Pci Audit Checklist
Pci Audit Checklist
Pci Audit Checklist
Payment Card
Industry (PCI)
Practical guidance
on how to prepare for
successful audits
Sponsored by:
www.ITCinstitute.com
IT AUDIT CHECKLIS T SERIES
Payment Card Industry (PCI)
About the IT Compliance Institute
The IT Compliance Institute (ITCi) strives to be a Table of Contents
global authority on the role of technology in business
2 Executive Overview
governance and regulatory compliance. Through
comprehensive education, research, and analysis 3 Introduction to PCI
related to emerging government statutes and affected 4 What Are the Benefits of PCI Compliance?
business and technology practices, we help organizations 5 The Auditor’s Perspective on PCI
overcome the challenges posed by today’s regulatory 5 Why Audit?
environment and find new ways to turn compliance 6 Who Is Responsible for PCI?
efforts into capital opportunities.
9 Management’s Role in the Audit Process
10 What Auditors Want To See
ITCi’s primary goal is to be a useful and trusted resource
11 Auditors Like…
for IT professionals seeking to help businesses meet
privacy, security, financial accountability, and other 11 Auditors Don’t Like…
regulatory requirements. Targeted at CIOs, CTOs, 11 How Companies (Inadvertently or
compliance managers, and information technology Intentionally) Help or Hinder Auditors
professionals, ITCi focuses on regional- and vertical- 12 Who Should Talk to the Auditors?
specific information that promotes awareness and 13 PCI Audit Checklist
propagates best practices within the IT community. 14 Theme 1: Building and Maintaining
a Secure Network Audit Testing
For more information, please visit: www.itcinstitute.com 15 Theme 2: Protecting Cardholder Data
19 Theme 3: Maintaining a Vulnerability
Comments and suggestions to improve the IT Audit Management Program
Checklists are always encouraged. Please send your 20 Theme 4: Implementing Strong Access
recommendations to editor@itcinstitute.com. Control Measures
21 Theme 5: Regularly Monitoring and
Testing Networks
All design elements, front matter, and content are copyright © 2007 IT Compliance
22 Theme 6: Maintaining an Information
Institute, a division of 1105 Media, Inc., unless otherwise noted. All rights are Security Policy
reserved for all copyright holders.
23 Audit Reporting
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, 24 Preparing for an Audit
recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under § 107 or 108 of the
1976 United States Copyright Act, without the prior written permission of the 25 Communicating with Auditors
copyright holder.
www.ITCinstitute.com 1
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Executive Overview
www.ITCinstitute.com 2
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Introduction to PCI
“PCI” generically refers to a set of information security • Point of sales (POS) software used in physical retail loca-
requirements issued by the Payment Card Industry Security tions must not store full magnetic-stripe (magstrip) data
Standards Council (SSC). It is the payment card industry’s
• E-commerce and call-center functions must not retain
effort at self regulation.
CVV2 data 5
More specifically, PCI is a joint effort by payment card • Personal account numbers (PANs) must be encrypted
brands—including Visa International, MasterCard while at rest and masked while being displayed, under
Worldwide, American Express, Discover Financial Services, most circumstances, if the merchant or acquirer
and JCB to force merchants¹, service providers, and acquir- chooses to store full PANs
ers² to reduce the risk of payment card fraud by protecting
the global information infrastructure that “stores, processes, Of course, there is quite a bit of devil in the details of PCI
or transmits cardholder data.”3 Within the context of PCI, requirements. The PCI DSS Security Audit Procedures (SAP)
these governing companies are referred to as the “brands.” document6 contains more than 230 detailed testing require-
ments. But, while these audit procedures and even the
For many companies, the processes surrounding PCI appear security standard itself might seem dense (or even cryptic),
at once well ordered and chaotic. This is fitting, considering merchants should remember they are not alone in either the
that it was the rise of payment card systems that gave birth responsibility or accountability for PCI compliance. The mer-
to the term chaordic. The word, coined by Visa founder Dee chant mantra should be, “Ask your acquirer.” You will hear
Hock, describes systems that are both chaotic and ordered; this phrase again and again, and it does bear repeating.
where, among other things, “competition and coopera-
1
tion…have to be seamlessly blended.”4 Throughout this paper, the term merchants is often generically used to denote
both merchants and service providers subject to PCI compliance. The two types of
companies share most control requirements. Where control objectives differ, these
It is exactly this blending of stakeholder interests, both variances are specified by the PCI DSS and PCI DSS Security Audit Procedures,
attached to this document.
competitive and common, that accounts for many of the
subtleties and peculiarities of PCI. Notably, from a report- ² An acquirer is a “Bankcard association member that initiates and maintains relation-
ships with merchants that accept payment cards,” according to the PCI SSC, an
ing and enforcement standpoint, much of what appears independent group founded by American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB,
to be “passing the buck” in regard to accountability and MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa International to develop, manage, and support PCI.
From the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Glossary, Abbreviations
authority is actually influenced by industry structure and and Acronyms, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/glossary.htm.
the contractual relationships along the payment-systems
3
Visa USA. What to Do if Compromised: Fraud Investigations and Incident
value chain. Management Procedures. (2006) http://www.usa.visa.com/download/merchants/
cisp_what_to_do_if_compromised.pdf
The good news—for the IT professional attempting to 4
Hock, Dee. Birth of the Chaordic Age. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers,
prepare an organization to pass its PCI audit—is that the 1999.
compliance process doesn’t have to be insurmountably con- 5
The CVV2 or Card Validation Value is a three- or four-digit number intended to be a
fusing. For all the corporate confusion and press hype, the security control for credit card transactions processed via telephone or the Internet.
essence of PCI compliance is largely good, old-fashioned IT On most cards, the CVV2 is a three-digit number printed on the signature line on
the back of cards. American Express prints CVV2s above account numbers on the
hygiene and security best practices. Beyond this, PCI speci- front of cards.
fies three special control objectives that are unique to the 6
PCI Security Standards Council. PCI DSS Security Audit Procedures. Delaware: PCI
payment card industry: Security Standards Council, 2006. Available at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.
org/tech/supporting_documents.htm
www.ITCinstitute.com 3
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 4
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Why Audit?
As a robust standard for information security, PCI also PCI is chiefly a preventative standard, intended to reduce
offers the risk management benefits of any effective data the risk of payment card-related fraud and information
protection program. All companies possess information theft. As such, its main benefit can be seen as the reduc-
that is critical or sensitive, ranging from personal data to tion of real liabilities related to information breaches.
financial and product information and customer, brand, PCI audits provide a level of assurance—and for larger
and intellectual property information. An information organizations, external validation—that information
security management program is necessary because security controls exist and are effective.
threats to the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of
the organization’s information are great and, apparently, But, while a PCI audit varies little in purpose from most
ever increasing. other information security audits, its rationale, scope,
participants, and liabilities differ profoundly from those
The benefits of an effective PCI data security indicated by other laws and standards. Unlike Sarbanes-
program include: Oxley and most other regulations, PCI is an industry
standard subject to contractual, not public, enforcement.
1. The ability to systematically and proactively protect Failure to comply does not result in breach of law, but
the company from the liabilities and potential costs breach of contract—and customer trust.
of credit card data misuse, customer identity theft,
and cybercrime The payment card brands can fine only acquirers. They
cannot directly fine merchants, software vendors, or
2. Management and control of costs related to (most) service providers. Thus, if a merchant violates PCI
information security rules and incurs a data security breach, the acquirer is
initially liable to the brands for any resulting fines. This
3. Greater organizational credibility with the payment gives acquirers very strong financial motivation for ensur-
card brands, acquirers, staff, and partner organizations ing merchant compliance with the security standard.
4. Higher customer confidence in the merchant’s Of course, merchants are not immune to penalty.
business systems and practices Acquirers invariably include a clause in merchant
contracts that enables them to recoup fines caused by
5. The ability to make informed, practical decisions about merchant noncompliance. Typically, the acquirer has the
security technologies and solutions and thus increase ability to unilaterally withdraw funds from the “reserve”
the return on information security investments they can maintain on a merchant’s Demand Deposit
Account (DDA). In addition, the merchant risk associated
6. Better compliance with other regulatory require- with payment card acceptance is substantially higher than
ments for security and privacy, such as HIPAA and that of the acquirer. Many merchants, including those with
state and international privacy acts physical storefronts, live and die by their ability to accept
credit cards. Even a brief ban on credit card processing
can have catastrophic consequences for a merchant.
www.ITCinstitute.com 5
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Who Is Responsible for PCI? While the first Level 3 merchant deadlines passed
The PCI audit responsibility is distributed between mer- on June 30, 2005, Level 2 merchants have until
chants, Qualified Security Assessors (QSAs), Approved September 30, 2007, to meet their requirements.
Scanning Vendors (ASVs), and acquirers. The responsi-
bilities of each party vary by merchant level, as described Level 4 includes merchants that process fewer than
below. PCI divides the merchant universe into four levels. 20,000 e-commerce transactions per year, and all
Audit responsibilities vary by level, which is determined other merchants that process up to 1 million total
by acquirers based on the volume of transactions pro- transactions per year. Requirements for Level 4 mer-
cessed, the potential risk incumbent in the transactions, chants are nominally similar to those for Level 2 and
and the degree of exposure introduced into the payment 3 (including a quarterly network scan by an Approved
system. Merchant levels and requirements, as defined by Scanning Vendor); however, validation requirements
the brands July 18, 2006, are: and deadlines are defined by each merchant’s
acquirer, as opposed to the SSC or brands.
