China Under Mao

China Under Mao
CHINA UNDER M AO

A Revolution Derailed
ANDREW G. WALDER
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
2015
Copyright 2015 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First Printing
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

is available from the Library of Congress
ISBN: 978-0-674-05815-6
To the memory of Richard M. Pfeffer (19372002)
Contents
Illustrations ix
Preface xi
1. Funeral 1
2. From Movement to Regime 15
3. Rural Revolution 40
4. Urban Revolution 61
5. The Socialist Economy 82
6. The Evolving Party System 100
7. Thaw and Backlash 123
8. Great Leap 152
9. Toward the Cultural Revolution 180
10. Fractured Rebellion 200
11. Collapse and Division 231
12. Military Rule 263
13. Discord and Dissent 287
14. The Mao Era in Retrospect 315
Notes 347
References 377
Index 399
Illustrations
Illustrations follow page230.
1. Mao Zedong, Yanan, 19371938
2. National Day parade, Mao images, Beijing, 1949
3. Land reform tribunal, Guangdong, 1952
4. Execution during land reform, Fukang, 1952
5. Mao and Khrushchev, Beijing, 1958
6. Socialist Education Movement denunciation meeting, 1965
7. Wall posters at Peking University, 1966
8. Mao and Red Guards, August 18, 1966
9. Mao and Lin Biao, Tiananmen Square, August 31, 1966
10. Zhou Enlai and Central Cultural Revolution Group, 1967
11. Struggle session, Harbin party secretary, August 26, 1966
12. Struggle session, wife of Heilongjiang governor, August 29, 1966
13. Execution grounds, cleansing campaign, Harbin, April 1968
14. Kneeling at execution grounds, Harbin, April 1968
15. Burning buildings, Nanning, July 1968
16. Mass surrender of April 22 ghters, Nanning, August 1968
17. Summary executions of April 22 ghters, Nanning, August 1968
18. Wreaths for Zhou Enlai at Tiananmen Square, April 4, 1976
19. Tiananmen Square protests, April 4, 1976

Preface
The rst quarter century of communist rule in China was dramatic and
disastrous, the mark of a political regime whose extremism created a
distinctive epoch in the history of revolution. The period bore the un-
mistakable imprint of Mao Zedong, who dominated his era as thoroughly
as any leader in modern history. Recent publications, drawing on new
sources, have claried the shifting relationships and disagreements
among Chinas leaderswith Mao rmly at the centeras they came
to decisions that frequently proved disastrous for the Chinese people. I
draw on this scholarship, but I focus on the consequences of a prior set
of decisions made by these leaders, ones that were not reconsidered in
the course of the Mao era. These decisions created the orga ni zation
through which Chinas revolutionary leaders sought to enforce discipline
among their subordinates and ensure that their directives were carried
out. These decisions created a structure that served as the core of a new
revolutionary state.
Two organizations were vitally important: the rst was a Commu-
nist Party apparatus that exercised rm and at times harsh discipline
over members and especially leadersor cadres. The second was a
design for a socialist economy that was borrowed from the Soviet
Union, which created problems in the many countries that adopted it.
Chinas leaders, and especially Mao, issued directives from Beijing that
reverberated through these political and economic structures, leading
both to startling accomplishments that were intended, and to disas-
trous outcomes that were neither anticipated nor desired. This work is
motivated by the conviction that to understand why leaders decisions
especially Maos initiativeshad the effect that they had, it is essential
xii Preface
to understand the way that Chinas social structure, economy, and po-
litical system were transformed in the 1950s. These structures frustrated
the designs of Mao and other leaders, leading to the dramatic and fre-
quently disastrous outcomes of the Mao era. Although much of this
book unfolds as a narrative, it is fundamentally driven by sociolog ical
concerns.
During this period, leaders decisions were translated into action
through a certain kind of political organization, in a society and economy
organized in a distinctive way. Orders from the top reverberated through
a large national bureaucracy and a new social structure, and in the pro-
cess their intended impacts were diverted, distorted, or magnied in
unanticipated ways. The centralized and disciplined nature of the party-
state, which lent it such seeming strength, also bred peculiar vulnera-
bilities. Almost none of Maos initiatives led to outcomes that he and his
supporters fully anticipated, foresaw, or welcomed. In fact, as we shall
see, most of Maos initiatives back red. Why?
This was a society that was organized in an unusual way, distinctive
in comparison with our own, but also, by the end of the rst decade of
communist rule, quite distinctive compared with Chinas past. To un-
derstand why so many Chinese citizens participated so actively in the
campaigns and con icts of this era, we need to understand the social
and organ izational milieu in which people ofcials and ordinary citi-
zens alike lived and worked. This is especially important today, after
so much of that milieu has receded under the tidal force of a dynamic
market economy integrated into global capitalism. My aim is to show
that the events of the Mao era were an expression of distinctive institu-
tions established during the rst decade of Communist Party rule. I tell
the story of the Mao era with these institutions rmly in mind.
When I took my rst course on contemporary China as a college ju-
nior at Johns Hopkins in 1973, the subject matter of this book was still
quite obscure, a topic for speculation about very recent events in an in-
sular and isolated regime. When I taught my rst course on this subject
as a faculty member at Columbia University in 1983, I presented the ma-
terial as postrevolution Chinese societythe new society created after
the revolution of 1949 that brought the Communist Party to power.
Today, after more than three decades of post-Mao history, much of the
social and economic organization of that era has vanished under waves
of economic reformthough much of the political organization survives.
Preface xiii
With the benet of hindsight, it is clear that 1949 was actually the be-
ginning, not the end, of the Chinese revolution. The Mao era was just
as surely one of revolution as the period of guerrilla insurgency and
civil war that preceded it, and which served only as a prelude.
This account of Maos China distills a perspective that has evolved
over more than three decades of research and teaching. It tells the story
of the period as a selective narrative, from the perspective of a sociolo-
gist deeply interested in politics and the economyin par tic u lar, the
foundations of political authority, the socialist model of development,
social inequal ity, political con ict, and popular protest. There surely are
other compelling ways to tell the story of Maos China, but they are not
my own.
My past publications about China have been for specialized academic
audiences. Writings in this vein emphasize the authors conceptual frame-
work, and new and original sources of evidence and modes of analysis,
and are organized around the critical evaluation of alternative accounts.
That approach unfortunately makes such work unnecessarily tedious for
those outside a small community of specialists. This book draws deeply
on my own research and many years of reading the work of talented
colleagues, but it is not intended primarily for the specialist. Here I try
to synthesize what I have learned about this phase of Chinese history
in a way that speaks directly to my academic colleagues and students,
while remaining accessible and clear to others.
My debts are many, both intellectual and institutional. My intellec-
tual debts are too many to enumerate here, especially on subjects out-
side my own areas of research, where I have had to rely heavily on the
research and writings of colleagues. I have tried to make clear in the
citations to others works where the primary debts lay; repeated cita-
tions to the same authors indicate to whom I owe my greatest debts. Iam
grateful to Thomas Bernstein, Jean Oi, Dwight Perkins, and Michael
Schoenhals for their comments on all or part of the original draft of this
book. I should also acknowledge my collaborator and coauthor, Professor
Dong Guoqiang of Nanjing Universitys Department of History. In sev-
eral of the chapters dealing with the Cultural Revolution, I draw on our
coauthored publications. Nancy Hearst, at Harvards Fairbank Center Li-
brary, helped prepare the nal manuscript for the publisher. Stanford
University has provided me with an ideal intellectual home for almost
two decades. I would like particularly to acknowledge the generous
xiv Preface
research support provided by Stanfords Freeman-Spogli Institute for

International Studies, the School of Humanities and Sciences, and the
Shorenstein Asia-Pacic Research Center. The Stanford Center at Pe-
king University provided support for the nal stages of research and
writing, and an inspiring physical setting where most of these chap-
ters were drafted. I would also like to thank my editor at Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Michael Aronson, for his support and encouragement of a
project that is so different from others that I have undertaken.
This book is the culmination of a journey that began in a Baltimore
classroom in September 1973, in the course Government and Politics of
China, taught by my undergraduate advisor, Richard M. Pfeffer. Ric was
a committed antiwar activist and China specialist who had recently vis-
ited the Peoples Republic in one of the rst American delegations. The
unfolding Cultural Revolution fascinated him, yet he understood all too
well the abuse of authority in disciplined revolutionary organizations,
and the seemingly intractable problem of bureaucratic dictatorship under
socialism. Ric was a passionate and demanding teacher who relentlessly
forced students to examine critically all ideas, especially their own. He
did this through seemingly limitless attention to student essays, ruth-
lessly exposing lazy rhetorical evasions and logical gaps with copious and
searing marginal comments. He was also a supportive and nurturing ad-
visor, especially after you started to get the point. My college courses
did not engage me very deeply before that semester, but afterward things
snapped into focus. Rics teaching altered my lifes trajectory. This was
a gift that I can never hope to repay, but I dedicate this book to his
memory.
China Under Mao
1

Funeral
A T 3 P. M .on September 18, 1976, Beijings vast Tiananmen Square

was lled with rows of uniformed workers and soldiers, standing
silently with heads bowed. Across this nation of almost one billion people,
in public squares, villages, factories, schools, and ofces, Chinese citi-
zens assembled as part of a nationwide memorial meeting for Mao Ze-
dong, who had died nine days earlier at the age of eighty-two. All were
instructed to stand in place, heads bowed, for three minutes of silence.
Maos designated successor, the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng, read
a speech lled with extravagant praise for the deceased Chairman, who
had led the Chinese Communist Party since the early 1930s and had
thoroughly dominated the Peoples Republic since its establishment in
1949. The entire party leadership lined up in a solemn show of unity.
The illusion of unity was shattered on October 6, when Hua Guofeng
moved against Maos radical followers. Conspiring with other senior of-
cials, Hua ordered his security detail to arrest Maos key political al-
lies. Maos wife, Jiang Qing, was arrested in her living quarters. Three
othersWang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuanwere
summoned to a leadership meeting. As they arrived, one by one,
thestunned ofcials were taken into custody by armed guards. These
individuals had done Maos bidding during his Cultural Revolutionan
assault on the party-state that crippled Chinas government and economy
and caused the death and suffering of millions. At the time of their ar-
rest, they represented one-quarter of Chinas sixteen-member Politburo,
the partys top decision-making body. Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chun-
qiao were members of the select Politburo Standing Committee, ranked
second and fourth, respectively. Soon they were reviled as a Gang of Four,
2 China Under Mao
charged with counterrevolutionary subversion. In reality, their crime was

to have done Maos bidding in the last decade of his life. Still a symbol
of the revolutions legitimacy, Mao was praised in death, but this was a
coup against the most distinctive elements of his political legacy. The un-
named ringleader of the Gang of Four was Mao himself.
Twenty-seven years before, on October 1, 1949, the fty-ve-year-old

Mao Zedong, addressing a massive assembly at the same spot, declared
the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China. This promised the
end of a century of economic and political decline, colonial intrusion,
foreign invasion, and civil war. For most of the previous half-century,
China was a failed state; the wreckage of an early attempt to establish a
constitutional republic.1 For most of the half-century before that, it was
a failing multinational empire. The last imperial dynasty (the Qing, or
Manchu), established in 1644, reached its zenith in the eighteenth cen-
tury, but was in deep decline in the late nineteenth century, suffering
from widespread internal rebellion and the incursions of colonial powers.2
The enduring historical signicance of 1949 was not the triumph of the
proletariat over the bourgeoisie, nor was it the victory of communism
over capitalism. Maos declaration of the Peoples Republic promised a
new, more powerful Chinese state that could withstand global political
competition and prevent the encroachment of other world powers.
For the rst time in well over a century, there would be a Chinese
state that effectively controlled its territory within secure borders, and
that was able to stamp out pockets of domestic rebellion. For the rst
time in Chinas long history, salaried state ofcials, not local notables,
would administer Chinese society in rural villages and urban neighbor-
hoods. These ofcials were part of a national hierarchy that connected
the apex of power in Beijing directly, and relatively effectively, with life
at the grass roots. Mao and his comrades may have viewed the victory
of the Communist Party in 1949 as part of the triumph of world socialism,
but it marked the birth of Chinas rst modern national state.
The past century had been brutal. The vast Taiping Rebellion of 1850
to 1864 engulfed much of the southeastern quadrant of the Qing em-
pire for over a decade, and the epic battles that accompanied the rise and
fall of the Heavenly Kingdom of the Taiping resulted in the deaths of
more than 20 million.3 The weakened Qing state fought against an array
of local rebellions, while at the same time losing a series of wars against
colonial powers. The antiforeign Boxer Uprising of 1900, encouraged by
Funeral 3
the Qing court, was crushed by an alliance of foreign armies, and the
empire never recovered.4 The revolution of 1911 was a relatively un-
eventful collapse that marked the end of what had become a nearly mor-
ibund regime.5
The effort to establish a modern Chinese republic quickly failed. Na-
tional parliamentary elections yielded a victory for the new Nationalist
Party. Song Jiaoren, the partys founder and architect of its electoral vic-
tory, was assassinated shortly afterward by agents of Yuan Shikai, a
former Qing ofcial who aspired to establish his own dictatorship.6 China
quickly disintegrated into a collection of regional efdoms ruled by rival
military overlords.7 In the 1920s two militant revolutionary parties
sought to unify the country by armed force: the Nationalist Party, led
by Sun Yatsen and later by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist Party,
eventually taken over by the Hunan radical and guerrilla commander
Mao Zedong. For a brief period in the mid-1920s the two movements
joined forces and enjoyed some success, but the Communist Partys com-
mitment to social revolution repelled the propertied elites who were a
core element of the nationalist movement, and the alliance split apart
violently in 1927. Chiang Kai-shek purged Communists from the coali-
tion, executing thousands in a lightning strike. 8
The bloody struggle between these two revolutionary parties was
waged for more than a decade, with the Communists driven to the edge
of extinction in the mid-1930s. Then fate intervened in the form of an
aggressive and militaristic imperial Japan, which initially conquered
the entire northeastern region known as Manchuria (the present-day
provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang) in 1931, and then in
1937 turned its attention to a massive military invasion of the Chinese
homeland. The invasion and occupation crushed the Nationalist state
established only a decade before, devastating the country and killing an
estimated 12 million.9
The sudden surrender of Japa nese forces in the wake of the Amer-
ican nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 led, after
a brief respite, to the resumption of full-scale civil war. The National-
ists, who had survived the invasion in their southwestern wartime cap-
ital of Chongqing (Chungking), resumed the ght against the greatly re-
vived Communists, who had steadily built their forces throughout
northern China in a low-grade resistance movement against Japa nese
occupation that deliberately avoided direct combat. After a strong be-
ginning, the civil war went badly for the Nationalists, who rapidly
4 China Under Mao
disintegrated as a political force after suffering a series of crucial battle-

eld losses in Manchuria. By the time Mao stood at Tiananmen to an-
nounce the founding of the Peoples Republic, most of the remaining
Nationalist assets had already been evacuated to the island province of
Taiwan, and Maos huge Peoples Liberation Army was in the nal stages
of conquering Chinas southern and western provinces.
Chinas citizens undoubtedly hoped that 1949 would bring an end
to the devastation of the rst half of the twentieth century and usher in
a new era of national unity, peace, and economic progress. These hopes
would soon be dashed. The era of revolution was not over; in fact it had
just begun. It would bring devastation on a scale that neither Mao nor
his colleagues in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party could
possibly have anticipated.
The two most famous instances of the devastation that de ned Maos
legacy were the Great Leap Forward of 19581960 and the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution, now the ofcial name for the entire decade
from 1966 to 1976, whose destructive force was felt most acutely during
its rst four years. The Great Leap Forward was a massive campaign to
mobilize the entire population to work harder for longer hours, break
production records, and catch up with the worlds economic powers in
a few short years. It showed off the remarkable reach of the new party-
state, an organ izational feat that would have been unthinkable only a
decade before and that few governments could have contemplated. The
result, to the surprise and dismay of the campaigns initiators, was un-
imaginable disaster: a massive, man-made famine that led to the deaths
of close to 30 million people, and a deep industrial depression that lasted
until the mid-1960s.
The economic and demographic disaster of the Great Leap was soon
followed by the political disaster of the Cultural Revolution. Mao mobi-
lized student Red Guards against party ofcials in 1966, and after some
hesitation eventually permitted workers to join in escalating attacks
against local and regional party ofcials, who were left largely defense-
less against the onslaught. By January 1967, the civilian structure of na-
tional government virtually collapsed in most of the country, and it was
slowly, tfully, and violently rebuilt over the next two years. In the in-
tervening period, rival rebel factions fought for power in complicated al-
liances and con icts with military units that were ordered to intervene.
Many regions of China were in a state resembling civil war, with no func-
tioning civilian government. Calls for warring rebels to unite under the
Funeral 5
victorious banner of Chairman Mao went unheeded, and this phase of

the Cultural Revolution was ended only through the draconian appli-
cation of military force.
With most of China effectively under martial law by the summer of
1968, many citizens may have hoped for a respite from strife. Unfortu-
nately, however, military authorities and their civilian partners embarked
on an escalating campaign of terror against imagined class enemies and
political conspirators that unambiguously reestablished government au-
thority, but led to the interrogation and torture of millions. The carnage
ended only after the mysterious death of party vice chairman Lin Biao,
the head of Chinas armed forces and Maos designated successor, in Sep-
tember 1971. After the withdrawal of the army from civil administra-
tion, China entered an uncertain period when the former combatants
of the late 1960s resumed a factional rivalry that periodically unleashed
local unrest. The strife lasted until 1976, with massive protests against
Maos legacy in Beijing and other cities in April, six months before the
aging dictators death.
This was the history that hung heavily over the solemn assembly at
Tiananmen Square in September 1976. Among the leaders on the ros-
trum were those who had supported Mao in his Cultural Revolution,
attacked their colleagues with zeal, and who sought to keep China on
the path of Maoist revolution, denigrating those who placed production
and living standards above revolutionary principles. Also on the rostrum
were those who had somehow managed to survive the tumult relatively
unscathed, and others who had lost their posts, suffered humiliation and
even the deaths of spouses and relatives, surviving imprisonment and
banishment before being recalled to the capital in the 1970s to begin
the task of rebuilding. Maos nal plans for the survival and preserva-
tion of his legacy were about to unravel in a dramatic and surprising
turn only a few years after his death. This was the ultimate failure of a
leader who had managed to seize one defeat after another from the jaws
of an astonishing victory, consigning China to two decades of destruc-
tion and pointless con ict. Maos destructive impulses left a China in
disarray, essentially forcing his successors to start over again. Over the
next three decades, they would take China in surprising new directions.
This book aims to make sense of these events and other dramatic devel-
opments of the period. Recent scholarship on Mao and his era has brought
into clear focus the con icts and motives of actors at the top of the
6 China Under Mao
political system, as well as the consequences of these leadership decisions

for Chinese society. I draw on these works, but my account shifts atten-
tion from the question of what happened to the question of why. At the
center of the narrative is Mao Zedongwhat he wanted to accomplish,
how he hoped to do so, and what ideas and commitments motivated his
actions. The core theme is that the results of his initiatives were often
unintended, unanticipated, and unwanted, not only by the broad pop-
ulation and the party leadership, but by Mao himself. To understand why,
we need to understand the revolutionary organization that conquered
the Chinese mainland by military force in 19481949, and the legacies
of its long struggle for power. We need to understand the reconstruc-
tion of state and society in the 1950s. We need to understand how the
party was organized, and how it recruited, rewarded, and disciplined
its members. We need to understand the aws inherent in the economic
system imported from the Soviet Union, a system that Chinas leaders,
especially Mao, saw as the key to Chinas rapid industrialization. These
two organizations the party system and Soviet command economy
were at the very core of the struggles and con icts of the Mao era. They
were the focus of Maos dissatisfactions, and their features repeatedly
frustrated his aims. The Mao that emerges from this history is in many
ways an irresponsible and blundering gure, gripped by a rigid and
anachronistic revolutionary ideology. Maos personal failings, however,
do not take us very far toward explaining why matters turned out the
way that they did. My account begins with Maos interventions, and fol-
lows their consequences as they coursed through the regime that he
created, and ultimately throughout Chinese society.
The next ve chapters of this book set the stage for the dramatic se-
ries of events that follow. They explain how China was reshaped in the
decade after 1947 into a powerful and cohesive new nation-state, one
with peculiar features and striking vulnerabilities. Chapter2 is an ac-
count of the Communist Partys long road to power and the legacy of this
struggle for subsequent developments. It underplays the legacy of guer-
rilla communism and the anti-Japanese war, so central to the founding
myth of the Peoples Republic. The wartime base area of Yanan was
where the intense Stalinization of the Chinese party began, and
where Mao absorbed the central tenets of Stalin-era communism, es-
pecially the doctrine of class struggle under socialism, long misunder-
stood as Maos singular innovation. In Yanan, the party perfected its
Funeral 7
techniques for enforcing draconian demands on its members for loyalty

and conformity, and for punishing those who fell short. This would be
a source of both great strength and destructive excess in future years.
Long after the strategy of guerrilla war was abandoned, the massive mo-
bilization of civilian populations to support conventional armed forces
for civil war in the late 1940s was a decisive inuence over the regime
founded in the 1950s.
The 1950s were a period of regime building, but they were also an
era of social revolution. Chapters3 and4 sketch the revolutions main
outlines, respectively, in the countryside and cities. A system of land
tenure that had existed for centuries, and much of the social structure
that was built on it, was wiped out in a few short years. Landlordism
and tenant farming disappeared, and the rural elites that derived power
from it were eliminated. China quickly became a nation of small inde-
pendent farmers. Yet within a few years the land would be taken back
and farmers would be absorbed into collective farms. Urban life was sim-
ilarly transformed. Shopkeepers, merchants, and wealthy capitalists who
had not ed the mainland had their holdings steadily expropriated, as
their rms were consolidated into government-managed collectives or
nationalized as state enterprises. Urban and rural populations were reg-
istered, labeled, and tied to local communities. The organized crime and
armed gangs that had plagued urban and rural China were effectively
wiped out, as were the drug and sex trades and criminal protection
rackets. Urban and rural society attained a new level of stability and
order. In the process, the Communist Party was building a new and ef-
fective national state, and was using it to eliminate the sources of ineq-
uity and insecurity that had long plagued ordinary Chinese citizens.
As the 1950s progressed, this new national order assumed a strong
Soviet avor. Chapter5 describes the way that China rapidly installed a
version of the state socialist growth machine developed after the 1920s
in Stalins Soviet Union. In retrospect, this was an ill-fated choice, be-
cause that model of development was deeply awed and eventually failed
everywhere it was installed. But in the early 1950s this was still far from
evident. The model generated rapid industrial growth in the Soviet Union,
helping it to defeat Nazi Germany, and it sustained a postwar growth
spurt that augmented the USSRs military might and threatened the
Western powers. In the rst half of the 1950s, China implemented the
model with a vengeance. This was a model that dictated high rates of
8 China Under Mao
savings and investment, which by design ensured that consumption and

living standards would not rise far above subsistence guarantees for
the foreseeable future. Rationing, shortages, and substandard housing
and public infrastructure prevailed in China through the end of the
Mao era.
While all of these changes were fundamental, the most important
change in the 1950s was the extension of the Communist Partys reach
into every dimension of the countrys government, social institutions,
and enterprises. This trend, described in Chapter6, is widely acknowl-
edged but not well understood. The party did not seek to control every-
thing. It focused its attention on organizations where key government
functions were performed, where major decisions about resource allo-
cation were made, and where Chinas future elite would be trained. The
party organization quickly developed the capacity to allocate resources
and career opportunities. This dramatically altered the incentives for in-
dividuals to join the party, inevitably changing the meaning of party
membership and the motives of the people who entered into its ser vice.
Before the partys victory seemed secure, the decision to join was one
that entailed considerable sacrice, personal risk, and even danger. In
the 1950s this changed completely. Party membership became a creden-
tial that boosted ones career opportunities and even the chance to re-
ceive a higher education. Party membership, especially in early adult-
hood, greatly multiplied the odds of attaining a position of power and
privilege, and this position, once attained, created the opportunity to
extend privileges to ones relatives and descendants. These advantages,
however, continued only so long as party members showed unfailing
loyalty and obedience.
The disciplined revolutionary orga ni zation of the 1940s inevitably
evolved into an avenue of personal advancement and a structure of pa-
tronage, a trend that bothered some in the national leadership. This even-
tually became a singular preoccupation of Mao Zedong, perhaps the most
important single plank in the Maoist political platform. Strangely, as we
shall see, Mao interpreted this trend as a reversion to capitalism rather
than the inevitable evolution of a bureaucratic hierarchy with monopoly
control over property and career opportunities. With this fatally awed
diagnosis of the disease, Mao prescribed cures that were highly destruc-
tive and counterproductive. He ailed unsuccessfully against the problem
until the end of his life.
Funeral 9
These chapters set the stage for the tumultuous events of the last two
decades of Maos life. What is striking about these chapters is that in al-
most every instance, Maos initiatives back red, creating outcomes that
were unintended, unanticipated, and unwanted, and forcing Mao to
backtrack, compromise, and change course. These tumultuous two de-
cades begin with Chapter7, which recounts the reverberations in China
of the post-Stalin upheavals in the Soviet bloc, and in particular the im-
pact of Nikita Khrushchevs denunciation of Stalin at the Soviet Party
Congress in February 1956. The criticisms stung a number of leaders in
the east European satellite states, many of whom had loyally carried out
policies that imitated Stalins own. Mao was strongly associated with
these policies, which he had pushed very hard, and he had consciously
imitated Stalin, creating a personal cult and a regime that had many of
the now-stigmatized features. Mao sought to outank Khrushchev and
initiate liberalization on his own terms. In February 1957, under the
slogan Let a hundred owers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought
contend, he condently encouraged ordinary citizens to criticize the
work of party cadres throughout the country in a campaign to rectify
the partys behavior and head off the resentments that had undermined
new regimes elsewhere in the Eastern bloc. The move back red. In a
few short weeks, initially timid criticisms led to an increasing crescendo
of complaints that seemed to repudiate the partys ideology and dicta-
torial style of rule. Students and faculty established independent jour-
nals and clubs and held rallies and gave speeches on campuses. Workers
began to agitate for wage concessions and workplace representation, and
a wave of work stoppages broke out in the cities. Farmers withdrew from
recently established collective farms. Young party members and Com-
munist Youth League activists began to join the crescendo of dissent.
Maos condent assertion that the party had nothing to fear from
open criticism was a major miscalculation. In June he reversed himself
and the party struck back, and it did so with a vengeance. The critics
were targeted in a massive Antirightist Campaign that framed the critics
as antiparty reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries. Those who had
uttered virtually any kind of criticism not just those who had offered
harsh denunciations or who had engaged in organized activitieswere
put through harrowing denunciation meetings and isolated by colleagues
and friends before sentence was pronounced. They were red from their
jobs, banished to collective farms, or sent to prison or labor camps.
10 China Under Mao
Selected leaders of student protests and industrial strikes were exe-

cuted. Also targeted were many thousands of young party members
who had responded to Maos call to criticize and rectify out of a sense
of loyalty and idealism. The counterstrike worked and quickly quelled
the agitation. This ended the last outpouring of genuinely independent
political criticism of party rule until the late 1970s.
Still eager to prove that he could handle the problems of socialism
in creative and daring new ways, Mao turned to a massive industrial-
ization drive even before the end of the Antirightist Campaign. In his
Great Leap Forward, described in Chapter8, the party used its exten-
sive new national organization to mobilize workers and farmers in a crash
production campaign. Party cadres drove their subjects to work long
hours to achieve ludicrously inated targets for the production of grain,
steel, and other products. The result was a asco of disorganization, waste,
and false reporting by party bureaucrats under extreme political pres-
sures to produce results. As signs of looming economic disaster became
unmistakable, the party leadership assembled in July 1959 to decide how
to scale back their policies. Mao was already aware of the problems and
seemed poised to change course, but he reacted with defensive vindic-
tiveness to a frank letter laying out the Leaps aws from the minister
of defense, Marshal Peng Dehuai. Peng was driven from his post as a
traitor and Mao insisted on staying the course, launching instead a second
Antirightist Campaign to target anyone who expressed criticisms or
doubts. As a result, the Great Leap continued for another year, until
hunger haunted even the large cities, and the famine in rural areas had
led to death by starvation of tens of millions.
This was the second consecutive defeat for Mao Zedong, but compared
to the Hundred Flowers gambit, this was a blunder of epic proportions.
The aftermath of the Great Leap, and the political fallout that soon led
to the Cultural Revolution, are described in Chapter9. Mao permitted
others to repair the damage to the economy, but he resented the blunt
assessment of the Leaps failures by his second in command, Liu Shaoqi.
He sensed that many of his colleagues thought little of the core ideas
behind the Leap. The Soviet Union was moving in a very different di-
rection. Khrushchev articulated a vision of advanced socialism that em-
phasized scientic expertise, higher education, bureaucratic planning,
peaceful economic development and the raising of living standards, and
a relaxation of tensions with the West. Mao saw this as an unprincipled
Funeral 11
accommodation by Soviet bureaucrats to the imperialist world system,

and a reversion to a stable pattern of hierarchical privilege by an elite
stratum of educated political insiders. For Mao this amounted oddly
to a reversion to capitalism. Styling himself as a genuine revolutionary,
in contrast to the post-Stalin bureaucrats leading the USSR, Mao initi-
ated ideological polemics that led eventually to the Sino-Soviet split.
In Maos mind, the perceived ideological wavering of his colleagues
and the direction taken by the Soviet Union were intimately connected.
Mao turned seventy in 1963 and had reason to be concerned about his
political legacy. He had long resented Khrushchevs repudiation of Stalin
only three years after his death. Mao surely recognized that even if his
colleagues dared not attempt to depose him, they could simply wait until
he had passed from the scene. Mao did not trust colleagues like Liu
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping to continue his revolutionary
legacy. In view of the path taken by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, his
concerns appear to have been based on accurate perception, not para-
noia. Chapter9 concludes with an account of Maos preparations for his
spectacular assault on the party-state.
Mao could simply have rounded up those he considered insufciently
loyal to his vision, but this was no ordinary leadership purge. It was ac-
companied by a popu lar rebellion, initially by students, the topic of
Chapter10. Mao and the mass media openly encouraged the rebellion
of college and high school students against bourgeois gures on their
faculty and the administrators who sheltered them. As students formed
Red Guard organizations and engaged in increasingly violent assaults on
faculty, school administrators, and eventually government ofcials, their
actions were celebrated in the mass media and in a series of mass rallies
on Tiananmen Square during which Mao reviewed his forces. Security
and military units were ordered not to interfere. The students, however,
repeatedly divided into factions, and many resisted obvious efforts to ma-
nipulate and steer the movement, and launched attacks on the ofcials
who did so at Maos bidding.
These problems led Mao to lose faith in the student rebels, and near
the end of 1966 he decided to bring industrial workers into the unfolding
campaign. Chapter11 examines the consequences of this move. Cities
throughout China quickly became ungovernable. Some workers took up
pay and welfare demands. Others mobilized to defend local authorities
against rebel attacks. Factions began to ght one another on the streets.
12 China Under Mao
By the end of 1966, most provincial governments were on the verge of

collapse. In the face of this looming paralysis, Mao turned to power sei-
zures by local rebel forces that would unite with loyal Maoist ofcials
to overthrow local party committees and restore order. The model for
this was Shanghais January Revolution, in which a large alliance of rebel
workers joined together with the Shanghai propaganda chief Zhang
Chunqiao, and with Maos blessing established a new form of govern-
ment for Chinas largest city and proceeded to restore order with the sup-
port of the army. Zhangs coup was celebrated by Beijing as a major vic-
tory for the masses and Maos revolutionary line, and it became a blueprint
and inspiration for the victorious conclusion of the Cultural Revolution.
The imagined victory failed to materialize. Throughout China, rebel
forces that attempted their own power seizures quickly fell into disagree-
ments and split into adamantly opposed factions. The military was or-
dered to assist, but they either suppressed rebel forces favored by Mao
and his colleagues, losing their superiors condence, or themselves be-
came embroiled in local factional con icts. Beijings equivocations and
indecision permitted local warfare to spiral out of control by the summer
of 1967, leading to a situation that sometimes resembled civil war.
Mao essentially was forced to resort to martial law. The failed experi-
ment with mass rebellion and power seizures drew to a close in 1968.
Chapter12 chronicles the armys move to enforce order, treating those
who continued to resist as counterrevolutionaries and implementing a
nationwide crackdown that brooked no opposition. Millions were inves-
tigated, imprisoned, and brutally interrogated in a nationwide campaign
to stamp out any form of dissent, the Cleansing of the Class Ranks.
College campuses were emptied, and students sent to rural villages for
reeducation for inde nite periods; faculty and administrators were dis-
patched for hard labor in the countryside. Government ofce workers
were sent en masse to rural locations for reeducation through manual
labor, or to factory oors as production workers. The Mao cult reached
absurd heights, with citizens performing a loyalty dance to express
their love for the Chairman, and bowing to an altar with Maos portrait
at the beginning of each workday to ask for instructions.
These campaigns ended after September 1971, leading to an unstable
period that is described in Chapter13. Marshal Lin Biao, who had so
publicly championed the Mao cult and was rewarded by promotion to
the number two spot in the party hierarchy as Maos closest comrade
Funeral 13
in arms and successor, was dead. The ofcial story, revealed eventually
to the Chinese public, was that Lin had died in an airplane crash while
eeing to the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful military coup and at-
tempt to assassinate Mao. The public rationale for the Cultural Revolu-
tion, which had justied the unparalleled destruction of the past ve
years, was in tatters.
Major changes ensued. The army was gradually withdrawn from ci-
vilian administration. Premier Zhou Enlai, who somehow survived the
Cultural Revolution despite constant attacks by Maos colleagues for at-
tempting to blunt its destructive impact, was given authority to repair
the damage. The party organization was slowly rebuilt. The Mao cult
was scaled back and the public rituals curtailed. The universities began
to bring back faculty members and admit small entering classes. The mil-
lions of government functionaries banished to perform manual labor
were restored to ofce jobs. Leaders like Deng Xiaoping, who had disap-
peared in the tumult and were still alive (Liu Shaoqi had died in prison),
were restored to positions of prominence.
This was an uneasy calm, soon broken by an upsurge of con ict
rooted in the earlier period. A campaign to criticize Lin Biao gave license
to many of the Cultural Revolutions victims, and some of its former ac-
tivists, to criticize the movement and indirectly Chairman Mao. Former
Red Guards and rebels, and students banished to the countryside, began
to form pockets of critical independent thought. The jockeying among
leaders in Beijing over the legacy of the Cultural Revolution encouraged
their followers to resist, and factional con icts and street protests reap-
peared in many large cities. The simmering con icts found their most
dramatic expression in massive demonstrations in Tiananmen Square
on April 4 and5, 1976with counterparts in other large cities. Osten-
sibly a tribute to the recently deceased Zhou Enlai, these commemora-
tions rapidly evolved into outspoken denunciations of the ofcials who
resisted his efforts to roll back the Cultural Revolution. In retaliation,
Deng Xiaoping was removed from ofce for a second time.
Mao left a severely damaged and backward China, and Chapter14
reviews the state of the nation at the time of his death. The economy
grew despite a sharp drop after the Great Leap and a more modest down-
turn in the late 1960s. But China fell far behind other socialist countries,
and even farther behind Japan, South Korea, and other economies in
East Asia. Average real wages for industrial workers had declined since
14 China Under Mao
1957, as had housing space for urban residents, who were crowded into
squalid apartments with shared facilities. Rationing and shortages of all
manner of basic consumer goods were still in force, and supplies in
some ways had gotten worse since the 1960s. The university system
was in shambles. So was the administration of public institutions, where
expertise was denigrated and where political animosities were always
just below the surface. Capital equipment was obsolete and in poor re-
pair; product designs had not been improved since the 1950s. Huge
pockets of dire poverty remained in rural China, where a fth of the
population had a standard of living that by ofcial Chinese standards
was below subsistence level, and where the quality of the diet was later
revealed to be among the worst in Asia.
Mao left a China that was badly broken, and it would take an enor-
mous effort to x it. The devastation and backwardness that he left in
his wake prompted his successors to rethink the nations trajectory
indeed, it was a historic opportunity. When they nally seized this op-
portunity, they rejected Maos core ideas and even the antipathy to
market mechanisms and private enterprise at the core of the Soviet eco-
nomic system that had been sacrosanct in China since the 1950s. When
the dust nally cleared, the new model would be the export-oriented
developmental states of East Asia, whose features would be grafted onto
the stock of a rebuilt and revitalized Communist Party. A reform of this
magnitude could only gain traction if leaders were forced to admit that
something in China had gone seriously wrong. This was not the legacy
that Mao had hoped to leave. It was in fact the opposite of what he
intended.
2

From Movement to Regime
A two disastrous setbacks in its early years and

F T ER SU RV I V I NG
overcoming initially long odds in the civil war with the National-
ists, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 was re-
markable, and to many of its members must have seemed miraculous.
The rst setback was the ferocious purge launched by Chiang Kai-shek
in the spring of 1927, which ended the early alliance with the National-
ists and decimated the Communist Partys urban networks. Party mem-
bership declined from 58,000in April 1927 to 10,000 four months later.1
The survivors withdrew into underground cells in the cities, but most
retreated to remote rural regions and set up temporary bases. After sev-
eral years the Jiangxi Soviet became the largest, after Mao and others
established it in a mountainous border region that straddled three
southern provinces.
The second setback was the Nationalist armys 1934 military cam-
paign, which destroyed the Jiangxi Soviet and forced an arduous retreat
by remnant Communist forces. The Red Army shrank from its 1933 peak
of 150,000 to 23,000in 1936, only half of which initially made it to the
new base area in remote northern Shaanxi.2 This left the Communists
stranded in a dry and hilly border region.3 They were spared additional
attacks only by Japans full-scale invasion of 1937, which decimated Na-
tionalist armies and forced the government to retreat deep into Chinas
interior.
Even after imperial Japans sudden surrender in August 1945, vic-
tory for the Communists was still far from certain. After a forced march
to Manchuria to be resupplied by Soviet occupation forces, the civil war
with the Nationalists, who had much larger and better-equipped armies,
16 China Under Mao
initially went very badly. Communist divisions in Manchuria were

pushed back against the Soviet border in the far north, and Chiang Kai-
shek launched his armies into a massive assault to nish off the Com-
munists or drive them into Siberia. Instead, the huge Nationalist armies
disintegrated after several decisive defeats, and the regimes hold over
northern and eastern China unraveled with stunning speed. In less than
a year the Communists situation shifted from near-defeat to an utter
rout of their enemies.
The Communist Partys path to victory left a legacy that strongly
shaped the regime that took power in 1949, and also the mentalities and
behavior of leaders and party members in the years to come. This legacy,
however, is not the one celebrated in the ofcial myth about the years
of guerrilla war, symbolized by the war time capital of Yanan. Nor is it
the years of village reform and partisan activity in war time base areas
behind Japanese lines, an experience once emphasized in scholarly anal-
yses and still widely celebrated in lm and textbooks in China today.
The CCP did not win power through guerrilla war: that was a strategy
of survival during the Japa nese invasion. The CCPs victory did not ac-
tually come from armed resistance against Japan: the party intention-
ally avoided direct confrontation with the invaders. Instead, victory came
from ghting rival Chinese forces in conventional warfare. This left a
legacy of a militarized party and conventional army that extracted sac-
rice from subject populations in all-out mobilization for war. The mo-
bilization for military conquest created the bureaucratic foundations for
the new Chinese state and heavily shaped its future.
Explaining Communist Victory
Political revolutions can be viewed as a contest between two organiza-

tions: the established state and insurgent forces, who vie to establish a
monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory.4 This is
essentially the way that historians have understood the Communist vic-
tory in 1949. Few disagree that the Communist Partys organization and
strategy were superior to the Nationalists. There is wide agreement about
the Nationalists weaknesses, but there are different views about the
Communists strengths.
One type of explanation roots Communist success in the strategy of
rural revolution pioneered by the party and associated with its leading
From Movement to Regime 17
proponent, Mao Zedong. By jettisoning Marxist dogma about proletarian

revolution and shifting the revolutionary movement to the countryside,
this strategy combined guerrilla military tactics with the building of
grassroots political organizations that harnessed the activism of impov-
erished peasants.5 There are three different versions of this argument,
each of which emphasizes a different reason why the strategy appealed
to Chinas peasantry.
The rst version, and the earliest, attributes the Communists rural
support to the political impact of the Japa nese invasion, which gener-
ated a wave of peasant nationalism that the Communists rode to vic-
tory. In this view, brutal Japanese counterinsurgency tactics deep in the
rural interior created a strong upsurge of nationalism among farmers
who previously had little sense of national identity. By focusing their
efforts on rural organizing behind enemy lines, the invasion turned the
Communists guerrilla forces into champions of national salvation. There-
fore the CCP rode a wave of newly awakened peasant nationalism as de-
fenders against foreign intruders.6
A second view emphasizes the partys programs of rent reduction and
land reform, which addressed the long-standing grievances of Chinas
rural poor. This view stresses the impact of or gan i zational work by
the CCP in villages, especially its emphasis on attending to the peren-
nially precarious welfare of the poorest peasants.7 Peasant hunger for
land and for relief from onerous debt and taxes was understood by the
CCP to be the linchpin of rural political mobilization. By addressing the
interests of landless peasants and tenant farmers, the CCP unleashed
latent class con icts that created a seemingly endless reservoir of rural
support.8
A third view is a variant of the second. It emphasizes not class con-
icts that divided villagers but a traditional peasant morality that was
shared across rural social classes. According to this argument, Commu-
nist policies promoted the livelihood of the rural poor and appealed to
traditional community values that enshrined a right to basic subsistence.
The Communists appealed to the peasantry as the champions of a tra-
ditional culture that clashed with the market rationality of an expanding
global capitalism.9
These are all arguments about why the guerrilla strategy earned
peasant support. As explanations for Communist success, however, they
take us only partway toward an answer. While there is little doubt that
18 China Under Mao
the CCP successfully mobilized peasants and created village-level political

organizations, this strategy depended crucially on the ability to secure
a region militarily. Scholars have searched in vain for correlations be-
tween regions that appeared to have social conditions that would make
Communist success more likely. The only circumstance correlated with
local success was the presence of armed Communist forces.10 The par-
tys leaders did not believe that the success of their tactics was linked to
specic economic conditions. In their view, there was enough class in-
equal ity in any locality to fuel revolutionary change.11
The revolution carried out in areas under secure Communist con-
trol was inherently fragile. Base areas unraveled quickly if the balance
of military control became unfavorable. In late 1939, after Japa nese
armies consolidated their gains in North China and turned their atten-
tion to the regions where the Communists had expanded their opera-
tions, the areas controlled by the CCP shrank, and their cadres found it
difcult to secure cooperation from wary villagers.12 The same thing oc-
curred during the rst six months of the civil war, when the ght with
the Nationalists was going badly in North China. This led to widespread
defections from local party organizations and a reversal of the changes
carried out in villages. As one historian has noted about this period, As
long as the Communist armies were there, local cadres would carry out
land reform and instigate political campaigns. But with military protec-
tion gone, the new adherents to the cause in the villagesthose who
had been recruited during the last phase of the war against Japan and
during the postwar years often switched allegiance.13
Another reason why guerrilla strategy falls short as an explanation
for Communist success is that victory was actually attained through con-
ventional warfare fought between large modern armies, involving mas-
sive mobilization of material and human support for each side. Guerrilla
warfare permitted the CCP to survive and expand during the Japanese
invasion, but this survival strategy placed minimal demands on peas-
ants to supply Communist partisans with food, material support, and
recruits. Once the civil war began, the CCP abandoned guerrilla opera-
tions. As its armies poured into Manchuria after Soviet forces occupied
the territory, Mao turned to a strategy of total mobilization for revolu-
tionary war. The Red Army, renamed the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) in 1945, grew from 475,000in 1944 to 2.8 million by 1948.14 The
resources and personnel required for this massive effort far outstripped
the capacities of the older guerrilla methods. The new approach trans-
formed Chinese society in areas under party control, as well as the party
itself. The entire population was now required to take part in the mili-
tary struggle against the Nationalists. Active support of the Communist
war effort was compulsory, and all were expected to contribute supplies,
labor, and recruits. The nal years of the civil war resembled the Soviet
armys conquest of Eastern Europe in the last phases of World War II.
The PLA rolled south from Manchuria and adjacent regions of North
China, conquering vast regions that had never before been under CCP
control, and regions like Tibet and Xinjiang that had not been governed
by any Chinese state since the fall of the Qing dynasty.
The orga ni zation that defeated initially superior Nationalist forces
during the civil war was not made up of guerrilla partisans conducting
operations in far-ung rural regions. It was a militarized party engaged
in all-out mobilization to support territorial conquest by a large modern
army, and it formed the kernel of a new Chinese state. If we are to un-
derstand how the Communist Party won this contest between organi-
zations, we need to consider the reasons why the Communists efforts
in this phase of the con ict were more effective than the Nationalists.
The Military Impact of the Japanese Invasion
Our account of this historic contest between two organizations begins

on the eve of the war with Japan. In 1936, Chiang Kai-shek assembled
Nationalist armies in Shaanxi Province for a nal assault against the
Communists small base area in the Shaanxi- Gansu-Ningxia border re-
gion, and its capital Yanan. At this point the Red Army had only 50,000
troops, 29,000 guns, and no air force. The Nationalists had more than 2
million soldiers and an air force with 314 warplanes.15 Before the offen-
sive could be launched, Chiang Kai-shek was taken into custody by troops
under two of his generals who wanted him to unite with the Commu-
nists to resist Japan, which had already seized all of northeastern China
and was encroaching on North China as well. The generals were not
aware that Chiangs representatives had already agreed to do so in con-
dential negotiations. Chiang was released and the nal assault against
Yanan never took place.16
The next year the Japa nese invaded, devastating the Nationalist
state and its armies, which were no match for the Japa nese. Their best
20 China Under Mao
divisions were decimated, with 187,000 dead in the rst weeks.17 Chiang
Kai-sheks elite forces were concentrated around Shanghai and the
Nationalist capital, Nanjing. Over three months, 300,000 died in the
defense of Shanghai, and another 100,000 died defending Nanjing. By
end of 1937 the total losses were 370,000 to 450,000, one-third to one-
half of the Nationalists best divisions.18 Their stubborn resistance in-
icted unexpectedly large casualties on the enemy, for which Japa nese
forces retaliated with their notorious massacres of civilians when they
nally reached Nanjing.19
The Nationalists continued their dogged resistance as they retreated
to their war time capital of Chongqing (Chungking). By late September
1939, half a million Japa nese soldiers had been killed or seriously
wounded in battles with the Nationalists, dashing Japanese expectations
of quick victory in a lightning war. The Nationalists turned the inva-
sion into a quagmire for the superior Japa nese armies. In the winter of
1939, Chiang Kai-shek ordered a general offensive across eight war zones.
From the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 to December 7, 1941, the Na-
tionalist armies would suffer another 1.3 million casualties.20
The Communist forces were initially in no position to resist Japan.
It was left entirely to the Nationalists to defend Chinese territory, and
they bore the brunt of the onslaught. The Communists entered the war
with only 30,000 troops. In September 1937 they were reorganized into
the Eighth Route Army. Shortly afterward, the New Fourth Army was
established to operate in central China, comprising the remnants of
troops left behind in the evacuation of the Jiangxi Soviet in 1934. 21
Mao was acutely aware of his partys strategic weakness, and he called
for guerrilla warfare, the avoidance of direct confrontation with Japa-
nese main forces, and the preservation and expansion of military re-
sources.22 From 1937 to 1939, during the rst two years of the war, Japa-
nese forces stayed close to railway lines and depots, leaving the countryside
unguarded. When they shifted their attention to securing their hold over
broader areas, the CCP had already expanded into rural areas behind
their lines.23 At this point some of Maos commanders urged mobile war-
fare against the Japanese, arguing that guerrilla warfare would have little
impact. They called for closer cooperation with Nationalist forces in an
effort to in ict larger losses on Japa nese armies, and they received sup-
port from a number of party leaders.24 Mao, however, insisted on avoiding
military confrontation and ordered the Eighth Route and New Fourth
armies to disperse into small units and engage in recruitment, political

work, and base area construction. Under this strategy, by design, there
were to be very few clashes with Japa nese troops, and even then only
small ones. Japanese patrols or puppet Chinese security forces would be
ambushed or raided for material and weapons. Collaborators were as-
sassinated, rail lines torn up, mines laid on roads, telegraph poles cut
down, and wire stolen.25
The sole exception was 1940. With growing condence due to their
expanding control of the countryside, the CCP launched its only sus-
tained offensive of the war. Mao authorized coordinated attacks by 104
regiments against rail lines, major roads, coal mines, and other infra-
structure in Japa nese hands. The Eighth Route Army lost 22,000 killed
and wounded, while the Japa nese lost an estimated 3,000 to 4,000. The
Japanese sent large reinforcements on search and destroy operations and
recovered all their lost territory, leveling villages that collaborated with
the CCP, massacring human populations and livestock, and building
block houses and strategic villages. The population in the Communist-
controlled areas dropped from 44 to 25 million, and the Eighth Route
Army shrank from 400,000 to 300,000. By 1942, 90 percent of the former
Communist base areas on the North China Plain were under enemy con-
trol or were actively contested. Having provoked a erce reaction, Mao
reverted to his previous strategy and would never launch another major
offensive against the Japanese.26
There was a staggering imbalance in the burdens of combat. In Jan-
uary 1940, Zhou Enlai sent a report to Stalin, commenting on the fa-
vorable impact of the war against Japan. He stated that more than 1 mil-
lion Chinese soldiers had been killed or wounded by August 1939, but
only 30,000 from the Eighth Route Army and1,000 from the New Fourth
Army. Halfway into the war, the CCP had suffered only 3 percent of total
Chinese military casualties.27 Despite their devastating losses, the Na-
tionalists continually rebuilt their armed forces and persisted in their
resistance against Japan in the years to come. The last major stand was
their 1944 defense of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi against a large Japa-
nese offensive known as the Ichigo Campaign.28 Nationalist forces suf-
fered another 146,000 casualties. In the words of one analyst, Japan
delivered a mortal blow to the Nationalist Chinese army from which she
never had time to recover.29 By the end of the war it was in an advanced
stage of deterioration.30
22 China Under Mao
In the wake of the Communist victory in 1949 and the CCPs subse-
quent decades of lavish self-praise as heroes of the anti-Japanese
resistance, the Nationalist war effort has often been overlooked and deni-
grated.31 In the view of one of the most acute critics of the Nationalists
failures, their military accomplishments were considerable: [The Nation-
alist army] persisted for eight years in a war against an enemy force that
was decidedly superior in organization, training, and equipment. . . .
Completely frustrating Japanese expectations of a quick and decisive vic-
tory, it actively fought at Shanghai, at Nanking, and on the plains of North
and Central China, incurring frightful losses . . . [and] mired the Japa-
nese army in the vastness of the Chinese nation.32 During the entire
Chinese war, Japan suffered 483,708 dead and1.9 million wounded, and
Chinese forces suffered 1.3 million dead and1.7 million wounded.33
The Communists contribution to the war effort was extremely
modest. According to a December 1944 Soviet Comintern report, a total
of more than 1 million Nationalist troops had been killed in battle, com-
pared to 103,186in the CCPs Eighth Route Army and another several
thousand in the New Fourth Army. The Communists suffered only 10
percent of total Chinese military casualties.34 One author has called
Maos famous doctrine of peoples war one of the great myths about
the period: peoples war was hardly used in the con ict against the
Japa nese.35
The Political Impact of the Japanese Invasion
The invasions impact was not purely military. It also weakened the co-
herence of the Nationalist regime. The state established by Chiang Kai-
shek was never a unied national organization, nor were its large armies
all under central control. After the purge of the Communists in 1927,
Chiang curtailed popular mobilization and negotiated a series of agree-
ments with regional warlords, who pledged nominal allegiance to Nan-
jing while retaining considerable autonomy.36 At the high point of central
control in 1935, Chiangs Nationalist Party directly controlled fewer
than one-third of Chinas provinces, primarily in eastern and central
China; the rest were controlled by various warlords or the Japanese (in
Manchuria).37 Control over military forces was no different. Out of a total
of 176 army divisions in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek directly controlled only
31.38 When the Japa nese invaded coastal China in 1937 and drove in-
land up the Yangzi River, they pushed the Nationalists out of their core
homeland, and Chiang Kai-sheks elite divisions bore the brunt.39
Chiangs reliance on the army to unify the Nationalist regime made
it, in the words of one analyst, an extremely narrowly based milita-
ristic regime under the guise of party leadership.40 The army was the
regimes principal foundation. The Nationalist Party and the Nanjing gov-
ernment never developed rm social foundations or created strong in-
stitutions. The weakening of the army during the war against Japan un-
dermined the government and proved fatal after the Japanese surrender.41
The invasion undercut Chiangs control over allied warlords. Govern-
ment administration in areas nominally under Nationalist control dete-
riorated badly, undermining the ability of the central government to
collect taxes and conscript soldiers. The Nationalist Party was only one
of several competing political forces, and the party itself was poorly in-
tegrated and deeply factionalized.42 Chiang Kai-shek held the entire
structure together, largely through personal loyalties that tied him to
top military commanders and party leaders. The party itself atrophied:
during the war, party work was nonex istent on the mass level, and the
party organizations, wherever existing, were controlled and exploited
by local leaders to advance their own vested interests.43
Chiang Kai-shek recognized the organizational weakness of his re-
gime and admired the discipline and unity of the Communists. Liu
Shaoqi codied the Communist Partys ethic of discipline and obedience
in 1939: Every Party member must completely identify his personal in-
terests with those of the Party both in his thinking and in his actions. He
must be able to yield to the interests of the Party without any hesitation
or reluctance and sacrice his personal interests whenever the two are at
variance. Unhesitating readiness to sacrice personal interests, even
ones life, for the Party and the proletariat and for the emancipation of
the nation. . . . 44 In 1938 Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, Commu-
nist parties all over the world have long been working underground,
thus they have a tightly organized structure and an iron discipline that
dees other parties. Chiang lamented the state of his own party, which
he characterized as a special class struggling for power and selsh inter-
ests, alienating the masses.45 After resigning from the presidency in
January 1949, before his departure for Taiwan, Chiang wrote about his
imminent defeat: The chief reason, which cannot be denied, arose from
the paralysis of the party: the membership, organizational structure, and
24 China Under Mao
method of leadership all created problems. Thus, the party became a life-
less shell, the government and military also lost their soul, and as a result
the troops collapsed and society disintegrated.46 The lesson was not
wasted, and as soon as Chiang landed on Taiwan he set about to create a
much more centralized dictatorship, ruthlessly enforcing the discipline
and coherence that his regime had always lacked on the mainland.47
If Chiang had long recognized the lack of unity and discipline of his
forces, why was he unable to remedy the problem? Much of the answer
is political geography, combined with the social composition of Nation-
alist Party members. After 1927, the Nationalist Party was spread across
large regions of China, concentrated in towns and large cities. Most of
its members had civilian jobs and business interests, many were profes-
sionals, and some were wealthy. Party life constituted only a fraction of
their attention, and there were many competing family and occupational
interests. Because the Nationalists were located in regions rich in re-
sources, they were able to extract the revenues they needed without de-
veloping strong ties to grassroots communities. Party and government
posts could easily become tools of personal enrichment. The National-
ists continued to rule the rural hinterland in a way similar to imperial
dynasties of a past era, permitting local notables to handle the functions
of government and collect taxes with relative autonomy.
Sources of Communist Party Discipline
The Communists situation was virtually the opposite. After 1927 they
were forced into isolated rural regions. As they built up their organiza-
tion in resource-poor rural regions, they were forced to develop close
ties with the rural populations that sustained them. Party members and
cadres were not integrated into urban society; they had no competing
professions, no property, and no business interests. Party work was of
necessity their entire lives. And there was little option to exit if they had
wanted to do so. Hemmed in rst by hostile Nationalist and then by Japa-
nese forces, it was difcult to defect from the movement and avoid im-
prisonment, torture, or execution. Communist cadres depended on the
party organization for their livelihoods.
While political geography lent the Communists an inherent advan-
tage, their single-minded focus on instilling discipline and unityin
many ways an obsessionis what permitted them to capitalize on it. The
party placed severe demands for discipline on its members, and its ef-
forts to enforce it could be devastatingly harsh. In the early years, party
purges were brutal and violent. The rst major purge, from 1930 to 1932,
was a campaign to suppress counterrevolution within the guerrilla
forces in the Jiangxi Soviet.48 Mao was convinced that resistance by local
commanders was due to an underground conspiracy, and he unleashed
a wave of torture and mass executions, as party inquisitors blanketed
the areas involved and went after suspects.49 A purge in another base
area during the period has been described as a near-hysterical witch-
hunt, a frenzied effort by local cadres to save their own hides by coming
up with expanding lists of counterrevolutionaries among their col-
leagues.50 Ofcial party histories put the death toll from that incident
at 2,500, but independent historians estimate that the actual number
was close to 10,000.51 Similar purges occurred in other local bases from
1934 to 1937, involving the routine extraction of confessions under tor-
ture and the summary execution of hundreds.52
These terroristic and self-destructive approaches to internal discipline
would be modied, re ned, and expanded as the party grew during the
anti-Japanese war, although charges of internal conspiracy and the ex-
traction of confessions through psychological pressure and physical tor-
ture would recur. The new methods were developed in Yanan and cul-
minated in the rectication campaign of 19421944. The campaign was
part of the intense Stalinization of the Chinese party, helped by the trans-
lation into Chinese of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(Bolsheviks): Short Course, which was compiled and published under Sta-
lins direction in 1938.53
The process began after the arrival in Yanan in October 1937 of party
leaders who had spent the previous years in Moscow, one of whom, Wang
Ming, aspired to challenge Mao for party leadership.54 Wang Ming had
spent most of his adult life in the Soviet Union and was well known to
Stalin. He was educated and articulate, far more conversant with Marxist
theory than Mao, who had never been abroad and whose authority rested
primarily on his abilities as a guerrilla strategist and shrewd political in-
ghter. Wang presented himself as the true interpreter of Stalins wishes
and tried unsuccessfully to undermine Maos authority. Shortly after ar-
riving in Yanan, Wang conveyed the instruction that Mao should be
strengthened ideologically because of his narrow empiricism and ig-
norance of Marxism-Leninism. 55 Mao responded by burnishing his
26 China Under Mao
Marxist credentials, solidifying his control of the party organization, and

elevating his status as a leader with attributes that mimicked Stalins in
the Soviet Union.56 Maos budding personality cult was in part intended
to compete with that of Chiang Kai-shek, who was the symbol of Chi-
nas war time resistance and was recognized internationally as Chinas
leader, even by the Soviet Union.57
Mao was assisted in this makeover by political secretaries, especially
Chen Boda, who studied at the Communist-controlled Shanghai Labor
University in the mid-1920s and later at Moscows Sun Yatsen Univer-
sity.58 Chen recommended readings for Mao, instructing him in the ba-
sics and editing his drafts. Mao began with Chinese translations of two
Soviet textbooks and one article published in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.
Easily the most inuential text was the Short Course, available in Chi-
nese translation in 1939.59 The book had a major impact on Mao, and
for the rest of his life it shaped his understanding of Marxism-Leninism
and the building of socialism. He once said that he never read the whole
book, but focused on the concluding sections of each chapter. Despite
his relatively shallow engagement with the material, he adopted its in-
terpretations uncritically and dogmatically.60
The Short Course was a schematic history of the growth and eventual
triumph of the Bolshevik Party in Russia, culminating in the historic
contributions of Stalin in the building of a socialist economy in the So-
viet Union. Mao would later adopt this story as his blueprint for China
in the 1950s. At this point in time, however, the textbooks greatest im-
pact was in its portrayal of Stalins struggle for dominance over his
rivals for the party leadership. The Short Course portrayed policy dis-
agreements as intraparty struggles that reected correct and incor-
rect lines, with each line, in turn, representing a class struggle between
revolutionary and reactionary forces. The books central tenet was that
class struggle continues after the establishment of socialism, and that
the capitalist class always in ltrates the party with representatives who
have to be rooted out and overthrown.61 Thus policy disagreements with
rivals like Bukharin and Trotsky were portrayed as struggles against
conspirators who represented the capitalist class and who headed an
inner-party conspiracy against socialism. The account gloried Stalin
and burnished his cult as an infallible leader who unerringly supported
the correct line. Mao imitated this example as he reinforced his au-
thority with a cult of personality and demands for obedience to a new
creation developed in collaboration with Chen Boda, known as Mao

Zedong Thought.62
The Partys First Stalinist Purge
The rectication campaign of 19421944 completed this process.63 As

the capital of the Communists war time base area, Yanan was a magnet
for patriotic youth, workers, and intellectuals who ed the Japanese in-
vasion to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle. Many were urbanites
with vague leftist views. Most had not previously been party members
and held liberal attitudes and idealistic views about democracy.64 Some
of them resisted the more severe forms of party discipline and were put
off by the dogmatism and hierarchy of the incipient party bureaucracy.
Within the party leadership, on the other hand, there was always the
worry that Nationalist agents had inltrated Yanan during the migration
touched off by the Japa nese invasion.
Mao made two speeches in early February 1942 to initiate the cam-
paign. He criticized three mistaken tendencies in the party: subjec-
tivism, sectarianism, and formalism. These labels were aimed at indi-
viduals who had recently migrated to Yanan and who still lacked
revolutionary experience, and more importantly at the party ofcials
who had recently returned from Moscow, in par ticular his rival, Wang
Ming. The worst form of subjectivism, according to Mao, was
dogmatism the assertion of authority based only on the study of
Marxist classics, without an understanding of specic political condi-
tions in China. Sectarianism was the error of putting ones par ticular
interests above those of the party, and by extension the higher aims of
the movement. While the party needed democracy, it needed centralism
even more subjection of ones personal interests to those of the party,
as de ned by its leadership. Mao declared that criticism of ones own
past behavior was essential to eradicate these problems and to prevent
future misbehavior. Distinguishing the current campaign from the bloody
purges of the past decade (and perhaps also from Stalins recent mass
executions of party ofcials in the USSR), Mao described the campaign
as analogous to a doctor curing the patient: the objective was to cure
the symptoms and eradicate the underlying disease.65
Maos call for criticism elicited an enthusiastic but unwanted response
from individuals who staffed the cadre schools and party newspaper in
28 China Under Mao
Yanan. In essays published in that paper and posted as wall newspa-

pers, the authors interpreted dogmatism to mean the control of lit-
erature and art by rigid and poorly educated party bureaucrats. They ar-
gued for a greater separation of politics and literature, and greater freedom
from the dictates of party propaganda. Others, like the famous novelist
Ding Ling, criticized the partys shabby treatment of women and the male
dominance and sexism that pervaded Yanan. By far the most contro-
versial and hard-hitting were a series of essays by Wang Shiwei, a trans-
lator in party organs. He charged that the ofcially approved literature
was coarse and inferior, and called for higher artistic standards. He ar-
gued that many ranking cadres in Yanan had become insensitive and
dictatorial in dealing with their young and idealistic subordinates, alien-
ating them from the party. He pointed out the emergence of privileges
tied to rank and the creation of a stratied system of rations for food,
clothing, and living quarters. He also criticized married cadres pursuit
of attractive younger women and their preferential access to them for
sexual activity, and their neglect of less glamorous older wives who had
been revolutionary comrades for many years. The last charge reportedly
incensed Mao, who had recently abandoned his wife from the Jiangxi
Soviet in favor of a young actress from Shanghai later known as Jiang
Qing. Wang criticized the party leaders habit of holding dance parties
each weekend while soldiers were ghting at the front. He reported the
hypocrisy with which these cadres defended their privileges and the
anger they displayed when they were challenged about them.66
These essays hit a responsive chord with many educated individuals
in the central party organs, but the critics threatened to divert the rec-
tication campaign from its real aims. Mao wanted to strengthen party
discipline and consolidate his personal authority. Independent challenges
to the absolute authority he was trying to accomplish especially the
criticisms of abuses that applied especially to himwere unacceptable.
The rectication campaign quickly turned into criticism and struggle ses-
sions against the critics and those who agreed with them. While others
penned abject confessions of guilt and promises to change their thinking,
Wang Shiwei refused to confess and argued with his accusers. Con-
demned as the head of a ve-person antiparty group, denounced as a
Trotskyite and a traitor, he was imprisoned along with others after a
highly publicized show trial. He remained in prison until his execution
in 1947.67
After silencing the critics, Mao unleashed the campaign on the en-
tire party hierarchy, with an increasing emphasis on traitors and spies
hidden in the partys ranks. Responsibility for organizing the rectica-
tion campaign was given to Kang Sheng, who had returned from Moscow
along with Wang Ming in 1937. Kang backed Mao in his rivalry with
Wang Ming and was put in charge of the CCP secret ser vice and internal
security in 1939.68 In 1941 he was made director of a committee for cadre
screening. The counterattack against intellectuals as traitors and Trotsky-
ites was expanded into a broad search for enemy agents in the CCP
throughout all of its areas of operation, with an emphasis on deviations
in thought.69
The campaign to cleanse the party of suspected traitors and spies
began with a screening of the les of cadres and party members. Inves-
tigators looked for those with suspicious backgrounds and af liations
prior members of Nationalist youth organizations who had defected,
and party operatives who had worked underground in enemy areas
(especially if they had been arrested and later released). In the rst
stages of the campaign, individuals were required to hand their
hearts to the party and report truthfully on their conversion to the
Communists cause and how they came to repudiate their previous po-
litical leanings. Inevitably, many people burnished their biographies and
left out inconvenient associations or activities. When it became clear that
many had been less than candid in reporting their class background
and prior associations, those responsible for internal security became
suspicious. Individuals who had shown too much independence of
mind by questioning the authority of their superiors or expressing
doubts about the wisdom of party policies were prime candidates for
investigation.
As it spread, the later stages of the rectication campaign increas-
ingly employed prolonged and psychologically coercive interrogations to
extract confessions and, increasingly, physical abuse. Large numbers of
false cases were built up about underground spy organizations. Confes-
sions given under these circumstances spiraled out of control. Believing
the coerced confessions, the partys inquisitors proceeded to demand
names of others involved in the conspiracies. Those who confessed falsely
to the charges to avoid further torment found that their ordeal was not
over until they named names. As names were extracted, the new sus-
pects were dragged in for the same treatment. The partys inquisitors
30 China Under Mao
generated manufactured evidence of what appeared to be a surprisingly

vast number of underground conspirators within the party.70
The campaign terrorized the party organization and led to dissatis-
faction among top leaders whose subordinates were caught up in the
dragnet. In par ticular, Zhou Enlai was indirectly implicated in Kangs
charges of a conspiracy in the underground organizations that were
under Zhous direction. Zhou denied this, and an investigation subse-
quently uncovered the routine use of torture to extract false confessions.
Mao backtracked in October 1943, seeing how unpopular the campaign
had become. Realizing that the campaign threatened to split and weaken
the party, he stepped in and called a halt to summary executions and
physical torture.71
In a March1944 report, Kang Sheng acknowledged the abuses, but
he still judged the campaign a huge success. The campaign had been very
successful in raising the consciousness of the masses and revealing
subversive elements. However, there were some regrettable shortcom-
ings: particularly the old problem of applying torture, extracting a con-
fession, and believing it. Kang attributed the recurrence of this practice
to inexperience, an unfortunate but unavoidable problem in mass
movements in which boorish attitudes led to oversimplied standards.
Kang lamented the fact that some comrades interpreted the partys policy
of leniency to mean nothing more than refraining from summary ex-
ecutions: Consequently, such other punishments as beating and abuse
and making arbitrary espionage accusations are considered harmless.
Accepting false accusations and confessions extracted through torture
is still a mistaken idea that lingers to a serious extent among cadres.72
Kang explained that in fact fewer than 10 percent of those who had con-
fessed under duress were actually enemy agents.73
Kang Sheng bore the blame for the campaign, even though Mao was
rmly behind it. Kangs inuence fell and he was relegated to minor roles
in the party well into the early 1960s.74 While the campaigns excesses
were ofcially regretted, only the use of physical torture to extract con-
fessions was deemed to be an error. The broader aims of the campaign
were not, especially the sense of fear that it provoked among both party
cadres and ordinary citizens about coming under suspicion for disloy-
alty. The campaign essentially made it treasonous to disagree with party
policies. As one analyst has noted, the stick, a fear of implication in trai-
torous activities, helped maintain a level of anxiety that also induced
conformity to Communist policy.75 The discipline and conformity that

resulted was an important ingredient of the CCPs success, and failure
to conform was always treated harshly in the years to come.
In its isolated base area, far removed from the main theaters of the
war against Japan, Mao and his colleagues molded the CCP and its armies
into a disciplined ghting force. The discipline was harsh, the confor-
mity it induced could be extreme, but despite costly abuses it achieved
the intended results. During this same period the Nationalist armies con-
fronted the nal Japanese offensive and the Nationalist Party had al-
most ceased to function at the grass roots. Mao coercively remolded the
CCP into a unied and disciplined hierarchy under his command. It was
this organization that would soon face off against the fragmented and
factionalized Nationalist regime that rushed to resume control over ter-
ritories vacated by surrendering Japa nese armies.
The Civil War
The civil war was the decisive phase of the contest between the organi-
zations headed by Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. Although Mao pre-
vailed in the end, the outcome was by no means predetermined. In June
1946, when full-scale civil war began, the Nationalists had 4.3 million
troops and the Communists only 1.2 million, and the Nationalists had
superior armaments.76 The civil war initially went badly for the Com-
munists, and as late as 1947 Stalin and many of Maos colleagues called
for a negotiated settlement. Mao, however, insisted that victory could
be won. Chiang Kai-shek gambled everything on crushing the Commu-
nists best divisions in Manchuria. That gamble failed, and as his armies
disintegrated his state unraveled, exposing the accumulated weaknesses
of the war years. The Communists abandoned guerrilla tactics, shifting
to all-out mobilization for conventional warfare. In view of the Nation-
alist debacle in the nal years of the civil war, historians have asked
whether the outcome was more a reection of Nationalist weaknesses
than Communist strengths, and whether the outcome may nonetheless
have been different if the leaders on each side had made different choices
at crucial turning points.
Shortly after the Japanese surrender, Communist armies were merged
into the renamed Peoples Liberation Army. The main force under Gen-
eral Lin Biao moved into Manchuria in late 1945 to be resupplied by
32 China Under Mao
the Soviet troops that had occupied the region. Lin turned his armies
into strong combat units, applying military techniques he learned during
his years in the USSR. He proved to be a master of the tactics of posi-
tional warfare, in par tic ular speed of movement, surprise, and counter-
attack. Lins model for the war with the Nationalists was the Soviet
campaigns against Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe at the end of World
War II. He argued that with the right kind of training and ample supplies
of Japa nese weapons (and later American weapons captured from
Nationalist forces), it was possible to win this type of war.77 Lins con-
dence reinforced Maos determination to push for a nal victory.
Nationalist armies in 1946 were fragmented and still recovering from
their costly battles with superior Japanese forces. Some of the remaining
divisions were well trained and equipped and among the best in Chi-
nese history, while others were poorly disciplined bands of stragglers that
victimized the population for loot. Some of the commanders were deeply
loyal to Chiang Kai-shek and considered him a national savior, while
others were still loyal to former warlords who held positions in the Na-
tionalist government. Because the command of armed troops was the
basis for authority in the factionalized politics of the Nationalist regime,
many regional commanders were reluctant to engage in combat, hoping
that their rivals would bear the costs.78
The Nationalists also had problems reestablishing their authority in
the wake of the Japa nese surrender. They rushed to take control over
cities in the regions long under Japa nese control, pushing aside elites
who had survived or who had collaborated with the occupiers. Nation-
alist ofcials often acted as if they were seizing privileges that had be-
longed to them in the past, enriching themselves at the populations ex-
pense.79 They had never developed strong rural organizations. Their
attempts to collect taxes during the civil war created hardships for rural
populations already suffering from recent famines and war time depri-
vations. Their conscription policies were onerous, coercive, and deeply
resented, often taking the form of surprise nighttime raids, and they were
riddled with corruption, as wealthier families could pay for draft exemp-
tions.80 In 1948, only 21 percent of government expenditures were met
through taxation, and68 percent were met by printing new currency,
creating hyperination in the later stages of the civil war, and hardships
that undermined morale.81
Chiang Kai-shek understood these structural weaknesses and lacked

