words of the law which is questioned, "the
Supreme Court shall, as a body, sit in banc, but it may sit in divisions . . . ."
The Legislature has merely attempted to regulate the organization of the court in a way not
prohibited by any constitutional provision. The constitution of divisions has been permitted for
convenience and the prompt dispatch of business. The provisions in no way involves the question of
jurisdiction.
We hold that the Philippine Legislature had power to enact law authorizing the Supreme Court to sit
either in banc or in divisions to transact business.