Level 1 merchants that process more than 6,000,000
total transactions per year, any merchant that has Irrespective of merchant level, internal information secu-
suffered a hack or attack that resulted in an account rity assurance requires a strong managerial commitment.
data compromise, and any merchant discretionarily The board of directors (if one exists), management (of IT,
determined by any payment card brand to meet the information security, PCI compliance, staff, and business
Level 1 merchant requirements. Level 1 merchants lines), and internal auditors all have significant roles in
are subject to annual onsite assessments by auditors PCI assurance and the auditing of PCI controls. The big
and must perform quarterly network scans. Audits question for many companies is how these stakeholders
may be performed by a qualified external auditor or should work together to ensure that everything that
conducted by the internal audit department and cer- should be done to protect sensitive information is being
tified by a corporate officer. Network scans must be done—and that cardholder data is protected appropriately.
validated by an Approved Scanning Vendor certified
by the PCI Security Standards Council (SSC).9 1. The board of directors must provide oversight at a
level above other business managers. The directors’
Level 2 merchants that process between 1,000,000 role in PCI is to ask managers the right questions
and 6,000,000 total transactions per year. Level and encourage the right results. Directors must set
2 merchants must complete an annual PCI appropriate tone at the top, communicating to execu-
Self-Assessment Questionnaire, available from tive management the business imperative of effective
the SSC, and perform a quarterly network scan. PCI management. The board also has a role in estab-
Questionnaires do not need to be executive certified lishing and overseeing PCI policy and defining the
or validated by an external auditor. Network scans corporate PCI culture—which includes PCI assurance
must be validated by an Approved Scanning Vendor and ethics attitudes.
certified by the SSC.
2. Executive management must provide leadership to
Level 3 includes merchants that process between ensure that PCI efforts are supported and understood
20,000 and 1 million e-commerce transactions per across the organization, demonstrating by example
year. Requirements for Levels 2 and 3 are the same; the mandate of PCI policies. Executive management
however, the initial compliance deadlines differ. must also dedicate sufficient resources to allow con-
trols to be effective.
9
PCI Security Standards Council (SSC), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
www.ITCinstitute.com 6
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
3. Staff and line-of-business managers are stakeholders the control process and should be part of the control
in PCI programs and should understand their respon- design and review process. In many cases, the desire
sibilities in regard to compliance, as well as how any to implement compensating controls is driven as
changes in network access and system functionality much by business needs as by technical feasibility.
will affect business processes. Managers are account-
able for the effectiveness of their own business pro- 4. Internal auditors in Level 1 merchants, by mandate,
cesses, which often rely on data resources that might and other merchants at their discretion provide
incur PCI-related changes. strategic, operational, and tactical support for PCI
compliance. For example, internal auditing:
Setting a proper “in-scope environment” for your audit
can be the most important decision a merchant makes. • Reports to the board and management as to whether
Start by creating a diagram of how payment card key information assets and systems are sufficiently
data enters your enterprise, protected, whether business
which systems it touches and units are adhering to policies,
where the data flows to within Setting a proper “in-scope whether programs are in place for
your organization. Make an environment” for your audit continually updating and strength-
effort to think of the less- ening safeguards against network
than-obvious consumers of can be the most important assaults, and whether existing
this information within your decision a merchant makes. security policies are reasonable.
organization. Hidden caches In brief, internal audits assess the
of card numbers in business Start by creating a diagram state of the information control
systems can be a hard-learned of how payment card data environment and recommend
lesson, and the biggest reposi- improvements.
tories of account numbers enters your enterprise,
• Independently validates that
are often found in databases which systems it touches, the organization’s PCI efforts
maintained by the marketing
department. and where the data flows are proactive and effective
against current and emerging
to within your organization. threats. To provide this level of
Under a separate aspect of
assurance, internal auditors
management, information
may compare current orga-
security managers should organize and implement
nizational practices with industry practices and
the organization’s technical information security
regulatory guidelines.
program, including its monitoring (testing) program.
To fulfill an audit’s potential, internal auditors need
IT management must regularly review and monitor to: 1) know what they are doing (have the skills to
PCI controls to ensure they are appropriate, despite perform appropriate PCI audits), 2) have a strong
ever-changing risks and business requirements. This understanding of both the technical and the business
is, in fact, a form of PCI auditing. environment, 3) know what to request, and 4) pursue
regular and ongoing training on new guidance
Although business managers might consider PCI to and standards of practice. In addition, the auditing
be a pure-IT function, they can still be affected by function should complement, but never replace or
technical, procedural, and oversight controls. For overpower, management’s responsibility to ensure its
example, marketing departments that rely on credit PCI controls are operating properly.
card data for customer analytics are stakeholders in
www.ITCinstitute.com 7
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
5. Acquirers are also responsible for enforcing mer- Engagement of an ASV is required for merchants at
chant audits. The brands hold acquirers financially all levels. ASVs perform quarterly network vulner-
accountable for the effectiveness of merchant ability scans, the results of which are submitted to
information security controls. Acquirers review mer- acquirers along with the QSA audit, certified internal
chant and vendor audits to ensure control adequacy. audit, or SAQ.
Acquirers are “members” of the card association and
are bound by the association’s operational regula- The size and complexity of various organizations’ audit
tions (OpRegs in Visa-speak). efforts differ, due to PCI’s merchant-level requirements,
relevant system scope, variations in operating environ-
As an audit authority, each acquirer has some discre- ments, and business and audit objectives. Ensuring
tion in its interpretation of PCI appropriate audit focus and scope is
requirements. This can be both another reason management should
good and bad news for mer- communicate with auditors, and
chants. It means that merchants Merchants should vice versa, early and often for every
should make a proactive effort audit project.
to understand their acquirer’s
make a proactive effort
particular interpretation of to understand their Understanding the PCI authority
PCI’s audit requirements. structure is key to maintaining
Deferring to an acquirer’s
acquirer’s particular control over PCI strategy and audits.
authority transfers some of the interpretations of PCI’s To encourage successful audits,
burden (and risk) of interpreta- merchants should communicate with
tion. Since, as a baseline, the
audit requirements. auditors early and often and request
goal of PCI compliance is to written clarification on acquirer expec-
pass the audit, getting direct tations. As a best-practice approach:
advice from your auditor can prevent early guesswork
and forestall expensive rework late in PCI projects. 1. Develop PCI objectives, stratgies, and implementation plans
6. Engagement of QSAs and ASVs is required by PCI of 2. Communicate your plans with audit staff at your acquirer
some merchants to validate specific aspects of secu-
rity programs. To support this requirement, the SSC 3. Ask the acquirer to reply with an accept/decline response
manages certification programs for QSAs and ASVs.
These steps should be performed before you initiate
Level 1 merchants must annually engage a QSA for major PCI projects or purchase expensive equipment. By
onsite data security assessments or submit an inter- formally accepting your proposed controls, the acquirer
nal audit assessment signed by a corporate officer. accepts any residual risk. This is important in the event
Smaller companies may also opt to engage QSAs to your organization ever finds itself in “Safe Harbor” dis-
help complete the PCI Self-Assessment Questionnaire cussions following a security breach.
(SAQ)10 that must be submitted to acquirers.
10
PCI Security Standards Council. PCI DSS Self-Assessment Questionnaire. Delaware:
PCI Security Standards Council, 2006. Available at https://www.pcisecuritystan
dards.org/tech/supporting_documents.htm
www.ITCinstitute.com 8
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 9
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
As noted throughout this paper introduction, PCI Accordingly, auditors and managers should work
managers can seek guidance from acquirers, assessment toward common goals—auditors striving to earnestly,
and testing vendors, and brands, as to what’s expected honestly, and completely assess program effectiveness,
from audit reports. Internal auditors and security and management working to help auditors make
assessors should also consider how well PCI efforts valid assessments. In that vein, there are some typical
support organizational performance goals, as dictated by compliance characteristics and managerial processes
the CEO, COO, board, and investors. that auditors do and don’t like to see. In all aspects of
audit and risk management programs, auditor likes and
In general, the managerial goal in the audit process is
dislikes vary by company; however, the following list
not simply to make auditors—external and internal—
itemizes typical indicators of good and bad audits.
happy, but to demonstrate how well operations, controls,
www.ITCinstitute.com 10
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Proactive management, including required (Not) meeting deadlines and responding to requests
operational monitoring
(Not) communicating at an appropriate
Supervisory review of key performance reports managerial level
Supervisory review of operating results (especially (Not) ensuring key staff are available to auditors,
exception reports and analyses) especially at critical milestones
Well-documented policies and procedures (Not) informing relevant staff about the audit and its
goals, impacting the time and effort auditors must
Organized, clear, and up-to-date documentation
spend to explain the audit to affected personnel
Managerial actions based on facts, not habits
(Not) having administrative support where needed
A documented chain of command, roles,
(Not) providing accurate documentation
accountability, and responsibilities (e.g., organization
charts, job descriptions, separation of duties)
www.ITCinstitute.com 11
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
11
The audit team is always expected to ensure all their interactions (with all staff)
are professional and result in a minimal disruption.
www.ITCinstitute.com 12
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
A PCI audit should determine that key information 1) on the protected network segment; or 2) reach into
security risks are being controlled, that required controls the protected network from less-trusted networks, typi-
exist and are operating effectively and consistently, and cally via a virtual private network (VPN). There is no
that management and staff have the ability to recognize need for a merchant to validate antivirus protection for
and respond to new threats and risks as they arise. all desktops within the corporate network.12
If a company processes more than 1 million transactions The PCI SSC publishes several free resources to help
per year and is a forward-looking organization, it should merchants and auditors meet assessment requirements.
base its PCI compliance and remediation on the DSS For your reference, three key resources are attached to
SAP, available from the PCI SSC. Smaller companies may this document:
refer to the DSS, but are more likely to focus on the SAQ.
• The PCI Data Security Standard (DSS)
Currently, most brands require a full “Report on • The PCI DSS Security Audit Procedures (SAP)
Compliance” based on the SAP only from merchants
• The PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Self-Assessment
that process more than 6 million transactions annually.
