Keyword identifying gaps/shortcomings inspection technologies and applications commercially

1. Purpose available
1.1. General
Users basic elements RBI Programdeveloping, Implementing, maintaining if inspection technology not adequately and/or cost-effectively mitigate risks, with RBI
- guide the direction of inspection technology development
owners, operators, designers of pressure-containing equipment developing, implementing - deployment of emerging inspection technologies that underutilized
inspection program
- understanding the design premise 1.4. RBI as an Integrated Management Tool
- planning the RBI assessment Integration of these risk management efforts is key to the success of a risk management
- data and information collection program: RBI with RCM, PHA, IOWs
- identifying damage mechanisms and failure modes
- assessing POF RBI provide:
- assessing COF - inspection and maintenance plans action to provide reliable and safe operation
- risk determination, assessment, and management - input into an organizations annual planning and budgeting
- risk management with inspection activities and process control
- other risk mitigation activities RBI integrated management system managing and controlling damage
- reassessment and updating mechanisms in fixed equipmentdefining and maintaining IOWs, robust MOC process
- roles, responsibilities, training, and qualifications
- documentation and recordkeeping 2. Scope
RBI process generating: 2.1. Industry Scope
- relative risk ranking Hydrocarbon and chemical process industry
- detailed description of the inspection plan
o methods 2.2. Flexibility in Application
o extent of application diversity in organizationssize, culture, federal and/or local regulatory requirements
o timing (interval/due date)
o risk management RBI is intended to promote consistency and quality in the identification, assessment, and
- Risk mitigation activities description management of risks pertaining to material deterioration, which could lead to loss of containment.
- expected risk levels after implementation
- risk drivers 2.3. Mechanical Integrity Focused
Focused on maintaining the mechanical integrity of pressure equipment, minimizing the
1.2. RBI Benefits and Limitations risk of loss of containment due to deterioration
RBI primary work products manage risks equipment level.
RBInot a substitute for a PHA or HAZOP
highlight risks safety/health/environmenteconomic standpoint RBI complements:
- PHA: the mechanical integrity related damage mechanisms and risk management through
projected risk mitigation cost-effective inspection
- RCM: understanding failure modes, addressing the modes and therefore improving the
RBI plan provide: reliability of equipment and process facilities
- overall reduction in risk
- acceptance/understanding current risk PHA focus on the process unit design, operating, units current/anticipated operating conditions

inspection and maintenancefocused, cost effective identify equipment with acceptable 2.4. Equipment Covered
level riskdoes not require inspection/ mitigation - Pressure Vessels (Pressurized)
reduction inspection data smaller set of data-> more accurate information - Process Piping (Pipe and piping components)
- Storage Tanks (Atmospheric and pressurized)
RBI plans may result cost reductions, risk reductions and process safety improvements - Rotating Equipment (Pressurized)
- Boilers and Heaters (Pressurized)
RBI will not compensate: - Heat exchangers (shells, floating heads, channels, and bundles).
- inaccurate or missing information, - Pressure-relief devices
- inadequate designs or faulty equipment installation, - pump and compressor casings
- operating outside the acceptable IOWs,
- not effectively executing the plans,
- lack of qualified personnel or teamwork,
- lack of sound engineering or operational judgment