condence in his ability to prevail in a prolonged con ict. He felt com-
pelled to destroy the PLAs largest and best eld armies, and he refused
to contemplate negotiations or a coalition government. Late in 1946 he
launched a broad attack across the entire front from Yanan to the Pa-
cic coast, and moved his forces deep into Manchuria. In the rst months
of the campaign the Communists lost one battle after another. In
March1947, Chiangs troops captured Yanan.82 Chiang had hoped to
capture the Communists entire leadership and destroy the army com-
mand, but a spy in Chiangs staff ofce warned the CCP two weeks in
advance, permitting their safe evacuation.83
When the Communists took over large parts of Manchuria from So-
viet armies, they continued to focus on the countryside, intensifying and
radicalizing the rural revolution that they had earlier conducted in areas
under their control. Land reform in Manchuria during 1947 and1948
has been called unrestricted revolutionary terror.84 Party cadres en-
tered villages and ensured that landlords, rich peasants, suspected enemy
agents, or anyone else seen as an obstacle to Communist control were
subjected to struggle sessions that forced victims to kneel, hear shouted
accusations, wear posters or caps proclaiming their guilt, and endure in-
terrogations that involved physical abuse and sleep deprivation. These
struggle sessions were a form of political theater: individuals in these
communities realized clearly that their fate under the new authorities
depended on their eagerness to accuse and to condemn. The struggle ses-
sions frequently ended in severe beatings, torture, and summary exe-
cutions that were initially encouraged by the CCP before they decided
later that excessive violence was counterproductive.85
Immediately after the liquidation of landlords and the distribution
of their land and other assets, farmers were faced with demands for food,
supplies, and labor. This was different from the relationship between CCP
forces and the rural population in the older base areas. The earlier land
reform was carried out more slowly and less coercively, and was usually
less violent, and afterward much less onerous demands were placed on
subject populations. This was something new: a war time mobilization
to support a large conventional army, a type of warfare that the CCP had
avoided during the Japa nese invasion. This new war against large Na-
tionalist armies required huge supplies of men, weapons, war materiel,
34 China Under Mao
provisions, horses, and transportation equipment. Compliance was

not voluntary and supplies were not purchased. A massive new army
was being mobilized, needing food, support workers, shoes, uniforms,
weapons, and fuel. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and tens of thou-
sands of Communist leaders, cadres, and local organizers also consumed
requisitioned supplies.86
While the CCP was building its forces in the large new base area in
Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek continued his push to destroy the Com-
munists best armies. After more than a year of battleeld successes, the
tide turned in 1948. Mao dispatched forces to a mountain range in the
central plains forcing Chiang to redeploy units to defend the major cities
under his control along the Yangzi River valley. The Communist coun-
terattack ruined Chiangs strategy for victory. Their rst major victory
was in 1947, when PLA divisions defeated a large Nationalist offensive
in the central plains. His condence vindicated, Mao called for an
offensive in all theaters of the war, assumed control of all military
decisions, and condently predicted victory within ve years.87 In April
1948, Communist forces retook Yanan. By June the Nationalist forces
had shrunk to 3.6 million, while the Communists had grown to 2.8
million.88
Chiang Kai-shek redoubled his efforts to crush PLA forces in Man-
churia, hoping to drive them into Siberia. He sent massive reinforce-
ments, including his best-trained and best-equipped divisions. In a se-
ries of decisive battles during the rst three months of 1948, Lin Biaos
forces outmaneuvered, cut off, and destroyed Chiangs large armies in
southern Manchuria, completely changing the direction of the war.89
As the tide turned, Chiang lost condence and began to explore a with-
drawal of his best forces to Taiwan. His only strategy for victory was mili-
tary and there was no backup plan. Chiang began to lose his grip on his
party, and many of his subordinates began to lose faith in him. Urban
support for the Nationalist war effort fell off among all groups, hyper-
ination undermined the economy, and sympathy for the CCP rose
among students and other urban groups. The American government,
which had supported Chiang with military aid and loans, lost condence
that he could win, and their assistance slowed.90 Chiang nally lost Man-
churia in a defeat in late 1948, losing 400,000 of his best troops.91
In the wake of Lin Biaos decisive victories, it now looked as if Maos
unwavering condence in victory had been prophetic. He immediately
began planning for a new campaign to capture all of North China. His
stature in the party assumed godlike proportions, helped by party pro-
paganda that attributed the recent victories to his military genius. Mao
had long rejected cautious advice for a slower push toward victory by
19511952 from the Soviet Union and other party leaders. The Soviets
still ofcially recognized the Nationalists as the legitimate government
of China. Stalin had long considered a coalition government, or sepa-
rate regimes, as the most favorable possible outcome. For Mao, however,
the coming offensive would nally prove that total victory was possible.92
As the PLA pushed forward, many in the party leadership worried
that their armies were overextended and needed to regroup, but Mao
insisted on racing ahead to nal victory. Stalin counseled caution and
in January 1949 he advised Mao to negotiate a settlement, advice
viewed favorably by Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. Mao took offense at
Stalins effort to stop the PLA offensive, which might have resulted in
separate regimes, north and south. He ignored this advice and pushed
ahead.93
Completing the Military Conquest
Once again Maos condence proved prescient. Chiangs armies collapsed

and military commanders and civilian authorities began to surrender.
Entire divisions defected to the Communists. The Manchurian city of
Changchun had been surrounded and starved into submission by Com-
munist forces under Lin Biao during a ve-month siege that ended with
the surrender of surviving Nationalist troops in October 1948. An esti-
mated 160,000 civilians perished in the bombardment and starvation
of the besieged city. The Changchun example sapped the will of re-
maining Nationalist commanders to sacrice civilian populations in ef-
forts to resist advancing communist forces.94 Beijing was surrendered
without a ght in January 1949, and Tianjin fell shortly afterward.95 Nan-
jing, the Nationalist capital, fell in April, and Shanghai in May. The rem-
nants of the Nationalist regime ed to Guangzhou, later to Chongqing,
and nally to Chengdu in December 1949, before the formal transfer of
the Nationalist government to Taiwan.96
As the PLA swept toward nal victory, the CCP nally had to act on
the question of where the borders of China were to be drawn. The status
of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia had long been at issue. The Ming
36 China Under Mao
dynasty, the last period of rule by ethnic Han Chinese, was roughly
one-third the size of China in 1911.97 Chinas last empire, the Qing, was
a multinational state ruled by ethnic Manchus who invaded Ming
China in 1644 from their homeland in what is now northeastern
China (or Manchuria). They greatly expanded the Ming borders through
military conquest in the early 1700s, incorporating non-Han peoples in
Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, who ercely resisted the expansion of
Chinese imperial rule and who rebelled periodically until the dynastys
end.98 After the fall of the Qing in 1911, these regions reasserted their
independence. The Soviet Union backed the creation of an independent
Mongolia in 1921, and in 1924 the country became a communist re-
gime and Soviet satellite.99 This was strongly opposed by the National-
ists, who refused to recognize the new Mongolian state and continued
to insist on the historical borders of the Qing empire. The Communists,
heavily reliant on the Soviet Union for nancial and military assis-
tance, acquiesced to the new reality. The Nationalist regime only relin-
quished its claim to all of Mongolia in a treaty signed with the Soviet
Union in August 1945, in return for Soviet recognition of Chiang Kai-
shek as Chinas legitimate head of state.100 This left only Inner Mongolia
within Chinese borders.
The Communists position on Chinas national borders initially sup-
ported the aspirations of large non-Han nationalities. Until the 1940s,
the partys position on Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet was that they would
rst receive full autonomy and then, in accord with the principle of
national self-determination, could decide whether to form a federa-
tion with China and the Han people. The CCP took pains to differen-
tiate their own stance from that of the reactionary forces in China
specically Chiang Kai-sheks Nationalistswhose policy of the unity
of ve nationalities, they claimed, was nothing more than an effort to
conceal its policy of national oppression. In their 1932 statement, the
CCP stated that it acknowledged the right of national self-determination
of all minority nationalities, including acknowledging their right of self-
determination, even leading to their separation from China. Statements
during the 1930s supported separatist movements by Tibetans as a na-
tional liberation movement that would release Tibet from both British
(Indian) and Chinese domination.101 This formulation equated China
with the Han ethnicity and explicitly recognized the right of other major
nationalities to determine their own political futures.
This position was reversed completely in 1949 and replaced by a plan

to create a socialist state that embodied the unity of ve nationalities
Tibetans, Xinjiangs Uighurs, and Mongolians, along with Han Chinese
and Hui (ethnic Han Muslims). This was the long-standing Nationalist
position that the CCP had denounced as a reactionary cover for national
oppression. Mao declared this new stance in discussions with Stalins
envoy in January 1949. The new claim was that the socialist state would
liberate minority peoples from feudal oppression.102
The conquest of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang proceeded much as it
had in China proper. These regions had already been ceded to the Na-
tionalist regime in negotiations with Stalin in August 1945, shortly after
the Japanese surrender.103 Tibet, however, was another matter entirely.
The PLAs battle to conquer Tibet was fought against Tibetan, not Na-
tionalist, troops. Shortly after the fall of the Qing dynasty, Tibetan troops
expelled the last Chinese imperial forces from their territory and the thir-
teenth Dalai Lama returned from exile in India to establish a new gov-
ernment that asserted complete independence.104 It maintained a sepa-
rate government and army in subsequent decades, and mounted a
concerted diplomatic effort after the defeat of Japan to fend off Chinese
claims and gain international recognition of separate statehood.105 Tibet
tried unsuccessfully to fend off the impending invasion through appeals
to the United Nations, Great Britain, and the United States, and fruit-
less negotiations with the CCP.106 The Chinese armies nally invaded
in October 1951, overwhelming the small and poorly equipped Tibetan
troops. Last-minute appeals to India and the United Nations yielded little
international support.107 The Tibetan government had little choice but
to accept terms dictated by Beijing that required Tibetan acceptance of
Chinese rule in return for vague and largely unenforceable promises of
autonomy and noninterference in religious and social affairs. The sixteen-
year-old fourteenth Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa.108
The CCPs new position was one of Han cultural superiority. Op-
pressed Tibetans were now liberated from their reputedly backward
social arrangements. Many Tibetans found this forced settlement, and
the associated claims of Han cultural superiority, difcult to accept. As
the new Chinese state steadily encroached on Tibetan autonomy in re-
ligious and social affairs in the coming decades, it created for itself en-
during political problems, including an armed rebellion that was crushed
by the PLA in 1959.
38 China Under Mao
Legacies
What lessons would Mao and other CCP leaders draw from their vic-
tory, and what legacies would the new party-state inherit from the rev-
olutionary organization that engineered it? The rst, and perhaps the
most important, was condence in Maos judgment and leadership. At
several key junctures in the partys history, Mao had taken minority po-
sitions on questions of strategy that were vindicated by subsequent events.
He was one of the earliest proponents of rural revolution in a period when
the partys leaders still adhered to the Soviet dogma that revolution could
come only much later, after an urban proletariat had developed. In the
Yanan base area, he rebuilt the party and army into an effective force
that nally presented a credible challenge to the Nationalists after the
Japa nese surrender. Perhaps the most decisive such instance was Maos
insistence, from the beginning of the civil war, that total victory was
possible. Despite extensive battleeld losses in the rst two years, Mao
insisted, against the counsel of more cautious colleagues, that victory
could be won and that their forces should ght on.109 This cemented his
reputation within the party as a leader of unusual ability and foresight.
In the words of two leading analysts of the Mao era, His perceived ex-
ceptional ability to solve the mysteries of revolutionary struggle in the
face of overwhelming odds created a deep faith that he could chart a
course others could not see . . . even when events suggested he was no
longer infallible.110
The second important legacy was the partys emphasis on discipline
and unquestioning obedience to the party line and to Mao Zedong. These
features, honed during the early 1940s in Yanan, would loom large in
the subsequent history of the Peoples Republic. The key point, however,
is not the demands that the party would make on Chinese society, but
the demands that were placed on party members and especially its own
cadres. The burden of undeviating loyalty and discipline is heaviest on
those entrusted by the party with leadership positions. Its cadres are
monitored in word and deed even more closely than subject populations
and are potentially subject to harsh sanctions for deviation or dissent.
The ever-present threat of sanctions for failing to thoroughly perform
assigned roles accounts for the remarkable discipline and unity of pur-
pose that the party organization so often exhibited in the struggle for
power and beyond. But there was a negative, dysfunctional side as well:
overconformity and overimplementation even when conformity with di-

rectives had unintended and highly negative outcomes. This led to a re-
curring pattern of starts and stops to party campaigns, reversals of policy
in the face of negative outcomes, or a push in one direction followed by
a rapid lurch in another to correct the problems created.
The ultimate legacy that emerges from the long struggle for power
was not the patient, persistent organizing characteristic of isolated guer-
rilla forces in base areas. In the last phase of its battle for power, the CCP
generated the foundations for a vast, militarized bureaucracy that ex-
celled at extracting sacrice from subject populations and party cadres
alike. This was a revolutionary orga ni zation determined to achieve a
large objective, quickly, against seemingly impossible odds, heedless of
the costs to the party and the people. In the coming decade, Mao would
use his credibility to push forward policies that harked back to the rev-
olutionary mobilization that won the civil war. In the words of one an-
alyst, for Mao and his followers the overriding lesson of the civil war
was that whatever the adverse odds and no matter what the obstacles,
revolutionary objectives could be reached by mobilizing the masses and
mustering up sufcient will and determination. This proved to be a costly
and fatal delusion.111
3

Rural Revolution
A LT HOUGH T H EY OF T EN begin as insurgencies against oppressive rule,

major social revolutions typically create larger, stronger, and
more powerfully centralized states. They do this by transforming old so-
cial structures, destroying the power of old elites, and establishing new
bureaucratic organizations that reach directly into the grass roots.1 During
its rst decade in power, the Chinese Communist Party carried out this
agenda with speed and thoroughness. In the countryside, this task was
completed in two distinct stages. In the rst stage, a revolutionary land
reform, carried out as a compulsory form of staged class struggle, de-
stroyed the economic and political foundations of the local elites who
had dominated Chinese communities for centuries. In the second stage,
collectivization, land was consolidated into village-wide farms, and peas-
ants were absorbed into rural organizations in which they essentially
became bonded laborers subject to the authority of leaders appointed by
the new party-state.
Land Reform as Class Struggle
The tool for extending state power into Chinas villages was the CCPs
practice of land reform conducted as class struggle. The partys conscious
intent was to change the rural social structure in a way that created
greater equality and promoted the interests of the poor. For this prac-
tice to succeed, however, CCP authority had to be established by securing
the region militarily. By placing its cadres within militarily secured areas,
having them orchestrate a campaign against groups identied as class
enemies and political opponents, and creating new village governments,
state power was extended directly into the grass roots.
Rural Revolution 41
This strategy of rural revolution was Mao Zedongs signature contri-

bution to Marxism-Leninism and to the theory and practice of socialist
revolution. Mao was one of the rst and most forceful advocates of the
view, contrary to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, that Chinas revolution
would of necessity be a peasant revolution.2 Maos main responsibility
from 1925 to 1927, during the United Front with the Nationalists, was
the peasant movement. The leaders of the CCP considered him their
leading expert on rural issues, and Mao helped to train many of the rural
cadres who accompanied Nationalist armies on their march to the north.
Mao argued forcefully, against opposition from both Nationalist allies
and more orthodox Marxists within his own party, that China was al-
ready ripe for rural revolution, and that only a thorough transforma-
tion of its backward rural social structure would create the revolutionary
energy necessary to bring Chinas national revolution to completion.3
In the months leading up to the July 1926 launch of the Northern
Expedition, Mao laid out his distinctive views on the political role of the
peasantry. He presented analyses of the economic structure of villages
in South China, including the role of secret societies and bandits, laying
out the grievances and interests of eight distinct social classes, and spec-
ifying the exploitation suffered by the majority in the form of excessive
rents, indebtedness, unequal access to land, and landlord domination
of local militia.4 A resolution on the peasant movement that he helped
to draft stated bluntly that in a country where 80 percent of the popula-
tion lived on farms, Chinas national revolution is, to put it plainly, a
peasant revolution. The anticipated national revolution could not be con-
solidated without liberating peasants from economic and political op-
pression.5 Mao wrote that the revolution could not succeed without
peasant support, and that the landlord class was in fact the greatest ad-
versary of the national revolution then under way.6
Maos view of the peasant movement as a class struggle became highly
controversial in the Nationalist-Communist alliance. During 1926, as
the Revolutionary Army under Chiang Kai-shek moved north, it often
retained village militias who were paid and controlled by landowners.
Mao advocated dissolving the local militias precisely because they were
controlled by landlords and would therefore block rural revolution.7 After
local militias were disarmed, new farmers associations, created by CCP
activists that followed behind the army, could operate unopposed. Led
by the dispossessed of the villages, the farmers associations conducted
trials of local bullies and evil gentry, and subjected village elites to
42 China Under Mao
public humiliation, beatings, and summary executions, after which they

distributed the property among themselves.8
Soviet advisors who were assisting the Northern Expedition were
alarmed by the rural violence, which in their view threatened the
Nationalist-Communist alliance necessary to unite China under a new
revolutionary government. In Stalins view, the Nationalist army was
needed for a bourgeois revolution against feudal and warlord forces in
China. But if the land revolution was pushed too far it would alienate
the Nationalist ofcer corps, many of which came from landowning fam-
ilies. Stalin ordered the CCP to moderate the movement, and its Central
Committee tried to stop the violence. Many corps commanders in the
army replaced Communist commissars with non-Communist ones, and
they suppressed rural uprisings and reversed land seizures.9
Mao responded strongly to these criticisms and refuted the seem-
ingly unanimous view that the peasant movement was deplorable, a
movement of riffraff. He argued, instead, that the peasant movement
did not endanger the United Front, but promised the creation of a more
unied alliance that included the majority of the Chinese people. Without
the violent overthrow of the landlord class, he argued, there could be
no real united front. During the revolution, all actions of the peasants
against the feudal landlord class are correct. Even if there are some ex-
cesses, they are still correct, because unless they learn to go too far . . . they
will certainly not be able to overthrow the power of the feudal class built
up over several thousand years.10
Mao had already made clear his position on revolutionary class con-
ict in an essay celebrating the anniversary of the Paris Commune sev-
eral months before. Only class wars can liberate humanity, he wrote.
At present, there are a considerable number of people within the country
who doubt or oppose class struggle. This is because they do not under-
stand the history of human development. The Paris Commune failed
for two reasons, in his view. First, there was no united, centralized and
disciplined party to lead it, and second, the attitude toward the enemy
was too conciliatory and mercifulto be conciliatory toward the enemy
is to be cruel to our comrades. . . . If we do not adopt severe measures
toward the enemy, the enemy will employ cruel measures toward us.
Mao argued that criticisms of red terror were part of a plot by imperi-
alists to sow dissension among Chinas revolutionary forces. In reality,
Mao wrote, white terror by the forces of order was always much worse.11
Rural Revolution 43
Maos most detailed defense of the peasant revolution was the lengthy
report he submitted in February 1927 to the Nationalist Partys Central
Committee on the peasant movement in Hunan. The report describes a
peasant rebellion against landlords and rich peasants that would become
a template for subsequent communist land reform. In par tic ular, its de-
scription became the model for the struggle sessions through which
CCP cadres later carried out land reform, and was later applied to party
rule in urban China as well. In this essay, Mao expressed views about
violence as the crucible of revolution that remained at the core of his
political philosophy until the end of his life.
The report praised the outburst of revolutionary violence as neces-
sary, describing it in detail, and celebrating its liberating impact on the
rural poor. He criticized those who timidly recoiled from what they called
excesses, which were in fact an inevitable by-product of revolution.
Mao argued that ones attitude toward rural revolution was a test that
determined whether you stood on the side of revolution or reaction. In
this document, one can readily see the internal tensions that would soon
split the Communists and Nationalists. Mao began with extravagant
praise for the peasant rebellion:
The present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a

very short time, several hundred million peasants in Chinas central,
southern, and northern provinces will rise like a erce wind or tempest,
a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able
to suppress it. They will break through all the trammels that bind them
and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will, in the end, send
all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt ofcials, local bullies, and bad
gentry to their graves. All revolutionary parties and all revolutionary
comrades will stand before them to be tested, to be accepted or rejected
as they decide. To march at their head and lead them? Or to stand op-
posite them and oppose them?12
Mao described the peasants actions with approval, and his descriptions
would later become an established part of the struggle sessions conducted
as part of the Communist Partys rural campaigns in future decades. A
big crowd is rallied to demonstrate against the house of a local bully or
one of the bad gentry who is hostile to the association. The demonstra-
tors eat at the offenders house, slaughtering his pigs and consuming his
grain as a matter of course. Public humiliation is also an important part
of the act of rebellion, and has a lasting effect:
44 China Under Mao
Parades through the villages in tall hats. This sort of thing is very common
everywhere. One of the local bullies or bad gentry is crowned with a
tall paper hat bearing the words local bully so and so or so and so,
one of the bad gentry. He is led by a rope and escorted with big crowds
in front and behind. . . . This form of punishment, more than any other,
makes the local bullies and bad gentry tremble. Anyone who has once
been crowned with a tall paper hat loses face altogether and can never
again hold up his head.13
Mao refuted the idea that this was excessive. Peasants do this only be-
cause they have been driven to it by gentry cruelty, and the gentry de-
serve whatever punishments the masses deem they should suffer: Who
is bad and who is not, who is the worst and who deserves to be let off
lightlythe peasants keep clear accounts, and very seldom has the pun-
ishment exceeded the crime. As he argued in a famous passage:
A revolution is not like inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or

painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so re ned, so lei-
surely and gentle, so benign, upright, courteous, temperate and com-
plaisant. A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one
class overthrows the power of another. . . . If the peasants do not use
extremely great force, they cannot possibly overthrow the deeply rooted
power of the landlords, which has lasted for thousands of years. . . . To
put it bluntly, it is necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every
rural area; otherwise we could never suppress the activities of the coun-
terrevolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the
gentry. To right a wrong, it is necessary to exceed the proper limits; the
wrong cannot be righted without doing so.14
Exceeding the proper limits, moreover, can include summary execu-

tion, and violence that reaches this level is highly effective in shaking
the old order to its foundations. Shooting. This is con ned to the worst
local bullies and bad gentry and is carried out by the peasants jointly
with other sections of the popular masses. . . . The execution of one such
big member of the bad gentry . . . reverberates throughout a whole
[county] and is very effective in eradicating the remaining evils of feu-
dalism.15 Mao was deant in his attitude toward those who opposed
this revolutionary upsurge. In fact, he asserted, Every revolutionary
comrade must support this change or he will be a counterrevolutionary.16
One month after Mao delivered this report, Chiang Kai-shek initiated a
violent purge of his Communist allies.
Mao always understood that revolutionary outbursts could occur only
with the backing of armed force. Left to their own devices, peasants
Rural Revolution 45
would be unable to break through the restraining force of gentry-led mi-

litias. A revolutionary party had to have its own armed forces to secure
areas for rebellion by the dispossessed. In August 1927, four months after
Chiang Kai-sheks purge of the Communists, Mao reiterated his posi-
tion. If you want to seize political power, to try to do it without the
support of military forces would be sheer self-deception. Our Partys mis-
take in the past has been that it neglected military affairs. Now we should
concentrate 60 percent of our energies on the military movement. We
must carry out the principle of seizing and establishing political power
on the barrel of a gun.17 Shortly after Chiangs purge, the Communist
Party organized a series of failed regional uprisings that ended with their
remnant forces retreating into isolated mountain bases.18 After consoli-
dating their base areas, Mao and his comrades proceeded to implement
the vision of rural revolution described in his reports, orchestrating them
through staged struggle sessions in militarily secured villages. As de-
scribed in his reports, the party mobilized the village poor in public meet-
ings to accuse, confront, humiliate, and expropriate the property of vil-
lage elites. Beatings and summary executions were a regular part of the
process. From the Jiangxi Soviet to the base areas during the anti-
Japanese war, to the nal struggle during the civil war, to the early years
after the military conquest of China, class struggle orchestrated as part
of a set script was the primary means employed by the CCP to break the
political and economic power of village elites, redistribute land, and pro-
mote new village leaders loyal to the party.
Political Impact of the Land Revolution
Revolutionary land reform had political consequences that were just

as important as the economic ones. The assault on landlords and other
power ful gures expropriating their property, humiliating them in
public rituals, subjecting them to beatings and summary executions,
and stigmatizing the survivors and their descendants demolished
the existing foundations of both political and economic power in the
countryside. Into this power vacuum was inserted a new scaffolding of
party-state power. Political activists and party members, drawn pri-
marily at this stage from the former poor, were mobilized into the land
reform campaign and emerged as village leaders in a new state struc-
ture. This new state, unlike the Nationalists, would not rely on local
landowning and merchant families to exercise power.
46 China Under Mao
This was political revolution in the guise of land reform. It was de-
signed to utterly destroy the wealth and inuence of prior elites, and to
permanently stigmatize them and their descendants. It recruited a new
generation of party members and rural leaders, individuals who distin-
guished themselves as activists in land reform. These leaders owed their
positions, and their allegiance, to the new party-state. Moreover, the pro-
cess of land reform demonstrated the overwhelming power of the party
to destroy its perceived opponents and remake society in a way that
previously seemed unimaginable. By granting land and the promise of
relative prosperity to the vast majority of the rural population, it cre-
ated support for the new regime. And by mobilizing the majority of vil-
lagers to participate actively in the violent struggle sessions that so often
ended in the summary execution of landlords and the seizure and divi-
sion of their property, the process implicated village populations in the
violence of the revolution.
William Hinton, an American communist who worked with the CCP
during the late 1940s, left a detailed and memorable account of this rural
revolution. Hinton reported sympathetically on the movement in central
Shanxi, where the Red Army moved in shortly after the Japanese sur-
render in late 1945. The rst step was an antitraitor campaign. Public
struggle sessions were held against the village head, the leader of the local
militia, and a landlord who had collaborated with the Japanese. Commu-
nist cadres organized a struggle session and ordered the entire village to
attend. The struggle targets were led to a stage, bound by hand, and forced
to stand. The cadres yelled accusations at them, slapped and punched
them, but despite calls for participation by the villagers, none came for-
ward. The meeting was then postponed to the next day. That evening the
cadres broke the village up into small group meetings and reviewed with
them the behavior of these individuals under the Japanese. They assured
the villagers that the Red Army would continue to hold the area, so they
need not fear later retribution. In these meetings the cadres identied a
group of activists who were instructed to stand up and begin the accusa-
tions at the mass meeting. The next day, the struggle session was more
effective: more villagers participated actively, and there were more
shouted accusations and more threats of violence. Several days later,
some higher-ranking military and public security ofcials came to the
village for a more extensive and emotional accusation meeting. Two of
the targets were condemned to death, marched to the edge of the village,
and shot. Their property was conscated and distributed to villagers.19
Rural Revolution 47
After the collaborators were punished, the party began its campaign
against wealthy village households. In 1946 they moved against land-
lords, who were accused of hoarding grain during a recent famine. Vil-
lage cadres led struggle sessions, forced the landlords to kneel, and beat
them to make them reveal where they had stored their money and gold.
They were not executed, but several of them ed.20 This was the opening
wedge of a broader campaign against landlords and the local Catholic
Church. The heads of prominent local families were subjected to struggle
sessions. Shouted accusations, beatings, forced confessions, and torture
were used to extract information about hidden wealth. This was more
violent than the previous campaigns, and quite a few individuals
were beaten to death or committed suicide. The property of these indi-
viduals and of the local Catholic parish was seized and distributed to
the village poor.21
By mid-1946, a new village government was in place, and there were
enough party members to form a party branch committee. But there were
problems: the new leaders, who exercised unchallengeable authority with
the backing of the Red Army and party organization, immediately began
to abuse their power. Hinton details the way that the new village cadres
and militia heads engaged in corruption, coercion, beatings, sexual ha-
rassment of women, and even rape, with little recourse by powerless vil-
lagers.22 These problems were apparently widespread in the liberated
areas during the civil war in North China, and the party leadership de-
cided to send a work team of fteen people, including ofcials from
the county seat, along with teachers and political activists from a local
university (including Hinton) to investigate and rectify the problems. The
work team took over the leadership of the village and investigated the
behavior of the village leaders and party branch. They set up a peasants
association, elected new leaders, and set up a new village government.
They documented landholding patterns prior to the land seizures through
interviews with villagers and small group meetings, and classied
households as poor, middle, rich peasants, and landlords.23 In these
interviews and small group meetings they also solicited reports of abuse
by the village leaders.24
As Hintons detailed account makes clear, revolutionary land reform
was above all an act of state building: it destroyed the foundation of the
previous order, cleared the ground for new political organizations, re-
cruited new leaders from among formerly marginal social groups, and
granted benets to the vast majority of farmers that would create
48 China Under Mao
widespread support for the new party-state.25 It created state machinery

that for the rst time in Chinese history could directly collect taxes from
individual households.
In Chinese imperial dynasties, the state structure extended no lower
than the county seat. This was the lowest level at which there existed
salaried ofcials that were part of the imperial bureaucracy. County mag-
istrates were responsible for collecting taxes and keeping local order; they
hired their own staff and established networks of inuence with other
local notables, often those who were property owners and had passed
lower levels of the imperial examinations. Villages were essentially gov-
erned autonomously by local propertied elites, who maintained temples
and schools, led kinship organizations, maintained local militia, and do-
nated resources for poor relief.26
By the 1940s, local society and politics had changed greatly, but the
pattern of rule by local elites continued in altered form. The traditional
gentry degree holders in imperial examinationsno longer played the
role in local governance that they once did. The imperial examinations
were abolished in 1905, and few of the degree holders were still around.
They were replaced by other local notablesmerchants, big landlords,
and local political actorswho served as intermediaries with the dis-
trict government. In some respects they were more autonomous than
the traditional gentry, who owed their status to performance on the im-
perial examinations.27
C. K. Yang described the Guangdong village of Nanching in 1948in
terms that had changed little from the imperial era: In the Republican
period, political order within the county functioned mainly through the
informal local community leadership, with the county government as
the supervising agent; and the village stood as a highly autonomous self-
governing unit. Since the fall of the last imperial dynasty, the national
government failed to substantially alter the traditional decentralized pat-
tern of local government in which the village political life operated largely
by its own local power structure and was but weakly integrated into the
system of central authority.28 Yang described a village where clan or-
ganizations were responsible for maintaining roads, dykes, and canals,
funding village schools, and arming local militia for protection against
bandits. Crop protection teams were also established by groups of poorer
and middle-class farmers to protect against bandits and theft, and they
established connections with the local underworld, sometimes forming
Rural Revolution 49
alliances with gangs of racketeers.29 Informally constituted local power

groups coexisted with one another in the village.30
Yang followed the transformation of the village though the rst years
after the consolidation of Communist rule, and chronicled the building
of the new state at the grassroots level. Class struggle and land reform
occurred in ways described elsewhere in China, and coincided with the
suppression of local bullies, although no public trials or executions were
initially held within the village. Households were given class labels. Land,
household items, farm tools, and draft animals were seized and redis-
tributed to poorer households, as was clan property devoted to the
funding of schools and temples.31
The political changes were equally radical. The party established a
new power structure backed by armed force. The crop protection asso-
ciation was disarmed and disbanded. Soldiers conscated rearms. The
power of prominent families melted away, and many ed to Hong Kong;
the clan organization was stripped of its property and former social func-
tions. The rst agents of the new state to appear in the village were fully
armed soldiers and ofcers. After land reform was completed, in the 1951
campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, sixteen individuals were
executed without trial or public explanation, spreading fear among vil-
lagers who were uncertain what made these individuals enemies of the
people. The new subdistrict government appointed a village head and
vice head, and a new peoples militia directly under the subdistrict gov-
ernment was formed.32 Yang concluded, in an amazingly short time the
Communists abolished the old system of formal government in Nanching
and completely disintegrated the informal local structure of power and
authority . . . a development which moved China perceptibly closer to
the structural reality of a modern state and im mensely increased the col-
lective strength of the nations central political power.33
Economic Impact of the Land Revolution

The economic consequences of the land revolution were just as dramatic.
In short order, land expropriated from prosperous families was trans-
ferred to poor peasants, creating a remarkably equal distribution of land.
Poor and lower-middle-class peasants comprised more than 57 percent
of the rural population, but owned only 24 percent of the land in the
1930s. After land reform, their share of the nations farmland almost
50 China Under Mao
doubled, to 47 percent. Rich peasants and landlords suffered drastic losses.

Rich peasants, who comprised 3.5 percent of the population, owned more
than 18 percent in the 1930s, but were left with 6.4 percent after land
reform. Landlords bore the brunt of the campaign, just as they had borne
the brunt of the violent struggle sessions and executions. Only 2.5 per-
cent of the population, they owned almost 40 percent of the land in the
1930s, but were reduced to barely more than 2 percent after land re-
form.34 Figure3.1 illustrates the impact of this radical land redistribu-
tion on landholdings. Poor peasants more than doubled their average
farm size, and middle-class peasants improved their holdings slightly,
while the farms of rich peasants shrank by roughly a thirdthough their
farms were still much larger than all other groups. Landlords were dev-
astated by land reform, which clearly focused its political animus on
them. Their average farm size shrank by 90 percent, and after land re-
form their holdings were the same as those of the village poor.35
By design, violence was integral to the process. It was entirely pos-
sible, however, to redistribute land and break landlord power without
violent struggle sessions, executions, and political stigma attached to elite
families. Moderate but effective land reforms were carried out in postwar
300
275
250
Mean acres per household
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
Poor peasant Middle peasant Rich peasant Landlord
1930s 1950s
Figure3.1. Average farm size, by class category, before and after land reform.
Source: Riskin (1987, 51).
Rural Revolution 51
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the 1950s, leading to a more equal
distribution of land and creating the foundation for a prosperous small-
holding agriculture and rapid rural development. This nonviolent ap-
proach to land reform stripped landlords of their traditional sources of
income and undercut their dominance of the rural economy, but they
received partial compensation and were not denied all other forms of
wealth or treated subsequently as political outcasts.
The land reform belatedly carried out by Chiang Kai-sheks Nation-
alists shortly after their retreat to Taiwan illustrates this point. Land re-
form was discussed constantly without action in Nationalist legislatures
during their long years on the mainland, but after consolidating a much
more centralized and oppressive dictatorship on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-
shek nally forced it to completion. From 1949 to 1953, rents for tenant
farmers were reduced by law to no more than 37.5 percent of the an-
nual crop yield; public land and land expropriated from Japanese owners
was sold to landless farmers at a deep discount; upper limits were placed
on landholdings; and private land in excess of these limits was sold
cheaply to small farmers. Landlords were compensated for the expro-
priated land in the form of stock in government-owned corporations.
The percentage of families that owned their own farms rose from 36 to
65 percent, and the percentage that rented land dropped from 39 to 11
percent. This did not level property ownership to the extent that it did
on the Chinese mainland, nor did it punish landlords econom ically or
physically liquidate them as a class. Nonetheless, landlord power was es-
sentially broken in rural Taiwan, as independent farmers organized rural
credit and savings associations and transport services, and promoted rural
industry.36
Consolidating Rural Control
The process of change was not smooth, nor was state building without
its complications. In the early 1950s, party organizations in rural coun-
ties were forced to take measures against party members and rural cadres
who failed to perform their duties in desired ways. One problem was a
tendency of rural party leaders to become focused on the prosperity of
their new family farms. Some rural cadres expressed satisfaction that
the land revolution had achieved its goals, and now that they had a work-
able family farm, they concentrated on economic rather than political
52 China Under Mao
activities. The demands of political leadership con icted with the time
necessary to farm successfully, especially because village leadership po-
sitions were poorly compensated. Signicant numbers of village party
members employed hired labor on their farms, which was viewed as a
form of economic exploitation, raising concerns that the party organi-
zation was losing its proletarian character. This led to a 1951 campaign
against rightist tendencies in village party organizations. Ten percent
of village ofcials and party members were expelled and many more sub-
jected to withering criticism and minor forms of punishment.37
A second problem that emerged early on was abusive behavior by new
village leaders of the kind documented by Hinton in base areas during
the civil war. This included the suppression of criticism, the use of co-
ercion and intimidation to achieve compliance with party policy, and
the routine use of physical intimidation and even severe beatings. This
kind of behavior was ofcially attributed to excessive bureaucratic pres-
sures placed on village cadres by their superiors to comply with party-
mandated targets. A 1953 campaign targeted these abuses of power. Once
again, those who occupied the lower rungs of the new party-state were
subjected to investigation, criticism, expulsion, and in some cases
imprisonment.38
In many rural regions, especially those where the Peoples Libera-
tion Army rolled through quickly on its campaign of military conquest,
new rural governments were established on shaky foundations. Guizhou
Province, conquered in November 1949, is one such example. Land re-
form was conducted quickly and new village governments were set up.
But organized resistance to the new regime soon appeared in reaction
to demands for large grain deliveries to the new military government.
Leadership posts were handed out to individuals who initially seemed
cooperative with PLA forces when they passed through, but many later
led popular resistance. After the PLA moved on to Tibet and Yunnan in
January 1950, anti-Communist guerrillas gained strength and the CCP
was soon forced to withdraw from twenty-eight besieged counties. The
battle to bring all of Guizhou fully under control continued well into
1951. The PLA returned and employed violently coercive methods de-
scribed as terroristic. There were similar problems elsewhere in south-
western China, requiring intensied suppression by the PLA.39
After China entered the Korean War in October 1950, the new re-
gime became increasingly concerned about internal security and
Rural Revolution 53
launched a nationwide campaign to suppress counterrevolution. The

sweeps in Guizhou were only one part of this nationwide effort. Like
land reform, the campaign aimed at eliminating groups that the regime
considered to be political and social rivals. This included former Nation-
alist soldiers and party members, bandits, local strongmen, leaders of
religious sects and secret societies, Catholic priests and Protestant min-
isters, and ordinary criminals. The campaign was reminiscent of land
reform, with public trials, denunciation meetings, imprisonments, and
executions.40 Although there are no agreed gures for the total num-
bers executed and imprisoned during land reform and the campaign to
suppress counterrevolution, the number easily ran into the millions. An
estimated 1.5 to 2 million people died during land reform from 1947 to
1952.41 Internal party reports suggest a minimum number of 710,000
executions during the campaign to suppress counterrevolution, with an-
other 1.2 million imprisoned. Unofcial estimates are frequently much
higher.42
Toward Collective Farms
The rural economy recovered quickly from the civil war, and there were
signs that Chinas new system of small family farms would raise rural
living standards. Rural markets revived, household incomes rose, and
the rst years of the Peoples Republic were a welcome respite from pre-
vious years of foreign invasion and civil war.43 But the new regimes goal
was not to create a system of smallholding private agriculture. This was
made clear in Maos 1953 General Line for the Transition period.
Land reform was designed to break landlord power, generate peasant
support, and create the foundation for a new socialist state. The next
stage was a socialist economy on the Soviet model, and this meant the
end of private ownership and the formation of collective farms.
In 1953, shortly after land reform was completed, rural ofcials
pushed farm households to pool labor, share draft animals, and engage
in other forms of mutual aid and cooperative activity. A new policy for
unied sales and purchase of grain meant that private grain markets
were banned and all crops had to be sold to state grain procurement sta-
tions in villages at prices xed by the state.44 In 1954, grain sales be-
came compulsory and all surplus grain de ned as a xed per capita
household rationhad to be sold to the state. Despite the fact that farming
54 China Under Mao
required more strenuous physical exertion than most urban jobs, the
rural grain ration was set lower than in the cities.45
This was the rst step toward a system that would permit the state
to extract grain from villages in amounts and at prices that it alone de-
termined. Rural China started down the road to Soviet-style collective
agriculture, and the only question was how long the process would take.
The rst step in what originally was to have been a gradual process of
collectivization was the formation of mutual aid teams among indepen-
dent farmers. Mutual aid teams pooled the labor of a number of
households during the busiest periods of planting and harvesting. Fam-
ilies still owned their own draft animals and agricultural implements,
but shared them with team members during peak seasons when they
worked together to put the crop in the ground or bring in the harvest.
The next step was the formation of agricultural cooperatives. In the co-
operatives, families continued to own their land, but the cooperative
owned draft animals, tools, and any machinery, and families contrib-
uted funds to the cooperative for the purchase of seed and fertilizer in
bulk, fodder for draft animals, and fuel for machinery. Members of the
cooperative also assisted one another during the peak planting and har-
vesting seasons, like the mutual aid teams.46
The nal stage was the collective farmland was no longer owned
and cultivated by families, but was consolidated into large farms that
were under collective ownership and run by village leaders appointed
by the party. A collective farm was managed like a factory, with collec-
tive members in the role of employees. The managers of collective farms
organized all agricultural operations, assigned jobs to individuals, stored
and marketed the harvest, and kept the proceeds in collective bank
accounts.47
Mao consistently pushed for more rapid transformation of Chinas
economy toward a Soviet model than the Soviet Union and other Chi-
nese leaders thought wise. Stalin counseled Mao to move slowly, keeping
existing economic structures in place for the foreseeable future, and to
adopt a long timetable for the collectivization of agriculture and socialist
transformation of industry. Mao, however, was determined to move
China rapidly along the path to socialism as laid out in the Short Course,
which described a radical process of collectivization early in the history
of the Soviet Union.48 But Stalin, in his 1951 book Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR, ignored his own signature contribution to socialist
Rural Revolution 55
development (or perhaps belatedly acknowledged the damage it caused

the Soviet economy) and asserted that rapid economic transformation
could not be obtained through the mere application of political will. In
that work he argued that there were laws of development that applied
equally to socialism and capitalism.49 Stalin also believed that China was
more backward econom ically, unprepared to move directly to socialism,
and that to make this attempt would set back economic development.
Many other Chinese leaders especially Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and
Deng Zihui shared this view. They had more contact with the Soviet
Union and were better versed in current ideas about socialist economics,
and argued for a more cautious approach.
Mao implicitly rejected this position in the early 1950s, and by the
early 1960s, in his unpublished reading notes on Soviet political
economy, he explicitly criticized this shift by Stalin.50 Essentially, Mao
rejected the late Stalin in favor of the early revolutionary Stalin, and
continued to believe that China could replicate the Soviet pattern de-
scribed in the Short Course. Mao was characteristically in a hurry to push
revolution forward as quickly as possible, and did not believe that China
was as backward as Stalin thought. While Stalin was alive, Mao did not
contradict him, but he quietly ignored his advice. After Stalins death
in March1953, Mao immediately pushed on with mutual aid teams and
cooperatives, and began a collectivization drive that initially was to be
completed in the early 1960s.51 After clashes with other leaders in 1957
about the pace of collectivization, Mao denounced several of them for
rightism, and called for the immediate completion of collectivization
by 1958.52
Village cadres began organizing mutual aid teams in 1951. By 1953
half of all households were members, and by 1954, 85 percent. After
Mao forced the pace of collectivization in the high tide of 1955 and
1956, cooperatives were formed very rapidly: 62 percent of households
joined them by the end of 1955, and a reported 100 percent by the end
of 1956. The decision to forge ahead even faster to full-scale collective
farms was made near the end of 1957 and, in a massive mobilization
that began near the end of that year, 100 percent of households were
reportedly absorbed into collective farms by the end of 1958.53 The ap-
parent speed of completion suggested a process that was relatively smooth
and successful, especially in comparison with the extensive violence em-
ployed in the Soviet Union, and the catastrophic famine in Russia and
56 China Under Mao
Ukraine that was a direct result.54 Nonetheless, there was widespread

local resistance, even isolated rebellions, and considerable hardship and
local hunger created by rural cadres who felt compelled to complete the
process rapidly and at any cost.55
The Village as a Collective Farm
The result of the collectivization drive was a radically new form of so-
cial and economic organization. For farm households, the fruits of land
reform lasted for a remarkably short period of time. The land gained by
poorer households was no longer theirs, and the ability of farmers to de-
cide what to produce and how to allocate their labor to enhance family
incomes was completely lost. Household farming was pushed almost to
extinction, relegated to marginal family sidelines that were only par-
tially tolerated in subsequent years. The rural markets that depended on
family production of eggs, chickens, hogs, handicrafts, and other prod-
ucts largely disappeared, replaced by state purchasing stations for staple
and cash crops. Now all land, tools, and draft animals were under col-
lective ownership and control.56
By the late 1950s, collective farms doubled as units of government
and as economic enterprises. Collective farms uctuated in size during
the late 1950sin the Great Leap Forward they were expanded to enor-
mous scale, but by the early 1960s they settled into a pattern that sur-
vived into the early 1980s. The farm population in a county was orga-
nized into communes, the name for the collective farm. The commune
headquarters was the lowest branch of the state bureaucracy, with a party
secretary and party committee at its head, and a staff of ofcials on the
state payroll. Communes had an average population of around 15,000
and usually spanned a number of separate villages. Each commune con-
tained an average of fteen production brigades of around 220 households
and980 people. A production brigade was roughly equivalent to a vil-
lage, although larger villages might be divided into two or more brigades,
and in more sparsely populated regions a brigade might span two or more
small settlements. Each brigade, in turn, was divided into an average of
seven production teams. The production team, the basic unit of agricul-
tural organization, was relatively small. They averaged just over thirty
households and around 145 people by the early 1970s.57 The production
brigades and teams had their own heads, accountants, and other of-
cials, whose salaries were part of brigade and team budgets. They were
Rural Revolution 57
not part of the state civil service system, which reached only so far as the
commune headquarters, and they were also considered farm households
and resided in the community.
Commune leaders made production decisions based on targets sent
down from the county, which were passed down to the brigades and
teams. The leaders of brigades and teams were in charge of ful lling the
plans. They assigned jobs to individual farmers and organized planting,
harvesting, processing, storage, and transport. Farmers received work
points for their assigned labor, which were recorded in team accounts
and accumulated over the year. Any cash surpluses in the collective ac-
counts were divided among households according to the number of work
points that individuals in the family accumulated over the year. Each
member of the team also received basic grain rations, set according to
age and gender, that came out of the grain stores that the brigade re-
tained after meeting state sales targets. Because rural residents could only
procure grain from their production teams, farmers were effectively
blocked from spending signicant periods of time away from the village.
Migratory labor of the type that was common before collectivization,
and that became widespread in China after the 1970s, was effectively
ended. Farmers were also subject to involuntary and uncompensated
ser vice labor on road building and water conservation projects during
the agricultural slack season that was mandated by county ofcials and
organized by communes. Farmers were essentially tied to the land in a
form of bonded labor.
Collective agriculture fully consolidated the state procurement system
that was put into place beginning in 1953. Staple grains (rice, wheat,
barley, maize, and sorghum), oil-bearing crops (peanuts, rapeseed,
sesame), and cash crops (cotton, tobacco, sugar, hemp) could be sold only
to state purchasing stations, at state-set prices. The system was easy to
enforce, because commune and brigade ofcialsnot householdswere
in control of the crop and were evaluated and rewarded (or punished)
according to their fulllment of production plans, and alternative market
outlets were unavailable. The system permitted state planning agencies
to control the terms of trade with the farm sector, and to directly inu-
ence the mix of crops that were grown.58
Soviet-style collective agriculture was designed to extract grain in
large volumes and at low prices in order to fuel rapid industrial devel-
opment in cities. Low food prices permitted lower wages for urban
workers, which left more funds for capital investment in the industrial
58 China Under Mao
economy. Over time, cropping decisions became increasingly focused on

staple crops. The prohibition of independent off-farm employment and
nonagricultural sidelines by households forced Chinas peasants into sub-
sistence agriculture. The demands for high production and sales targets
by the state, and the setting of deliberately low procurement prices, meant
that many residents on collective farms found their grain rations to be
increasingly tight and their cash incomes depressed. By the 1970s, with
the exception only of economic crops like tobacco and hemp, procure-
ment prices barely covered production costs for most products governed
by the state purchasing system.59
Household production was frowned upon, and in some periods pun-
ished severely, because devotion to household production directly con-
icted with commitment to collective activities. For most of the next two
decades, household sidelines of any signicant volume were effectively
banned. Chickens, ducks, hogs, and shponds were maintained by pro-
duction teams and brigades, and the labor devoted to them was com-
pensated with work points. The products were marketed by the collec-
tive in the same way as crops. Some brigades and communes organized
off-farm enterprises construction teams, handicraft workshops, or
small industrial enterprises like brick kilns. Commune and brigade of-
cials managed these enterprises, assigned workers to jobs, and collected
and banked the proceeds. Workers were paid in work points and at times
partially in cash.60
The periodic rural markets that had characterized village life in China
for centuries went into deep decline, and they survived only in the form
of illicit black markets.61 In their place a state procurement system ap-
propriated agricultural products from collective farms in volumes and
at prices set by state planning agencies. Planners tried to ensure that they
left enough food in collectives to permit farmers a basic standard of
living but not much more. The emphasis on staple grain production
reduced the variety of crops and sideline products that was typical under
household agriculture, effectively pushing Chinese farmers into grain-
centered subsistence agriculture. This kept cash incomes low relative to
urban areas. Differences in living standards within brigades and teams
were reduced even further than was the case after land reform. Certain
jobs in a collective were less arduous but had a higher work point
valuation leadership positions, tractor drivers, and carpentry, for
examplewhile unskilled eld labor earned fewer work points. Yet the
Rural Revolution 59
differences in income were limited, and the result was a leveling of

living standards within villages.
These changes gave rural cadres considerably more power than they
had before collectivization. One of the major consequences of this
change, according to Huaiyin Li, was the creation of co-op cadres as a
privileged group in the village society. Previously these individuals had
been veterans of the revolution or activists in land reform and the cre-
ation of cooperatives, and in many cases they had won villagers re-
spect for their hard work, austerity, and intimacy with the masses. After
the creation of collective structures, however, they alienated themselves
from the rest of the community because of their privileges; they received
plenty of workpoint subsidies and, without doing much work, they
earned more income than most strong laborers did. These developments
were in many ways inherent in the new structures themselves: They
controlled all aspects of the co-op economy, including the assignment
of work opportunities, the awarding of workpoints, the distribution of
agricultural products, and management of co-op nance. The shift was
marked by an increasing reliance on administrative orders, coercion, and
in some cases the abuse of farmers in the form of shouting and beat-
ings. This also gave rural cadres the opportunity, for the rst time, to
engage in various forms of corruption and malpractice.62 This imported
Soviet system bureaucratized rural life: Agricultural collectivization not
only enabled the state to extend its reach down to each household but
also resulted in the creation of millions of grassroots cadres; so huge were
the ranks of the cadres that they were practically out of the governments
direct control.63
Rural China Transformed
In ten years, the CCP radically transformed rural China. In earlier times
Chinese villages were governed by local elites whose authority was based
on some combination of private wealth, education, and armed force. Chi-
nese states had always been distant from village life, collecting taxes
through local elites but otherwise leaving rural communities largely to
themselves. Land tenure patterns varied enormously across China, from
large-scale landlordism run on behalf of wealthy lineages to widespread
share tenancy, hired agricultural labor, and self-sufcient, independently
owned small farms. Secret societies and religious sects were widespread.
60 China Under Mao
Christian missionaries made converts deep into the countryside in

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Banditry was common,
private militias hovered between protection and predation, and life was
insecure in many rural regions.
The extension of state power into rural China began with the Com-
munist Partys establishment of a monopoly on the use of armed force.
Bandits, private militias, secret societies, organized religion, and religious
sects were suppressed. It was ultimately armed force that backed the rev-
olutionary land reform that eliminated prior village elites. The rst step
in the extension of state power was to destroy social groups that exer-
cised authority, and to obliterate the economic foundation for their elite
status. As they destroyed previous structures of wealth and power, the
party drew poor peasants into political involvement as land reform ac-
tivists and, after training and indoctrination, elevated them to new po-
sitions of village leadership. Redistributing land and other forms of wealth
among villagers, the party created a reservoir of support, while at the
same time demonstrating beyond all doubt the reach and capacity of the
new state.
Having already extended state power far more deeply into villages
than any prior Chinese state, the CCP quickly moved to extend its con-
trol into the operation of agriculture itself. The land and draft animals
distributed to families during land reform were rapidly merged into col-
lective farms. The state and its village representatives now controlled de-
cisions about production; they controlled the crops after harvesting; they
controlled the sales and distribution of the products; and they controlled
the cash proceeds and distributed incomes to farmers. They also con-
trolled the labor of farmers, and could prohibit their departure from col-
lective farms. The land reform represented an initial rural revolution that
radically transformed the economic structure of rural China and greatly
extended the reach of the state into village life. Collectivization repre-
sented a second rural revolution that radically transformed the economy
in a very different direction, and extended the reach of the state even
more deeply into activities that had for millennia been the province of
kinship groups and farm households.
4

Urban Revolution
F ROM T H E L AT E 1920S , the Communist Partys strategy for revolution

focused on rural China. Maos early doctrine about class struggle
was applied in regions that the party controlled, and as the PLA rolled
south and west in its military conquest of China after 1947, CCP cadres
orchestrated revolution in villages according to a well-practiced script.
The cities, however, were another matter entirely. Not until April 1946
did the party take control of a major city, when they took over Harbin
from departing Soviet forces. The rst major city that the PLA occupied
outside of Manchuria was Zhangjiakou, in northern Hebei, which they
held from August 1945 to October 1946 before losing it once again to
advancing Nationalist forces.1 Initially, their strategy was to implement
military control and leave existing ownership of industry and commerce
intact, with the exception of state enterprises controlled by the Nation-
alists. In the cities, the main emphasis was to stabilize the economy and
promote industrial development, not to obliterate the economic foun-
dations of the old society. The policy was to move slowly, preserve the
industrial foundations for national economic strength, and only gradu-
ally shift toward a socialist planned economy.2
Although there were underground party operatives in trade unions,
schools, police forces, and government ofces, the CCP had only a small
fraction of the cadres necessary to run the cities. Moreover, unlike the
countryside, in cities the party lacked an obvious constituency that made
up the majority of the population, and that would immediately benet
from its presence in the same way as poor peasants. In the cities were
concentrated former members and ofcials of the Nationalist Party, in-
dustrial capitalists and trade unions, middle classes and intellectuals.
62 China Under Mao
These groups had uncertain loyalties at best, and had few reasons to wel-
come the CCP and its programs.
In some of the rst cities to be captured in Manchuria and North
China, PLA occupation forces, unprepared for their new tasks, failed to
follow orders. Troops and party personnel seized private rms and hand-
icraft workshops, dismantled factory equipment, and conscated citizens
personal possessions, declaring them enemy property for military use.
These actions disrupted urban economies and created an atmosphere of
fear among groups whose cooperation the party would need. Mao did
not want these errors repeated, and he directed the PLA to avoid similar
abuses and respect property and citizens as they assumed urban control.3
The party had no choice initially but to rely on existing ofce personnel
and police forces to keep order.
Eventually the CCP did adapt some of its approach to rural revolu-
tion in the cities. There was no obvious counterpart to the land revolu-
tion, but the techniques of mass mobilization translated well. The party
pursued urban state building through a series of mobilization campaigns
that combined coercion with attempts at popular persuasion. As in the
countryside, the process was at times violent and could rely on brute
force, open intimidation, and even terror. But coercion and terror alone
could not accomplish the partys aims: the party built grassroots orga-
nizations that permitted them to monitor the population, reward and
punish, and extend their control.
In the years from 1949 to 1956, the CCP extended its reach in the
cities through three distinct types of mobilization campaigns. The most
dramatic were mass campaigns designed to enhance their political con-
trol. This included the urban version of the campaign to suppress coun-
terrevolution, and the subsequent Three Anti and Five Anti campaigns
against corruption and tax evasion, which expropriated private business
assets. A second type of campaign was designed to change behavior and
attitudes in targeted populations. This included campaigns against crime,
drugs, and the sex trade, and the thought reform campaign designed
to remold the thinking of bourgeois intellectuals. A third type was to
mobilize the urban bureaucracy to complete specic tasks, like the reg-
istration of the urban population, the vetting of politically reliable po-
lice forces, the collectivization of ser vices and handicrafts, and the na-
tionalization of industry.4
Urban Revolution 63
By the mid-1950s, as the initial push to eliminate enemies and si-

lence potential critics took hold, the party began to extend its control
over the population through bureaucratic means. A household registra-
tion system xed the population in place, preventing permanent moves
and unauthorized travel. A supply system and urban rationing allocated
food, housing, and material goods according to status and rank.
Government-appointed ofcials monitored activities in neighborhoods
and coordinated their work with neighborhood police stations. Private
handicrafts, services, and manufacturing were placed under government
ownership and control, and a new employment system assigned jobs bu-
reaucratically rather than through voluntary choice. The urban popu-
lation was registered according to social class and political history, and
a system of political dossiers was established to keep track of individual
behavior and political leanings. In the second half of the 1950s, the mass
meetings, public trials, and executions relied upon so heavily in the early
years were replaced by bureaucratic routines within state-organized work
units and neighborhoods.
Establishing Order
When the PLA entered a city, its rst act was to replace all the top mu-
nicipal ofcials with cadres and ofcers who had traveled south with
the conquering armies: a military control committee.5 Most of the
cadres who came south with the army were veterans of northern base
areas, were natives of that region, and were unable to speak or under-
stand southern dialects.6 The party faced a severe shortage of reliable
cadres with urban experience. There were too few party members in the
local underground, and regional guerrilla forces lacked urban experi-
ence. Student activists who joined CCP-led organizations and who trav-
eled south with the troops helped to ll the gap, but there was little choice
initially but to rely extensively on existing urban administrators and even
existing police forces.7
More than 60 percent of the Nationalist police forces in Shanghai kept
their posts during 1949 and1950 after reeducation classes. They were
supervised by a staff of newly trained police ofcers from the PLA and
by underground party members who had in ltrated the police force in
earlier years.8 In Shanghai, the CCP utilized the existing organ izational
64 China Under Mao
structure of neighborhoods established under the Japa nese occupation

and kept by the Nationalists after their return. The party built on the
existing system of household registration, but updated and expanded it,
adding food ration cards. Unlike the Nationalists, the new regime used
basic-level neighborhood organizations to mobilize participation in mass
meetings and political campaigns.9
The reeducated police forces rst task in Shanghai was to strengthen
social order. They shut down small peddlers and kiosks on the streets,
cutting their number in half. All publications were required to register
with the police in order to operate legally. Currency exchanges were shut
down. Beggars, pickpockets, and other vagrants were arrested, registered,
and sent for reeducation. Scams run by urban gangs in collaboration with
pedicab drivers were stopped. Counterfeiters were executed. Former Na-
tionalist soldiers and ofcials were ordered to register. If they came for-
ward voluntarily they were promised leniency; if they failed to register,
they were threatened with harsh punishment. Harsh measures against
crime were based on the principle that those arrested were guilty, and
that only those who confessed would be granted leniency. Major offen-
sives were mounted against armed robbers and underground Nationalist
operatives left behind to engage in sabotage, subversion, and assassina-
tion. These initial moves were intensied after the onset of the Korean
War in 1950, in the campaign to suppress counterrevolution, when the
new regime pushed much harder, and more violently, to consolidate
its hold.10
The new regime made clear that members of the large expatriate com-
munity, many of whom had long been resident in China, were no longer
welcomed. Police harassment, expropriation of homes and property, and
imprisonment of foreign businessmen, consular staff, teachers, mission-
aries, and even students were common even before the onset of the Ko-
rean War, when the persecutions intensied, leading to a wave of im-
prisonments, expulsions, and occasional murders. Chinas foreign
community was largely expunged by 1951. Particularly hard hit were
the Catholic and Protestant churches and their networks of orphanages,
charity organizations, and convents. In a few years they would be re-
placed by a wave of advisors from the Soviet Union and its newly con-
quered satellite states.11
Urban Revolution 65
Eliminating Opposition
The campaign to suppress counterrevolution of 1950 and1951 tightened

control after the initial period, when public order was the primary ob-
jective. As in the countryside, the initial conquest by PLA forces left
behind widespread pockets of resistance. In the cities, the primary con-
cern was active Nationalist underground operatives who engaged in sab-
otage and assassination. However, the campaign also targeted secret so-
cieties, underground criminal gangs, and religious sects, which had been
a major feature of Chinese urban life and had the capacity to organize
resistance to the new regime. The campaign was carried out in cities
through mass rallies, public struggle sessions, the broadcast of public trials
over loudspeaker systems and radio stations, and a large wave of highly
publicized arrests and executions.12 The denunciation meetings were well
staged, emotional, and often ended with the crowds demand for imme-
diate execution, which was frequently carried out summarily. Those tar-
geted in the campaign but who managed to escape imprisonment were
placed under control by public security forces, essentially a form of pro-
bation, and were kept under surveillance in the years to come.13 As the
campaign intensied, struggle sessions and mass trials were a ubiqui-
tous feature of the urban scene: in Hangzhou, more than 450,000 resi-
dents attended 1,545 mass rallies to denounce counterrevolutionaries.14
According to ofcial gures, more than 1.2 million people were ar-
rested, ultimately being sent to labor camps, and no fewer than 710,000
executed.15 There is evidence that the number of executions went far be-
yond what the party leaders initially intended. Mao Zedong tried to regu-
late the rate of executions during the course of the campaign, sometimes
encouraging greater vigilance, other times trying to moderate the cam-
paigns ferocity. He intervened repeatedly through comments on reports,
and at one point suggested a rate of 0.1 percent of the population as the
proper level of executions.16 Local ofcials, not wanting to be viewed
as soft on counterrevolution, tried to comply with this number, treating it
as a quota. The campaigns original documents specied spies, saboteurs,
and members of underground resistance organizations as the targets for
arrest and execution. But many localities could not nd enough individ-
uals in these categories to ll the quota. Members of criminal gangs
and leaders of religious sects were often thrown into the mix, as were
individuals arrested on vague charges of being local bullieswithout
66 China Under Mao
being charged with specic acts. In the course of the campaign, former
Nationalist soldiers and ofcials who had registered after being promised
leniency were nonetheless arrested and executed as well. In Guizhou,
all eighty- one county magistrates in power during the last days of
the Nationalists were executed, as were almost all of the township
heads near the city of Chengdu.17
The campaign virtually wiped out organized resistance, and it deci-
mated the Nationalists remaining underground networks. Acts of as-
sassination and sabotage dropped drastically. But by the partys own stan-
dards, the number of executions was far too high. Internal party
investigations in 1953 revealed that large percentages of those executed
were innocent and were hastily executed on fabricated charges. Loyal
party members were executed in some of these cases. Especially hard
hit were Nationalist ofcials and soldiers who had voluntarily defected
to the CCP in the nal stages of the civil war. Promises of leniency made
to those who did not defect, but who registered voluntarily after the Na-
tionalists defeat, were ignored. As signs of runaway indiscriminate kill-
ings became apparent to the partys leaders, escalating even after orders
to stop, Mao intervened to call a halt to the campaign.18
The numbers arrested during these suppression campaigns quickly
outstripped the capacity of conventional prisons to house detainees.19
The prison system inherited from the Nationalists proved woefully in-
adequate, and the new regime augmented its holding capacity with a
massive new system of labor reform camps. By the end of 1951, more
than 2 million individuals were imprisoned, 670,000 of which were in
the new labor camps, where they were required to contribute through
labor to their own upkeep. By 1955, more than 1.3 million were in the
labor camps. Conditions were brutal, hunger and physical abuse ram-
pant. The growth rate of the camp and prison populations was suppressed
by high death rates.20
Suppressing Religious Sects, Secret Societies, and Urban Gangs
In January 1949 the CCP banned secret societies and religious sects. The
directive that did so denounced them for their ties to the Nationalist Party,
for collaborating with the Japanese, gathering intelligence, spreading ru-
mors, and staging local uprisings.21 Religious sects drew their primary
membership from among the rst generation of rural migrants to cities
Urban Revolution 67
like Tianjin. They were strong in northern China, where the most im-
portant was known as the Unity Sect (yiguandao). A specic order tar-
geting this sect was issued in 1950. It had a philosophy that was a mix-
ture of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Islam, with
borrowings from other native sects. The sect was viewed as a major threat
to the new government. In the city of Tianjin, which had an adult pop-
ulation of 1 million in 1951, there were over 200,000 members, con-
centrated heavily among men who worked in small handicraft and com-
mercial establishments, and women in the rst generation of urban
families.22 It included an estimated 11 percent of the population of Sui-
yuan Province, and15 percent of the population of Beijing, and its mem-
bership was growing. An estimated 1,100 ofcers in the Beijing Bureau
of Public Security were members, and local party cadres and members
of the Communist Youth League were also found to have joined. In
one Beijing district, 23 percent of all the police ofcers were members
of the sect.23
The group obviously had the capacity to subvert the new regime. The
Unity Sect was openly opposed to communism and had earlier agitated
against land redistribution. Before the triumph of the CCP, it spread ru-
mors that the party would enforce the sharing of property and wives.
During the Korean War, it proclaimed the coming of a third world war
that would destroy the new regime. Before the onset of the campaign
to suppress counterrevolution, the CCP criticized the sect and urged
members to withdraw from the orga ni zation and come forward to reg-
ister voluntarily. Afterward, however, moves against the Unity Sect were
folded into the campaign against counterrevolution. Sect members began
to inform on one another; its leaders were subjected to mass denuncia-
tion meetings and executed; and the trials and executions were given
wide publicity. The campaign effectively broke the back of the
organization.24
A similar fate befell the secret societies and criminal gangs that had
long ourished in Chinese cities. The secret societies were large and rel-
atively well organized, drawing members overwhelmingly from second
or later generations of urban dwellers, especially among workers in the
transport industry. In coastal cities like Tianjin and Shanghai, they were
a major political and economic force under the Nationalists, engaged in
smuggling opium, running brothels, controlling the docks and freight
delivery, and running many of the trade unions in these sectors. They
68 China Under Mao
were heavily represented among coolies, dockworkers, pedicab drivers,

and freight haulers. Criminal gangs were smaller and more concentrated
in local neighborhoods. They were typically composed of rural toughs
who practiced extortion and ran protection rackets. In many parts of
cities under Nationalist rule, they had been the sole organization that
could guarantee the security of small merchants in return for payoffs.25
Both groups had ties to Nationalist ofcials that were part of the per-
vasive corruption that plagued that party during its years on the main-
land. The Green Gang, in par ticular, was well integrated with the urban
Nationalist administration. Chiang Kai-shek reportedly joined the or-
ganization in the 1920s and relied heavily on Green Gang members in
his violent purge of Communists in Shanghai in 1927. The head of Shang-
hais Green Gang, Du Yuesheng, had close ties with the Shanghai mu-
nicipal government, and had extensive relationships with the Nation-
alist Party organization there.26 The CCP had good reason to treat the
secret societies as subversive.
When the CCP took over the cities, there was always the possibility
that they could obtain Nationalist Party membership lists, so when they
warned members to register voluntarily or face severe consequences, the
threat had real force. But secret societies and criminal gangs did not keep
written records, and it was much harder to compel them to come for-
ward. When the CCP took over Tianjin in January 1949, they immedi-
ately attacked Green Gang control over the transport industry. They es-
tablished a new freight company and ser vice stations in different
neighborhoods, and they organized coolies into brigades that marched
in the streets, chanting denunciations of coolie bosses. They also estab-
lished new trade unions to provide the protections that gang bosses and
secret societies had formerly provided. Coolie bosses who cooperated and
informed on others were permitted to join the new union, while the
more violent or stubborn ones were denounced and excluded. Public se-
curity operatives were sent to meetings of the new union, and they
warned the coolie bosses to desist. Study classes were organized to pro-
mote loyalty to the party and new union and to criticize the reactionary
feudal secret societies.27
The gang bosses were more difcult to eradicate than initially an-
ticipated. They continued to use intimidation against those who sided
with the new union, and they were able to in ltrate their loyal followers
into positions of leadership. Party cadres were dismayed to nd that the
Urban Revolution 69
secret societies had in ltrated the new freight company and transport
union. This led to a wave of arrests in the last half of 1950 as the cam-
paign against the urban gangs was folded into the campaign to suppress
counterrevolution. Harsher methods ensued, and all identied coolie
bosses were arrested. Denunciation meetings were organized once again,
but now criminal sentences were passed. In the spring of 1951, the de-
nunciation meetings led to a wave of highly publicized executions of
coolie bosses, which nally dismembered the urban gangs.28
The Campaign against Vice
The harsh campaign against secret societies and criminal gangs curtailed
the rampant drug trade and organized crime of the Nationalist era. The
approach to the sex trade proceeded differently, but was equally effec-
tive. The CCP issued directives abolishing sex work as soon as it began
to take over cities from 1948 to 1950. As it consolidated urban control, the
party closed brothels and sent women back to their native places in the
countryside or provided jobs for them in the cities.29
Women engaged in the sex trade were considered by the CCP to be
part of the working class, not criminals. The party viewed sex workers
as being exploited by others; the criminals were those who proted from
their activities. The new authorities closed down the nightclubs, bars,
and brothels where they worked. They enforced a strict ban on street
solicitation. They opened reeducation centers that also hosted drug ad-
dicts and beggars. The reeducation centers were not voluntary. The in-
mates were not free to leave. They were given medical treatment and
subjected to propaganda, discipline, and retraining. They engaged in
study, mutual criticism, and manual labor. When they were considered
to have sufciently reformed, they were released, assigned to new jobs,
and in some cases introduced to marriage partners. Many, however, were
removed from the city and sent permanently to distant regions.30
More punitive measures were reserved for brothel keepers and pimps
who persisted in the trade. In Shanghai in 1950 the authorities publi-
cized the execution of two brothel keepers who were still recruiting
women. In 1951, during the campaign to suppress counterrevolution,
all remaining brothels were closed, and several of their operators were
executed after public trials. The trade persisted on a small scale after
1952, and the authorities increasingly treated sex workers who resisted
70 China Under Mao
the early drive against the trade as criminals. By the mid-1950s, as

the private economy was close to elimination, the trade had largely
disappeared.31
Curbing Organized Labor
Labor unions had always been active under the Nationalists, and they
quickly revived after the Japanese surrender. Gang bosses controlled only
a fraction of them, in trades like the transport sector. Major industries
in Shanghai and other cities had long been organized by labor unions,
and many of them had long histories of labor militancy.32 Some were
af liated with the Nationalists; others were independent but had long
been inltrated by communist operatives. Many of these unions saw the
advent of Communist Party control as an opportunity to advance their
interests at the expense of employers. The hyperination of the nal
years of Nationalist control had eaten deeply into their living wage, and
many unions acted to recoup their losses.
As Chinas large cities fell under CCP control in the latter half of 1949,
they experienced a massive upsurge of labor activism by existing union
organizations, some of them with Nationalist af liationsin fact, the
largest wave of labor activism in modern Chinese history.33 Many of the
unions organized workers militias to enforce their strike activity, and
these militias were under unions, not under the public security bureau
or military occupation forces. Some party cadres, who had long been
involved in underground labor organizing, viewed these union activi-
ties with sympathy.
Given their ideological afnity for the industrial proletariat, one might
expect the Communist Party to be sympathetic to the upsurge in strikes,
but this was by no means the case. The CCP was now in charge of ad-
ministering the cities, and it was intent on maintaining order and re-
viving the economy. Labor strikes undermined this stability and threat-
ened to set back industrial recovery. Moreover, many of the unions had
nationalist af liations in the past, leading to suspicions about their
motives.
In early 1952, Chinas minister of labor and head of the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions, the veteran communist leader Li Lisan, was
removed from both posts. He was denounced for encouraging trade union
syndicalism that was divorced from party leadership, and accused of
Urban Revolution 71
promoting economisman unprincipled concern for workers mate-