Questionnaire (SAQ)
However, some brands and acquirers are increasingly
training their sights on Level 2 merchants, as well. For
Each of these documents can serve (and in the case of
example, the Visa CAP program also involves Level 2
the SAQ is designed) as a PCI checklist. To supplement
merchants. CAP includes extra incentives and penalties
these lists, the remainder of this section highlights the
for Level 1 and 2 merchants that process more than 1
most common technical-control challenges encountered
million transactions per year.
by PCI stakeholders.
The PCI SAP contains more than 230 specific testing pro-
cedures for validating PCI compliance of an organization.
These testing procedures are directly related to the 12
requirements and 6 security themes outlined on the DSS.
www.ITCinstitute.com 13
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 14
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
database servers, and DNS should be implemented 3: Protect stored cardholder data
on separate servers).” This requirement generates
much confusion and frustration, especially at in- 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open,
number of computing devices they need to support. Number of related testing procedures in SAP: 34
Management should strive to prevent auditors from
interpreting the requirement too literally. The Technologies: Cryptography; key management
www.ITCinstitute.com 15
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Implementing encryption, per se, is becoming less The evolution of symmetric key management issues
technically demanding. Certified AES or 3DES crypto is similar to that of domain name resolution. Before
libraries are widely available. The most difficult issue the development of the Domain Name System (DNS),
typically is adapting legacy AS/400 applications that resolving the IP address of a human readable “host
were originally written in a fragile manner. name” was handled via a “host table” file managed
manually and individually on each node on the network.
These days, the most persistent difficulty with encryp- As the boundary of managed systems grew to include
tion is not encryption itself, but rather symmetric key more hosts, this “provincial” approach to domain name
management. About 80 percent of the 22 SAP testing management proved unscalable. Thus, the DNS was
procedures related to encryption are about key adopted as a standardized way to abstract an important,
management, and the PCI SAP is very specific about but “ancillary,” service from applications and consoli-
control objectives for key management (see Testing date it on a “centralized” server on the network. In a
Procedure 3.4.a, Bullet 4). According to the SAP, similar vein, the goal of EKMI is an abstraction of key
proper key management is critical to the acceptability management capabilities from applications into a scal-
of a solution that “renders PAN unreadable.” able enterprise solution.
Fortunately, the rise of Enterprise Key Management EKMI standardization is currently managed by the
Infratructure (EKMI) represents an approaching Organization for the Advancement of Structured
watershed for companies struggling with this aspect Information Standards (OASIS), a not-for-profit
of PCI compliance. EKMI is an open source effort13 international consortium that drives the development,
to reconcile fractious approaches to key management convergence, and adoption of e-business standards. Visa
through standardized protocols, implementation International co-chairs the EKMI Technical Committee.
13
EKMI open source development is managed by the Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) and sponsored in part
by the Defense Information Systems Agency of the US Department of Defense
(DoD). http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=ekmi
www.ITCinstitute.com 16
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
However, while EKMI may smooth some of the techni- it? Currently we are at a stage of the SKMS’ evolu-
cal path to encryption, process and people hurdles tion, just as DNS and RDBMS [relational database
may prove more persistent. Trying to convince C-level management systems] were at their inception.
business executives to support encryption by quoting Before the creation of these “abstraction” tech-
DSS subrequirements such as “Split knowledge and nologies, applications had to resolve hostname-IP
establishment of dual control of keys” or debating the addresses and perform data management on their
definition of “secure key distribution” is likely to draw own. As DNS and RDBMS protocols and APIs
limited success. A stronger case can be made by explain- became standards, application developers aban-
ing the business value of EKMI from the mundane doned their proprietary implementations to adopt
perspective of key rotation (testing procedure 3.6.4 industry standards–the monetary benefits were
and 3.6.8). Your PCI auditor is likely to ask for evi- too good to ignore. It is anticipated that SKSML
dence that you have rotated encryption keys at least [Symmetric Key Services Markup Language] will
annually. Furthermore, the be adopted faster than DNS
standard requires managers and the RDBMS, because of
to be able to quickly change the same benefits that would
“known or suspected compro-
The labor cost of annually accrue to independent software
mised keys” enterprise-wide. and manually replacing keys vendors, and also due to the
The labor cost of annually regulatory and TCO [total cost
and manually replacing keys
throughout a distributed of ownership] pressures on IT
throughout a distributed POS quickly adds up to organizations.14
POS quickly adds up to more
than the cost of deploying an
more than the cost of Another obstacle that arises in
EKMI implementation is protect-
EKMI solution, such as the deploying an EKMI solution. ing digital certificates at client
open source StrongKey.
machines (POS registers and
Management should be aware, however, that com- in-store servers). Typically this process involves using
mercial off-the-shelf POS software is not likely to a hardware security model (HSM), which is expensive,
be plug-and-play when it comes to EKMI. Bought or a USB dongle,15 which can be inconvenient. Over
applications must be modified by their vendors to the long term, this issue will go away, as hardware
integrate the key-management system’s API and accom- that POS software runs on is refreshed and the new
modate encrypted data and a Global Key-ID(GKID). hardware is shipped with a trusted platform module
According to EKMI co-chair Arshad Noor: (TPM) chip on the motherboard. It is expected that
the widespread proliferation of TPM chips over the
How does one use the SKMS [symmetric key man-
next five years will be a crucial and potent enabler of
agement system] if a specific COTS [commercial
the uptake of EKMI in POS environments.
off-the-shelf software] at a site does not support
14
Noor, Arshad. Symmetric Key Management Systems. http://www.oasis-open.
org/committees/download.php/22096/Noor_Symmetric%20Key%20Management
%20Systems-1.pdf ISSA Journal. Feb 2007
15
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongle
www.ITCinstitute.com 17
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
In the short term, best practices for advancing EKMI(and Before you rush headlong into an encryption and
thereby promoting an easier tomorrow) include: key management, first investigate whether it would
be possible to eliminate PAN repositories within your
• If you use a vendor-developed POS system, start
company. In most cases, the business value of keeping
urging the vendor to investigate the EKMI stan-
PANs is less than the cost of precautions necessary to
dardization project at OASIS.
secure them.
• If you participate in an “enterprisewide encryp-
In many cases, marketing departments provide the
tion project committee,” or other encryption
strongest objections to eliminating PANS. Marketing
management effort, champion an enterprisewide
departments use PANs as unique identifiers that link
key-management project that can accommodate
customer buying patterns, and in marketing-driven
multiple encryption engines suited to various
companies this can be particularly hard dependency to
applications deployed throughout the enterprise.
break. One solution is hashing card numbers to create
• Urge internal development groups to integrate a different unique identifier that marketing can use.
the royalty-free SKCL (Symmetric Key Call Or the merchant can keep multiple databases—one
Library) with internal applications. Programs with complete PANs on a secure server and another
written in C/C++ can use a Java Native Interface production database with hashed numbers. When a
( JNI). AS/400 must be integrated to an RPG new PAN enters the system, two copies of the informa-
Native Interface (RPGNI).16 tion are made: one is hashed and entered into the
production database; the other is copied into the
PAN storage (DSS section 3.1)
secure “archive” which is itself protected with whole-
The requirement to render stored PANs unreadable disk encryption. The archive’s purpose is protective
has probably generated more strategy meetings than and preventative, in case a valid business reason arises
any other requirement. This is because concealing for accessing PANs.
PANs involves encryption, a process that can disquiet
even experienced IT managers. Not only does encryp- Masking the stored PANs (replacing some numbers
tion involve cryptography (read: math), but it also has with a “mask” value, such as “x”), is also an option, but
significant implications for existing IT systems. As a is impractical for most merchants. Note that masking
specific challenge, cryptographic key management stored PANs is different than the masking requirement
is a wholly new field for most IT managers, and even listed in DSS section 3.3, which refers to conditionally
PCI compliance managers. masking on the fly, when the PAN is displayed.
16
Noor, Ashad. Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure (EKMI) (2006). http://
www.oasis-open.org/events/adoptionforum2006/slides/noor.pdf
www.ITCinstitute.com 18
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 19
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 20
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 21
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
File integrity monitoring software (11.5) • For the purposes of PCI, policies need apply only
A literal reading of Requirement 11.5, which requires to the in-scope network
the use of file integrity monitoring (FIM) software,
might suggest that the software must be deployed on
every device that handles cardholder data, as well
as other critical file locations—such as log files, to
ensure they don’t decrease in size. In reality, however,
few merchants have FIM deployed extensively. Many
merchants request an FIM waiver from their acquirer
on the basis of compensating controls that meet the
same control objective.
www.ITCinstitute.com 22
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Audit Reporting
During the reporting phase, management and the board The following are typical steps an audit team takes to
of directors receive formal feedback from the audit confirm and release the audit results.
team (or vendor). This knowledge transfer should be
an open and transparent process. PCI supplies auditors Auditors debrief management, formally discussing
and vendors with free tools to facilitate the assessment significant audit findings and conclusions before they
process. The SAP and SAQ (attached) can help focus issue the final audit report
both audit testing efforts and reporting discussions.
Managers receive a written draft report from auditors
Almost every audit identifies opportunities for improve- __ The report communicates audit results clearly
ment. The primary goal of management and auditors and precisely
should be to address critical issues first, followed by impor-
__ Results are presented in an unbiased tone,
tant issues. Both management and auditors should work to
noting where management has taken actions
ensure that, whatever action plans they agree to, the goals
to correct deficiencies and acknowledging
are achievable and beneficial to the organization.
good performance
During the reporting phase, management must deter- Management and auditors discuss the draft report
mine which corrective actions it will implement, based
Management provides feedback on the draft report
on audit findings. Managers will provide oversight and
support to ensure the timely resolution of found issues. Auditors review managerial comments and
Although the audit team may make recommendations action plan(s)
based on its assessments of risks and consequences, it
Auditors finalize and distribute the final audit report
cannot make or dictate managerial decisions.