2.5. Equipment Not Covered

1.3. Using RBI as a Continuous Improvement Tool May be covered by other types of RBI/risk assessment work processes such as RCM
RBIcontinuously improving the inspection reassessment new data, changes occur - instrument and control systems,
refreshed view of the risks - electrical systems,
- structural systems,
- machinery components
 4.1.15.Event tree: An analytical tool that organizes and characterizes potential
2.6. Target Audience occurrences in a logical and graphical manner.
primary audience inspection and engineering personnel mechanical integrity and The event tree begins with the identification of potential initiating events.
operability of equipment Subsequent possible events (including activation of safety functions) resulting from
the initiating events are then displayed as the second level of the event tree. This
the primary audience inspection and materials engineering personnel process is continued to develop pathways or scenarios from the initiating events to
RBI initiative Champion inspection/materials engineering group potential outcomes
4.1.16.external event: Events resulting from forces of nature, acts of God, sabotage, or
requires the involvement engineering, maintenance and operations events such as neighboring fires or explosions, terrorism, neighboring hazardous
material releases, electrical power failures, forces of nature, and intrusions of
3. Normative References external transportation vehicles, such as aircraft, ships, trains, trucks, or
API 510, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration automobiles. External events are usually beyond the direct or indirect control of
API 570, Piping Inspection Code: Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Rerating of In-service Piping persons employed at or by the facility.
Systems 4.1.17.Facility: Any location containing equipment and/or components to be addressed
API 571, Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry under this RP
API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, Fitness-For-Service 4.1.18.Failure: Termination of the ability of a system, structure, equipment or component
API 581, Risk-Based Inspection Technology to perform its required function of containment of fluid (i.e. loss of containment).
API 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction Failures may be unannounced and undetected at the instant of occurrence
API 752, Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings (unannounced failure). For example, a slow leak under insulation may not be
API 941, Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum detected until a pool of fluid forms on the ground or someone notices a drip or wisp
Refineries and Petrochemical Plants of vapor. A small leak may not be noticed until the next inspection (unannounced
AICHE , Dows Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide, 1994 failure), e.g. slow leakage from buried piping or small leak in a heat exchanger tube;
ASME PVRC Project 99-IP-01, A Comparison of Criteria For Acceptance of Risk, February 16, or they may be announced and detected by any number of methods at the instance
2000 of occurrence (announced failure), e.g. rupture of a pipe in a process plant or
EPA 58 FR 54190 (40 CFR Part 68), Risk Management Plan (RMP) Regulations sudden decrease in pressure in the system
ISO Guide 73, Risk Management Vocabulary 4.1.19.failure mode: The manner of failure. For RBI, the failure of concern is loss of
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemical containment of pressurized equipment items. Examples of failure modes are small
hole, crack, and rupture.
4. Terms, Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations 4.1.20.Fitness-For-Fervice assessment: A methodology whereby damage or
4.1. Terms and Definitions flaws/imperfections contained within a component or equipment item are assessed
4.1.1. Absolute risk: An ideal and accurate description and quantification of risk in order to determine acceptability for continued service
4.1.2. Acceptable risk: A level of risk that is acceptable to the owner-user. 4.1.21.Hazard: A physical condition or a release of a hazardous material that could result
4.1.3. As low as reasonably practical (ALARP): A concept of minimization that from component failure and result in human injury or death, loss or damage, or
postulates that attributes (such as risk) can only be reduced to a certain minimum environmental degradation. Hazard is the source of harm. Components that are
under current technology and with reasonable cost used to transport, store, or process a hazardous material can be a source of
4.1.4. Components: Parts that make up a piece of equipment or equipment item hazard. Human error and external events may also create a hazard
4.1.5. Consequence: An outcome from an event. may range from positive to negative, but 4.1.22.HAZOP (hazard and operability) study: A HAZOP study is a form of failure modes
always negative for safety aspects, may be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively and effects analysis (FMEA). HAZOP studies, which were originally developed for
4.1.6. corrosion specialist: A person who is knowledgeable and experienced in the the process industry, use systematic techniques to identify hazards and operability
specific process chemistries, corrosion degradation mechanisms, materials issues throughout an entire facility. It is particularly useful in identifying unforeseen
selection, corrosion mitigation methods, corrosion monitoring techniques, and their hazards designed into facilities due to lack of information, or introduced into existing
impact on pressure equipment facilities due to changes in process conditions or operating procedures. The basic
4.1.7. cost-effective: An activity that is both effective in resolving an issue and is a objectives of the techniques are:
financially sound use of resources - to produce a full description of the facility or process, including the intended
4.1.8. damage (or deterioration) mechanism: A process that induces micro and/or design conditions
macro material changes over time that are harmful to the material condition or - to systematically review every part of the facility or process to discover how