rial welfare and for advancing the interests of backward workers. As
was the case in the coolie trades, new trade unions were formed and
the former members of the old unions absorbed into new structures with
new leaders. The union-organized workers militias were shut down.34
The new ofcial trade unions discouraged strikes and other forms of labor
militancy, especially when state-owned enterprises were involved. After
the mid-1950s, strikes by industrial workers were considered to be sub-
versive criminal acts, subject to swift retribution.
Intellectuals and Universities
Chinas urban intellectuals were also brought to heel. Many had been
educated in the West, relatively few were Marxist-Leninists, and most
were liberals committed to principles of democracy and free intellectual
inquiry.35 These attitudes needed to be changed. The party conducted a
thought reform campaign among educated elites to correct these mis-
taken views, which had no place in socialist China. The objectives of
the campaign were stated in a Peoples Daily editorial in October 1951:
College teachers in the new era must boldly criticize their erroneous
and incorrect thoughts. On the one hand they must examine themselves
and oppose the attitude of self-complacency and self-delusion, and, on
the other hand, they must boldly criticize each other.36 The campaign
intensied in September 1951 with the isolation of more than 3,000 fac-
ulty in twenty universities and colleges in Beijing and Tianjin for four
months of remolding and study. The purpose was to combat worship
of the so-called American way of life, and a preference for teaching
the old stuff they learned in England and America ten, twenty, or thirty
years ago. This was wrong, and academics had to learn the revolu-
tionary standpoint, the standpoint of serving the people, the viewpoint
of materialism, and the method of dialectics. The students in these
months-long classes read party documents, the works of Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, and Mao, and speeches by CCP leaders. They engaged in criti-
cism and self-criticism designed to eradicate their erroneous thoughts.37
The campaign at Zhejiang National University was carried out in typ-
ical fashion. Faculty were subjected to lectures, criticized for their bour-
geois political standpoint, and compelled to criticize one another in small
groups and to write elaborate biographies that confessed to backward
72 China Under Mao
worldviews. Those who were unable to produce convincing self-criticisms

were forced to do so until they were sufciently thorough, and they were
subjected to denunciation meetings if they failed to make the grade.38
Those unable to withstand the pressures to confess and reform their
thoughts sometimes found a way to ee to Hong Kong or, on rare occa-
sion, committed suicide.39
Most confessions contained formulaic pledges of allegiance to the
new regime and its ideology, coupled with self-criticism for the harm
done previously as bourgeois intellectuals. One faculty member stated
in May 1952, I feel extremely grieved to realize how much harm has
been done to the people because of my failure to use faithfully the ide-
ology of the proletariat as a yard-stick in my work. . . . Henceforth I will
redouble my efforts to study Marxism-Leninism and the thought of
Chairman Mao, with the hope of reforming fundamentally. I will
steadfastly hold to my position with the working class in order to serve
the people better.40
Par ticular pressure was brought to bear on scholars who had studied
with or who were otherwise connected to prominent Chinese intellec-
tuals. For example, former students of Chinas famous liberal phi loso-
pher Hu Shi were required to denounce him for his decadent and reac-
tionary standpoint. Hu Shis own son, for example, concluded a long
denunciation of his father with this statement: I boldly use the scales
of historical materialism to weigh his worth to the people. From the
standpoint of class analysis, I clearly see him as a faithful minister of
the reactionary class and an enemy of the people. Hu Shi was just one
of a long list of prominent intellectuals whose inuence the new regime
felt necessary to diminish in this fashion.41
The primary objective of the campaign was to reorient Chinas in-
tellectuals to the Soviet Union and away from the inuence of scholar-
ship that emanated from the leading research institutions and liberal arts
universities in capitalist countries. The core doctrine was that all schol-
arship, from the natural sciences to the liberal arts, ultimately expressed
the interests of the ruling class. In addition, the vast majority of Chinas
intellectuals, from prosperous households, were assumed to be sympa-
thetic to the class interests of landlords and capitalists. Moreover, the
vast majority of faculty members in Chinas universities had studied
abroad, had studied in Chinese universities with foreign- educated
scholars, or had been exposed to curricula that were developed in the
Urban Revolution 73
United States, England, or Germany, in some cases in institutions mod-

eled after foreign universities or directly founded and sponsored by Chris-
tian missionaries or Catholic orders. Soviet scholarship was the new rev-
olutionary model. It reected the interests of the proletariat and advanced
the cause of revolution.
If faculty members were to keep their positions in the new China, it
was essential that they repudiate their associations with bourgeois edu-
cational standards and pledge loyalty to Soviet standards. The pressures
became particularly intense after China entered the Korean War.
One foreign-educated editor stated in a July 1952 confession, I had
blindly worshipped the material civilization of European and Amer-
ican imperialism and especially the science and culture of American
imperialism. . . . Not until the Resist-America, Aid-Korea campaign
was underway did I awaken . . . to realize the decadent nature of Amer-
ican imperialism and the ugliness of American cultural aggression. . . .
The American imperialists are the deadly enemy of the Chinese and of
all the peace-loving peoples of the world.42 Another stated, I now un-
derstand that to hate America and to love the Soviet Union are two
sides of the same coin. After I began to hate America, I naturally came
to see that the Soviet Union is lovable and worthy of respect and
admiration. . . . Soviet specialists are selessly helping us, and the Soviet
Union is unconditionally lending us support in world affairs. I feel
ashamed that I have in the past stood on the same ground with the re-
actionary elements.43
The more prominent the scholar, and the more detailed the denun-
ciation of the West, the more valuable and widely publicized were these
statements. The published self-criticism of the prominent Tsinghua Uni-
versity physicist Zhou Peiyuan, who was educated at Chicago and Cal
Tech, included the following passages about his several stays in the United
States:
During the four years of my rst sojourn in the United States I saw only
the skyscrapers, automobiles and the licentious and shamelessly free-
spending life of the exploiting classes, but I did not see the tragic ex-
ploitation of the toiling masses by the monopolistic capitalists. . . . I
erroneously thought that American democracy was good and that
the people had freedom of speech. . . . I did not realize that the Amer-
ican President and the so-called government ofcials were slaves of the
monopolistic capitalists, and the bickerings reported in the newspapers
74 China Under Mao
were merely the ravings of one ruling clique against another. . . . My

second trip to the United States in 1943 was the most shameful chapter
of my life. I went in the name of a scientic worker from a democratic
country engaged in opposing fascism, but actually, in early 1945,
during my stay in America, the glorious victories of the Soviet Union in
Eastern Europe had already spelled the ultimate doom for Fascist Ger-
many. . . . I became an instrument of American imperialism and yet
felt it was my honor.44
A professor of biology from Wuhan University excoriated himself for

his years of study and research in the laboratories of Harvard Univer-
sity, ashamed of his blind admiration of America in all phases of his
work. He had used American laboratory equipment and followed Amer-
ican teaching methods. He taught Darwins theory of evolution instead
of the more advanced theories of the Soviet scientist Michurin, which
were consistent with the scientic Marxist doctrine of dialectical mate-
rialism. He committed the extreme error of exchanging laboratory
specimens with American scholars. He confessed to the mistake of
accepting nancial aid from Harvard and collecting specimens for the
U.S. Department of Agriculture: I failed to realize that botanical re-
sources were a matter of great value to the imperialists in their exploi-
tation of colonial and semi-colonial countries. After sincere reection
and hard study, the scholar concluded that only by applying Marxism-
Leninism the thought of Mao Zedong and the theories of Michurin
is it possible to have a Chinese botanical science dedicated to ser vice for
the people.45
This last confession of a reformed intellectual points to a source of
tension that was to fester in Chinese universities throughout the early
1950s infatuation with the Soviet Union. Michurin was a geneticist who
championed the idea that acquired characteristics could be inherited
genetically a variant of an old idea attributed to the eighteenth-century
French naturalist Lamarck, which had long been rejected in favor of the
Mendelian understanding of genetics and Darwinian theories of natural
selection.46 Because Michurins theories were supercially consistent
with Stalins understanding of dialectical materialism, they were pro-
moted as ofcial Soviet science in opposition to bourgeois genetics.47
His ideas were developed after his death by the Soviet biologist Lysenko,
who, writing retrospectively about his celebrated discoveries in 1953,
Urban Revolution 75
stated that Stalins teaching about gradual, concealed, unnoticeable

quantitative changes leading to rapid, radical qualitative changes per-
mitted Soviet biologists to discover in plants the realization of such qual-
itative transitions, the transformation of one species into another.48 In
the early postwar period, widespread questioning of the scientic basis
for Lysenkos claims within the Soviet scientic community was silenced
by accusations of idealism, complicity with imperialism and the bour-
geoisie, groveling before the West, metaphysics, racism, and alien-
ation from practice. Lysenko and his followers branded the bourgeois
science of genetics as attempting to justify the class struggle and the
oppression, by white Americans, of Negroes. Rotting capitalism, at the
imperialist stage of development, gave birth to a still-born bastard of bi-
ological science, the thoroughly metaphysical and antihistorical doctrine
of formalist genetics.
A Soviet scientist writing in the 1960s noted, This stupid and vulgar
demagoguery could not, of course, have scored a serious success; it only
increased the opposition of the scientists. It is doubtful that many of
Chinas best scientists were persuaded either. Within a decade Michurin
and Lysenko were widely acknowledged as scientic quacks in the So-
viet Union, the entire episode an embarrassing symbol of the subservi-
ence of science to ideology and ignorant politicians.49
In many elds of study including biology, physics, economics, and
history Chinese academics were forced to conform to similar doctrinal
claims that they knew to be nonsense, and to comply with academic stan-
dards they considered laughably ignorant. Some Soviet scientists, on ar-
riving in Chinese universities, were impressed with the quality of the
scientic laboratories, which was often superior to what was available
in the Soviet Union at the time. Some of them were quietly appalled by
the way in which well-trained scientists schooled in the worlds nest
research institutions were bullied and denigrated by dogmatic and ig-
norant party hacks, whose behavior and attitudes reminded them of the
Soviet Union in the nal years of Stalins life, and whose main function
appeared to be the prevention of useful scientic work.50 The thought
reform of the early 1950s and the political authority of party secretaries
was deeply resented, and in the Hundred Flowers period of 1957, critics
in universities and research institutes lacerated the party for the dog-
matism and ignorance that it fostered.
76 China Under Mao
Expropriating Private Assets
The urban private sector declined immediately after 1949, even before
the party leadership announced its decision to move toward socialism
in 1953. Government agencies began to take over banks and wholesale
suppliers, making it more difcult for businesses to obtain credit and
nancing, supplies, and customers. These changes deprived the private
sector of the means to compete and grow. Between 1949 and1952, pri-
vate rms percentage of output sold on open markets declined from 88
to 44 percent. Increasingly, private rms depended on state contracts
for their business: the output sold by private rms on state contracts rose
from 12 to 56 percent during the same period.51 In these early years,
the share of industrial output in the private sector shrank from 63 to 39
percent, rapidly losing ground to state, cooperative, and joint public-
private enterprises.52 Without any explicit attacks on the private sector,
it was gradually being squeezed by state policy and made dependent on
state agencies.
The gradual squeezing of the private sector turned into a frontal at-
tack in 1952. The party launched the Three-Anti movement to combat
corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, and the abuse of power by cadres
in urban administrations.53 The campaign struck civil servants who had
stayed in their posts and pledged loyalty to the new regime. Coercive
interrogations and physical torture of those who refused to confess led
to a wave of executions and suicides, and soon paralyzed the partys ad-
ministrative hierarchy, causing Mao to call off the campaign.54 Of the
estimated 4 million individuals who were investigated and1.2 million
who were convicted on vague charges of corruption, fewer than 200,000
were party members.55
The campaign then pivoted to an attack on private businesses. The
Three Anti campaign was merged into a Three Anti, Five Anti campaign.
The new claim was that corruption among cadres was caused by the busi-
ness practices of private entrepreneurs. The new Five Anti targeted tax
evasion, bribery, cheating on government contracts, theft of economic
intelligence, and stealing state assets. Work teams moved into private
businesses, demanded to see their accounts, and conducted all-night in-
terrogations that pressured business owners to confess to corruption and
tax evasion, reveal the source of their illegal prots, and divulge hidden
assets. Large nes were levied that bankrupted many businesses, which
Urban Revolution 77
subsequently closed. Many business owners voluntarily turned their

rms over to the government as payment for their alleged back taxes
and criminal nes.56 By the end of the campaign, the urban private sector
had shrunk to the point where it produced barely 37 percent of indus-
trial output valueroughly half of the percentage it produced in 1949.57
The campaign was an assault not only on private business activity,
but also on all independently organized activities that involved resources
not controlled by the new government. A case in point was the assault
on private charities, the main means of welfare relief in Chinese cities
before 1949. There were close to 1,300 nongovernmental organizations
in Shanghai in 1949, many of them private or religion-based charities.
Wealthy citizens were permitted to continue operating them after 1949,
and in the rst years they were helpful to the CCP in restoring social
order. Some of the philanthropists were welcomed into municipal as-
sociations run by the new city governments, and their philanthropy was
welcomed in a period when the new regime still lacked the capacity to
deliver welfare to deprived citizens.
This began to change in 1951. The rst step in the eventual closure
of private charities was the campaign to suppress counterrevolution,
which brought attacks on charities with funding from the United States,
staff who were U.S. citizens, or ties to overseas religious organizations.
These organizations were denounced as subversive and forcibly closed.
Charities that had close ties to the Nationalist regime were also treated
with increasing suspicion. The end came with the Three Anti, Five Anti
campaign, which was applied to the private charities with equal force.
Essentially an attack on the social elite that funded and directed the char-
ities, the same allegations of bribery, tax evasion, and hiding of assets
were applied to those who operated charities. Large nes and orders to
close or merge with government agencies followed. By 1954 the private
charity sector in Shanghai was no more.58
Registering Households
During these years, a system of household registration was set up in urban

areas, which eventually locked urban residents in place and kept rural
residents out of the cities. By the end of the 1950s, without a valid urban
household registration, one could not establish identity and citizenship,
prove ofcial status, qualify for rations of food and clothing, nd shelter
78 China Under Mao
and employment, attend school, marry, or join the army.59 The founda-
tions were laid from 1953 to 1956, with the completed collectivization
of agriculture and the nationalization or collectivization of urban ser-
vices, handicrafts, and industry. The authorities set up the system to pre-
vent unauthorized migration from the countryside to the city, and also
to send excess urban populations back to villages or to interior cities
scheduled for industrial development.60
Regulations issued at the end of 1954 established police substations
in urban neighborhoods, and they began to take over population regis-
tration and enforcement of residence status. At same time, urban street
ofces were established along with state funding for their operations,
which authorized ten to fteen salaried staff by the 1960s.61 A June 1955
regulation established a permanent system of household registration:
prior permission was required to move ones residence, and hotels re-
quired travel documents authorized by work units or local governments.
In August 1955, the rst regulations on grain rationing in cities were
issued, consolidating control over population movements.62 Except for
its temporary collapse during the chaotic Great Leap Forward in 1958
and1959, the system effectively kept rural migrants out of cities and pre-
vented unauthorized travel until the late 1970s.63
Organizing Neighborhoods
The household registration system was the linchpin for administering

urban neighborhoods during the 1950s. Each city was divided into urban
districts, which typically contained several hundred thousand people.
The districts, in turn, were divided into subdistricts operated by Street
Committees, which in turn were divided into an average of roughly eight
neighborhoods, which were run by Residents Committees composed of
several hundred households. The Residents Committees, in turn, were
divided into Residents Small Groups that contained anywhere from f-
teen to forty households living in a single building or along a single lane.64
The party appointed all of the ofcials that staffed these urban orga-
nizations. Salaried state ofcials staffed the district and street commit-
tees, but workers in the neighborhood committees were mostly volun-
teers. They patrolled the area, checking to see whether there were
overnight guests or other unregistered individuals living in local homes.
They put up propaganda posters, operated public address systems that
Urban Revolution 79
made political announcements and read news reports, and convened po-
litical meetings to transmit government messages. They also carried out
sanitation campaigns, helped to administer grain and other rations, and
mediated disputes between households or within families, including
marriage counseling. They patrolled the neighborhood, investigating
anything out of the ordinary, and checked the identity of individuals
not known to them. Because households almost never had private tele-
phones, the committees telephone doubled as a public phone, and one
of the members of the committee staff monitored it, logged telephone
calls, and notied residents when they had received one.65
The socialist transformation of industry, which was completed in a
rapid campaign conducted in 1955 and1956, was the nal step in the
consolidation of the new regimes control over the urban economy and
city residents. In a highly publicized mobilization campaign, the owners
of the remaining private businesses were pressured to donate their rms
to the state, or to convert them to joint state-private ownership, which
was essentially a halfway house toward full state ownership. The former
owners received shares in the resulting state enterprises, in many cases
continuing to work as managers. The state sector produced 80 percent
of all industrial output in 1957, and the joint category soon disappeared
from government statistics.66
As the urban economy was brought under state control, the outlines
of a new type of work organization took shape. This was the work unit
that would play such a central role in the lives of urban citizens, and it
became the second pillar of urban social organization that worked along-
side neighborhood organizations and household registers to monitor
urban citizens and x them in one place. After household registration
was in place and after industry and commerce were transferred to state
control, jobs were allocated by state agencies and the allocation became
virtually permanent.67 The work unit increasingly assumed the role of
providing housing and many of the goods and services formerly provided
by private ser vice establishments. Pensions were funded through work
organizations, as were state medical insurance and disability coverage.68
Work units also became organs of political and social control that were
in many ways more effective than neighborhood committees. They or-
ganized political study and convened political meetings, both during and
after working hours. They organized birth control campaigns, approved
applications for marriage and divorce, and provided authorization to
80 China Under Mao
travel between cities. Their party organizations were responsible for

carry ing out political campaigns and implementing state policies, and
their security departments carried out both political and criminal in-
vestigations and turned over violators to the judicial authorities.69
The City Revolutionized
These urban transformations, coupled with the revolutions in the coun-

tryside, gave the new Chinese state an unprecedented ability to extend
its power into communities, workplaces, and families. This new state had
capacities similar to those built up over a more prolonged period in the
Soviet Union, and it paralleled those being built in the satellite states of
Eastern Europe. For China this was historically unprecedented. In Chi-
nas traditional empires, state structures reached no lower than county
seats. The situation did not change fundamentally under the National-
ists, whose state-building efforts were crippled by factionalism inherited
from the warlord past and by a devastating foreign invasion. The CCP, a
far more disciplined and unitary force, followed up its military conquest
of China with a characteristically disciplined and focused attack on im-
pediments to the extension of central state control. The CCP was on a
mission to build a strong modern state, one that was based on a com-
pletely foreign, indeed Western, model.
During the 1950s the CCP decisively ended a centuries-old pattern
of indirect state rule by local elites. The power of propertied elites who
had ruled their communities through the end of the Nationalist era was
utterly destroyed. Rural banditry, organized crime, and governmental
corruption, rampant during the Nationalist era, were all steadily brought
under control. Secret societies and heterodox religious sects were sup-
pressed; the ubiquitous sex and drug trades were effectively ended. These
were all signs that Chinas new rulers were different, and that the na-
tion had truly entered a new era. China was no longer subject to for-
eign military occupation and colonial control of its major coastal cities.
The new state mobilized millions of soldiers that fought to a standstill
with superior Western armies on the Korean peninsula.
The changes wrought during the rst eight years of revolutionary
state building, however, were symptoms of a deeper transformation. The
CCP embarked on building a powerful modern state, but one that was
patterned after a distinctive new form of twentieth-century civilization
Urban Revolution 81
Soviet state socialism. This new civilization was founded on two pillars:
a bureaucratically administered economy that utterly rejected market
mechanisms, and a disciplined and unitary party organization that ex-
tended its reach deep into society and economy. Each of these two pillars
had striking aws, ones that would soon become increasingly apparent
to Mao and other leaders. The struggle against inevitable bureaucratic
tendencies in the economy and the party would preoccupy Mao for the
rest of his life, spurring destructive impulses that marred the last two
decades of his rule. In order to understand the next twenty years of
Chinese history, it is essential to examine the bureaucratic features of the
economy and the growing party organization that made Chinas new
dictatorship, and the next twenty years, so distinctive. These are the sub-
jects of the Chapters5 and6.
5

The Socialist Economy
A with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China became

F T ER T H E SPL I T
famous for deviating from the Soviet model of development. As
the primary architect of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Rev-
olution, Mao became a symbol of Chinas quest to forge a unique road
to socialism. Maos later reputation, however, obscured his earlier en-
thusiasm for the full-blown Soviet model. From the outset of the Peo-
ples Republic, Mao was one of Chinas most enthusiastic supporters of
Soviet economic practice, and pushed to impose central planning faster
and more thoroughly than many of his colleagues were inclined.1 Maos
ideas about socialist economics were decisively shaped by reading the
Stalinist Short Course, a history of the USSR that sketched out the stages
of Soviet development.2 Mao decided to move rapidly to the full Soviet
model as early as 1950, but did not publicly declare his intention to do
so until the end of the Korean War in 1953. His General Line for the
Transition Period of 1953 was a thinly disguised copy of Stalins own
statement on the subject in 1929.3 China, along with other members of
the postwar socialist bloc, proceeded to implement the core elements of
the mature Stalinist system: absolute single-party rule by a disciplined
and hierarchical party organization, massively expanded internal secu-
rity organs, and a dominant gure gloried as the supreme leader.
The political system was paired with an economic model that mandated
complete state ownership and control over the economy and a strong em-
phasis on heavy industry and armaments.4
During the 1950s, China developed deep and extensive ties with the
Soviet Union, and faithfully adopted the USSRs organ izational model
in the design of party and state organs, the educational system, research
The Socialist Economy 83
institutions, and the management of state enterprises. More than 200

industrial plants were built by the Soviets, forming the core of Chinas
new industrial system. As many as 10,000 Soviet and East European ad-
visors spent time in China, working on more than 300 major industrial
projects, and almost 40,000 Chinese were trained in the USSR and
Eastern Europe.5 In many areas, the Chinese implemented the Soviet
blueprint so thoroughly that their own arrangements exemplied text-
book ideals more fully than actual Soviet practice.6
In light of the worldwide collapse of the Soviet model some forty years
later, Maos enthusiasm might seem to have been driven primarily by
political dogma. At the time, however, there was every reason for con-
dence in the Soviet model. Czarist Russia was easily defeated in World
War I, but thirty years later the Soviet Union, the least economically de-
veloped of the major combatants in World War II, absorbed the full brunt
of an even more formidable German attack and turned back the enemy
while ghting alone in Europe. The Soviet industrialization drive of the
1930s was widely credited with making the difference. The Soviet system
outperformed the German economy in the production of munitions by
more than twofold, and it proved superior at extracting human and ma-
terial resources from its population, supporting a ghting force far dis-
proportionate to the size of its economy and initial level of economic de-
velopment.7 This was the model for the intense war mobilization in
Manchuria that later secured Maos nal victory over the Nationalists.
Even before it proved to be a superior war economy, the Soviet Union
experienced rapid economic growth throughout the 1930s, while the cap-
italist West remained mired in the Great Depression. From the begin-
ning of its First Five-Year Plan in 1928 to the eve of its war with Ger-
many, the per capita gross domestic product of the Soviet Union grew
by an annual average of 3.8 percent compared with the depression-
wracked U.S. economy, which stagnated during the same period.8 From
1928 to 1949, the Soviet economy sustained growth at an annual rate
of 3.2 percent, double that of the United States.9 This was a remarkable
record, especially because much of Soviet territory west of the Ural Moun-
tains was devastated by warfare from 1941 to 1944. This rapid growth
continued well into the 1960s. The Soviet economy continued to grow
from 1950 to 1965 at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, compared to 2.3 per-
cent in the United States.10 The vitality of the Soviet economic system,
and in the eyes of some its superiority, was demonstrated by the USSRs
84 China Under Mao
launch of the worlds rst orbiting satellite in 1957. This economic model
turned the Soviet Union into a major world power, and it had obvious
appeal to the leaders of revolutionary China. The appeal of the Stalinist
model was twofold: it laid out a clear map of what was to be done, and
it provided a model of how to develop unity of thought and action around
that plan. One observer of this period has noted, particularly after a
revolution, countries seize on preexisting ideas to guide them through
times of high uncertainty and to allow them to legitimate and coordi-
nate their actions. This solution can often produce a more slavish imita-
tion of another countrys experience than might seem merited on grounds
of pure efciency.11
State Socialism as a Growth Machine
What made this socialist growth machine so successful? The most impor-
tant foundation for rapid and sustained growth was the fact that market
demand and nancial markets were not the drivers of the economy.
Fluctuations in aggregate demand and the instability of nancial markets
had generated periodic economic crises and depressions throughout
the relatively short history of the capitalist system, and the crises seemed
to become more severe and prolonged, culminating in the Great De-
pression of the 1930s. Market demand did not drive economic activity
in the Soviet system, and nancial markets did not exist. State planners
ensured effective demand by providing enterprises with mandatory pro-
duction plans that were increased annually. Financing was provided by
the state, which allocated investment and operating capital through the
state banking system in line with the requirements of state-mandated
production plans. The instability characteristic of capitalism was there-
fore entirely absent from the Soviet model.
The Soviet system was designed to promote capital formation at an
accelerated pace. Instead of permitting growth rates to be determined
by the vagaries of the consumption and savings decisions of households
and the investment and production decisions of private rms, the state
itself regulated levels of consumption and investment. Soviet planning
set priorities based on their distinction between two types of investment:
productive and unproductive. Productive investment increases the output
of producers goodsused by factories to make other products. This cat-
egory includes all of the sectors symbolic of modern industrial strength:
mining, metallurgy, chemicals, petroleum, machine building, motor ve-

hicles, aviation, armaments, and the physical infrastructure upon which
these industries rely. Unproductive investment is essentially anything
that is consumed by end users and not subsequently employed in man-
ufacturing. This includes all consumer goods: clothing, household fur-
nishings, bicycles, private telephones, and civilian automobiles. It also
includes the retail and ser vice sectors that cater to private consumption.
This also includes housing: apartments depreciate as soon as they
are occupied and do not themselves contribute directly to material
production.12
The Soviet model achieved rapid growth by pouring investments into
sectors de ned as productive at the expense of sectors de ned as un-
productive. This is why mature socialist economies became famous for
massive heavy industrial sectors alongside woefully undeveloped con-
sumer goods sectors and overcrowded, substandard housing. Consumer
sacrice was considered an acceptable cost in order to build the heavy
industrial base on which a modern economy and strong national defense
are based.
From the perspective of socialist economics, unproductive invest-
ments are wasteful, and a major aw of capitalism as a development
model. The wasteful consumer sectors of modern capitalist economies
were viewed as socially and econom ically irrational. Capitalist econo-
mies expend huge resources for no other purpose than to encourage con-
sumer demand. Examples are legion. Television sets, audio equipment,
or private automobiles are redesigned every year to attract buyers. Huge
budgets are allocated to marketing and advertising to convince consumers
to purchase. Scores of nearly identical products vie for consumer atten-
tion with expensive packaging designed to draw the shoppers eye on
store shelves. Entire sectors of the economy are devoted to the completely
unproductive task of urging people to buy things of questionable value:
marketing, retail sales, advertising. And after new consumer products
are purchased, perfectly usable but no longer fashionable items are dis-
carded.13 To an orthodox economist in the Soviet mold, capitalism is an
empire of wasteresources that could be devoted to socially rational pur-
poses are instead squandered on unproductive activities that only serve
the circulation of goods and to promote unnecessary household expen-
ditures. This kind of argument appealed to leaders searching for an eco-
nomic model that would generate rapid industrialization.
86 China Under Mao
In order to maintain maximum levels of investment in productive

sectors, the state owned all productive assets and the nancial sector.
There could be no signicant private enterprise, no private nance. State
planners made all production and investment decisions. The nancial
sector, no longer a dangerous source of economic instability, simply al-
located capital as part of the state production plan. This also required
that state planners set the prices for virtually all products. With prices
set by the state, planners could ensure that resources owed to favored
sectors.14
The most important example of this control of pricing was the agri-
cultural sector, which served the function of providing inexpensive food-
stuffs for a rapidly growing urban workforce. Collective farms were an
integral part of this system, because the states agents administered these
farms and controlled the production of the harvest and its allocation.
Collective farms were required to sell quotas of grain and other food-
stuffs to the state at low prices essentially extracting surpluses out of
the countryside to promote urban industry. Inexpensive food was an es-
sential part of the growth engine: low prices for food staples meant a
lower cost of living for urban workers, which in turn permitted the state
to pay urban workers lower wages. Coupled with limited investment in
consumer goods and housing for urban workers, this permitted state in-
dustries to accumulate greater surpluses that could be reinvested at higher
rates in the further expansion of (productive) industries. This, in a nut-
shell, is the relatively simple design of the Soviet economic model: the
state limits improvements in living standards in order to promote sav-
ings and industrial investment. Consumer prosperity would have to wait
until a later stage of economic development.
The Industrial System
The Soviet development model created a world of management that was

remarkable in its simplicity.15 Each year a factory would receive two plans:
a production plan and a supply plan. The production plan would be laid
out in a grid: the rows specied the planners annual quotas for the var-
ious products of the enterprise; the columns specied the end users to
whom the products were to be sold. The supply plan was the ip side of
the production plan: the rows specied the quotas for the various sup-
plies that the planners estimated were necessary for the factory to meet
its production quotas; the columns specied the factories from which
the enterprise was permitted to purchase a certain quantity of an input

within the plan. The entire industrial system was essentially an inter-
locking network of production and supply plans that created elaborate
connections among enterprises and state purchasing agencies.
Negotiations among enterprises proceeded largely in accord with the
production and supply plans. Customers included in your production
plans would arrive early in the year to settle product specications and
delivery dates. Your purchasing agents would travel to the enterprises
named in your supply plan to do the same. If the plan was ful lled, the
transactions among producers and suppliers would be completed at xed
state prices, and funds would be transferred among accounts kept at state
banks. A factorys nancial plan advanced to the rm a set amount of
working capital needed for completion of the plan. Completion of the
plan meant that a factory would make a preplanned level of prot, al-
most all of which would be remitted to the states nancial arm to fund
further industrial investment. Small percentages of factory prots could
be retained for production bonuses for managers and workers.
On the surface it might appear that there was virtually no room for
entrepreneurship in an economy organized in this fashion. Such appear-
ances would be deceiving. There were always gaps in the production and
supply plans. Planners wanted to encourage efciency in the use of
resources, but they could not do so by using price mechanisms, which
were simply an accounting device that shadowed planned transactions.
Instead, they encouraged efciency by devising tight plans: not all of
the supplies needed for production quotas were specied in purchasing
plans. Planners assumed that managers stockpiled inputs in their store-
rooms or, if not, they would have to nd ways to economize on the use
of materials: reduce scrap and waste in the production process or econ-
omize on fuel and energy.
An additional problem with the supply plan was built into the struc-
ture of the planned economy: inputs that were delivered within the
plan were frequently not of the specications needed by the purchasing
enterprise. Supply plans did not designate precise specications of the
goods to be supplied. Product qualityfor example, thickness or ten-
sile strength of steel, or spare parts of a specic size or designhad to
be negotiated by procuring agents with the supplying rm. Sometimes
the supplier claimed an inability to produce to the needed specications.
More commonly, after the supplier agreed to the indicated specications,
the goods that were eventually delivered were not what the contract
88 China Under Mao
specied. There was little recourse for the aggrieved rm: contract law
was virtually nonex istent, and the supplier had little incentive to sat-
isfy customers precise needsthere was no prospect of losing customers
in this planning system. Unless the manager of the aggrieved enterprise
had considerable rank and inuence, and could pull strings within the
party hierarchy, there was little for the supplier to fear. Managers had
little choice but to try to rework the supplies into usable form, or put
them in storerooms, hoping to exchange them for supplies with the
proper specications.
In practice, managers responded to tight supplies through a our-
ishing barter trade. This was the realm of entrepreneurship in the planned
economy. Socialist factories maintained only a minimal sales force: all
they had to do was sit in their ofces and accept appointments with the
end users specied in production plans. Supply departments, on the other
hand, were much larger operations, and were most important for the
ful llment of production plans. Supply departments sent procuring
agents around the country in search of inputs that another factory might
be willing to trade for an item that they in turn needed for their own
production process. Often the procuring agent would travel to a familiar
rm used to solve supply problems in the past. At other times they would
attend large goods ordering meetings, essentially conventions organized
by regional planners for enterprises to solve their supply problems.
It is here that human ingenuity defeated the bureaucrats best-laid
plans. Managers, recognizing that the only constraint on their ability
to complete production plans was a supply shortfall, stockpiled supplies
in storerooms to guard against future shortfalls. In many years it was
possible to overfulll production targets, not report the output, and stock-
pile these products in storerooms. These in turn could be bartered with
other enterprises to secure supplies for future production. This created
a pervasive hoarding mentality at the level of the enterprise that actu-
ally went beyond the supplies that a factory needed for its own produc-
tion. Procuring agents often found it impossible to arrange a straight trade
that provided production inputs needed by both sides of the transaction.
In these cases, one party to the trade might accept products that they
did not need for their own production process, but which were none-
theless in short supply and could readily be traded with another rm
for inputs that were actually needed. Factory storerooms therefore stock-
piled nished products that were not sold to customers and were of no
direct use to the factory, but were held on the chance that they could be
traded for supplies that the factory needed. In short, planners were en-
gaged in an elaborate game with the managers of state rms. They tried
to estimate slack resources and force managers to use them by devising
tight plans. Managers, in turn, responded by stockpiling supplies and
other items for a pervasive barter trade that served to exacerbate supply
shortages and tie up huge inventories in warehouses.16
To those familiar with the workings of a market economy, this elab-
orate barter trade would seem counterproductive and unnecessary. A
simpler solution would be to permit a market in scarce outside the plan
supplies, with prices to be set according to their scarcity. Factories could
then buy and sell scarce supplies, allocating them for more efcient uses.
Motivated by the incentive to turn stockpiled goods into cash, they would
release their stockpiled inventories, reducing supply shortages and pro-
moting greater resource efciency in the economy as a whole.
This obvious solution was ruled out by several hard realities. The rst
was that enterprise managers were not permitted to conduct money
transactions with enterprises that were not in their production or supply
plans. State banks administered enterprise funds and allowed transfers
among enterprises only for ofcially approved uses. The second is that
so long as enterprise managers were evaluated solely by the ful llment
of production plans, and so long as almost all of their rms prots were
remitted to the state, they would have no economic incentive to sell their
stockpiles for cash. The nancial gain from these transactions would
simply be appropriated by the state, and the manager would still face
an uncertain supply of scarce inputs on unpredictable markets and at
prices that could not be anticipated. The ultimate constraint, of course,
was political. Permitting a free supplementary market in scarce mate-
rials would potentially subvert the planned economy, as managers di-
verted supplies within the plan to protable uses outside the plan. This
was a concession to capitalism that Soviet planners were unwilling to
make almost until the very end of the Soviet Union, and the idea was
anathema to Mao and most of the party leadership during his lifetime.
The Shortage Economy

The Hungarian economist Jnos Kornai has done more than anyone to
characterize the aws in this economic model, which ultimately proved
90 China Under Mao
its undoing. He aptly described this economic system as resource con-

strained, in contrast with a market economy, which is demand con-
strained.17 At the level of the rm, production in a demand-constrained
economy will continue to the point where buyers for the products can
no longer be found. To continue to produce in the absence of customers
would raise costs and lower prots, potentially threatening the survival
of the rm. In a socialist economy, these considerations are irrelevant.
Demand is guaranteed in state plans; rms are not only given produc-
tion quotas, they are also given lists of buyers who are designated to pur-
chase specic amounts of the rms output for the year. The socialist
economy is resource constrained because production will continue
until the plan is metor until the rm exhausts its supplies of inputs.
The result of this resource constraint is the prevalence of the hoarding
that we have just described, and which was characteristic of industrial
management in every country where this model was implemented.18 The
unfortunate result is a very inefcient use of capital. An economic system
that is designed to funnel maximum amounts of investment into heavy
industrial sectors to spur rapid growth has the unintended consequence
of enshrining an extremely wasteful use of resources in the favored in-
dustrial sectors. Market capitalism may produce large numbers of so-
cially wasteful products very efciently, but state socialism churned out
large volumes of heavy industrial goods, often substandard, and very
inefciently.
Firms that operated at a decit were subsidized. It was almost un-
heard of in this system for a state enterprise to be closed, for several rea-
sons. Even if the rm operated at an accounting loss, it still provided
employment for local workers. In addition, the rm put pension and
medical costs for its labor force, both active and retired, into its costs of
production. Firms that were large and old had signicant pension obli-
gations that made their operations inherently less protable, but they
were still funding the states welfare system. Moreover, socialist rms
built and maintained housing and ser vices for employees that could not
be readily obtained elsewhere. Finally, the rms products were needed
as inputs in the supply plans of other enterprises, part of the interlocking
network of input and output plans.
For these reasons, closing a socialist enterprise entailed costs for the
government that might far outweigh the expense of subsidizing its con-
tinued operations. Closing a rm would create unemployment, under-
mine the supply and maintenance of housing and ser vices, ofoad
pension costs onto the government, and force planners to nd alter-
nate sources of supply for the products of the closing rm. Needless
to say, the larger the rm, and the more important it was as an em-
ployer and supplier, the greater the inherent cost of closing operations
simply because of accounting decits. The government, as owner, was
dependent on the rm just as surely as the rm was dependent on the
government.19
The result of the investment bias toward heavy industry, and the in-
herently soft budget constraint on rms, was an industrial sector in the
Soviet bloc that lagged far behind international standards in its use of
inputs. Industry received a much higher share of total investment in state
socialist than in capitalist economies, even in their mature phase after
1965. Industrial investment in socialist economies averaged 40 percent of
total national investment; in capitalist economies, 25 percent.20 As these
gures suggest, and as the earlier discussion makes clear, economic growth
was achieved in socialist economies by pouring resources into industry
rather than developing more efcient ways to use these resources.
In one study, improved factory productivity in mature socialist eco-
nomies contributed an average of only 27 percent to economic growth
from 1960 to 1988, while the comparable gure for capitalist economies
was 65 percent. 21 This was the system that Mao was in a hurry to im-
plement in the 1950s, and Mao would struggle in the years to come to
devise ways of resolving these inherent aws without violating core
tenets of socialism that he had absorbed from Soviet doctrines of the
1930s. This proved to be an impossible task.
Enterprise Welfare Provision
Socialist economies were designed to achieve full employment. In addi-

tion to the absence of layoffs due to the characteristic business cycles of
market capitalism, there was no incentive for managers to cut the labor
force to reduce costs. The wage bill was budgeted as part of the annual
plan, and was a xed cost of production in an economy that did not eval-
uate rms by their protability. But the role of the socialist enterprise
in promoting social welfare was not limited to providing full employ-
ment. Throughout the Soviet bloc, and to a pronounced degree in China,
the workplace became the focal point for the delivery of the entire range
92 China Under Mao
of state insurance and benets, and the provision of housing and a wide
range of other ser vices. By the end of the 1950s, Chinas version had
evolved into its urban work unit system that continued to develop
throughout the Mao era. The work unit, in the larger and better-endowed
workplaces, became an intense focus of social and political life for urban
Chinese.22
The rst notable feature of the work unit in China was that employ-
ment was permanent: employees could not be red except for criminal
or political offenses that involved imprisonment. By the same token,
workers could not leave to take up employment elsewhere. Upon the
completion of schooling, urban residents were assigned jobs by labor bu-
reaus (or by personnel departments that handled university graduates).
Except for management and party personnel who had career lines that
led out of state organizations into higher posts in the bureaucracy, all
employees could therefore expect to remain in the same work unit for
the duration of their careers. Whether they remained within the same
workplace or were promoted higher in the party or government hier-
archy, administrative decisions governed job assignments.23
In addition to providing secure lifetime employment, the work unit
delivered and in fact funded health and accident insurance and pen-
sions.24 Employees received basic coverage with employment, and the
costs were covered directly in the work units budget, itemized as a cost
of production in an enterprise or as part of the budget of a state agency
or institution. Pensions were paid in cash, at the workplace, and retirees
lined up at the cashiers ofce to collect their pension payments at the
end of each month. If the work unit was large enough, or had the re-
sources to do so, it also directly provided health clinics and in-patient
hospital ser vices. The largest state enterprises frequently provided hos-
pitals, nurseries, and kindergartens for preschool children of employees,
and sometimes even primary schools on site.
The work unit was also a major provider of housing. By the end of
the Mao era, roughly one-third of urban residents lived in apartments
that were built, maintained, and allocated to them by their work units,
very often on site.25 There was no private market in housing, and the
only alternative was through the city government. As a result, many
large and important work units state enterprises, government agen-
cies, and institutions like major universities became integrated com-
munities with employees living together on site throughout their adult
lives, raising families together in housing complexes, and remaining

after retirement.
As the private service sector was closed down in the 1950s, work units
picked up ser vices formerly supplied by the market. Work units devel-
oped meal halls and food stalls for employees and their family mem-
bers. They built shower and bath facilities for employees, whose apart-
ments rarely had these luxuries. They opened up retail shops and grocery
stores. They organized barber shops and hair salons. They built audito-
riums that could be used to stage concerts or plays, or show feature lms.
They built gymnasiums or laid out sports elds for athletic teams, and
if they did not have sufcient resources to do this, they would organize
teams to compete in municipal leagues. Some even provided transpor-
tation for commuters who did not live on site, and others organized and
paid for periodic vacation tours for employees and family members.26
Those who worked for large state enterprises also might receive pe-
riodic benets from the ourishing barter trade between rms. Procuring
agents at times would obtain large batches of scarce consumer items: ra-
dios, wristwatches, famous-brand bicycles, and in later years even black-
and-white television sets. These goods would be distributed to favored
employees and their families. Some work units established regular rela-
tionships with collective farms, and traded manufactured items for sup-
plies of scarce foodstuffs. Many tried to provide these rare food items
smoked hams, chickens, melonsat major holidays to build employee
morale.
The extent to which urban work units developed into self-contained
communities was documented by a mid-1980s survey of Chinas third
largest city. Just over 85 percent of the surveyed individuals had meal
ser vices, medical clinics, and shower facilities in their work units; two-
thirds had infant day care centers and reading libraries; half of them had
auditoriums that doubled as cinemas and organized vacation tours; more
than one-third had organized sports teams; one-quarter had barber shops
and on-site sports facilities; and one- fth offered bus ser vices for com-
muters. 27 But not all work units were equal; they varied considerably in
the resources at their disposal, which translated into differences in stan-
dard of living. Large state enterprises and higher-ranking government
ofces were favored over other work units. In a market economy, in-
come differences across occupations determine the lifestyle and living
standards of different social groups. In China, wages were low and wage
94 China Under Mao
differences modest, so a major component of inequality was the capacity

of the work unit to supply goods and services, virtually all of which were
provided either free or for a nominal charge. Surveys conducted in the
early post-Mao era revealed large differences in the ser vices and bene-
ts available to employees in enterprises of different size and rank.28
Work units also became the locus of an individuals identity. The stan-
dard means of personal identication was the work unit identity card,
issued by the units personnel department. Every employee also had a
personal dossier that recorded family background, class status, educa-
tional history, and political demeanor. A combination of employment
record and police le, the dossier was kept at the place of employment.
No one could transfer to a new work unit without transfer of the dos-
sier.29 In order to travel to another city, work unit permission was re-
quired. If travel was on ofcial business, the work unit would procure
the train, bus, and on rare occasion air tickets. If travel was for personal
reasons, the employee needed an ofcial document from the work unit
certifying the individuals permission to travel. Work unit permission
was required to ofcially register a marriage; divorce required similar
work unit consent.30
Consumer Austerity
The decline in the role of money and markets meant that different means
had to be devised to handle the inevitable consumer shortages. Consumer
austerity was central to the design of the Soviet growth model: invest-
ment in consumer goods, and all manner of unproductive investments,
were neglected in favor of productive investments in heavy industry.
There are three ways to deal with pervasive consumer shortages. The
rst, largely rejected in all socialist economies, is rationing by price. Prices
of scarce goods rise to levels that are affordable to only a small portion
of the population. In a socialist system, where production is not oriented
to market demand, shortages will persist, and scarce goods will become
permanently accessible only to a minority that can afford high prices.
The second method is rationing by queue: prices remain xed, and con-
sumers exercise vigilance to nd items that are in stock. They stand in
line to make a purchase, hoping that supplies last until they get to the
front of the line. This requires large expenditures of time and effort by
consumers to nd retail outlets that stock the items they need. The third
approach is administrative rationing: prices are xed, and coupons are

issued to individuals or families that permit them to purchase a rationed
item. In the case of a major item like an apartment or the purchase of a
private automobile, individuals or families put their names on waiting
lists and are called when their turn comes up. The administrative ap-
proach saves time and effort over the second, and in theory provides
broader and more equal access to scarce goods at low prices, although
rank will still have its privileges.
Administrative rationing was prevalent in the Soviet Union during
war time and in the immediate postwar period in the Soviet bloc. It was
also used selectively during World War II in the market economies of
the United States and England, whose governments mobilized for all-
out warfare against the Axis powers; rationing was more comprehen-
sive in England than in the United States, and lasted for a number of
years after the end of the war. As the economies of the postwar Soviet
bloc recovered, and the supply of food and basic consumer goods im-
proved, administrative rationing was gradually abandoned and rationing
by queue became common (though housing and private autos continued
to be allocated administratively). Vigilant shopping and long waits in line
at retail shops became the norm, and they were a prominent feature of
social life in the Soviet bloc.31
With a much larger and poorer population, China had to manage its
food supplies very carefully, and with a much lower initial level of eco-
nomic development, consumer goods were in shorter supply and much
more basic than in the more prosperous economies of the Soviet bloc
(no motorcycles, televisions, or private autos). After the appearance of
long lines for basic foodstuffs in large cities in 1953 and1954, the gath-
ering of large numbers of disgruntled shoppers in major cities presented
an obvious threat to public order. China moved quickly in 1955 to put
in place a comprehensive system of administrative rationing for a wide
range of goods, from staple foods to major consumer items (and housing).32
The system remained in force throughout the Mao era.
The bottom rung of the rationing system was for basic requirements:
food and clothing. Staple grains (either rice or wheat our), meat, cooking
oil, and cloth were available only with ration coupons. This was a na-
tional system, and coupons were issued separately by province and could
be redeemed only where issued. The coupons were distributed by place
of residence: if a family lived in work unit housing, they would receive
96 China Under Mao
rations through the work unit; if they lived outside, they would receive
them through the residents committees. The importance of these cou-
pons is indicated by their appearance: they were printed in color, with
a design as elaborate as the regular national currency.
The most highly valued consumer durables were also rationed, but
the supply was more irregular. Individuals working in resource-rich work
units were favored in these distributions, as were individuals of higher
rank. Ordinarily, workplaces and neighborhoods organized waiting lists
for the industrial coupons that permitted one to purchase an item at
a state retail outlet. The most valued coupons were for three famous-
brand bicycles that were manufactured in Shanghai and Tianjin (Phoenix,
Eternal, and Flying Pigeon). Bicycles were the primary means of urban
transportation; the main streets of major cities during rush hour were
broad rivers of bicycles, slowly moving in unison. Many bicycles of lesser
quality were widely available, although they were markedly inferior: tires
punctured easily, spokes broke with regularity, frames cracked unpre-
dictably, and parts rusted out quickly. The famous brands were known
for using the best-quality steel and rubber; durable, reliable, and safe.
Other highly valued consumer durables were rationed in a similar
fashion. Foot-powered sewing machines were essential. They were copies
of 1950s Soviet models that were in turn copied from the product mar-
keted by Singer in the United States until the 1920s. They were needed
to make the most efcient use of cloth rations: premade clothing was a
less efcient use of the ration coupons. The most valued item of all was
living space. Housing conditions were very cramped in urban China in
the 1950s, and as the population grew, families became crowded into
ever-smaller spaces. Young couples that registered to marry faced long
waits at work units or city neighborhoods for an apartment; they could
not le an application and be placed on the waiting list until the mar-
riage was ofcially registered. Separation and divorce did not constitute
valid grounds for making a housing application (not surprisingly, divorce
rates were very low but grew rapidly with increased housing supply in
the 1980s). Growing families expanded, often living in a single room,
and led their own applications for larger quarters. Ordinary citizens
rarely had private kitchens and almost never had fully functional pri-
vate bathrooms. Apartments had running water, perhaps a sink, but
kitchen facilities and bathrooms were in the hall (or in outdoor court-
yards or on the street) and shared with neighbors. In work units and
neighborhoods, citizens used every means at their disposal to inuence

authorities to move them up on lists and convince them of the urgency
of their need. Allocations of new apartments to neighbors or coworkers
could stimulate loud complaining among those passed over. By the end
of the Mao era, this led to an urban culture that was seemingly obsessed
with inuencing decision makers to make allocations in ones favor,
and cultivating networks of connections with others to exchange favors
and prosper under these conditions of scarcity.33
Political Implications of Economic Problems
This is the economic system that Mao pushed to impose rapidly in the
1950s. It is important to understand how the system worked, and its in-
herent aws, because proposed solutions had political implications that
would contribute heavily to a split between China and the Soviet Union,
and eventually to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
The split in world socialism, and the raging political con icts within
China in the 1960s and1970s, originated in disagreements about how
to solve the problems just described.
The aws of this institutional design became visible in China as soon
as the system was implemented. They had long been known in the So-
viet Union. The new satellite states in Eastern Europe were struggling
with them for the rst time. In the Soviet bloc, the 1950s were a time of
active discussion about how to improve the design of the system.34 It had
mobilized capital for the early stages of heavy industrial growth and had
promoted national defense. But now, many thought, it was time to look
more closely at the systems obvious aws. Improvements in living stan-
dards would be impossible so long as the industrial system continued
to waste investment and resources. Somehow, greater efciency had to
be wrung out of this hopelessly bureaucratic mode of economic
organization.
There were three basic approaches, each of which had political im-
plications. The rst, and the one that was increasingly favored in the
Soviet Union, was the application of modern scientic management tech-
niques to the planning process.35 Modern statistical techniques and math-
ematical models would be employed by highly trained experts to per-
fect input-output planning. This set of solutions relied heavily on trained
scientic personnel in elite bureaucratic departments. It did not threaten
98 China Under Mao
the dominance of the party or its control over the economy, but it im-
plied that party ofcials had to cede considerable authority to technical
specialists. It also meant that politicians with grandiose and unrealistic
ambitions would confront expert advice that placed limits on their po-
litically inspired plans. This was a vision of a socialist economy run ac-
cording to scientic principles, implemented by elite experts in a large
bureaucracy.
The second approach was to rely on market mechanisms to supple-
ment the planned economy. This was pioneered in Yugoslavia in the
1950s and Hungary after the late 1960s, and was under wide discussion
in the Soviet bloc at the time.36 This approach called for an end to input-
output planning and granting enterprise managers greater discretion
over their production lines and greater responsibility for nding cus-
tomers. Enterprises in this scheme would become responsible for their
own prots and losses. Goods would circulate increasingly based on
market prices that reected relative scarcities. The states monopoly over
ownership would be maintained, but enterprise per for mance would be
based on prot criteria rather than simply meeting output quotas. In
theory, as managers became more sensitive to price and cost, they would
become more efcient in their use of inputs and capital. Firms that made
greater prots could pay higher wages and bonuses, and provide better
housing and services. This approach relied on prot incentives and market
mechanisms to coordinate the socialist economy. Chinese economists
were among the rst to champion this approach; the most famous was
Sun Yefang, who began advancing these ideas in the mid-1950s.37
The third approach was the one favored by Mao Zedong. This was
essentially a form of political fundamentalism that idealized the prin-
ciples of a war time economy. Mao favored the kind of political mobili-
zation that had worked in Manchuria during the last years of the civil
war: politics in command in the form of party secretaries who pushed
employees and enterprises to display greater commitment to the socialist
cause and sacrice for the common good. In Maos view, only political
mobilization could unleash the creativity of the masses of workers and
dig out slack resources that lay fallow in conventional methodsas in-
creasingly seen by the problems of hoarding and inefciency in the bu-
reaucratic Soviet model. This approach put party secretaries in command
of an enterprise and drastically reduced the authority of educated ex-
perts. It refused to be bound by bureaucratic rules and regulations that
tied up organizations in red tape. It did nothing, however, to change the

underlying reality that the entire economy was organized as a massive
bureaucratic machineit simply put the economy in the hands of po-
litical bosses.
Maos approach, by the 1960s, also came with a strident political cri-
tique of the rst two approaches.38 The scientic management solution
empowered experts in a massive bureaucracy who were, in his view, in-
evitably bourgeois in their outlooks and orientations. Mao had no in-
tention of permitting his revolutionary party to yield power to bureau-
cratic experts, and he did not want to empower highly educated elites
who rose to their positions through a stable bureaucratic career. He would
eventually charge that this would lead inevitably to the rebirth of a class-
stratied capitalism. It is odd that Mao identied this vision of scientic
management by a massive bureaucracy as capitalismit would seem to
be the very antithesis of an economy organized along the lines of market
competition. Yet in rejecting this model and labeling it as capitalism, Mao
would make very clear that he utterly rejected this answer.
Reliance on market mechanisms to improve incentives and cost ef-
ciency was, in Maos mind, even worse. For him, this was the very de-
nition of capitalism, and market approaches to the problems of socialism
were completely beyond the pale. Mao identied socialism with the
system inherited from the Stalin-era Soviet Union. If it no longer worked
the way that it had in its glory years, this was because party cadres no
longer played the animating role that made the system work. It was the
role of the party to mobilize enterprises and their personnel to greater
accomplishments, greater efciencies, greater commitment to the so-
cialist cause. Party leadership and an emphasis on hard work as a po-
litical obligation was the remedy to the inefciencies and contradictions
that plagued the socialist model. Failing to recognize this would inevi-
tably lead to rule by a narrow bureaucratic elite and class rule, and per-
haps the full-blown restoration of capitalism. This was the vision that
Mao tried to enact during his Great Leap Forward of 19581960. In the
wake of the Leaps humiliating failure, one of the primary motives of
the Cultural Revolution was to ensure that China would never resort
to either the bureaucratic or the market solutions after he had left the
scene.
6

The Evolving Party System
S I NCE T H E L AT E 1920S , the CCP had been a revolutionary organization,

governing far-ung and isolated rural base areas, organizing villages
behind Japanese lines, operating underground in cities controlled by the
Japa nese or the Nationalists, and mobilizing forces to ght a civil war.
We have already seen that the party transformed both city and coun-
tryside during the 1950s as it consolidated its new regime. However, the
party itself was changing inexorably as it established a new state. Before
1949 it was an organization designed for political and military combat.
To administer China it expanded drastically in size, recruited new
kinds of members with new skills, and administered cities as well as
villages.1 The Soviet model that the CCP adopted so faithfully in the 1950s
made the growth of a massive and complex bureaucracy a foregone
conclusion.
At the time of the Japa nese surrender in August 1945, the party had
1.2 million members and an army of 910,000.2 The mobilization in Man-
churia in the late 1940s greatly expanded the size of both. During the
military conquest of the mainland, large numbers of new members
ocked to the winning side. By the time the new regime was established
in October 1949, there were 4.5 million party members, the core of a
new regime that was to rule a nation of 541 million.3 The party was about
to undergo a profound and largely unforeseen transformation.
From Political Movement to Ruling Party

To join the party before its victory was a different matter than joining it
afterward. The CCP referred to those who joined prior to its victory as
The Evolving Party System 101
revolutionary cadresan ofcial status that recognized contributions

in an era of risk and sacrice. In subsequent decades, these party mem-
bers lled the top spots in the new administration, and their families
carried the most favored household status. Inheriting this favored status,
their offspring would receive special preference in admission to the party
and to schools, and in job assignments. Those who had served in the
Red Army before its victory had a similar status revolutionary
soldier and their offspring received similar preferences in later years.4
Revolutionary cadre status acknowledged the fact that joining the
party before its victory represented commitment to a cause, one that en-
tailed considerable risk, hardship, even loss of life or limb. One could
not say the same about those who joined after the partys victory. As
the years went by, and as the party consolidated its control over the
economy and the educational system, joining it was an act of loyalty to
established authority, one likely to be rewarded with status and career
advancement. To be sure, party members were still expected to sacri-
ce time and effort, perform unpopular tasks, and set aside their per-
sonal beliefs under party discipline that could be harsh. Whatever an
individuals motivation, the personal risks and sacrice involved in this
decision paled in comparison with those of the earlier era, and the po-
tential rewards were large.5 As the party grew in the 1950s, new mem-
bers were recruited in universities, ofces, and factories. They had dif-
ferent skills and life experiences than the revolutionary generation. The
party quadrupled in size by 1965, by which point post-1949 recruits out-
numbered revolutionary cadres by a ratio of more than three to one.6
The Partys Reach
The party organization was at the core of the new state, and as the So-
viet system was put into place, it exercised control over job assignments,
the allocation of material goods, school admissions, and appointments
to leadership positions in government and enterprises. Its reach extended
into all social institutions and economic enterprises, right down to the
village, the factory oor, and the staff ofce. Essentially an interlocking
chain of committees that replicated itself from the top leadership in Bei-
jing down to the grass roots, the party maintained a separate adminis-
trative system that supervised and controlled government and admin-
istration at every level. At the top was the CCP Politburo, composed of
102 China Under Mao
twenty full members and six alternates in 1956; the seven most inu-
ential of these individuals served on the smaller Politburo Standing Com-
mittee, which met more regularly. Mao Zedong, as party chairman, was
at the apex of this structure. The Politburo was a subset of a much larger
and largely ceremonial Central Committee, which included some 197
full and alternate members in 1956. It met irregularly and had little di-
rect inuence on decision making.7
Directly subordinate to the national orga ni zation in Beijing were
party committees that were in charge of each of twenty-nine province-
level jurisdictions. Party secretaries, the top ofcials in each province,
chaired these provincial committees and met regularly with the smaller
standing committee. This structure was replicated down each level of
government all the way to the grass roots. Below the provincial com-
mittees were municipal and prefectural party committees; below these
were county and city district party committees; and below them party
committees in every rural commune, every university, all but the smallest
factories, and any other organization of signicance.
This national network of party committees exercised control over ad-
ministrative decisions at each level. Provincial governors, for example,
were themselves party members and members of the standing
committeeif the party secretary was not in fact also the governor. The
same was true for mayors, county magistrates, factory executives, and
university presidents. If the top administrators at each level were not
also party secretaries, they were almost always members of its standing
committee and held the post of party vice secretary. In this fashion the
partys national organization paralleled, and was intertwined with, the
administration of government, economic enterprises, and public institu-
tions at every level.
At the bottom of the hierarchy were the party branches. This is where
ordinary party members were integrated into the national organization.
Party branches supervised an average of fteen members in an ofce,
workshop, academic department, or collective farm. Party members at-
tended separate meetings that were closed to others, and they were sub-
ject to party discipline exercised by a party branch secretary. The branch
secretary, in turn, was subordinate to the general branch secretary, and
selected branch secretaries were members of the general branch com-
mittee. General branch secretaries, in turn, were subordinate to the party
secretary, and were themselves often members of the party committee.
This was the power structure of the new party-state. Several impli-
cations of this structure should be immediately apparent. The rst is that
this was a single hierarchy that was directly subordinate to the top lead-
ership in Beijing and was expected to faithfully carry out directives from
the top. No important decisions could be made at any of these levels
without the consent of party secretaries and the support of the party
organization. The second is that this hierarchy was extraordinarily large.
By 1955 there were already 9.4 million party members, and this number
doubled again by 1965, to 18.7 million.8 By the latter date there were
more than 80,000 party committees organized throughout the country,
42,000 general branches, and1.2 million grassroots party branches.9 The
third is that there were millions of party positions to be staffed: each
party committee had a party secretary and vice secretaries, along with
administrative staff; each general branch and branch also had a secre-
tary and vice secretary. The party organization, therefore, de ned ca-
reer opportunities for hundreds of thousands of party cadres, a separate
career path for individuals that in theory could lead to promotion up
the hierarchy to the apex of power in Beijing. There was no other path
to the top.
Despite its massive size, the party organization was not distributed
evenly across regions and organizations. Aggregate membership gures
are misleading: workers and farmers consistently comprised more than
80 percent of all members, with the vast majority in the latter group.10
Aggregate gures mask the concentration of party members in specic
organizations and occupations. The party concentrated its inuence in
settings where decisions were made, capital was invested, resources were
allocated, and power exercised. This meant that rates of party member-
ship were much higher in cities than in the countryside; much higher
in large and important organizations than in small and unimportant
ones; and much higher among top decision makers than among ordi-
nary staff and workers.
Surveys conducted in the early post-Mao era reveal the enduring
legacy of the partys concentration on important organizations and oc-
cupations.11 By the 1990s, 17 percent of adults in urban areas were party
members, but only 5.8 percent in the countryside. In cities, rates of party
membership varied directly with the importance of the orga ni zation.
Employees of state enterprises were twice as likely to be members of
the party than employees of smaller collective enterprises (19 versus 9
104 China Under Mao
percent), and employees of government ofces were twice as likely to

be party members than those who worked in schools, hospitals, and
research institutes (64 versus 33 percent). In both city and countryside,
rates of party membership rose sharply by occupational rank. In the
countryside, only 4.6 percent of adult farmers were party members; 22
percent of those who were village (or production brigade) cadres of any
rank; and78 percent of those who were top ofcials in a village (or pro-
duction brigade). In cities, rates of party membership rose by rank in a
similar fashion: 8 percent of manual workers were party members, 15
percent of white-collar workers, 49 percent of lower-ranking cadres,
and85 percent of high-ranking cadres.12
These gures illustrate an important feature of the party in power:
it was strategic and selective in focusing its efforts. Ruling communist
parties are highly elitist. Because their goal was to control both govern-
ment and economy, party organizations were concentrated where power
was exercised and resources allocated, and in those occupations that ex-
ercise power over people and resources. Accordingly, the intensity of
pressures to conform, and the pervasiveness of politics in the lives of citi-
zens, varied with the partys coverage of different social settings. Peas-
ants on collective farms were least subject to the partys daily demands;
blue-collar industrial workers somewhat more so. But in settings where
power and resources were concentrated, the intensity of political disci-
pline and intrusion of politics into lives rose.13
Political Surveillance
The partys growing network was the public, overt side of political
power. It grew alongside a covert network of political surveillance a
new state security network under the Ministry of Public Security. The
agencys purpose was not to safeguard public order, but to consolidate
the new regimes control and afterward to safeguard the partys power.
The public face of order maintenance household registration, neigh-
borhood organization, school and workplace dossiers, and work units
might make it appear that an extensive covert network of state security
agents played little role. But this was not the case. The public security
organs were an ever-present backdrop to the public face of political
power, and operated in ways that paralleled the Soviet KGB and the
East German Stasi.
The ministry built a hierarchy of regional and local bureaus begin-

ning in 1949, modeled after the Soviet KGB. Its network of covert of-
cers and agents focused heavily on urban areas and border regions pop-
ulated by non-Han nationalities. It conducted counterintelligence
operations against foreign agents, monitored the population for signs of
political subversion, and guarded critical economic infrastructure against
sabotage.14 To perform these tasks, the ministry and its regional bureaus
placed covert case ofcers (salaried professional employees) and agent-
informers (nonemployee civilians) in government ofces, universities,
factories, and other institutions. During the 1950s, ministry regulations
mandated that roughly one-third of the staff in university personnel de-
partments were to be covert state security ofcers who developed net-
works of agents in the school and compiled case les separate from the
personnel dossiers kept by these departments that monitored the po-
litical leanings of faculty and students.15 Ofcers with similar functions
were placed in factories, banks, hospitals, and other urban organizations.
Security ofcers in the national railway system maintained networks
of agents that numbered 10,000 by the mid-1950s.16
The ministry recruited and ran three kinds of agent-informers. The
rst, secret investigation agents, were tasked with monitoring poten-
tial sites of subversion in society at large. These agents reported on what
they observed in schools, factories, inns, restaurants, movie houses, and
especially foreign-related organizations. Case agents, a second category,
were employed not for general information gathering and monitoring
but to penetrate targeted groups and organizations as part of sustained
investigations especially churches or other organizations with foreign
ties. The third category, critical asset guardians, were stationed in or
near strategic installations and factories the railway network, major
manufacturing complexes, the postal and telecommunication systems,
and installations related to military weapons programs. Their task was
to assist case ofcers in guarding against sabotage and leaks of sensitive
information.17
Agents were recruited from all walks of life. Political activists and
party members could be relied upon to cooperate when asked, but their
public political leanings were unlikely to be trusted by the kinds of people
targeted for investigations. At the opposite extreme were bad elements,
recruited precisely because they had access to other suspect groups. Their
cooperation could be secured by exempting them from imprisonment
106 China Under Mao
on the condition that they inform on their associates. Individuals tar-

geted during the 1950s campaigns to eliminate counterrevolutionaries
were occasionally offered immunity in return for their assistance in
providing information about others.18 A third category was neither loyal
political activists nor politically suspect individuals, but individuals who
were persuaded to report on what they observed in staff ofces, churches,
foreign trade organizations, and banks.19 Recruitment appeals ranged
from blackmail, to appeals to patriotism and political loyalty, to a more
subtle mixture of implied reward or threat.20 The surveillance networks
could be effective only so long as they remained covert. The ministry had
elaborate procedures for condential communications between agents
and ofcers at permanent safe houses or temporarily borrowed sites,
coded communications, and special telephone exchanges.21 This surveil-
lance network was based primarily on human intelligence, verbal com-
munication, and written paper les. Not until long after the Mao era
would Chinas state security agencies develop more pervasive and tech-
nologically sophisticated forms of surveillance.
Party Recruitment
In a society where the party organization selects individuals for leader-

ship positions in a national hierarchy, party membership becomes a very
important avenue of personal advancement and social mobility. If only
17 percent of adults in cities are party members, and fewer than 6 per-
cent in the countryside, party membership is clearly not something that
is open to all. Those who joined the party after its triumph typically did
so after establishing a sustained record of political activism and com-
mitment to party policy and their work unit superiors. They joined the
Communist Youth League in schools or workplaces, likely rising to lead-
ership positions in these organizations. While on the job, they were typ-
ically the rst to come to work, the last to leave, the rst to speak out in
meetings where party policies were being discussed, and the rst to ex-
press support for them. If the party organization demanded that they
report on their coworkers words and deeds, they did so. If a campaign
required that a targeted individual be denounced for an alleged political
error, they would do so. After establishing a record of activism and loy-
alty, they put themselves forward as candidates to the party branchor
were invited to apply. After checking family background and other ma-
terials in the individuals dossier, the successful applicant would be ac-
cepted as a candidate member and placed under the tutelage of a desig-
nated sponsor, who was charged with developing him or her. After a
period of close observation as a candidate member, full membership
followed.22
Individuals were most likely to join the party when they were young.
Data from life history surveys reveal that after 1949, individuals likeli-
hood of joining the party rose to its maximum at ages twenty-two and
twenty-three and dropped off rapidly thereafter.23 If one had not joined
the party by age thirty-ve, it was highly unlikely that one would ever
join. For individuals in manual occupations, party membership was the
primary way to attain promotion out of jobs in the elds or on the shop
oor. Once one completed schooling and was given a rst job assign-
ment, attaining party membership was the most important single factor
in improving ones odds of career advancement. Decisions made early
in ones career therefore affected the extent to which ones subse-
quent career would be shaped by active participation in party- directed
activities.24
What do we know about the characteristics of those who were re-
cruited into the party during this period? A clear picture emerges from
the analysis of life history surveys, which allow us to estimate how the
odds of joining were affected by one individual characteristic, holding
other characteristics constant.25 The rst is that men were almost twice
as likely to join the party as women other things being equal. This could
be due to traditional discrimination against women in male-dominated
party organizations, and it could also be due to lower rates of applica-
tion among women due to cultural expectations or additional household
responsibilities that fall disproportionately on married women, making
them less available for the activities that establish a record of political
activism in the work unit. The second is that parentage matters: indi-
viduals whose fathers were already party members were twice as likely
to become party members. This could be due to higher parental pres-
sures on offspring to become politically active and apply, and also to fa-
voritism shown by party branches to sons and daughters of party mem-
bers. The third is that position mattered greatly. Individuals who were
already in a low-level leadership post were almost three times more likely
108 China Under Mao
than others to become party members suggesting that they rst proved
themselves in entry-level leadership tasks and that the party wanted to
ensure that leaders were under party discipline.
The interesting feature of these estimates is that these odds were mul-
tiplied, not just added together, when an individual had more than one
characteristic. So, for example, a man whose father was a party member
and who was in an entry-level leadership post was around twelve times
more likely to be recruited into the party than a woman whose father
was not in the party and who was not in a leadership position (2 2 3).
At the other extreme, highly skilled professionals were far less likely to
become party members than anyone else only 16 percent as likely as
nonprofessionals. This indicated the partys suspicion of the educated
elite, which became pronounced after 1957; it probably also indicates
unwillingness on the part of educated professionals to put themselves
under party discipline. Education was valued just not too much of it.
Those who completed high school were 70 percent more likely to be-
come party members than those without a high school education, but a
college degree did not improve the odds of membership over those with
a high school education.26
Class Categories and Family Origin
The CCP adopted the late 1920s Soviet practice of sorting its population
into class categories. As in the Soviet Union, these categories were in-
spired by Marxist class analysis, but they were in fact political statuses
that became characteristics of entire families, passed down through gen-
erations and enforced by bureaucratic rules. The Soviet Communist Party
classied its population during the 1920s to distinguish proletarian el-
ements from exploiters and class enemies. Once identied, those in
the proletarian categories enjoyed certain privileges and opportunities,
while those in the exploiter categories faced certain forms of discrimi-
nation and restricted opportunities.27 The system of bureaucratic class
identities served several purposes: social justice, social engineering, and
regime consolidation. Proletarian categories were to be favored in ad-
mission to the party, promotion at work, and advancement into higher
education, because these groups were denied opportunity in the old so-
ciety. Individuals from exploiter households, who previously enjoyed
huge advantages in opportunities, were henceforth to face certain forms
of discrimination. By favoring households that beneted from the revo-

lution, new elites would form through the process of higher education,
replacing the old elites who had lost status and power in the revolution.
These new elites would presumably be more loyal than those from former
exploiting households, who were understood to be hostile to proletarian
power. They were designated as class enemies and periodically abused
as enemies of the people.28
These categories were strongly emphasized in the Soviet Union in the
late 1920s. They became a tool in the class war waged in the Soviet
Cultural Revolution of 19281931, when those from bourgeois back-
grounds, especially trained professionals and members of the old intel-
ligentsia, were targeted by party activists as subversive representatives
of an alien class culture and faced demotion, and in some cases ring
and banishment from cities. This campaign expressed Stalins novel claim
that class struggle actually intensied even after the expropriation of
former exploiting classes assets eliminated the material basis for class
differences. Class enemies, he asserted, would scheme to prevent the nal
victory of socialism.29 The Soviet party backed away from class discrim-
ination in the early 1930s, and by 1937 Stalins new constitution ended
class discrimination. This, however, did not prevent individuals from ex-
ploiter backgrounds from being targeted as class enemies in Stalins mas-
sive purges of 19371938.30
China af xed class categories to its population long after the practice
had fallen out of favor in the Soviet Union. As in the Soviet Union,
these class categories were le identities that were xed by the classi-
cation of the male household head at the time of the CCPs liberation
of a locality.31 Cadres assigned these identities to rural households
during the course of land reform, on the basis of their investigation of
landholding and individual political histories garnered during the visits
of work teams to villages. Class categories were af xed to households
based on some combination of their economic status and the political
activities of the male household head. In the cities, they were assigned
on the basis of written individual autobiographies that were placed in
permanent dossiers. Individuals were told to report fully on their entire
work histories, describing the positions they held and the occupations
of their parents. They were also instructed to report fully on their own
and their parents political histories. It was impossible to complete de-
tailed background checks on everyone; cadres who compiled the dossiers
110 China Under Mao
and decided on classications would often check with coworkers and

other family members to ensure consistency and the veracity of self-
reports. The most thorough background checks were done on those who
were already in positions of some authority, or who were applying for
party membership.
As in the Soviet Union, the effort to classify households into loyal
(proletarian) and enemy (exploiter) categories was plagued with ambi-
guity and contradictions. The ambiguity came in two forms. First, in
many cases individuals worked in a variety of occupations during their
lives. Individuals could rise from humble backgrounds to establish a busi-
ness and accumulate some wealth; or they could lose privileged posi-
tions through bankruptcy or unemployment in the course of their ca-
reers. These kinds of disruptions were common during the Japa nese
invasion and civil war, which could lead to drastic changes in a familys
fate. Upward and downward mobility could make class designations an
arbitrary judgment call. Second, large segments of the population could
not readily be assigned to either proletarian or exploiter categories. In
the countryside, the CCP adapted the Soviet categories of poor, middle-
class, and rich peasant and added two more: poor and lower-middle
and landlord. This was necessary to cover the common situation of self-
sufcient households who ran their own farm or small business entirely
with household labor. The same was true of urban professionals, white-
collar workers, teachers, and intellectuals. Because they were not engaged
in material production, they were not exploited in Marxist terms, and
they did not hire others or possess capital that made them exploiters. Like
middle-class peasants, urban middle classes were assigned politically
ambiguous labels.
The system was also rife with contradictions. The rst was the con-
ation of class with political af liation. In the Soviet Union, member-
ship in the Communist Party before the classication of the population
in the 1920s made one proletarian, regardless of family background or
personal occupation before joining. This practice was adopted in China.
People who joined the party or the Red Army before their victory were
considered revolutionary even if they had come from prosperous ex-
ploiter households. The Communist Party attracted many patriotic stu-
dents during the anti-Japanese war, during a period when high school
and university education was limited to individuals from prosperous
households. The party itself was founded and led by the sons of pros-
perous rural families, and it attracted many individuals from similar

backgrounds in the long course of its movement. Life history surveys
conducted in the 1990s have shown that the class status and educational
level of the male founders of revolutionary households were surprisingly
high, surpassed only by those designated as exploiting classes.32
The reverse relationship also holds: no matter how humble ones ori-
gins, to have joined the Nationalist Party or army would have erased
ones proletarian origins and would make one a class enemy. This was
especially egregious in the case of Nationalist army veterans who fought
against the Japa nese while Communist armies deliberately avoided
combat. The same ambiguities evident in classifying occupations apply
also to these political categories. This was pronounced in cases where
individuals defected from the Nationalist cause to join the Communists.
This occurred on a large scale late in the civil war.
Another contradictory feature of these classications is that they are
inherited. This means that individuals who grew up in households clas-
sied as landlord or capitalist would still be considered as such, even if
their families assets had been expropriated before they were born and
they grew up in dire poverty. The same applied to individuals whose fa-
thers or grandfathers had been ofcials in the Nationalist Party or ofcers
in Nationalist armies even if they had no prior contact with these fore-
bears because they had been executed or ed to Taiwan. On the other
hand, revolutionary cadres and soldiers were assigned to leadership posi-
tions after the partys victory and rose at high rates into important posi-
tions. This meant that their offspring were considered revolutionary, even
if they were raised in privileged households, with spacious apartments
and household servants.
Although these labels were intended to be permanent, in practice they
could be altered due to political investigations or individual behavior.
Individuals who had successfully hidden aspects of their past from the
new regime might nd their prior histories exposed and their political
labels altered. Individuals who fell afoul of authorities in subsequent cam-
paigns might nd that their family origins were reclassied in a less fa-
vored category. The exibility, indeed malleability, of these labels a
product of their fundamental ambiguitymeant that many individuals
could never be assured that favorable status in the eyes of the regime
would be permanent. These bureaucratic identities could always be re-
vised due to individual behavior or reinvestigation.33
112 China Under Mao
A nal ambiguity is the way that class categories overlapped with

gender. Household categories were xed by the status of male household
heads, and they were inherited through the male line. This meant that
a woman from an exploiting class could marry a man from a revolu-
tionary or proletarian background and enjoy the security and privileges
that accrued to the males status. Such a woman would have offspring
who would inherit the advantages of the more favorable household clas-
sication. The obvious gender dimension of these categories had a major
effect on marital choice in China, in both rural and urban areas.34 The
practice had no foundation whatsoever in Marxist theory, but was in-
stead an expression of the patriarchal attitudes of a traditional society
that the party ofcially dismissed as feudal.35
The class labels were divided into three broad categories. Red classes
included revolutionary and proletarian households. They were presumed
to be loyal to the party and the revolution, and were to be shown pref-
erence. Ordinary classes included the old middle classes. They were
presumed to be neutral, or wavering, in their loyalties to the revolution,
and were to receive neither preferences nor penalties. The black or bad
classes were households classied as either exploiting class or reac-
tionary (see Table6.1).
These labels were an important criterion in determining party
membership, and special preference was shown to individuals from
revolutionary households.36 Those with a revolutionary class label were
roughly twice as likely to become party members in the Mao era than
individuals from ordinary proletarian categories, controlling for gender,
age, and years of education. By the same token, those from non-red
categoriesformer middle classes, exploiting classes, and political reac-
tionary originswere much less likely to become party members than
others. Those from proletarian households were twice as likely as pro-
fessionals to join the party, and those from revolutionary households
were almost four times more likely.
Political Loyalty and Career Advancement
Just as the party screened for loyalty in deciding whom to admit, party
organizations also screened individuals for political loyalty real or
presumedin decisions about college admissions, rst job assignment,
and promotion to higher rank. Party membership itself was an impor-
Table6.1. Political classications of households