Auditors close out the internal audit project and
plan any necessary follow-up efforts regarding
management’s action plans
www.ITCinstitute.com 23
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
A well-managed business unit or governance program Other steps management should take to prior to the
includes robust plans, procedures, goals, objectives, audit or assessment:
trained staff, performance reporting, and ongoing
improvement efforts. When an internal auditing team Learn early and contribute often to the internal
is involved, it looks for evidence that the PCI program audit goals, approach, and testing procedures. In
is well organized and well managed. The program must particular, setting an appropriate purpose and the
also specifically and evidently mitigate security risks audit approach are the two most important elements
related to cardholder data. Managerial preparation of every successful audit.
should mainly be routine, day-to-day practices.
Discuss with audit management the evaluation criteria
and standards and how the audit will actually be
Management’s ultimate goal in the audit process is not
conducted, in order to ensure that you’ll receive a
to make auditors happy, but rather to demonstrate that
“quality” audit.
PCI efforts meet the demands of the CEO and other
executives, payment card brands, and acquirers. Likewise, Know who is on the audit team and their qualifications,
auditor requests should be aligned with these overarching talents, and motivations. The audit team exists to help
needs; that is, to support responsible program perfor- make your operations more efficient and effective,
mance within a sound, ethical business environment. but they are also individuals with strengths and
weaknesses common to many employees. It pays to
Prior to the audit, managers should collect the informa- know the experience of your auditors, whether they’re
tion and documentation necessary to demonstrate how rookies or veterans (and perhaps to push for the latter).
well they manage their operations in concert with the Showing an interest in their work can also influence
overall organizational business objectives. They should and increase the benefits from the audit—within
be prepared to provide auditors with evidence of well- reason. At the end of the day, auditors still need to be
managed PCI efforts and results. This might include independent and objective.
documentation of information security plans, supporting
budgets, policy and procedure manuals, organizational Throughout any discussion with an internal audit team
charts, logs and trending information, and finally, any prior to the audit, management should try to strike a
other relevant evidence that demonstrates a well-run, balance between influence and deference. Managers
compliant program. should neither yield entirely to the audit team nor micro-
manage its efforts.
In selecting documentation, management should not
try to overload the audit team with information, but to
provide genuine insight into how the information PCI
program is run and how well it is doing. The PCI SAP is
fairly specific about what sort of evidence auditors require
and should be a primary resource for audit preparation.
www.ITCinstitute.com 24
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Communicating with
Auditors
www.ITCinstitute.com 25
Presenting Continuous Auditing
PCI DSS should be more about protecting your customers’
intellectual data and company reputation, than just passing
your annual PCI assessment and certification.
www.configuresoft.com
Security, Compliance and Control for the Virtualized World.
Research Sponsor
Configuresoft
Configuresoft is an innovator in systems management
technology, delivering the enterprise Configuration
Intelligence™ to effectively and efficiently manage today’s
heterogeneous computing infrastructures. Spanning both
security and operations, the Company’s configuration
management, compliance and remediation products are used
by 12 of the world’s 25 largest companies to keep their critical
systems properly configured, while ensuring compliance with
regulatory requirements such as Sarbanes-Oxley, FISMA,
GLBA, Basel II, HIPAA and DISA, and industry standards such
as ISO 27001, PCI DSS and Microsoft Security Hardening
Guides.
www.ITCinstitute.com 27
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
If you have ideas for improving ITCi’s IT Audit Checklists, please write editor@itcinstitute.com.
Legal Notice
When assessing any legal matter, do not rely solely on materials published by third parties, including the content in this paper, without additionally seeking legal
counsel familiar with your situation and requirements. The information contained in this IT Audit Checklist is provided for informational and educational purposes and
does not constitute legal or other professional advice. Furthermore, any applicability of any legal principles discussed in this paper will depend on factors specific to
your company, situation, and location. Consult your corporate legal staff or other appropriate professionals for specific questions or concerns related to your corporate
governance and compliance obligations.
ITCi makes every effort to ensure the correctness of the information we provide, to continually update our publications, and to emend errors and outdated facts as they
come to our attention. We cannot, however, guarantee the accuracy of the content in this site paper, since laws change rapidly and applicability varies by reader.
The information in this publication is provided on an “as is” basis without warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied. The IT Compliance Institute disclaims
any and all liability that could arise directly or indirectly from the reference, use, or application of information contained in this publication. ITCi disclaims any liability,
whether based in contract, tort, strict liability, or otherwise, for any direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, punitive or special damages arising out of or in any way
connected with access to or use of the information in this paper.
ITCi does not undertake continuous reviews of the Web sites and other resources referenced in this paper. We are not responsible for the content published by other
organizations. Such references are for your convenience only.
www.ITCinstitute.com 28
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
Acquirer A financial institution, usually a bank, that processes credit card transactions received
through merchants
Also: Acquiring bank
AES Advanced Encryption Standard, a cryptographic algorithm published by the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and specified in Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) 197
ASV Approved Scanning Vendor, an independent company engaged to perform quarterly
network vulnerability scans
Asymmetric encryption A form of encryption in which different keys must be used for encryption and decryption
Brand A payment card company, such as Visa or MasterCard, responsible for governing PCI
Cardholder An individual who owns or uses a payment card
Cardholder data Payment card and customer data, including, but not limited to, the cardholder name,
card expiration date, customer primary account number (PAN), and CVV2
Chaordic A term coined by Visa founder Dee Hock to describe systems that are both chaotic
and ordered
Compensating control Policies and procedures that meet a stated control objective, but are not consistent with
the control requirement of the DSS
Compromise An information security breach that allows unauthorized access to cardholder data
CVV2 Card Validation Value 2, a three-digit security number, usually printed on the back of
physical payment cards
Also: Security code, CID or Card Identification Number, CAV2 or Card Authentication
Value 2, CVC2 or Card Validation Code 2
DMZ DeMilitarized zone, a network added between a private and a public network to provide
an additional layer of security
DNS Domain name system or domain name server, a system that stores information associ-
ated with domain names in a distributed database on networks
DSS Data Security Standard
Also: PCI DSS
Egress Traffic exiting a network
EKMI Enterprise Key Management Infratructure, an open source effort to reconcile fractious
approaches to key management through standardized protocols, implementation guide-
lines, and controls
Encryption The process of encoding information so that it that cannot be readily interpreted. The
product of encryption is ciphertext.
IDS Intrusion detection system, a technology used to alert system managers about network
events that represent illicit use or access
Also: Intrusion protection system or IPS
Ingress Traffic entering a network
Key An algorithmic value used to encrypt and/or decrypt information
www.ITCinstitute.com 29
IT AUDIT CHECKLIST: PCI
www.ITCinstitute.com 30
Payment Card Industry (PCI)
Data Security Standard
Version 1.1
Release: September, 2006
Build and Maintain a Secure Network
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other
security parameters
The following table illustrates commonly used elements of cardholder and sensitive authentication data;
whether storage of each data element is permitted or prohibited; and if each data element must be
protected. This table is not exhaustive, but is presented to illustrate the different types of requirements
that apply to each data element.
PCI DSS requirements are applicable if a Primary Account Number (PAN) is stored, processed, or
transmitted. If a PAN is not stored, processed, or transmitted, PCI DSS requirements do not apply.
* These data elements must be protected if stored in conjunction with the PAN. This protection must be consistent
with PCI DSS requirements for general protection of the cardholder environment. Additionally, other legislation (for
example, related to consumer personal data protection, privacy, identity theft, or data security) may require specific
protection of this data, or proper disclosure of a company's practices if consumer-related personal data is being
collected during the course of business. PCI DSS; however, does not apply if PANs are not stored, processed, or
transmitted.
** Sensitive authentication data must not be stored subsequent to authorization (even if encrypted).
These security requirements apply to all “system components.” System components are defined as any
network component, server, or application that is included in or connected to the cardholder data
environment. The cardholder data environment is that part of the network that possesses cardholder data
or sensitive authentication data. Adequate network segmentation, which isolates systems that store,
process, or transmit cardholder data from those that do not, may reduce the scope of the cardholder data
environment. Network components include but are not limited to firewalls, switches, routers, wireless
access points, network appliances, and other security appliances. Server types include but are not limited
to the following: web, database, authentication, mail, proxy, network time protocol (NTP), and domain
name server (DNS). Applications include all purchased and custom applications, including internal and
external (Internet) applications.
All systems must be protected from unauthorized access from the Internet, whether entering the system
as e-commerce, employees’ Internet-based access through desktop browsers, or employees’ e-mail
access. Often, seemingly insignificant paths to and from the Internet can provide unprotected pathways
into key systems. Firewalls are a key protection mechanism for any computer network.
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other
security parameters
Hackers (external and internal to a company) often use vendor default passwords and other vendor
default settings to compromise systems. These passwords and settings are well known in hacker
communities and easily determined via public information.
2.1 Always change vendor-supplied defaults before installing a system on the network (for example,
include passwords, simple network management protocol (SNMP) community strings, and
elimination of unnecessary accounts).
2.1.1 For wireless environments, change wireless vendor defaults, including but not limited
to, wired equivalent privacy (WEP) keys, default service set identifier (SSID), passwords,
and SNMP community strings. Disable SSID broadcasts. Enable WiFi protected access
(WPA and WPA2) technology for encryption and authentication when WPA-capable.
2.2 Develop configuration standards for all system components. Assure that these standards address
all known security vulnerabilities and are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening
standards as defined, for example, by SysAdmin Audit Network Security Network (SANS),
National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST), and Center for Internet Security (CIS).
2.2.1 Implement only one primary function per server (for example, web servers, database
servers, and DNS should be implemented on separate servers)
2.2.2 Disable all unnecessary and insecure services and protocols (services and protocols not
directly needed to perform the devices’ specified function)
2.2.3 Configure system security parameters to prevent misuse
2.2.4 Remove all unnecessary functionality, such as scripts, drivers, features, subsystems, file
systems, and unnecessary web servers.