mechanical properties. deviations from the intention of the design can occur
Damage mechanisms are usually incremental, cumulative, and, in some instances, - to decide whether these deviations can lead to hazards or operability issues
unrecoverable. Common damage mechanisms include corrosion, stress corrosion - to assess effectiveness of safeguards.
cracking, creep, erosion, fatigue, fracture, and thermal aging
4.1.9. damage (or deterioration) mode: The physical manifestation of damage 4.1.23.Inspection: Activities performed to verify that materials, fabrication, erection,
4.1.10.damage tolerance: The amount of deterioration that a component can withstand examinations, testing, repairs, etc., conform to applicable code, engineering, and/or
without failing owners written procedure requirements. It includes the planning, implementation,
4.1.11. design premise: Assumptions made during the design (e.g. design life and and evaluation of the results of inspection activities. The external, internal, or on-
corrosion allowance needed) stream assessment (or any combination of the three) of the condition of pressure
4.1.12.deterioration: The reduction in the ability of a component to provide its intended equipment
purpose of containment of fluids. Damage or degradation may be used in place of 4.1.24.integrity operating window (IOW): Established limits for process variables that
deterioration can affect the integrity of the equipment if the process operation deviates from the
4.1.13.equipment: An individual item that is part of a system. Examples include pressure established limits for a predetermined amount of time
vessels, relief devices, piping, boilers, and heaters. 4.1.25.likelihood: probability
4.1.14.Event: Occurrence of a particular set of circumstances, may be certain or uncertain, 4.1.26.management of change (MOC): A documented management system for review
can be singular or multiple. The probability of an event occurring within a given and approval of changes in process, equipment or piping systems prior to
period of time can be estimated implementation of the change
4.1.27.Mitigation: Limitation of any negative consequence or reduction in probability of a 4.1.42.risk criteria: Terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed. Risk
particular event criteria may include associated cost and benefits, legal and statutory requirements,
4.1.28.Probability: Extent to which an event is likely to occur within the time frame under socio-economic and environmental aspects, concerns of stakeholders, priorities and
consideration. The mathematical definition of probability is a real number in the other inputs to the assessment.
scale 0 to 1 attached to a random event. 4.1.43.risk driver: An item affecting either the probability, consequence, or both such that
Probability can be related to a long-run relative frequency of occurrence or to a it constitutes a significant portion of the risk
degree of belief that an event will occur. For a high degree of belief, the probability 4.1.44.risk estimation: Process used to assign values to the probability and
is near one (1). Frequency rather than probability may be used in describing risk. consequence of a risk. Risk estimation may consider cost, benefits, stakeholder
Degrees of belief about probability can be chosen as classes or ranks like concerns, and other variables, as appropriate for risk evaluation
rare/unlikely/moderate/likely/almost certain or incredible/ 4.1.45.risk evaluation: Process used to compare the estimated risk against given risk
improbable/remote/occasional/probable/frequent. criteria to determine the significance of the risk. Risk evaluation may be used to
4.1.29.process unit: A group of systems arranged in a specific fashion to produce a assist in the acceptance or mitigation decision
product or service. Examples of processes include power generation, acid 4.1.46.risk identification: Process to find, list, and characterize elements of risk.
production, fuel oil production, and ethylene production Elements may include: source, event, consequence, probability. Risk identification
4.1.30.qualitative risk analysis: An analysis that uses broad categorizations for may also identify stakeholder concerns.
probabilities and consequences of failure. Methods that use primarily engineering 4.1.47.risk management: Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with
judgment and experience as the basis for the determination of probabilities and regard to risk. Risk management typically includes risk assessment, risk mitigation,
consequences of failure. The results of qualitative risk analyses are dependent on risk acceptance, and risk communication.
the background and expertise of the analysts and the objectives of the analysis. 4.1.48.risk mitigation: Process of selection and implementation of measures to modify
FMEA and HAZOPs are examples of qualitative risk analysis techniques that risk. The term risk mitigation is sometimes used for measures themselves.
become QRA methods when consequence and failure probability values are 4.1.49.risk reduction: Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences, or
estimated along with the respective descriptive input both associated with a particular risk
4.1.31.quantitative risk analysis (QRA): An analysis that quantifies the probabilities and 4.1.50.semi-quantitative analysis: A semi-quantitative analysis includes aspects of both
consequences of the probable damage mechanisms and that: qualitative and quantitative analyses
- identifies and delineates the combinations of events that, if they occur, may lead 4.1.51.source: Thing or activity with a potential for consequence. Source in a safety
to a severe event or any other undesired consequence; context is a hazard
- estimates the probability of occurrence for each combination 4.1.52.stakeholder: Any individual, group or organization that may affect, be affected by,
- estimates the consequences or perceive itself to be affected by the risk
4.1.53.system: A collection of equipment assembled for a specific function within a
QRA generally: process unit. Examples of systems include service water system, distillation
- integrates information about facility design, operating practices, operating systems, and separation systems.