(3)
Percentage
(1) (2) of Urban
Categories Labels Population
Red category
Revolutionary classes Revolutionary cadre, 4.4
revolutionary soldier,
revolutionary martyr
Proletarian classes Poor and lower-middle-class 77.8
peasant, worker, urban poor
Ordinary category Middle-class peasant, white- 14.4
collar staff, intellectuals,
teachers, professionals
Black category 3.4
Exploiting classes Capitalist, landlord, rich peasant
Reactionary classes Nationalist Party member,
ofcial, or soldier;
counterrevolutionary, bad
element, rightist
Sources: Columns 1 and2, Kraus (1981); column 3, Walder and Hu (2009, 1405).
tant credential, especially among working adults, but other criteria were
important, especially among the young. Two of these criteria were in-
herently political: ones record of political activism and ones family
background as designated by the inherited class label.
Advancement in Chinas school system was highly competitive, and
the odds of reaching the top of the educational ladder were very steep.
Of the 32.9 million children who entered primary school in 1965, only
9 percent could expect to enter ju nior high school. Only 15 percent of
junior high school entrants, in turn, could expect to graduate and enter
high school. Among the highly selected group that graduated from aca-
demic high schools, only 36 percent could expect to enroll in a univer-
sity. Of those who entered primary school in 1965, only 1.3 percent could
expect to attend an academic high school, and only one-half of 1 per-
cent could expect to attend university.37
Through the mid-1960s, the most important criterion for admission
to academic high schools, and for university admission, was a stan-
dardized entrance examination city or county-wide for high school,
114 China Under Mao
nationwide for university. This highly competitive and meritocratic

system, however, could be inuenced at the margin by political criteria
that were built into the admissions process.
The rst criterion was the familys class label. Applicants from revo-
lutionary and proletarian households were to be shown preference if their
exam per for mance was near the threshold score for admission; appli-
cants from exploiting or reactionary households had to score well above
the threshold level to gain admittance.38 College admissions were an
openly political form of af rmative action designed to promote red
classes at the expense of all others. The stated preference for proletarian
households opened up educational opportunities that were virtually un-
attainable for individuals from these backgrounds before 1949. As late
as the 1930s, most of the students in Chinas universities were from
wealthy families, and in the elite colleges almost every student was.39
Despite the intentions of the policy, however, students from revolutionary
backgrounds beneted from the preference for red classes far more
than the proletarian students, while students from the former middle
classes and even former exploiting classes still entered university at much
higher rates.
Table6.2 illustrates the impact of class labels on school admissions
in two of Beijings elite schools in the mid-1960s: Tsinghua High School
and Tsinghua University. In both of them, the non-red classes did far
better than the policy might suggest. Tsinghua High School was an elite
Table6.2. Admission rates to elite schools by class background, mid-1960s
(1) (3)
Percentage of Percentage of (5)
Enrollment, (2) Enrollment, (4) Percentage
Tsinghua (Col. 1)/ Tsinghua (Col. 3)/ of Urban
Class Label High School (Col. 5) University (Col. 5) Population
Proletarian 11 0.14 38 0.49 77.8

classes
Revolutionary 25 5.7 9 2.0 4.4
classes
Middle classes 55 3.8 42 2.9 14.4
Exploiting 11 3.2 11 3.2 3.4
classes
Sources: Columns 1 and3, Andreas (2009, 70) (percentages are rounded averages of two
estimates when they differ); column 5, Walder and Hu (2009, 1405).
boarding school in the far suburbs of the capital and drew its body of
applicants from Beijing. It is striking (column 1) that students from rev-
olutionary households are represented far out of proportion to their size
in the urban population of China (column 5). This is surely due to the
concentration of revolutionary cadres in the nations capital, where they
occupied high-ranking posts. Equally striking is the fact that students
from middle and even exploiting classes are represented at far higher
levels than their weight in the population, as indicated by the ratios in
column 2 (ratios above 1.0 indicate overrepresentation, while ratios below
1.0 indicate underrepresentation). Students from proletarian households
were a small minority at the high school and they were vastly under-
represented relative to their share of the urban population.
Class representation at Tsinghua University was different, because it
attracted applicants from the entire nation and not just the nations cap-
ital. This is why revolutionary classes occupied a much lower percentage
of the student body than in the high school, although they were still
overrepresented relative to their population size, as indicated by the
ratios in column 4. Proletarian classes occupied a much higher per-
centage of the student body than in the high school, but still less than
half their share of the urban population. Remarkably, both the middle
classes and black classes the elite of the old society occupied a
proportionally much greater share of college slots than students from
all other backgrounds. The highly meritocratic test-based system
worked against the intentions of the class line policy.40
The reason for this lingering overrepresentation of old elites is no mys-
tery. In any society, children who grow up in households with educated
parents have advantages: due to greater educational resources in the
home; due to their parents ability to help them with schoolwork; and
especially due to the high expectations that they place upon their off-
spring. Chinas former elites found ways to succeed in this educational
system despite the discrimination against them enshrined in the class
label policy. This became a major political issue in the mid-1960s and
was the primary reason why entrance examinations were abolished
during the Cultural Revolution.
Political activism was the second criterion used by the party to in-
uence opportunity, and in theory individuals from all family back-
grounds could strive to compile a strong political record. These were the
same attitudes and behaviors that were important in admission to the
116 China Under Mao
party. Because high school students and all but a small number of uni-
versity students were too young to be eligible for party membership, ac-
tivism in the school setting was demonstrated by participation in the
Communist Youth League, especially by taking up leadership posts in
the organization. High schools and universities maintained active youth
leagues that were directly subordinate to party committees, and they
contained a full complement of league branches and leadership posts that
mirrored those of the party organization itself. Students who had a his-
tory of work as student cadres in these organizations compiled a strong
record, recorded in their personal dossiers, that was explicitly taken into
consideration and could be decisive in cases where ones standardized
tests scores were marginal, or in deciding to which school or program
of study an individual would be assigned.41
The same two political criteria class background and political
activismwere employed in assigning students to jobs after graduation,
although party membership at this stage became an emblem of political
loyalty for the university students who had joined while still in college. In
1965, for example, 7.8 percent of Peking University students were already
party members, and13 percent of Tsinghua University students.42 These
students had the best possible records of political activism. Combined
with class origin, college transcripts, and advisors recommendations, col-
lege graduates were selected by ministries, research institutes, state enter-
prises, or graduate programs. Those who were already party members
had a wider range of opportunities.
There was an obvious tension between political and meritocratic cri-
teria for advancement. Surveys conducted in later years yielded a clear
picture of how this potential con ict was handled. Essentially, the party
created two separate career paths that required different credentials.43
Not surprisingly, to attain an important leadership position in govern-
ment, industry, or public institutions, it was essential to have attained
party membership long beforehand, but a college degree was not essen-
tial.44 Party members were more than eight times more likely to be pro-
moted into a decision-making position than nonmembers, controlling
for a range of other individual characteristics. The role of prior educa-
tion was similar to what we saw earlier for the attainment of party mem-
bership: graduation from high school increased ones odds of promotion
2.5-fold, while having a college degree did not provide any additional
advantage.
Given the emphasis on political criteria for college admissions and

job assignments, it is remarkable how little party membership mattered
for those who became scientists, engineers, doctors, economic analysts,
government planners, or university instructors. Through the mid-1960s,
these were well-compensated positions with high prestige, but prior party
membership played no role in attaining this kind of elite occupation.
Education, however, was overwhelmingly important. A high school
diploma increased the odds of becoming an elite professional almost
ninefold, and a college degree increased the odds almost an additional
vefold. Prior party membership had no net impact. The professional
career was based on formal education, period.
While it might appear that the regime was relatively indifferent to
the educational qualications of its party, government, and enterprise
ofcials, this was far from the case. We noted earlier that party mem-
bers were most frequently recruited while very young, especially those
who showed early signs of both political loyalty and leadership ability.
Although these individuals rarely obtained a college degree before
joining, the party maintained a large system of adult education and se-
lected young party members with leadership potential for further edu-
cation. Party members could be admitted into regular universities as
adults based on recommendation and sponsorship by work unit party
organizations. The most visible example of this program was the prac-
tice by work unit party organizations of recommending individuals for
admission to a university. These were known as cadre-transfer students.
Regional governments also organized part-time adult education programs
on a massive scale, all designed to upgrade the quality of leaders. Party
members were more than ve times more likely to receive higher edu-
cation through these sponsored adult programs, and after completing
adult education at the college level, they were more than four times more
likely than those who graduated from college before working to be pro-
moted into a senior leadership position.45
Power and Privilege
Joining the party had no immediate impact on ones standard of living.

It simply opened up the possibility of future career advancement, either
as a party cadre if one was a party secretary at some level, or an ad-
ministrative cadre if one held a management position in an enterprise or
118 China Under Mao
government agency. China had a single nationwide cadre ranking system,

ranging from the lowest, grade 26, to the highest, grade 1. Ministers and
higher-level cadres generally occupied ranks 6 and above, while middle-
level cadres, beginning with division chiefs, occupied ranks 15 and
above.46 Differences in standard of living were not the product of differ-
ences in income. Money incomes could vary considerably, but purchasing
power did not directly translate into different levels of material pros-
perity. Privilege came directly from the rules that governed the entitle-
ments for ofcials who had achieved a certain rank, and were entitle-
ments for which the cadres either did not have to pay, or for which only
a nominal fee was charged.
Privilege came in virtually all dimensions of ones professional and
personal life. Ofcials above a certain rank did not ride a bicycle, but
had access to an automobile (with driver) provided by the work unit.
They found it easier to travel domestically, and for long- distance travel,
higher-ranking cadres had the right to sit in soft-seat or soft sleeper com-
partments of trains, avoiding the badly overcrowded and uncomfortable
hard-seat cars for the masses. Ranking cadres had access to larger and
better apartments and were more likely to have private bathrooms and
kitchens. At the highest levels, ofcials might live in a single-family bun-
galow, be served by maids and nannies, and have round-the-clock ac-
cess to a car and driver. Ranking cadres also had better access to foods
and consumer items that were rationed in the general population. When
they traveled, they had access to better-quality hotels and guesthouses,
and when they ate in restaurants, they did so in separate cadre sections
that had better ser vice and better-quality food.
Rank also affected access to information. Ofcial party and govern-
ment documents were issued with a range of security classications that
were keyed to an ofcials rank. Only ofcials above a certain grade could
read designated documents and reports. The party published several in-
ternal newspapers and bulletins that had a far greater range of infor-
mation than what was published in the ofcial mass media. Reference Ma-
terials (cankao ziliao), a restricted-circulation bulletin published by New
China News Agency, contained translations from foreign news outlets
that contained material considered more sensitive than what was avail-
able in a similar publication, Reference News (cankao xiaoxi), which was
available to all cadres during the Mao era. Internal Reference (neibu cankao),
published twice daily by the New China News Agency, contained do-
mestic news reports intended specically for Chinas political elite. It con-
tained reports on problems encountered in implementing national poli-
cies, natural disasters, regional protests, and a range of other news items
deemed inappropriate for wider circulation.47 Ranking ofcials were also
able to gain access to foreign books and movies that were banned to the
general public.
Although living standards and privileges were carefully calibrated
to bureaucratic rank, the privileges were relatively modest, and standards
of living were not strikingly different from ordinary people until one
reached the top ranks. Even the highest ofcials in China throughout
the Mao period had material lifestyles that paled in comparison with
those of wealthy individuals in market economies. Compared with later
years, there was virtually no conspicuous consumption. Corruption was
rare and petty in scale where it did occur. Nonetheless, the privileges
that came with rank were highly valued in an economy that enshrined
seemingly permanent consumer austerity. A cadre career permitted one
to escape the privations of rationing and shortages and live with a level
of comfort and convenience that few citizens in China would be able to
experience.
A Closed Hierarchy
In a state socialist economy with a single party hierarchy, power and

privilege were inevitably intertwined. This, however, was not cost
free. There were distinctive features of life as a party bureaucrat that
were fundamentally different from those of civil servants in market
economies with liberal political systems. The rst distinctive feature
is that ofcials did not have any personal wealth or any means of sup-
port other than their government positions. To be sure, they had sav-
ings accounts, and they owned certain household items, but they did
not have any signicant property or independent means of support.
The homes they occupied were allocated to them at a nominal rent,
but they did not own them. The automobiles belonged to their orga ni-
zation. Their expenses were covered by the or ga ni zation. They did
not accumulate signicant wealth, even if their careers were long and
they rose high in rank. Their privileges were a direct expression of
their rank, and they enjoyed them so long as they were in good political
standing.
120 China Under Mao
The second distinctive feature is related to the rst: cadres had no

alternative to working for the party-state. They could not withdraw from
an ofcial career to go into consulting or private business. They could
not emigrate. They could not choose to retire and live off of their accu-
mulated savings. They could not transfer to another organization or prov-
ince to start anew. If they tried to quit the system, or withdraw from
active party life, this would be interpreted as a sign of political wavering,
a decline in commitment, a breach of party discipline. The only exit op-
tion in this career path was essentially involuntary and unappealing: a
demotion or expulsion that brought with it immediate loss of the privi-
leges accorded to that rank.48
These implications are often missed in discussions of cadre privilege.
These privileges came at a cost. Cadres were entirely dependent on the
party organization for their livelihoods and the privileges that they en-
joyed, and they continued to enjoy them only so long as they remained
in good standing. The partys demands for conformity and loyalty did
not end with the conferral of party membership, or with appointment
as an ofcial. Cadres were pressured to carry out policies, some of which
made little sense, to reach targets, and to identify and punish allegedly
disloyal individuals in their work units. More than any other social
group except perhaps career military ofcers they were subject to
the discipline of the regime. They could not openly resist extreme de-
mands from above, and always lived under the knowledge that failure
to perform, or failure to comply with party policy, could seriously jeop-
ardize their current standing and future opportunities. A negative evalu-
ation for substandard per for mance or wavering loyalty could have life-
long repercussions in a system where there was only one employer. The
worst possible experience was a rectication campaign or a search for
hidden enemies similar to that carried out in the party rectication of
19421944in Yanan. That could lead to a loss of position and status,
and even to prison or a labor camp. These pressures affected Chinas
cadres more than any other social group.
Dilemmas of a Changing Party
The transition from revolutionary party to a political bureaucracy was

a fundamental change, inevitable once the decision to follow the Soviet
model was made. The incentives for individuals to join the party, the
rewards in careers opened up by party membership, and the qualities

and motivations of the individuals attracted to the party, were all funda-
mentally different from those of the long years of revolutionary struggle.
Controlling all economic resources and access to career advancement,
the party became the route to power and privilege. It became a massive
bureaucracy, operating like a political machine, with all of the prob-
lems of bureaucratic organizations throughout the world.
Not long after the new state was consolidated at the end of the 1950s,
Mao began to have misgivings about these developments and saw them
as a threat to the ideals of revolutionary sacrice and struggle. A bu-
reaucratic system staffed by individuals motivated by career advancement
and special privileges threatened to replace one form of oppression with
another. Many of Maos colleagues in the national leadership did not see
this as a negative development. Instead, it was part of the evolution to-
ward a modern form of scientic socialism, a system that relied on ad-
vanced science and technology, and modern forms of industrial organi-
zation to create a modern and prosperous nation. This model assumed
the partys monopoly of power, but it also involved a major role for the
highly educated professionals upon which this vision depended.
This was the vision of a socialist future that became the hallmark of
Soviet socialism as it emerged from the Stalin era. To be sure, this was
no path toward democracy, and certainly was not a path toward market-
based capitalism. But the system was far more stable and predictable than
its earlier incarnation in the Stalin era. Massive campaigns against hidden
enemies were to be discontinued; claims of continuing class struggle and
underground conspiracies were declared a regrettable error of the past;
victims would be released from labor camps and their convictions
overturned. If they avoided signs of dissent, citizens could lead secure
lives, unworried that they might be accused of an imaginary political
crime. Public adulation of a great leader as a national hero and genius
was a sign of ignorance and national backwardness, a manifestation
of feudalism and a regrettable deviation from the socialist path that led
to unimaginable suffering and destruction under Stalins iron rule.
By the mid-1960s, Mao had decided that this post-Stalin Soviet view
of a socialist future was a deviation from the correct revolutionary path.
His vision was very different, and he was unwilling to permit his party-
state to evolve into a stable bureaucracy ruled by bureaucrats who lorded
over subordinates and paid lip ser vice to revolutionary ideals, but were
122 China Under Mao
motivated by career advancement and material comfort. Maos answer

was essentially to revive what he saw as the spirit of struggle and sacrice
that had led to improbable victories in the past not careful planning
and reliance on scientic and technical experts, but the mobilization of
party and society to achieve victories over nature and over enemies that
were attempting to subvert the revolution from within. Mao eventually
decided to smash the machine and start over, relying on his prestige and
status as a Stalin-like genius to mobilize the masses against the party
establishment, and members of the establishment against one another.
It would take several more years, and several more political episodes
beginning in 1957, for him to come to this conclusion. The result, even-
tually, was the Cultural Revolution.
7

Thaw and Backlash
B Y 1956 CH I NA had almost completed a series of revolutionary changes.

Land reform was followed by the rapid formation of collective farms.
Private industry and commerce disappeared as productive assets were
nationalized. The foundations for a bureaucratic economy along Soviet
lines were laid. The partys networks of power spread across the country,
working their way into factories, ofces, and villages. Status no longer
came from ownership of property, and wealth could no longer be passed
across generations. Instead, people were granted access to public property
and ser vices based on their rank in a bureaucratic hierarchy, access to
which came through the party system. Educational institutions and in-
tellectual life were remolded, and previously strong inuences from
the West were repudiated in favor of advanced Soviet doctrines. Chi-
nas historic links with the worlds market economies were severed.
While China was not subject to dictates from Moscow, it was drawn
rmly into the orbit of the world communist system.
This was Chinas rst coherent national state since the fall of the Qing
empire, integrating almost all of the former imperial territories. It was
also Chinas rst unied modern state, one with a salaried bureaucracy
that reached from Beijing into rural and urban communities. In 1956
Chinas leaders could look back with satisfaction and view the near fu-
ture with condence. From their perspective, they consolidated control
over China after an unexpected victory in the civil war; their armies
had fought to a standstill with the United States and other nations on
the Korean peninsula; and they had made unexpectedly rapid strides
toward socialism. In partic ular, collective agriculture was put in place
124 China Under Mao
without the violent coercion and devastating famine that had marred
Soviet collectivization in the early 1930s.
To be sure, coercion and terror propelled these changes forward. The
land reform and campaigns against counterrevolution in the early 1950s
led to the execution of more than a million and the imprisonment of
many more. The Three Anti, Five Anti campaign coercively expropriated
the assets of urban shopkeepers and business owners. The Thought Re-
form campaigns forced educated Chinese to publicly repudiate their be-
liefs, promise to remold their reactionary views, and pledge loyalty to the
new regime. Campaigns against a series of deviations from correct so-
cialist doctrine repeatedly targeted authors and academics, even the par-
tys own leading intellectuals, for their erroneous and subversive thoughts,
which sometimes were treated as counterrevolutionary conspiracies.
These changes were rapid, more rapid than originally planned. Mao
had been the most forceful advocate of an immediate transition to Soviet-
style socialism. He pushed this forward after he unveiled his General
Line of 1953, criticizing and on occasion bullying other leaders who ar-
gued for a more measured pace of change. Mao identied socialism with
the model created by the Soviet Union under Stalin, and he was impa-
tient with arguments that change should be gradual. Above all, Mao
pushed for rapid industrialization, and he saw the transformation of the
economy along Soviet lines as the surest way for China to succeed.
Against those who counseled a more cautious and balanced approach,
he pushed hard for larger grain deliveries from the new collective farms
and for increased investment and output in heavy industry. Maos iden-
tication with Stalin-era Soviet socialism was symbolized by the growing
cult that surrounded his leadership of the party. His collected works were
published; his portrait hung in ofces and factories throughout the
country; and Mao Zedong Thought was still enshrined in the 1945 party
constitution as the guide to all of the partys work. By his own stan-
dards, Mao had been remarkably successful.
Developments in the Soviet bloc after Stalins death in March1953,
however, took a very different direction than in China during the same
period. In 1956 their implications hit China hard, generating deep dis-
agreements within the leadership and the new regimes rst real political
crisis. From this time forward, almost continuously until Maos death,
this sense of success and optimism would be absent, replaced by a series
of disruptive crises.
Thaw and Backlash 125
Instability in the Post-Stalin Soviet Bloc
The changes in China during these early years had also taken place in
the Eastern European nations occupied by the Soviet army at the end
of World War II. By 1953 they had reached roughly the same point as
China in 1956. The results, however, were much less favorable, coming
to a crisis in mid-1953. The impetus for Chinas political crisis of 1957 is
typically attributed to Khrushchevs denunciation of Stalin at the So-
viet partys Twentieth Congress of February 1956, but that speech was
the culmination of changes in the Soviet bloc that began soon after Sta-
lins death three years earlier.
The Moscow Communists who had taken control of puppet regimes
in the Soviet sphere of control in Eastern Europe all implemented poli-
cies of rapid socialist transformation, repression of political enemies,
purges of political opponents, and ambitious industrialization programs
similar to those implemented in China. Like Mao, their leaders imitated
the standard Soviet playbook, mimicking the revolutionary changes in
the Soviet Union of the late 1930s. Dominant leaders in these countries
modeled themselves after Stalin, frequently adopting the trappings of a
leadership cult.
The intense construction of socialism in these regimes created se-
vere disruptions. They were most obvious in the German Democratic Re-
public, which was established in 1949 as a separate state. The new regime
had previously attempted to establish political control through the applica-
tion of coercive force, but in 1952 an intensied campaign to build so-
cialism began. It featured a crackdown on private enterprise, attacks on
Protestant churches, a shift to heavy industrial investment that led to
lower wages, rationing and food shortages, and class struggle conducted
against those who resisted.1 Close to half a million people ed for the
Western zone in the early 1950s, with a sharp increase in the rst months
of 1952, when hundreds of police and border guards also joined the wid-
ening ow to the West. The exodus threatened the regimes economic
plans, depleting its skilled workforce, and was solved only by the construc-
tion of the Berlin Wall in 1961.2 Early signs of strain also appeared in Bul-
garia, where rapid collectivization and severe repression created economic
hardships from 1948 to 1950, generating a series of regional rebellions.3
After Stalins death, the new Soviet leadership signaled its intention
to moderate the repressions of the Stalin era and to back away from some
126 China Under Mao
of the policies that created widespread dissatisfaction in the satellite states.

This signaled an opportunity for change, and unrest followed as people
took to the streets in protest. Strikes and demonstrations broke out across
Bulgaria in May 1953.4 The announcement of new economic policies in
Czechoslovak ia that devalued the currency and reduced purchasing
power led to sporadic strikes and demonstrations during the rst three
months of 1953. As news of the rumored devaluation spread, more than
32,000 workers joined strikes and protest marches during April and May.
When the devaluation was nally implemented on June 1, thousands
of workers walked out of the large koda auto factory in the Bohemian
city of Pilze, and other citizens joined them. Violent confrontations with
militia and security police ensued, with injuries on both sides. After army
units refused to re, demonstrators stormed and trashed government
buildings, beat up unpopular ofcials, and threw busts of Stalin and the
Czech communist leader Gottwald out of windows. The revolt was
crushed only after special units from the Ministry of Interior were sent
from the capital in Prague.5
The Pilze rebellion was quickly overshadowed by a much larger
one that spread across East Germany two weeks later, one so extensive
that it threatened the survival of the new regime. Economic policies
similar to those in Czechoslovak ia touched off a wave of protest: under
the new industrial system, the pace of work would increase, but wages
would be readjusted downward. Strikes began immediately after the
smaller paychecks were issued. In mid-June, massive street demonstra-
tions began in Berlin, and over half a million citizens joined the striking
workers. They assembled at party and government headquarters, and
their demands escalated to calls for free elections. After initial economic
concessions, the government appeared paralyzed, and the unrest spread
to all of the industrial cities in the Eastern zone, leading to a general in-
surrection on June 17. As the crisis spread, with the regime on the verge
of collapse, only the declaration of martial law and massive intervention
by armored Soviet troops and tanks restored order. Dozens were killed,
many more were arrested, and a wave of executions followed.6 The
German rebellion, so close on the heels of the Czech unrest, shook the
condence of communist leaders throughout the region and caused
the new post-Stalin leadership in Moscow to rethink its policies.
The Soviet response was to initiate a thaw, a relaxation of levels of
overt repression and a pullback from the rush to build socialism at an
accelerated pace. The basic policies were correct, they concluded, but they
were implemented in a heavy-handed fashion. Stalins onetime secret
police chief, Beria, was purged and executed early in the post-Stalin
power struggle, and the repressions of the recent past were blamed on
him.7 The process of de-Stalinization began in Moscow, with the sys-
tematic release of political prisoners and the partial relaxation of its re-
pressive political atmosphere. As criticism of the USSRs Stalinist past
gained momentum, communist leaders in the satellite states were criti-
cized for relying too heavily on repression to implement change, for
forcing a too-rapid transition to socialism, and for pushing to accelerate
industrialization at the expense of citizens living standards. Moscow dic-
tated a new course for Eastern Europe: de-emphasis of class struggle,
a new emphasis on elevating living standards, and a less dogmatic and
more open approach to intellectual life.
Now openly critical of leaders who engaged in waves of repression,
economic adventurism, and the personality cult, Moscow forced
changes throughout the region, in some cases ordering entrenched
leaders to step down. The hard-line Hungarian party secretary Rkosi,
for example, was forced to yield the post of prime minister to the reform-
minded Imre Nagy, who initiated a new course in economic policy and
intellectual life.8 Crash drives to nationalize industry and raise output,
mass purges and political terror, and exaggerated praise for great leaders
were now out of favor, blamed for disrupting economies and generating
discontent that created political instability. As Khrushchev consolidated
his power in the Soviet Union, he ordered the creation of special com-
missions to reinvestigate charges against Stalins victims and release
thousands of prisoners from labor camps.9
Yugoslavia under Tito had been the rst to denounce Stalinism. After
its expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1950, its leaders developed an elab-
orate critique of the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union.10
Within the Soviet bloc, no country went further in criticizing the Stalinist
legacy than Poland. In January 1955 the party issued a harsh assessment
of Stalinisms impact. Unofcial critics were more outspoken and over
the rest of the year the boundaries of permissible criticism widened. Much
of the dissatisfaction came from within the party, among committed
communists who strongly objected to the partys recent direction. Heavy-
handed repression and censorship were part of what repelled them, but
they also objected to the bureaucratic centralism inherent in Soviet
128 China Under Mao
economic planning. Party economists in Poland and Hungary, fol-

lowing ideas developed earlier in Yugoslavia, devised plans for decentral-
izing the bureaucratic economy, borrowing techniques from market
economies to generate greater efciency and higher living standards.11
These trends contrasted sharply with Chinas direction during the
same period. Mao was still pushing China along the path blazed by Stalin,
seemingly oblivious to the liberalization and relaxation in the Soviet bloc.
He began his own push for rapid collectivization and nationalization in
1953, just as Moscow was condemning these policies as adventurism
in the satellite states. The nationwide campaign against the editor and
essayist Hu Feng and Hu Feng elements in 1954, and the return to mass
arrests and executions in the new elimination of counterrevolutionaries
campaign of 1955, contrasted sharply with the widening thaw in Eastern
Europe. And the Stalinist personality cult Mao had cultivated since the
late 1930s remained undiminished. Mao was nally forced to confront
these contradictions in February 1956, after Nikita Khrushchevs hard-
hitting and emotional denunciation of Stalin.
Khrushchev Denounces Stalin
Although de-Stalinization had been gathering steam for almost three

years in the Soviet bloc, Khrushchevs speech to the Twentieth Congress
of the Soviet Communist Party on February 25, 1956, came as some-
thing of a shock. Indeed, the content of his speech went far beyond the
expectations of many in the Soviet leadership, and quite a few of them felt
that he had gone too far. The ostensible topic was the personality cult,
but Khrushchev went on to detail the murderous purges that devastated
the party leadership in the late 1930s. This broke new ground and had
more profound implications. The Soviet leadership had heretofore blamed
Stalins deputy, the former security chief Beria, for the mass executions of
loyal communists. Now Khrushchev made clear that Stalin himself was
the villain. In a four-hour speech, Khrushchev portrayed Stalin as a sa-
distic mass murderer, and the cult of praise he deliberately built for him-
self was a grotesque manifestation of tyranny in its most evil form.12
Observers from all of the fraternal communist states were in atten-
dance, including many of their top leaders. There were hints earlier in
the congress that Stalins standing had been diminished, but delegates
all leaped to their feet and cheered loudly when words of praise for Stalin
in a letter from Mao Zedong were read to the audience.13 Khrushchevs
secret speech was given on the last day of the congress, at an unsched-
uled closed session for Soviet delegates. It was a devastating attack on
Stalin. Khrushchev called him guilty of a grave abuse of power. Under
his direction, mass arrests and deportation of thousands and thousands
of people, and executions without trial or normal investigation, created
insecurity, fear, and even desperation. The escalating charges of mas-
sive underground conspiracies to engage in counterrevolution had been
absurd, wild, and contrary to common sense. Innocent people con-
fessed in the face of bizarre accusations because of physical methods of
pressure, torture, reducing them to unconsciousness, depriving them of
judgment, taking away their human dignity. Perhaps the most stun-
ning passages in this long speech were the statistics that Khrushchev
cited on the extent of the purges of the 1930s, based on recent investi-
gations. Of the 139 full and candidate members of the 1934 Central Com-
mittee, 98, or 70 percent, had been arrested and executed. Of the 1,966
delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934, 1,108 were arrested
for alleged counterrevolutionary crimes. The shock that this registered
in the audience is recorded in the transcript (indignation in the hall).14
Khrushchev attacked Stalins mania for greatness and the nause-
atingly false adulation that he demanded for himself. Khrushchev por-
trayed him in reality as an incompetent leader and a weak war time
commander. His purges of the Soviet military command immediately
prior to the war had fatally weakened Soviet defenses, and his collec-
tivization campaign had ruined Soviet agriculture.15
In the words of his biographer, Khrushchevs speech was the bravest
and most reckless thing he ever did.16 There had been a long debate about
its contents in the weeks leading up to the congress, and most of his col-
leagues argued strongly that his criticism of Stalin should be restrained.
The nal draft of the speech was revised repeatedly until the day it was
delivered. Khrushchevs text went much further than his colleagues ex-
pected, and in the surge of emotion during its delivery, he added even
more colorful ourishes. In early March an edited copy of the transcript
was printed in a small red-covered booklet with the label top secret,
and distributed to party committees and nonparty activists around the
country.17
130 China Under Mao
Foreign delegates to the congress were given oral brie ngs on the
speech late at night on February 25. Many of them, especially leaders
of satellite states who were Stalinists of the old school, were stunned.
The Polish leader Bierut was in the Kremlin hospital with pneumonia
when a copy of the speech was given to him. He had a heart attack while
reading it and died on March12.18 The Polish party, which was already
gripped by de-Stalinization, made an unauthorized ofcial translation,
published 18,000 copies, and distributed them to all party groups in the
country. Distributed so widely in a party already in ferment, it was in-
evitable that copies would nd their way outside the country. The New
York Times published passages from the speech in mid-March and a full
translation on June 5, 1956, ensuring worldwide circulation.19 Chinas
leaders received a full text of the speech shortly after excerpts appeared
in the Western press in mid-March.20
Khrushchevs speech had repercussions throughout the Soviet bloc,
even in North Korea, where Kim Il Sung had worked hard since the end
of the Korean War in 1953 to consolidate his personal dictatorship and
isolate his increasingly reclusive regime from Soviet and Chinese inu-
ences. The cornerstone of Kims personal power was a new ideology
known as juche, a nationalistic concept of self-reliance, an effort to as-
sert national independence in the face of the regimes obviously heavy
dependence on its two powerful sponsors, the Soviet Union and China.
When Kim visited the Soviet Union and several East European coun-
tries in June 1956, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders criticized him
for his economic policies and especially for his effort to create a cult of
personality around himself. These developments encouraged individuals
within the Korean party leadership who were critical of Kim. At the end
of August, several leaders associated with a pro-China faction sided with
a pro-Soviet faction and directly challenged Kim over his economic pol-
icies and his growing personality cult. Kim initiated a purge, and sev-
eral top ofcials ed and sought asylum in Beijing and Moscow. Shortly
afterward, Mao and Soviet leaders criticized Kims use of arrests and ex-
ecutions to deal with inner-party disagreements, and his practice of la-
beling critics as foreign agents and class enemies. A joint Sino-Soviet del-
egation to Pyongyang to help Kim correct his errors was able to extract
only temporary and limited concessions.21
Upheaval in Poland and Hungary
The impact of Khrushchevs revelations was far more dramatic in Po-

land and Hungary, where it destabilized both regimes in crises that
reached a climax in October 1956. Poland barely averted a Soviet inva-
sion; the Hungarian regime collapsed in the face of a national insurrec-
tion, and communist rule was restored only after a massive invasion by
Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops.
Even before Khrushchevs speech, the Polish party was a hotbed of
ferment against the abuses of the Stalin era. After General Secretary
Bieruts sudden death in mid-March, he was succeeded by Edward Ochab,
who initiated a liberalization from above that was matched by a radi-
calization from below. Young intellectuals formed independent discus-
sion groups around the country; tens of thousands of prisoners were re-
leased; and critical articles were published in ofcial outlets. The Catholic
Church recovered; workers began to agitate about pay and working con-
ditions; farmers complained about compulsory sales at state-set prices
and demanded a rollback of collectivization; and party cadres and se-
curity police became demoralized. 22
Ochab tried to steer a middle course between hard-liners and those
who wanted a distinctively Polish road to socialism. One of his rst acts
was to restore the party membership of Wadysaw Gomuka, a mod-
erate leader who had been pushed aside by Bierut as general secretary
in 1948 and subsequently arrested and expelled from the party in 1951.
Bierut did not release Gomuka until 1954, forced to do so in the face of
the de-Stalinization initiated in Moscow. Gomuka became a symbol of
reform and Polish independence, and the situation soon spun out of con-
trol. In June, factory workers in the industrial center of Poznan held dem-
onstrations to demand higher wages, which quickly escalated into a full-
scale uprising involving more than half the citys population. Communist
Party ofces were set on re, and demonstrators led by factory workers
clashed with security forces and the Polish army, leading to at least
seventy-four deaths and hundreds wounded.23
After the suppression of Poznan, ferment continued in the party, cre-
ating a groundswell of support for Gomuka, who returned to the Polit-
buro and soon replaced Ochab as the top leader.24 The selection of a new
Polish leader without Moscows consent alarmed the Soviets: worse, the
Poles were also demanding the dismissal of the Soviet marshal imposed
132 China Under Mao
on Poland as minister of defense. Soviet troops in Poland moved toward

Warsaw, and additional troops moved to the Polish border. Khrushchev
demanded a meeting in Warsaw but was refused. On October 22 a se-
ries of massive rallies took place in a number of Polish cities. In Warsaw
half a million lled the streets to demonstrate against Soviet interfer-
ence. The rebellion spread to rural areas: by the end of 1957, 85 percent
of the cooperatives had been disbanded, a complete rollback of the re-
gimes collectivization drive. Khrushchev ew into Warsaw uninvited,
accompanied by several other Politburo members, and after angry ex-
changes was convinced to call off the threatened invasion and let
Gomuka stabilize Poland, which he did successfully until the next round
of Polish unrest in 1970.25
Khrushchevs compromise on Poland was dictated by even larger
problems in Hungary. In July the Soviets insisted that Mtys Rkosi,
the hard-line Stalinist party secretary who was responsible for a series
of purges and executions of party leaders during his reign, step down
from his post. He had recently deposed the reform-minded Prime Min-
ister Imre Nagy and expelled him from the party at the end of 1955 for
rightist deviations. In the wake of Khrushchevs February speech,
Rkosi was forced to backpedal, and he rehabilitated a number of com-
munists that he had imprisoned or executed in earlier show trials against
alleged Titoist spies. The most important of these was Lszl Rajk, who
was minister of the interior before Rkosi had him executed in 1949.
The move deeply undercut Rkosis credibility, because he had used the
charges against Rajk to justify a much larger wave of arrests of party
leaders.26 Intellectual ferment in Budapest was centered on the Pet
Circle, an intellectual forum that Rkosi set up in March1956in response
to Khrushchevs speech. The group became increasingly radicalized and
turned into a center of opposition to Rkosi himself. Moscow became
alarmed and lost condence in Rkosis ability to keep order, and in mid-
July removed him in favor of Ern Ger.27
The situation turned critical in October. At an ofcially approved
public reburial of Rajk, now a martyr to Stalinism, Imre Nagy assured
those present that soon Stalinism would nally be buried. One day later
he was readmitted to the party, and he became the most credible can-
didate to stabilize Hungary under a course of reform. Street protests soon
took a more radical turn. On October 22, 5,000 students gathered at Bu-
dapest University of Technology and issued a manifesto that called for
the withdrawal of Soviet troops, inner-party elections, the removal of

all Stalinists in the leadership, and the formation of a new government
under Nagy. They declared solidarity with the Polish movement for na-
tional independence and demanded freedom of opinion and expres-
sion and freedom of the press and radio. The next day, October 23,
the students gathered at the Budapest radio station to demand that their
manifesto be read to the entire nation. The director of the station agreed
and staged a fake broadcast over local loudspeakers. When the students
learned of the subterfuge, they laid siege to the building. Elsewhere in
Budapest that same day, the gigantic statue of Stalin in the central square
was toppled to the cheers of tens of thousands of citizens. Khrushchev
instructed Ger to reappoint Nagy as prime minister late that evening.
Nagy, however, refused Soviet instructions to sign a formal request for
Soviet troops to restore order. Instead, he declared martial law and
ordered Hungarian troops to enforce it. Soviet troops already stationed
in Hungary nonetheless moved into Budapest in the early morning
hours of October 246,000 soldiers and700 tanks. They were over-
whelmed by crowds who fought them in the streets with rebombs
and small arms, and by Hungarian troops that fought on the side of
the insurgents.28
In the midst of the insurrection, Nagy replaced Ger as party leader,
and he formed a coalition government that included the leaders of other
political parties that were forced to disband in the 1940s. As ghting con-
tinued in the streets, Khrushchev initially decided to withdraw his troops.
Mao agreed, and counseled him to let the Hungarian working class
decide the fate of the country. They both changed their minds after two
incidents. In the rst, a crowd besieged the Budapest party headquar-
ters, grabbed security police, and lynched them from lampposts (along
with Budapests rst party secretary) in retaliation for a mass shooting
of protesters. Shortly afterward, Nagy declared Hungarys intention to
withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and called for the permanent with-
drawal of all Soviet troops. Khrushchev then organized a massive So-
viet invasion, which killed more than 2,500 Hungarians and wounded
more than 20,000. Seven hundred Soviet troops were killed in the
ghting. In the postinvasion crackdown, more than 100,000 were ar-
rested for counterrevolution and more than 200,000 ed across the border
into Austria. Nagy was imprisoned and eventually executed along with
his minister of defense in 1958, after receiving promises of safe passage
134 China Under Mao
out of the Yugoslav embassy, where he had sought refuge. The Hun-
garian party-state had to be rebuilt from scratch.29
Out of Step: Chinese Political Trends after 1953
These developments shocked Chinas leadership, and they were a major

challenge for Mao. Although Mao had not carried out massive leader-
ship purges of the kind attributed to Stalin, China had seen repeated
persecutions of antiparty groups and counterrevolutionaries in a se-
ries of campaigns after 1953 that smacked of the nal years of the Stalin
era. Prominently targeted during this period were left-wing writers who
had opposed the Nationalists and supported the Communists, but who
had from the beginning chafed at the rigid dictates of bureaucrats who
demanded strict conformity with the doctrines of socialist realism.30
These authors pushed for a more nuanced and less stereotypical portrayal
of characters and plots, and proved to be thorns in the side of propa-
ganda bureaucrats. In 1954 and1955 a series of them were subjected to
denunciations for bourgeois idealism and lost their editorial posts:
among the more prominent were Feng Xuefeng and Ding Ling. Essen-
tially, this was a renewal of the campaign to remold the thinking of in-
tellectuals and to expunge independent thought.31 In the summer of
1955, the charges against the famous author Ding Ling escalated into
an accusation that she had formed a conspiratorial antiparty group. She
and her subordinates were removed from their posts and detained for
investigation.32
These gures typically confessed to the charges against them in an
effort to lighten their punishment, but one individual refused to acknowl-
edge error and argued against his accusers. This was the prominent writer
Hu Feng, who was a member of the National Peoples Congress, the edi-
torial board of Peoples Literature, and the executive board of the Chinese
Writers Association. He submitted a long report to the Central Committee
in July 1954 that criticized the rigid and dogmatic censorship of litera-
ture and poetry and repudiated specic propaganda ofcials by name.
The response was harsh, seemingly all out of proportion to the issues at
stake. There followed a 1955 campaign against the Hu Feng Counter-
revolutionary Clique.33 Hu and his close associates were imprisoned as
counterrevolutionaries, and a nationwide campaign against Hu Feng
elements targeted those with similar viewpoints. More than 2,100 au-
thors and editors were investigated as members of the counterrevolu-

tionary clique; ninety-two were imprisoned and scores removed from
their posts.34
The literary persecutions were limited in scope, but they were part
of a broader wave of repression that culminated in the campaign to
eliminate counterrevolutionaries, launched in July 1955. This was an
intense nationwide scrutiny of individual dossiers, a reexamination of
political histories, interrogations of suspects, and the solicitation of se-
cret denunciations. The campaign continued under various guises
through 1957, by which point more than 18.6 million individuals were
investigated, and more than 257,551 were found to be counterrevolu-
tionaries or bad elements. Most of them were sent to labor camps or
relocated to villages to work under supervision. During its course, 1,717
targets of the campaign committed suicide.35
In short, political trends in China since the death of Stalin had more
closely resembled the persecutions of the last few years of the Stalin era
than the thaw and partial liberalization in the post-Stalin Soviet bloc.
They had not, however, even begun to approach the level of repression
during Stalins great purges of the late 1930s. Nonetheless, Khrushchevs
denunciation of Stalin placed the CCP, and especially Mao, in a politi-
cally awkward position. China was out of step, staying the Stalinist
course.
The Hundred Flowers
Developments in the Soviet bloc affected China after some delay, in two
phases. In response to Khrushchevs February 1956 speech, China scaled
back the praise of Mao, began to emphasize collective leadership of the
party, and initiated a belated thaw of its own. In response to the Oc-
tober upheavals in Europe, Mao went further, staking out a new posi-
tion as an advocate of openness and criticism. He pushed hard, against
strong resistance from his colleagues, for a rectication campaign that
brought ordinary citizens into the process as critics of dogmatism and
abuse of power. This was a politically adroit and unexpected move, un-
characteristic of Maos political mentality up to that point in time. As a
potential target of de-Stalinization, Mao tried to outank criticisms by
posturing as an advocate of openness and popu lar restraint on party
power.
136 China Under Mao
Maos pivot away from his identity as a loyal follower of Stalin was
perhaps not the utterly cynical ploy that it seemed. True, Mao created a
personality cult in Yanan in the early 1940s. His party had used exten-
sive coercion and terror in consolidating control over China, and he
was an advocate of rapid socialist transformation in both agriculture
and industry. However, many of the faults for which Khrushchev exco-
riated Stalin, and many of the errors of Moscow communists in the
satellite states, could not (yet) be laid at Maos doorstep. Mao had not
conducted extensive purges of Chinas leadership, complete with
Stalinist show trials. He had not carried out mass executions of party
ofcials. True, he had pushed for an overly rapid transition to so-
cialism, but the disruptions and violence that accompanied this in the
Soviet bloc were largely absent in China, and there were no rebellions
of the kind seen in Eastern Europe. Mao could legitimately claim that
the initial phases of socialist transformation in China had been handled
relatively well.
Nonetheless, Chinas reaction to Khrushchevs February 1956 reve-
lations was guarded and defensive, and the initial steps toward de-
Stalinization were measured. The speech had surprised and alarmed
Chinas leaders, who, like other fraternal communist parties (and in-
deed Khrushchevs own colleagues), had not been warned in advance
of its content. Mao and others in the leadership concluded that Khrush-
chev had gone much too far, failing to recognize Stalins accomplish-
ments. They worried, as did many of Khrushchevs colleagues, that the
harsh repudiation of Stalin undermined the credibility of the socialist
bloc and strengthened the imperialist enemies of socialism. Especially
galling to them was the personal nature of Khrushchevs attack, which
in Maos view failed to provide a theoretical rationale for distinguishing
Stalins errors from his accomplishments. Chinas leaders became pre-
occupied with how to distinguish their recent history from the Stalin era,
and how to distinguish Mao from Stalin.36
The result was a Peoples Daily editorial on April 5, 1956, titled On
the Historical Experience of the Proletarian Dictatorship. Its main thrust
was that excessive denigration of Stalin was mistaken: his accomplish-
ments far outweighed his errors. Implicitly, it also deected criticism of
Mao for developing a personality cult of his own. Mao then gave two
speeches, the rst on April 25, titled On the Ten Great Relationships,
which called for long-term coexistence and mutual supervision with
the small noncommunist parties that were permitted to survive, sym-
bolizing a united front of all patriotic Chinese, and in par tic ular with
the professional and managerial classes that made up the bulk of the
democratic parties membership. More notable was Maos famous
speech of May 2, 1956, which called for the policy symbolized by the
slogan let a hundred owers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought
contend signaling a relaxation in the elds of culture and scholarship,
and an openness to non-Marxist ideas that might serve the task of na-
tional development. Conflicts among the people were not always
tantamount to conicts between the people and the enemy. These
speeches, along with the April 5 editorial, criticized excessively harsh
repression, neglect of collective leadership, turning legitimate differ-
ences of opinion into political errors or crimes, and excessive haste in
economic policy.37 This was a relatively moderate and, in the minds of
Chinas leaders, a properly balanced approach to de-Stalinization.
The speeches initially did little to encourage open debate, for obvious
reasons. The campaign against the Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Clique
and especially the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries were
still fresh in everyones minds. But Maos speeches were followed by both
concrete and symbolic changes. Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen called on the
security agencies to arrest fewer people, give lighter sentences, and use
less harsh methods.38 At the partys Eighth Congress in September 1956,
Mao Zedong Thought was removed from the partys constitution.39 More-
over, the political report issued at the congress stated that the socialist
transformation of industry and agriculture had resolved class con icts
based on previous modes of production, and that now the primary task
was the creation of a modern industrial base.40 Also signicant was the
drastic demotion of Kang Sheng, one of the primary architects of the
terroristic party rectication campaign of 1943, a movement that had
solidied Maos hold over the party during the period when his person-
ality cult began. Kang was demoted from the sixth-ranked member of
the Politburo to the fth alternate member, which put him twenty-third
in the national leadership rankings, a drop of seventeen places.41 The
party congress gave clear signs that the CCP was backing away from some
of its more pronounced Stalinist tendencies.42
Disagreements about Rectication
Mao wanted to go further, but there was resistance. His call for ordinary
citizens to criticize the partys errors expressed in the April 5 editorial
138 China Under Mao
On the Historical Experience were not included in Liu Shaoqis

political report to the Eighth Party Congress.43 The party leadership
had agreed that a rectication campaign was essential, but there were
disagreements about how to proceed. Mao advocated open-door
rectication encouraging ordinary citizens to criticize party ofcials.
The alternative was closed-door recticationhaving party members
criticize one another for their shortcomings. To his credit, Mao did not
believe that preaching correct behavior within the party was sufcient
to prevent abuses that generated dissatisfaction with party rule. He ar-
gued that outsiders should also express their frustrations. Permitting
their free airing, he felt, would lead to greater social and political har-
mony. Opponents of open-door rectication, on the other hand, argued
that open criticism of the party from outside could demoralize party
cadres and lead to political instability.44
This disagreement reportedly pitted Mao and Deng Xiaoping on one
side against Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen on the other. The Hungarian rev-
olution deepened the disagreements, with some arguing that openness
could lead to chaos, while Mao argued that only open-door rectica-
tion could have prevented the Hungarian upheaval. Mao ultimately won
the argument.45 Chinas ofcial response to the Hungarian uprising was
expressed in a second Peoples Daily editorial, More on the Historical Ex-
perience of the Proletarian Dictatorship, published on December 29,
1956. The editorial refuted the claim, expressed by Yugoslavias Tito, that
the Hungarian revolt was a reaction against Stalinism, which in turn
was an inevitable outgrowth of the Soviet system. The Chinese argued
that the problem was not the system, but leadership errors that created
contradictions between the government and the people. In other words,
the Hungarian uprising was due to erroneous leadership practices, not
the Soviet system. Party ofcials tended to be dogmatic, bureaucratic,
and sectarian, behaviors that could be corrected. Calls to change the
system were wrong, a revision of Marxism-Leninism.46
This was a limited and conservative doctrine. There could be no
change in Chinas new political and economic institutions. The system
was not the problem, and reforms in governance and economic organi-
zation were therefore out of bounds. The problem was incorrect behavior
of individual cadres. The institutions that China copied from the Soviet
Union were to be maintained.
Mao elaborated this idea in his speech of February 27, 1957, On the
Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.47 This was his
case for open-door rectication, and it was Maos attempt to establish

himself as an innovative leader of world communism. His essential point,
expressed in a long and rambling speech of almost four hours, was that
contradictions between the party and the people are normal and need
not be viewed as class struggle. Contradictions between the party and
the people should be sharply distinguished from contradictions between
the party and class enemies, and criticism of the party does not neces-
sarily represent counterrevolution waged by hostile social classes. A party
that cannot accept criticism and that treats all critics as class enemies
will commit the errors that led to the Hungarian uprising.48
Maos speech was an effort to push harder to carry out rectication.
He referred repeatedly to resistance by party cadres to open-door recti-
cation.49 Mao followed up with similar speeches to a variety of smaller
audiences, traveling outside Beijing throughout the month of March.50
After his earlier Hundred Flowers speech, the partys propaganda ap-
paratus had essentially sabotaged that call by organizing a campaign of
denunciation against an author of a short story that portrayed a young
communist demoralized by the cynicism and incompetence in his party
organization.51 Mao was especially angry with the Peoples Daily, which
did not publicize his new ideas on contradictions until after he called
its editor, Deng Tuo, to his living quarters and angrily dressed him down,
along with several other propaganda ofcials.52 Maos attack broke the
logjam. Prominent opponents of the policy, in particular Peng Zhen, -
nally gave in, and the newspaper published a series of ve editorials in
mid-April that criticized those who opposed opening up and letting a
hundred owers bloom.53 The rectication campaign was nally
launched on May 1, 1957. The Hundred Flowers would last only ve
weeks, but would be as dramatic as it was short.
The Popular Response
Party organizations throughout urban China held forums that welcomed

criticism of the attitudes and conduct of party cadres.54 Once it became
clear that retaliation against critics did not immediately occur, critics be-
came more numerous and outspoken. Party ofcials were exposed to
unrestrained comments from those subject to their authority. These were
thoughts that subordinates had previously not dared to express. The
result, for party cadres, was often humiliating and demoralizing. As
critics found their voice, and as their colleagues and even selected party
140 China Under Mao
members voiced agreement, the criticisms became more severe. The de-
mands for redress quickly moved beyond the boundaries of the cam-
paign and into the inherent defects of Soviet-style institutions.
The new system of party control in urban workplaces came in for
particularly harsh criticism. Speakers lamented the requirement that
party members exercise authority in every organization: party cadres
overruled decisions made by experts and dismissed the advice of those
with far more extensive experience and better education; party cadres
lacked ability, bungled their jobs, and showed open disrespect for those
under their authority; they took privileges for themselves, appointing
their spouses to well-paid jobs in their own organizations; and party
members were always shown favoritism in promotions, even when they
were totally unqualied for their jobs, and in some cases barely able
to read.55
Journalists complained about their inability to do their jobs and about
the way that censorship demeaned their profession. They decried the lack
of real access to the decisions of government and demanded greater
freedom to report truthfully. They complained that newspapers had be-
come organs that simply repeated exactly what government ofcials said,
and that journalists and editors were forbidden to think for themselves.
The more outspoken critics declared that the partys objective in the eld
of journalism was simply to keep people in ignorance.56
Academics were particularly bitter about the impact of the party
system. They decried controls by the party that placed severe restrictions
on the natural sciences and virtually destroyed the humanities and so-
cial sciences, forcing adherence to outdated Marxist dogma. They de-
nounced rigid conformity to Soviet doctrines and scholarship: the wor-
ship of things Russian and the knee-jerk rejection of anything from
America. Critical thinking was forbidden and punished when exercised;
unqualied party secretaries oversaw research and teaching in subjects
where they lacked even minimal qualications; faculty and researchers
were so intimidated by past political campaigns that they dared not ex-
press opinions. Research in some elds had ground to a halt because of
the doctrinaire attitudes of ignorant party secretaries. Economists de-
cried the decline of their discipline: statistics and survey sampling were
denounced as bourgeois science and scholars were forced to repeat rit-
ualistic quotations from Marxist classics, with proofs based on simple
arithmetic.57
Authors and editors who had endured recent campaigns against lib-
eral thinking in their elds spoke out in defense of their earlier views
and penned satirical essays that skewered the dogmatism of communist
bureaucrats. One essay published in Peoples Literature lampooned the
unthinking dogmatism of party ofcials and the constantly shifting party
line:
Certain of our high-ranking cadres . . . have such remarkable talents that

they, however ill-read seem extremely capable of directing others in their
studies, and of criticizing those who obtain their ideas from books. . . .
It is characteristic of this sort of Marxist leader that, although his theo-
ries may change time and time again, he never admits a mistake. Each
time his views undergo a reversal he considers them to be correct. . . .
This is to say that he never thinks for himself. . . . He is, however, a
leader. Therefore, it is unfortunate for those who must follow him.58
These criticisms may well have stung party cadres who were used to
agreement from intimidated subordinates, but in many organizations the
critics strayed into statements that were clearly critical of the system it-
self, not just the behavior and attitudes of individuals. A professor at Chi-
nese Peoples University asserted that the current situation was worse
than under the Nationalists, and the party had completely separated it-
self from the people: the masses want to overthrow the Communist
Party and to kill the Communists. If the party did not fundamentally
reform itself, this critic argued, it would be swept away and collapse.59
A professor at Shenyang Normal University painted a painful picture of
party rule:
Since the founding of the Republic, particularly in the last one or two
years, the Party has become superior to the people and has assumed priv-
ileges, praising itself for its greatness, glory and correctness. . . . For this
reason, Party prestige is falling day by day. More and more persons with
impure motives join the Party. They join the Party because they can win
glory and acquire power, inuence, and money. Imbued with despicable
individualism . . . they atter the Party, bow to the Party and obey the
Party on everything. . . . The absolute leadership of the Party must be
done away with. . . . The Constitution is a scrap of paper and the Party
has no need to observe it. . . . As to freedom of assembly, association
and publication, this is just something written in the Constitution; ac-
tually, citizens can only become obedient subjects or, to use a harsh
word, slaves. . . . A system of general election campaigns should be put
into effect alongside the abolition of the absolute leadership of the
142 China Under Mao
Party. The people should be allowed freely to orga nize new political
parties and social bodies, and to put out publications so as to open the
channels of public opinion, supervise the government, combat cheap
praises and encourage them to oppose an undesirable status quo even if
it meant opposition to the Communist Party.60
Another charged that in the past, the party had stood up for the people,
but now it ruled them like an oppressive master: instead of standing
among the masses, it stood on the back of the masses and ruled the
masses. Political activists volunteered in public but informed on people
in private; they pretended to be seless and self-sacricing but in fact
were scheming to better themselves at the expense of others.61 An-
other complained about the self-censorship and alienation involved in
surviving as a party member in an oppressive environment: to be a
Party member one had to regard oneself as either a lunatic or a corpse.
One could speak ones own mind only in the privacy of ones own
bedroom.62
These were indictments of the system, not the shortcomings of in-
dividual cadres. The complaints of professionals and academics, how-
ever, were not the developments that most alarmed party leaders. What
ultimately led to the abrupt end of the Hundred Flowers was the inde-
pendent mobilization of students, especially university students, and
an even more troubling rise of unrest among industrial workers.
Student activism in the capital was centered at Peking University,
which historically had been the initiator of student movements earlier
in the twentieth century. The rst wall posters appeared in mid-May
and the campaign grew quickly. A democracy wall was established near
the center of campus, attracting huge throngs of people to read and paste
up essays. The wall became a site for public debates and speeches. Inde-
pendent political clubs and discussion groups were formed, and they is-
sued their own mimeographed newsletters and journals.63 A translation
of long excerpts from Khrushchevs speech was posted at the university
in May.64 Among the most common complaints were the injustices com-
mitted during the campaign to suppress counterrevolution, the negative
impact of party rule in educational institutions, the obviously false
charges against the Hu Feng Clique, the narrow adherence to the So-
viet educational model, the excessive politicization of academic courses,
and the dogmatic and sectarian attitudes of party ofcials toward non-
party teachers and students. Other critics challenged the partys claims
that living standards had been improved, and complained of the growing
gap between a dictatorial party and the people.65
Of the speeches made at Peking University, the most famous and con-
troversial were those of a bluntly outspoken law student from nearby
Peoples University, Lin Xiling.66 In a May 23 speech, Lin openly chal-
lenged the partys verdict against Hu Feng and his associates, pointing
out the obvious fact that his suggestions to the Central Committee were
fully in line with the current Hundred Flowers policy. His suggestions
about art and literature were correct; his purge as a counterrevolu-
tionary was based on Maos old and outdated talks from the early 1940s.
Lin was dismissive of the charge that Hu Feng formed an antiparty
group because he communicated secretly with others: Well, who
doesnt communicate privately? This makes people not dare to tell the
truth to one another. Why, despite the obvious, had the party not re-
versed this perversion of justice? I think that the Communist Party is in
an embarrassing position and doesnt know how to get out of it. It knows
it has made a mistake, but refuses to admit it.67
Lin then moved on to draw parallels between the crimes of Stalin,
as outlined in Khrushchevs secret report, and the same errors in China:
Our country also expanded the scale of suppression of counterrevolu-
tion. She knew this because of her internship in a district court, where
they spent almost all of their time reviewing cases brought against al-
leged counterrevolutionaries that were obviously false. These problems,
she asserted, were rooted in the institutions themselves: I heartily agree
with the Yugoslav opinion that the cult of personality is a product of the
social system. . . . The problem of Stalin is not the problem of Stalin
the individual; the problem of Stalin could only arise in a country like
the Soviet Union. . . . Genuine socialism should be very democratic, but
ours is undemocratic.68
Lin bluntly stated her view that the problems with Chinas Soviet
system were too severe to be corrected by supercial measures like Maos
rectication campaign:
We dont think it sufcient for the Party merely to employ methods of

rectication . . . and make minor concessions. . . . During the tempest
of the revolution, Party members stayed together with the people; but
after the victory of the revolution, they climbed up into the ruling posi-
tion and ideological limits were imposed. They want to suppress the
people; they adopt policies aimed at deceiving the people. . . . Iam not
144 China Under Mao
optimistic about the rectication, because there are still too many guard-
ians of the rules. These guardians want to use the fruits of socialism,
bought with the blood of the martyrs, as a ladder to climb to higher
positions.
Lin closed her rousing speech by referring to students who were mobi-
lizing in Wuhan, Nanjing, and elsewhere in China, and called for a na-
tionwide struggle to establish genuine socialism, which she saw as part
of the same agenda that inspired the Hungarian upheaval: The blood of
the Hungarian people was not shed in vain!69
In a second speech at Peking University one week later, Lin elabo-
rated on her claim that the abuses typical of Stalinism were rooted in
the organ izational structures of Soviet-type regimes. She made clear
the source of her inspiration: The problem of Yugoslavia: I am very
interested in this. Here is socialist democracy. In Chinas bureaucratic
personnel system, A man is judged not by his virtues and abilities, but
by whether or not he is a party member. . . . Some party members
rushed to join the party in order to enjoy the resultant privileges; those
who do not join the party have no future.70 These tendencies were
rooted rmly in the new organ izational structure of Chinas economy
and political system, which in turn had its roots in feudalism and
fascism also toadying to foreigners: The compradors toadied to for-
eigners and worshipped America; our learning from the Soviet Union is
just like that.71
Lin Xiling was able to read a translation of Khrushchevs speech, and
it had a deep impact on her thinking: I used to have a very good im-
pression of Stalin, and I was very angry about the criticism of him at
the Twentieth Congress. But after I read this secret report, I began to
see through Stalin. An appraisal of Stalin cannot be based on the cult
of personality; it must be based on the system itself. The excessive per-
secution of alleged counterrevolutionaries was Maos idea, which was
inuenced by Stalins erroneous theory that class contradictions will be-
come more and more acute after socialism is established. 72
Lins position was one of democratic socialism; she admired efforts
by Polish, Hungarian, and especially Yugoslav thinkers to step away from
the Stalinist past and generate a new form of socialism. This was far be-
yond the boundaries of Maos conception of party rectication. Lin was
not alone, nor was she the most extreme. Others went much further. At
Peking University a Hundred Flowers Society pushed for democracy and

freedom, declared that Marxism and the proletarian dictatorship were
out of date, and called for the formation of new political parties and gen-
uine multiparty competition.73 Wall posters likened the classication of
households according to their political status to a kind of caste system,
and in the hands of personnel departments, it had become the founda-
tion for a new ruling class.74
The idea that China had already created a new privileged class was
stated repeatedly in the dissident posters during this period. One of the
most extreme statements was by an anonymous writer who appears to
have been a middle-aged party functionary, and it expressed the view-
point of a deeply alienated insider:
I am weak, with neither courage nor a ghting spirit. I only know how
to live at the beck and call of the leaders. I eat well every day and draw
a high salary. . . . A great many leading cadres are enjoying a luxurious
life of banquets and villas. Why should I live so frugally? How many
people have learned to fake obedience, bow to the leadership, turn
their backs on the masses, and thus become high-ranking ofcials and
dignitaries? . . . For twenty years Ive seen through the imperialists.
Facing the enemy, my eyes were red with anger and I would risk losing
my head and shedding my blood; but facing the dictatorship of the
Communist Party Iam cowardly and powerless. . . . We have given our
blood, sweat, toil, and precious lives to defend not the people but the
bureaucratic organs and bureaucrats who oppress the people and live off
the fat of the land. They are a group of fascists who employ foul means,
twist the truth, band together in evil ventures.75
This writer went on to pour contempt on Mao, portraying him as a hyp-

ocritical tyrant. I protest against Chairman Maos recent statement to
the Youth League Central Committee that the Party is the leading core
in all work, and any deviation from socialism is erroneous. This state-
ment should be translated as follows: It is necessary to accept Party dic-
tatorship; anyone who opposes the words of the super-emperor is wrong
and should be killed forthwith. The writer compared Mao with the rst
emperor of the Qin dynasty, a famous tyrant known for treachery and
his massacre of scholars during a violent and brief reign: Your majesty!
How many people have had their ideals and hopes destroyed by just one
word from you! Your majesty! Emperor Qin Shi Huang was nothing but
an obscure dwarf compared to you. . . . Since 1949 you have killed more
146 China Under Mao
than 700,000 people (this doesnt include those who committed suicide).
Kill if you like! Kill off all the Chinese!76
The writer also ridiculed the myth of Yanan communism. Dictator,
youve turned into a brute. In Yanan . . . how many so-called suspects
did you kill? You called this internal purication. . . . In the so-called
holy land of Yanan, Wang Shiwei was rectied simply because he men-
tioned the large kitchen, the medium kitchen, and the small kitchen. . . .
Where is he now? Nobody knows. When the students of Resist-Japan
University were ghting desperately at the front, you were drinking and
whoring it up in Yanan. What a hard life you had in the caves!77
For obvious reasons, the mass media did not publicize sentiments like
these, and there was no public reporting on the student activism. Party
ofcials were kept informed, however, by condential reports published
in the bulletin Internal Reference and other classied materials.78 The open
expression of sentiments like these indicated that the rectication cam-
paign was going off the rails, just as the opponents of open-door recti-
cation had feared. Mao had been wrong, and he began to have serious
misgivings. He had mistaken intimidated obedience for consent and had
underestimated the resentment that the repressions of the 1950s had cre-
ated, especially among educated Chinese. He had assumed incorrectly
that the relative quiet in China throughout 1956 had meant that there
was rm popular trust in the regime.
The formation of independent clubs and publications went far beyond
the original conception of the campaign, as did calls for the end of party
dictatorship. Even more alarming was the rapid mobilization of students
across the country, which many likened to the famous May Fourth Move-
ment of 1919 that touched off the modern era of revolution. Student ac-
tivists at Peking University traveled to Tianjin to organize and mobilize
students there.79 Democracy walls and freedom forums spread to
campuses across the country. By the end of May similar levels of campus
ferment were reported at all thirty-one college campuses in Beijing, and
at universities in Wuhan, Shanghai, Nanjing, Jilin, Tianjin, and Lan-
zhou.80 High school students who failed to gain admission to university
staged strikes and demonstrations, in some cases attacking school build-
ings and destroying equipment; college students dissatised with their
job assignments and other issues staged strikes and demonstrations on
their own campuses in Wuhan, Xian, Guangzhou, and Shenyang.81 Stu-
dents went out onto the streets to stage demonstrations and protests in
Wuhan, Nanjing, Chengdu, Qingdao, and Guilin.82 Youth league orga-

nizations in many schools were turning into centers for dissent.
An even greater potential threat, given the earlier rebellions in East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovak ia, was labor protest. Workers mo-
bilized to protest working conditions that were imposed under the new
planned economy. The industrial city of Shanghai was a microcosm of
a wave of worker protest that began in 1956, reaching a peak during the
Hundred Flowers. There were labor disputes at 587 enterprises in
Shanghai in the spring of 1957, involving close to 30,000 workers. More
than 200 of them were factory walkouts. An additional 700 enterprises
experienced less serious forms of industrial con ict. This was the largest
wave of labor unrest experienced at any point in Shanghais long his-
tory of labor activism, with the sole exception of the six months after
the communist takeover of Shanghai in 1949. An internal party bulletin
in 1957 estimated that more than 10,000 strikes had erupted in China
in the spring of 1957, and it described widespread student boycotts, mass
petitions, and demonstrations. In Shanghai, the majority of the disputes
were in factories that had recently converted from private to joint state
ownership, and they were a reaction to the reduced wage levels and elim-
ination of former rights to bonuses and other perquisites that were won
through bargaining with private employers in the past. When the state
took over the rms, wages and privileges were readjusted downward
much as they had been in Berlin and Pilze a few years before. Workers
spoke out against the bureaucratic and authoritarian character of labor
relations, and they openly denigrated party secretaries and puppet
trade unions.83
Rural protests were also widespread, coming on the heels of the rapid
and involuntary formation of collective farms in the previous year.
During these weeks, farmers openly expressed dissatisfactions that came
to a head near the end of 1956. They were later detailed in an internal
party report. Villagers complained about the new restrictions on the use
of their time, cadre mismanagement and arbitrariness in job assignments
and income distribution, loss of income and a drop in the quantity and
quality of food allocations, and rudeness and oppression and bullying
by the new village cadres. They also complained about embezzlement
by cadres, squandering of public funds, and their habit of cursing at,
beating, and tying up villagers who openly complained. The report
quoted some farmers as claiming that to join the co-op is no better than
148 China Under Mao
staying in a labor camp and that the new collective structures caused
increases in suffering rather than income.84
The protests in villages are less well documented, but there are indi-
cations that unrest was widespread, and where it did occur the conse-
quences were severe. Across Jiangsu Province, farmers forcibly seized
harvested grain, angrily confronted rural cadres, and withdrew from col-
lective farms.85 In one county in Zhejiang Province, there were major
protests in twenty-nine out of thirty-three townships from mid-April
1957 to the end of May, and farmers withdrew from collective farms in
droves. Participation in collective farms in the county fell from 91 per-
cent to 19 percent of households; rural cadres were beaten and their
homes were invaded and ransacked. Similarly large outbreaks were re-
ported in Shanxi and Guangdong. 86 In border areas, radical collectiv-
ization bred stubborn and well-organized regional rebellions.87
Chinas leaders had ample cause for alarm. Initially, Mao persisted
in defending his vision of open-door rectication, making light of student
protests and strikes, arguing that they were nothing to get overly alarmed
about. He was unable to calm his colleagues fears, and there was a
clear sense that the situation was about to spiral out of control. Most
disturbing was the fact that young party members were expressing some
of the most pointed criticisms, and that Communist Youth League orga-
nizations were becoming a focal point for dissent. The multiple threats
of a national student movement, mass protests by workers, and the de-
fection of young party members all symptoms of earlier mobilizations
in Eastern Europenally closed the debate. Developments vindicated
leaders who had feared that open-door rectication was potentially de-
stabilizing. Mao backtracked, reversed himself, and ordered a harsh
crackdown.88
Backlash: The Antirightist Campaign
The campaigns reversal was signaled in a front-page Peoples Daily edi-

torial on June 7. The central thrust was that open-door rectication had
been turned into merciless attacks on the party and on socialism. These
were attacks on socialism by rightists whose words and actions ex-
pressed the interests of former exploiting classes. Essentially, this new
stance reversed the party line enunciated at the Eighth Party Congress
that the socialist transformation of the economy had eliminated the basis
of class con ict. In effect, the open-door rectication of the Commu-

nist Party turned into a rectication of the people by the Communist
Party. Those who had expressed criticisms during the Hundred Flowers
were now targeted in a nationwide Antirightist Campaign. The democ-
racy walls were shut down; students and workers who persisted were
arrested; the independent clubs and newsletters were forcibly closed.
The forums that previously encouraged the free airing of criticisms
were now turned into forums for denouncing those who had made the
mistake of offering criticisms in the preceding weeks. The Antirightist
Campaign lasted far longer than the Hundred Flowers and continued into
early 1958. The entire party apparatus was mobilized to document the
critical utterances and activities of people during the Hundred Flowers.
Accused rightists were denounced angrily in workplace meetings. They
were held in isolation and made to write full confessions. Individuals
deemed to have made the most outrageous criticisms were put on a stage
and denounced at mass rallies. Local party committees were given per-
centage guidelines that dictated the scope of the movement. This had
the effect of sweeping even those who had made the most supercial
and well-intentioned criticisms onto the list of victims.89 While the cam-
paign was prosecuted with par ticular intensity in universities and other
organizations with high percentages of educated personnel, it reached
into factories and deep into the countryside as well. In rural counties it
focused on middle school teachers, former landlord and rich peasant
households, and those who had complained about corrupt and abusive
village cadres.90
As the campaign got under way, Maos February speech On the Cor-
rect Handling of Contradictions among the People was nally published.
It was not the same speech that Mao gave in February, which had been
replayed to many audiences by a tape recording. The revised version of
the speech contained several warnings that excessive criticism would
not be tolerated, which were not in the original speech. The new ver-
sion mentioned class struggle, also absent in the original. The original
had a long passage criticizing Stalin for failing to distinguish between
two kinds of criticism, and for treating all criticism as a contradiction
with the enemy, thereby making a mess of things. That passage was
deleted, as was another: Whoever said anything critical was suspected
of being an enemy and risked landing in jail or having his head chopped
off. Also deleted was Maos paraphrase of Khrushchevs claim that 90
150 China Under Mao
percent of the delegates to the 1930s Soviet Party Congress were shot,
and80 percent of the Central Committee. Maos casual mention in his
original speech that small numbers had been killed earlier because it
was absolutely necessary in China700,000 from 1951 to 1953, and
80,000 since 1955 also disappeared. Maos discussion of widespread
student disturbances over the past year as representing contradictions
among the people was also deleted.91
The revisions in the published version of the speech were cover for
Maos obvious political miscalculation. He had pushed hard, with great
condence, for open-door rectication, and he had been proven dead
wrong about its outcome. The revisions, along with Maos later disin-
genuous claims that he had all along been preparing to lure the snakes
out of their holes, were designed to save his face with party members.
Of deeper long-term signicance, however, is the fact that the prosecu-
tion of class struggle was revived as one of the partys central tasks. The
bland statements about peacefully building the economy from the 1956
party congress were set aside.92 The effort to recruit intellectuals and ex-
perts in the task of economic development was abandoned, and intel-
lectuals were increasingly treated as potentially subversive. Chinas brief
irtation with de-Stalinization was now at an end.
The campaign to punish rightists involved tens of millions of citizens
who participated in denunciation meetings and rallies, and hundreds
of thousands of activists who denounced the victims or served as in-
formers. By the time the campaign concluded in early 1958, a total of
550,000 people were designated as rightists.93 They were sorted into cat-
egories based on the severity of their crimes. A small number whose ac-
tions and utterances were deemed to be openly counterrevolutionary
were executed. This included some of the leaders of violent student pro-
tests and some of the workers who organized strikes.94 Large numbers
received an indeterminate sentence in a labor camp. Many of the most
notorious rightists ended up serving sentences of more than twenty years
and were not released until after Maos death. Those whose crimes were
deemed somewhat less severe were sent to collective farms, and some
of them were pardoned in the early 1960s. Others suffered demotions
and loss of pay but remained in their schools and workplaces under a
form of supervised probation. All of them suffered under the burden of
the rightist label until after Maos death. Their family members suffered
as well, because the rightist label, like landlord or Nationalist, was
one that affected all members of a household. The end result of Maos
Hundred Flowers initiative, which had the objective of cementing close
ties between the party and educated urbanites, was to destroy this link.
There were subtle signs during this period that Maos credibility and
judgment were questioned publicly, if indirectly.95 Mao disagreed with
Liu Shaoqi about the conduct of the Antirightist Campaign for most of
1957the more the dangers of class enemies were emphasized, the worse
Maos judgment looked. Eventually the two sides reached a compromise
after several months of jousting over the nature and scope of the cam-
paign.96 In June 1957, just as Mao was forced to retreat from the Hun-
dred Flowers, Khrushchev barely averted being thrown out of ofce for
the upheavals his secret speech had created in Eastern Eu rope. The
charge against Khrushchev was that his reckless actions and headstrong
leadership had led him to commit a series of errors. He faced withering
criticism from a majority of Politburo members, but he was later able to
turn the tables on his opponents and purge them from the Politburo as
an antiparty group.97 The efforts by Mao and Khrushchev to push lib-
eralization backred on both of them, although the challenge to Khrush-
chev was far more severe. While Khrushchev was able to extend his lim-
ited de-Stalinization in the years to come, Mao snapped back to his earlier
persona as a proponent of militant class struggle under socialism. From
this point on, China and the Soviet Union moved in opposite ideolog-
ical directions.98
Defeated in his brief initiative as a proponent of limited de-
Stalinization, Mao turned his energies to the struggle for rapid economic
development. His instrument for waging this struggle was the Commu-
nist Party, and the methods would resemble the mass mobilization of
the last stages of the civil war. The outcome, as we shall see, was far more
disastrous for China, and damaging to Maos credibility, than the events
of 1957.
8

