SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 162890

AND LEONORA TALARO, as
represented by MAXIMINO Present:
DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners, PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus - TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ, as

represented by BENEDICTO U. Promulgated:
CRUZ, [1]
Respondents. November 22, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69671, reversing the decision of the Department
of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 6297,
and ordering the dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in Reg.
Case No. 5853 NNE96 for lack of jurisdiction.

The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate located

in Barangay Casulucan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants and
landless farmers, conformably with Commonwealth Act No. 539, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1400. The property was under the administration of the Land
Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian
dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot No. 778
with an area of 3.362 hectares.[3]

Sometime in September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold Lot No. 778 to
Julian dela Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell. On September 27, 1960, the
DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor as the
qualified allocatee of the landholding.[4] Julian bound and obliged himself to pay
the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the
property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He
died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10
children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.[5]

For a time, Mario administered the landholding. Too old and sickly to
cultivate the property by herself, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document
in May 1980 in which she declared that, with the consent of her children, she had
sold the land in favor of Alberto Cruz, who henceforth had

the right to possess and cultivate the property, and the obligation to continue the
payment of the amortizations due over the land under the terms of the Agreement
to Sell. Mario dela Cruz conformed to the deed.[6]

Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10

years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an
application to purchase the property with the DAR. On August 8, 1990, Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Paterno Revollido prepared and signed an
Investigation Report, recommending that the landholding be declared vacant and
disposable to a qualified applicant. Declaring that there was no adverse claimant,
the said report also recommended the approval of Albertos application to purchase
the property.[7] Appended to the report was the deed executed by Leonora in favor
of Alberto.

On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)

issued an Order[8] approving the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the
cancellation of Julians CLT and declared that whatever rights Julian had over the
landholding and payments made in favor of the government under the Agreement
to Sell were forfeited. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued:

1. Canceling the Order of Award-CLT No. AS No. 5323 issued on

9-27-60, subject hereof, forfeiture whatever rights and
payments made on the account of the lot in favor of the
government, declaring Lot No. 778 pt Block No. xx Pls-Psd-
Pcs N. 56903 of De Leon Estate, located at Casulucan,
Talavera, N.E. vacant and disposable to the qualified
applicant; and

2. Giving due course to the application of Mr. Alberto L. Cruz to

purchase the said lot.

Let a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), as the case may be,
be issued to the herein new awardee-applicant after fifteen (15) days posting of
this Order, if no protest has been filed by affected parties.

SO ORDERED.[9]

It appears on the dorsal portion of the order that only Julian (although
already deceased by then) was given a copy of the order by registered mail.[10]
 The PARO endorsed the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to
the DAR Secretary, copy furnished the Regional Director. The DAR Bureau of
Land Acquisition and Distribution reviewed and evaluated the records and
recommended that the PAROs recommendation be affirmed.

On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750
over the property in favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with
the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0-3035 over the landholding
in favor of Alberto Cruz.[11] The title contained
an annotation prohibiting the beneficiary from selling or transferring the
landholding within a period of 10 years from issuance, except to the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP).

Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian,

discovered that the landholding had already been registered in the name of Alberto
Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, with the assistance of the
DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance, filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order of
the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of
Alberto Cruz. The petitioners declared, inter alia, that they were the surviving
heirs of Julian dela Cruz; they had no knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario
of their right as beneficiaries of the property; not being privies to the said sale, they
were not bound by the private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as well as
the issuance of the CLOA and the title over the property in favor of Alberto, was
null and void, inasmuch as they violated agrarian reform laws and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980. They insisted that they were
deprived of their rights as heirs of the beneficiary without due process of law.[12]

In his comment on the petition, Alberto Cruz alleged that he acquired the rights
over the landholding from Leonora for P51,000.00 and had taken possession of the
subject property. He further averred that he collected his
share in the produce of the land with the consent of Leonora and her children. He
had been paying the amortizations for the property to the government and in fact
had already paid the purchase price of the property to the LBP in full.[13]

Meantime, on November 14, 1996, Alberto Cruz paid P8,054.07 to the DAR for
the property and for which he was issued a receipt. [14] The PARO directed the
Register of Deeds to cancel the annotation at the dorsal portion of the title covering
the property.[15]