history, component reliability, human actions, the physical progression of 4.1.54.Turnaround: A period of down time to perform inspection, maintenance, or
incidents, and potential environmental and health effects modifications and prepare process equipment for the next operating cycle
- Uses logic and probabilistic models depicting combinations of events and the 4.1.55.toxic chemical: Any chemical that presents a physical or health hazard or an
progression of incidents to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights into environmental hazard according to the appropriate material safety datasheet. These
the level of risks chemicals (when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin) can cause
- analysis logic models consisting of event trees and fault trees to estimate the damage to living tissue, impairment of the central nervous system, severe illness, or
frequency of each incident sequence in extreme cases, death. These chemicals may also result in adverse effects to the
4.1.32.reassessment: The process of integrating inspection data or other changes into the environment (measured as ecotoxicity and related to persistence and
risk analysis. bioaccumulation potential)
4.1.33.relative risk: The comparative risk of a facility, process unit, system, equipment 4.1.56.unmitigated risk: The risk prior to mitigation activities
item or component to other facilities, process units,systems, equipment items, or
components, respectively 4.2. Acronyms and Abbreviations
4.1.34.residual risk: The risk remaining after risk mitigation ACC American Chemistry Council
4.1.35.risk: Combination of the probability of an event and its consequence. In some AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers
situations, risk is a deviation from the expected. When probability and consequence ALARP as low as reasonably practical
are expressed numerically, risk is the product ANSI American National Standards Institute
4.1.36.risk acceptance: A decision to accept a risk. Risk acceptance depends on risk ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
criteria. ASNT American Society of Nondestructive Testing
4.1.37.risk analysis: Systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials
risk. Risk analysis provides a basis for risk evaluation, risk mitigation and risk BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion
acceptance. Information can include historical data, theoretical analysis, informed CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
opinions, and concerns of stakeholders. COF consequence of failure
4.1.38.risk assessment: Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation EPA Environmental Protection Agency
4.1.39.risk avoidance: Decision not to become involved in, or action to withdraw from a FMEA failure modes and effects analysis
risk situation. The decision may be taken based onthe result of risk evaluation HAZOP hazard and operability assessment
4.1.40.risk-based inspection (RBI): A risk assessment and management process that is IOW integrity operating window
focused on loss of containment of pressurized equipment in processing facilities, ISO International Organization for Standardization
due to material deterioration. These risks are managed primarily through equipment LOPA layers of protection analysis
inspection MOC management of change
4.1.41.risk communication: Exchange or sharing of information about risk between the MSD material selection diagrams
decision maker and other stakeholders. The information may relate to the existence, NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers
nature, form, probability, severity, acceptability, mitigation, or other aspects of risk. NDE nondestructive examination
 NFPA National Fire Protection Association failure is defined as loss of containment
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration Rbirisk-based approachFocuses attentionequipment and damage mechanisms
PHA process hazards analysis risk to the facility focusing on risks and their mitigation better linkage mechanisms
PMI positive material identification lead to failure (loss of containment)and the inspectioneffectively reduce the associated
POF probability of failure risks
PSM process safety management
PTASCC polythionic acid stress corrosion cracking 5.4. Overview of Risk Analysis
PVRC Pressure Vessel Research Council Many methods available to assess risknumber of factor risk analysis complexity
QA/QC quality assurance/quality control strictly relative ranking or rigorous calculation
QRA quantitative risk assessment
RBI risk-based inspection lack of data, low-quality data, approach not adequately differentiate risksthe results may
RCM reliability centered maintenance not yield usable, analysis results may not be realistic
RMP risk management plan
SIL safety integrity level logical progression for a risk analysis:
TEMA Tubular Exchangers Manufacturers Association - Section 8: collect and validate the necessary data and information
TNO The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research - Section 9: identify damage mechanisms and, optionally, determine the damage
UT ultrasonic testing mode(s) for each mechanism (e.g. general metal loss, local metal loss, pitting)
- Section 9: determine damage susceptibility and rates
5. Basic Risk Assessment Concepts - Section 10: determine the POF over a defined time frame for each damage
5.1. What is Risk? mechanism
People are constantly making decisions based on risk. Risk is the combination of the - Section 10 determine credible failure mode(s) [e.g. small leak, large leak, rupture
probability of some event occurring during a time period of interest and the consequences - Section 11: identify credible consequence scenarios that will result from the failure
(generally negative) associated with the event mode(s)
- Section 11: determine the probability of each consequence scenario, considering
Risk = Probability X Consequence the POF and the probability that a specific consequence scenario will result from the
failure
Effective risk assessmentrational, logical, structured processdetermine how big the - Section 12: determine the risk, including a sensitivity analysis, and review risk
risk, determine whether the risk is acceptable analysis results for consistency/reasonableness