Great Leap
T merged seamlessly into the Great Leap

H E A N T I R IGH T IST CA M PA IGN
Forward, a gigantic production drive that failed disastrously. The
Leaps failure was inevitable, but disaster was not. The economic rea-
soning behind the Great Leap Forward was awed and would not have
achieved its lofty goals under any circumstances. Disaster, however, was
created by the politics of the Leap: it was launched and sustained through
two massive campaigns to root out disloyalty within the party. The An-
tirightist Campaign was not directed solely against those who had criti-
cized the party from the outside in the spring of 1957; it also victimized
many thousands of party members and young cadres who had responded
to Maos call to correct the partys aws through open criticism. These
criticisms were now treated as political disloyalty, taking a bourgeois
and liberal standpoint against a proletarian and socialist one. Mao
asserted that these differences reected an ongoing class struggle in China
that was expressed within the party itself. Party members were punished
as rightists for voicing ideas that allegedly expressed the ideology of the
former exploiting classes. Their antisocialist stances, it was said, were
designed to weaken the party politically and halt Chinas transition to
socialism.
As the Antirightist Campaign merged with the Great Leap Forward,
enthusiastic support for the production drive and faith in its success be-
came the primary mark of political loyalty. Skepticism about its mea-
sures or the claims made on its behalf, or factual reporting of problems
created by the policy, became a mark of political disloyalty. After severe
problems emerged and evidence mounted that the Leaps policies were
creating a disaster, a second loyalty campaign, against right-wing op-
Great Leap 153
portunism, was launched against those who reported failures or who

advocated slowing down. This prevented a course correction that could
have avoided the Leaps most spectacular failures, saving tens of mil-
lions of lives.
Origins of the Great Leap Forward
During the 1950s Mao consistently pushed for a more rapid transforma-
tion of Chinas economy into the Soviet mold. The collectivization of ag-
riculture and socialization of industry were both completed much more
rapidly than originally planned, largely due to his intervention. This cre-
ated problems in agriculture in 1955 and1956, and leaders who were in
charge of economic planning warned against excessively high targets for
grain production and other quotas. Pushing for a rash advance, they
argued, would create imbalances and harm long-term economic growth,
creating problems for farmers own livelihoods. During 1956 and1957
they were able to curb Maos urge to push output targets to unsustain-
ably high levels but not for long.1
Mao pushed back hard at party meetings in September October 1957,
in the midst of the Antirightist Campaign. He called for much more am-
bitious production targets. He turned questions of economic policy into
questions of political loyalty. He declared that the main contradiction
in China, as demonstrated in the criticisms voiced by rightists, was a class
con ict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Party leaders who had
recently opposed a rash advance, he declared, committed a rightist
deviation. This erroneous political line, he charged, led to a soft line
on class struggle that encouraged attacks by the bourgeoisie and rich
peasants in 1957.2
Maos aspirations for the Great Leap Forward originated during his
November 1957 visit to Moscow for the fortieth anniversary of the Rus-
sian Revolution. At the previous years party congress, Khrushchev
claimed that the new Soviet ve-year plan would be a big step for-
ward in the building of communism, and in May 1957 he declared
that the USSR would overtake the United States in the output of impor-
tant products within fteen years. In private conversations, Khrush-
chev likely told Mao that their Seventh Five-Year Plan was projected to
overtake the United States in per capita industrial output by 1970.3 Mao,
like Khrushchev, was an optimist about socialist development, and he
154 China Under Mao
shared Khrushchevs disdain for experts and planners who insisted

that such grand plans were impractical. His condence was reinforced
by Khrushchevs grandiose claims. While still in Moscow, he phoned
his colleagues in Beijing and declared that opposition to rash advance
was wrong, and that a socialist economy could advance much more rap-
idly than his cautious colleagues thought.4
Khrushchevs boasts inspired Mao to pledge publicly in Moscow that
China would overtake Great Britain in fteen years. This became party
policy two weeks after his return from Moscow.5 Mao planned to achieve
a sudden economic breakthrough with political mobilization. The Chi-
nese economy grew rapidly during the First Five-Year Plan from 1953
to 1957, but typically for the Soviet model, growth was highly imbal-
anced. Industry grew ve times faster than agriculture. Per capita grain
output grew slowly, with no net increase in the grain that could be ex-
tracted for the industrial workforce.6
Mao was impatient with ofcials in planning ministries who coun-
seled caution and balance, and he believed that collectivization and mass
mobilization would overcome all barriers.7 He rejected the balanced ap-
proach to industrial development advocated by ofcials like Chen Yun
and Deng Zihui, whose ideas were supported by Premier Zhou Enlai.
Chen Yun wanted higher incomes for peasants and increased investment
in light industry that would provide them with consumer goods to buy.
The accumulation of prots from light industry, in turn, would provide
the investment funds for heavy industry. Chen Yuns approach was sim-
ilar to that advocated by Nikolai Bukharin in the Soviet Union during
the 1920san approach rejected by Stalin and declared a right-wing de-
viation in his struggle for dominance over his rivals (as described in the
Short Course on Soviet history, which de ned Maos understanding of
Marxism-Leninism).8 Although Chen Yuns approach ran counter to So-
viet orthodoxy of the early Stalin era, it was very much in line with ret-
rospective critical thinking about the Soviet development model that was
widespread in the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu rope in the 1950s. Maos
views on the subject were distinctly old-fashioned and, to those steeped
in socialist economics, they were dogmatically narrow minded and
twenty years out of date.
Maos answer was to achieve a rapid breakthrough in grain supplies
through organ izational changes and political mobilization. More grain
would be extracted from the countryside to support higher investment
Great Leap 155
in heavy industry. Mao believed that larger and more socialist farm
units would bring economies of scale, and that intensive mobilization
of existing resources, particularly labor, would lead to a breakthrough
in output. As in the traditional Soviet model, capital investment would
be lavished directly on heavy industry, especially on sectors like steel.9
Maos uninformed ideas about economic growth were not sufcient
by themselves to generate the disasters of the Great Leap. The Leaps out-
comes were the product of welding these ideas onto a political campaign
that cast economic policy in terms of political loyalty, equating it with
class struggle. The Leap would have failed to spur economic growth; the
politics of the Leap turned it into a disaster.
Mao went on the offensive in a party conference in January 1958,
blasting Zhou Enlai and other leaders who had criticized rash advance.
He asserted that this erroneous line gave courage to rightists. In party
meetings over the next several months, he continued to criticize the em-
phasis on balance, planning, and economic laws. He charged that these
principles were based on mere superstition and dogmatism. Mao pro-
claimed that China henceforth would put politics in command and em-
phasize the human factor and mass enthusiasm. Professional experts
would no longer dominate decision making. Their belief in rational plan-
ning and scientic standards were bourgeois superstition. Instead, party
cadres and the masses would take over from the experts, who wielded
their rules and regulations merely to buttress their status and authority.10
Mao pushed for going all out, launching technological revolution,
criticizing rightist ideology, and smashing superstitious belief in both
experts and Soviet practice.11
This was the rst time that Mao asserted his view about the economy
so forcefully, essentially moving toward a personal dictatorship that tol-
erated no opposition. Those with different policy views were severely
criticized. During 1958 he took direct control of the economy, bypassing
economic planners in the industrial ministries in Beijing and turning
to provincial party secretaries and the national party apparatus to carry
out his directives. He ratcheted up political pressure to increase produc-
tion targets by warnings about class struggle within the party. He called
opposition to rash advance anti-Marxist, and asserted that rash advance
was the Marxist view. He warned of the danger of splits in the party. He
alleged that antiparty cliques appeared in several provinces, leading
in May 1958 to highly publicized purges of provincial leaders associated
156 China Under Mao
with the earlier criticism of rash advance. Zhou Enlai and other ofcials
were forced to make humiliating self- criticisms, and several were re-
moved from their posts. For a period it seemed that Zhou Enlai might
even be removed as premier.12
These threats pressured leaders at all levels to display unquestioning
enthusiasm for the Leap. Meetings held to set production targets turned
into criticism sessions against the incorrect line of opposing rash advance.
As the continuing Antirightist Campaign spread into the countryside
during 1958, it targeted those who had objected to rapid collectivization
or who had pointed out the problems it created.13 It silenced any objec-
tions and made enthusiasm for Maos line the de nition of political
loyalty.
The strategy of economic development that Mao rejected the one
devised by Chen Yun and supported by Zhou Enlaipresumed that min-
istries and bureaus, and the planners, professional managers, and tech-
nical experts who staffed them, would be in charge of setting economic
targets and investment priorities. This was the modernized Soviet prac-
tice of the postwar era, a bureaucratic procedure where plans were trans-
mitted to provincial and regional governments from above. During 1958
Mao took the planning process out of their hands and turned it over to
party secretaries of provinces, who were compelled to respond enthusi-
astically in such a tense political atmosphere. Planning for the Great Leap
became a politically charged pledge campaign, conducted in a cascading
series of party conferences in which party secretaries at each level vied
with one another to promise large increases in the output of grain, steel,
and other key products. This put enormous power back into the hands
of the party orga ni zation itself, which took over economic decision
making at all levels of government. It also put enormous pressure on
party ofcials at all levels to conform to expectations of wholehearted
support and, subsequently, to ful ll their pledges.
As party secretaries promised implausibly large increases in output,
Mao was greatly encouraged. In May 1958 he proclaimed that he had
previously been too conservative: it would now take only seven years to
surpass Great Britain, and fteen to catch the United States.14 Steel tar-
gets escalated wildly. National output in 1957 had been 5 million tons,
and the planners original target for 1958 was an ambitious 5.8 million.
By September 1958, pledges by provincial party secretaries had inated
the years target to 11 million tons, and the plan for 1959 to an absurd
Great Leap 157
39 million.15 Capital investment in heavy industry soared to support these

pledges. New plant capacity had to be built, primarily through the im-
portation of equipment from the Soviet bloc (paid for by the increased
export of grain). The initial capital investment target for 1958 was 14.5
billion yuan, but this was quickly raised to 38.6 billion.16
Party secretaries pledged equally fantastic increases in agriculture.
Grain output in 1957 was 195 million tons. During the course of 1958,
targets rapidly escalated to more than 350 million tons.17 Unlike those
of heavy industry, these massive increases were to be accompanied by
only small increases in capital investment. In their frenetic attempts to
meet grossly unrealistic new output quotas, party ofcials in rural re-
gions made radical organ i zational changes and placed draconian de-
mands on peasants.
The Rural Great Leap Forward
The strategy for increasing grain output relied heavily on expanding ir-
rigation and bringing new land into cultivation. Dams and canals served
areas that were larger than the boundaries of collective farms, so the
rst step in the campaign was to amalgamate existing collectives into
much larger units. In 1957 there were roughly 70,000 communes, which
contained an average of approximately fteen production brigades
(roughly equal to villages). During 1958 these collective farms were com-
bined into roughly 23,000 gigantic communes, containing an average
of more than fty villages. This permitted party cadres to mobilize mas-
sive labor armies for major construction projects.18
Internal changes were also made in collective farms. Agricultural
production was to be organized in a military fashion. Families were or-
dered to turn over personal possessions cookware, tables, chairs, and
cabinetsfor communal mess halls. Families were no longer to store
and prepare their own food; this would be done collectively. The re-
cording of work points would be suspended, because massive new de-
mands were to be made on farmers time and effort. Families would eat
what they needed in the mess halls, no longer limited by the calculation
of household rations. Nurseries and child care centers were established,
releasing women and the elderly for labor. When the meal halls, child
care centers, and other ofcial buildings were to be constructed, farmers
were assigned to these projects as construction laborers. In some cases,
158 China Under Mao
private homes were pulled down as sources of building materials.

Farmers were organized into large brigades along military lines, often
segregated by gender. This work was largely uncompensated and was in
no way voluntary. If you refused to work, you had no right to eat in the
collective mess hall, the only source of food.19
The production drive was organized like a military campaign. A model
commune in Henan province set up twenty-eight production corps,
which were in turn divided into regiments, companies, platoons, and
squads. Farmers were expected to obey strict rules of discipline: obey
the leader and follow orders; work actively; do not arrive late or depart
early; wage a constant struggle against capitalist thinking; and cooperate.
Farmers were required to work at least twenty-eight days each month.
All were required to rise with the morning bugle call, take meals to-
gether, and go to sleep at the same time. This model commune replaced
private housing with communal barracks, segregated by gender, with
children housed in a separate building.20
Prior to the Great Leap, labor on collective farms had a rhythm that
was determined by the seasons. Planting and harvesting were the bus-
iest periods, and winter was slack time. The Great Leap obliterated this
rhythm with constant and seemingly ceaseless demands for hard labor,
not only in the elds but also on massive irrigation projects, road building,
and terracing of hillsides. To help provincial leaders meet their inated
targets for increased industrial output, communes established small fac-
tories. To contribute to the provinces inated quotas for producing steel,
villages set up primitive makeshift steel furnaces, which had to be fu-
eled and maintained around the clock. The diversion of labor away from
agriculture frequently left too few farmers on the land to tend crops or
bring in the harvest. Farmers whose lives were previously governed by
agricultural seasons now found that virtually all of their time and ef-
fort was subject to the seemingly insatiable demands of commune of-
cials for unrelenting labor.21
The new peoples communes intensied communal life far beyond
that of the recently established collective farms. They also greatly ex-
panded the rural bureaucracy. The centralized direction of all aspects
of rural production required larger salaried staffs at each level of the hi-
erarchy. Communes typically had at least thirty cadres, production bri-
gades around ten, and a production team around ve. This was a mas-
sive increase in the administrative overhead from only two years before.
Great Leap 159
Prior to collectivization, typically one salaried cadre was responsible for

several villages. Now each village was required to support the salaries
of a team of roughly ve, and full-time salaried cadres were added at
the commune level.22 Nationwide, this represented a new rural bureau-
cracy of millions of full-time ofcials, a further drain on rural incomes.
Moreover, this new bureaucratic stratum exercised centralized control
over resources that previously had been in the hands of households or
village governments. They controlled larger budgets, made decisions
about expenditures, and they controlled villagers time, labor, and even
food supply. This opened up opportunities for small-scale corruption and
privilege, in addition to the abuse of power.
The Cycle of Bureaucratic Self-Deception
The Great Leap Forward generated disaster through mutual deception

and ultimately self-deception within a massive bureaucracy whose agents
at all levels were placed under im mense political pressure to agree and
conform. In the rst wave, after seeing purges of colleagues for opposing
rash advance, party ofcials at each level in the national hierarchy
pledged impossibly high increases in grain output, displaying full con-
dence and enthusiasm over the prospect. Self-deception also meant
agreeing that obviously counterproductive measures would have posi-
tive results and violating common sense by implementing them. It then
took the form of reporting extravagant successes to superiors, which were
duly publicized and celebrated, putting greater pressures on other party
leaders to implement the same misguided practices and report the same
successes. As failures multiplied, it took the form of hiding the evidence,
blocking negative reports, and insisting that all was well even as crops
failed and starvation spread. Next, rural cadres in the midst of a growing
famine were trapped by their earlier false reports of massive grain har-
vests, forcing them to come up with even larger deliveries of grain to
the state, exacerbating famine conditions that were already under way.
The nal act of deception was the claim that peasants were hiding grain,
eating too much, and that rural leaders who reported that there was
simply no grain left to deliver were submitting false reports and hoarding
grain for their own use. This led to a tragic campaign to strip farmers of
their dwindling food stores even as the famine was already well
advanced.
160 China Under Mao
The rst step in the cycle was the new planning process, which con-
sisted of group meetings of party secretaries of provinces, cities, coun-
ties, and at each level down the hierarchy, to pledge production targets
for the coming year. The rst rounds of such meetings were held just as
the Antirightist Campaign was nearing its end and as Mao was openly
linking opposition to rash advance to a rightist deviation within the party
leadership. These pledge meetings resembled an auction, with undue in-
uence being exercised by the highest bids. High bids pulled the others
along, because no one wanted to be seen as lagging behind.23 When pro-
vincial ofcials held planning meetings at the district and city level, they
put im mense political pressure on their subordinates to pledge output
targets that would permit them to ful ll their provincial pledges. As a
margin of safety, they routinely pushed subordinates to pledge targets
whose sum was higher than the initial provincial pledge, guarding against
possible shortfalls. This led to increasingly unrealistic targets as the pro-
cess moved down the hierarchy.
One problem with these escalating demands was that they conicted
with one another. Demands for immediate increases in grain output con-
icted with the reality that this would be possible only after improve-
ments in irrigation and water control brought more land under cultiva-
tion. Rural ofcials diverted massive amounts of labor away from farming
for crash construction projects to build dams, reservoirs, and canals, and
to terrace hillsides for cultivation. This diverted labor from planting, cul-
tivation, and harvesting, leading to smaller yields than would otherwise
have been the case. Similar problems were created by the diversion of
labor for the smelting of homemade steel from local scrap metals, and
transferring farm laborers to new factories that were established by com-
mune and county governments. Rural cadres could only respond to these
con icting objectives by driving farmers to work harder and faster.
The next step in the cycle of mutual deception was a series of model
practices that were said to contribute greatly to the attainment of seem-
ingly impossible objectives. Two such methods were close planting and
deep plowing. These were prescribed by party authorities and accompa-
nied by press reports that celebrated their value. Close planting was os-
tensibly designed to bring higher yields on limited cropland simply by
planting seeds closer together, and applying much larger amounts of fer-
tilizer. This had two negative results. It led to the use of much higher
amounts of seed grain during the planting season, and the sprouts com-
Great Leap 161
peted with one another for sunlight, water, and nutrients in the soil,
leading to stunting and crop failure. This depressed agricultural output
wherever it was tried, and also caused enormous waste of seed grain and
fertilizer. Successes using this technique were nonetheless enthusiasti-
cally reported in the mass media. Deep plowing was similarly destructive.
It turned fertile topsoil, already thin and depleted in much of China, deep
underground, and pulled nutrient-poor subsoil to the surface.24
Desperate to make good on impossible pledges, local cadres made de-
cisions that were self-defeating and ultimately harmful. One common
example was the destruction of valuable crops, like orchards, in order
to bring more land under grain cultivation. Another was the extension
of grain planting onto land that was poorly suited to wheat or other
grains, leading to lost output of nonstaple products. One of the more sur-
prising and harmful was a common response to shortages of fertilizer.
Peasant homes made out of mud brick and straw were torn down to fer-
tilize the elds, leaving surprisingly large percentages of farmers in some
regions without shelter for an extended period.25 Carried out in haste
and without consulting civil engineers and other experts, irrigation proj-
ects could create severe environmental damage. In one region they led
to waterlogging that drew salt into the topsoil, sharply reducing crop
yields. Dams built hastily were prone to collapse during rainy seasons,
leading to disastrous oods. Hillsides that were terraced or cleared of trees
for planting grain led to severe soil erosion and the clogging of streams
and rivers with silt.26
Failure was not an option. Ofcials who reported that these politi-
cally lauded practices were unwise risked political censure for lack of
faith in the party and the Great Leap. Cadres at all levels were aware of
the problems but hesitated to speak, and they actively suppressed the
spread of information that would expose them for submitting false re-
ports. Years later they would explain their failure to report the spreading
famine to their superiors as resulting from fear of being labeled a right
deviationist. In other cases, when they reported starvation conditions
to their commune superiors, they were explicitly warned that they were
expressing right deviationist thinking and were viewing the problem
in too simplistic a manner. In one production brigade, cadres were
expected to report increased grain output, but those who failed had to
go through group training, criticism, struggle, and beating.27 Visiting
ofcial delegations were taken on carefully planned tours designed to
162 China Under Mao
prevent them from discovering local problems. Party investigators who

nonetheless found evidence of unreported famines were threatened by
local ofcials and in some cases prevented from leaving the area.28 Local
ofcials underreported deaths and devised elaborate strategies for falsi-
fying statistics, often with the connivance of superiors who were equally
anxious to avoid negative reports.29
The statistical system was completely politicized. Party committees
at all levels had to approve the statistics submitted to higher levels. During
the rst year of the Leap, statistical agencies were told, Our statistical
work is carried out in ser vice to others, not to ourselves. Whether some-
thing is wanted or not, or what is wanted, is up to others. The calcula-
tion methods and specications are likewise applied according to the
requirements of whomever we serve.30 When provincial statisticians
complained that their party committees were reporting false numbers,
they were told, The Great Leap Forward is an irresistible trend; all you
can do is obey the provincial party committee. Some day the central gov-
ernment will ask you for the actual gures, so you must make sure to
have all the real numbers ready to present them at any time.31 In 1959,
as problems caused by the Leap were becoming too large to ignore, the
State Statistical Bureau insisted on submitting accurate reports. Their
leaders were compelled to make a self-criticism for their inadequate po-
litical consciousness and for trying to blow a cold wind on the Great
Leap Forward. The Statistical Bureau was instructed to resolutely de-
fend the partys General Line and launch a counterattack in the struggle
against right opportunism.32
The Cycle of Bureaucratic Oppression
Farmers did not always comply voluntarily with the demands placed
upon them, and not all local ofcials complied enthusiastically with or-
ders from above, agreed with obviously wrongheaded directives, sub-
mitted false reports, and covered up disastrous failures. As time wore
on, the cycle of bureaucratic self-deception became unsustainable without
the application of coercion, through intimidation and surprising levels
of violence, of individuals who failed to fall into line or who tried to re-
port the truth. This would give the rural Great Leap many of the vio-
lently oppressive features that were later observed on an even wider scale
during the Cultural Revolution. In this sense the mutual deception was
Great Leap 163
enforced by a party bureaucracy that did not want to hear bad news and
willfully misinterpreted it when delivered.
The Great Leap in rural areas was destructive from the beginning.
Despite widespread self-censorship and false reporting, some accurate
reports did reach central authorities as early as April 1958 that food short-
ages and food riots were disturbingly widespread. By the last half of 1958
there were unmistakable signs of impending famine. By early 1959
famine was spreading nationwide.33
As problems multiplied, Mao stated a point of view from which he
never wavered: the General Line represented by the Great Leap was ab-
solutely correct, and its accomplishments far outweighed its shortcom-
ings. Criticism of the Leap reected class struggle, attacks by enemies of
the party and socialism, as his speech to a February 1959 party confer-
ence asserted:
The relationship between our achievements and our shortcomings is, as

we usually say, the relationship between nine ngers and one nger out
of ten ngers. Some people suspect or deny the 1958 Great Leap For-
ward, and suspect or deny the advantages of the peoples communes,
and this viewpoint is obviously completely wrong. . . . Extra large com-
munes are the best means for us to achieve the transition from the rural
socialist collective system to the socialist system of full public ownership,
and are also the best means of accomplishing the transition from so-
cialism to communism. If suspicions develop regarding this basic issue,
this is completely wrong, and it is right deviation. It is necessary to
anticipate . . . [that] factions will come out jeering at us, and . . . that
those landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad ele-
ments will carry out acts of sabotage.34
Instead, Mao blamed local ofcials for pushing policies too far and too
fast, for incompetence, and for setting excessively ambitious targets. He
acknowledged reports of hunger, but insisted that the problems were not
that severe, and were due to implementation at lower levels and not the
principles behind the Leap.35
The primary cause of famine was excessive procurement of grain
based on wildly inated harvest gures.36 When provincial ofcials
falsely reported massive increases in grain harvests the previous year,
their quotas for delivery of grain were raised accordingly. The actual grain
harvest in 1958 was 200 million tons, a mere 2.5 percent increase over
the previous year. Yet the ofcial gure for the grain harvest was a
164 China Under Mao
ludicrously inated 375 million tons.37 For obvious reasons, provincial

ofcials were nding it impossible to meet the higher procurement
quotas. Due to spreading hunger and the disruption of collective farms
in 1958, crops were already failing, and the grain harvest would drop
15 percent in 1959. Provincial ofcials were placed in a very difcult situ-
ation, and Mao was already talking as if the problems with the Leap were
their fault.
How could provincial ofcials extract themselves from this dilemma?
They could admit that the previous years grain harvest gures were a
fantasyfor which political retribution was sure to followor they could
blame their subordinates. And this is what many of them did. In Jan-
uary 1959 Guangdong Province reported that in fact the grain was there,
but was being hidden by peasant households with the connivance of local
cadres. They reported great success in a campaign to scour the villages
to dig out the hidden grain. Anhui Province submitted a report that
stated, The issue of so-called grain shortages in the countryside has
nothing to do with lack of grain, nor is it linked to excessive state pro-
curements: it is an ideological problem, in particular among local cadres.
The report explained that the hoarding was due to local worries that
communes would not let them retain enough grain, or that they were
holding some back to avoid much higher quotas the next year, or that
they suspected other leaders were withholding grain to shift the burden
onto them.38
Mao, who was already forced to acknowledge serious problems with
the Leap but was unwilling to acknowledge aws in its overall design,
jumped at the idea. He declared that the problem of hiding grain was
very serious, and called for an intensied effort to procure more.39 Thus
began the nationwide campaign to combat false reporting and grain
hoarding. Ofcials at any level who insisted that in fact there was no
more grain, and that peasants were already starving, were treated as if
they were part of the conspiracy against the Great Leap Forward and,
by implication, Chairman Mao.
The campaign was conducted as a form of political warfare. Village
leaders and ordinary farmers who denied that there was any hidden grain
were subjected to verbal abuse and threats that frequently escalated into
beatings and even torture. One elderly rural cadre reported years later,
If you didnt beat others, you would be beaten. The more harshly you
beat someone, the more rmly you established your position and your
Great Leap 165
loyalty to the Communist Party. If you didnt beat others, you were a
right deviationist and would soon be beaten by others.40 In one com-
mune, the county party committee ordered an investigation that began
at the top of the local party hierarchy. At the meeting where the order
was relayed, seven commune cadres were strung up and beaten, one of
whom died at the scene.41 Violent struggle sessions and beatings were
administered to rural cadres who insisted that there was no grain left.
Many escaped with demotions or expulsions from party posts, but some
committed suicide.42
The campaign was even more devastating when it reached farm
households. Homes were ransacked for hidden grain, and household
heads detained and interrogated, threatened with imprisonment, beaten,
and even tortured.43 When hidden grain could not be found, furniture
and other family property was looted, leaving many rural families al-
ready suffering from hunger utterly destitute. Sometimes homes were
pulled down as punishment for refusing to reveal hidden grain and fur-
ther grain rations were denied, condemning the victims to death through
starvation. Many localities formed labor reform brigades where sus-
pected hoarders were forced to perform hard labor on starvation rations.
No matter how violent local ofcials became in their frenetic efforts to
uncover more grain, there was very little left. The campaign simply ac-
celerated the deepening famine.44
As the campaign against hoarding was under way, the party leader-
ship met in July and August 1959the Lushan Plenumto consider re-
adjustments in the Great Leap and alleviate some of the severe prob-
lems that Mao had been forced to acknowledge. Many leaders were now
acutely aware of the spreading famine, in part by visiting their home
villages and talking to relatives. Top military ofcers were aware of the
problem through reports submitted by junior ofcers and enlisted men,
most from rural areas, about the plight of their families. These ofcials
clearly recognized the disastrous outcomes of many of the core policies
of the Leap, and they were hopeful that Mao could be convinced to
change course and avoid further damage.
Unfortunately, this did not happen. Mao reacted violently to criti-
cisms of the Leap that clearly implied that there were few accomplish-
ments to brag about, and that the problems were not due to poor imple-
mentation by local cadres.45 He heard reports that some members of the
Central Committee had spoken privately in blunt terms about the
166 China Under Mao
failures of the Leap, calling backyard steel furnaces useless, the en-
tire policy a wrongheaded result of hubris, and questioning Maos
repeated claim that the shortcomings were equivalent to only one
nger and the accomplishments equivalent to nine ngers. He was
especially bothered by reports that some of these same ofcials compared
his imperious behavior toward others in the leadership with Stalin in
his later years.46
Mao decided to strike back after receiving a note from the minister
of defense, Marshal Peng Dehuai, that detailed the shortcomings of the
Leap. Maos response was emotional and vindictive, destroying any pos-
sibility of adjusting Leap policies to prevent disaster from growing even
larger.47 He immediately called together the Politburo Standing Com-
mittee and demanded severe criticism of Peng Dehuai and several other
top leaders for forming an antiparty clique that engaged in a savage
assault of right-wing opportunism. Escalating his claims about class
struggle within the party, he denounced the critics in personal terms as
careerists and plotters who lacked loyalty to the party and the cause of
socialism.48 Other top ofcials, even those who inwardly shared the
critics views, fell into line and denounced their errant colleagues in
equally vicious language.49
In his speech to the gathering on August 2, Mao referred to a fun-
damental line struggle within the party:
Is our line actually correct or not? Some of our comrades are expressing
doubts. . . . Soon after arriving at Lushan, some comrades called for de-
mocracy, saying were not democratic now, we cant speak freely, theres
a kind of pressure that prevents us from daring to speak. . . . Only later
did it become clear that they wanted to attack this General Line, that
they wanted to sabotage the General Line. When they say they want
freedom of expression, what they want is freedom to destroy the Gen-
eral Line with their speech, and freedom to criticize the General Line. . . .
The Lushan Conference is not a matter of opposing the Left, but of op-
posing the Right, because [right] opportunism is a vicious attack on the
party and the partys leading organs, and an attack against the peoples
undertakings.50
Mao followed up these charges with two memos in mid-August that

were even more defensive and emotional. To those splittists within the
Communist Party, those friends at the most extreme right. . . . Youre un-
willing to listen to me; Im already in Stalins last years, and have become
Great Leap 167
arbitrary and rampaging, not giving you freedom or democracy, while

subordinates magnify the actions of their superiors. . . . No one is able to
speak frankly to my face, only your leader is qualied to do so. Its just
too deplorable, and apparently only your emergence can save the day.51
Mao would have none of this. The struggle that emerged at Lushan was
a class struggle, and a continuation of the life-and-death struggle that
has been going on between the bourgeois class and the proletarian class
in the course of the socialist revolution for more than ten years now.52
This, nally, was Maos full application of the Stalinist playbook that
he absorbed from the Soviet Short Course back in Yanan. Policy disagree-
ments express class struggle, and the leader is the only fount of truth
and wisdom. Doubters are traitors who express the interests of capital-
ists and imperialists. The ofcial resolution on Peng Dehuai de ned the
problem as a right-deviating opportunist anti-party clique led by Com-
rade Peng Dehuai, which engaged in a savage attack against the Par-
tys General Line, against the Great Leap Forward, and against the
peoples communes. The resolution called for the entire party to ex-
pose the true face of this hypocrite, careerist, and conspirator. Ev-
eryone was called upon to proclaim the correctness of the Great Leap
Forward and repudiate all doubters: Insistently crushing the activities
of the right-deviating opportunistic anti-party clique led by Comrade
Peng Dehuai is absolutely essential, not only for defending the partys
General Line, but also for defending the central leadership of the party
headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, defending the unity of the party, and
defending the socialist undertaking of the party and the people.53
Thus began a second antirightist campaign against right-wing
opportunismthat ensured the death through starvation of tens of mil-
lions. This second political campaign diverted the party from a mid-
course correction that could have moderated the disaster that the Great
Leap was rapidly becoming. China was teetering on the edge of a famine
of historic proportions, Maos reaction at Lushan was the nal push over
the cliff. It reinforced the ongoing campaign against the imaginary phe-
nomenon of false reporting and grain hoarding by launching a cam-
paign against equally ctitious local antiparty cliques of right-wing op-
portunists. The campaign punished more than 10 million people
nationwide as right opportunists.54
Any sensible view would have recognized that the root cause of
the disaster was mass mobilization within a coercive bureaucracy that
168 China Under Mao
threatened cadres at all levels for failing to respond enthusiastically to

unrealistic demands of the party center, and which punished cadres,
sometimes with brutal violence, for pointing out obvious problems with
these demands. Mao, however, concluded illogically and self-servingly
that the problems were due to a erce countercurrent in opposition to
the socialist road. He attributed the origins to sabotage by antiparty
cliques and class enemies.55
Instead of blaming rural violence and starvation on the class struggle
that he had himself ordered to combat false reporting and grain
hoarding and right-wing opportunism, Mao asserted that alien class
elements had usurped power in the Chinese countryside. Rural cadres
who had acted as Maos most loyal and politically zealous agents in pros-
ecuting his misguided campaign were blamed for the disasters that en-
sued. A Central Committee report issued at the end of 1960 stated that
the problems were absolutely a matter of counterrevolutionary resto-
ration, and a ruthless class retaliation against the working people by land-
lords and by the Kuomintang [Nationalists] in the garb of the Commu-
nist Party.56 The Central Committee charged that counterrevolutionaries
and bad elements usurped party and administrative leadership, and using
the campaign against right deviation as a cover, they . . . adopted the tac-
tics of landlords and the Kuomintang, such as arbitrary beatings, arrests,
and killings to implement wide-scale class retaliation. . . . Leaders and
cadres at all levels became organizers and leaders in the domination and
oppression of the people, and cold-blooded killers as well.57
In short, these problems were not the result of a coercive bureau-
cratic system that demanded unquestioning loyalty from agents that were
mobilized to engage in a relentless class struggle against imaginary en-
emies. The real problem was subversion by class enemies who in ltrated
the ranks. It simply could not be true that loyal party cadres committed
atrocities under pressure to conform to wrongheaded policies emanating
from Beijing. In discussing the case at a meeting of the Henan Provin-
cial Party Committee in December 1960, one ofcial stated his resolve
to carry out the struggle against the enemy:
What is at issue is our inadequate understanding of the very evident con-

tradictions between the enemy and us, and our inability to clearly per-
ceive the Kuomintang implementing a bourgeois class retaliation in the
guise of Communist Party members. . . . To see the masses dying, yet
keep the grain locked in storerooms and refuse to distribute it; to watch
Great Leap 169
the communal kitchens close down and yet not allow the masses to light
stoves in their own homes; to refuse to let the masses harvest wild herbs
or ee the famine . . . to treat people worse than oxen or horses, arbi-
trarily beating people and even killing them, lacking even a shred of
human feelingif these people were not the enemy, who were
they? . . . These people, for the sake of their own self-preservation,
slaughtered our class brothers, and we must kill them with equal
ruthlessness.58
In the Henan prefecture where the abuses were particularly severe, thou-
sands of rural ofcials were removed from their posts, more than 10,000
subjected to struggle sessions, and quotas for executions of erring cadres
were issued by the hundreds for each county.59 Because the culprits were
alleged to be the landlords and rich peasants who had survived land re-
form and the earlier campaigns against counterrevolutionaries, these
bad class groups were singled out for victimization as well.60
The Magnitude of the Famine and Its Causes
The famine was not ofcially acknowledged until several years after
Maos death. Data on famine-related deaths were a closely guarded se-
cret even at the highest levels. When presented with a detailed report
that put the death toll in the tens of millions, Zhou Enlai reportedly in-
structed the ofcials responsible to destroy all copies of the report and
the original data on which it was based.61 No population gures were
published for two decades. When the post-Mao government began to re-
lease population and agricultural statistics, demographers immediately
noticed unmistakable evidence of a famine of surprising magnitude.62
Not until the 1982 national census and the release of data from the
1953 and1964 censuses could the demographic impact of the Great Leap
Forward be calculated with precision and condence. The national av-
erages, for a country with more than 600 million people, were staggering
in their implications. The crude death rate increased 2.5-fold from 1957
to 1960, life expectancy at birth fell from 49.5 to 24.6 years, and infant
mortality more than doubled. Chinas population declined by more than
10 million in the four years after 1958 (Table8.1). The census data yield
estimates of close to 30 million premature deaths.63
Although the famine is now ofcially acknowledged, the Chinese au-
thorities still nd it difcult to admit its magnitude and true causes. The
170 China Under Mao
Table8.1. Demographic impact of the Great Leap Forward
Crude Crude Life Infant

Birth Rate Death Rate Expectancy Mortality Rate
(Births per (Deaths per at Birth (Deaths per Population
Year Thousand) Thousand) (Years) Thousand) (Millions)
1956 39.9 20.1 47.0 143 619.1

1957 43.3 18.1 49.5 132 633.2
1958 37.8 20.7 45.8 146 646.7
1959 28.5 22.1 42.5 160 654.3
1960 26.8 44.6 24.6 284 650.7
1961 22.4 23.0 38.4 183 644.8
1962 41.0 14.0 53.0 89 653.3
1963 49.8 13.8 54.9 87 674.2
Source: Banister (1984, 254).
famine is referred to as three years of natural disasters oods,

droughts, and storm damage.64 This explanation is contradicted by re-
gional data on weather damage and crop output. Only 9.6 percent of
sown areas were affected by natural disasters in 1959, when the famine
reached its height; 16.6 percent in 1960, and20.1 percent in 1961. Only
9.6 percent of sown areas were in designated disaster areas two years
running. Weather damage in 1959 was no worse than in 1956 and1957,
when grain harvests increased.65 Less than 13 percent of the decline in
grain output was attributable to weather, and this would not have led
to famine if Great Leap politics had not prohibited the delivery of grain
back to villages.66
Accurate agricultural statistics for these years are sobering. Real grain
output actually increased by only 2.5 percent in 1958 (Table8.2). The
harvest decreased drastically after that, falling by almost 30 percent
through 1960 before gradually increasing once again. Chinas agricul-
ture was so damaged by the Great Leap Forward that grain output did
not return to 1958 levels until 1966. The emphasis on grain output led
to even larger declines in other food products. The output of oil-bearing
crops in 1960 was less than half of output in 1957, and lower than any
year since 1949. Output of sugarcane and sugar beets in 1962 was one-
third less than in 1957, and output of meat less than half.67
Beijing, however, was initially working with a very different set of
gures on grain output. The initially reported 1958 harvest was 375 mil-
Great Leap 171
Table8.2. Grain output and procurements during the Great Leap Forward
Retained Grain
Grain Output Grain Procurement per Capita
Year (Million Tons) (Million Tons) (Kg/Person)
1956 193 40 284

1957 195 46 273
1958 200 52 268
1959 170 64 193
1960 143 47 182
1961 148 37 209
1962 160 32 229
1963 170 37 231
1964 188 40 256
1965 195 39 261
1966 214 41 282
Source: Li and Yang (2005, 846).
lion tons; in 1980 it was reported that the actual number was 200 mil-
lion tons.68 In 1959 reported output was 270 million not the actual 170
million. Not until 1960, when the famine had grown to historic propor-
tions, did Beijing report a more realistic harvest gure of 150 million
tons (against an actual 143).69 In the meantime, for two years larger grain
deliveries were demanded from collective farms. In 1959, after grain
output fell by 30 million tons, procurements increased by 12 million tons.
In 1960, when the famine could no longer be ignored, procurements fell
to 47 million tons, still far too high: this was the same procurement levy
as in 1957, when output was 52 million tons higher (Table8.2). Grain
procurements as a percentage of the harvest reached an all-time high at
exactly the point when harvests began to fail, edging close to 40 per-
cent in 1959, which was almost double the percentage of the harvest
claimed by the state in 1956 (Figure8.1).
The available food grain left in collective farms dropped drastically:
from 284 kilograms per person in 1958 to 182in 1960 (Table8.2). The
damage wrought by Great Leap policies was so deep and prolonged that
the per capita grain supply in collective farms did not return to 1956
levels until a decade later (Figure8.2). This was due to the continued
bias shown to cities in the allocation of food supplies. The cities experi-
enced severe disruptions in food supplies, which were further stressed
172 China Under Mao
50
45
Percentage of harvest procured
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Year
Figure8.1. State grain procurements, as percentage of harvest, 19561966.

Source: Calculated from Li and Yang (2005, 846).
300
275
250
Kilograms per capita
225
200
175
150
125
100
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Year
Figure8.2. Grain retained by collective farms, 19561966. Source: Li and Yang

(2005, 846).
Great Leap 173
by starving refugees from suburban communes. Beggars roamed the

streets, ghts broke out at grain shops, and petty theft and armed rob-
bery became more common.70 Supplies of pork to Shanghai fell by al-
most 90 percent from 1957 to 1961, and low supplies of other foodstuffs
led to widespread diseases of malnutrition. Beijings 1961 death rate was
double the 1957 gure.71 Nonetheless, cities received enough supplies of
grain to avoid famine.
The regime worked hard to conceal these problems from their urban
populations and especially from the outside world. Refugees eeing the
famine caused the International Red Cross to offer food aid, which the
regime atly refused.72 Grain exports to the Soviet Union and elsewhere
in the Eastern bloc as loan repayments continued.73 Net grain exports
in 1959 actually increased by more than 50 percent. They continued at
reduced levels in 1960, even after the extent of the famine could no longer
be ignored. Not until 1961 did China become a net importer of grain.74
This two-year delay in purchasing grain on international markets led to
net grain exports of almost 7 million tons. This amount of grain could
have supplied 16 million people a survival diet of 2,000 calories per day
for almost two years.75 International trade policy, motivated by a con-
cern to save face for Chinas leaders, made the famine much worse.
The Great Leap in Industry
The Great Leap Forward had an impact on manufacturing industries that

was just as devastating in statistical terms as it was in agriculture. Given
the magnitude of the famine generated by the destruction of agricul-
ture, it is understandable that industry has received much less attention.
When industries fail, output falls, and workers are laid off. The Great
Leaps destruction of the industrial system did not generate millions of
deaths, but it created an industrial depression that lasted for years.
The reasons why are easy to understand. As noted in Chapter5, the
Soviet industrial system was resource constrained rather than demand
constrained. In this resource-constrained economy, production stops
when the supply of inputsfuel, raw materials, spare partsfalls short.
The vision behind the Great Leap was to expand the entire industrial
system by transcending in one fell swoop the resource constraints that
held back production. This was to be accomplished by massive inputs of
both labor and capital. Existing workers were mobilized (involuntarily)
174 China Under Mao
to work harder, faster, and longer hours. New plant capacity was built.
Local governments established large numbers of new factories and mobi-
lized labor from rural communes to operate them. Output targets were
raised across the board. Party secretaries at all levels were pressured to
pledge greatly inated targets for steel, coal, chemicals, petroleum, ma-
chinery, and motorized vehicles. By pushing everyone to work harder
and faster, and to squeeze every ounce of slack resources out of the in-
dustrial system, a virtuous circle of increasing supplies would lift the re-
source constraints on industry and accelerate Chinas industrialization.
This idea made sense to Mao and was an appealing notion to party
cadres. By commandeering industry for a massive political campaign,
the lumbering bureaucratic system borrowed from the Soviet Union
would spring to life, as party leadership would unleash human poten-
tial to previously unimagined heights. Seemingly impossible goals could
be achievedas in the last phase of the civil war only if the party re-
lentlessly mobilized people and material resources and focused them
single-mindedly on the task. Overnight, the shortage economy would
become a thing of the past.
In the short run, factories could meet demands for vastly increased
output only by speeding up existing operations. This could be accom-
plished by altering or abandoning procedures designed to ensure product
quality, worker safety, or the maintenance of capital equipment; by man-
dating involuntary overtime work; or by hiring large numbers of new
workers. Local ofcials in less industrialized regions responded to calls
for increased output by rapidly establishing new factories or expanding
the few that already existed. They did this by hiring large numbers of
new workers from nearby collective farms, part of the diversion of labor
from agriculture to industry that eventually harmed grain output. County
seats and rural towns throughout China reported massive increases in
industrial employment in 1958 and1959. Almost all of this increase was
in simple, labor-intensive operations that could increase output with little
capital investment.
The demand to speed up existing operations ran roughshod over pro-
cedures established by engineering and technical staff to ensure product
quality, worker safety, and the maintenance of capital equipment. This
frequently pitted party secretaries and party activists against white-collar
staff and skilled veteran workers. Party secretaries who insisted on
smelting steel at faster rates, nding substitutes for scarce alloys, or re-
Great Leap 175
ducing chemical checks for quality overrode concerns by technical staff

and skilled workers who pointed out that heating batches faster would
waste scarce fuel and that altering the chemical composition or skipping
quality inspections would result in products that did not meet technical
specications for the steel needed by downstream users. In machine tool
or production line operations, party secretaries found it expedient to
speed up operations by cutting back on quality inspections, increasing
the pace of work, or lengthening the working day.
Technical staff, veteran workers, and trade union ofcials understood
that these proposals would lead to breakdowns of capital equipment, in-
dustrial accidents that imperiled worker health and safety, and awed
products that did not meet quality specications and that therefore repre-
sented a waste of scarce resources. Party secretaries silenced such objec-
tions. In meetings designed to unleash the creativity of the masses,
political activists proposed shortcuts and innovations of the type described
above that were celebrated within the factory (and the press). Engineers
and technical staff that raised objections about waste, quality, or safety
were subjected to criticism as bourgeois experts whose reactionary
views were allegedly based on superstition. In the wake of the Anti-
rightist Campaign, few were so foolish as to persist in their objections that
the partys celebrated production drive would likely backre.
These predictions soon came to pass. Factories experienced a wave
of industrial accidents and equipment breakdowns. Workers pushed to
endure long shifts made mistakes due to fatigue; safety regulations ig-
nored in the push for speed led to fatal accidents.76 Equipment that was
pushed faster or longer than it was designed for, or that was used be-
yond scheduled inspections and maintenance broke down, and even
when the breakdown did not involve injuries or fatalities, production
would be shut down while time-consuming repairs were made.
Despite these setbacks, production was increased, at least at rst. Pre-
dictably, however, the increased quantity of output led to a sharp de-
cline in quality. Producers therefore faced a choice, but one that in the
context of the times was by no means difcult. They could acknowledge
the substandard quality of their products, declare them unusable, not
include them in their production quotas, and rework them into usable
products. This meant that they would not ful ll their quotas, and that
the labor, materials, and fuel expended to produce the substandard prod-
ucts had been wasted.
176 China Under Mao
Party secretaries overwhelmingly chose to declare all the output up

to standard and ship it to end users, silencing managers, workers, and
engineers who suggested otherwise. This meant that they simply passed
the problem on to the factories that used their products. Factories
throughout the industrial system received shipments of steel that was
too brittle or too soft to be used in their products; parts that could not
be used for their assembly processes; machine tools that broke down or
failed to operate; trucks that broke down constantly. Despite the increase
in the quantity of available inputs, there suddenly developed, throughout
the industrial system, a severe shortage of inputs of sufcient quality to
sustain manufacturing operations.
A production drive designed to overcome resource constraints led in-
stead to a resource crisis. Factories throughout China were receiving in-
puts that they could not use. They expended additional energy and labor
simply to rework the inputs into usable form (if possible), or they tried
to barter the useless materials to other factories that had the capacity to
do so (and that were themselves desperate for usable inputs).
This was an industrial depression in the making, with fundamen-
tally different causes than the nancial panics and downturns in de-
mand that create depressions in market economies. Chinas Soviet-style
industrial system, constrained by resources, systematically wasted re-
sources on a monumental scale, creating a cascading shortage crisis. Elec-
tricity, gasoline, fuel oil, and coal were expended in vast quantities in
order to generate products that could not be used.77
By 1960 all of the slack in the industrial system was exhausted. In
1961 industrial output simply collapsed. Net industrial output dropped
by almost 50 percent through 1962 (Figure8.3). The damage to the in-
dustrial system was so severe that output did not recover until 1964.
Workers added during the upsurge of 1958 and1959 were laid off, and
part of the pre-1958 labor force was laid off as well.78 Total nonagricul-
tural employment dropped from just under 60 million in 1960 to 42 mil-
lion in 1962, and employment in state industry dropped from 21.3 mil-
lion in 1960 to 11.2 million in 1963 (Figure8.4).79 Many of these workers
had migrated from nearby collective farms early in the Great Leap For-
ward. Now they were forcibly returned to collective farms on a massive
scale. Chinas urban population, 99.5 million at the end of 1957, bal-
looned to 130.7 million in 1960. By 1962 it was reduced to 116.7 mil-
lion.80 The number of industrial enterprises in China, which had more
Great Leap 177
200
Gross value of industrial output (millions yuan)
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Figure8.3. Gross value of industrial output, 19571965 (constant yuan).

Source: State Statistical Bureau (1983, 214).
30
Employees in state industry (millions)
25
20
15
10
0
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Figure8.4. Employees in state industry, 19561965. Source: State Statistical

Bureau (1983, 126).
178 China Under Mao
than doubled early in the Leap, dropped precipitously as many of the

new factories set up in rural areas were closed. As late as 1965 there were
fewer industrial enterprises than in 1957.81
A Centrally Planned Depression
The Soviet industrial system was designed to ensure steady growth

without the instabilities due to business cycles and nancial panics char-
acteristic of market capitalism. Mao sought to make an innovative con-
tribution to world socialism with his Great Leap Forward. His was an
innovation of dubious distinction: he inadvertently gured out how to
create a massive depression in an industrial system that was designed
precisely to avoid one. The famine of 19601962 was less of an innova-
tion. It was an unfortunate repeat of the disastrous Soviet experience
of 19321934, which China had been fortunate to avoid in its earlier col-
lectivization campaign.82
The collapse of the Chinese economy in the early 1960s was as se-
vere as the United States Great Depression. Per capita income dropped
32 percent in the United States between 1929 and1933; in China it
dropped 35 percent between 1959 and1962. The two depressions, how-
ever, had different causes. The Great Depression was created by deep
structural problems in a market economy, and as a result the United
States did not fully recover until 1940. Chinas depression was created
entirely by faulty government policy, and the economy revived more
quickly after those policies were abandoned. China returned to pre Great
Leap levels of output by 1964, only two years after the low point.83
Chinas economic crisis had political and organizational causes. They
were political because of Maos extraordinarily bad judgment and his
dogmatic bullying of other leaders who disagreed with him. They were
political also because of Maos reaction to criticisms at the Lushan Plenum
and the erce Antirightist Campaign that he launched in order to squelch
criticism. That campaign prevented a timely correction to Leap policies
that could have saved tens of millions of lives. The causes were organ i-
zational because of the way that pressures from the top induced unre-
alistic pledges by provincial, regional, and local ofcials to increase in-
dustrial and agricultural output. They were organizational because these
ofcials, faced with a choice between reporting actual failure or imagi-
nary success, chose the latter. Maos intervention had caused both his
Great Leap 179
economic system and his mobilization-based political orga ni zation to

break down. In Manchuria in 19481949, Mao had seized victory from
the jaws of defeat by pushing his army and party organization far be-
yond ordinary limits. Ten years later he used the same methods and
seized defeat from the jaws of victory. Mao could not have undermined
his credibility as a leader and thinker in a more spectacular fashion. The
political fallout from the Great Leap disaster would take several years to
become manifest, but when it did so in the form of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, it hit China very hard.
9

Toward the Cultural Revolution
A of the Great Leap, attributable directly

DISAST ER OF T H E M AGN I T U DE
to Maos bullying and erratic leadership, was bound to create se-
rious political fallout. Surprisingly, it did not lead to efforts to remove
him from ofce, nor did it seriously weaken him politically. But Mao
was forced to retreat from his unrealistic views about the speed of eco-
nomic development. Other leaders, even those who had initially sup-
ported the Leap and who acquiesced in Maos attack on Marshal Peng
Dehuai and his antiparty clique, took this opportunity to rein in the
political excesses of the period. They subtly tried to steer economic policy
away from Maos obsession with class struggle as a way to speed indus-
trial development and took strong measures to repair a badly damaged
economy.
Mao initially agreed to backtrack on Great Leap policies. In agricul-
ture this meant dividing the massively enlarged communes into more
manageable units, closing the communal meal halls, ending military-
style mobilization of labor, and restoring production teams and in many
places household farming, with clearer incentives and rewards for pro-
duction. In industry, it meant returning authority to managers and
technical specialists, respecting their advice, ending crash production
drives organized by party branches, and providing incentives for workers
in the form of wage raises and bonuses. Throughout China, it meant a
relaxation of the shrill insistence that economic policy reected a class
struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Ideas prevalent in
the modern socialist bloc about how to remedy the aws of Soviet-style
economies were given a broader hearing. Intellectuals and scientists
were to be given greater autonomy to consider ideas and express view-
Toward the Cultural Revolution 181
points that were suppressed by the partys ideologues. Class origins and
political loyalty were to be de-emphasized in university admissions.
Mao tolerated these changes only to a point. He viewed them as tem-
porary concessions to repair problems inadvertently created by the Leap.
Even in the depths of Chinas depression and famine, he bridled at frank
assessments that portrayed the Leap as the disaster that it was. And
he reasserted his insistence on class struggle as soon as the worst of the
economic crisis had passed. Though Mao did criticize himself for exces-
sive optimism, he never admitted that the core ideas behind the Great
Leap were at fault. He continued to assert, despite all evidence to the
contrary, that the positive accomplishments of the Leap far outweighed
its shortcomings.1
More disturbing to him was the fact that some leaders, led by a stub-
born Liu Shaoqi, frankly challenged his claim that the Leap had many
accomplishments to commend it. Also troubling to Mao was the call to
rehabilitate those wrongly accused of right-wing opportunism in 1959
and also those purged for opposing rash advance in 19571958. All of
these subtly implied that Mao had committed a fundamental error of
line. The limited thaw in intellectual life, moreover, bred the airing of
views that were clearly opposed to Maos most cherished commitments
and suggested a different path toward building socialism that reected
negatively on Mao himself. Mao soon turned to loyal subordinates to
push back against these trends, reviving his insistence on the centrality
of class struggle under socialism.
Rescuing China from Maos Leap
In November 1960 the party nally issued an urgent bulletin, drafted

by Zhou Enlai, calling for the restoration of smaller collective farms, the
end to commandeering the resources of teams and households, the res-
toration of private plots for rural families and their right to engage in
small-scale household production, the restoration of the work point
system, increased rural incomes, the revival of rural markets, and a gen-
uine balance between work and rest.2 A few weeks later Mao made a
limited self-criticism at a party conference, admitting that he had erred
in expecting an overly rapid transition to communal ownership and in
pushing too many large public works projects. He conceded that changes
in ownership and agricultural orga ni zation would take more time to
182 China Under Mao
complete.3 These moves nally permitted the long- delayed correction

that brought the Great Leap Forward to a halt.
By this time it was clear that the Leap had led to mass starvation,
and Mao could no longer maintain his fantasy that the problem was due
to false reporting and grain hoarding. He sent out investigation teams
to rural areas led by his political secretaries and other top ofcials. Liu
Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and other leaders went to rural areas
themselves to investigate in the aftermath of the famine.4 What they
learned shocked them: not until the policies were clearly reversed, and
they went to the countryside themselves, did they grasp the full mea-
sure of the brutality and suffering to which Chinas peasants were sub-
jected by local ofcials during the Great Leap Forward.5
Assigning Responsibility
Once the famine was acknowledged within the higher reaches of the
party, it became increasingly difcult to assert that the positive accom-
plishments of the Leap greatly outweighed its shortcomings, and that
problems were attributable to the schemes of alien class elements. In Jan-
uary 1961 the party proceeded to make concessions to household farming,
rural markets, technical expertise and material incentives in industry,
and greater autonomy in scientic research and intellectual life.6
But there were widely varied understandings within the party about
what had gone wrong. The Central Committee convened an unusually
large party conference in January 1962 designed to talk through the
experience and unify thinking about the economic crisis. Ofcials in
charge of party committees at ve levels of the national hierarchy were
invited to Beijing for a session known as the Seven Thousand Cadres
Conference.7
The conference began with small-group breakout sessions to discuss
a report drafted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. It was a contradic-
tory mix of wholehearted af rmation of the correctness of the General
Line that inspired the Leap while pointing out a series of errors com-
mitted by the party center.8 This led to an unexpected level of ques-
tioning about whether the policies themselves, rather than local imple-
mentation, were the real cause. This in turn provoked a reaction by
staunch defenders of the Leaps core policies, prompting Mao to order
Liu to have his drafting committee revise the report. The committee it-
self split over assigning responsibility to the partys top leadership. Some
members argued strongly that the entire party leadership shared re-
sponsibility, including Mao. This led others to strenuously defend Maos
leadership as indispensible and unerring, and to af rm the absolute
correctness of his vision.9
When Liu Shaoqi read his report to the conference, he carefully pref-
aced his remarks with praise for Mao, but he also said several things that
ew in the face of Maos claims. Liu said that agricultural production
had drastically decreased from 1959 to 1961, and that industrial output
dropped 40 percent. The Great Leap Forward, he concluded, had actu-
ally been a great leap backward. He pointed out that when he visited
villages in Hunan, the farmers told him that the problems were three
parts natural disaster and seven parts man-made disaster a counter-
point to Maos repeated insistence that it was nine ngers good to one
nger bad. Liu was equally blunt about attributing responsibility: If
we fundamentally refuse to acknowledge that there have been short-
comings and errors, or claim theyre just on minor issues and try to beat
around the bush or cover things up, and dont practically, realistically,
and thoroughly acknowledge our past and existing failings, then no sum-
ming up of the experience can be carried out, and bad cannot be turned
to good. Liu called the core policies behind the Leap an experiment,
and said that the ultimate verdict would become clear only as a result of
practical experience.10
Lius assessment was far more negative than Maos, and his statement
about acknowledging errors, whether or not intended as a challenge to
Mao, caused the conference to be extended for several days while a
number of delegates felt compelled to defend the correctness of the Leap
and pledge loyalty to Mao, blaming the Leaps problems on natural di-
sasters that were exceptionally serious and long-lasting. Perhaps the
most vocal and enthusiastic support came from Lin Biao, head of Chi-
nas military and member of the Politburo Standing Committee, who
stood strongly on Maos side on this occasion as he had at the Lushan
Plenum of 1959in the attacks on Peng Dehuai.11
After the conference, Mao departed Beijing for Wuhan, and Liu
Shaoqi convened a series of meetings to plan measures to rescue the
economy. These meetings gave a much more dire assessment of Chinas
economy than the one painted at the Seven Thousand Cadres Confer-
ence. Liu stated that the party had not yet sufciently faced up to facts,
184 China Under Mao
and he argued that China was facing a deep crisis, requiring not rou-
tine readjustments but emergency measures. When Liu, Deng Xiaoping,
and Zhou Enlai ew to Wuhan to present this dire assessment to Mao,
he agreed to the emergency measures but objected that the report still
painted too bleak a picture.12
Despite Maos objections, Liu forged ahead with recovery measures.
In May he developed a plan to restructure the economy, and he stated
that the economic foundation of China was unsound, a situation that
could lead to political instability. Under his direction a series of mea-
sures were designed to put the economy on a rmer footing. The urban
population was drastically reduced, with 10 million shipped back to the
countryside by the end of 1962. Capital construction projects were cur-
tailed. Experiments with household agriculture were expanded, and
party members who were criticized and disciplined for right-wing op-
portunism would have their cases reexamined, potentially leading to re-
versal of their verdicts.13
Mao surely sensed a political drift in the party leadership that was
owing against him. He was particularly alarmed by reports that indi-
vidual farming was proving popular with regional ofcials and farmers,
and that it was being implemented more extensively than he had an-
ticipated. He began to push back hard against the practice by harshly
criticizing provincial ofcials who promoted it.14 In July, shortly after
returning to Beijing, Mao summoned Liu Shaoqi to his living quarters.
Mao confronted him, expressing anger at his negative reports and the
rush to backtrack on so many Leap policies. Liu responded with blunt-
ness that virtually no one in the top leadership circle had dared with
Mao for years: History will record the role you and I played in the star-
vation of so many people, and the cannibalism will also be memorial-
ized! Mao reportedly shot back, The Three Red Banners have been
refuted, the land has been divided up, and you did nothing? What will
happen after I die?15
Mao must have sensed that Lius stubborn insistence on the seri-
ousness of Chinas economic crisis, and his measures to reverse the
failures of the Leap, signaled that his commitment to Maos most cher-
ished objectives was uncertain, along with that of other top leaders.
Particularly telling in this exchange is Maos query, What will happen
after I die? He was already acutely aware of how Khrushchev had re-
pudiated Stalin in 1956, and his comments after the Lushan Plenum of
1959 suggested that he was already aware of talk in the top reaches of
the party that his behavior resembled Stalins in his later years. Maos
concerns, in hindsight, have to be viewed as realistic. Even if Mao did
not need to worry that his control over the party was in danger, he had
every reason to be concerned that after his death his core ideas would
be repudiated.
A Temporary Thaw
The Great Leap Forward was launched as a general attack on intellec-

tuals and a denigration of their claims to authority. Beginning with the
Antirightist Campaign and throughout the Leap there were attacks on
bourgeois science, social science, and traditional humanistic elds. Class
struggle had to be reected in scholarship. Foreign bourgeois ideas and
revisionist views from the socialist bloc were criticized and suppressed,
along with traditional humanistic learning and any scholarship or art
that did not express a Marxist worldview and active support of the par-
tys General Line. Older intellectuals were sent to perform manual labor
and lost their leadership positions in universities and academies in favor
of younger, party-oriented individuals. Engineers were told to learn from
peasants and workers; elds like mathematics and scientic theory were
slighted in favor of the teaching of practical technical skills.16
As the party backed away from the Great Leap, it also retracted these
counterproductive policies and began to court academics and educated
specialists as part of the strategy of economic recovery. This led to a brief
period of intellectual relaxation, a thaw similar in some respects to
that initiated by Mao during the Hundred Flowers. This time, however,
it was Liu Shaoqi who initiated the thaw, and the purpose was not to
promote criticism of the party bureaucracy, but instead to reengage Chi-
nas educated elite in the urgent task of economic construction. In mid-
1961 the party signaled that it was not necessary for intellectuals to con-
stantly profess ideological devotion to the party. They could show their
patriotism simply by contributing to Chinas development.17 This was fol-
lowed by the rehabilitation of many of those condemned as rightists in
1957. Many were permitted to return to their former jobs.18 The partys
new professed attitude was one of respect for the skills and learning of
intellectuals, which were no longer denigrated as superstition rooted
in bourgeois ideology.19
186 China Under Mao
The new policy permitted greater latitude for the use of scientic the-
ories, even social science theories, from bourgeois sources. Economists
began to offer arguments about economic reform that paralleled ideas
being widely discussed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These
ideas were rooted in critiques of the Soviet model of economic develop-
ment that began in the late Stalin era and that developed further after
his death in 1953.20 Chinas leading journals of economics soon published
articles that echoed Soviet bloc discussions about prot and efciency
under socialism, the role of prices and market mechanisms, the promise
of mathematical modeling in the planning process, and the utility of
charging interest on capital.21 All of these ideas had been previously con-
demned as applications of capitalist economic principles as reected in
bourgeois social science. Among those who led these discussions was Sun
Yefang, who had rst advanced these ideas in 1956, and who resumed
his advocacy from 1961 to 1963.22
The period also saw a brief cultural renaissance. Banned books were
republished. Literary styles other than orthodox socialist realism the
unfailing celebration of proletarian heroeswere openly encouraged.
The intrinsic value of art for arts sakeindependent of class or political
content was more widely appreciated. Ofcial journals and news-
papers criticized cultural bureaucrats who acted like oppressive over-
lords, ignorant about literature and art and interested only in asserting
their power and privilege.23 During this period a major literary confer-
ence convened by the deputy director of the CCP Propaganda Depart-
ment criticized the doctrines of socialist realism, and encouraged
writers to denounce mass campaigns and crash programs, to portray
the Great Leap in ction not as a utopia in the making but as an unfor-
tunate tragedy, and to depict accurately the suffering of peasants.24
Despite the new latitude for discussion of formerly proscribed ideas,
intellectuals, especially in universities, were understandably much more
hesitant than they had been in 1957. There were no independent jour-
nals or clubs as in the Hundred Flowers. The most critical expressions
actually came from educated ofcials who were relatively high in the
party hierarchy, principally in the CCP Propaganda Department and Bei-
jing Party Committee. The criticisms that emanated from intellectuals
in these institutions were not aimed at the party as in the Hundred
Flowers, but at the kinds of policies recently pushed by Mao and the po-
litical mentality that they expressed.
One center for this activity was the Beijing Municipal Party Com-
mittee, under the citys rst party secretary, Peng Zhen. During breakout
discussion sessions at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, Peng had
been one of the few who dared to suggest that Mao himself shared re-
sponsibility for the Great Leaps disasters. 25 Beijings newspapers and
journals published a series of essays and ctional works that appeared
on the surface to be mild social and historical commentaries, but could
also be interpreted as subtle criticisms of Maos leadership and his re-
cent policies, although they were not widely understood as such at the
time. The essays of Deng Tuo are one example. Reecting Maos displea-
sure at the papers delayed and reluctant support for his Hundred Flowers
policy in 1957, Deng was removed as editor of Peoples Daily and was kicked
upstairs as director of ideology and culture for the Beijing Party Com-
mittee.26 His regular column in the Beijing Evening News, Evening Chats
at Yanshan, which totaled 152 installments from March1961 to Sep-
tember 1962, contained a number of essays that could be read as indi-
rect criticisms of the Mao cult, arbitrary leadership, irrational behavior
and arrogance of ofcials, the denigration of science, the ignorantly
wishful thinking behind the Great Leap, and the punishment of honest
ofcials who bring bad news.27 Many of these themes were elaborated
in the short column Notes from Three Family Village, which appeared
in each issue of the journal Frontline, edited by Deng Tuo, at about the
same period of time. The pieces spanned a range of topics and were
written under a pseudonym, primarily by Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao
Mosha, a former journalist and historical novelist who was now a se-
nior ofcial in the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, responsible for
propaganda and education. 28
Wu Han, a distinguished historian of the Ming dynasty and one of
several deputy mayors of Beijing, wrote a series of plays about a coura-
geous and upright Ming dynasty ofcial named Hai Rui, who insisted on
offering criticism to an isolated and out- of-touch emperor, telling him
that if the peasants plight was not alleviated by returning the land to
them, the dynasty would be lost. In June 1959, shortly before the Lushan
Plenum, he had published in Peoples Daily a vernacular translation of Hai
Ruis 1566 memorial to the Ming emperor, under the title Hai Rui Scolds
the Emperor. The translation included the passage, In earlier years, you
did quite a few good things, but . . . all ofcials in and out of the capital
know that your mind is not right, that you are too arbitrary, too perverse.
188 China Under Mao
You think you alone are right, you refuse to accept criticism and your
mistakes are many.29 After the Great Leap, Wu Han wrote these plays at
the urging of one of Maos secretaries, who heard Mao complain in 1959
that no one dared speak up in front of him. Mao responded positively,
praised the work, had several friendly encounters with the historian, and
gave him a signed copy of the fourth volume of his Selected Works.30
Reasserting the Radical Vision
This period of relaxation was brief. Mao soon pushed back to reassert
his vision and reaf rm his control over the political agenda. At party
meetings in August 1962 he criticized excessively gloomy assessments
of the Leap, enthusiasm for individual farming, and the trend of re-
versing verdicts on right-wing opportunists.31 Warning against class po-
larization due to individual farming, he asked, Have we arrived at so-
cialism or at capitalism? Do we want agricultural collectivization? Are
we going to divide up the elds and assign production quotas to
households or have collectivization? He blamed the increasing trend to-
ward private farming on a certain petty bourgeois component in the
party, individuals with only a quasi-Marxist outlook: There are quite
a few comrades within our party who lack adequate psychological prep-
aration for socialist revolution. Mao asserted that the verdict against
Peng Dehuais antiparty clique was correct.32
Mao reasserted the core of his political beliefs in a speech to a party
plenum in September 1962. It proved to be the ideological inspiration
for the Cultural Revolution.33
In the entire historical period of the transition from capitalism to com-