2.3 Encrypt all non-console administrative access. Use technologies such as SSH, VPN, or SSL/TLS
(transport layer security) for web-based management and other non-console administrative
access.
2.4 Hosting providers must protect each entity’s hosted environment and data. These providers must
meet specific requirements as detailed in Appendix A: “PCI DSS Applicability for Hosting
Providers.”
3.1 Keep cardholder data storage to a minimum. Develop a data retention and disposal policy. Limit
storage amount and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, and/or regulatory
purposes, as documented in the data retention policy.
3.2 Do not store sensitive authentication data subsequent to authorization (even if encrypted).
Sensitive authentication data includes the data as cited in the following Requirements 3.2.1
through 3.2.3:
3.2.1 Do not store the full contents of any track from the magnetic stripe (that is on the back of
a card, in a chip or elsewhere). This data is alternatively called full track, track, track 1,
track 2, and magnetic stripe data
In the normal course of business, the following data elements from the magnetic stripe
may need to be retained: the accountholder’s name, primary account number (PAN),
expiration date, and service code. To minimize risk, store only those data elements
needed for business. NEVER store the card verification code or value or PIN verification
value data elements. Note: See “Glossary” for additional information.
3.2.2 Do not store the card-validation code or value (three-digit or four-digit number printed on
the front or back of a payment card) used to verify card-not-present transactions
Note: See “Glossary” for additional information.
3.2.3 Do not store the personal identification number (PIN) or the encrypted PIN block.
3.3 Mask PAN when displayed (the first six and last four digits are the maximum number of digits to
be displayed).
Note: This requirement does not apply to employees and other parties with a specific need to see
the full PAN; nor does the requirement supersede stricter requirements in place for displays of
cardholder data (for example, for point of sale [POS] receipts).
3.4 Render PAN, at minimum, unreadable anywhere it is stored (including data on portable digital
media, backup media, in logs, and data received from or stored by wireless networks) by using
any of the following approaches:
• Strong one-way hash functions (hashed indexes)
• Truncation
• Index tokens and pads (pads must be securely stored)
• Strong cryptography with associated key management processes and procedures.
The MINIMUM account information that must be rendered unreadable is the PAN.
If for some reason, a company is unable to encrypt cardholder data, refer to Appendix B:
“Compensating Controls for Encryption of Stored Data.”
3.4.1 If disk encryption is used (rather than file- or column-level database encryption), logical
access must be managed independently of native operating system access control
4.1 Use strong cryptography and security protocols such as secure sockets layer (SSL) / transport
layer security (TLS) and Internet protocol security (IPSEC) to safeguard sensitive cardholder data
during transmission over open, public networks.
Examples of open, public networks that are in scope of the PCI DSS are the Internet, WiFi (IEEE
802.11x), global system for mobile communications (GSM), and general packet radio service
(GPRS).
4.1.1 For wireless networks transmitting cardholder data, encrypt the transmissions by
using WiFi protected access (WPA or WPA2) technology, IPSEC VPN, or SSL/TLS.
Never rely exclusively on wired equivalent privacy (WEP) to protect confidentiality and
access to a wireless LAN. If WEP is used, do the following:
• Use with a minimum 104-bit encryption key and 24 bit-initialization value
• Use ONLY in conjunction with WiFi protected access (WPA or WPA2) technology,
VPN, or SSL/TLS
• Rotate shared WEP keys quarterly (or automatically if the technology permits)
• Rotate shared WEP keys whenever there are changes in personnel with access to
keys
• Restrict access based on media access code (MAC) address.
4.2 Never send unencrypted PANs by e-mail.
5.1 Deploy anti-virus software on all systems commonly affected by viruses (particularly personal
computers and servers)
Note: Systems commonly affected by viruses typically do not include UNIX-based operating
systems or mainframes.
5.1.1 Ensure that anti-virus programs are capable of detecting, removing, and protecting
against other forms of malicious software, including spyware and adware.
5.2 Ensure that all anti-virus mechanisms are current, actively running, and capable of generating
audit logs.
6.1 Ensure that all system components and software have the latest vendor-supplied security
patches installed. Install relevant security patches within one month of release.
6.2 Establish a process to identify newly discovered security vulnerabilities (for example, subscribe to
alert services freely available on the Internet). Update standards to address new vulnerability
issues.
6.3 Develop software applications based on industry best practices and incorporate information
security throughout the software development life cycle.
6.3.1 Testing of all security patches and system and software configuration changes before
deployment
6.3.2 Separate development, test, and production environments
6.3.3 Separation of duties between development, test, and production environments
6.3.4 Production data (live PANs) are not used for testing or development
6.3.5 Removal of test data and accounts before production systems become active
6.3.6 Removal of custom application accounts, usernames, and passwords before applications
become active or are released to customers
6.3.7 Review of custom code prior to release to production or customers in order to identify any
potential coding vulnerability.
6.4 Follow change control procedures for all system and software configuration changes. The
procedures must include the following:
6.4.1 Documentation of impact
6.4.2 Management sign-off by appropriate parties
6.4.3 Testing of operational functionality
7.1 Limit access to computing resources and cardholder information only to those individuals whose
job requires such access.
7.2 Establish a mechanism for systems with multiple users that restricts access based on a user’s
need to know and is set to “deny all” unless specifically allowed.
8.1 Identify all users with a unique user name before allowing them to access system components or
cardholder data.
8.2 In addition to assigning a unique ID, employ at least one of the following methods to authenticate
all users:
• Password
• Token devices (e.g., SecureID, certificates, or public key)
• Biometrics.
8.3 Implement two-factor authentication for remote access to the network by employees,
administrators, and third parties. Use technologies such as remote authentication and dial-in
service (RADIUS) or terminal access controller access control system (TACACS) with tokens; or
VPN (based on SSL/TLS or IPSEC) with individual certificates.
8.4 Encrypt all passwords during transmission and storage on all system components.
8.5 Ensure proper user authentication and password management for non-consumer users and
administrators on all system components as follows:
8.5.1 Control addition, deletion, and modification of user IDs, credentials, and other identifier
objects
8.5.2 Verify user identity before performing password resets
8.5.3 Set first-time passwords to a unique value for each user and change immediately after
the first use
8.5.4 Immediately revoke access for any terminated users
8.5.5 Remove inactive user accounts at least every 90 days
8.5.6 Enable accounts used by vendors for remote maintenance only during the time period
needed
8.5.7 Communicate password procedures and policies to all users who have access to
cardholder data
8.5.8 Do not use group, shared, or generic accounts and passwords
8.5.9 Change user passwords at least every 90 days
8.5.10 Require a minimum password length of at least seven characters
8.5.11 Use passwords containing both numeric and alphabetic characters
8.5.12 Do not allow an individual to submit a new password that is the same as any of the last
four passwords he or she has used
8.5.13 Limit repeated access attempts by locking out the user ID after not more than six
attempts
8.5.14 Set the lockout duration to thirty minutes or until administrator enables the user ID
8.5.15 If a session has been idle for more than 15 minutes, require the user to re-enter the
password to re-activate the terminal
8.5.16 Authenticate all access to any database containing cardholder data. This includes access
by applications, administrators, and all other users
9.1 Use appropriate facility entry controls to limit and monitor physical access to systems that store,
process, or transmit cardholder data.
9.1.1 Use cameras to monitor sensitive areas. Audit collected data and correlate with other
entries. Store for at least three months, unless otherwise restricted by law
9.1.2 Restrict physical access to publicly accessible network jacks
9.1.3 Restrict physical access to wireless access points, gateways, and handheld devices.
9.2 Develop procedures to help all personnel easily distinguish between employees and visitors,
especially in areas where cardholder data is accessible.
“Employee” refers to full-time and part-time employees, temporary employees and personnel, and
consultants who are “resident” on the entity’s site. A “visitor” is defined as a vendor, guest of an
employee, service personnel, or anyone who needs to enter the facility for a short duration,
usually not more than one day.
9.3 Make sure all visitors are handled as follows:
9.3.1 Authorized before entering areas where cardholder data is processed or maintained
9.3.2 Given a physical token (for example, a badge or access device) that expires and that
identifies the visitors as non-employees
9.3.3 Asked to surrender the physical token before leaving the facility or at the date of
expiration.
9.4 Use a visitor log to maintain a physical audit trail of visitor activity. Retain this log for a minimum
of three months, unless otherwise restricted by law.
9.5 Store media back-ups in a secure location, preferably in an off-site facility, such as an alternate or
backup site, or a commercial storage facility.
9.6 Physically secure all paper and electronic media (including computers, electronic media,
networking and communications hardware, telecommunication lines, paper receipts, paper
reports, and faxes) that contain cardholder data.
9.7 Maintain strict control over the internal or external distribution of any kind of media that contains
cardholder data including the following:
9.7.1 Classify the media so it can be identified as confidential
9.7.2 Send the media by secured courier or other delivery method that can be accurately
tracked.
9.8 Ensure management approves any and all media that is moved from a secured area (especially
when media is distributed to individuals).
9.9 Maintain strict control over the storage and accessibility of media that contains cardholder data.
9.9.1 Properly inventory all media and make sure it is securely stored.
9.10 Destroy media containing cardholder data when it is no longer needed for business or legal
reasons as follows:
9.10.1 Cross-cut shred, incinerate, or pulp hardcopy materials
9.10.2 Purge, degauss, shred, or otherwise destroy electronic media so that cardholder data
cannot be reconstructed.
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data
Logging mechanisms and the ability to track user activities are critical. The presence of logs in all
environments allows thorough tracking and analysis if something does go wrong. Determining the cause
of a compromise is very difficult without system activity logs.
10.1 Establish a process for linking all access to system components (especially access done with
administrative privileges such as root) to each individual user.