5.2. Risk Management and Risk Reduction risk analysisdevelop inspection planif necessary other mitigation actionsevaluate
risk is known, magnitude of the risk is established risk management residual risk

Risk management: process to assess risks, determine risk reduction required, develop damage modegeneral metal losson-stream wall thickness
plan to maintain risks at an acceptable level measurementsrequirement shut down/repair on-streamFitness-For-Service
acceptance criteria
risk reduction: act of mitigating a known risk that is deemed to be too high to a lower,
more acceptable level of risk with some form of risk reduction activity
5.5. Inspection Optimization
risk reduction part of risk management risk determined inspection techniques, process monitoring effectiveness reducing risk
estimated or quantified adequate information available for planning, optimizing, and
5.3. The Evolution of Inspection Intervals/Due Dates implementing an RBI program
established inspection, testing programs, process monitoring to detect and evaluate
deterioration due to the effects of in-service operation

effectiveness of inspection programs varies widely

- reactive programs, concentrate on known areas of concern
- proactive programs, covering a variety of equipment
- dont fix it unless its broken or complete inspection of all equipment items on a
frequent basis

Setting the intervals/due dates time-based/calendar-based condition-based

inspection philosophy API 510, API 570, and API 653:
- inspection intervals/due dates based on some percentage of equipment life (such
as half life)
- on-stream inspection in lieu of internal inspection based on low deterioration rates
- internal inspection requirements for damage mechanisms related to process
environment induced cracking
- consequence based inspection intervals/due dates showing risk reduction expected when degree and frequency of inspection increased
y-axis no inspectionhigher level of risk
RBI represent next generation inspection approaches, interval/due date setting with initial investment inspection activities risk significantly reduced
ultimate goal is the safety and reliability of operating facilities
 additional inspection activitydiminishing return very little additional risk - have minimal safety, health, environmental, and/or economic impact
reductionpoint is reached
failures relatively frequently no significant adverse safety, environmental,
Excessive inspection invasive inspections may cause additional deterioration level of economic impacts
risk may go up failurespotentially serious consequencesprobability is low the risk may not warrant
immediate or extensive action
RBI program consistent methodologyoptimum combination of methods and riskhigh (unacceptable)mitigation action to reduce the probability and/or the
frequencies of inspection consequence of the event is appropriate
available inspection method estimate relative effectiveness reducing failure
probability cost each proceduredevelop optimization program Traditionallyfocused COF or POFno tying the two together
effective risk-based decision making considering COF & POF
The key to developingassess the risk associated equipmentdetermine most
appropriate inspection techniques for equipment risk acceptability criteria defined:
- not every failure lead to incident with serious
A conceptual result of this methodologylower curve in Figure 1indicates application consequence (e.g. water leaks)
effective RBI programlower risks achieved with the same level of inspection - serious consequence incidentslow probabilities (e.g.
activityRBI inspection activities focused higher risk items and away from lower risk rupture of a clean propane vessel)
items

risk cannot be reduced to zero solely by inspection efforts residual risk factors
strongly influenced by the PSM system
- human error
- natural disasters
- external events (e.g. collisions or falling objects)
- secondary effects from nearby units
- consequential effects from associated equipment in the same unit,deliberate acts
(e.g. sabotage)
- fundamental limitations of inspection methods,
- design errors
- unknown or unanticipated mechanisms of damage