After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a

Decision[16] dated July 9, 1997. It declared that the petitioners were the rightful
allocatees of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No. 51750 and
TCT No. CLOA -0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was
ordered to vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in
favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

1. Declaring the petitioners to be the rightful allocatees of the

subject land;

2. Ordering the respondent or anyone acting in his behalf to

peacefully relinquish the possession of the land in question
unto the herein petitioners;
 3. Ordering the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and/or the PARO
of North Nueva Ecija to cancel TCT No. CLOA-0-3035,
(DAR CLOA No. 51750) previously

issued to respondent Alberto Cruz and, in lieu thereof, to

generate a new one in the name of herein petitioners, the heirs
of Julian dela Cruz;

4. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the

above-mentioned CLOA and to register the new one to be
generated in its stead.[17]

Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of
the PARAD on June 19, 2000. The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners
as farmers-beneficiaries could not be transferred or waived except through
hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with agrarian reform laws
and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her children by
Julian, who were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that in executing the
private document, Leonora failed to comply with DAR Memorandum Circular No.
8, Series of 1980.[18]

The DARAB further declared that, even if the private document may be
considered a waiver of Leonoras tenancy rights over the landholding, nevertheless,
the CLOA and the title may still be canceled as such waiver is null and void.
Citing Torres v. Ventura,[19] it held that the pari delicto doctrine is not applicable.
The DARAB ruled that under DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994,
such sale, the CLOA and the Torrens title issued over the landholding in favor of
Alberto may be cancelled by it.[20] Alberto filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision which the DARAB denied on February 11, 2002.[21]
 Alberto then filed a petition for review in the CA, where he raised the
following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLOA AWARDED TO ALBERTO CRUZ MAY BE
CANCELLED; and

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID LOT MAY STILL BE AWARDED TO
HEREIN PETITIONERS.

He alleged that the Dela Cruz heirs filed their petition with the PARAD only on
October 17, 1996, long after the lapse of 16 years after Leonora executed the
private document and conveyed the property to him on June 1, 1980. Conformably
with Section 38 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, their petition with the PARAD
had already prescribed. He also alleged that the said heirs should have filed an
action for recovery of possession of the property within 10 years from 1980,
conformably with Article 1134 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, their action in
the PARAD was barred by estoppel because they failed to oppose the November
16, 1990 Order of the PARO, the issuance of the CLOA and the transfer of title in
his favor. The petitioner maintained that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the
respondents petition because the implementation of agrarian reform laws and rules
and regulations was administrative in nature. He argued that the respondents
should have sought relief from the DAR instead
of filing their petition with the DARAB. The petitioner posits that the landholding
subject matter of the petition is a landed estate acquired by the government under
R.A. No. 1400; hence, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, which prohibits the sale
of tenancy rights over the landholding, does not apply. Moreover, the ruling
in Torres v. Ventura does not apply because the facts therein are different from
those obtaining in the present case.

In their Comment on the petition, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz maintained that
Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844 and Section 1134 of R.A. No. 386 have no application
in the case, considering that the issue is not one of tenancy because they had never
entered into such a relationship with Alberto. They averred that they were not
barred from filing their petition, either by laches or by prescription, because they
discovered the private document their mother executed only in 1995. They claimed
that they filed their petition with the PARAD instead of filing an administrative
complaint with the Office of the DAR Secretary because time was of the essence
and further delay in the resolution of the case would only cause great and
irreparable injury to them. Besides, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz averred, the
MARO and the PARO violated DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990,
and deprived them of their right as beneficiaries over the property without due
process of law. They maintained that under Rule 2, paragraph (f) of the DARAB
New Rules and Procedures, the DARAB had jurisdiction over actions involving
the issuance, correction or cancellation of the CLOA and Emancipation Patents
registered with the LRA. They insisted that the ruling of this Court in Torres v.
Ventura is decisive of the issues in the case.
In a Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered
the dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack
of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there was no tenancy relationship between
respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over
the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful
ownership over the landholding.
 The said heirs moved for the reconsideration of the decision contending that
the jurisdiction of the DARAB is not confined solely to agrarian disputes, but
includes the cancellation of CLOAs registered with the LRA in favor of persons
who are qualified beneficiaries under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657. The Heirs of
Julian dela Cruz reiterated the claim that the MARO and PARO violated their right
to due process and the pertinent agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations.
Further, they asserted that respondent Alberto was estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the DARAB because he never raised the same in the PARAD and
the DARAB. However, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion in its
Resolution[22] dated March 18, 2004.