10.2 Implement automated audit trails for all system components to reconstruct the following events:
10.2.1 All individual user accesses to cardholder data
10.2.2 All actions taken by any individual with root or administrative privileges
10.2.3 Access to all audit trails
10.2.4 Invalid logical access attempts
10.2 5 Use of identification and authentication mechanisms
10.2.6 Initialization of the audit logs
10.2.7 Creation and deletion of system-level objects.
10.3 Record at least the following audit trail entries for all system components for each event:
10.3.1 User identification
10.3.2 Type of event
10.3.3 Date and time
10.3.4 Success or failure indication
10.3.5 Origination of event
10.3.6 Identity or name of affected data, system component, or resource.
10.4 Synchronize all critical system clocks and times.
10.5 Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered.
10.5.1 Limit viewing of audit trails to those with a job-related need
10.5.2 Protect audit trail files from unauthorized modifications
10.5.3 Promptly back-up audit trail files to a centralized log server or media that is difficult to
alter
10.5.4 Copy logs for wireless networks onto a log server on the internal LAN.
10.5.5 Use file integrity monitoring and change detection software on logs to ensure that existing
log data cannot be changed without generating alerts (although new data being added
should not cause an alert).
10.6 Review logs for all system components at least daily. Log reviews must include those servers that
perform security functions like intrusion detection system (IDS) and authentication, authorization,
and accounting protocol (AAA) servers (for example, RADIUS).
Note: Log harvesting, parsing, and alerting tools may be used to achieve compliance with
Requirement 10.6.
10.7 Retain audit trail history for at least one year, with a minimum of three months online availability.
11.1 Test security controls, limitations, network connections, and restrictions annually to assure the
ability to adequately identify and to stop any unauthorized access attempts. Use a wireless
analyzer at least quarterly to identify all wireless devices in use.
11.2 Run internal and external network vulnerability scans at least quarterly and after any significant
change in the network (such as new system component installations, changes in network
topology, firewall rule modifications, product upgrades).
Note: Quarterly external vulnerability scans must be performed by a scan vendor qualified by the
payment card industry. Scans conducted after network changes may be performed by the
company’s internal staff.
11.3 Perform penetration testing at least once a year and after any significant infrastructure or
application upgrade or modification (such as an operating system upgrade, a sub-network added
to the environment, or a web server added to the environment). These penetration tests must
include the following:
11.3.1 Network-layer penetration tests
11.3.2 Application-layer penetration tests.
11.4 Use network intrusion detection systems, host-based intrusion detection systems, and intrusion
prevention systems to monitor all network traffic and alert personnel to suspected compromises.
Keep all intrusion detection and prevention engines up-to-date.
11.5 Deploy file integrity monitoring software to alert personnel to unauthorized modification of critical
system or content files; and configure the software to perform critical file comparisons at least
weekly.
Critical files are not necessarily only those containing cardholder data. For file integrity monitoring
purposes, critical files are usually those that do not regularly change, but the modification of
which could indicate a system compromise or risk of compromise. File integrity monitoring
products usually come pre-configured with critical files for the related operating system. Other
critical files, such as those for custom applications, must be evaluated and defined by the entity
(that is the merchant or service provider).
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for employees and
contractors
A strong security policy sets the security tone for the whole company and informs employees what is
expected of them. All employees should be aware of the sensitivity of data and their responsibilities for
protecting it.
12.1 Establish, publish, maintain, and disseminate a security policy that accomplishes the following:
12.1.1 Addresses all requirements in this specification
12.1.2 Includes an annual process that identifies threats and vulnerabilities, and results in a
formal risk assessment
12.1.3 Includes a review at least once a year and updates when the environment changes.
12.2 Develop daily operational security procedures that are consistent with requirements in this
specification (for example, user account maintenance procedures, and log review procedures).
12.3 Develop usage policies for critical employee-facing technologies (such as modems and wireless)
to define proper use of these technologies for all employees and contractors. Ensure these usage
policies require the following:
12.3.1 Explicit management approval
12.3.2 Authentication for use of the technology
12.3.3 List of all such devices and personnel with access
12.3.4 Labeling of devices with owner, contact information, and purpose
12.3.5 Acceptable uses of the technologies
12.3.6 Acceptable network locations for the technologies
12.3.7 List of company-approved products
12.3.8 Automatic disconnect of modem sessions after a specific period of inactivity
12.3.9 Activation of modems for vendors only when needed by vendors, with immediate
deactivation after use
12.3.10 When accessing cardholder data remotely via modem, prohibition of storage of
cardholder data onto local hard drives, floppy disks, or other external media. Prohibition
of cut-and-paste and print functions during remote access.
12.4 Ensure that the security policy and procedures clearly define information security responsibilities
for all employees and contractors.
12.5 Assign to an individual or team the following information security management responsibilities:
12.5.1 Establish, document, and distribute security policies and procedures
12.5.2 Monitor and analyze security alerts and information, and distribute to appropriate
personnel
12.5.3 Establish, document, and distribute security incident response and escalation procedures
to ensure timely and effective handling of all situations
12.5.4 Administer user accounts, including additions, deletions, and modifications
12.5.5 Monitor and control all access to data.
12.6 Implement a formal security awareness program to make all employees aware of the importance
of cardholder data security.
12.6.1 Educate employees upon hire and at least annually (for example, by letters, posters,
memos, meetings, and promotions)
A.1 Protect each entity’s (that is merchant, service provider, or other entity) hosted environment and data,
as in A.1.1 through A.1.4:
A.1.1 Ensure that each entity only has access to own cardholder data environment
A.1.2 Restrict each entity’s access and privileges to own cardholder data environment only
A.1.3 Ensure logging and audit trails are enabled and unique to each entity’s cardholder data
environment and consistent with PCI DSS Requirement 10
A.1.4 Enable processes to provide for timely forensic investigation in the event of a compromise to
any hosted merchant or service provider.
A hosting provider must fulfill these requirements as well as all other relevant sections of the PCI DSS. Note:
Even though a hosting provider may meet these requirements, the compliance of the entity that uses the hosting
provider is not necessarily guaranteed. Each entity must comply with the PCI DSS and validate compliance as
applicable.
The effectiveness of a compensating control is dependent on the specifics of the environment in which the
control is implemented, the surrounding security controls, and the configuration of the control. Companies
should be aware that a particular compensating control will not be effective in all environments. Each
compensating control must be thoroughly evaluated after implementation to ensure effectiveness.
The following guidance provides compensating controls when companies are unable to render cardholder data
unreadable per requirement 3.4.
For companies unable to render cardholder data unreadable (for example, by encryption) due to technical
constraints or business limitations, compensating controls may be considered. Only companies that have
undertaken a risk analysis and have legitimate technological or documented business constraints can consider
the use of compensating controls to achieve compliance.
Companies that consider compensating controls for rendering cardholder data unreadable must understand the
risk to the data posed by maintaining readable cardholder data. Generally, the controls must provide additional
protection to mitigate any additional risk posed by maintaining readable cardholder data. The controls
considered must be in addition to controls required in the PCI DSS, and must satisfy the “Compensating
Controls” definition in the PCI DSS Glossary. Compensating controls may consist of either a device or
combination of devices, applications, and controls that meet all of the following conditions:
Version 1.1
Release: September 2006
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
PCI DSS Applicability Information ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
Scope of Assessment for Compliance with PCI DSS Requirements ............................................................................................................................................ 5
Wireless .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Outsourcing ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Sampling ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Compensating Controls .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Instructions and Content for Report on Compliance...................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Revalidation of Open Items ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Build and Maintain a Secure Network............................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data........................................................................................................ 8
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters. .................................................................... 12
Protect Cardholder Data .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data.................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks..................................................................................................... 21
Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program........................................................................................................................................................................... 23
Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software or programs......................................................................................................................... 23
Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications............................................................................................................................ 24
Implement Strong Access Control Measures .............................................................................................................................................................................. 28
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know .................................................................................................................. 28
Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access. ........................................................................................................................ 29
Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data. .............................................................................................................................................. 33
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes........................................................................................................................................ 39
Maintain an Information Security Policy....................................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for employees and contractors. ........................................................................... 41
Appendix A: PCI DSS Applicability for Hosting Providers (with Testing Procedures) ................................................................................................................. 47
Requirement A.1: Hosting providers protect cardholder data environment ......................................................................................................................... 47
Appendix B – Compensating Controls......................................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Compensating Controls – General ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Compensating Controls for Requirement 3.4 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Appendix C: Compensating Controls Worksheet/Completed Example ....................................................................................................................................... 50
* These data elements must be protected if stored in conjunction with the PAN. This protection must be consistent with PCI DSS requirements for general protection of the
cardholder environment. Additionally, other legislation (for example, related to consumer personal data protection, privacy, identity theft, or data security) may require
specific protection of this data, or proper disclosure of a company's practices if consumer-related personal data is being collected during the course of business. PCI DSS,
however, does not apply if PANs are not stored, processed, or transmitted.
** Sensitive authentication data must not be stored subsequent to authorization (even if encrypted).
Adequate network segmentation, which isolates systems that store, process, or transmit cardholder data from the rest of
the network, may reduce the scope of the cardholder data environment. The assessor must verify that the segmentation is
adequate to reduce the scope of the audit.
A service provider or merchant may use a third party provider to manage components such as routers, firewalls, databases,
physical security, and/or servers. If so, there may be an impact on the security of the cardholder data environment. The
relevant services of the third party provider must be scrutinized either in 1) each of the third party provider’s clients’ PCI
audits; or 2) the third party provider’s own PCI audit.
For service providers required to undergo an annual onsite review, compliance validation must be performed on all system
components where cardholder data is stored, processed, or transmitted, unless otherwise specified.