munism . . . there exists a class struggle between the two roads of so-
cialism and capitalism. The overthrown reactionary ruling class has not
resigned itself to its demise; theyre still scheming for a restoration to
power. At the same time, society retains some bourgeois inuence and
the force of custom from the old society, as well as a tendency toward
spontaneous capitalism among a portion of small producers. . . . Its un-
avoidable that this class struggle should be reected within the party.
The inuence of foreign imperialism and domestic bourgeoisie are the
social roots of revisionist thinking within the party. While carry ing out
struggle against class enemies at home and abroad, we must be at all
times on guard and resolute in our opposition to all types of opportu-
nistic ideological tendencies within the party.34
The Socialist Education Movement
Maos renewed assertion of the ubiquity of class struggle under socialism

soon led to the Socialist Education Movement, launched tentatively in
late 1962, initially in order to target corruption and abuse of power in
the countryside. Mao had asserted that the problems of the Great Leap
were the work of class enemies who had seized control of the party at
the grass roots. Mao asserted that the fate of socialism rested in Chinas
countryside, and this new campaign pursued the issue further.35 The
campaign took another year to take shape. The basic approach was to
send work teams of party ofcials to rural areas to investigate local abuses.
But there were fundamental questions to be resolved. How large should
the effort be, and how many work teams should be mobilized? How
harshly should the targets of the campaign be treated, and how many
ofcials should be removed from ofce? Should the work teams be under
the authority of county-level party committees who might cover up mis-
behavior by their direct subordinates, or should the campaign be run
from the prefecture or province, taking it completely out of the hands
of local party ofcials? The campaign proceeded in ts and starts, without
a clear animating focus, for well over a year.36
Although Mao and Liu Shaoqi had previously clashed about the Great
Leap, Liu wholeheartedly embraced the notion that rural problems were
a manifestation of class struggle. He accepted Maos premise that class
enemies had taken over communes and had infected their party branches.
Liu took over the campaign in 1964 and made it his own, and expanded
it to include urban institutions as well. He ordered the formation of much
larger work teams, made up of ofcials of higher rank and controlled
from higher reaches of the party hierarchy. He dictated a more militant
stance, a more dire de nition of the severity of the problem, and the
adoption of harsh methods against rural leaders who had engaged in cor-
ruption and abuse of power. Lius militant stance and energetic mobili-
zation to prosecute this class struggle initially met with Maos
wholehearted approval, because it pursued with a ruthless thoroughness
Maos vision of class struggle under socialism. With Maos approval, large
work teams were dispatched throughout the country. They launched ex-
tensive investigations and purges of large percentages of local cadres. The
campaign unfolded through mass meetings, struggle sessions, and on
occasion beatings and suicides of targeted ofcials.37
190 China Under Mao
This was the largest assault on the national party organization since
1949. It wrought havoc on local party organizations in the countryside,
which readily collapsed under the assault of militant work teams, re-
quiring that authority be taken over by the work teams themselves.38 It
had a similarly disruptive effect on urban institutions, throwing party
committee authority into question in enterprises and universities. A
newly assertive Liu Shaoqi showed determination to exert his authority
over the national party machine, and he dressed down provincial party
secretaries who dragged their feet.39
One would have thought that Lius stance would please Mao, but by
the end of 1964 Mao expressed strong objections to the way that Liu was
running the campaign, and in par tic ular with the way in which he was
asserting his authority as a proponent of a radical political line. Maos
concerns may have been touched off by news of Khrushchevs ouster
by his Politburo colleagues in October 1964, and the subsequent percep-
tion in Beijing that Moscows new leaders were carry ing out Khrush-
chevism without Khrushchev.40 Now that Liu was taking over Maos
signature obsession with class struggle and pursuing it aggressively, this
raised the specter of Maoism without Mao. More signicantly, the new
Soviet leadership denounced Khrushchev for harebrained schemes in
the economy, and for an erratic and moody style of leadership that led
to bullying his colleagues and treating them with disrespect.41 Maos
transgressions in both areas evidently were far worse. By directing this
Maoist campaign with such intensity, Liu appeared to be asserting his
own claims to leadership.
Mao provoked a disagreement with Liu Shaoqi over the aims and
methods of the Socialist Education Movement at the end of 1964. At a
December party conference he openly criticized Lius running of the
campaign.42 He complained that it was too broad and focused on too low
a level in the party hierarchy. Mao insisted that the campaign should
focus on party cadres, and instead of focusing on corruption, it should
attack the faction of capitalist roaders in the party. At a later session,
when Mao went on the attack again, Liu refused to be walked on, an
unusual stance for members of the top leadership. Liu questioned Mao
openly at the meeting, claiming that he did not understand the concept
of capitalist roaders in the party, asking Mao to explain what he meant.
The next day Mao surprised everyone with a long monologue on the
Socialist Education Movement that ended with accusations against un-
named ofcials for trying to revoke his right to attend meetings and to
express his own views.43 Mao took over the conference and ordered the
retraction of a document issued about the Socialist Education Movement
the previous day and had a new document issued in its place, which em-
phasized that the campaign should focus on people in positions of au-
thority taking the capitalist road even in prefectural, provincial, and
central party organs.44 With this document, Mao seized back the class
struggle agenda from Liu Shaoqi.
By shaking up party organizations at the grass roots, the Socialist
Education Movement created deep divisions that would surface once the
Cultural Revolution got under way. This impact was most obvious in
urban areas. In the fall of 1964 the campaign was extended into the cities
and targeted 1,800 large state enterprises and a number of universities
and research institutes. The focus in these organizations was less on
corruption and abuse of power than on peaceful evolution toward
revisionism.45
The way that the campaign divided urban enterprises is illustrated
by the Yangzi River Machine Works, a large state enterprise in Nanjing.46
This large manufacturing complex was under the dual leadership of the
Fourth Ministry of Machine Building in Beijing and the Nanjing Mu-
nicipal Party Committee. The ministry was in charge of business opera-
tions while the Nanjing Party Committee directed party affairs. The en-
terprise was founded in 1945 by the Nationalist government, and had
many workers and staff from that era. These old personnel had an iden-
tity distinct from the younger workers, technicians, and demobilized Peo-
ples Liberation Army soldiers who came later.
In September 1964, the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building sent a
work team of more than 600 cadres to investigate the enterprise, headed
by the ministrys party vice secretary and director of its Political Depart-
ment, who had a military background. The work team head, representing
the ministry, concluded that the factorys party leadership, under the
direction of the Nanjing Party Committee, had become thoroughly revi-
sionist. The work team conducted a deep purge of the party apparatus.
The party secretary lost his post, and close to half of the middle-level
and higher cadres were labeled members of his clique. Almost all of them
were subjected to struggle sessions along with a number of workers and
technicians who were criticized as their loyal followers. The conduct of
the campaign was an implicit rebuke of the Nanjing party authorities.
192 China Under Mao
In January 1965, after Maos criticism of Liu Shaoqis version of the

campaign, the ministrys work team was ordered to engage in self-
criticism and moderate and narrow its purge. Many of the factory leaders
targeted in the earlier phase were restored to their posts. The work team
withdrew in July 1965 and a few months later the ministry sent a vet-
eran army ofcer to serve as the new party secretary. The previous fac-
tory director and some of the other top managers and party secretaries
survived the purge and kept their posts. This was a compromise between
the Beijing ministry and the Nanjing party authorities. The purge was
halted in midcourse, but the work team remained in charge and ap-
pointed new leaders. The Socialist Education Movement opened up se-
vere con icts within this large state enterprise without ultimately re-
solving them, creating deep cleavages that would break out into open
warfare in the fall of 1966.
A second example traces the same process at a leading university one
that would soon have momentous national implications. The cleavages
created by the Socialist Education Movement at Peking University would
provide the spark that initiated the Cultural Revolution in June 1966.
In July 1964 Kang Sheng ordered a small team of ten cadres, led by the
vice head of the CCP Propaganda Department, to investigate the uni-
versitys leadership. They interviewed a number of disgruntled cadres
and instructors, the most outspoken of which were Philosophy Depart-
ment political instructors and veteran party members who had been in-
volved in a series of con icts with the universitys party leadership since
the late 1950s.47 Joining these instructors was Nie Yuanzi, a party com-
mittee member who had become general branch secretary of the Phi-
losophy Department only months before. The investigation team sub-
mitted its report at the end of August. It asserted that there were many
politically impure elements and foreign spies in the university and that
schools party committee did nothing about it. Kang Sheng accepted the
report and its conclusion that bad elements had wormed their way into
the schools party apparatus.
A large Socialist Education Movement work team went to the campus
in October 1964 to begin a full-scale investigation. Led again by the same
vice head of the CCP Propaganda Department, it was composed of over
200 cadres from propaganda, cultural, and educational units nationwide.
At the end of November the work team concluded that the schools party
organization had indeed taken the capitalist road. In January 1965 they
began to stage struggle sessions against alleged class enemies; large num-
bers of party secretaries and standing committee members found them-
selves accused of antiparty activity. The schools party leadership, and
in particular Party Secretary Lu Ping, was charged with permitting open
subversion.
The campaign seemed excessive to many members of the work team
and to ofcials in the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, the CCP Pro-
paganda Department, and the Central Party Secretariat. In January 1965,
the universitys party secretary, Lu Ping, and a deputy party secretary,
Peng Peiyun, made self-criticisms at a meeting of the Beijing Municipal
Party Committee, but they also protested the campaigns methods. A
heated debate ensued, but Beijing Party Secretary Peng Zhen sided with
Lu Ping. Deng Xiaoping agreed, criticized Kang Sheng for instigating the
episode, and cleared the universitys party leadership of wrongdoing. In
March1965 Deng Xiaoping ordered the CCP Propaganda Department
to conduct a rectication campaign of the university and work team,
and correct the problems that had made the campaign so disruptive.
The tables were then turned on militant work team members and
their supporters in the university. In three conferences held between
March and July 1965, the work team was criticized for leftist errors.
Members of the universitys party apparatus who had supported the work
teams accusations were forced to make self-criticismsmost notably Nie
Yuanzi, the Philosophy Departments party branch secretary, and a
number of instructors in the department who had supported her. Those
who had stood up to denounce the schools party secretary now had to
serve under him. The cleavages opened up during the campaign would
come back with a vengeance one year later.48
The Break with the Soviet Union
Chinas relationship with the Soviet Union had been strained since
Khrushchevs denunciation of Stalin in 1956 and had deteriorated fur-
ther during the Great Leap Forward, a campaign that the Soviets viewed
with open skepticism. Mao bristled at the USSRs leadership of the world
communist movement, especially over their assessment of the world sit-
uation and the desirability of relaxing superpower tensions. The relation-
ship worsened in the early 1960s and led effectively to a nal break in
1963. The nal exchanges between the two sides dramatically illustrate
194 China Under Mao
the doctrinal differences that divided the two main communist powers
at that time and led the Chinese side to articulate a vision that was pur-
sued with a vengeance during the Cultural Revolution.
The Chinese view was presented in a lengthy statement about the
world communist movement in July 1963. The core of the Chinese po-
sition was essentially about confrontation with imperialism and de-
Stalinization.49 The Chinese asserted that American imperialism was
pursuing worldwide aggression and must be confronted. World peace
could be achieved only through armed struggle, not appeasement and
naive calls for universal disarmament. Nuclear weapons did not alter the
necessity for struggle and revolution; the Soviets could not use the threat
of nuclear war to back away from support for revolutionary struggles in
the Third World. Socialism would not triumph simply through a peaceful
competition with the capitalist world system. Class struggle and the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat inevitably persist for a long time after the es-
tablishment of a socialist state, and efforts to scale back the vigilant hunt
for internal class enemies and spies that implied that former social classes
no longer existed were bourgeois concepts. Attacks on the personality
cult were nothing more than an excuse for the Soviet Union to force
other communist states to change their leaders.50
The Soviets responded with an open letter to the world communist
movement. They expressed surprise that any communist party would
express support for the personality cult, which had long been exposed
as a petty bourgeois notion. The clear implication was that the Chinese
were simply defending Maos anachronistic cult of personality, a symptom
of the worst features of Stalinism. They also insisted that nuclear weapons
did lead to a radical, qualitative change in the nature of struggle against
capitalism, because a nuclear exchange would wipe out the proletariat
of a country just as certainly as the small number of capitalists. The So-
viets charged that Chinas position lacked any class content because it
treated with utter insensitivity the lives of hundreds of millions of indi-
viduals in the working class who would perish in nuclear war. The So-
viets signed a partial test ban treaty with the United States immediately
afterward on July 20, guaranteeing a nal split between the two com-
munist powers.51
The relationship broken, China geared up for a massive propaganda
campaign against the Soviet Union. The task was led by Kang Sheng,
who presided over more than one hundred writers divided into eight
working groups housed in the Diaoyutai state guest compound. They pro-
duced a stream of polemical statements about Soviet policy, the most im-
portant of which was the last, the Ninth Polemic of July 1964.52 The
essay expressed what was to be the ideological justication for Maos Cul-
tural Revolution.
The document portrayed a Soviet Union that was the scene of repeated
attacks by the bourgeoisie on the proletariat. The revisionist Khrush-
chev clique promoted material incentives, widened income differences
by permitting high salaries, defamed the dictatorship of the proletariat
by attacking the personality cult, and substituted capitalist for socialist
methods of management. The revisionist Khrushchev clique are the po-
litical representatives of the Soviet bourgeoisie, and particularly of its
privileged stratum, and they had taken control of the party and gov-
ernment after purging genuine communists. As a result, the rst so-
cialist country in the world . . . is now facing an unprecedented danger
of capitalist restoration. Khrushchev adhered to the American policy
of peaceful evolution, which promoted the rollback of socialism.53
The essay then turned to the implications for China. The crucial ques-
tion for China was how to train a generation of revolutionary succes-
sors who would carry on the true Marxist-Leninist tradition, whether
the party and state would remain in the hands of genuine proletarian
revolutionaries, and whether their successors would continue to march
along the correct road laid down by Marxism-Leninism. The central
question was how to prevent the emergence of Khrushchev-style revi-
sionism in China. This was a matter of life and death for our Party and
our country. . . . It is a question of fundamental importance to the pro-
letarian revolutionary cause for a hundred, a thousand, nay ten thou-
sand years.54 The essay did not say how this should be accomplished.
This would be the objective of the Cultural Revolution, launched two
years later.
Preparing Maos Assault on the Party
Mao prepared carefully for the coming upheaval. Although his colleagues
were almost always deferential to him personally, he could not be cer-
tain that there would be no coordinated resistance if his intentions were
known in advance. Not until his loyalists were in place would he be ready
to launch his assault on the party. Mao intended not merely to remove
196 China Under Mao
from the party leadership prominent communists from the revolutionary

generation starting with the second-ranking ofcial, his designated
successor Liu Shaoqihe also intended to mobilize a massive purge of
the entire party apparatus, to root out all ofcials at all levels who in
word or deed showed a tendency toward revisionist thought and be-
havior. Maos chargeit would soon become clearwas that there was
a massive nationwide conspiracy of revisionist ofcials, inuenced by
remnants of former exploiting classes and their ideas. He planned to wipe
them out in a massive upheaval of as-yet undetermined form and
duration.
Mao could not do this without the ser vices of individuals whose per-
sonal loyalty to him transcended their loyalty to the party organization.
These individuals had proven themselves utterly loyal to him in past con-
icts and could be relied upon to do his bidding without question. Maos
actions were the very de nition of an antiparty conspiracy. His moves
from late 1964 to mid-1966 laid the groundwork for seizing control of
the party apparatus, the government, and the army and security ser-
vices, cementing his unquestioned personal control as his attack on the
party began.
The two most important individuals in this respect were his wife,
Jiang Qing, and Lin Biao. Jiang Qing had not previously been active in
Chinese politics, held no government or party post, and had not appeared
in public for many years. In the early 1960s she became active in ar-
tistic circles, promoting operas and plays with revolutionary content and
becoming a leading critic of traditional themes from the prerevolution
era. With Maos backing, she prompted the publication of harshly crit-
ical essays of playwrights and productions that lacked revolutionary mes-
sages. In the course of her activities she formed an alliance with sym-
pathetic ideologues in the Shanghai propaganda apparatus, in par ticular
Zhang Chunqiao, who was a member of the Shanghai Municipal Party
Committee and head of its Propaganda Department, and Yao Wenyuan,
who was Zhangs subordinate as deputy propaganda chief and editor of
Liberation Daily.55 When Jiang was unable to have her attacks on au-
thors published in the Beijing media, she found ready cooperation in
Shanghai. As she became more active in suppressing alleged subversion
in artistic elds, she received help from the armed forces and its publi-
cations, which Lin Biao put at her disposal. Jiang organized forums on
literature and art under the auspices of the PLA as well as the Shanghai
Party Committee, during which she expressed harsh criticisms of the

laxity of Beijing cultural and propaganda ofcials while praising indi-
viduals like Lin Biao and Kang Sheng.56
Lin Biao had shown unswerving loyalty to Mao, and his leadership
of the PLA during the nal phases of the civil war had vindicated Maos
view that victory could be won. He supported Mao during the Lushan
Plenum in 1959 and the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference of 1962,
when he strongly backed Maos charges against the Peng Dehuai anti-
party clique and heaped extravagant praise on the Great Leap Forward.
After Lin replaced Peng Dehuai as minister of defense, he turned the
PLA into a totally Maoist institution, a model of upholding guerrilla tra-
ditions and the idea that human motivation is more important than
modern weaponry. He argued in conferences of senior military ofcers
that Mao was a genius, and his Thought was the apex of Marxism-
Leninism. He organized a highly publicized campaign to propagate Mao
Zedong Thought throughout the armed forces. In 1961 he ordered the
compilation and publication of a small handbook of Maos aphorisms,
which later achieved fame as the little red book, Quotations from Chairman
Mao Zedong.57
Another important Mao loyalist was Kang Sheng. Kang directed the
later phases of the partys ferocious rectication campaign in Yanan in
the early 1940s. He suffered from the backlash against the use of tor-
ture to extract false confessions and for the wide scope of the campaign,
essentially taking the blame for a policy that Mao had initiated. Once a
member of the partys top leadership, he was sidelined afterward and
served in provincial posts in the 1950s. At the Eighth Party Congress in
1956 he was drastically demoted, apparently as part of the general re-
vulsion against widespread repression by security ser vices in the wave
of de-Stalinization in the communist bloc.58 In the early 1960s, Mao
brought Kang back to Beijing to assist him in ghting revisionism and
ideological backsliding and developing the polemics against the Soviet
Union. Kangs elevation was completely due to Maos patronage, and he
was entirely dependent on Maos support for his position.59
Chen Boda was in a similar position. As Maos political secretary in
Yanan, he played a key role in developing the Mao cult and Mao Ze-
dong Thought, and along with Kang Sheng he was responsible for the
rectication campaign of the early 1940s. Chen had unfailingly sup-
ported Maos position in the Great Leap Forward and in the post-Leap
198 China Under Mao
disagreements about its causes. The partys theoretical journal, Red Flag,
founded under his editorship in 1958, became the home of a number of
leftist authors who could be counted upon to provide ideological cover
for Maos initiatives, and Red Flag effectively became Maos unofcial
mouthpiece during the 1960s. Chen, like Kang Sheng, owed his position
entirely to Maos support and patronage.60
Another crucial loyalist was Premier Zhou Enlai, although his rela-
tionship with Mao was very different. Zhou had a long history of prom-
inent positions in the party, and in the 1920s and early 1930s had out-
ranked Mao. As premier, he headed Chinas State Council and the
national government and had a reputation as a skilled, tireless, and honest
administrator. He had a well-deserved reputation for pragmatism and
loyalty to the party line. Above all, he had unfailingly proven himself
loyal to Mao since the 1930s, taking his side each time that Mao chose
to attack colleagues for alleged errors, including the purge of Peng De-
huai. Whenever he was criticized for deviation from Maos thinking, he
unfailingly engaged in long and abject self-criticism and pledges of loy-
alty. Mao valued Zhou for his loyalty and administrative ability, but he
was not a loyalist motivated by belief inor even approval ofMaos
ideas.61
Mao proceeded with moves to ensure that his loyalists were in con-
trol of the levers of national power. In a series of coordinated moves be-
ginning in November 1965, he removed potential sources of resistance
to his plans to upend Chinas political order. He had Peng Dehuai moved
out of Beijing to the far southwest and abruptly removed Yang Shangkun
from his position as head of the CCPs General Ofce, which controlled
the ow of documents at the top of the party apparatus. Mao replaced
Yang with Wang Dongxing, a Mao loyalist who headed the central guard
unit charged with Maos security and who accompanied Mao every-
where.62 In January, he ordered an investigation of Luo Ruiqing, chief
of staff of the Military Affairs Commission, who was in charge of day-
to-day operations of the PLA. Luo had a history of con ict with Lin Biao
over the politicization of the army and the denigration of modern weap-
onry and training. After a series of harsh denunciation meetings, Luo
Ruiqing attempted suicide in March. This ensured that the PLA com-
mand was entirely under Lin Biaos and Maos control.63
Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi were the nal two barriers to be removed.
Peng, Beijing party secretary, also headed a party group in charge of the
national propaganda apparatus. A longtime friend and associate of Liu

Shaoqi, he had openly resisted Maos rectication campaign of 1956
1957.64 At the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962, he suggested
that Mao shared responsibility for the Great Leap disasters. In response
to escalating denunciations of literary and intellectual gures in 1964
and1965, Peng had tried to blunt politicized attacks and insisted on
distinguishing artistic from political issues.65 In these efforts Peng
had worked closely with Lu Dingyi, head of the CCP Propaganda
Department.
Mao struck after Liu Shaoqi left for an extended trip abroad in late
March. During Lius absence, Mao summoned Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing,
and Chen Boda to Hangzhou, and he condemned Peng Zhen and the
CCP Propaganda Department, headed by Lu Dingyi, for protecting an-
tiparty elements and resisting his directives. He ordered the disbanding
of the CCP Propaganda Department, the Beijing Party Committee, and
Peng Zhens ve-man group in charge of culture.66 On April 2, Peoples
Daily denounced a black line in the Beijing propaganda establishment.
Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun were denounced
as an antiparty group. Their subordinates were arrested. The Beijing
party apparatus was decimated by purges, and several prominent g-
ures committed suicide.67
Through these rapid and coordinated moves, Mao secured his per-
sonal control over the national propaganda apparatus, the armed forces,
and the communication ow to the national party apparatus. Security
arrangements in the capital were reorganized. Armed troops and public
security forces were placed under the unied command of a newly ap-
pointed commander of the Beijing Garrison.68 Liu Shaoqi was far from
the capital when Mao openly revealed his hand. The rst moves in Maos
antiparty conspiracy now complete, his Great Proletarian Cultural Rev-
olution was about to begin.
10

Fractured Rebellion
M AO S CU LT U R A L R EVOLU T ION began with the leadership purges of

May 1966. But what was the Cultural Revolution? In answering
this question, we can only refer to what the Cultural Revolution even-
tually became. Mao appears not to have had a clear plan in mind at the
outset, and he was repeatedly forced to improvise and change course.
At crucial junctures he was frustrated by events and by the behavior of
his loyal subordinates. The struggles that he set in motion repeatedly
moved in directions that he had not anticipated, forcing him to react
and reconsider. Other than the destruction of the national bureaucracy
and the purge of alleged revisionists, it is hard to decide whether the
outcome of the Cultural Revolution was what Mao had in mind. In fact,
it is very hard to say what Mao did have in mind. What the Cultural
Revolution eventually became was probably not anticipated by Mao him-
self, or by anyone else in the party leadership.
From one perspective the Cultural Revolution was a massive purge.
Its explicit purpose was to remove people in authority taking the capi-
talist road, Maoist code for revisionists. Starting with Liu Shaoqi and
Deng Xiaoping at the top, and eventually down to the level of party sec-
retaries of rural communes and state factories, cadres lost their positions
on an enormous scale. As in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s, vast num-
bers were ejected from their posts. In the Soviet Union, those purged
were unfailingly sent to labor camps or executed. In China they might
be imprisoned for a period, sometimes dying in custody or committing
suicide, but the standard treatment was public humiliation and beatings
at the hands of rebel groups, brief imprisonment in makeshift cells, and
later long stints of manual labor in factories or the countryside. Unlike
Fractured Rebellion 201
Stalins victims, the vast majority survived and eventually returned to

ofce.
But the Cultural Revolution was much more than a leadership purge.
A purge removes individuals from ofce while leaving the structure of
ofces intact. The Cultural Revolution aimed at the destruction of the
bureaucratic system that China copied from the Soviet Union. In its place
would be a much simpler network of committees that merged civilian
and military cadres with rebel representatives, working with ofce staffs
that were only a fraction of the size of the former bureaucratic depart-
ments. These were intended to be disciplined political hierarchies, led
by individuals vetted for absolute loyalty to Maos vision, and they were
to administer China in ways that resembled the war time mobilization
against the Nationalists. Eventually, between 70 and90 percent of the
employees of central ministries were sent to rural reeducation centers
known as May 7 Cadre Schools, where they performed manual labor.1
The destruction and rebuilding of Chinas party-state was to be ac-
complished from both above and below. Mao began with a rapid restruc-
turing of power at the apex of the political system, the rst stage of which
was complete by late summer of 1966. The Central Committees estab-
lished structures were gutted by purges and paralyzed, making resistance
nearly impossible. Its bureaucratic departments were downsized and
merged, while decision-making authority was shifted to informal com-
mittees staffed by Mao loyalists who reported directly to him alone. These
informal bodies grew in scope and power as the Cultural Revolution con-
tinued. As the formal bureaucratic structures of the party-state were fur-
ther weakened via purge and dismemberment, they eventually collapsed
and ceased operating. Committees of Mao loyalists at the apex of the
party-state carried out the destruction and dismemberment of the na-
tional bureaucracy, on Maos authority, even though they had no foun-
dation in the party or state constitution.
The other distinctive feature of the Cultural Revolution was the simul-
taneous mobilization of a mass insurgency from below. The insurgency
targeted ofcials at all levels that were deemed insufciently loyal to Mao
Zedong Thought. One of the primary reasons for the initial restructuring
of the organs of national power was to facilitate this popular insurgency
and to steer its activities in directions desired by Mao. On the surface, the
student Red Guard movement that burst onto the scene so dramatically
in August 1966 appeared to be chaotic and disorganized. In fact, it was
202 China Under Mao
monitored and guided by full-time liaison personnel stationed on cam-

puses who reported on local developments while relaying advice, encour-
agement, and instructions to student rebels. These networks of inuence
steered the student movement in the summer and fall of 1966, but as
the manipulation became increasingly obvious it fostered backlash and
divisions.
Restructuring the Apex of National Power
The May 1966 denunciation of the Beijing antiparty clique began a

rolling series of purges that decimated the administrative structures of
the Central Committee and the city of Beijing. By July, all ten Beijing
vice mayors had been removed from ofce, along with all but two mem-
bers of the Beijing Party Secretariat. In October these two were also
purged, and eighty-one department directors or vice directors were im-
prisoned.2 Departments under the Central Committee Secretariat were
dismembered: 234 cadres in the CCP Propaganda Department were re-
moved from ofce, and the department was downsized into an Ofce
for the Propagation of Mao Zedong Thought. The CCP Organization De-
partment was also gutted: its entire leadership was removed in August
and the vast majority of more than 200 staff placed under investigation.3
These changes marked a drastic shift in the structure of national
power. The CCP Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the partys bu-
reaucratic departments in the capital steadily lost power and eventually
ceased to function. A new ad hoc committee, composed of those who
had proven themselves personally loyal to Mao, took over their leading
roles. The Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) was formally es-
tablished at the end of May. Its membership evolved rapidly over the next
year. The key players were familiar gures whose loyalty to Mao was
beyond question, and whose positions depended entirely on Maos pa-
tronage. They were experienced almost exclusively in the eld of pro-
paganda or security, and had distinguished themselves in earlier strug-
gles against liberalization and bourgeois tendencies. None of them were
full members of the Politburo at the time; none of them held positions
that made them responsible for government departments or the economy.4
Initially the CCRG was formally headed by Chen Boda, Maos tutor
in Marxism-Leninism back in the Yanan era and editor of the party
journal Red Flag, which became the mouthpiece of the CCRG and the
authoritative voice of Maos political line. Kang Sheng, who had driven
the partys 1943 rectication campaign to violent excesses and who re-
cently had directed the large writing group that wrote polemics against
Soviet revisionism, was a key advisor. Two important vice heads were
Jiang Qing, Maos wife since 1938, who held no formal party or gov-
ernment position, and Zhang Chunqiao, the director of the Shanghai
Propaganda Department, who had assisted Jiang Qing in her earlier forays
against liberalization in the arts and culture. The other key members
were all ideologues who had distinguished themselves as polemicists or
theorists. This included Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiaos subordinate
in the Shanghai Propaganda Department, and a series of relatively young
gures with histories of collaboration with Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, or
both: Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, and Mu Xin.5
The CCRG became Maos headquarters for conducting a campaign
to attack, downsize, and dismantle the existing party-state. As we shall
see, it was far more effective at destruction than at building new organs
of power. The CCRGs authority depended entirely on Mao, and its ac-
tions were based on their understanding of Maos intentions, which
often shifted and were left vague and unde ned for long periods of time.
Beginning as a writing group of roughly ten individuals, over the next
year it grew rapidly into a small bureaucracy that occupied seven villas
in the Diaoyutai state guest compound on the western edge of Beijing.
It replaced the CCP Secretariat, recently headed by Deng Xiaoping, which
handled the Central Committees day-to-day operations. As the central
bureaucracy of the party-state was decimated by purges and drastically
downsized, the CCRG grew in scale and power.
Unfortunately for Mao, by all accounts the CCRG was a chaotic and
poorly organized entity that was beset by internal con icts and an ob-
vious lack of coordination. Its membership was constantly in ux, and
by January 1967 more than half of the original nineteen members and
advisors had been either purged or otherwise sidelined. Many of the
members were openly antagonistic toward one another, and there were
few clear lines of authority and no division of labor. Moreover, the re-
porting lines to Mao were never formalized. There were no regular
written reports, and Mao received different oral versions of the same
events from different individuals. It did not help that Mao kept himself
aloof, rarely attending meetings, often living in provincial villas far from
Beijing. To make matters even more confusing, neither Chen Boda nor
204 China Under Mao
Jiang Qing convened meetings of the group. Neither were capable or ex-
perienced administrators, and both had erratic and difcult personali-
ties. This responsibility fell to Premier Zhou Enlai, who was not formally
a member of the group. Zhou set the agenda for meetings and could speak
publicly in the name of the CCRG.6 Zhou, however, had very different
political leanings from the radical members, and throughout this period
he tried subtly to blunt the impact of their more destructive initiatives.
The CCRG radicals understood this, viewed Zhou with considerable dis-
trust, and frequently tried to undermine and block him.
In August 1966 Mao reshufed the party leadership, drastically re-
ducing the role and formal rank of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, pro-
moting more senior members of the CCRG, and elevating Lin Biao to
the position of rst party vice chairman and Maos designated successor.
Lin, however, had no taste for civilian administration, and limited him-
self to military matters. Instead, duties formerly handled by Liu Shaoqi
and Deng Xiaoping were handled by Zhou Enlai, who convened an in-
formal central caucus on an irregular basis that assumed the functions
formerly handled by the Politburo Standing Committee and Party Sec-
retariat. Mao and Lin almost never attended.7 These changes evidently
placed Zhou Enlai at the very center of the new structure of power, in
many ways an indispensable cog in the Cultural Revolution power ma-
chine. Zhou had little independent authority, but because virtually all
decisions and their implementation went through his hands, he inu-
enced the course of events.
Also founded during this period and taking on an increasingly im-
portant role was the Central Case Examination Group. It grew out of
the committee set up to investigate the Beijing antiparty group in late
May 1966. Its members included virtually all of the members of the CCRG
and Kang Sheng, along with Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi and
Lin Biaos representative, his wife Ye Qun. The groups purpose was to
investigate, unmask, arrest, and imprison revisionists and traitors in
the CCP. As the purges of the Cultural Revolution expanded, the groups
activities and size also grew. 8
The Central Case Examination Group eventually employed thousands
of staff members who were in charge of scores of investigations into sus-
pected underground traitor groups. They coordinated their work with
quasi-independent mass organizations across China that did local in-
vestigations on their behalf.9 By 1968, a total of eighty-eight members
of the Central Committee were under investigation for suspected

treachery, spying, or collusion with the enemy. The groups activi-
ties spread through a nationwide network of case groups and took on
enormous scope by 1968. In gathering their evidence, the case groups,
especially those at the grass roots, relied heavily on coercive interroga-
tions, employing threats and both mental and physical torture. Seem-
ingly a throwback to the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the key charges
brought against revisionists had little to do with policy positions they had
taken or their public activities. Instead, the victims of these investigations
faced implausible charges of treachery: underground antiparty activity,
spying on behalf of the Nationalists or foreign intelligence ser vices, or
betraying the revolutionary movement before 1949.
Mobilizing Mass Insurgency
The Cultural Revolution also mobilized a mass insurgency that targeted

bureaucratic structures from below. For almost two years, students and
eventually industrial workers were given nearly free rein to form orga-
nizations to criticize and drag out ofcials who, in their view, exhib-
ited tendencies that marked them as revisionists. This aspect of the Cul-
tural Revolution bore a certain resemblance to Maos insistence on
open-door rectication of the party in 1956 and1957. But in 1957 Mao
did not sanction independent organizations, or even the removal of in-
dividual ofcials by the masses. Maos assessment of the party was fun-
damentally different than in 1957, when he believed that well-meaning
criticism by ordinary citizens of individual cadres was sufcient to rec-
tify the partys problems. The threat of evolution toward revisionism was
now so serious, in his view, that only a massive mobilization that cleansed
the party of revisionists, smashed the bureaucratic machinery, and
trained a new generation of revolutionary successors could prevent China
from taking the Soviet road.
The popular insurgency, however, was not left to its own devices. One
of the primary functions of the CCRG was to monitor activities on cam-
puses, instigate and support rebellion, and actively undermine serving
ofcials through back-channel communication and encouragement. The
CCRG attempted to run the mass movement to subvert the established
order in ways reminiscent of the underground communist movement
in areas controlled by the Nationalists before 1949. Its activities in 1966
206 China Under Mao
and1967, however, were much more public and open, even though they
maintained private, even clandestine, links with the more inuential
Red Guard leaders.
These efforts, like the CCRG itself, started out small but grew rap-
idly. They began in June and July 1966 with a small number of junior
CCRG members and related staff, along with a handful of investigative
reporters, who traveled to Beijings college campuses to establish links
with student activists, providing back-channel information and advice.
As the Red Guard movement grew rapidly in August, hundreds of re-
porters from Liberation Army Daily and the New China News Agency were
drafted into roles as liaison personnel and stationed on college campuses
throughout the country; their numbers eventually approached 1,000.
They established relationships with Red Guard leaders, submitted reg-
ular reports to their superiors in Beijing, and in many cases provided
information and advice to student activists about imminent shifts in Cul-
tural Revolution politics. The reports that they submitted to the CCRG
were distilled into the Cultural Revolution Bulletin, of which fewer than
twenty copies were printed and distributed to Mao and a selected group
of other leaders. This served as an alternative source of information to
the more established and widely distributed classied bulletins for the
party elite provided by the New China News Agency, Internal Reference,
which began publishing a supplement titled Cultural Revolution Trends in
August 1966. By November two were issued every day.10
Mao and the CCRG utilized this intelligence network to monitor
trends in the student movement, steer it in desired directions, identify
and promote promising and cooperative student leaders, and warn off
those who were saying and doing things that were not approved. Near
the end of 1966 the network was crucial in identifying dissident Red
Guards who were critical of the CCRG, and in orchestrating their arrest
and denunciation. Some of the liaison personnel became permanent x-
tures on campuses, inserting themselves into the deliberations of the
leading rebel groups, and were treated by them as authoritative sources
of intelligence and advice and as a direct link with the CCRG. As the
CCRG consolidated its links with favored student factions in the nations
capital, the Beijing students in turn established liaison stations in pro-
vincial capitals throughout China, providing advice and direction to local
Red Guards. This added another, more public layer to the CCRGs na-
tional network of inuence. By the fall of 1966 the CCRG regularly in-
vited favored Red Guard leaders for consultations and strategy sessions
held at their Diaoyutai headquarters, and eventually even at the leader-
ship compound of Zhongnanhai or the Great Hall of the People.11
Mao and the CCRG also took a series of highly visible as well as less
obvious, even mundane, measures to facilitate student rebellion. The
mass media consistently encouraged the student rebels, praising them
in an unrestrained fashion. Beginning on August 18, Mao and other
leaders held a series of appearances at gigantic mass rallies held on Tian-
anmen Square, all of which were lavishly covered in the national
media. By the time the last one was held in November of that year, some
12 million people had attended them.12 If students were to devote them-
selves full time to this political campaign, they would obviously have to
set aside their studies. The barriers to political activism evaporated in
mid-June, when all classes were suspended along with nal exams, the
conferral of degrees, job assignments, and college entrance examinations.
Students now had nothing to do except remain on campus and partici-
pate in the campaign. Equally important was an order to keep dormito-
ries and meal ser vices in operation into the summer vacation and be-
yond. In late August two decrees ordered the Public Security Bureau and
armed forces not to interfere in Red Guard activities. These orders were
strictly observed until December 1966, when the security forces were
ordered to move against students who were critical of the CCRG itself.13
Despite all of these measures, the CCRG found the Red Guard move-
ment difcult to control. It repeatedly generated splits and controver-
sies that required their intervention. Through increasingly overt and
heavy-handed manipulation, the CCRG was able to steer the movement
in its desired direction, but its manipulations provoked a backlash. The
opposition became so widespread and troublesome that it provoked a
harsh year-end crackdown by the security forces and a wave of arrests
of dissident Red Guards.
The University Red Guards
Emblematic of the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the Red Guard

movement was the appearance of the rst Marxist-Leninist wall poster
at Peking University, which became famous nationwide as the opening
salvo of the Cultural Revolution. On May 25, 1966, seven instructors of
Marxism-Leninism in Peking Universitys Philosophy Department put
208 China Under Mao
up a wall poster that denounced the universitys president (who was also
party secretary) and two other ofcials as revisionists who were linked
to the Beijing antiparty clique. Their alleged crime was to conspire to
block the free mobilization of the masses and to divert the campaign into
small forums that permitted them to exercise sinister control. Their
behavior showed that they were a bunch of Khrushchev-type revisionist
elements.14
Although this wall poster took on mythical status as the precursor
of the Red Guard movement and made its reputed author a political ce-
lebrity, none of the authors were students, and most were senior party
members. Nie Yuanzi, who became known as the primary author, was
in fact a member of the universitys party committee and general branch
secretary of the Department of Philosophy. In 1966 she was already forty-
ve years old, a revolutionary cadre who left high school during the Japa-
nese invasion to become a party activist in Yanan, and her long history
in the party afforded her extensive elite connections. She was nonethe-
less a likely candidate to denounce her schools party leadership. She and
her allies were among those who attacked the universitys leadership
during the Socialist Education Movement two years before, and they suf-
fered criticism after the campaign reversed direction. She and her col-
leagues were under a political cloud, serving under a party leader they
had tried to overthrow, and many of them were in the midst of arranging
transfers elsewhere.15
The famous wall poster appeared after back-channel encouragement
arranged by Kang Sheng, who sent condential emissaries to Peking Uni-
versity to arrange the denunciation of the universitys leaders. Kangs
emissaries assured them that there would be no repercussions this time
around. The wall poster had its intended effects on the campus commu-
nity, creating an uproar. Kang provided Mao with a copy of the wall
poster, and Mao saw his opportunity: he ordered that it be broadcast na-
tionwide and published in party newspapers throughout the country
along with lavish editorial praise. This sealed the fate of the universitys
leadership. The next day they were publicly denounced and removed
from power and a work team of scores of ranking party ofcials moved
onto the campus to take over from the now-defunct party committee.
The impact was immediate. The work team cooperated with Nie and her
colleagues in a massive purge of the campus hierarchy that essentially
resumed the radical attacks of the earlier Socialist Education Movement.16
Throughout the nations capital, and on campuses across the country,
activist students, political instructors, and party members imitated Nie

Yuanzis group and made similar attacks on their school leaders.
Critics besieged party committees in universities throughout Beijing;
many of them organized emergency meetings, panicked at the prospect
of being dragged into the purges of the Beijing party apparatus. Their
fears were justied: within a week the party secretary of Nanjing Uni-
versity was also denounced and removed from his post. He had incurred
the wrath of students in his humanities division by sending them to a
distant new rural campus to combine study and manual labor, in line
with Maos recent pronouncements about education. But the students
and faculty deeply resented the fact that the science and engineering di-
vision remained in downtown Nanjing. The president stood rm and
tried to silence the critics as anti-Mao, a stance for which he was stripped
of his position and denounced as an arch-revisionist.17
In a seeming replay of the earlier Socialist Education Movement, work
teams were sent into universities and high schools with orders to solicit
mass criticisms and orchestrate purges of grassroots party leaders. They
would be withdrawn in late July, after Mao returned from a long ab-
sence from Beijing to denounce them for suppressing the masses. Mao
blamed Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for this error of line, and the
two were further sidelined as a direct result, the rst step toward po-
litical oblivion as Chinas leading revisionists.18 As the work teams were
withdrawn, they were charged by their opponents, and by some of Maos
radical followers, for attempting to blunt mass mobilization and thereby
protect power holders in the party apparatus. Closer examination of the
actual impact of work teams has shown that they in fact facilitated at-
tacks by students and others that devastated most party organizations,
splitting school authorities and student bodies, pitting them against one
another, inadvertently laying the foundations for subsequent divisions
that would plague the Red Guard movement.19
When work teams entered a university, they faced several choices.
The rst was to leave the party leadership intact and let them conduct
purges of lesser gures. If the work team rejected this approach and forced
the entire party leadership to stand aside, they faced a further choice:
should they selectively purge some while afrming the loyalty of others,
or should they adopt a radical stance and denounce the entire party or-
ganization as rotten to the core? Work teams initially hesitated, but most
of them rapidly shifted to more radical approaches. 20 Each approach,
however, generated opposition and created divisions among students,
210 China Under Mao
party members, and cadres. If the work team left the party leadership
intact, those who criticized the top leaders in imitation of Nie Yuanzi
would suffer retribution. If the work team designated some leaders as
reliable and others as targets of the purge, this split party organizations
and alienated large percentages of the party apparatus and their sup-
porters among students and instructors. If the work team denounced
the entire party apparatus, this alienated large numbers of party mem-
bers and student activists who were tainted by association. Under virtu-
ally all of these scenarios, vocal minorities began to resent work teams
and demand that they be removed or replaced.
Work teams that permitted unrestricted accusations against party au-
thorities also faced another problem: by permitting unrestricted criti-
cism of anyone, work teams inadvertently encouraged students to take
matters violently into their own hands. This raised questions about who
was in charge, and many work teams worried about losing control of
the forces that they had unleashed. When work teams responded to vi-
olence by attempting to control student activists, they bred antagonism
among some of the more militant students, who resented attempts to
suppress them.
These problems were illustrated by events at Peking University on
June 18, less than three weeks after the work team arrived. The work
team absorbed Nie Yuanzis group of dissidents and proceeded with a
purge of the entire party organization. They targeted prominent admin-
istrators and faculty for impure class origins, foreign connections, and
anyone who sided with the former university president in earlier po-
litical battles. By early July only one of the twenty party general branch
secretaries was spared from the purge Nie Yuanzi herself. Fewer than
8 percent of the schools cadres were found to be free of political error;
two-thirds were found to have committed errors serious enough to be
removed from their posts. 21
The work team soon found it difcult to control the students. The
unfolding of the campaign at Peking University was a shocking contrast
to the brief Hundred Flowers period less than a decade before. In 1957
students mobilized to put up critical wall posters, but their intentions
were very different. They protested the imposition of authoritarian party
rule and the unthinking dogmatism inspired by Stalinist doctrine, and
they demanded greater freedom of thought and expression. Some of them
even criticized the personality cult formed around Mao Zedong. In line
with its liberal tradition going back to the May Fourth Movement of 1919,
Peking University students were at the forefront of a growing campaign
to have China follow the liberalizing tendencies in the Soviet bloc.
What a difference a decade had made. Now the schools student
activistslike their counterparts on campuses across the countryvied
with one another to demonstrate their mettle as militant and dogmati-
cally unthinking enforcers of proletarian dictatorship. They went after
faculty with foreign educations or with liberal reputations, many of
whom were earlier the targets of the thought reform and antirightist
campaigns. They also went after party ofcials who in their view facili-
tated the inuence of these alien class elements.
Even more striking than this narrow-minded dogmatism was the pro-
pensity of student activists to engage in harsh and extreme denuncia-
tion coupled with personal cruelty and physical violence. During prolif-
erating struggle sessions, which consciously imitated the ritualized
humiliations meted out to landlords and other class enemies during rev-
olutionary land reform and other political campaigns, student activists
made the accused wear tall hats and hung heavy placards around their
necks. Their targets were subjected to screaming accusations and insults,
shoved about violently, their hair pulled, and their arms extended pain-
fully behind them while kneeling in the jet plane position. In some
cases they were beaten severely. At Peking University, which was by no
means unusual in this regard, the work team recorded 178 cadres,
teachers, and students who were treated in this manner by mid-June,
leading to a series of suicides.
The work team nally took a stand against unrestricted violence on
June 18, when a series of violent struggle sessions broke out across the
campus. Close to seventy cadres and faculty members were dragged onto
makeshift platforms, faces smeared with black ink, and were beaten,
kicked, and subjected to shouted accusations. Particularly disturbing were
reports that two female ofcials had their clothes partially stripped off
and were humiliated by a young man who groped their genitals. Most
of the victims were members of the schools party committee or were
lower-ranking general branch and branch secretaries. The work team
sent members across the campus to halt the violence and give the vic-
tims rst aid.22
The work team denounced the violence and sent a report to the Party
Secretariat (still functioning under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping)
212 China Under Mao
condemning this June 18 incident. The report was transmitted to

party committees nationwide two days later as a Central Committee doc-
ument, with the comment that the work teams actions were correct and
timely. Armed with this new directive, work teams throughout the
country cracked down on students who refused to conform. Students
who persisted in violent activities in deance of work teams were sin-
gled out, criticized, and detained. Those who resisted the authority of
work teams were warned to desist and threatened with punishment.
Those who called for the withdrawal of the work team, or who de-
manded that students and faculty should themselves be responsible for
their own Cultural Revolution, might be subjected to criticism sessions
and accused of antiparty activity. During the brief campaign to reassert
work team authority, a signicant minority of work team opponents
in virtually every school were criticized, sometimes given stigmatizing
political labels, and had their names recorded by work teams, who kept
records on troublemakers.23
It was this document and the campaign to consolidate work team
authority that gave Mao the pretext to return to Beijing in mid-July
and angrily denounce the work teams and Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaopingfor suppressing the student movement and instituting dic-
tatorship on college campuses. Mao ignored the fact that most work
teams had prosecuted his campaign against campus revisionism with
extraordinary thoroughness, and he showed no concern whatsoever for
the widespread violence that served as the cause of the work teams back-
lash against selected campus militants. Mao ordered all work teams to
be withdrawn at the end of July; henceforth campuses would conduct
the campaign on their own.24
Mao presumably intended that with the work teams properly de-
nounced and withdrawn, student militants would unite in a common
assault on school ofcials. This did not happen, because the student
movement was deeply divided from the very start. Mao had failed to con-
sider the fact that most work teams permitted virtually unfettered at-
tacks on school party organizations. This appealed to the majority of stu-
dent militants on campuses, who formed close relationships with their
radical work teams and who supported the backlash against the minority
of activists who challenged work team authority. When work teams with-
drew, the students who had cooperated with work teams, a solid ma-
jority, assumed control of campuses and proceeded to organize elections
for campus Cultural Revolution committees, which they naturally ended

up dominating.
This laid the foundations for deep and enduring splits. Students who
had clashed with work teams many of them punished as a result
demanded that the campaign shift its focus from school authorities to
the work teams. They charged that the students who cooperated with
work teams were complicit with an attempt to suppress rebellion, and
therefore had no right to lead their schools cultural revolution. They de-
manded that work team members return to campus for struggle sessions
and confess to their crimes of trying to suppress revolutionary masses.
The majority of student activists, however, saw these charges as a
scarcely veiled accusation against them. They felt justied in claiming
that they had cooperated with purges coordinated by radical work teams,
that the disgruntled minority was exaggerating the errors of work teams
and distorting their record. The disgruntled minority implied that the
majority of students were revisionist, or conservative, while the ma-
jority implied that the minority deserved the treatment they received,
and were only interested in clearing their records. During the month of
August, universities were roiled with vociferous debates between stu-
dents in these two camps, which sometimes degenerated into brawls.
As Red Guard organizations formed, these two groups generated splits
on almost all campuses into majority and minority factions.25
Majority factions took control of their campuses and, to demonstrate
their militant credentials, organized struggle sessions and herded the ac-
cused into makeshift cells and labor reform brigades that dug ditches
or cleaned latrines. Minority factions, instead, wanted to keep the focus
on the errors of the work team and challenged the validity of elections
that brought majority factions to power. If Mao and the CCRG had in-
tended to inspire a huge upsurge of student activism that would carry
on the rebellion against revisionism, they were sorely disappointed. From
the very outset, the university Red Guards were at cross-purposes, pre-
occupied with ghting one another.
The High School Red Guards
The student rebels in the high schools were initially much more promi-
nent than their university counterparts and received fulsome public
praise from Mao. The rst student organization to adopt the name Red
214 China Under Mao
Guard (hongweibing) was reportedly founded at Tsinghua University High

School near the end of May 1966. The students in that organization strug-
gled with the schools authorities over their right to form the organiza-
tion, and later struggled with the schools work team over the same issue.
They put up wall posters challenging the work team and drafted several
essays expressing their spirit of rebellion. A parallel struggle was under
way at Peking University High School, where another progenitor of the
Red Guard movement, which called itself Red Flag Battle Group, chal-
lenged the work team sent to their school.
Shortly after work teams were withdrawn, Mao and the CCRG went
out of their way to draw attention to these two student organizations
and lavish them with praise. At forums held with high school leaders,
Jiang Qing and other ofcials praised these groups and welcomed their
leaders to share the stage and microphone. Mao read the students es-
says and responded enthusiastically. He wrote to them on August 1, af-
rming that their wall posters were revolutionary, and he applauded
their militant stand. He ordered that two of their posters, along with his
letter, be reprinted and circulated to all participants at the partys Elev-
enth Plenum, which began in early August. Mao also took the opportu-
nity to express his support for Peking University High School Red Flag.
Maos public message read, in part, Your two wall posters . . . express
anger and condemnation toward the oppression of workers, peasants,
revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary parties and groups by land-
lords, capitalists, imperialists, revisionists, and their running dogs. This
shows that it is right to rebel against reactionaries, and I express to you
my enthusiastic support.26
In the wake of this praise, Mao invited some 1,500 students onto the
reviewing stands for the gigantic Red Guard rally on Tiananmen Square
on August 18. More than twenty members of the Tsinghua High School
Red Guards received invitations. When they met Mao and identied
themselves, Mao responded, I resolutely support you! The encounter
was described a few days later in the Peoples Daily. At that rally, Mao
was presented with a Red Guard armband by a student leader from Bei-
jing Normal Girls High School who had penned the rst wall poster
at her school. A famous photograph of her on the Tiananmen rostrum
tting the armband onto a smiling Mao Zedong was carried on the front
page of newspapers nationwide. In the days to come, the national media
published excerpts from the speeches and wall posters of these high
school militants.27
These student rebels, in line with the denunciation of revisionists in

the party leadership, took a militant stance on the partys class line in
education. This involved a marked emphasis on political indoctrination,
an emphasis on class origin and political activism in school admissions,
and a criticism of an overly narrow focus on academic excellence and
performance on examinations. This message was highly congenial to
the rst wave of high school Red Guards, most of whom came from
households of party members and revolutionary cadres. The early
stars of the Red Guard movement from Peking University High School,
Tsinghua High School, and Beijing Normal Girls High School were all
from ofcial families that carried the revolutionary designation, and
they were proud of their backgrounds. Trouble began, however, with the
circulation of a derogatory rhyme, a couplet (duilian) that praised students
of revolutionary parentage and denigrated those from bad family ori-
gins. This led to the rst major divisions among high school Red Guards.
The offending couplet declared that the son of a hero is a real man;
the son of a reactionary is a bastard. The authors defended it as an
expression of the partys class line, but many students found it offensive
because it suggested that the children of revolutionaries were a heredi-
tary political aristocracy, assumed to be red by birth, and that others
were damned at birth, regardless of their actual loyalties. The couplet
also offended those from proletarian and peasant backgrounds whose
parents were not revolutionary heroes. Not surprisingly, many students
began to criticize the couplet as immature and self-defeating. Arguments
over the issue escalated into violence among Red Guards at neighbor-
hood rallies in early August, when students fought over control of a mi-
crophone, leading to beatings and a stabbing.28
Members of the CCRG worried that arguments over the couplet would
divide and weaken the student movement just as it was getting started.
Several members of the group urged students to set the issue aside. Fig-
ures like Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng offered less offensive versions of
the couplet and tried without success to clarify the question of how class
analysis could justify inherited political status, and how to weigh actual
political loyalty against family background.29 These efforts to explain
ner distinctions of party doctrine regarding political labels did little to
quell the controversy.
A more serious issue, and one that led to the rst clear factional split
in the high school movement, was the problem of student violence. A
wave of violence swept through high schools and city neighborhoods as
216 China Under Mao
soon as the work teams were withdrawn. High school students seized
party secretaries, principals, teachers, and classmates on their campuses
and subjected them to violent beatings, leading to a number of murders
and suicides.30 High school militants also poured off their campuses to
attack individuals in targeted categories. In public parks and historic sites
they held struggle sessions against ofcials in educational and youth
league ofces, prominent novelists, playwrights, and Beijing Opera per-
formers, beating them severely with sts and belts. Red Guards roamed
the citys residential streets, terrorizing members of reactionary
households, invading their homes, and subjecting the occupants to vio-
lent struggle sessions. During this period, Red Guards issued handbills
that ordered black class households to turn over their property to the
Public Security Bureau and leave the city immediately.
Members of these households assembled on high school grounds and
in neighborhood parks for struggle sessions and beatings. Processions of
victims being driven through the streets in the backs of trucks were a
common sight. In the month following the rst Tiananmen rally on Au-
gust 18, 114,000 homes in Beijing were searched, and44.8 million yuan
of foreign currency, gold, and other valuables were conscated, along
with more than 2.3 million books and3.3 million paintings, art objects,
and pieces of furniture. In the Western District, the books, paintings,
scrolls, and other items conscated from 1,061 homes were set ablaze
and burned for eight days and nights. During this period, 77,000 people
were expelled from their homes in Beijing. The violence crested during
the last week of August, when an average of more than 200 people were
dying every day. The ofcial Beijing death toll for the four weeks after
mid-August is 1,772.31
The rst public objection to these trends came from the Tsinghua High
School Red Guards, the group credited with founding the Red Guard
movement and praised by Mao in early August. They expressed alarm
about the wave of violence that swept over the city and issued an Ur-
gent Appeal that denounced bastards and incompetents who in the
name of the Red Guard movement were going around everywhere
beating people up . . . carrying on like gangsters. The appeal demanded
that genuine leftist organizations be formed in schools to control
gangster-like behavior. Those who committed such acts should be ex-
pelled from Red Guard organizations.32
The appeal fell on deaf earsunlike the earlier wall posters, this doc-
ument was not publicized in the mass media and the wave of violence
and terror crested in late August. The Tsinghua High School Red Guards
later issued an assessment of the Red Guard movement that lamented
the utter disregard for human life of so many students, and argued
that this was the behavior that one expected from fascists, not the be-
havior of genuine red guards from the ve-red classes.33
Mao, unfortunately, did not agree. Student calls to curtail violence
ran directly counter to his view, shared by key gures in the CCRG, that
violence was an inevitable feature of rebellion, and the suffering of vic-
tims was acceptable collateral damage. Top ofcials were privately in-
formed of the violent course of the movement, but they essentially re-
acted with a shrug.34
From the outset of the student movement, Jiang Qing clearly signaled
to student activists that violence against victims would not be consid-
ered a serious transgression. In one of her rst speeches to the high school
Red Guards on July 28, she said:
We dont fear chaos. Chaos and order are inseparable. . . . We dont ad-
vocate beating people, but beating people is no big deal. . . . You cant
beat someones mistaken thoughts out of them, but for beatings to occur
during a revolutionary outburst is not a bad thing. Chairman Mao has
said, If good people beat bad people, it serves them right; if bad people
beat good people, the good people achieve glory; if good people beat good
people, its a misunderstanding; without beatings you dont get ac-
quainted and then wont need to beat them anymore.
The Red Guard Urgent Appeal about violence was issued one week
later. Jiang Qing did not initially object to it, but her attitude soon
changed. She became convinced that more moderate gures in the lead-
ership were too enthusiastic about its message, seeing it as a pretext for
quelling the student rebellion. Mao shared this view. He had been com-
pletely indifferent to the work teams role in restraining student violence,
and he was unwilling to let the same considerations place any restric-
tions on student rebellion. Near the height of violence on August 23, at
a meeting with members of the Politburo Standing Committee, he ex-
pressed his impatience over the issue: I dont think Beijing is all that
chaotic. . . . Beijing is too civilized, hooligans are only a minority, now
is not the time to interfere . . . rushing to make decisions, getting all
worked up. Rushing to struggle against leftists . . . rushing to issue ur-
gent appeals. Xie Fuzhi, minister of public security, mirrored Maos at-
titude. At the late August meeting where he directed neighborhood po-
lice stations to assist Red Guards in identifying reactionary households,
218 China Under Mao
Xie said, I dont approve of the masses killing people, but the masses
bitter hatred toward bad people cannot be discouraged, and its unavoid-
able. This attitude was translated into ofcial directives on August 21
and22, relayed nationwide: local army units and bureaus of public se-
curity were strictly prohibited from taking any action to restrict Red
Guards.
Given Maos attitude, restrictions on Red Guard violence would have
to be self-imposed.35 The effort to organize self-policing bred a deep split
among high school Red Guards and fed into broader divisions in the Red
Guard movement. Here is one of the rst of many instances when Zhou
Enlai tried to limit damage from the campaign. In late August a group
called the Western District Picket Corps announced its formation. One
of the founders of the group was the son of one of Zhou Enlais subor-
dinates in his State Council ofce. While there is no direct evidence that
Zhou instigated the groups formation, the connection seems more than
coincidental, given the groups stance and the organized support that
Zhou quickly provided for it. This was the rst cross-campus alliance of
Red Guard organizations.
The Picket Corps dictated a set of ground rules that insisted on non-
violent struggle: In the Cultural Revolution from this point forward it
is absolutely forbidden to beat people, absolutely forbidden to physically
abuse them either openly or in a disguised manner; absolutely forbidden
to humiliate people, absolutely forbidden to extract forced confessions a
prohibition that applied without exception, even to people who had
already been determined to be counterrevolutionaries. They provided
explicit detail about what they meant by physical abuse: kneeling, lying
at, bending at the waist, carry ing a heavy weight, standing for long
periods, keeping hands raised for long periods, keeping heads bowed for
long period, etc., all are open or disguised forms of physical abuse and
are not methods of struggle that we should use. The forbidden forms of
humiliation included hanging signboards [from the neck], wearing a
tall hat, being made to sing chants, shaving heads, etc. What did they
mean by forced confessions? Failing to stress investigation and re-
search, failing to stress facts and evidence, readily believing confessions,
having blind faith in confessions, using a combination of violence and
threats to force a confession, and then believing the confession.
Because he was unable to use regular police forces, the Picket Corps
became Zhous primary instrument of control. He established a direct
line of communication with the Red Guard pickets through the Ofce of
the State Council, and he assigned members of his own State Council
ofce staff to communicate with the groups. Zhou invited members of
the Picket Corps onto the rostrum during subsequent rallies at Tiananmen
Square. He met with their leaders and had his assistants provide them
with ofce space, funds, uniforms, means of transportation, and printing
facilities. Their handbills were professionally printed in large runs at the
State Councils printing plant.
The Picket Corps would not last long. In carry ing out their duties,
they collided with a new campaign by minority faction rebels from the
universities, who invaded government ofces to capture the leaders of
their schools work teams and subject them to struggle sessions. This drew
the Picket Corps into an implicit alliance with the university majority
factions, and led to strong countermeasures by the CCRG to realign and
redirect the Red Guard movement. It also put these students on a colli-
sion course with the CCRG.
The Rise of the Rebels
Minority factions in the universities were on the defensive everywhere

in August and September. Unable to control the debate on their cam-
puses, they took their cause off campus. The pioneers of this tactic were
the minority factions of two important schools: Aeronautics Institute Red
Flag, which staged a daring and prolonged sit-in strike at the gates of
the Ministry of Defense, and Geology Institute East Is Red, which dem-
onstrated repeatedly at the ofces of the Ministry of Geology, eventu-
ally invading the building and occupying it.36
Aeronautics Institute Red Flag began their sit-in at the Ministry of
Defense on August 26in an effort to get the head of their schools work
team to return to the university to face their accusations. For obvious
reasons the ofcial balked at being taken into custody, and the sit-in con-
tinued through mid-September, when Zhou Enlai tried unsuccessfully
to resolve the standoff. Geology Institute East Is Red took parallel ac-
tion beginning on August 23 when it sent roughly a thousand of its
members to the Ministry of Geology to get their work team head, a
ranking ofcial in the ministry, to accompany them back for a denun-
ciation meeting. The ofcial understandably refused their invitation,
and the group sent demonstrators to the ministry on two subsequent
220 China Under Mao
occasions, eventually invading and occupying the ministry ofces on