In the instant petition for review, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz, as
petitioners, maintain that under Rule VI, Section 1(f) of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over matters
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs registered with the
LRA even if there is no tenancy relationship between the
parties. The petitioners point out that the issues before the DARAB do not only
involve the ownership of the landholding, but also whether the PARO violated
their substantive and procedural right to due process, as well as agrarian reform
laws, rules and regulations in issuing the November 16, 1990 Order, and whether
they are the rightful allocatees of the landholding under the ruling of this Court
in Torres v. Ventura.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioners
petition in the DARAB was one for recovery of ownership over the landholding,
which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
 The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial

officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the
relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action
is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of
the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or
subject matter of the action.[23] Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any
act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from
addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent
on the face of the complaint or petition.[24]

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the

defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion
to dismiss.[25]Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status
or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is
the subject of the controversy.[26] If the issues between the parties are intertwined
with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB,
such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.[27] The proceedings
before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and
void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.[28]
The ruling of the appellate court that the ownership over the landholding was the
threshold issue before the DARAB is not correct. The petitioners did not claim
ownership over the landholding. When Julian dela Cruz died in 1979, he had not
yet paid in full the amortizations for the property. The DAR issued only a CLT in
his favor on September 27, 1960. Unless and until the amortization for the
landholding is fully paid, the DAR will not issue a CLOA in the name of the
beneficiary. It is only upon the issuance of the CLOA that a beneficiary becomes
the owner of the property.[29]

The decisive issues raised by the petitioners and Alberto in their pleadings
before the DARAB related to the following: whether petitioner Maximino dela
Cruz and his siblings are bound by the deed of transfer/sale of the tenancy rights
executed by their mother in favor of Alberto; and whether the August 8, 1990
report of the MARO and the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO violated R.A.
No. 1400, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent DAR Orders,
memoranda and circulars, including the substantive and procedural rights of the
petitioners.[30]

However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between the
petitioners and the respondents over the validity of the November 16, 1990 Order
of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 and the cancellation
thereof is not agrarian in nature. Under Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229, the
DAR is vested with quasi-judicial power and exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as other matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform laws, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture.
The President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume
the power and functions pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases,
which may be delegated to the regional offices of the DAR in accordance with
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the DARAB.

Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or,
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental,[31] this Court held that there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It
is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties
to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6)
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court held that the jurisdiction
of the DAR is limited to the following:
a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and

 c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.[33]

The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that

there was no landlord-tenancy relationship between them and Alberto over the
landholding. Nor did they have any tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations
whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her son Mario executed the deed of sale
in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed their petition with
the DARAB. The sole tenant-beneficiary over the landholding was Julian dela
Cruz. There is no showing that before the execution of the deed of transfer/sale,
Alberto was a tenant or farmer, or that he was landless.

The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the
LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate
to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been
issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of
agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural
tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.

In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the
name of Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and in the
implementation of the agrarian reform laws. The approval was based on the Report
of the MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO and the
recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution, over whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control. The DAR
Secretary also had the authority to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the
same is contrary to law and DAR orders, circulars and memoranda. The resolution
of such issues by the DAR Secretary will entail the application and implementation
of agrarian reform laws, inclusive of P.D. No. 946 as well as the implementing
orders, circulars and rules and regulations issued by the DAR. On the issue of who
may be or shall be declared as the owner-cultivator of the landholding, P.D. No. 27
and other agrarian reform laws, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
1978 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 14, Series of 1988, and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980 will apply. On the issue of whether or
not the petitioners sold their tenancy rights over the landholding and barred them
from asserting their rights, either by pari delicto, prescription or laches, the DAR
Secretary will apply P.D. No. 27 and the rulings of this Court in Torres v.
Ventura[34] and Corpus v. Grospe,[35] reiterated in Siacor v. Gigantana.[36] On the
issue of whether the petitioners were denied of their right to substantive and
procedural due process, the DAR Secretary will take into account, inter alia,
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990.

As the Court ruled in Nuesa v. Court of Appeals:[37]

P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative

implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27
and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations,
shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including:
xxx (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases
outside the purview of P.D. No. 816.