For merchants required to undergo an annual onsite review, the scope of compliance validation is focused on any
system(s) or system component(s) related to authorization and settlement where cardholder data is stored, processed, or
transmitted, including the following:
• All external connections into the merchant network (for example; employee remote access, payment card company,
third party access for processing, and maintenance)
• All connections to and from the authorization and settlement environment (for example, connections for employee
access or for devices such as firewalls and routers)
• Any data repositories outside of the authorization and settlement environment where more than 500 thousand account
numbers are stored. Note: Even if some data repositories or systems are excluded from the audit, the merchant is still
responsible for ensuring that all systems that store, process, or transmit cardholder data are compliant with the PCI
DSS
• A point-of-sale (POS) environment – the place where a transaction is accepted at a merchant location (that is, retail
store, restaurant, hotel property, gas station, supermarket, or other POS location)
• If there is no external access to the merchant location (by Internet, wireless, virtual private network (VPN), dial-in,
broadband, or publicly accessible machines such as kiosks), the POS environment may be excluded
When selecting samples of merchants’ stores or for franchised merchants, assessors should consider the following:
• If there are standard, required PCI DSS processes in place that each store must follow, the sample can be smaller than
is necessary if there are no standard processes, to provide reasonable assurance that each store is configured per the
standard process.
• If there is more than one type of standard process in place (for example, for different types of stores), then the sample
must be large enough to include stores secured with each type of process.
• If there are no standard PCI DSS processes in place and each store is responsible for their processes, then sample
size must be larger to be assured that each store understands and implements PCI DSS requirements appropriately.
Compensating Controls
Compensating controls must be documented by the assessor and included with the Report on Compliance submission, as
shown in Appendix C – Compensating Controls Worksheet / Completed Example.
2. Executive Summary
Include the following:
• Business description
• List service providers and other entities with which the company shares cardholder data
• List processor relationships
• Describe whether entity is directly connected to payment card company
• For merchants, POS products used
• Any wholly-owned entities that require compliance with the PCI DSS
• Any international entities that require compliance with the PCI DSS
• Any wireless LANs and/or wireless POS terminals connected to the cardholder environment
All systems must be protected from unauthorized access from the Internet, whether entering the system as e-commerce,
employees’ Internet-based access through desktop browsers, or employees’ e-mail access. Often, seemingly insignificant
paths to and from the Internet can provide unprotected pathways into key systems. Firewalls are a key protection
mechanism for any computer network.
1.1.3 Requirements for a firewall at 1.1.3 Verify that firewall configuration standards include
each Internet connection and requirements for a firewall at each Internet connection and
between any demilitarized zone between any DMZ and the Intranet. Verify that the current
(DMZ) and the internal network zone network diagram is consistent with the firewall configuration
standards.
1.1.4 Description of groups, roles, 1.1.4 Verify that firewall configuration standards include a
and responsibilities for logical description of groups, roles, and responsibilities for logical
management of network components management of network components
1.1.5 Documented list of services 1.1.5 Verify that firewall configuration standards include a
and ports necessary for business documented list of services/ports necessary for business
1.1.6 Justification and 1.1.6 Verify that firewall configuration standards include
documentation for any available justification and documentation for any available protocols
protocols besides hypertext transfer besides HTTP and SSL, SSH, and VPN
protocol (HTTP), and secure sockets
layer (SSL), secure shell (SSH), and
virtual private network (VPN)
1.1.7 Justification and 1.1.7.a Verify that firewall configuration standards include
documentation for any risky protocols justification and documentation for any risky protocols
allowed (for example, file transfer allowed (for example, FTP), which includes reason for use
protocol (FTP), which includes reason of protocol, and security features implemented
for use of protocol and security
features implemented 1.1.7.b Examine documentation and settings for each
service in use to obtain evidence that the service is
necessary and secured
1.1.9 Configuration standards for 1.1.9 Verify that firewall configuration standards exist for
routers both firewalls and routers
1.2 Build a firewall configuration that 1.2 Select a sample of firewalls/routers 1) between the
denies all traffic from “untrusted” Internet and the DMZ and 2) between the DMZ and the
networks and hosts, except for internal network. The sample should include the choke router
protocols necessary for the cardholder at the Internet, the DMZ router and firewall, the DMZ
data environment. cardholder segment, the perimeter router, and the internal
cardholder network segment. Examine firewall and router
configurations to verify that inbound and outbound traffic is
limited to only protocols that are necessary for the cardholder
data environment
1.3 Build a firewall configuration that 1.3 Examine firewall/router configurations to verify that
restricts connections between publicly connections are restricted between publicly accessible
accessible servers and any system servers and components storing cardholder data, as follows:
component storing cardholder data,
including any connections from
wireless networks. This firewall
configuration should include:
1.3.1 Restricting inbound Internet 1.3.1 Verify that inbound Internet traffic is limited to IP
traffic to internet protocol (IP) addresses within the DMZ
addresses within the DMZ (ingress
filters)
1.3.2 Not allowing internal 1.3.2 Verify that internal addresses cannot pass from the
addresses to pass from the Internet Internet into the DMZ
into the DMZ
1.3.3 Implementing stateful 1.3.3 Verify that the firewall performs stateful inspection
inspection, also known as dynamic (dynamic packet filtering). [Only established connections
packet filtering (that is, only should be allowed in, and only if they are associated with a
”established” connections are allowed previously established session (run NMAP on all TCP ports
into the network) with “syn reset” or ”syn ack” bits set – a response means
packets are allowed through even if they are not part of a
previously established session)]
1.3.4 Placing the database in an 1.3.4 Verify that the database is on an internal network
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters.
Hackers (external and internal to a company) often use vendor default passwords and other vendor default settings to
compromise systems. These passwords and settings are well known in hacker communities and easily determined via
public information.
2.1.1 For wireless environments, 2.1.1 Verify the following regarding vendor default settings
change wireless vendor defaults, for wireless environments:
including but not limited to, wireless • WEP keys were changed from default at
equivalent privacy (WEP) keys, installation, and are changed anytime any one with
default service set identifier (SSID), knowledge of the keys leaves the company or
passwords, and SNMP community changes positions
2.2.1 Implement only one primary 2.2.1 For a sample of system components, critical servers,
function per server (for example, web and wireless access points, verify that only one primary
servers, database servers, and DNS function is implemented per server
should be implemented on separate
servers)
2.2.2 Disable all unnecessary and 2.2.2 For a sample of system components, critical servers,
insecure services and protocols and wireless access points, inspect enabled system
(services and protocols not directly services, daemons, and protocols. Verify that unnecessary
needed to perform the devices’ or insecure services or protocols are not enabled, or are
specified function) justified and documented as to appropriate use of the
service (for example, FTP is not used, or is encrypted via
SSH or other technology)
2.2.3 Configure system security 2.2.3.a Interview system administrators and/or security
parameters to prevent misuse managers to verify that they have knowledge of common
security parameter settings for their operating systems,
database servers, Web servers, and wireless systems
3.4.1 If disk encryption is used 3.4.1.a If disk encryption is used, verify that logical access
(rather than file- or column-level to encrypted file systems is implemented via a mechanism
database encryption), logical that is separate from the native operating systems
access must be managed mechanism (for example, not using local or Active Directory
independently of native operating accounts)
system access control mechanisms 3.4.1.b Verify that decryption keys are not stored on the
(for example, by not using local local system (for example, store keys on floppy disk, CD-
system or Active Directory ROM, etc. that can be secured and retrieved only when
accounts). Decryption keys must needed)
3.5 Protect encryption keys used 3.5 Verify processes to protect encryption keys used for
for encryption of cardholder data encryption of cardholder data against disclosure and misuse
against both disclosure and misuse: by performing the following:
3.5.1 Restrict access to keys to the 3.5.1 Examine user access lists to verify that access to
fewest number of custodians cryptographic keys is restricted to very few custodians
necessary
3.5.2 Store keys securely in the 3.5.2 Examine system configuration files to verify that
fewest possible locations and forms cryptographic keys are stored in encrypted format and that
key-encrypting keys are stored separately from data-
encrypting keys
3.6 Fully document and implement 3.6.a Verify the existence of key management procedures for
all key management processes and keys used for encryption of cardholder data
procedures for keys used for
encryption of cardholder data, 3.6.b For Service Providers only: If the Service Provider
including the following: shares keys with their customers for transmission of
cardholder data, verify that the Service Provider provides
documentation to customers that includes guidance on how to
securely store and change customer’s encryption keys (used
to transmit data between customer and service provider)
3.6.c Examine the key management procedures and
perform the following:
3.6.1 Generation of strong keys 3.6.1 Verify that key management procedures require the
generation of strong keys
3.6.2 Secure key distribution 3.6.2 Verify that key management procedures require
secure key distribution
3.6.3 Secure key storage 3.6.3 Verify that key management procedures require
secure key storage
8.5.2 Verify user identity before 8.5.2 Examine password procedures and observe security
performing password resets personnel to verify that, if a user requests a password reset by
phone, email, web, or other non-face-to-face method, the user’s
identity is verified before the password is reset
8.5.3 Set first-time passwords 8.5.3 Examine password procedures and observe security
to a unique value for each user personnel to verify that first-time passwords for new users are set to
and change immediately after a unique value for each user and changed after first use
the first use
8.5.4 Immediately revoke 8.5.4 Select a sample of employees terminated in the past six
access for any terminated users months, and review current user access lists to verify that their IDs
have been inactivated or removed
8.5.5 Remove inactive user 8.5.5 For a sample of user IDs, verify that there are no inactive
accounts at least every 90 days accounts over 90 days old
8.5.6 Enable accounts used by 8.5.6 Verify that any accounts used by vendors to support and
vendors for remote maintenance maintain system components are inactive, enabled only when
only during the time period needed by the vendor, and monitored while being used
needed
8.5.7 Communicate password 8.5.7 Interview the users from a sample of user IDs, to verify that
procedures and policies to all they are familiar with password procedures and policies
8.5.9 Change user passwords 8.5.9 For a sample of system components, critical servers, and
at least every 90 days wireless access points, obtain and inspect system configuration
settings to verify that user password parameters are set to require
users to change passwords at least every 90 days
For Service Providers only, review internal processes and
customer/user documentation to verify that customer passwords are
required to change periodically and that customers are given
guidance as to when, and under what circumstances, passwords
must change
8.5.10 Require a minimum 8.5.10 For a sample of system components, critical servers, and
password length of at least seven wireless access points, obtain and inspect system configuration
characters settings to verify that password parameters are set to require
passwords to be at least seven characters long
For Service Providers only, review internal processes and
customer/user documentation to verify that customer passwords are
required to meet minimum length requirements
8.5.11 Use passwords 8.5.11 For a sample of system components, critical servers, and
containing both numeric and wireless access points, obtain and inspect system configuration
alphabetic characters settings to verify that password parameters are set to require
passwords to contain both numeric and alphabetic characters
For Service Providers only, review internal processes and
Target Date/
Requirements Testing Procedures In Place Not in Place
Comments
A.1 Protect each entity’s (that is A.1 Specifically for a PCI audit of a Shared hosting
merchant, service provider, or other Provider, to verify that Shared hosting Providers protect
entity) hosted environment and entities’ (merchants and service providers) hosted
data, as in A.1.1 through A.1.4: environment and data, select a sample of servers (Microsoft
A hosting provider must fulfill these Windows and Unix/Linux) across a representative sample of
requirements as well as all other hosted merchants and service providers, and verify A.1.1
relevant sections of the PCI DSS. through A.1.4 below.