September 19.
These actions attracted the attention of the CCRG, which saw them
as a way to break out of the impasse created by the majority-minority
split. It now seemed possible to propel university Red Guards into at-
tacks on government ministries to drag out the ofcials who staffed
work teams and, inevitably, higher-ranking revisionist ofcials who
had sent them. Up to this point the CCRG had tried, without success, to
get the university Red Guards to unite and carry on with the Cultural
Revolution, but in viewing these new developments they reformulated
their strategy and openly supported the minority faction against their
opponents.
Here is where the newly formed high school Picket Corps blundered
into the middle of the split in the university movement, becoming a
stumbling block to the designs of the CCRG.37 The Picket Corps idolized
the Peoples Liberation Army, whose legendary discipline was their model
for restrained Red Guard behavior. They were outraged by protests out-
side the PLA headquarters at the Ministry of Defense. They were also
opposed to the violence that would undoubtedly be meted out in the
struggle sessions to which the minority faction rebels intended to sub-
ject work team ofcials. In their rst public act on August 31, only six
days after their founding statement, a detachment of the Western Dis-
trict Picket Corps showed up at the Aeronautics Institute Red Flag sit-in
at the ministry gates, now in its second week. They tried to forcibly dis-
lodge the protesters, but were repelled.
An even more dramatic confrontation occurred at the Ministry of
Geology on September 7, where the Geology Institute East Is Red was
in the third day of their most recent protest at the ministry ofces. When
they arrived and demanded the surrender of the work team head on Sep-
tember 5, the Western District Pickets were called in. They surrounded
the university students and waded into their sit-in, whipping them with
belts and throwing bricks. They seized several protesters and roughed
them up; afterward they issued handbills denouncing their attack on the
ministry.
It was now evident that the Red Guard movement was hopelessly split,
and the progress of the CCRGs rebellion was being blocked. The minority
factions, whose new forays the CCRG heartily approved, already had to
deal with more powerful opponents on their campuses. Now, it appeared,
they were being confronted by the rst organized cross-school alliance

of high school Red Guards, who were standing in the way of these new
assaults on the party-state bureaucracy. To make matters worse, the Red
Guard pickets had obvious support from Zhou Enlai and others in the
party leadership who were appalled at Red Guard violence, and they were
quickly becoming a formidable force, circumventing the prohibition
against action by police and army units.
Under Maos direction, the CCRG initiated a series of countermoves
that reshaped and redirected the student movement, openly taking sides
in the student splits.38 If the insurgency was to succeed, it needed a cross-
campus alliance and the clear backing of the CCRG. It had both by the
end of September, and by mid-October it was routing its opponents. Their
alliance, founded September 6, became known as the Third Headquar-
ters. Up to this point, the CCRG had expressed evenhanded support for
the Red Guard movement and had repeatedly called for warring students
to unite. They now abandoned this stance and took a direct hand in
shaping the movements direction with a wholehearted endorsement of
the minority factions, signaled in meetings with Red Guards.
After these meetings, Mao decided to openly favor the minority camp.
On September 21, the day after the meetings concluded, the CCRG met
with leaders of Aeronautics Institute Red Flag and expressed support for
their protest at the Ministry of Defense. They ordered the work team
head to surrender to the students. That same week the Geology Insti-
tute East Is Red protesters surged through the doors of the Ministry of
Geology and raided the ofces where the work teams les were kept.
They broke open the cabinets and carted off the les compiled on the
student opposition. They returned to the Geology Institute to seize power
from the majority faction on September 23. A massive brawl over con-
trol of the campus broadcasting system left more than 100 injured. News
of CCRG support for the minority faction spread quickly, and minority
factions across the city seized control of their campus broadcasting sys-
tems. The tide was turning.
The shift in CCRG support for the new rebel coalition was publicized
by a mass rally of the Third Headquarters on September 26. Zhou Enlai
spoke, af rming Maos support for the minority factions struggle, and
calling for the rehabilitation of all those in the minority faction who had
been labeled antiparty. Addressing one of their core concerns (and no
doubt trying to lessen their incentive to further attack ministries in
222 China Under Mao
searches for their work team leaders), he announced that all black ma-
terials collected on these individuals would be removed from their les.
The shift in direction was signaled by the rise of a new group of Red
Guard leaders. Most striking was the sudden elevation of Tsinghua Uni-
versitys Kuai Dafu, who was a minor gure in his schools large mi-
nority faction. Kuais claim to fame was that he had earlier clashed pub-
licly with party vice chairman Bo Yibo and had lodged accusations against
Liu Shaoqis wife, Wang Guangmei, who took part in Tsinghuas work
team.39 Despite his notoriety, Kuai remained a minor gure in Tsing-
huas minority faction, whose leaders considered him too mercurial and
reckless to be taken seriously.
Reckless and mercurial, however, was exactly what the CCRG wanted.
Kuais clashes with Bo Yibo and Wang Guangmei motivated him to at-
tack top leaders, and he had shown a willingness to confront virtually
anyone. The CCRG intended to steer the student movement into attacks
on Liu Shaoqi, and Kuai was clearly the man for the job. Zhang Chun-
qiao invited Kuai for an individual session on September 23, encouraging
him to start a new rebel organization and assuring him of CCRG sup-
port. The next day Kuai announced the establishment of his new rebel
organization, and he and his group began a rapid ascent to the top of
the rebel movement.
The October Turning Point
The decisive shift in support for the Third Headquarters was expressed
in an authoritative commentary published in Red Flag on October 3. The
editorial laid out a new denition of the immediate aims of the Cultural
Revolution and pronounced a new verdict on the events of the previous
four months. The work teams errors were part of a bourgeois reac-
tionary line that was manipulated from above by ofcials who opposed
Mao and tried to obstruct the Cultural Revolution. The two-line struggle
has by no means concluded, the editorial intoned, and it followed that
there were even higher ofcials in the state hierarchy who had master-
minded the conspiracy.40
To ensure that ofcials nationwide understood the new line, Mao
convened a Central Party Work Conference during the last three weeks
of October. One of the highlights of the conference was a report by Chen
Boda revised repeatedly by Mao beforehand that summarized the
movements progress. Chen described a two-line struggle over the Cul-
tural Revolution. He charged that ofcials and certain Red Guards tried
to impede the campaign and divert its course. Refuting criticisms of Red
Guard violence, he denied that they were acting recklessly and that
they were opportunists joining up with careerists, thugs, brutal savages.
Chen also attacked Red Guards who had defended their work teams,
insinuating that their reactionary stance was due to arrogance about
their revolutionary cadre parentage.41 Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping
were blamed for this reactionary line. They were further demoted in the
party hierarchy.42
Now the student movement was directed to criticize ofcials who had
engaged in this bourgeois reactionary lineanyone who had tried to di-
vert, moderate, or suppress student activism in any form. It was obvious
from Chen Bodas speech that this included any effort to restrict Red
Guard actions on the pretext of preventing violence. It was also obvious
that Red Guards who had collaborated with work teams and who de-
fended them afterward, and Red Guards who had organized to prevent
beatings and murders, were complicit in this reactionary line. They were
at minimum conservative and arguably reactionary. In one stroke, stu-
dent activists who were at the vanguard of the movement in August were
shunted aside and stigmatized.
Majority factions who had up to this point defended their positions
became demoralized and lost inuence within their schools. Their ef-
forts to form cross-campus alliances collapsed. In Beijing and across
China, the term Red Guard, while never completely disappearing,
seemed increasingly tied to the bourgeois reactionary line. The term
rebel (zaofan pai) became more popular as a name for student organi-
zations, indicating a break with the rst Red Guards who had run afoul
of the CCRG. Mao and the party center had now spoken: these earlier
Red Guards had collaborated with the bourgeois reactionary line, and
they had better align themselves with the new direction of the rebel
movement. In Beijing the reaction was immediate: the city quickly ex-
perienced a massive wave of invasions of government ministries as mi-
nority factions attacked in search of work team leaders and les. Liaison
stations of minority factions in other major cities transmitted the new
direction to local Red Guard organizations, encouraging attacks on of-
cials at the provincial and city level.
The high school Picket Corps also fell into disarray. Now that their
stance was clearly repudiated by Mao, Zhou Enlai backed away from
them, and their support from the Ofce of the State Council. Given the
224 China Under Mao
obvious indifference and seemingly tacit approval of Mao and other

leaders to the beating and murder of victims, some of the former mem-
bers broke off into small groups that committed such acts themselves.
As a coordinated citywide organization, the Picket Corps ceased to exist,
but campus-level groups maintained their cohesion and identity for many
weeks to come. Some, including many of the early stars of the Red Guard
movement, would mount a last-ditch effort to resist, an effort that led
to a daring and ill-fated confrontation with the CCRG.
Now that the CCRG had intervened to create a new alliance and
rescue the minority faction from oblivion, they inevitably created a rebel
movement that depended heavily on their patronage and took orders
from above. The ties between the CCRG and the rebels became more ex-
plicit and formally organized. Student leaders in the new rebel alliance
were granted the funds and resources they needed to conduct the move-
ment, and they were integrated more rmly into the growing CCRG net-
works. CCRG members visited campuses and attended rallies to make
speeches and instruct student leaders and activists. Liaison personnel
relayed CCRG instructions and outright orders to favored student leaders
and, if necessary, backed them up with threats. In the coming months,
rebel leaders looked to these encounters for validation of their course of
action and guidance about what to do next.43
The Red Guard Backlash and Its Suppression
Former leaders of the now-disgraced majority faction and the high school
students who had tried to contain Red Guard violence now found them-
selves labeled as dupes of a bourgeois reactionary line. Some of them
began to ght back, and they crafted a campaign through wall posters,
handbills, and in some cases new cross-campus alliances that imitated
the minority factions earlier campaign against the work teams. They
turned the campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line against the
CCRG itself, charging it with manipulating the student movement, sup-
pressing points of view with which they disagreed, and suppressing those
who dared criticize them. Their campaign roiled several college cam-
puses, leading to emotional debates, wall posters attacking the CCRG,
and increasingly brazen challenges to CCRG authority. Adherents of
the newly anointed rebel faction expressed outrage at the temerity of the
dissidents in challenging the sacrosanct authority of the CCRG. The dis-
sident campaign began in mid-November and grew bolder by the week,

leading to a CCRG crackdown on dissent that signaled the end of the
Red Guard movement as an independent political force.
One center of the campaign was at the Beijing Aeronautics Institute,
whose majority-faction Red Guards complained that the CCRG ignored
them and brushed them aside as revisionist.44 They likened their treat-
ment to that of the minority faction under the work teams and portrayed
the CCRG as disdainful of mass opinions, bureaucratic, and manipula-
tive, a suppression of mass activism characteristic of the bourgeois reac-
tionary line. As one of their wall posters put it, It seems as if those who
constantly say they want to criticize the bourgeois reactionary line still
havent recognized what was reactionary about it. . . . The likes of Guan
Feng and Qi Benyu, full of bureaucratic airs, simply cannot represent
Chairman Mao. As the campaign escalated, the dissident students chal-
lenged the actions of the CCRG itself, pointing out that its activities looked
suspiciously like an underground party faction that was engaged in a
conspiracy to throw the country and party into disorder. Their most in-
cendiary wall poster, appearing in mid-December, essentially accused
the CCRG of posing as leftists in order to engineer a coup.
Majority faction leaders echoed these challenges to the CCRG on other
campuses. One former Red Guard leader at the Forestry Institute circu-
lated a wall poster titled Kick Aside the CCRG and Make Revolution
on Your Own, employing the same slogan that the minority faction had
earlier used against work teams. He pointed out that the CCRG had no
standing in the party or state constitution, and that no one had ever stated
that they would be exempt from criticism. As he put it, Members of
the CCRG just sit at the upper levels, acting like bureaucrats and
overlords. . . . [They] y about like imperial envoys, spewing all kinds of
verbiage, making all kinds of confused statements. Leaders speeches
are cherished like life itself, treated like precious treasures. . . . China
can be led only by Chairman Mao. Anything else you can doubt,
doubt everything.
These sentiments also appeared in wall posters and debates on high
school campuses. More noteworthy, however, was the attempt by some
of the original Red Guards at Peking University High School and Tsinghua
High School to form an orga ni zation to coordinate resistance, calling
it United Action (liandong). Among its founders were the same students
who had issued the Urgent Appeal against Red Guard violence back
226 China Under Mao
in August, many of whom had appeared on the rostrum with Mao at the
rst Red Guard rally on August 18. These students now openly expressed
their opposition to the CCRG. They rst met to pull together a cross-
school alliance of like-minded students from high schools in the Haidian
district on November 27, and issued their founding declaration on
December 5.45
This campaign had par ticular resonance at Peking University, where
Nie Yuanzi still claimed absolute authority over the movement in her
school, buttressed by Maos praise of her revolutionary wall poster. Nie
considered herself politically untouchable, and in many ways she was.
The campaign against the bourgeois reactionary line, however, had un-
settling implications for Nie and her followers. Nie and her group had
cooperated actively with her universitys work team, and they had never
led a resistance movement to drive it away, as did minority factions on
other campuses. Nie had tried to exercise absolute control over her
schools Red Guard movement as it emerged in August and September.
She issued orders as if her authority was unchallengeable, leading to re-
sistance by Red Guard militants who demanded autonomy. Displaying
a pronounced authoritarian streak, she accused rebellious students of
political crimesto oppose her, she claimed, was to oppose the CCRG.
This alienated large percentages of Red Guards at her school, driving
many of her original supporters including most of the coauthors of
the famous wall poster into the opposition. Alienated rebels at Pe-
king University echoed attacks on the CCRG as a weapon in their re-
bellion against Nie.46
The attempt to manipulate the student movement had touched off
an intense backlash. The effort to mold the student rebellion into an obe-
dient instrument of elite Maoists was being openly challenged, and Maos
trusted representatives were now openly mocked. Rebellion against the
CCRG, however, was not to be tolerated. By mid-December the CCRG
ordered a counterattack. It began with the publication of an editorial in
the December 13 issue of Red Flag, which charged that the dissident cam-
paign was an attack on the genuine left instigated by a small group of
capitalist roaders.47 The editorial called for exercising proletarian dic-
tatorship over class enemies.
This ushered in the ironic transformation of the new rebel faction,
born as a protest movement against the dictatorial practices of the work
teams, into enthusiastic proponents of proletarian dictatorship. On De-
cember 14, the CCRG met with rebel leaders who peppered them with
questions about how to handle the dissident challenge. Kang Sheng told
them, We must carry out severe suppression of counterrevolutionaries,
this is the greatest form of democracy. . . . We must carry out dictator-
ship over counterrevolutionary elements. . . . Only revolutionaries have
freedom of speech.
An even more dramatic demonstration of the CCRG backlash was a
December 16 mass meeting of high school activists, where Jiang Qings
speech set the tone for a new campaign against the high school Picket
Corps. These so-called picket corps had a small group of little kids
carry ing out the bourgeois reactionary line. . . . Their aristocratic arro-
gance, thinking that their bloodline is so noble, treating others so rudely
what nonsense! Jiang then made a remarkable charge, openly de-
nouncing the ofcials who worked under Zhou Enlai to organize and
supply the Picket Corps. Jiang Qing charged that the Picket Corps were
themselves responsible for the cruelty and violence of the Red Guard
movement: We must resolutely carry out dictatorship over this small
group of criminals who murder, beat people, sabotage the revolution.
In Jiangs distortion of recent history, the Picket Corps was a violent gang
of reactionary murderers who received backstage support from ofcials
who were pursing their bourgeois reactionary line to block Maos Cul-
tural Revolution. The students did so, she claimed, because they had
aristocratic backgrounds due to their parents revolutionary heritage,
and their violence was a desperate attempt to protect their privileges.
The rebels now understood what was expected and a wave of repres-
sion followed. Rebel students seized dissident Red Guards on their
campuses and turned them over to public security agencies. In January
1967, Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi claimed that the Cultural
Revolution had entered a new stage, and those currently being arrested
under newly tightened public security regulations were counterrevolu-
tionaries. Public security ofcers fanned out across the city to arrest
dissident students, putting the captives in handcuffs, and then paraded
them through the city streets on the back of a truck like convicted
criminals, accompanied by throngs of students from the rebel faction
who chanted slogans as the procession worked its way downtown.
The CCRG felt compelled to build an elaborate public justication
for their actions. Their denunciation campaign completely ignored the
dissidents criticisms, focusing instead on the allegedly violent and
228 China Under Mao
reactionary nature of the Picket Corps and United Action. Both were
singled out as neofascist organizations that sought to defend the resto-
ration of capitalism. They were part of an alleged conspiracy orches-
trated by the State Council ofcials who had assisted the Picket Corps,
and through them in unspecied ways were linked to Liu Shaoqi and
Deng Xiaoping. Zhou Enlai, who actually directed these efforts and was
directly implicated, escaped untouched.
The shrillness of the campaign was undoubtedly due to two incon-
venient facts: many of the leaders of the Picket Corps and United Action
were once nationally celebrated Red Guards, and they were the only stu-
dents ever to have taken a public stand against Red Guard violence a
stand rejected by Mao and the CCRG. The campaign diverted attention
from the CCRGs responsibility for violence by permitting them to pose
as champions of nonviolence. The tone of the denunciation campaign,
which was publicized nationwide, was reected in ofcial pamphlets:
It is not at all surprising that United Action elements furiously car-
ried out the bourgeois reactionary line. United Action is now behaving
crudely, like mad dogs. Whoever is revolutionary, they oppose. Who-
ever is reactionary, they support. They crave nothing more than chaos
nationwide. Although they receive enthusiastic applause and secret over-
tures from clowns in Moscow and Washington, they have long ago been
spurned by the broad masses.
The crackdown on dissident Red Guards marked the death of the stu-
dent movement as an independent political force. Little noticed at the
time, but characteristic of this development, was the fate of Zhu Cheng-
zhao, leader of Geology Institute East Is Red and one of the architects of
the Third Headquarters rebel alliance. In mid-December he had begun
to express doubts about the direction of the movement. He argued that
the rebels had already achieved their main objectives: the rehabilitation
of the students targeted by work teams, the destruction of black mate-
rials in their les, control over their schools, and the clear support of
the CCRG. In meetings with colleagues, he complained that the Cultural
Revolution had lost the character of a mass movement. Zhu argued that
the CCRG was not mobilizing a mass movement but was inciting the
masses to struggle with one another, or, as he put it, the Cultural Revo-
lution was not a mass movement, but manipulation of the masses. He
also complained that the persecution of teenage Red Guards and groups
like United Action was far too extreme. This talk alarmed other mem-
bers of his group, one of whom denounced him to the CCRG. Zhu was
stripped of leadership and taken into custody. Several months later the
CCRG exposed the crimes of the Zhu Chengzhao counterrevolutionary
clique and organized a denunciation meeting at the school. Zhu was
described as a counterrevolutionary rightist, traitor to East is Red. His
counter-revolutionary clique had viciously attacked our great leader
Chairman Mao, bombarded the proletarian headquarters headed by
Chairman Mao, engaged in planning for a counterrevolutionary coup,
betrayed the nation and went over to the enemy, and committed unfor-
givable crimes. Zhu Chengzhao would spend more than a decade in Chi-
nas labor camps.48
The Final Collapse of Rebel Unity
The Beijing Red Guard movement had presented its sponsors with a se-
ries of headaches. First were the emotional divisions over the question
of class origins, which tied the CCRG in knots trying to explain the im-
plications of the partys ambiguous and contradictory policies about class
origin. Next was the series of declarations by early celebrities of the Red
Guard movement that poured contempt on violent Red Guards as fas-
cists. Then there was the split between the majority and minority fac-
tions in universities, which stalemated the movement and once again
turned student radicals against one another. Then there was the forma-
tion of the Picket Corps, which evaded Maos prohibitions against reining
in violent students, and which soon ended up in a tacit alliance with
the majority faction. After that came the concerted effort to redirect the
entire student movement by organizing and promoting a new rebel al-
liance and a new set of student leaders. Finally, there was the remark-
ably aggressive resistance movement by dissident Red Guards that openly
challenged the CCRG, forcing them to drop their ban on suppressing stu-
dent radicals and crush dissent with public security forces.
In the course of all of this, Mao was understandably losing condence
in the radical student movement as an instrument of his aims. They had
one last chance to prove their worth. After the crackdown on dissident
students in Beijing, it would seem that the strengthened and disciplined
rebel movement was nally poised to carry out the task for which they
ultimately had been created: seizing power from the municipal party and
government of Beijing. This turned into a asco.49
In mid-January, CCRG gures instructed rebel leaders to seize power
from the city authorities. Nie Yuanzi and Kuai Dafu announced plans
230 China Under Mao
to create a Beijing Commune, a new form of government based on a rep-

resentative assembly of Mao loyalists and rebel leaders. The effort was
doomed from the outset. Previously, rebel leaders had been united in
their common struggle against their opponents in the majority faction,
and later against the dissident backlash. Now, however, they were com-
petitors in the race to seize power in party and government ofces. The
effort to coordinate their actions quickly broke down, and confusion
reigned. Power seizure groups from different universities arrived at of-
ce buildings at the same time and argued over which of them had pre-
cedence. In other cases, rebels from one university seized power, only
to confront rebels from another university several days later that declared
their own power seizure. The confusion was compounded by the fact
that most government and party agencies already had active rebel groups
made up of members of their own staff, and they were invariably split
into factions. When student rebels arrived to seize power they had to
sort out claims and counterclaims by the two sides, and they came to
different conclusions about which side to support.
Rebel leaders had succeeded by exhibiting harsh intolerance toward
their opponents; they equated compromise and moderation with revi-
sionism. This undermined their efforts to unite behind power seizures.
By the end of January student rebels from different universities engaged
in physical confrontations for control over ministries, bureaus, and news-
papers. New animosities grew among the leaders of the recently victo-
rious rebel coalition. Rebels from the Geology Institute and Beijing
Normal University gravitated into an alliance, increasingly in open op-
position to Nie Yuanzi at Peking University, Kuai Dafu at Tsinghua, and
rebels from Beijing Aeronautics Institute. To make matters worse, the
rebels from the Geology Institute and Beijing Normal University sup-
ported the large rebel factions that opposed Nie Yuanzi and Kuai Dafu
on their campuses.
In early February the plan was abandoned. The CCRG informed the
disorganized Beijing rebels that their power seizure was being called off.
There would be no mass power seizure in the nations capital. Instead,
a new revolutionary committee for the nations capital would be formed
by administrative at, with the Ministry of Public Security and the Bei-
jing Garrison Command playing a major role.50 The student rebels had
missed their chance. They would not be the leading force in the broad-
ening movement to seize power across China.
1. Mao Zedong in Yanan, 19371938, when Mao Zedong Thought was
developed as part of the Stalinization of the Chinese Communist Party (UIG
via Getty Images).
2. Early manifestation of the Mao cult. Parade celebrating the establishment

of the Peoples Republic of China, Beijing, 1949 (Associated Press).
3. Land reform, 1952. Farmer sentenced to death as a despotic landlord
forowning two-thirds of an acre of land, Fukang County, Guangdong
( Bettmann/CORBIS).
4. Land reform, 1952. Execution of a despotic landlord immediately after

sentencing, Fukang County, Guangdong ( Bettmann/CORBIS).
5. Mao and Nikita Khrushchev, Beijing, 1958. The two leaders would
soon split over the direction of world communism, a development
that led to the Cultural Revolution (AFP / Getty Images).
6. Socialist Education Movement, May 12, 1965. A rich peasant is

denounced in Acheng County, Heilongjiang; he was sentenced to
two years of hard labor ( Li Zhensheng / Contact Press Images, from
Red- Color News Soldier, Phaidon, 2003).
7. Wall posters at Peking University, summer 1966, at the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution (China Pictorial, November 1967).
8. Chairman Mao greets Red Guards on the rostrum of Tiananmen, August

18, 1966 (ChinaFotoPress via Getty Images).
9. Chairman Mao reviews Red Guards on Tiananmen Square, August 31,
1966, with Lin Biao on the right (Mondadori via Getty Images).
10. Zhou Enlai (left) and other ofcials who directed the course of the Cultural
Revolution, July 1967. To the right of Zhou are Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Kang
Sheng, and Zhang Chunqiao (Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images).
11. First party secretary of Harbin, face smeared with ink, is de-
nounced at a struggle session, August 26, 1966 ( Li Zhensheng /
Contact Press Images, from Red- Color News Soldier, Phaidon, 2003).
12. Wife of the Heilongjiang provincial governor during a

struggle session, August 29, 1966, Harbin ( Li Zhensheng /
Contact Press Images, from Red- Color News Soldier, Phaidon,
2003).
13. Cleansing of the Class Ranks Campaign, outskirts of Harbin, April 5,
1968. Two individuals sentenced to death as members of a counterrevolu-
tionary clique are prepared for execution ( Li Zhensheng / Contact Press
Images, from Red- Color News Soldier, Phaidon, 2003).
14. Cleansing of the Class Ranks Campaign, outskirts of Harbin, April 5,

1968. Execution of a group condemned for political crimes ( Li Zhensheng /
Contact Press Images, from Red- Color News Soldier, Phaidon, 2003).
15. Burning buildings in Nanning, Guangxi, during the
military campaign to seize control of the city from armed
ghters of the April 22 faction, July 18, 1968 (New
Century Press, Hong Kong).
16. Mass surrender of April 22 ghters in Nanning, August 5, 1968 (New

Century Press, Hong Kong).
17. Summary executions of April 22 ghters on the streets of Nanning after
their surrender, early August 1968 (New Century Press, Hong Kong).
18. Tiananmen Square, April 4, 1976. Citizens surround wreaths

commemorating Zhou Enlai piled up around the Revolutionary
Martyrs Monument in Tiananmen Square, in deance of
ofcial prohibitions (ChinaFotoPress via Getty Images).
19. Tiananmen Square, April 4, 1976. Speeches and poems critical of Maoist
radicals are read out on the square during protests known as the Tiananmen
Incident (ChinaFotoPress via Getty Images).
11

Collapse and Division
T H E R EPEAT ED H EA DACH ES created by the Red Guards eroded Maos

condence in the students. He and the Central Cultural Revolution
Group (CCRG) had to intervene repeatedly to keep them relatively uni-
ed and on message, but each time they solved one problem, another
took its place. University students, after all, were a very small elite. There
were fewer than 675,000 college students in a nation of 740 million. They
were too small a group, and too divided, to have the desired impact on
the national party hierarchy. These considerations spurred Mao and the
CCRG to turn to the mobilization of industrial workers.
Well into November 1966, urban workers were still ofcially discour-
aged from organizing their own rebel groups. On November 10, Peoples
Daily admonished them to remain at their production posts and not leave
their factories to engage in exchange of revolutionary experiences. Zhou
Enlai, in scores of meetings with representatives of the masses, des-
perately tried to insulate the economy from the Cultural Revolution, just
as he had tried to limit the violence perpetrated by the students. In their
much more numerous meetings with Red Guards and worker activists,
however, members of the CCRG were more cavalier about this prohibi-
tion, and they asserted repeatedly that revolutionary consciousness would
have a positive impact on production.1
Worker Rebels
In early November the CCRG was already encouraging the formation of a

worker-based insurgency behind the scenes. On November 6, the Shanghai
Liaison Station of the Beijing student rebels met with politically active
232 China Under Mao
workers from seventeen state factories in the city. Encouraged by the

students, who spoke on behalf of the CCRG, the workers formed an or-
ga ni zation called the Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebel General
Headquarters, and named a thirty-two-year-old factory security ofcer
and party member named Wang Hongwen as their commander. Wang
had authored the rst wall poster that appeared at Shanghais No. 17
Cotton Mill back in mid-June, and had a record of con ict with the work
team sent to his factory.2
The group demanded recognition from the Shanghai Municipal Party
Committee, which understandably refused to permit the formation of
what looked like an independent trade union. More than 2,000 mem-
bers of the Workers General Headquarters commandeered a Beijing-
bound train to petition for ofcial support. Zhou Enlai ordered the train
halted in the Shanghai suburbs. The workers then blocked the rail lines
connecting Shanghai with Nanjing and northern China. The action com-
pletely disrupted rail trafc. The CCRGs Zhang Chunqiao, himself a
ranking Shanghai ofcial, was sent to negotiate. In return for a pledge
to halt the blockade and return to Shanghai, Zhang agreed to all of their
demands ofcial recognition of their orga ni zation and blaming the
incident on the Shanghai Party Committee.3
Zhang Chunqiaos unilateral action surprised several of his CCRG col-
leagues, who initially objected, but Mao quickly signaled his approval. It
was still unclear whether the Shanghai agreement marked a fundamental
shift in national policy. Zhou Enlai called meetings of industrial ministers
and representatives of regional party committees to solicit their views.
They ercely opposed the formation of worker rebel organizations,
arguing that the resulting chaos would bring production to a halt. Zhou
presented their views to Mao on November 22, who rejected them. On
December 9, Beijing nally issued a document af rming the right of
workers to set up their own revolutionary organizations but insisted
that they participate in politics only in their spare time. A companion
document extended the policy to collective farms.4
This was a momentous decision, radically expanding the scale and
scope of the nationwide insurgency. There were 52 million workers and
staff in state and collective enterprises in 1966seventy-ve times larger
than the university student population.5 Essentially, the Maoist author-
ities gave the green light to the mobilization of the entire industrial work-
force. The impact was immediate and explosive. In early December 1966
Collapse and Division 233
the insurgency spread throughout the country, pushing the student

movement to the sidelines.
If Mao and the CCRG believed that a workers insurgency would be
more pliable and unied than the troublesome student movement, they
quickly learned otherwise. Two problems immediately became evident.
First, there was nothing to stop workers from concluding that grievances
related to pay and living standards were due to revisionist managers
who were concerned with production targets at the expense of worker
welfare. The industrial system China inherited from the Soviet Union
mandated low wages, consumer austerity, and housing shortages, and
this was the rst opportunity since 1957 for industrial workers to openly
raise issues of pay and living standards. Second, unlike the universities
and high schools, whose party organizations were devastated by work
teams and immobilized during June and July, party organizations in fac-
tories throughout China were still active and largely intact. There was
nothing to prevent networks of party activists from organizing their own
rebel groups among workers to oppose disruptive rebel insurgencies. And
there was nothing to prevent rivals within the party leadership of fac-
tories to organize rebel groups that expressed preexisting antagonisms
within the organization. These conditions ensured that the workers in-
surgency would grow rapidly and be just as divided as the student move-
ment. Given the much larger scale of the workers insurgency, the prob-
lems it presented were even more severe.
The Collapse of Local Governments
After factory workforces split into factions, it was impossible to main-

tain the prohibition against political activities during work hours. Fac-
tories were disrupted by internal con icts, and factions linked up with
allies in other enterprises to engage in battles off site. Attacks on fac-
tory ofcials by nascent rebel groups, and street actions that disrupted
transportation and ser vices, provoked immediate countermobilization
led by workers who were party and union activists.6 Factory ofcials and
municipal authorities did little to discourage such countermobilization.
Once it became clear that Mao authorized independent worker organi-
zations, local authorities quickly recognized that mass mobilization by
loyal worker groups was in their interest. They learned to provide tacit
and in some cases direct support for this kind of rebel group.
234 China Under Mao
Relying on factory party organizations and trade unions, which al-

ready had well-established ties with the workforce and considerable re-
sources, these loyalist organizations grew with astonishing rapidity and
presented a major challenge to nascent rebel movements. In Shanghai,
shortly after the ofcial recognition of the Workers General Headquar-
ters in mid-November, an opposed workers alliance known as the Scarlet
Guards quickly appeared, and soon was able to mobilize hundreds of
thousands of rank-and- le workers into the streets.7 Whereas rebel or-
ganizations grew slowly and built independent organizations through a
long period of struggle, loyalist organizations relied on existing party and
union networks to generate huge memberships in very short order.
At the factory level, conict and divisions within the workforce often
mirrored divisions within the party leadership. The Yangzi River Ma-
chine Works, described earlier as an example of the divisive impact of the
Socialist Education Movement, was one such case. Recall that the 1964
campaign split the factorys leadership into factions that had the backing,
respectively, of the Fourth Machine Building Ministry and the Nanjing
Party Committee. When the Cultural Revolution spread to factories,
the party faction earlier backed by the Nanjing authorities mobilized
the workers loyal to them into an insurgency aimed at overthrowing the
ofcials aligned with the ministry. The ministry-backed factory of-
cials, in turn, mobilized their loyalists to defend against these attacks.
As the workers insurgency developed during November and December
1966, the dissident worker faction sought and received the backing of
the Nanjing party authorities, and subsequently fought to defend them
in a broader citywide rebel coalition. The faction mobilized by ministry-
backed ofcials joined the coalition that sought to overthrow the Nan-
jing authorities.8
A second consequence was the rapid escalation of economic demands.
Workers demands would have required greater expenditures on wages
and living standards at the expense of investment, undermining a core
feature of Chinas Soviet-inspired industrialization model. In Shanghai,
as the con ict between the Workers General Headquarters and the
Scarlet Guards grew, hundreds of new organizations sprang up to pursue
livelihood complaints. The primary demands were for higher wages and
welfare subsidies, granting of permanent urban household registration,
allocation of new apartments, and new job assignments or classications.
Temporary and contract workers formed rebel groups to demand per-
manent state sector jobs; permanent workers whose wages had been
frozen for years demanded immediate wage hikes; workers relocated to
the countryside during the post Great Leap recession demanded a re-
turn to the city and their former jobs; poorly paid apprentices demanded
promotions and raises; workers in small and marginal collective and co-
operative rms demanded the medical and fringe benets that were pro-
vided only for those with state sector jobs.
Workers held factory and government ofcials hostage until they
agreed to these demands. In many cases they were pressured to autho-
rize lump sum payments for travel expenses. The demands escalated
rapidly during December, spreading from small and isolated groups
formed around specic grievances to members of larger branches of rebel
organizations af liated with both the Workers General Headquarters
and the Scarlet Guards.9 These escalating demands, which expressed dis-
satisfactions bred by Chinas planned economy, were wholly unantici-
pated and unwanted by Mao and the CCRG. They did, however, bear
out the predictions of industrial ofcials who were adamantly opposed
to independent worker organizations.
An equally crippling blow was the rapid emergence of rebel groups
among the white-collar staff of government and party organs. If indus-
trial workers were permitted to rebel, there was nothing to restrain em-
ployees in civil administration and the organs of state power. Ofce staff,
even in the headquarters of party and government, formed their own
rebel organizations, making accusations against top ofcials in their
units, disrupting normal operations, vying with competing rebel groups
within the same ofce, and linking up with outside rebel groups. As the
insurgency spread, party ofcials could not even be condent that their
own ofce staff would heed their authority.10
By the end of 1966, Chinas large cities were rapidly becoming un-
governable. Workers left their jobs to engage in protests against local party
organs, and they often found themselves in pitched battles against other
workers who pledged loyalty to the party apparatus. Railway and ferry
ser vices were disrupted; ships were unable to load or unload freight in
the harbors; and factories shut down. The army and security ser vices
had been prohibited from intervening in rebel activities since late
August a prohibition still in place despite the CCRGs suppression of
dissident Red Guards in Beijingso local party organs were unable to
call on them. Having lost control over the streets, and increasingly
236 China Under Mao
having lost control over their own ofce staff, party ofcials reported
to Beijing that their ofces were paralyzed. Many local leaders by this
point were in fact under detention by rebels, and were carted back and
forth for mass meetings and struggle sessions.11 If the Cultural Revo-
lution were to accomplish something more than a general collapse of
Chinas economy and civil order, something had to be done.
Shanghais January Revolution
Shanghai suffered from all of these problems in pronounced form. Clashes

between the Workers General Headquarters and the Scarlet Guards es-
calated during December, paralyzing the city. The situation became crit-
ical when the Scarlet Guards, nally recognizing that their efforts to de-
fend the Shanghai party authorities were futile, withdrew their allegiance
and went on the attack. On December 23 they mobilized some 300,000
workers for a rally at the city center to criticize the reactionary line of
the Shanghai Party Committee. They demanded recognition of their
organization by Shanghais mayor, who immediately granted it. But the
mayor was forced to repudiate the agreement the next day by the Workers
General Headquarters. After his change of mind was broadcast over the
radio, 20,000 to 30,000 Scarlet Guards surrounded the Shanghai Party
Committee ofces to demand a confrontation with the mayor.
The next day, December 29, the Workers General Headquarters mo-
bilized a force of almost 100,000 to surround the protesters. A violent
battle ensued, and the outnumbered Scarlet Guards were badly battered.
On December 31 a force of some 20,000 Scarlet Guards marched along
the railway lines to Beijing to protest their treatment. When they reached
the outskirts of Shanghai, regiments from the Workers General Head-
quarters attacked them. The ghting halted rail trafc in and out of
Shanghai once again. Factories, transport hubs, and dockyards in
Shanghai were paralyzed as members of both factions either left work-
places for street protests or engaged in battles at work. Rebel workers de-
manded cash from besieged factory ofcials, who had little choice but
to comply. The bank accounts of state units were drained, and the ben-
eciaries of the cash windfall swarmed to retail outlets, quickly ex-
hausting supplies of scarce consumer items. Food shortages occurred,
and citizens rushed to withdraw their savings from banks, while public
transportation was paralyzed.12
The response was a contrived power seizure, designed to restore

civil order and industrial production while at the same time replacing
the Shanghai party leadership with ofcials loyal to the Maoist cause.
On January 4, CCRG members Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan ew
to Shanghai. Coordinating their actions with the Workers General Head-
quarters, they authorized the takeover of major media outlets by rebels
and ordered them to publish editorials demanding the restoration of
order. The editorials asserted that the Shanghai authorities plotted to ob-
struct the Cultural Revolution by instigating factionalism and luring
workers into making economic demandsyet another manifestation of
the bourgeois reactionary line.13 Zhang ordered the Workers General
Headquarters to organize a mass rally on January 6 to overthrow the
Shanghai Party Committee. During the rally, attended by 100,000, the
rst party secretary, mayor, and other leading ofcials on the Shanghai
Party Committee were denounced on the stage, heads bowed.14
This move effectively dissolved the Shanghai Party Committee. In
short order, forty-ve out of fty-six members were stripped of their posi-
tions; the mayor and all seven deputy mayors were deposed. On January
9 local papers published an Urgent Notice in the name of the Workers
General Headquarters and other rebel groups, spelling out a series of steps
to restore stability. Economic demands were condemned and denounced
as a plot by revisionists. Mao told members of the CCRG that the actions
of the Shanghai rebels were correct, and that the entire country should
learn from the experience of Shanghai, and take concrete action. A
congratulatory telegram was published nationwide on January 12. It ex-
pressed approval for the Shanghai power seizure and encouraged similar
actions elsewhere. The Scarlet Guards responded by issuing a statement
titled Begging Forgiveness from Chairman Mao, apologizing for their
previous opposition to the Workers General Headquarters.15
Zhang Chunqiao announced on January 19 that the new organ of
municipal power would be known as the Shanghai Peoples Commune.
Mao, however, perhaps in response to the bungled effort by student rebels
to create a Beijing Commune, informed Zhang in mid-February that the
name should be changed to Revolutionary Committee. Zhang did so du-
tifully, and on February 23 the name change was announced: Zhang
was the head of the Revolutionary Committee, Yao Wenyuan rst vice
head, and Wang Hongwen, the leader of the Workers General Headquar-
ters, was their principal deputy.16
238 China Under Mao
Zhang made clear that power was now in the hands of genuine rev-
olutionaries and further challenges to authority were forbidden. Zhang
ordered rebels to return to work and withdraw from the streets. For the
rst time since the August prohibition he deployed the military to keep
order and prevent further attacks on organs of power. He deployed troops
from the Nanjing Military Region, and he had worker militias from loyal
factions march through the streets and keep order.17
Zhangs power seizure sparked opposition from both student and
worker rebels. The rst challenge came from the large student alliance
known as the Red Revolutionaries. Their leaders viewed the power sei-
zure with suspicion. Backed by the armed forces, it looked suspiciously
like the suppression of the mass movement a crackdown masked with
empty rhetoric about revolution. Zhang, after all, was a senior member
of the Shanghai Party Committee. Moreover, he had pushed aside stu-
dents who were the rst to attack the Shanghai Party Committee,
working instead with the Workers General Headquarters. At a meeting
with Zhang and Yao Wenyuan on January 27, the Red Revolutionaries
held the two for six hours, attempting to force an apology for using troops
to suppress rebels. Zhang and Yao were freed without making any con-
cessions, but the next day student radicals kidnapped one of Zhangs top
deputies and held him on the Fudan University campus. Zhang dis-
patched troops to free the aide. The students responded by distributing
handbills and wall posters attacking Zhang for suppressing the student
movement. In response, Zhang mobilized workers to patrol public spaces
to prevent further expressions of dissent. The CCRG issued a public tele-
gram calling the attacks on Zhang completely mistaken, and warning
of dire consequences for those who persisted. The student rebels quickly
abandoned their offensive.18
Zhang faced similar challenges from rebel groups allied with the
Workers General Headquarters. Several of them objected to the planned
Shanghai Commune, which was negotiated without their participation.
They balked at an order to dissolve and merge with the Workers Gen-
eral Headquarters. Geng Jinzhang, the leader of the massive Second Reg-
iment, mobilized a large alliance of workers to openly challenge Wang
Hongwen, and they announced the formation of a rival commune. In
late February, public security forces arrested Geng Jinzhang and dissolved
the independent regiments. From that time on Shanghai did not expe-
rience street ghting between large factional alliances. Factional strife
persisted but was contained within individual factories.19 Maos unwav-

ering support permitted the deployment of public security forces and local
militia to make Shanghai an oasis of relative stability as public order col-
lapsed in most of China.
Regional Power Seizures
Shanghais January Revolution was a model for the rest of the country.
It could plausibly claim to be the result of a mass movement. Several
large mass organizations supported Zhang Chunqiao, and their leaders
were absorbed into new organs of power. Zhang was a trusted radical, a
longtime supporter of Maos initiatives and a member of the CCRG. Fi-
nally, Shanghai showed that a power seizure could restore production
and civil order after power holders were overthrown. Rebels in prov-
inces throughout the country were urged to seize power in a similar
fashion.
While Shanghai was the inspiration, Heilongjiang provided the ap-
proved name for the new architecture of power: Revolutionary Com-
mittee. Interestingly, the incumbent rst party secretary of the province,
Pan Fusheng, survived to head a new government that incorporated se-
lected leaders of rebel organizations alongside revolutionary cadres and
military ofcers. Pan Fusheng was a newcomer to the province, having
been transferred to the post from elsewhere in October 1965. He there-
fore did not have strong ties with other local leaders, nor did he have to
answer for the actions of provincial leaders in the past. Pan openly wel-
comed the student rebellion from the very beginning, distancing him-
self from his longer-serving colleagues and acting as if he was himself
the sponsor of the local Red Guards. He presided over massive Red Guard
rallies in Harbin in mid-August, during which he imitated Maos role
in Tiananmen Square. When students made accusations against top of-
cials in the province, he readily agreed to them, and even presided over
struggle sessions against other top provincial ofcials. When rebel groups
clamored to seize power in late January, Pan openly welcomed them,
and with the approval of the CCRG, on January 31 he formed a new
power structure with himself at the head. Several large rebel organiza-
tions opposed the action, but Pan dispatched the army to suppress them.
The CCRG ofcially approved the new regional government on February
2.20 Mao came to prefer this name to commune perhaps inuenced
240 China Under Mao
by the bungled efforts by student rebels to form the Beijing Commune

and the stubborn opposition to the Shanghai Commune.
Power seizures appealed even more strongly to gures eager to curb
the destructive thrust of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou Enlai, who had
initially opposed the inclusion of workers for that reason, became an en-
thusiastic supporter of power seizures in January 1967. He saw them as
the only way to bring order out of chaos and began to encourage them
in other parts of the country. Zhou, for example, directly phoned hesi-
tant rebel leaders in Nanjing and urged them to seize power from the
Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee.21 His moves, however, earned the
suspicion of members of the CCRG, who saw Zhous sudden leftist en-
thusiasm as an unprincipled and expedient effort simply to restore order.
The CCRG worried that a Zhou-engineered power seizure might be a
cover for a restoration of the status quo. The tension between these two
objectives, and between these two political tendencies, would prolong
the struggle to create new organs of power well into 1968, ensuring that
the greatest disorders for Chinas provinces, and the highest levels of vi-
olence, were still in the future.
The Shanghai model, if replicated nationwide, would obviously allow
Mao and the CCRG to claim that the Cultural Revolution had been
brought to a victorious conclusion. This seems to have been their hope
early in 1967. Initially, they followed the Shanghai and Heilongjiang
script with some success: they identied a senior ofcial who demon-
strated unswerving loyalty to Maos line and who was able to earn the
support of a signicant portion of local rebel forces, and placed that person
in charge of the power seizure. Three more provincial power seizures of
this kind were approved by mid-February: Guizhou, Shandong, and
Shanxi. In each case Beijing ofcials were able to identify a sufciently
senior local ofcial who had demonstrated loyalty to the CCRGs agenda
and who had the support of a large segment of the rebel insurgency. In
each case their power seizures stimulated rebel opposition of the variety
experienced in Shanghai. And in each case the new leaders, with the
backing of Mao, Zhou, and the CCRG, deployed the armed forces to shut
down opposition.22
After this, the power seizure movement stalled. No further revolu-
tionary committees were approved until August, and only one other for
the rest of the year. Efforts to orchestrate power seizures in other re-
gions foundered on the inability of the CCRG to identify a trusted se-
nior cadre to take the lead, or by rebel movements that were so evenly
divided that any effort to declare a power seizure would require the mas-
sive application of brute force against one of the two sides. The armed
forces were called in to maintain order while the political situations in
the remaining provinces were sorted out. Without approved power sei-
zures at the provincial level, there could be no approved power seizures
at lower levels of government, which meant that these issues remained
unresolved down to the grass roots.
Jiangsu Province illustrates the problem: there the effort was plagued
by a sharp difference in attitude between Zhou Enlai, who was at the
center of negotiations to approve power seizures, and the radical mem-
bers of the CCRG. In early January, with most of the top leadership of
the province held captive by rebel forces, and with the transportation
hubs and the port completely paralyzed by street battles, Zhou placed
calls to local rebel forces to urge them to seize power. After failing over
several days to negotiate relative roles in the new power structure, one
group of rebel leaders decided to move ahead without the others. With
the support of the local armed forces and the prior approval of both Zhou
Enlai and the CCRG, they declared a power seizure on January 25. The
rebels who were left behind immediately protested and invaded the of-
ces of the local party newspaper to prevent publication of the announce-
ment. The rebels who seized power waited expectantly for Beijings ap-
proval of their action, but it never came. Instead, Zhou Enlai ordered
them to Beijing for negotiations to work out unity in the rebel camp.
Large delegations of leaders from each side traveled to Beijing and en-
tered into contentious negotiations with Zhou and other top ofcials,
and could not agree on a senior ofcial to serve as the governments new
head. In the end, the negotiations ended in a stalemate, and Jiangsu
was placed under military control in early March, essentially a holding
strategy. The commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Xu Shiyou,
was entrusted to keep order while the situation was sorted out. 23
Guangdong Province had a similar experience, although the power
seizure there took a different form. As in Jiangsu, the citys large rebel
movement was unable to negotiate an agreement about seizing power.
When one group of rebels went ahead without the consent of the others,
they alienated the rebel groups left behind. Their power seizure, how-
ever, took a unique form. The Guangdong party secretary, Zhao Ziyang,
perhaps trying to imitate Pan Fusheng in Heilongjiang, welcomed the
242 China Under Mao
rebels when they arrived to seize power. Zhao agreed to hand over power
and pledged that his leading group and their staff would continue to work
under supervisors appointed by the rebels. This would ensure that the
power seizure was successful and that order could be maintained. The
rebels agreed, and the arrangement obviously appealed to Zhou Enlai,
who was arguing in Beijing that this was the preferred format for future
power seizures. The excluded rebels, however, instantly opposed these
arrangements as a fake power seizure, because it left the provinces
top ofcials in place. This charge resonated with the CCRG, who bought
the argument and supported the claims of the excluded rebels. Zhou
fruitlessly tried to negotiate a settlement and was forced to put Guang-
dong under military control.24
The Consequences of Military Intervention
Because of the unfailing tendency of rebel forces to split, the support of

the armed forces was essential in stabilizing new organs of power. It had
proved crucial for the rst group of province-level revolutionary com-
mittees, and rebels who claimed to have seized power eagerly sought mil-
itary support. In the last week of January Mao sent a note to Lin Biao
calling for military support for the broad masses of the left. There fol-
lowed a directive that stated, When genuine proletarian Leftists ask the
army for help, the army should send troops actively to support them.
Subsequent requests for clarication about how to implement this order
led to a January 28 order that forbade mass organizations from attacking
military installations, and authorized local commanders to suppress
rightists and counterrevolutionary groups.25
This fateful order reversed the August 1966 prohibition against PLA
interference in the rebel movement. Military control altered the rela-
tionship between military units and rebels who claimed to have seized
power. Once military control was declared, troops assumed greater au-
thority. In the absence of a revolutionary committee approved by Bei-
jing, military ofcers had no local civilian authorities to guide their ac-
tions (unlike Shanghai or Heilongjiang), and they were forced to exercise
their own judgment about how to sort out competing rebel claims, and
how to respond when local rebel groups resisted military control. In these
circumstances, which characterized most of China, instead of hastening
the formation of revolutionary committees, military control inadver-
tently drew the armed forces into local factional con icts. This intensi-
ed and prolonged the divisions, further delaying the formation of rev-

olutionary committees.
After the late January 1967 order for the PLA to support the left,
there followed a two-month period during which the foundations for
deepening factional violence were laid. It was inevitable that clashes be-
tween rebel groups and armed forces would occur. When the PLA im-
plemented military control, it confronted rebel groups that had occu-
pied ofces and other public installations. Although these power seizures
had yet to receive the imprimatur of Mao and the CCRG, the rebels con-
sidered their power seizures as legitimate and frequently tried to defend
them. When military units took over strategic sites, they weakened the
inuence of rebel groups that had seized power, and inadvertently
strengthened the hand of rival rebels who had been left out of the power
seizure. This upset the balance of power in local rivalries. For this reason,
military units frequently met with strong resistance from rebels in
possession of strategic sites.26
These clashes had consequences. Rebel groups forced to yield control
frequently interpreted the armys actions as an illegitimate suppression
of the mass movement. They understood that losing control of strategic
sites weakened their claims to have seized power, and they feared that
this would weaken them in their rivalry with other rebels. When the
confrontations turned violent, arrests followed, and the seeds of deep an-
tagonism were sown.
Rebels who suffered in these initial encounters frequently mobilized
their forces to surround military compounds in protest, orchestrating
campaigns of resistance to the army. These confrontations could be dan-
gerous, primarily for the rebels. They resulted in a massacre of 169 rebels
outside a military compound in Qinghai in late February, and in shoot-
ings that resulted in civilian casualties in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and
Henan. More commonly they resulted in mass arrests of rebel groups
that organized resistance. In Sichuan, tens of thousands were arrested
after a rebel siege of the Chengdu military headquarters. Less dramatic
confrontations in Guangzhou and Nanjing resulted in arrests that fo-
cused on the factions that claimed to have seized power.27 Rebel groups
that persisted in violent resistance were branded as counterrevolutionary,
their leaders and activists incarcerated, their organizations banned.
Mao and the CCRG were not bothered by military suppression in sup-
port of approved revolutionary committees. The actions of the military
to defend approved new organs of power in Shanghai, Heilongjiang, and
244 China Under Mao
elsewhere were deemed entirely legitimate, even essential. Or ga-

nized resistance under these circumstances was deemed illegitimate;
the armys actions were a defense of a local victory for the Cultural
Revolution. However, when the army actively suppressed rebels where
Beijing had yet to sort out rival rebel claims, they threatened to upset
the local balance of power. To Mao and many on the CCRG, the army
appeared to be suppressing a mass movement that had been cultivated
and encouraged for many months. Mao became concerned that mili-
tary units with unclear political sympathies were forcing their own solu-
tion on regional con icts, bringing them and the Cultural Revolu-
tionto a premature end. These concerns were heightened after some
of Chinas most senior military ofcials angrily confronted members of
the CCRG about the disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution
during mid-February 1967 meetings of the remaining party leader-
ship.28 Lin Biao may have been Maos most loyal lieutenant, but other
military ofcers, especially regional commanders, seemed to be far
from enthusiastic about the rebellion.
By mid-March Mao concluded that the military had gone too far, and
that their actions had weakened rebels to an unacceptable degree. He
ordered the arrest of several local commanders and purged problematic
local commands. On April 6 Lin Biao responded to Maos concerns by
issuing a new directive to the army that reversed the emphasis of the
January orders. It ordered army units never to re on mass organiza-
tions and to halt mass arrests. The army was forbidden to ban mass or-
ganizations or label them as counterrevolutionary, and such bans were
to be lifted and labels removed. Only civilian ofcials in Beijing could
approve such bans and labels in the future. Opposition to the PLA could
no longer be the criterion for deciding whether a mass organization was
genuinely leftist.29
These orders forced the army to curtail its aggressive enforcement of
military control and led to the revival of rebel organizations that suf-
fered in February and March. There were unintended consequences as
well, because the situation on the ground had changed. When rebel
leaders and their followers were released from jail, their organizations
were restored and their reactionary labels removed. It was not possible
to pretend that the events of the past two months had not occurred.
Now they harbored deep grievances against the local military com-
manders at whose hands they had suffered. More importantly, when
their organizations were suppressed, their claims as leaders of a power

seizure were undermined. The April 6 directive removed the hand of
military suppression, but the liberated rebels now had an urgent new
political objective: to regain the inuence and prestige that had de-
clined at the hands of the military and to roll back military control.
There was also a more subtle change that would have equally pro-
found implications. The actions of the armed forces inadvertently inserted
them into the middle of factional con icts. Power seizures almost al-
ways generated opposition by rival rebels who were marginalized or ex-
cluded. This is what happened in Shanghai, when the Second Regiment
and Red Revolutionaries both opposed the power seizure orchestrated
by the Workers General Headquarters. The new Shanghai authorities,
with clear backing from Mao, condently deployed the armed forces to
stamp out opposition. Something very different happened elsewhere in
China, where rebels seized power but waited in vain for Beijings ap-
proval. In these circumstances, dissident rebels who had objected to local
power seizures welcomed the militarys actions against their opponents.
These rebels found military control to be very congenial, because the
armed forces refused to recognize their rivals claims. When rebel fac-
tions suppressed by the military reemerged in April to pursue their griev-
ances against the army and regain their former power and status, their
rivals felt compelled to defend the army, whose actions had indirectly
aided their cause. The foundations for new factional divisions were laid:
between rebel groups that opposed, and defended, the actions of the
army.
The Foundations for Factional Violence
Efforts to enforce military control inadvertently created the violent

summer of 1967. In Nanjing, the armed forces implemented military
control in March after the citys rebel movement had split in two one
side supported the power seizure (the Pro faction), and the other side
opposed it (the Anti faction).30 During the failed February negotiations
in Beijing between the two sides, the CCRG favored the claims of the
Anti faction rebels. That faction contained some of the most promi-
nent rebel commanders in Nanjing, gures well known to the CCRG
from the fall campaign against the Jiangsu Party Committee. When
the armed forces imposed military control over strategic sites in
246 China Under Mao
Nanjing, they clashed with units of the Pro faction. Arrests followed,
and the Pro faction began to protest their treatment by the military.
The Anti faction, on the other hand, saw no problem with the armys
actions.
After the early April directive that called for the armed forces to pull
back from the suppression of rebels, the axis of con ict began to shift.
To the earlier antagonism between the Pro and Anti factions over the
power seizure was now added a fundamental disagreement about the
role of the army. When Pro faction leaders were released from prison,
they began a campaign against the army for its errors of line. The Anti
faction, for its part, defended the armed forces. The two sides were now
more evenly balanced, and the Anti faction enjoyed close ties with the
army. The intensied antagonisms between the two rebel alliances over
the power seizure and military control escalated in the late spring into
renewed ghting over control of schools, ofces, and other sites. Street
battles became more common, and the Pro faction accused the army of
aiding the Anti faction behind the scenes. Because the April directive
ordered the armed forces to back off, they did little to intervene in street
battles between the two sides.
At this point the CCRG shifted its support from the Anti to the Pro
faction. They had originally supported the famous rebels in the Anti fac-
tion, but the CCRG was now worried that the armed forces were stamping
out the forces of rebellion, and the Pro factions attacks on the Nanjing
Military Region were aligned with their shifting political agenda, while
the Anti faction now supported the army. The CCRG began to work with
Pro faction forces to promote resistance to the army, which now found
itself in the middle of the unfolding factional struggle in Jiangsu. In the
wake of the new April directive the army no longer had the authority
to curtail street battles between the two sides. The scene was set for large-
scale violence.
Essentially the same pattern occurred in Guangzhou. Local rebel
forces split over the late January power seizure for the same reasons as
in Nanjing.31 The rebels excluded from the power seizure charged that
it was fake because it protected ofcials who were earlier behind the
bourgeois reactionary line. This argument resonated with the CCRG, es-
pecially because Zhou Enlai promoted the Guangzhou power seizure as
a model. The CCRG favored the Anti faction in February negotiations
in Beijing. When the negotiations reached an impasse, military control
was imposed in late February. The same sequence of events observed in
Nanjing unfolded in Guangzhou. The rebels who had seized power re-
sisted military control, suffered arrests, and had their organizations
banned. The rival rebels approved the militarys actions. When the new
April directive to the army liberated the arrested rebels, they mobilized
to attack the armed forces. This won them the approval of the CCRG,
which had previously supported the other rebel faction. Clashes between
the two rebel alliances, now more evenly matched, escalated throughout
the province. Rebels who opposed the army became known as Red Flag,
while their rivals who supported the armys actions became known as
East Wind.32
Wuhan experienced the same initial splits among rebel forces over
their January power seizure, but events subsequently took a very dif-
ferent turn, and in ways that would have huge national repercussions.
The province experienced the familiar splits between rebels over repre-
sentation in the power seizure, and the group that went ahead with the
power seizure clashed with the local military, and was denounced and
suppressed in return.33 However, in late March Chen Zaidao, the com-
mander of the Wuhan Military Region, met in Beijing with Zhou Enlai
and members of the CCRG, and they agreed that the actions of the dom-
inant rebel faction had been incorrect and that their attacks on the mil-
itary were not to be tolerated. Drawing condence from these instruc-
tions, Chen returned to Wuhan and conducted an unusually aggressive
campaign against the rebel faction that had resisted, imprisoning its
leaders and large numbers of followers, crushing the organization and
denouncing many of its members as counterrevolutionary.
The rival rebels supported the armys actions, and they cooperated
with the army by informing on and denouncing their opponents. How-
ever, they also quickly fell afoul of the army. In early March they pub-
lished an editorial in Hubei Daily, a newspaper that they still controlled,
warning that the armys crackdown on their rivals should not mislead
conservatives into thinking that the status quo would be restored. The
rebels were surprised to nd that the army interpreted this editorial as
an attack on them. The army seized control of the newspaper and forced
their leaders to make a self-criticism. Now seemingly out of favor, their
organization declined as well.
The army proceeded to stabilize public order and restore production.
They set up teams to promote production in factories, relying on party
and trade union organizations that were severely undermined in pre-
vious months. New rebel organizations appeared that in membership and
248 China Under Mao
orientation resembled the defunct Scarlet Guards of Shanghai, which

had mobilized to defend the Shanghai Party Committee. These organi-
zations rmly supported the armys efforts to restore order in Wuhan.34
The actions of the Wuhan military were exactly the type that was
prohibited in the April 6 directive that reined in the military. The new
directive strengthened the resolve of both wings of the formerly divided
rebel movement, who joined together once again in a campaign to at-
tack General Chen Zaidao. The banned rebel organizations re-formed
and declared their rebirth, staged marches in the city, raided the ofces
of the two major daily newspapers, and staged a large hunger strike to
demand the release of prisoners.35
Unlike those in Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Hangzhou, the factions that
developed in Wuhan during May and June 1967 were not two rival wings
of the earlier rebel movement. The rebels reunited in opposition to the
military, while a completely new alliance, adopting the name Million
Heroes, defended the military and had close ties to party, security or-
gans, and militia. Resurgent Wuhan rebels began an offensive against
the Wuhan Military Region, staging hunger strikes across the city to de-
mand the release of imprisoned comrades and the recognition of their
banned organizations. Small clashes occurred with security forces in
early May. The army released some of the imprisoned rebels, but stub-
bornly insisted that their verdict on the banned rebel organizations was
correct. During May and June the rebels expanded and rebuilt their or-
ganizations, while the Million Heroes organization grew and strongly
supported the local military.36
With the two factions gaining strength and the armed forces now
prohibited from using armed force, there was no way to restrain esca-
lating factional violence. Large-scale violence did not begin until late
May, when the rst death was recorded. At this point each faction began
to arm itself, primarily with clubs and spears, and occupy buildings, of-
ces, and factories, reinforcing them against attacks by its rivals. The Mil-
lion Heroes had a distinct advantage, organizing themselves into disci-
plined units staffed by army veterans, and they took over most of the
factories in several city districts as well as the citys party headquarters.
The Wuhan military issued repeated calls to end the street violence, but
without the ability to use force their appeals fell on deaf ears.
Wuhan became a battleground, with street ghting throughout the
city. According to gures compiled by the rebels, during May and June
there were 174 violent clashes, involving 70,000 ghters, resulting in

158 deaths and more than a thousand serious injuries. The Million He-
roes launched a major offensive against rebel forces in June, systemati-
cally taking over districts in rebel hands. Dozens of deaths and even more
injuries were reported, and the rebel forces were in disarray. On June
23, units from the Million Heroes captured the headquarters of the main
rebel organization, killing twenty-ve in the process. The Wuhan rebels
were on the verge of total defeat.37
The CCRG, monitoring these events, became alarmed at the rebels
plight. On June 26 they sent an urgent telegram to the Wuhan Military
Region ordering Chen Zaidao to prevent further attacks. The order
criticized the Million Heroes and warned that those responsible for
the killings would be punished. The two sides were to be invited to
Beijing for negotiations. Street ghting abated as the Million Heroes
refrained from further attacks, and each side prepared to present their
case in Beijing.38
The Wuhan Incident
The venue for the negotiations soon shifted to Wuhan, because Mao Ze-
dong was beginning an unannounced inspection tour of southern prov-
inces and Wuhan would be his rst stop. Mao arrived secretly on July
13, bringing CCRG member Wang Li and Minister of Public Security Xie
Fuzhi along with him, later joined by Zhou Enlai. Wang and Xie visited
rebels at a local university and news of their presence in the city spread.39
Mao dictated his resolution of the crisis on July 15 and16. The suppressed
rebel organizations must be reinstated and treated equally; the Million
Heroes should not be disbanded, but it was a conservative organization;
and the Wuhan military leaders must make a self-criticism for their er-
rors. Xie Fuzhi and Wang Li relayed the gist of these instructions to mili-
tary commanders and mass organizations over the next several days. As
the news spread throughout the city, the rebels emphasized the criti-
cisms of the Million Heroes and the errors of the military, and Wang Li
reinforced the impression that the decision was tilted against the Mil-
lion Heroes in an undiplomatic speech to military ofcers. This appeared
to represent a complete defeat for the Million Heroes, whose leaders and
activists were outraged, many of whom refused to believe that the ver-
dict was nal. Many of them blamed Wang Li for the decision, believing
250 China Under Mao
that he was responsible, and soldiers sympathetic to the Million Heroes

shared this view.40
The dramatic events of the evening of July 20 became known as the
Wuhan Incident. That evening a contingent of disgruntled soldiers sym-
pathetic to the Million Heroes broke into the compound where Xie Fuzhi
and Wang Li were staying, roughed them up, and kidnapped Wang Li,
holding him hostage. Mao was staying in a nearby villa in the same com-
pound and the incursion by hostile soldiers raised alarms about his secu-
rity. Mao was hustled out of Wuhan and took a plane to Shanghai.
Rumors spread that Wang Lis instructions were repudiated by the CCRG
and that Mao had rejected his verdict. Million Heroes forces staged cele-
bratory demonstrations throughout the city and posted slogans de-
nouncing Wang Li. Wang was eventually transferred to the custody of
military units and released on July 22. Nursing a broken leg and other
injuries, he ew back to Beijing for a staged welcome as a returning
hero.41
Beijings reaction to Wang Lis return came as a shock to the jubilant
Million Heroes. The events of July 20 were called a counterrevolu-
tionary rebellion, and huge demonstrations were held across China to
repudiate Wuhan reactionaries. Beijing issued an open letter on July
27 calling on the people of Wuhan to struggle against the evil leaders
of the Wuhan Military Region and the Million Heroes. Chen Zaidao and
his subordinates were escorted to the capital and blasted with charges
that they had attempted a military coup. The Million Heroes were loudly
and repeatedly condemned. The organization quickly disintegrated and
disappeared from the political scene. The resurgent rebel forces resumed
attacks on members of the Million Heroes; in Wuhan alone more than
600 were killed and some 66,000 suffered permanent injuries in the
rebels violent retaliation in the coming months.42 Their common enemy
vanquished, the rebel forces once again split over their respective places
in local organs of power. Unable to compromise, and with the new mili-
tary authorities adopting a hands-off stance, the two rebel alliances ex-
panded enormously and resumed their violent rivalry.43
The Violent Summer of 1967

The Wuhan Incident provoked a radical shift in policy toward the armed
forces. On July 31, Peoples Daily and Red Flag jointly published an edito-
rial that called for dragging out a handful of capitalist roaders in the
army. The editorial signaled strong support for rebel forces that had chal-
lenged local military commanders. Throughout the country, military
forces found themselves under renewed attack. Factions that had clashed
with the army used the campaign to gain the upper hand in their struggle
with rival rebels. In Wuhan and elsewhere, rebels immediately began a
campaign to capture military armaments. Army units, prevented from
ring on mass organizations, were unable to halt spontaneous arms sei-
zures. During this period Mao himself called for arming the left in its
ght against its enemies, and some local military units began to supply
arms and ammunition to rebel factions that they favored.44
These developments had an explosive impact across China. August
and September 1967 were the climax of armed battles between rebel
factions and of rebel attacks on the military. In Chongqing, one battle
fought with military weapons involved an estimated 10,000 ghters and
resulted in close to 1,000 casualties. In another fought with tanks and
artillery, one harbor district in that city was razed to the ground. Yangzi
River shipping was interrupted for more than six weeks.45 The Yangzi
River port city of Luzhou became the scene of an enormous battle in the
rst few days of September. More than 30,000 ghters took part, armed
with military weapons, leading to more than 2,000 deaths. Large sections
of the city, especially the dockyards in the port area, were leveled.46
In Jiangsu, military forces under General Xu Shiyou had been on the
defensive since April. Armed battles escalated between Pro and Anti fac-
tion forces during June, and the Pro faction staged a series of raids against
Public Security Bureau ofces that were under the military authorities.
After the Wuhan Incident, local representatives of the CCRG encouraged
Pro faction rebels to attack Xu Shiyou directly. They charged that Xu was
the Chen Zaidao of Jiangsu and said that he needed to be dragged
out. Xu Shiyou, understanding the danger, retreated with trusted sub-
ordinates to a secret military site in the neighboring province of Anhui.
The anti-Xu forces acted as if they expected soon to overthrow the local
military leadership and form a revolutionary committee. The Jiangsu
military stayed in their barracks as factional ghting spun out of
control.47
In Guangzhou, the Red Flag faction, emboldened by the Wuhan In-
cident, stepped up their offensive against their East Wind opponents
and the Guangzhou Military Region. Large street battles fought with
252 China Under Mao
military arms broke out in and around Guangzhou, including a four-

hour gun battle at a trade union building in mid-August and two large
battles at a shipyard and river warehouse complex fought with guns,
bombs, and grenades. In one such battle, the Taigu Sugar Renery ware-
houses burned, destroying all of the rened sugar.48 In Zhejiang, battles
between the two rebel alliances escalated. Both sides obtained weapons
from raids on arms depots and from sympathetic military units. In the
coastal port city of Wenzhou, an offensive burned a large swath of the
citys central business district to the ground. Atrocities occurred as ghters
captured in battle were tortured and executed. Military forces, unable to
use force, could not bring the province under control.49
Due to the strong support shown by the CCRG for attacks on local
military commanders, the armed forces began to show signs of deep in-
ternal divisions. Xu Shiyou in Nanjing faced challenges from air force
units and other ofcers under his command, and army units in other
parts of Jiangsu openly sided with rebel groups that were leading the
attacks on him.50 The same splits became evident in Zhejiang, with dif-
ferent military units supporting different sides in local factional battles.
In Hangzhou, air force units and selected ground troops pledged sup-
port to the United Headquarters in their attacks on the leadership of the
Zhejiang Military District and Military Control Committee.51
Throughout the month of August, Mao, still resident in Shanghai after
his hurried retreat from Wuhan, monitored events in the provinces,
seemingly undecided about how to respond. His agents on the CCRG en-
couraged attacks on the military, and they relayed his orders to distribute
arms to mass organizations that represented the left. Instead of redressing
the balance of forces in regional factional struggles, the arming of rebel
groups only led to an increase in destruction and death. Worse, there
were growing signs of severe political divisions within regional military
commands, and active involvement of local military units on different
sides of factional battles, threatening a disintegration of the army itself.
Some of the revolutionary committees established early in 1967 began
to experience renewed challenges by previously suppressed rebels. Maos
utterances during August seemed intended to relay an air of blithe un-
concern, as if all of this were going according to a grand plan known
only to him. In fact, Mao was already backtracking on his recent deci-
sions, having concluded that they only created new problems.
Forging a New Order
In late August, Mao reversed course yet again. He expressed doubts about
the slogan drag out a handful of capitalist roaders in the army, and on
August 30 ordered the arrest and public disgrace of several CCRG radi-
cals implicated in the attacks on the armed forces, including Wang Li of
Wuhan Incident fame, along with several staff members who had worked
to support antiarmy insurgencies.52 These gures became scapegoats for
Maos decision to arm rebels and sanction attacks on the military. Seeing
the clear shift in Maos views, other prominent CCRG members, in par-
ticular Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing, quickly backpedaled and with-
drew their support for provincial rebels campaigns against military com-
manders.53 Mao ordered army units to stop distributing weapons and
to retrieve those in rebel hands. They were told that they had the right
to shoot in self-defense if any rebels resisted these orders with force.54
The impact in provinces like Jiangsu was dramatic and immediate.
On August 16, Mao, still in Shanghai, ordered Zhang Chunqiao to y to
Anhui, where General Xu was in hiding, and personally escort him safely
to Shanghai. The next day Mao met with General Xu and promised him
that neither he nor the Nanjing Military Region would be overthrown.
Zhang Chunqiao quickly ordered his rebel allies in Nanjing to halt their
attacks on him. Zhou Enlai capitalized on the shift in Maos attitude to
emphasize in his many meetings with regional rebels that attacks on the
PLA were now off. Zhou Enlai ordered the Nanjing rebels in no uncer-
tain terms to end their campaign. They did so, but the two rebel fac-
tions remained at odds.55
Figure11.1 illustrates the nationwide impact of calls to arm rebels
and to encourage attacks on local armed forces. The number of armed
battles between rebel factions and attacks on government ofces or army
installations spiked in August 1967, and rapidly returned to previous
levels during September, when Mao reversed himself and leaned heavily
toward support for local military commanders. The impact of the distri-
bution of military armaments to rebel forces was even more dramatic.
Figure11.2 shows how much more deadly the factional con icts became
after military weapons were distributed to the combatants. While the
number of reported armed conicts increased by a little more than two-
fold from July to August 1967, the number of deaths due to these con-
icts increased more than vefold. The difculty in retrieving these arms
254 China Under Mao
1500
1250
1000
Armed conflicts
750
500
250
0
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Month
Figure11.1. Number of reported violent events, by month, 1967.