5.6. Relative Risk vs Absolute Risk

Calculating absolute risk time and cost consuming many uncertaintiescan not high
inspection planfocuses attention on the areas of highest risk
degree accuracy
user defined acceptable risk levelplotted as an ISO-risk line
An ISO-risk constant risk level
determination absolute risknot even possible, not cost effective
acceptable risk line separate the unacceptable and acceptable risk
RBI focused systematic determination of relative risks
facilities, units, systems, equipment, or componentsrelative risk rank focus high risks
6.3. Types of RBI Assessment
choice of approachdependent on multiple variables:
quantitative rigorously and properlyfair approximation actual risk of loss of containment
- objective of the study,
due to deterioration
- number of facilities and equipment items to study,
- available resources,
evaluate risk acceptance sensitivity analysis qualitative and semi-quantitative
- assessment time frame,
assessments numeric relative risk values
- complexity of facilities and processes,
6. Introduction to Risk-Based Inspection - nature and quality of available data,
6.1. Key Elements of an RBI Program - the amount of risk discrimination needed
- management systems for maintaining documentation, personnel qualifications, data
requirements, consistency of the program and analysis updates
- documented method for POF determination;
- documented method for COF determination;
- documented methodology for managing risk through inspection, process control and
other mitigation activities
6.2. Consequence and Probability for RBI
objective RBIdetermine what incident could occur (consequence) in the event of an
equipment failure, and how likely (probability) it is that the incident could happen

possible consequences:
- form a vapor cloud that could ignite causing injury and equipment damage; RBI procedurequalitatively, quantitatively, semi-quantitatively
- release of a toxic chemical that could cause health problems; Each approach provides screen for risk, identify areas of potential concern, develop a
- result in a spill and cause environmental damage; prioritized listmore in depth inspection or analysis
- force a unit shutdown and have an adverse economic impact;
risk ranking evaluating separately the POF and the potential COFcombined estimate systems definition, hazard identification and consequence
risk of failure analysisintegrally linked

approach selected at the beginning or may be changed as the analysis progresses Hazard identification focuses identifiable failure mechanisms equipment
consistency is vital (inspectable causes)not explicitly deal with other potential failure (power
failures/human errors)
risk below the acceptance criteria specified by the management no further
analysis, inspection or mitigation within time frame if conditions and assumptions QRA deals with total risk
valid
Data that typically analyzed in QRA:
6.3.1. Qualitative Approach - existing HAZOP or PHA results,
enables completion risk assessment in the absence of detailed quantitative - dike and drainage design,
data. - hazard detection systems,
requires data inputsbasis :engineering judgment and experience - fire protection systems,
accuracy dependent background and expertise risk analysts and team - release statistics,
members - injury statistics,
- population distributions,
Inputs data ranges Results qualitative terms high, medium, low - topography,
(numerical values may associated with categories) - weather conditions,
- land use
less precise than quantitative approaches effective in screening out units
and equipment with low risk 6.3.3. Semi-quantitative Approach
has aspects derived from both the qualitative and
may used for any aspect of inspection plan development quantitative approaches
conservatism should be considered when making final mitigation and obtain the major benefits previous two approaches (e.g. speed of the
inspection plan decisions qualitative and rigor of the quantitative)
Typically, data used in a quantitative approach needed but in less detail
6.3.2. Quantitative Approach models not rigorous as for the quantitative
Distinguished qualitative approach: analysis depth and integration of
detailed assessments resultsconsequence and probability categories/risk numbers but numerical
Resultstypically presented as risk numbers values may be
QRA refers prescriptive methodology resulted from the application of
risk analysis techniques at many different types of facilities, including 6.3.4. Continuum of Approaches
hydrocarbon and chemical process facilities RBI approachesnot competing but complementary

QRA integrates uniform methodology relevant information facility design, high level qualitativeused at a unit levelselect the unit within a highest
operating practices, operating history, component reliability, human actions, risk for further analysis
the physical progression of accidents, and potential environmental and
health effects screened after qualitativequantitative for the higher risk

QRAlogic modelscombinations of events that result in severe qualitative consequence combined with a semi-quantitative probability
accidentsphysical models progression of accidents and the transport of a analysis
hazardous material to the environment
user cautioned about comparing specific results
Modelsevaluated probabilisticallyprovide both qualitative and unless the same or very similar RBI methodologies and assumptions were
quantitative insightslevel of riskidentify the applied
design, site, or operational characteristics that are the most important to risk
user cautioned against drawing conclusions about different results when
QRA logic models consist of event trees and fault trees different methodologies are used to evaluate the same piece of equipment
Event trees delineate initiating events and combinations of system
successes and failures
fault trees depict ways in which the system failures represented
in the event trees can occur

traditional QRA comprised of five tasks:

- systems identification,
- hazards identification,
- probability assessment,
- consequence analysis,
- risk results
 risk is dynamic RBI have the ability to be easily updated for changes:
- new data from inspection activities (i.e. changes in rates of deterioration are noted
in external, internal, or onstream inspections);
- changes in operation, operating variables or operation outside of the IOW;
- changes in the process fluids, however small

6.6. Management of Risks

6.6.1. Risk Management Through Inspection
Inspection influencesuncertainty of the riskimproving knowledge deterioration state
and predictability of the POF

Inspectionnot reduce risk directlyrisk management activity (provider of new

information) that may lead to risk reduction

inspection precipitates risk mitigation activitieschange the POF

POF due to such deterioration is a function of four factors

6.4. Precision vs Accuracy - deterioration type and mechanism,
Accuracyfunction of the analysis methodology, the quality of the data and consistency - rate of deterioration,
of application - probability of identifying and detecting deterioration and predicting future
deterioration states with inspection
Precision function of the selected metrics and computational methods technique(s),
- tolerance of the equipment to the type of deterioration
Riskprecise numeric value (as in a quantitative analysis) implies a greater level of
accuracy when compared to a risk matrix (as in a qualitative analysis) 6.6.2. Using RBI to Establish Inspection Plans and Priorities
inspection plandetail the unmitigated riskcurrent operation related
precision and accuracy may not existelement of uncertainty unacceptable risk mitigation actionsreduce unmitigated riskacceptable level

level of confidence inspection data and the technique should be considered cost-effective inspectionplans describe the type, scope and timing of
inspection/examination recommended
many extraneous factors will affect estimate of damage rate (probability) and the
magnitude of a failure (consequence) that cannot be fully taken into account with a fixed level of the unmitigated riskevaluate the urgencyinspection
model
6.6.3. Evaluation and Fitness-For-Service Analysis
Quantitativelogic modelscalculate POF COFcharacterize materials damage of key parts RBI process Evaluate inspection, examination results , conducting
equipment and determine the COFsignificant variabilityerror and FFS
inaccuracyimpacting the quality of the risk assessmentlogic models are validated by
expert judgment inspection process reduction in uncertaintybetter quantify calculated risk
without inspection result evaluation and
accuracy depends sound methodology, quality data, and knowledgeable personnel FFS after the inspection may not be accomplished effective risk reduction

6.5. Understanding How RBI Can Help to Manage Operating Risks FFS knowledge and expertise inspector
mechanical integrity and functional performance of equipment operate safely and and engineers involved when deterioration is within known acceptable limits /
reliablynormal and abnormal (upset) operating conditions engineering analysis API 579-1/ASME FFS-1