Note: Even though a hosting
provider may meet these
requirements, the compliance of the
entity that uses the hosting provider
is not guaranteed. Each entity must
comply with the PCI DSS and
validate compliance as applicable.
A.1.1 Ensure that each entity only A.1.1 If a shared hosting provider allows entities (for
has access to own cardholder data example, merchants or service providers) to run their own
environment applications, verify these application processes run using the
unique ID of the entity. For example:
• No entity on the system can use a shared web server
user ID
• All CGI scripts used by an entity must be created and
run as the entity’s unique user ID
A.1.2 Restrict each entity’s access A.1.2.a Verify the user ID of any application process is not a
and privileges to own cardholder privileged user (root/admin).
d t i t l
The effectiveness of a compensating control is dependent on the specifics of the environment in which the control is
implemented, the surrounding security controls, and the configuration of the control. Companies should be aware
that a particular compensating control will not be effective in all environments. Each compensating control must be
thoroughly evaluated after implementation to ensure effectiveness. The following guidance provides compensating
controls when companies are unable to render cardholder data unreadable per requirement 3.4.
Compensating Controls for Requirement 3.4
For companies unable to render cardholder data unreadable (for example, by encryption) due to technical
constraints or business limitations, compensating controls may be considered. Only companies that have
undertaken a risk analysis and have legitimate technological or documented business constraints can consider the
use of compensating controls to achieve compliance.
Companies that consider compensating controls for rendering cardholder data unreadable must understand the risk
to the data posed by maintaining readable cardholder data. Generally, the controls must provide additional
protection to mitigate any additional risk posed by maintaining readable cardholder data. The controls considered
must be in addition to controls required in the PCI DSS, and must satisfy the “Compensating Controls” definition in
the PCI DSS Glossary. Compensating controls may consist of either a device or combination of devices,
applications, and controls that meet all of the following conditions:
1. Provide additional segmentation/abstraction (for example, at the network-layer)
2. Provide ability to restrict access to cardholder data or databases based on the following criteria:
• IP address/Mac address
• Application/service
• User accounts/groups
• Data type (packet filtering)
3. Restrict logical access to the database
• Control logical access to the database independent of Active Directory or Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP)
4. Prevent/detect common application or database attacks (for example, SQL injection).
Company XYZ employs stand-alone Unix Servers without LDAP. As such, they each require
a ‘root’ login. It is not possible for Company XYZ to manage the ‘root’ login nor is it feasible
to log all ‘root’ activity by each user.
2. Objective: Define the objective of the original control; identify the objective met by the compensating control
The objective of requiring unique logins is twofold. First, it is not considered acceptable from
a security perspective to share login credentials. Secondly, shared logins makes it
impossible to state definitively that a person is responsible for a particular action.
3. Identified Risk: Identify any additional risk posed by the lack of the original control
Additional risk is introduced to the access control system by not ensuring all users have a
unique ID and are able to be tracked.
4. Definition of Compensating Controls: Define the compensating controls and explain how they address the objectives of the
original control and the increased risk, if any.
Company XYZ is going to require all users to log into the servers from their desktop using
the SU command. SU allows a user to access the ‘root’ account and perform actions under
the ‘root’ account but is able to be logged in the su-log directory. In this way, each user’s
actions can be tracked through the SU account.
Self-Assessment
Questionnaire
Version 1.0
Release: December 2004
How to Complete the Questionnaire
The questionnaire is divided into six sections. Each section focuses on a specific area of security, based
on the requirements included in the PCI Data Security Standard. For any questions where N/A is marked,
a brief explanation should be attached.
Questionnaire Reporting
The following must be included with the self-assessment questionnaire and system perimeter scan
results:
Organization Information
CORPORATE NAME: DBA(S):
PHONE: E-MAIL:
After completing each section of the assessment, users should fill in the rating boxes as follows:
ALL questions are answered with Green - The merchant or service provider is compliant with the
“yes” or “N/A” self-assessment portion of the PCI Data Security Standard.
Note: If “N/A” is marked, attach a brief explanation.
ANY questions are answered with Red – The merchant or service provider is not considered
“no” compliant. To reach compliance, the risk(s) must be resolved
and the self-assessment must be retaken to demonstrate
compliance.
1.1 Are all router, switches, wireless access points, and firewall Yes No
configurations secured and do they conform to documented
security standards?
1.2 If wireless technology is used, is the access to the network Yes No N/A
limited to authorized devices?
1.3 Do changes to the firewall need authorization and are the Yes No
changes logged?
1.4 Is a firewall used to protect the network and limit traffic to that Yes No
which is required to conduct business?
1.5 Are egress and ingress filters installed on all border routers to Yes No
prevent impersonation with spoofed IP addresses?
1.6 Is payment card account information stored in a database Yes No
located on the internal network (not the DMZ) and protected by
a firewall?
1.7 If wireless technology is used, do perimeter firewalls exist Yes No N/A
between wireless networks and the payment card environment?
1.8 Does each mobile computer with direct connectivity to the Yes No N/A
Internet have a personal firewall and anti-virus software
installed?
1.9 Are Web servers located on a publicly reachable network Yes No
segment separated from the internal network by a firewall
(DMZ)?
1.10 Is the firewall configured to translate (hide) internal IP Yes No
addresses, using network address translation (NAT)?
5.1 Is there a virus scanner installed on all servers and on all Yes No
workstations, and is the virus scanner regularly updated?
6.1 Are development, testing, and production systems updated with Yes No
the latest security-related patches released by the vendors?
6.2 Is the software and application development process based on Yes No N/A
an industry best practice and is information security included
throughout the software development life cycle (SDLC)
process?
6.3 If production data is used for testing and development Yes No N/A
purposes, is sensitive cardholder data sanitized before usage?
6.4 Are all changes to the production environment and applications Yes No
formally authorized, planned, and logged before being
implemented?
6.5 Were the guidelines commonly accepted by the security Yes No N/A
community (such as Open Web Application Security Project
group (www.owasp.org)) taken into account in the development
of Web applications?
6.6 When authenticating over the Internet, is the application Yes No N/A
designed to prevent malicious users from trying to determine
existing user accounts?
6.7 Is sensitive cardholder data stored in cookies secured or Yes No N/A
encrypted?
6.8 Are controls implemented on the server side to prevent SQL Yes No N/A
injection and other bypassing of client side-input controls?
7.1 Is access to payment card account numbers restricted for users Yes No
on a need-to-know basis?
9.1 Are there multiple physical security controls (such as badges, Yes No
escorts, or mantraps) in place that would prevent unauthorized
individuals from gaining access to the facility?
9.2 If wireless technology is used, do you restrict access to wireless Yes No N/A
access points, wireless gateways, and wireless handheld
devices?
9.3 Are equipment (such as servers, workstations, laptops, and Yes No
hard drives) and media containing cardholder data physically
protected against unauthorized access?
9.4 Is all cardholder data printed on paper or received by fax Yes No
protected against unauthorized access?
9.5 Are procedures in place to handle secure distribution and Yes No
disposal of backup media and other media containing sensitive
cardholder data?
9.6 Are all media devices that store cardholder data properly Yes No
inventoried and securely stored?
9.7 Is cardholder data deleted or destroyed before it is physically Yes No
disposed (for example, by shredding papers or degaussing
backup media)?
12.1 Are information security policies, including policies for access Yes No
control, application and system development, operational,
network and physical security, formally documented?
12.2 Are information security policies and other relevant security Yes No
information disseminated to all system users (including vendors,
contractors, and business partners)?
12.3 Are information security policies reviewed at least once a year Yes No
and updated as needed?
12.4 Have the roles and responsibilities for information security been Yes No
clearly defined within the company?
12.5 Is there an up-to-date information security awareness and Yes No
training program in place for all system users?
12.6 Are employees required to sign an agreement verifying they Yes No
have read and understood the security policies and
procedures?
12.7 Is a background investigation (such as a credit- and criminal- Yes No
record check, within the limits of local law) performed on all
employees with access to account numbers?
12.8 Are all third parties with access to sensitive cardholder data Yes No
contractually obligated to comply with card association security
standards?
12.9 Is a security incident response plan formally documented and Yes No
disseminated to the appropriate responsible parties?
12.10 Are security incidents reported to the person responsible for Yes No
security investigation?
12.11 Is there an incident response team ready to be deployed in Yes No
case of a cardholder data compromise?