The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of

Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of
the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators
acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the
case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding
the case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his
case.

As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, the DAR is vested with the
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A.
3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.

In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial,

leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this
controversy between them within the ambit of the above-cited provision.
Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should
not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first place.

Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs the

distribution and titling of lots in landed estates administered by the DAR. This
Order explicitly provides that since land has a social function, there is a
concomitant social responsibility in its ownership and should, therefore, be
distributed to the actual occupant/tillers thereof. In the investigation on December
27, 1993, conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it was established that the
subject lots were in the possession and cultivation of persons other than the
awardee Verdillo. Clearly, this constituted a violation of the terms of the Order of
Award issued in favor of private respondent as an awardee, aside from
contravening the underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social justice
measure. Given these circumstances, we find petitioner Restituto Riveras plea to
overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals meritorious.

While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which

have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters
are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken
that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional
boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent
DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and
private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of
the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARABs
 unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess
of its jurisdiction.

It bears stressing that in Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it is

made clear that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
R.A. No. 6657,[38] and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules, shall be the
exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Indeed, under P.D.
No. 27 and other agrarian reform laws (including R.A. No. 6657), the DAR
Secretary is vested with the administrative authority to issue and correct or recall
the CLT issued under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Secretary is vested
with authority to approve and execute CLOAs on which are based the TCT to be
issued by the Register of Deeds. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over the orders,
resolutions, or other administrative circulars of the DAR Secretary in the exercise
of its administrative powers.

In fine then, the petitioners should have filed their petition against Alberto
Cruz with the DAR Secretary instead of the DARAB. For its part, the DARAB
should have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction; or, at the very least,
transferred the petition to the DAR Secretary for resolution on its merits. In case
the DAR Secretary denies their petition, the petitioners may appeal to the Office of
the President, and in case of an adverse ruling, a petition for review with the CA
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The

Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
69671 WITH MODIFICATION. The dismissal of DARAB Reg. Case No. 5853
NNE96 for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice to its re-filing in accordance
with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000, within thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

C E R T I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

*
On leave.
[1]
The heirs are Rosalina, Benjamin, Angelito, Ludivina, Rolando, Sevilla, Jose Ariel, Susana, Celso, Venus Wilson,
and Lucila, all surnamed Cruz.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Noel G.
Tijam, concurring; Rollo, pp. 30-35.
[3]
CA Rollo, p. 37.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Id. at 42.
[6]
Exhibit E, CA Rollo, p. 36.
[7]
Exhibit G, Id. at 38.
[8]
Exhibit F, Id. at 37.
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 37. (Dorsal portion).
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Id. at 35.
[12]
CA Rollo, pp. 42-46.
[13]
CA Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[14]
Exhibit I.
[15]
Exhibit J.
[16]
Exhibit L, CA Rollo, pp. 42-46.
[17]
CA Rollo, p. 46.
[18]
Id. at 26-27.
[19]
G.R. No. 86044, 2 July 1990, 187 SCRA 96.
[20]
CA Rollo, p. 27.
[21]
Id. at 31-32.
[22]
Rollo, p. 37.
[23]
Actuel v. Valdez, G.R. No. 139561, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 517.
[24]
Atuel v. Valdez, supra.
[25]
Arzaga v. Copias, G.R. No. 152404, 28 March 2003, 400 SCRA 148.
[26]
Vesagas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142924, 5 December 2001, 371 SCRA 508.
[27]
Monsanto v. Zerna, G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001, 371 SCRA 664.
[28]
Estoestas, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 203.
[29]
Section 24, Republic Act No. 6657.
[30]
MAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978, MAR Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990.
[31]
G.R. No. 123417, 10 June 1999, 308 SCRA 167.
[32]
G.R. No. UDK-9864, 3 December 1990, 191 SCRA 885.
[33]
Id. at 889.
[34]
G.R. No. 86044, 2 July 1990, 187 SCRA 96.
[35]
G.R. No. 135297, 13 June 2000, 333 SCRA 425.
[36]
G.R. No. 147877, 5 April 2002, 380 SCRA 306.
[37]
G.R. No. 132048, 6 March 2002, 378 SCRA 351.
[38]
Otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Refo