susceptibility current and projected operating condition: 6.6.4. Other Risk Management
- normal operation inspection may not be sufficient manage risks acceptable levels:
- upset conditions, - equipment nearing retirement;
- normal start-up and shutdown, - failure mechanisms (such as brittle fracture, fatigue) where avoidance of
- idle or out-of-service time, failure primarily depends on design and operating within a defined
- emergency shutdown and subsequent start-up pressure/temperature envelope;
- consequence-dominated risks
Process variables
- process fluid, contaminants and aggressive components; non-inspection mitigation actions equipment repair, replacement or upgrade,
- pressures, including cyclic and transient conditions; equipment redesign or maintenance of strict controls on operating
- temperatures, including cyclic and transient conditions; conditionsmay only appropriate reduce risk to acceptable levels (section 14)
- flow rates;
- desired unit run length between scheduled shutdowns (turnarounds) 6.7. Relationship Between RBI and Other Risk-Based and Safety Initiatives
6.7.1. General
current condition established IOW POFCOFriskmitigation, inspection, other risk-based and safety initiatives:
metallurgy change or change in operating conditions - OSHA PSM programs
 - EPA risk management programs - What are their roles in the RBI process?
- ACC responsible care - Who is responsible and accountable for what actions?
- ASME risk assessment publications - Which facilities, assets, and components will be included?
- CCPS risk assessment techniques - What data is to be used in the assessment?
- RCM - What codes and standards are applicable?
- PHA - When the assessment will be completed?
- safeguarding analysis - How long the assessment will remain in effect and when it will be updated?
- SIL - How the results will be used?
- LOPA - What is the plan period?
6.7.2. PHA
identify and analyze hazards in a process unit development of the RBI program should have been completed:
Hazards potential equipment failure due to in-service degradation - establish the objectives of the risk analysis,
RBI can include a review of the output from any PHA - identify the physical boundaries,
- identify the operating boundaries,
Hazardincrease the POF - develop screening questions and criteria consistent with the objectives of the
Potential hazardsPHA affect the POF analysis and identified physical and operating boundaries
Events/ process design or instrumentation deficiencies hazard process upset
Next step: identifying required data and information for collection
Hazardeffect COF potential failure of an isolation valve increase the
inventory of material available for release in the event of a leak 7.2. Establishing Objectives and Goals of an RBI Assessment
7.2.1. General
6.7.3. PSM RBI assessmentclear objectives and goalsfully understood by all members
effective PSM significantly reduce risk levels OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 and 7.2.2. Understand Risks
API 750 understand the risks involved in the operation of a plant
understand the effects that inspection, maintenance and mitigation actions have
RBI focus inspection plan strengthened PSM program on the risks
7.2.3. Define Risk Criteria
6.7.4. Equipment Reliability RBI team and managementjudge individual equipment item and cumulative
provide inputprobability analysis RBI risks are acceptable
reliability recordsdevelop equipment failure probabilities and leak frequencies
leaks secondary failures (loss of utilities) if users company risk criteria do not exist.-->judge acceptability of risk could be
RCM linked with RBI reduce downtime an objective of the RBI assessment
RCM reliability equipment other than
pressure equipment and pressure equipment that do not pertain to loss 7.2.4. Management of Risks
of containment (e.g. tray damage and valve reliability) risks identifiedreducing risk to acceptable levelinspection actions and/or other
mitigation that have a positive effect
6.8. Relationship with Jurisdictional Requirements
Codes and legal requirementsvary from one jurisdiction to another significantly different from the inspection actions undertaken during a statutory or
certification type inspection program
specific actions type of inspections and inspection intervals
jurisdictions prescriptive time-based inspection intervals do not preclude gaining results of managing and reducing risk improved safety, avoided losses of
significant benefits as long as jurisdictional requirements are met and as long as the containment, and avoided commercial losses
local regulations do not specifically prohibit the use of RBI planning
7.2.5. Reduce Costs
permit API inspection codes and standards RBI should be an acceptable method for RBI assessment Reducing inspection costs side effect
establishing inspection plans and setting inspection due dates of optimization

benefits from the application of RBI: cost reduction benefits:

- provide evidence of sound risk management and integrity monitoring programs that - ineffective, unnecessary or inappropriate inspection activities may be
can be used as a basis for advocating adoption of RBI by jurisdictions eliminated;
- provide evidence of fulfilling requirements of meeting specific industry standards as - inspection of low-risk items may be eliminated or reduced
well as other types of asset integrity programs - on-line or noninvasive inspection methods may be substituted for invasive
- provide a basis for reducing risk further than what may be achieved through time- methods that require equipment shutdown;
based inspection rules. - more effective infrequent inspections may be substituted for less effective
frequent inspections
7. Planning the RBI Assessment
7.1. Getting Started 7.2.6. Meet Safety and Environmental Management Requirements
important to answer the following questions: RBI assessment implementing effective inspection program meets
- Why the assessment is being done? performance-based safety and environmental requirements
- How the RBI assessment will be carried out?
- What knowledge and skills are required for the assessment? RBI focuses effortsgreatest risks
- Who is on the RBI team?
 RBIsystematic method to guide a userselection equipment to be inspected - reduce or limit available inventories to reduce COF;
frequency, scope, and extent of inspection activities meet performance - upgrade safety, detection or loss limiting systems;
objectives. - change process fluids to less flammable or toxic fluids;
- change component design to reduce POF;
7.2.7. Identify Mitigation Alternatives - process control and adherence to IOWs
- modification of the process to eliminate conditions driving the risk
- modification of operating procedures to avoid situations driving the risk data of RBI assessment determining the optimum economic strategy to reduce
- chemical treatment of the process to reduce deterioration risk different at different times in a plants life cycle
rates/susceptibilities
- change metallurgy of components to reduce POF 7.2.8. New Project Risk Assessment
- removal of unnecessary insulation to reduce probability of corrosion under
insulation