Source: Tabulations from data in Walder (2014).
5000
4000
Reported deaths
3000
2000
1000
0
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Month
Figure11.2. Number of reported campaign deaths, by month, 1967.

from rebel forces meant that the monthly death toll after August re-
mained much higher than it had been beforehand.
Mao had nally abandoned the idea that there was anything more
to be gained from trying to manipulate the outcome of regional con-
icts among rebel groups and the armed forces. By September 1967 he
had concluded that the only way to enforce order was to rely heavily on
the armed forces. The Shanghai model was dead and buried. As revolu-
tionary committees were formed, military commanders were almost al-
ways placed in the top posts, and military ofcers would dominate cru-
cial ofces that handled security and propaganda. These outcomes would
sorely disappoint rebel leaders, who expected to occupy important posts
like rebel leaders in Shanghai. The violent battles that raged across China
for much of 1967, however, made it almost impossible to place leaders
of either rebel faction in positions of real authority. Rebel leaders who
had spearheaded attacks on the armed forces were left increasingly at
the mercy of their enemies.
The rebuilding of political order in the many provinces under mili-
tary control was prolonged and contentious. To create a revolutionary
committee took six steps. First, a cease- re between warring mass fac-
tions and their military supporters had to be concluded. Second, dele-
gations of representatives would travel to Beijing and, under the super-
vision of Beijing authorities, engage in self-criticisms and discussions
designed to settle the issues that divided them. The third step was to forge
an agreement about the leadership of the new revolutionary committee
or, more accurately, force the delegations to accept the candidate ulti-
mately decided upon by Mao, Zhou Enlai, and the CCRG. The fourth
step was to criticize and remove factional leaders who proved unwilling
to compromise, and who did not understand that the time for ghting
was over. The fth step was to create a new power structure and ban
mass organizations that coordinated activity across workplaces and
schools. The sixth and nal step was for the new authorities to replicate
the process in cities, prefectures, and counties, and conduct criticism
campaigns within schools and work organizations designed to break
down factional ties, create new leadership bodies, and enforce the au-
thority of the army.
Jiangsu Province illustrates the course of these negotiations.56 On
September 4, shortly after Mao halted attacks on General Xu Shiyou,
Zhou Enlai pushed the two rebel alliances to sign a cease-re agreement,
256 China Under Mao
and ordered Jiangsus Military Control Committee to assemble delega-

tions to send to Beijing. More than 180 delegates were chosen from rival
factions in Nanjing and key cities elsewhere in Jiangsu. Military ofcers
who had been active in attacks on General Xu and who had supported
him formed separate delegations.
The negotiations began with study classes where each side was or-
dered to make self-criticisms for their factional behavior over previous
months, but the meetings repeatedly broke down into acrimonious ar-
guments. The negotiations inadvertently rekindled street battles in Nan-
jing and other cities in Jiangsu, as each rebel faction sought to improve
its position on the ground in order to strengthen its hand at the bargaining
table. The antiXu Shiyou factions refused to drop their accusations
against him. Acrimonious meetings continued well into December,
testing the patience of ofcials like Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng, who an-
grily reprimanded stubborn delegation leaders on several occasions. As it
became apparent in December that the negotiations were deadlocked,
violent battles resumed along the rail lines connecting Shanghai with
Nanjing, blocking rail trafc once again for several days, and drawing dif-
ferent military units into opposite sides in support of their rebel allies.
After four months of acrimonious and unproductive negotiations,
Mao laid down the law. The opponents of Xu Shiyou within the armed
forces, along with the leaders of the rebel groups that supported the army,
were arrested and denounced as black hands that instigated factional
ghting. Huge public rallies were held in Nanjing during which they were
denounced and roughly handled on the stage. The local media conducted
a shrill denunciation campaign against them and their followers. In-
citing attacks against the army was now a crime and would be punished.
Delegates and their local followers were threatened that further pursuit
of factional ends was forbidden. The central military command disci-
plined and transferred ofcers and military units that were involved in
the ghting against Xu Shiyou. This nal crackdown put an end to the
arguments in Beijing and put a blanket on factional passions back in
Jiangsu. With this authoritarian turn, the four-month-long negotiations
ended in January 1968.
In February 1968 new delegations, purged of the militant rebels and
military ofcers opposed to Xu Shiyou, met in Beijing to select mem-
bers of the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee. At this point there was
not much for the delegates to negotiate. Mao had already decided that
Xu Shiyou would head the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee, and the

only real question was which of Jiangsus former top party ofcials would
be included in the new leadership body. After brief haggling, the new
lineup, negotiated by Zhou Enlai in consultation with Xu Shiyou, was
presented to the delegation, which dutifully and unanimously approved
it on March20. Although on paper, a majority of the 165 members of the
new revolutionary committee were mass representatives, rebel mem-
bership was largely ceremonial. The revolutionary committee as a whole
would rarely meet. Its standing committee did meet regularly to make
key decisions, but military ofcers completely controlled it. Army ofcers
held fewer than one-fth of the positions on the revolutionary committee
but they monopolized all of the key posts. Xu Shiyou was the head, and
all four vice heads except veteran party secretary Peng Chong were army
ofcers. The heads of the key staff ofces in charge of politics, production,
and security were all military ofcers. Not a single rebel leader was ap-
pointed vice head. One prominent leader from each of the rebel factions
was appointed to the thirty-nine-member standing committee, but nei-
ther held positions of authority. Xu Shiyou and the troops under his com-
mand proceeded to place the province under rm military control.
Jiangsus revolutionary committee was the seventeenth of twenty-
nine provincial revolutionary committees to be established. One of the
last, in August 1968, was in Guangxi, a province bordering Vietnam
where severe and prolonged ghting had not responded to efforts to ne-
gotiate a cease- re. Guangxis Beijing negotiations were themselves
marred by violence: Wei Guoqing, the military commander of the
Guangxi forces, was attacked and beaten in his hotel by rebels who had
traveled from Guangxi to confront him. Guangxis rebel factions had co-
alesced around two province-wide alliances. One, called April 22, op-
posed Wei Guoqing but had the support of main-force PLA units stationed
in the capital of Nanning that took orders directly from Beijing. United
Command supported Wei Guoqing and had the support of his military
units. With military support for each large rebel alliance, the Beijing ne-
gotiations were stalemated.
Maos patience was at an end. On July 3 a strongly worded document
ordered the harsh suppression of any group in Guangxi that resisted the
imposition of military control, and the main-force PLA unit that sup-
ported the April 22 alliance was transferred out of the region. Wei
Guoqing launched an offensive against the rebels who still controlled
258 China Under Mao
Nanning. His forces bombarded the city in mid-July and large districts of
the city were destroyed. The battle against April 22 continued in Nan-
ning for two weeks, leaving 50,000 homeless and taking more than
10,000 prisoners, more than 2,300 of whom were later executed.57
The offensive was waged by regular PLA units and heavily armed
United Command ghters across the province. As the ghting extended
deep into the rural interior, it touched off massacres in small towns and
villages that appear at times to have been only tangentially connected
to the major rebel rivalries in the province.58 In Binyang County, every
commune experienced mass killings between July 26 and August 6:
3,681 people were killed. Of the 3,951 killed during the entire Cultural
Revolution in Binyang, 93 percent were killed during these eleven days.59
In Donglan County, the leaders of the United Command faction and their
military allies mobilized 3,000 ghters to cleanse the county of their op-
ponents. They arrested over 10,000 and executed 1,016.60
Guangxi was the nal shocking spasm of violence that crushed rebel
opposition and placed most of China under a harsh military regime. PLA
generals headed twenty of the twenty-nine provincial-level jurisdictions.
In Guangdong, Liaoning, Shanxi, Yunnan, and Hubei, army ofcers
headed between 81 and98 percent of all revolutionary committees at
the county level and above.61 In Jiangsu, army ofcers headed every pre-
fecture and sixty out of sixty-eight counties.62 The PLA had effectively
replaced Chinas civilian party-state. Rebels who had fought against mil-
itary control were now completely at their mercy.
The Bitter End in Beijing
During the many months that Beijing authorities tried to forge great
alliances in the provinces, the capitals own student rebels exhibited
the same factional tendencies. The university rebels were divided into
two large alliances, labeled Heaven and Earth. The main axis of con ict
centered on the two largest campuses: Peking and Tsinghua universi-
ties. The rebels on these two campuses were split over the controversial
leadership of Nie Yuanzi (Peking) and Kuai Dafu (Tsinghua). Large rebel
factions at the Geology Institute and Beijing Normal University were the
backbone of the Earth faction, and they staunchly supported the oppo-
nents of Nie and Kuai, leaders of the Heaven faction, who held out on
their campuses.63
The split between Heaven and Earth had been a headache for the
CCRG since early 1967. Despite their nationwide celebrity as paragons
of the capitals rebel movement in late 1966, Nie Yuanzi and Kuai Dafu
had become political liabilities. Both behaved in ways that split the large
rebel movements on their campuses. The citywide deadlock between
Heaven and Earth factions gradually degenerated into violent campus
battles. Efforts to enlist cadres for their planned revolutionary commit-
tees led each faction to intensify their attacks on the cadres enlisted by
the other side. Rebel factions began to take prisoners, and they estab-
lished torture chambers to extract confessions. They reinforced campus
buildings under their control, and proceeded to ght over campus ter-
ritory. By the spring of 1968 the Peking and Tsinghua university cam-
puses were in a state of civil war, without any recognized campus au-
thority to mediate violent clashes.64
The conict at Peking University came to a head in March1968, when
a large force of rebels from the Earth faction marched onto the campus
demanding that Nie Yuanzi be dragged out. Nie organized her ghters
to resist, and violent battles followed over the next several days, as thou-
sands of reinforcements from Earth and Heaven factions joined in the
fray.65 Skirmishing between the two sides continued and mutual accu-
sations became more bellicose and threatening. In April, Nies forces
gained the upper hand. Her rivals dug in behind defensive barriers, and
she appeared to be on the verge of complete victory. Her opponents tried
to hold out behind defense works and stopped issuing their newspaper.
Skirmishes broke out when they tried to restore utilities and food
deliveries to their buildings. Nies forces seized and interrogated any
opponents that they could capture, and subjected them to public struggle
sessions. Several of them were tortured to death. At the end of April
Nie held a series of public trials of captured opposition leaders. She es-
tablished a prison that held more than 200 cadres and faculty, who
were regularly beaten and tortured to confess.
Nie brooked no compromise and demanded complete surrender. Near
the end of July she prepared for the nal battle. Her forces cut off water
and electricity to the buildings still controlled by her opponents,
touching off a battle fought with roof tiles, spears, and bricks that spread
onto adjacent streets. After Nie heard that a large force of workers and
soldiers was surrounding the adjacent Tsinghua campus on July 27, she
called an emergency meeting to coordinate defenses. They stockpiled
260 China Under Mao
Molotov cocktails and other weapons and posted lookouts. Instead, Nie
was summoned to an emergency meeting at the Great Hall of the People
at 3 a.m. on July 28.
This summons was a response to events that day at Tsinghua. The
struggle between Kuai Dafu and his opponents had long since deterio-
rated into violent armed con ict. Since early May the large campus was
a patchwork of fortied buildings and ill-de ned front lines, with Kuai
consistently on the offensive. Initially the students were armed with
clubs, spears, daggers, bricks, and stones launched from slingshots. In-
juries mounted. The rst death was recorded near the end of April. In
early May members of the opposition carried the corpse of their slain
comrade in a protest march to Tiananmen Square, where they held a
protest rally. There followed a series of campus skirmishes resulting in
casualties and two more deaths, with prisoners captured and brutally
beaten. After one of their leaders was killed, the opposition staged another
protest march in late May, carry ing the corpse to Tiananmen Square in
protest.
A turning point was reached on May 30. In a large assault on a
building controlled by the opposition, the two sides used spears, knives,
Molotov cocktails, gas grenades, and even a makeshift tank. Kuais forces
set the building on re and captured opposition ghters as they tried to
escape. At the end of an eleven-hour battle, three students were dead
and more than 300 were wounded. Kuais forces obtained ries and set
up snipers at the campus gates and outside the buildings where the op-
position was barricaded, and began to pick off people who tried to leave
or enter. Skirmishes continued, increasingly with grenades, rebombs,
improvised explosive devices, and makeshift tanks that were designed
and built by engineering students. Desperate, Kuais opponents appealed
repeatedly to the Beijing Revolutionary Committee to put the campus
under martial law. On July 7 they marched to Tiananmen Square with
the corpse of another slain comrade to dramatize their demand. Fighting
continued, and on July 9 a large new building on campus was set on
re and virtually destroyed. By the end of July, twelve people had been
killed and several hundred seriously wounded. Most of the campus com-
munity had ed, and an estimated force of fewer than 400 diehard
ghters remained on campus.
Mao had reached the end of his patience with Kuai and the Beijing
student rebels, who had been his favorites back in 1966. He ordered of-
cers from the elite army unit assigned to safeguard national leaders to
assemble thousands of workers from more than sixty nearby factories,
along with a leadership core of soldiers. They mobilized a force of close
to 30,000 to converge on the Tsinghua campus the next morning, armed
only with books of Maos quotations. Mao did not want armed soldiers
to enter the campus and use deadly force to suppress the rebels. Instead,
this propaganda team was to swarm through the gates in overwhelming
numbers while chanting slogans from Maos works, separate the two
sides, and clear away barriers and fortications.
Kuai Dafu saw this as an attempt to steal his victory and declared
that there were black hands in the party leadership who had sent the
workers. He ordered his followers to resist. During a twelve-hour clash
the unarmed workers and soldiers were assaulted as they attempted to
enter buildings and convince Kuais ghters to disarm. Eventually Kuais
forces surrendered, but not until they had killed ve members of the pro-
paganda team and wounded more than 700.
Just as the Tsinghua hostilities were winding down, Kuai Dafu, Nie
Yuanzi, and three other prominent Red Guard leaders on both sides of
the Heaven-Earth divide were summoned to an urgent meeting in the
Great Hall of the People. When they arrived in the early morning hours
of July 28, they faced a phalanx of top ofcials headed by Mao himself.
Joining him were Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang
Qing, and several others literally the entire top ranks of a party lead-
ership badly depleted by purges. The meeting began at 3:30 a.m. and
lasted ve hours.
Edited transcripts of the meeting were later issued as a printed pam-
phlet. In them, Mao is by turns solicitous, sarcastic, threatening, and
angry.66 The urgent meeting was obviously a reaction to the Tsinghua
events, and Mao began by expressing strong displeasure with Kuai Dafu.
Kuai was late in arriving, and Mao asked why he was not there. Mao im-
mediately made clear the reason for the meeting: Kuai Dafu wants to
grab the black hand, so many workers suppressing the red guardswho
is the black hand? Now you cant drag him outthe black hand is me!
The central message, despite Maos characteristic ramblings, was clear:
the Red Guard movement was over. Mao was deeply disappointed by
their behavior. The universities were to be put under military control.
The key points of the message were issued as a supreme directive
from Chairman Mao in the name of the ve Red Guard leaders. Mao
262 China Under Mao
was quoted as saying, Now we have come to the point where you little
generals are committing errors. . . . I dont want you split into Heaven
faction and Earth faction. Form one faction and thats the end of it. The
key mistake, Mao made clear, was the persistence of violent factional
con ict:
The Cultural Revolution has gone on for two years now! . . . Now the
workers, peasants, soldiers and residents are all unhappy, and the great
majority of students are unhappy, and even some of the people who sup-
port your faction are unhappy. Youve become divorced from the workers,
divorced from the peasants, divorced from the army, divorced from the
residents, and youre divorced from the vast majority of students.
Mao made very clear that his patience was at an end:
I say youre divorced from the masses; the masses cant accept civil
war. . . . Well now were issuing a nationwide directive, and whoever
violates it, striking at the army, sabotaging transportation, killing people,
setting res, is committing a crime. If theres a minority who wont listen
to persuasion and refuses to change, then theyre bandits, Nationalists.
Well surround them, and if theyre stubborn, well wipe them out.
Red Guards were told to return to campus and await the arrival of Mao
Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. By the end of August the Beijing
Revolutionary Committee and Garrison Command sent more than
10,000 soldiers and17,000 workers to Beijings universities. When these
units arrived, students found that the Cultural Revolution had come full
circle. These were new work teams, ones that would brook no opposi-
tion or criticism, unlike the work teams for which Liu Shaoqi was de-
nounced in 1966. In virtually every case army ofcers led them, and
they established their authority in no uncertain terms.
12

Military Rule
A upheavals of 1967 and 1968, it is tempting to

F T ER T H E V IOL EN T
think of military control and revolutionary committees as the
restoration of order. Nothing could be farther from the truth. This
new period brought radical and wrenching social changes and new
persecution campaigns of unprecedented scope and ferocity. Huge
numbers of students and bureaucrats were transferred from city to
countryside to engage in manual labor. Universities were closed and
government ofces were emptied of their staffs. The Mao cult escalated
to the point where it resembled organized religious worship. Millions
were imprisoned, interrogated, tortured, or executed in campaigns
that searched for participants in imaginary political conspiracies, or
committed suicide. The toll of these campaigns far exceeded the damage
wrought by rampaging Red Guards and factional warfare among rebel
alliances.
Eliminating Rebel Organizations
Red Guard and rebel leaders were in for a rude awakening after mili-
tary-led propaganda teams arrived to enforce proletarian dictatorship
in their organizations. These teams, composed of factory workers and
military ofcers, and backed by military control committees, were not
there to declare winners and losers, and they had no intention of per-
mitting movement activists to run the show. Their attitude was that the
rebels failed to unite, that both sides had committed severe political er-
rors, and that they had to undergo reeducation and confession in coer-
cive study classes. The slogan for this reeducation process was struggle,
264 China Under Mao
criticize, transform. Military control committees worked systematically

to neutralize the leaders of rebel groups, cut off their communication
with allies in other schools and workplaces, and steadily break up fac-
tional af liations within schools, factories, and ofces.
Struggle, criticize, transform was a coercive process of mutual crit-
icism and thought reform through which the factional divisions of re-
cent years were to be obliterated. In compulsory Mao Zedong Thought
Study Classes, faction leaders at all levels were compelled to write self-
criticisms that confessed to errors committed during the mass movement.
Their confessions were evaluated by the class directors and were criti-
cized by other participants. The mutual criticisms often revealed new
errors to which the individuals had yet to confess. Those who refused
to acknowledge guilt were subjected to struggle sessions and mass de-
nunciation meetings organized by army ofcers. The idealized end point
was to transform the organization into a unied and disciplined corps
of obedient servants of Chairman Mao who had overcome the counter-
productive factionalism that had so divided the rebels.
Nationally celebrated rebel leaders were not exempt. Typical of this
turn of events was the humiliating demise of Peking Universitys Nie
Yuanzi, the famous author of the rst Marxist-Leninist wall poster that
won Maos extravagant praise, and a member of the Beijing Revolutionary
Committee.1 After the July 1968 meeting with Mao that signaled the
end of the Red Guard movement, Nie returned to her campus, and her
factions newspaper published an editorial to warmly welcome the Mao
Zedong Thought Propaganda Team. Things changed drastically after the
propaganda team entered the campus in mid-August. Her factions news-
paper was immediately shut down. The propaganda team demanded the
surrender of all arms and the dismantling of defense works. It took con-
trol of all broadcasting equipment, secured the release of all prisoners
held in private jails, and demanded an end to mutual recriminations.
Nie was immediately informed that she should reect on how her at-
tempts to forcibly suppress critics created and sustained violent splits.
The leaders of both factions were placed in study classes to confess
the errors they had committed during the movement. Nie Yuanzi refused
to acknowledge serious errors and continued to make accusations against
her rivals. In October the propaganda team held a mass denunciation
meeting attended by more than 3,000 people to criticize her for resisting
the propaganda team. In late November she was subjected to another
Military Rule 265
denunciation meeting where she was criticized for her bourgeois stand-
point and decadent, hypocritical ways.
When Peking Universitys revolutionary committee was nally es-
tablished in September 1969, a military ofcer was the head, and of the
six vice heads, three were soldiers and one was a worker on the propa-
ganda team. Only two vice heads were from the university, one of whom
was Nie Yuanzi. This was completely for showthe iconic author of Maos
beloved wall poster could not be publicly disgraced. Nie was isolated for
reeducation for over a year and was paroled briey only for a token ap-
pearance as a delegate to the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, at
which, remarkably, despite her political troubles, she was elected as
an alternate member of the Central Committee. Two months after the
schools revolutionary committee was established, she was sent to a state
farm for labor reform. Her name quietly disappeared from all leadership
lists at the city and national level within two years.
Kuai Dafu, Tsinghua Universitys famous Red Guard commander, did
not fare any better.2 The propaganda team assigned to Tsinghua disarmed
both factions in early August and released all prisoners. When the schools
revolutionary committee was established in January 1969, its head was
the commanding ofcer of the army regiment in charge of the propa-
ganda team. The team remained in charge of Tsinghua for most of the
next decade.3 Kuai Dafu was shipped off to a military factory in the re-
mote Ningxia Muslim Autonomous Region. He was briey returned to
Tsinghua in 1970, placed in isolation, and interrogated as a suspected
member of an underground organization of ultraleftists. He eventually
returned to Beijing to work in a factory under supervision.
Beijings other famous rebel leaders all suffered a similar fate. Bei-
jing Normal Universitys Tan Houlan was assigned to perform manual
labor under a military regiment near Beijing in October 1968. In mid-
1970 she was returned to her former campus to be interrogated about
an alleged conspiracy of ultraleftists. After this ordeal, she worked in a
Beijing factory under supervision until the mid-1970s. The Aeronautics
Institutes Han Aijing was similarly isolated for investigation at the end
of 1968. He was sent to a factory in Hunan in late 1969 to labor under
supervision. The Geology Institutes Wang Dabin was assigned to a fac-
tory in Sichuan in January 1969. The famous leaders of Beijings stu-
dent movement would play no role in the newly established organs of
power.
266 China Under Mao
Consolidating Revolutionary Committees
The experience of the famous Beijing rebels captures in microcosm the

overall strategy of military commanders in shutting down factions. In
Jiangsu, the provincial revolutionary committee was established in
Nanjing in April 1968, with General Xu Shiyou in the top post.4 What-
ever inuence the rebel leaders had was eliminated through the step-
by-step dismantling of their former organizations. The rst step was to
organize students, workers, and peasants into separate congresses at
the city level. This effectively prohibited political activities across schools
and work units. This did not immediately end factional con ict, but it
served to bottle it up inside individual schools and factories. The next
step was to organize study classes for faction leaders and conduct the
struggle, criticize, transform campaign to degrade factional ties. When
the leaders of local factions resisted, they became the primary targets of
the campaign. Subsequent campaigns against various political conspir-
acies further cowed active members of rebel factions and landed many
of them in prison. Through this step-by-step process, the Jiangsu mili-
tary steadily tightened their grip over the province without the massive
application of armed force.5
Rebel leaders on revolutionary committees soon realized that their
positions were largely honorary. Their dissatisfaction was heightened
after they sent a delegation to visit nearby Shanghai in May 1968 to learn
from their model experience. Former rebels from both factions openly
praised Shanghai when they returned home. Unlike themselves, Shang-
hais former rebels (most notably Wang Hongwen) held positions of real
inuence. Members from the faction that had led the attacks on Xu
Shiyou were upset because they bore the brunt of the struggle, criti-
cism, transform campaign.
The process was far from smooth, and resistance occasionally bred
violent clashes. From April to July 1968 there were ve major skirmishes
in Nanjing. Because cross-occupation organization had been eliminated,
the factional clashes were within work units, unlike the large street bat-
tles of the past. The rst such confrontation was in the Nanjing Radio
Academy on April 23, a stronghold of antiXu Shiyou sentiment. A brawl
broke out between members of the two factions. Troops sent to arrest
the culprits met resistance, activists from nearby units rushed to the
school to reinforce their allies, and a furious battle broke out. A similar
clash occurred on May 4 at a military-run manufacturing plant, leading
Military Rule 267
to the dispatch of troops to the scene. This, in turn, led the anti-Xu ac-
tivists to stage a demonstration at the revolutionary committee head-
quarters. Similar incidents broke out into early July, one of which re-
sulted in the death of a student.
This chronic low-grade con ict frustrated military authorities, who
could only organize more study classes. In August 1968 Xu Shiyou la-
mented the fact that more than 1.5 million such study classes had been
held throughout Jiangsu, without quelling factional quarrels. Although
the street battles had ended and the large rebel alliances were broken
up, the revolutionary committees authority at the grass roots was still
tenuous.
In July 1968, the same month that Mao called in Beijings Red Guard
leaders to reprimand them, the central authorities issued two strongly
worded directives authorizing stern measures against continuing fac-
tional warfare in Guangxi and Shaanxi provinces. Xu Shiyou seized this
opportunity to adopt harsher measures. Nanjings rebel leaders were iso-
lated in study classes where the leaders who still resisted were denounced
in no uncertain terms. Propaganda teams were sent into schools and fac-
tories, where they carried out campaigns that targeted rebel groups who
resisted. The authorities cause was aided further by the emptying out
of the schools. In late 1968 university students were assigned jobs and
left Nanjing altogether, and most of the high school students were shipped
off to the countryside. University rebels in the anti-Xu camp were as-
signed to jobs far from Nanjing. The students and faculty left behind were
soon sent to factories, mines, or the countryside for manual labor, and
would not return until 1970.
The events in Jiangsu conformed to the national pattern. Figure12.1
illustrates the impact of military control and the formation of revolu-
tionary committees. The gure shows the effects of the nal push to de-
mobilize mass factions during the summer of 1968. The number of armed
battles between rebel factions and the number of attacks on government
ofces and military installations dropped rapidly. By September 1968
this tumultuous phase of the Cultural Revolution was over.
Closing the Universities

In the tumult of the preceding years, no new students were admitted to
universities, no classes were held, and no one graduated with degrees.
The national entrance examinations were cancelled in June 1966 and
268 China Under Mao
1500
Number of reported events
1000
500
0
Jan 1967 July 1967 Jan 1968 July 1968 Dec 1968
MonthYear
Figure12.1. Number of reported violent events, by month, 19671968.

were not reinstated. Students who were on university campuses in the

spring semester of 1966 remained for the next two years, although many
ed in the later stages when campus con icts became dangerously vio-
lent. By the fall of 1968, Chinas entire population of university and high
school students had neither continued their education nor embarked on
careers. Three entering classes1966, 1967, and1968had already been
skipped. It was now time to decide what to do about the students and
the universities.
Initially, the top priority was to ensure military control over warring
student factions. Faculty and school ofcials, who had already been sub-
jected to student attacks for almost two years, underwent further thought
reform and ideological remolding. Instead of reopening the universities,
admitting a new class of students, and continuing the educations of those
whose course work was interrupted in 1966, a radically different option
was chosen. The universities were closed inde nitely, and the campuses
were emptied of students, faculty, and administrators.
The rst step, at the end of 1968, was to declare all students gradu-
ated and assign them to jobs. This effectively ended any hope that stu-
Military Rule 269
dent rebels would be appointed to positions in new organs of power in

their schools, and rebel leaders were usually assigned to jobs in distant
locations, typically as manual laborers in factories or as low-level tech-
nical staff. The most fortunate students became soldiersan assignment
that favored the politically connected. The political careers of student
rebels, in either their schools or local government, were largely ended.
The second step, after a harrowing campaign to expose alleged reaction-
aries and spies, was to send virtually all faculty and administrators to
May 7 Cadre Schools, the name for rural facilities set up for the re-
molding of intellectuals and bureaucrats through manual labor. The fac-
ulties of Peking and Tsinghua universities were shipped off together to
a single site on the muddy banks of a lake in Jiangxi Province, where
they had to build their own shelter and grow much of their own food.
The facility was not closed until the early 1970s.6
Most universities did not reopen until 1972, after most faculty and
administrators returned from their May 7 experience, and the rst en-
tering classes made their way to college campuses still under the con-
trol of Mao Thought Propaganda Teams. Enrollments were much lower
than in 1966 and did not return to previous levels until 1977.7 The big-
gest change, however, was in the way that entering students were se-
lected. The meritocratic national examinations had earlier favored stu-
dents from the former middle classes and households labeled as
reactionary, despite the class label system. These examinations were
now abolished. No one would be admitted to university directly from
high school. Instead, all college students would be recruited directly from
collective farms, factories, or the armed forces. The sole standards would
now be an applicants class label and political activism, and written rec-
ommendations based on political assessments submitted by the leaders
of local revolutionary committees.8
Banishment to the Countryside

The new college admissions process meant that graduates of academic
high schools had to abandon immediate college plans to undergo an in-
de nite period of work in a job that involved manual labor. Students
who did not gain admittance to high school, or who completed courses
in vocational and technical high schools, were assigned local jobs in fac-
tories or other urban work units. The vast majority of academic high
270 China Under Mao
school graduates were sent to remote rural villages to work inde nitely
as ordinary farmers. The practice had started in the early 1960s on a small
scale in large cities like Shanghai, where local jobs could not be found
for all graduating seniors who failed the university entrance exams.9 Now
the practice became universal.
This rural sojourn had no time limit. Urban youths were required to
make new lives as ordinary farmers. Some obtained party membership
and later became cadres in brigades and communes. A lucky few were
able to impress their superiors and gain a recommendation for college
admission as a worker-peasant-soldier student. As might be expected,
these youths initially suffered serious problems of adjustment to difcult
rural lives, and they found the lower-calorie grain-based rural diet,
coupled with hard physical labor, beyond anything they had ever expe-
rienced in the cities. Vulnerable young females, living independently far
from their families, were subjected to aggressive sexual harassment and
even sexual assaults at the hands of rural cadres.10 Over the next de-
cade more than 18 million urban youths were sent to the countryside.
During these years, only 720,000 were able to attend universities as
worker-peasant-soldier students.11
A separate aspect of the transfer of urban residents to the country-
side was the deportation of political outcasts. The banishment of sus-
pect individuals and entire households to the countryside based on class
background or other negative political labels began in 1966, but esca-
lated under the revolutionary committees. This was intended to be per-
manent, but in the waning years of the Mao era these individuals began
to protest their plight. In the city of Tianjin, some 15,000 individuals
were deported to rural regions, along with more than 25,000 of their
family membersroughly 1.3 percent of Tianjins urban population.12
Labor Reform for Bureaucrats
The imperative to force all educated individuals to undergo ideological

remolding through manual labor was also applied to the white-collar
staffs of bureaucratic agencies. Very few were able to avoid a prolonged
period in a rural May 7 Cadre School or as a manual worker in a fac-
tory. Ofces throughout urban China were almost emptied from 1969
to 1971. Large majorities of administrators and staff spent long periods
in manual labor. The emptied ofces operated with skeleton staffs, cov-
Military Rule 271
ering only minimal functions. Research virtually ceased, and govern-

ment ser vices were slashed to a bare minimum. The practice was repli-
cated within large state factories: engineers, accountants, and other
technical staff worked at lathes and blast furnacesor as support staff
for cleaning and meal servicesas factory ofces were emptied out.
When these individuals eventually returned to their ofce jobs, their au-
thority was much reduced.
Initially, this movement to send down ofce workers far outstripped
the scale of the transfer of youths to the countryside, but it lasted for a
shorter period. In Shanghai, more than 20,000 cadres were sent to work
on factory oors, with plans to permanently reduce the staf ng of of-
ces at all levels of administration.13 In Tianjin, more than 70 percent
of the ofce staff in the citys factories were transferred to manual jobs.14
In Henan, a total of 12,300 cadres working in provincial party and gov-
ernment ofces were sent down in three groups to rural camps for
manual labor near the end of 1969.15 In Hubei, more than 8,000 cadres
from the provincial government were sent to a converted military camp
for their stint of rural labor.16 Guangdong Province built a total of 313
May 7 facilities, and sent 164,600 cadres from provincial, prefectural,
and county and city organs to them. The Guangdong authorities at the
time planned to permanently reduce the number of government per-
sonnel by more than 150,000.17 Not until 1971 did the practice begin to
wane, and not until 1972 were the rural camps closed.
Cleansing the Class Ranks
As military control committees consolidated their authority, the criti-

cism campaign known as struggle, criticize, transform was expanded
into a much larger and more draconian hunt for traitors and counter-
revolutionaries: the Cleansing of the Class Ranks (qingli jieji duiwu). The
national network of newly established revolutionary committees mobi-
lized for a purge campaign of enormous scope. It began shortly after rev-
olutionary committees were formed and continued well into 1969.
The cleansing campaign was initiated through two distinct channels.
The rst was a series of investigations in Beijing by the Central Case Ex-
amination Group formed in 1966 to build cases against national ofcials
who had fallen in the purges of the Cultural Revolution. Close to 1 mil-
lion cadres were caught up in the nationwide investigations coordinated
272 China Under Mao
by this group.18 Recently deposed high ofcials were accused of antiparty

conspiracies; but conspiracies must have followers, and these followers
must be hidden in regions where these ofcials had formerly worked.
Investigators in Beijing ordered local authorities to look into people pos-
sibly implicated in a higher-level case. The request was not one that a
local revolutionary committee could ignore, and this touched off auxil-
iary investigations of cases nationwide.
The campaign to uproot the Inner Mongolian Peoples Party was ini-
tiated in this fashion. It began as an investigation of Ulanfu, Inner Mon-
golias top ofcial, who was purged at the outset of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. In the spring of 1968 the cleansing campaign unfolded as a drive
to uproot and eliminate Ulanfus inuence. As the revolutionary com-
mittee built a conspiracy case against him, they charged that he headed
a nonex istent New Inner Mongolian Peoples Party, an alleged con-
spiracy of ethnic Mongol separatists with links to Mongolia and the So-
viet Union. The campaign proceeded via the arrest and torture of sus-
pects, primarily ethnic Mongols, who frequently confessed and were then
tortured further to name coconspirators. By March1969, when Beijing
nally intervened to halt the campaign, 790,000 individuals had been
targeted and interrogated: 120,000 suffered permanent physical disabil-
ities as a result of beatings or torture, and22,900 were killed or exe-
cuted, or committed suicide.19
Most of the victims of the cleansing campaigns were not implicated
in cases originally fabricated by the Central Case Examination Group.
More commonly, the campaign unfolded through local investigations ini-
tiated independently in schools and work units. The national campaign
began after activities in several model units in Beijing were described
in central policy documents distributed nationwide, with a personal en-
dorsement by Mao. The tone was set by a Peoples Daily editorial on New
Years Day 1968: it called for the cleansing of a wide variety of enemies
and traitors from the revolutionary ranks as the victory of proletarian
power was being consolidated. In late May 1968 the campaign conducted
in Beijings New China Printing Plant was recounted in the rst of these
central documents. It was carried out by the plants military control com-
mittee, which was composed of ofcers from the army unit that served
as the Politburos security detail. The factory was an old one, and the
campaign was motivated by the premise that employees left over from
the old society, who had worked under the Nationalists and the Japa-
Military Rule 273
nese, had been behind extremely complex, acute, and violent class
struggles in the factory. Mass meetings were held to expose traitors, un-
masking a number of counterrevolutionaries. The suspects were sub-
jected to struggle sessions and forced to write confessions, and told that
leniency would be granted only to those who confessed fully.20
To conduct the campaign, local governments, ofces, factories, and
schools formed case groups that were charged with gathering evidence
about the alleged crimes of targeted individuals. Political dossiers of
suspects were scoured for evidence of prior malfeasance, and former
superiors and associates would be contacted for incriminating informa-
tion. As it unfolded across China the campaign operated through
accusation, interrogation, and confession. The rst step was an accusa-
tion, often supported by nothing more than suspicion based on personal
history or associations. The accusations could arrive in the form of a letter
transmitted from higher authorities, letters or delegates from other
units or localities investigating cases of their own, or from an accusation
made by members of the masses in meetings or privately.
After the campaign claimed its rst victims, the primary source of
new accusations was the interrogation rooms themselves. Under the best
of circumstances, the interrogations were threatening and bullying. The
accused were assumed to be guilty and were coerced by threats of dire
punishment if they did not confess. Despite instructions from Beijing
that interrogators use principled methods, physical abuse was com-
monly employed, including, according to a number of post-Mao retro-
spective reports, sadistic torture. Once an unfortunate suspect confessed,
the interrogations were not over. Conspiracies by de nition involved
others. The next step was to name coconspirators. If the suspect refused
to name others, the ordeal would continue until additional names were
extracted. Those named, in turn, were hauled in for similar interroga-
tions, similar confessions, similar naming of coconspirators. In this
manner, the campaign frequently escalated to claim large numbers of
victims. Because the charges to which they confessed amounted to coun-
terrevolution, executions often followed although many in this cam-
paign died under torture in the interrogation rooms or found the means
to commit suicide. Suicides could become a problem for investigators be-
cause they were taken as an admission of guilt, and they halted the
process of extracting the names of coconspirators, leading investiga-
tions to a dead end. Early in the campaign, gures like Kang Sheng
274 China Under Mao
and Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi expressed concern about the
rash of suicides, complaining that it served to obstruct investigations.21
At Peking University the cleansing campaign began one month after
the army took over the university, dismantling rebel organizations and
detaining their leaders for reeducation. Case groups ignored all that had
transpired in the university over the previous two years and initiated
investigations of more than 900 suspected cadres and faculty members.
The targets were detained on campus. After grueling interrogations, the
propaganda team took a little over a month to rule that 542 of these in-
dividuals were enemies of the people. By the end of the year, eighteen
had committed suicide. The dead included one of the rst senior party
ofcials to publicly side with Nie Yuanzi in her initial rebellion against
the school authorities. He was found in the universitys swimming
pool, an apparent suicide.22
The cleansing campaign cast a wide net. A large proportion of its vic-
tims were individuals in social categories that were targeted earlier in
the Cultural Revolutionthose with overseas and Nationalist afliations
or from landlord and capitalist backgrounds. But there were a great many
other ways to fall afoul of the campaign. Party members who had served
the organization loyally for decades might nd themselves accused of
membership in an imaginary spy ring. Those who risked their lives in
the party underground before 1949 often found their service taken as
evidence that they were Nationalist spies. Those who were active in fac-
tional struggles earlier in the Cultural Revolution might now nd their
activities interpreted as a conspiracy against Mao and socialism. Indi-
viduals who made stray critical comments about Jiang Qing or who
had praised Liu Shaoqi or other leaders during unguarded moments
also fell under suspicion. Those who had earlier offended an individual
now entrusted with carry ing out the campaign, those who made the
mistake of speaking out against torture and murder, or who defended
fallen party leaders, were also prime suspects.23 The terror created during
this campaign was due not solely to the draconian treatment of sus-
pects but also to the widespread uncertainty created by the campaigns
unpredictability.
The campaign had a major impact in Shanghai, even though the city
had been spared the widespread factional warfare that affected most re-
gions of China. The citys revolutionary committee had in mind a disci-
plined campaign in which hidden class enemies were uncovered and pa-
Military Rule 275
raded publicly before the masses. Beginning in January 1968 and

concluding in April 1969, 169,000 individuals were placed under inves-
tigation. Of the top twenty party and government ofcials in Shanghai
on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, seventeen were found to be trai-
tors. The former mayor and one vice mayor died in detention. Some 84
percent of the party and government ofcials in the city, more than
900in all, were accused and detained, and forty-six of them died in cus-
tody. The campaigns overall death toll by the end of 1968 was more than
5,000 a partial count based only on cases under the jurisdiction of the
ofce in charge of the investigations.24
In Guangdong, which experienced violent factional warfare that was
quelled by military force, the campaign was fueled by still-strong fac-
tional animosities, and escalated locally in horric ways. In Guangdong
Province the army favored the East Wind rebels over their opponents,
the Red Flag alliance, which had fought stubbornly against army con-
trol until the very end. The cleansing campaign followed closely on the
heels of the provinces political settlement in February 1968, and it began
while there was still last-ditch armed resistance to the nal imposition of
military control. The mass killings that accompanied the pacication of
the Guangdong countryside resulted in the deaths of more than 30,000in
this period alone.25
Figure12.2 conveys the impact of the cleansing campaign relative
to the earlier phase of the Cultural Revolution. The cleansing campaign
and the contemporaneous armed suppression of factional opponents gen-
erated a wave of violent death that far outstripped the worst months of
the earlier period. The spike in the death toll during August 1967, when
military armaments were distributed to mass factions, is insignicant
by comparison. From March through September 1968 the death toll was
well in excess of the August 1967 gure, and during that period the
monthly death toll was roughly four times higher for ve consecutive
months. The peak in the death toll from the cleansing campaign coin-
cides with the nal drop in rebel activity earlier seen in Figure12.1. It
is evident from these gures that the cure for the malady of violent fac-
tional warfare was in fact far worse than the disease.
The cleansing campaign had an initial purpose of suppressing deeply
rooted factional con icts by diverting attention onto hidden enemies.
But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it expanded through an un-
planned escalation process. Revolutionary committees were composed
276 China Under Mao
25000
20000
Reported deaths
15000
10000
5000
0
Jan 1967 July 1967 Jan 1968 July 1968 Dec 1968
MonthYear
Figure12.2. Number of reported campaign deaths, by month, 19671968.

of survivors of the struggles of previous years, and they were by no means

united in background and orientation. New organs of power were com-
posed of military ofcers, the dominant group, who were frequently
suspicious of leaders from rebel factions. They also included civilian
cadres, some of which had been targets of rebels earlier in the Cultural
Revolution, but many of which later pledged allegiance out of a sense of
self-preservation with a rebel faction that was intent on broadening its
base for the anticipated great alliance. Finally, the new organs of power
included selected leaders of rebel factions, sometimes leaders from both
sides of bitterly antagonistic struggles. The reality of these new organs
of power, and the case groups that they created, was one of insecurity
and mutual suspicion, if not barely concealed hostility.
Under these circumstances the cleansing campaign turned into some-
thing that resembled inquisitions and witch hunts in other historical set-
tings. Newly established local authorities had every reason to believe that
zealous prosecution of the new campaign was a sign of their own loy-
alty to the new order. Failure to prosecute the campaign with sufcient
thoroughness could put one under suspicion. The recent past gave them
Military Rule 277
every reason to believe that people in positions of authority could them-

selves become victims if they failed to zealously implement directives
from above.
The insecurity of members of revolutionary committees and special
case groups made it virtually impossible for anyone to speak out to re-
strain the more zealous or violent inquisitors among them, or to ques-
tion even the most far-fetched and bizarre accusations. To speak out to
protect those accused, to moderate their treatment during interrogations,
or to restrict the numbers accused and interrogated would risk falling
under suspicion for sympathy with the enemyperhaps even being one-
self a member of an underground conspiracy. Once torture to extract
confessions, both psychological and physical, became common, the pro-
cess of escalation got under way. Confessions extracted, names named,
meant that others would be pulled in, interrogated and tortured, and
more names named. It would take an act of extraordinary personal
bravery bordering on foolhardiness for an individual to question the va-
lidity of confessions, to question the plausibility of gigantic underground
networks of traitors, to demand that something more than suspicion was
needed to subject an individual to the machinery of interrogation, or
that something more substantial than an extracted confession was ad-
equate evidence. To do so would be to express doubts about the leader-
ship, to oppose the Cultural Revolution, to reveal sympathy toward the
enemy.
Like so many other Mao-sponsored campaigns, from the Great Leap
Forward to the Socialist Education Movement to the Red Guard and rebel
movements, the campaign rumbled on, generating outcomes on a scale
that was not originally anticipated. It accelerated like a vehicle without
a brake, ultimately slowing only after Mao himself made comments sug-
gesting that the campaign may have been too severe.26 By this time it
was too late to prevent the carnage. More than half of the deaths due to
the Cultural Revolution were a result of this campaignan estimated
600,000 to 800,000.27
Mao Worship
It was during the cleansing campaign and its immediate aftermath that
the cult of Mao reached its most extreme forms. Badges, busts, and posters
with Maos image became ubiquitous. Virtually every home had its
278 China Under Mao
portrait of Chairman Mao on the wall or a bust of the Chairman on full

display. Failure to display Mao paraphernalia could put one under po-
litical suspicion. In public spaces, large statues of Mao were erected on
university campuses, in front of government ofce buildings, and in city
squares. Carefully orchestrated parades with marchers displaying scores
of large Mao portraits or mobile oats with statues of the Chairman in
a heroic pose were a common event during public holidays.28 Large sta-
diums were lled with thousands of performers who engaged in syn-
chronized displays designed to glorify the Chairman and express loy-
alty. Individuals who inadvertently defaced portraits of the Chairman
or who discarded newspapers with his photograph or writings could be-
come targets of harrowing loyalty investigations. Families saved virtu-
ally every item with Maos image because it was politically dangerous
to discard them.
The escalation of the Mao cult was part of an organized campaign
that originated in the armed forces under Lin Biao and was implemented
by military control committees. Known as the three loyalties and four
boundless loves, it promoted loyalty to Chairman Mao, Mao Zedong
Thought, and Chairman Maos proletarian revolutionary line, and
boundless love for Chairman Mao, the Communist Party, Mao Zedong
Thought, and Chairman Maos proletarian revolutionary line. Popular
reverence for Mao had long been encouraged by the regime, but gen-
uine popular respect for Chinas leader was now transformed into what
two leading analysts of the period have termed a state-sponsored cult
complete with carefully orchestrated rituals, the transformation of even
the most banal utterances by Mao into holy writ, and coercive mecha-
nisms for dealing with acts of deviance and heresy.29
A core element of the campaign was based on the model experience
of the Beijing General Knitting Mill. The army ofcers in charge of the
plant invented a method to promote loyalty throughout the working day.
At the start of the shift, workers assembled, facing a portrait of Chairman
Mao, and asked for instructions that would guide their conduct for the
day; during the shift, they would read Mao quotations posted on the walls
in order to boost their enthusiasm for work; when changing shifts, they
exchanged Mao quotes with fellow workers as a way to show concern
and offer help; and at the end of the working day, they would once again
turn to Maos portrait and report back, critically reviewing their thought
and work performance during that day. The factory leadership submitted
Military Rule 279
a report on their practices to Mao in late 1967, and Mao wrote a mar-
ginal comment on the report: Ive read this, and it is very good. Thank
you, comrades!30 The report was distributed nationwide, and soon mil-
lions of people were participating in these organized rituals in their work
units.31
A core element of the Mao cult was its living application in solving
seemingly intractable real-life problems, especially those that seemed be-
yond the capacity of modern science and technology to remedy. News-
papers and radio programs frequently reported on the ways in which
diligent study of Chairman Maos writings inspired ordinary individ-
uals, without scientic training, to redouble their efforts to do the seem-
ingly impossible. A team of surgeons, in one famous case, was able to
perform an extraordinarily complicated operation to successfully remove
a 100-pound tumor from a patient, despite lacking the necessary expe-
rience and without a trained anesthetist. Cancer patients studied Mao
Thought diligently as an aid to surviving their ordeal of radiation therapy
and its side effects. Untrained orderlies, applying Mao Thought to the
rehabilitation of deaf-mutes, enabled them to sing The East Is Red and
chant Long Live Chairman Mao. The orderlies were able to accomplish
this despite the inability of the hospitals specialized medical personnel
to make any progress in the patients treatment. In other cases, Mao
Thought proved similarly efcacious in developing strategies to restore
sight to the blind, reattach severed hands, and revive accident victims
whose hearts had stopped beating.32
These accounts did not directly ascribe magical qualities to Mao
Thought. They were intended to demonstrate that Mao Thought Study
Classes inspired ordinary individuals to accomplish feats that they would
otherwise have thought far beyond their capacity. The subtext for most
of these examples was that diligent application of Maos wisdom by or-
dinary people brought results superior to those to be attained through
the application of modern science and technology, the realm of bour-
geois experts.33
Perhaps the most famous manifestation of the Mao cult was the rap-
turous celebration touched off by Maos gift of mangoes to various Bei-
jing schools and factories in early August 1968. Mao received a basket
of golden mangoes from the visiting Pakistani foreign minister, and had
his aide divide them up and distribute them to various model units in
Beijing. Some of them were sent on August 5 to the Mao Zedong Thought
280 China Under Mao
Propaganda Team that had recently been installed at Tsinghua Univer-

sity.34 On August 7, Peoples Daily reported this act in a large headline on
the front page that read, The greatest concern, the greatest trust, the
greatest support, the greatest encouragement; our great leader Chairman
Maos heart is always linked with the hearts of the masses; Chairman
Mao gave the precious gifts given by a foreign friend to the Capital Worker
and Peasant Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team.35 The accompa-
nying article described the reaction on the campus:
In the afternoon of the fth, when the great happy news of Chairman
Mao giving mangoes to the Capital Worker and Peasant Mao Zedong
Thought Propaganda Team reached the Tsinghua University campus,
people immediately gathered around the gift given by the Great Leader
Chairman Mao. They cried out enthusiastically and sang with wild aban-
donment. Tears swelled up in their eyes, and they again and again sin-
cerely wished that our most beloved Great Leader Chairman Mao lived
ten thousand years without bounds, ten thousand years without bounds,
and ten thousand years without bounds! They all made phone calls to
their own work units to spread this great happy news; and they also or-
ga nized all kinds of celebratory activities all night long, and arrived at
[the national leadership compound] Zhongnanhai despite the rain to re-
port the good news, and to express their loyalty to the Great Leader
Chairman Mao.
One of the mangoes was sent to the Beijing Textile Factory, whose rev-
olutionary committee organized a large assembly where workers recited
Mao quotations and celebrated the gift. The fruit was sealed in wax in
order to preserve it, and it was placed on an altar in the auditorium, where
workers lined up for a viewing, solemnly bowing as they passed by. After
a few days the mango began to rot, and the fruit was peeled and boiled
in a pot of water. Once again, the workers led by and each was given
a spoonful of the precious water in which the mango had been boiled.
The revolutionary committee made a wax replica of the mango and
placed it back on the altar in the auditorium as a centerpiece for future
Mao rituals in the factory.
There followed several months of mango fever, as the fruit became a
temporary focus of the boundless loyalty campaign. More wax rep-
licas were made of the mangoes, some of them encased in glass con-
tainers, and the replicas were sent on tours around Beijing and elsewhere
in China to work units that organized welcoming parties, celebrations,
Military Rule 281
and viewings. Beijing was besieged with requests from revolutionary

committees in outlying provinces for visits from the precious mangoes.
Replicas encased in glass cases were manufactured to meet requests that
were impossible to ful ll with the rotting originals. They were shipped
around China like touring celebrities. An estimated half million people
greeted the mango replicas when they arrived in Chengdu, and the man-
goes were shuttled to other cities by special train, where they were wel-
comed with mass demonstrations.36 Mao badges and wall posters were
produced in the millions that contained the mango image. A cigarette
factory in Henan began producing a line of mango-brand cigarettes. Some
years later a lm about class struggle was produced that employed Maos
mangoes as a key to the story line.37
Another prominent Mao cult activity was a loyalty dance to ex-
press veneration and love for the Chairman. It involved a series of steps
reputedly inspired by ethnic minority folk dances, accompanied by a
standard melody and lyrics that expressed boundless loyalty to the
Chairman by a million hearts beating in unison. This dance might be
performed anywhere at any time: on trains, public buses, or airplanes,
or during political meetings in factories and ofces. Once the loyalty
dance was invoked in any setting, there was no way to refuse participa-
tion, an obvious sign of disloyalty. According to individuals who lived
through these years, young women were more willing and competent
participants in this ritual, and for some of them the dancing appears to
have been a form of entertainment. Elderly individuals, those without
a sense of rhythm, and veteran blue-collar workers who found the whole
thing embarrassing, were less amused.38
In recounting these events, one might be tempted to conclude that
they express a kind of collective hysteria driven by actual belief in the
magical powers of Maos thought, or at least by a genuine veneration of
Mao as a great political leader. While it is not possible to know what was
in the minds of hundreds of millions of individuals when they experi-
enced these activities, we do know a great deal about the political con-
text in which they took place. The Mao cult reached its height during
the Cleansing of the Class Ranks Campaign designed to uncover hidden
traitors and enemies of the revolution. The entire exercise had a barely
concealed coercive element; an implicit threat that hinted at what might
happen to someone who failed to exhibit sufcient enthusiasm. In the
words of one perceptive analyst of the Mao cult, for most Chinese, taking
282 China Under Mao
part in public worship became a crucial element of surviving within a

completely volatile situation dominated by witch hunts against supposed
counterrevolutionaries. Insufcient compliance made one suspect: Ev-
eryone who, intentionally or not, failed to partake in the cult rituals,
misspelled Mao quotations, or vilied cult symbols faced being sentenced
as an active counterrevolutionary. 39
There are many reported cases of individuals imprisoned or exe-
cuted during this period for remarks seen as disrespectful toward Mao,
for inadvertent slips of the tongue, or use of material that contained
Maos words or images as toilet paper.40 Ordinary individuals need not
have witnessed such punishments in order to understand the implicit
threat. In the context of an organized campaign to root out hidden trai-
tors, and where it was clear to many that the accusations lodged against
unfortunate victims were obviously false, it would have been foolishly
dangerous to put yourself and your family at risk by failing to conform
with these relatively cost-free outward displays of veneration and loy-
alty. To feign boundless admiration for the Great Leader was a small
price to pay to avoid the attention of case groups during the cleansing
campaign.
Given the extraordinarily threatening political context, it seems more
plausible to conclude that the entire population felt compelled to behave
as if they were gripped by irrational beliefs. In a radically different form,
this was the same kind of collective pressure to conform that led to the
systematic self-deception observed during the Great Leap Forward,
when expressions of belief in the efcacy of the campaign were made
into a mark of political loyalty. Compared to the Great Leap famine, the
loyalty campaign was relatively harmless. But it was the same species
of collective behavior and had the same sources. These activities con-
tinued until the loyalty campaign was ofcially called off in June 1969,
after the more embarrassing aspects of Mao worship came under criti-
cism, with Maos apparent blessing, at the Ninth Party Congress in April
of that year.41
More Investigation Campaigns
On the heels of the cleansing campaign and the high tide of the Mao
cult, two overlapping new campaigns targeted counterrevolutionary
activities and sought to further consolidate military control and the au-
Military Rule 283
thority of revolutionary committees. The rst of these was the One Strike,
Three Anti (yida sanfan) campaign, launched in February 1970, and it
appears to have been conducted in most of the country by the end of
that year. One Strike referred to a crackdown on counterrevolutionary
destructive activities. In a number of regions around China, there was
still sub-rosa resistance to the imposition of authority, or stubbornly
rooted factional con ict. This aspect of the campaign was designed to
wipe out any lingering opposition. The document that launched the cam-
paign instructed local authorities as follows:
Resolutely put down those active counterrevolutionary elements who

collude with the enemy and betray the nation, conspire to revolt, gather
military intelligence, steal state secrets, commit murder and physical
assault, commit arson and poison people, counterattack to settle old
scores, viciously slander the party and the socialist system, plunder
state property, and disrupt the social order. . . . Resolutely execute those
counterrevolutionary elements who are swollen with arrogance after
having committed countless heinous crimes and against whom popular
indignation is so great that nothing save execution will serve to calm it.42
The targets designated by the term Three Anti were graft and em-
bezzlement, proteering, and extravagance and waste. This appears
to have been intended to tighten discipline over new authorities at the
local level who spent excessively on dinners, gifts, guest houses, and fur-
nishings for ofces, or who began to barter goods with other units as a
form of cooperation.
The One Strike, Three Anti campaign had a much narrower scope
than the cleansing campaign, even if the criteria for deciding whom to
target were still exible and vague. It did not have anywhere near the
impact of the cleansing campaign, but it did leave large numbers of vic-
tims in its wake. In urban Beijing, 5,757 renegades, special agents, coun-
terrevolutionaries, and other bad elements were identied, and more
than 6,200 cases of embezzlement and proteering were prosecuted. In
the rural counties surrounding Shanghai, 64,000 individuals were
dragged out and struggled, resulting in 520 deaths. Nationwide, during
the rst eight months of the campaign, more than 284,800 individuals
were arrested.43 Estimates from local histories published in the post-Mao
era suggest that the campaign investigated in some fashion only one-
quarter as many individuals as the cleansing campaign and was far less
deadly. The national death toll from the One Strike, Three Anti campaign
284 China Under Mao
was less than 10 percent that of the massive cleansing of 19681969,

mostly executions.44
The campaign known colloquially as Anti May 16 Elements (fan wu
yao liu fenzi) was launched on the heels of the One Strike, Three Anti
campaign. It was even more tightly focused and smaller in scope. It os-
tensibly targeted an underground conspiracy of ultraleftists who were
said to have conspired to sabotage the Cultural Revolution through ex-
tremist behavior. The term originated much earlier, back in 1967, and
became associated with the radical members of the Central Cultural Rev-
olution Group, Wang Li, Guan Feng, and others, who were made scape-
goats for the wave of attacks on the army in August 1967.45 The cam-
paign began in many regions in 1970 and reached a peak in 1971. Local
authorities interpreted it as a license to haul in, interrogate, intimidate,
and in some cases imprison former leaders of mass factions, especially
those who had resisted the imposition of military control. It did not matter
if these former rebel leaders had long since abandoned their resistance.
Revolutionary committees complied with this campaign by placing
former rebel leaders in isolation and interrogating them about their
alleged underground ties to this suspected national conspiracy of ultra-
leftist rebels.
Worker rebels were still close at hand and could be readily identied,
placed in isolation, and interrogated. Most student rebels, however, had
since been assigned to distant collective farms or factories. In these
cases authorities had them brought back to the locality where they had
led rebel factions and interrogated them there. Famous Beijing Red
Guards, for example, were brought back to their universities from their
rural exile in 1970 to undergo prolonged interrogations about their fac-
tional activities during the student movement.46 Former rebel leaders in
Wuhan were placed in makeshift cells in their work units and interro-
gated to reveal their secret af liations with the May 16 group. A total of
33,659 individuals in the city were labeled May 16 Elements; if they were
in leading posts, they lost them. Most of them ended up performing penal
labor under supervision. Initial plans to execute eighty-four prominent
ringleaders were later abandoned.47
In Jiangsu the campaign was unusually severe. It was the nal blow
against the faction that had opposed military authorities in the prov-
ince. Launched in the spring of 1970, it peaked near the end of that year
and continued sporadically into 1972. More than 130,000 individuals
Military Rule 285
in Jiangsu were charged as May 16 Elements, and57,000 confessed to

underground factional ties. Published accounts later claimed that more
than 6,000 of them died or suffered permanent physical or mental dis-
abilities as a result of their treatment in detention. Individuals who par-
ticipated in internal reinvestigations of these cases in subsequent years
have claimed that the real number was twice as large.48
The campaign in Jiangsu removed almost all former rebel leaders from
any leadership posts they had gained as part of the great alliance in
1968, along with many of the veteran civilian cadres that had managed
to earn revolutionary labels at the time. It was the nal step through
which General Xu Shiyou established the armys absolute control over
the province. The campaign targeted the vast majority of the standing
committee of the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee twenty- one of
the twenty-eight original members. All nine of the former rebel leaders
on the standing committee were purged, and all eight veteran provin-
cial cadres were targeted, though some of them were able to keep their
posts. The purges extended into the military ranks: a number of ofcers
who had participated in attacks on Xu Shiyou in the summer of 1967
were isolated for interrogation and removed from their posts. Many of
them were imprisoned, and one of the most prominent ofcers died
while in custody. Some of the famous Nanjing rebel leaders were so
shattered psychologically by their interrogation and imprisonment that
they were unable to function normally after their later release from
prison.49
The years from 1968 to 1971 were a staggering reversal from the pre-
vious two years of mass mobilization and protest, during which authority
gures of all kinds could be challenged and were. What had begun as
a rebellion against authority inspired by a party chairman who declared
that rebellion is justied ended in the suppression and persecution of
most of the rebels who took up the Chairmans call. A campaign that
began by encouraging students and workers to challenge bureaucratic
authority ended in an orgy of repression conducted by a newly milita-
rized bureaucracy. New bureaucratic organs conducted escalating witch
hunts that terrorized the urban population. Citizens were compelled to
engage in the most servile and infantilized forms of hero worship that
treated Mao as an almost supernatural being, and that frequently claimed
extraordinary powers for his thought.
286 China Under Mao
This period would soon come to an end. In September 1971 a Tri-

dent jet left Chinese airspace and shortly thereafter fell from the sky and
crashed on the steppes of Mongolia, killing everyone on board. This event
would push China in a new and uncertain direction. The May 7 camps
were closed and cadres and white-collar staff returned to their ofces.
Military control committees were disbanded and soldiers withdrawn
from government administration. Civilian ofcials purged during the
Cultural Revolution began to return to their former posts. Criticisms of
the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution were widely circulated.
Eventually, industrial workers, whose living standards had stagnated,
became restive. Former Red Guards and rebels who had been shunted
aside by the military mobilized to protest their marginalization. The rst
stirrings of a democracy movement appeared. And just a few months
before Maos death, large protests erupted in Beijing and other major
cities that openly expressed criticism of the Cultural Revolution and in-
directly of Mao.
Normally an aviation accident would not have such wide repercus-
sions, but this aircraft carried the Chinese Communist Partys vice
chairman, Marshal Lin Biao, Maos designated heir and successor, widely
credited as the originator of the Mao cult, the head of an army that had
effectively run most of China since 1968. He was said to have ed China
after an abortive coup that included a plan to assassinate Mao.
13

Discord and Dissent
B EFOR E H IS SPECTACU L A R DEM ISE , several of Lin Biaos subordinates

were in political trouble, a sign that Lin himself might soon face
demotion or worse. Unlike other prominent victims of Maos unpredict-
able judgments, Lin did not quietly exit the political stage. The sensa-
tional story about his death a plane crash while apparently en route
to defect to the Soviet Unionhad major political implications. This was
especially true because of the way that Lins demise was explained to
the nation: his ight was the result of a failed plot to assassinate Mao in
the course of a political coup. According to the ofcial story, after his
plot was discovered he tried to escape to the Soviet Union, only to crash
en route when his jet ran out of fuel.
Whatever the truth about the Lin Biao incident, his death created
shock waves that decisively altered the course of Chinese politics. Lin
popular ized the little red book of Maos quotations within the army
that eventually spread nationwide with the Red Guards, and it was the
centerpiece of the Mao cults boundless loyalty campaign. He made
sure that the army backed the Cultural Revolution and had been extrava-
gant in his praise of the Chairman at every opportunity. The man who
symbolized Maos political line was now unmasked as a traitor. This
called into question Maos judgment, even his competence. It called into
question the entire rationale for the Cultural Revolution.
The Lin Biao affair was a considerable blow to Mao personally. He
became depressed and withdrawn for several months, contributing to a
serious health crisis in 1972.1 Mao responded by changing course: he
decided to repair his relations with veteran ofcials he had purged during
the Cultural Revolution, and to blame the excesses of the movement on
288 China Under Mao
Lin Biao and his coterie of military loyalists. He initially leaned heavily
on Zhou Enlai to rebuild these bridges, pulling back from the more dam-
aging policies of recent years. With Maos blessing, Zhou conducted a
national campaign to criticize Lin Biao for the extremism that caused
such suffering during the course of the Cultural Revolution. During
the next two years, Mao entrusted Zhou with rebuilding Chinas ci-
vilian administration and easing uniformed soldiers out of government
administration.
This attempt at damage control inadvertently unleashed new waves
of con ict that roiled Chinese politics and society until Maos death in
September 1976. As the armed forces withdrew from government ad-
ministration, which civilians would replace them? There were two very
different claimants. The rst were civilian cadres, experienced party ad-
ministrators and professional experts who had been shunted aside, many
of whom were still performing manual labor on shop oors or in rural
reeducation camps. The second were former rebels who had led the at-
tack on veteran cadres and professionals several years before. Although
some of them survived under military rule in largely ceremonial posts,
most had lost positions that they initially held on revolutionary com-
mittees, or had fallen in the purge campaigns run by the army from 1968
to 1971. The rivalry between these two very different claimants to posi-
tions of authority would rekindle con icts that had lain dormant under
military rule.
The post-Lin effort to correct the errors of previous years raised deeper
questions that de ned Chinese politics during the nal years of the Mao
era questions that were inextricably bound up with the question of who
would assume positions of civilian leadership. Which practices and pol-
icies were counterproductive excesses of ultraleftism and which were
de ning elements of Maos political line, deviation from which had to
be resisted at all costs? These questions divided political actors from top
to bottom of Chinese society. In the national leadership, veteran of-
cials who were sidelined during the Cultural Revolution had a broader
view of excesses and were willing to restore many of the older prac-
tices that were recently condemned. Surviving members of the Central
Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) and their supporters, on the other
hand, saw efforts to correct excesses as a cover for rolling back the poli-
cies of the Cultural Revolution itself. The same differences in viewpoint
divided leaders at all levels, and set veteran cadres and former rebel
Discord and Dissent 289
leaders on a collision course. Mao resolved these disagreements by in-

tervening at crucial turning points, trying to balance opposed forces in
the national leadership. But his views were obscure and his decisions
unpredictable. He signaled them by shifting his support for one side or
the other in the course of their ongoing disputes. Leaning rst one way,
then another, the aging Mao ensured political instability during his nal
years.
As these con icts played out, a new and unanticipated force came
into play: ordinary citizens who were uninvolved in factional con icts
but who suffered during the Cultural Revolution. They were former ac-
tivists who felt betrayed, and citizens young and old who had grown
weary of sectarian factional battles, stagnating living standards, and
blocked educational and career opportunities. Expressions of dissent over
radical Maoism appeared early in this period and grew in intensity, cul-
minating in massive street demonstrations in Beijing, Nanjing, and many
other cities shortly before Maos death. They contained the seeds of a
new political mentality that was later expressed more openly in nascent
democracy movements. More than anything else, these massive dem-
onstrations signaled the loss of popular support for radical initiatives and
the futility of any effort to uphold them after Mao had departed the scene.
The Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao
These con icts were set in motion by the campaign to criticize Lin Biao,
which began in early 1972. Much of the ofcial story about Lin Biaos
demise was clearly a fabrication, especially its depiction of Lins char-
acter and motives. He did die when his plane crashed in Mongolia. So-
viet ofcials found the crash site and identied his remains and those
of his immediate family members. However, Lin Biao was not the am-
bitious, power-crazed plotter depicted in the ofcial story. He was in fact
reluctant to play a major political role and long felt insecure as Maos
successor.2 There is little evidence that Lin himself was involved in a plot
to overthrow Mao and seize power in a coup, although there are indi-
cations that Lin Biaos son, an inuential air force colonel, may have
discussed organized resistance to his fathers impending fall from power
with other young ofcers, and that these discussions were leaked.
It is clear that by late 1969 Mao had become deeply concerned about
the enormous power he was forced to grant to army ofcers in 1968.
290 China Under Mao
Maos position depended almost entirely on the military apparatus, and

this apparatus reported to Lin Biao. Lins military forces achieved a dom-
inant position when provincial party committees were reestablished in
the wake of the Ninth Party Congress. In August 1971, military ofcers
were rst party secretaries in twenty-two out of twenty-nine provinces,
and were an absolute majority of cadres in provincial party bodies.3 They
had pushed aside civilian Maoists.
Factional divisions between Lins military commanders on the Po-
litburo and the surviving civilian radicals from the CCRG sharpened
during 1970. Chen Boda switched sides, abandoning his erstwhile ci-
vilian allies to side with the military ofcers. As the rivalries in the lead-
ership grew, Mao decided to push back against the military wing. Chen
Boda became the rst victim. Despite his role as one of the early archi-
tects of Mao Zedong Thought and as the standard bearer of radical Maoism
throughout his life, Chen, the nominal chair of the CCRG, was denounced
as a fake Marxist, traitor, and counterrevolutionary in January
1971. Mao called for apologetic self-criticisms by Lins military com-
manders, but their response did not satisfy him, and he began to make
changes in the military hierarchy to ensure personal loyalty to him. It
was in this context that Lins son allegedly began discussions with other
ofcers about moving against the civilian radicals and resisting Maos
moves against his father and the military wing of the party. The family
boarded a small passenger jet in what appears to have been great haste,
without proper refueling, to avoid imminent arrest. While this is the most
plausible of the published accounts, the case remains shrouded in of-
cial secrecy.4
Whatever the reality, it is the ofcial story and the ensuing denun-
ciation campaign against Lin that altered Chinas subsequent political
course. Lins top commanders on the Politburo were purged and arrested
and the military command was reshufed. But Lins demise presented
Mao and other leaders with a dilemma: how to explain Lins death in a
way that limited the potential political fallout. The message transmitted
to the party and government hierarchy, and to the people of China, had
four elements. First, Lin planned a military coup to seize power; second,
Lin and his coconspirators despised the civilian radicals that had helped
Mao launch the Cultural Revolution; third, Lin and his coconspirators
viewed the Cultural Revolution as an unmitigated disaster; and fourth,
they had come to hold Mao himself in contempt.
The most intriguing feature of this campaign, and its cornerstone,

was an ofcial central party document issued in January 1972, titled The
Struggle to Smash the Lin [Biao]-Chen [Boda] Antiparty Cliques Coun-
terrevolutionary Coup. It was rst distributed to the party and army
leadership at all levels, then to all party members, and its contents were
relayed orally to the population at large. The core of the document was
a reprinted set of notes purportedly written by the alleged conspirators.
It expressed the rationale for a coup that accounted for the political mo-
tives of the conspirators.5
Whatever the provenance of the material, the content is stunning.
The document expresses vehement and powerful criticisms of both Mao
and the Cultural Revolution. Presenting the document as study mate-
rials seemed motivated by a desire to prove beyond any doubt that Lin
indeed was a traitor, something that otherwise would be difcult for
many Chinese to accept. But the criticisms surely must have struck many
in the party leadership, in the party at large, and ordinary citizens as a
damaging indictment of Mao, the Cultural Revolution, and the politi-
cians who helped him launch it. Virtually every one of the strongly stated
criticisms had a rm foundation in facts that were surely known to al-
most everyone who read them.
The rst theme of the document is that the conspirators did not view
the Cultural Revolution as a glorious victory. It had left Chinese society
in a mess: The political situation has been unstable. . . . The broad
masses of the peasantry are oppressed, the economy is stagnant, the
actual living standard of the masses, basic-level cadres, and soldiers . . .
is falling, and the mood of dissatisfaction is spreading daily people
are angry but dare not speak. . . . The ruling group is corrupt, mud-
dled, and incompetent. . . . The ruling group is internally very unstable;
the struggling for power, striving for advantage, scheming and locking
horns have almost reached a climax.6
The document lists all those who were harmed by the Cultural
Revolution and the grievances that they harbored. The livelihood of
peasants had been neglected: Peasants lack food and are short of
clothing. The sending of youths to the countryside was really a dis-
guised form of labor reform. The Red Guards were used and then
cynically discarded: During the early stages the Red Guards were
cheated and used, and they served as cannon fodder; during the later
stages, they were suppressed and made into scapegoats. The civilian
292 China Under Mao
ofcials who formerly ran China were quietly simmering with resent-
ment: Cadres who were rejected and attacked are angry but dare not
speak.7
The document expresses contempt for the civilian radicals who sup-
ported Mao in launching the Cultural Revolutionindividuals who only
ve years later would be openly denounced as the Gang of Four. They
are portrayed as frauds and hypocrites: wielding the pen [they] still will-
fully tamper with [and distort] Marxism-Leninism, making it serve
their private interests. They use false revolutionary rhetoric . . . in order
to deceive and mislead the thoughts of the Chinese people. In reality,
according to the authors, their political doctrines amounted to
nothing more than a violent and deadly new form of fascism: Their
socialism is, in essence, social fascism. They have turned Chinas state
machine into a kind of meat grinder for mutual slaughter and strife.8
In the wake of the recent extremes of the Mao cult, the documents
assessment of the Chairman must have come as something of a shock.
Mao is portrayed as manipulative, ruthless, and duplicitous: Today he
uses this force to attack that force; tomorrow he uses that force to attack
this force. Today he uses sweet words and honeyed talk to those whom
he entices, and tomorrow he puts them to death for some fabricated
crimes. The document points out Maos record of purging loyal com-
rades and those who did his bidding: [Do you see] anyone whom he
has supported initially who has not nally been handed a political death
sentence? . . . Is there a single political force which he has been able to
work with from beginning to end? . . . His few close comrades-in-arms or
trusted aides have also been sent to prison by him.9
The authors viewed Mao as anything but the godlike gure of the
Mao cult. They saw him as an arbitrary tyrant and political fraud, no
better than some of the worst emperors in Chinese history: He abuses
the trust and status given him by the Chinese people. In an historical
sense he is going backward. . . . He has become a contemporary Chin
Shih-huang. . . . He is not a true Marxist-Leninist. . . . He is the biggest
feudal despot in Chinese history.10
We can only speculate about the reasoning behind the decision to
circulate such a critical portrayal of Mao and the Cultural Revolution.
It could not have been circulated without Maos approval, which only
deepens the puzzle.11 But we need not speculate about its impact. This
document did to Mao what Khrushchevs 1956 speech did to Stalin: de-
nounced him as an arbitrary and vicious tyrant and stripped him of all
ideological posturing. Citizens of China did not need to be told how they
had suffered in recent years. They did not need to be told that their living
standards were still low and in fact had worsened. But they had not been
exposed so widely to unvarnished criticisms that stripped these suffer-
ings of any pretense that they were a necessary part of a higher, noble
cause. The civilian radicals were self-serving frauds, ideological deviants
who had invented a violent new form of social fascism. Mao himself
was a dangerously duplicitous tyrant, no better than the rst Qin em-
peror, who was renowned for a violent rule that led quickly to the col-
lapse of Chinas rst united empire.
To be sure, many of the remaining true believers who were exposed
to this document may have taken it as a shocking revelation of the twisted
logic of the worst kind of traitors. This was probably the reaction that
they were expected to have. But many others surely found in this doc-
ument thoughts that they had inwardly harbored but dared not express.
This reaction must surely have been common among the many who were
abused, purged, or otherwise suffered during the Cultural Revolution,
including many of those who had idealistically responded to the early
call for rebellion and who were harshly repressed afterward. This docu-
ment exposed to masses of Chinese an alternate interpretation of reality
that sharply contradicted ofcial propaganda. It also provided a language
and a rationale with which to criticize the Cultural Revolution, civilian
radicals in the leadership, and Mao himself. The impact of the document
would soon become apparent. The same language and sentiments later
appeared in wall posters on city streets and in underground writings that
represented the rst stirrings of open dissent in 1970s China. The same
language and sentiments would be on display in the large protests in
Tiananmen Square and elsewhere in China in late March and early April
1976, just six months before Maos death.
Restoring Civilian Government, 19721973
The campaign to criticize Lin Biao launched an effort to rebuild Chinas

party organization and bring civilian ofcials back into their former posts.
Lin Biao was portrayed as an ultraleftist who distorted Maos intentions
during the Cultural Revolution and drove it to excess. The damage
wrought by the Cultural Revolution was now portrayed as part of a plot:
294 China Under Mao
the ludicrous exaggeration of the Mao cult, the enormous toll of the
Cleansing of the Class Ranks campaign, the disbanding of organs of ci-
vilian administration and the rural labor camps for ofcials were all ul-
traleft cover for a plan to seize military power. Millions of photographs
of Mao with Lin Biao and copies of the little red book and other ma-
terials that contained epigraphs or quotations from Lin were recalled and
destroyed.12
With this campaign as political cover, Mao relied on Zhou Enlai to
repair the damage and restore civilian administration. Mao went into
seclusion, in very poor health for some of this period, and Zhou pro-
ceeded on this course until late in 1973.13 The public rituals of the Mao
cult ended. The May 7 Cadre Schools, where millions of ofcials and
other educated staff underwent reform through labor, were closed, and
their occupants returned to the cities and their former workplaces. Uni-
versities began to admit small numbers of worker-peasant-soldier stu-
dents for short courses of basic-level study. Party committees at all levels,
which had ceased to operate in 1966, began to be rebuilt, and after they
began to operate, political authority owed back toward them and away
from the revolutionary committees created by the Cultural Revolution.
The primary focus of Zhous work during his brief period in charge
was cadre rehabilitation the return of disgraced ofcials to important
posts. In March1972 Zhou prepared a list of more than 400 senior of-
cials who had been vetted and found satisfactory, and submitted the
list to Mao, who approved it. The process continued at successively lower
levels of government as party committees were restored. This work cul-
minated in the Tenth Party Congress, held in August 1973. Membership
in the partys Central Committee reected a major change from the Ninth
Party Congress of April 1969. The number of serving army ofcers de-
clined sharply, and they were replaced by civilian ofcials who had spent
recent years in disgrace. The most important and most surprising of these
returnees was Deng Xiaoping, who in 1967 had been denounced as Chi-
nas number two capitalist roader (Liu Shaoqi, the number one capi-
talist roader, died in prison after being denied medical care in 1969).
With Maos approval, Deng returned to Beijing from exile in Jiangxi in
February 1973, and shortly afterward was restored to the Central Com-
mittee and the post of vice premier.14
Dengs rapid elevation, which culminated when he took over Zhou
Enlais duties in December 1973, was Maos idea. Mao viewed Deng as
a more palatable alternative to Zhou Enlai, who fell badly out of favor
during the last half of 1973.15 Politburo radicals mistrusted Zhou and
viewed his activities with deep suspicion. They had long viewed him as
a compromiser who had consistently tried to blunt the destructive as-
pects of the Cultural Revolution and who was all too willing to sacrice
Maoist principles for administrative expediency. Throughout 1972
and1973 they objected repeatedly to the strident critique of ultraleftism
and the rehabilitation of veteran cadres at the expense of rebels in the
provinces.16 They seized on his handling of negotiations with the United
States to denounce him for selling out Chinas national interests, and
were able to bring Mao around to their point of view. Zhou was removed
from his pivotal position at the apex of Chinas government.17
This had two consequences for domestic politics. The rst was to place
Deng Xiaoping in charge of the un nished effort to rebuild civilian ad-
ministration and repair the damage of the Cultural Revolution. The
second was a shift in political line from denouncing the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution to guarding against the restoration of the pre
Cultural Revolution status quo. This was signaled by a change in the na-
tional campaign to criticize Lin Biao. In January 1974 it was converted
into a movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius. This signaled a
bizarre reversal of the interpretation of Lins misdeeds: he was now por-
trayed as someone who actually opposed everything about the Cultural
Revolution and plotted to restore the pre Cultural Revolution status quo,
a reactionary stance analogous to that of Confucius. Confucius was por-
trayed as a character that sought compromise and mediation, stability
and harmony, values that expressed the interests of reactionary social
classes who opposed revolution. These were also qualities of Zhou Enlai,
who was the scarcely concealed target of the campaign.18 This signaled
to those who opposed the rollback of Cultural Revolution policies that
it was now time to push back against the trend of restoration.
The Second Cultural Revolution, 1974
The Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign had two objectives.
The rst, part of the original campaign to repudiate Lin Biao, was to -
nally eliminate the armys control over the levers of government. The
earlier campaign against the Lin Biao clique had drastically reduced
the armys power in the national leadership and in many provinces, but
296 China Under Mao
army ofcers who had not been implicated in Lins alleged plot still held
key posts in many regions, and civilian control had yet to be fully re-
stored. At the end of 1973 military commanders in each of Chinas major
military regions were transferred to new regional commands. Local
strongmen were removed from the bases they built up after 1968, and
they moved to new commands where they lacked personal networks and
local allies. The second objective was to slow the ongoing rollback of poli-
cies associated with the Cultural Revolution itself. Zhou Enlai had em-
ployed the earlier criticism of an ultraleft Lin Biao to push for more ef-
fective civilian administration, and this meant the restoration of veteran
cadres and party ofcials to their former positions. The 1974 campaign
was a Mao-sanctioned effort to slow the rise of veteran cadres and halt
the reversal of the economic and educational policies cherished by the
Maoist camp.19
Initiated in January 1974, the campaign openly encouraged criticism
of leaders who allegedly opposed the aims of the Cultural Revolution
and sought to restore the status quo ante. This could include either re-
gional military authorities or veteran civilian cadres. In many regions,
an array of local forces mobilized to use the obscure language of central
directives to their advantage. One group who seized this opportunity
were former rebel leaders who had risen briey to positions of promi-
nence during the Cultural Revolution, only to be marginalized and thrust
aside by military ofcers and then ignored during the restoration of cadres
to their former posts. Former rebels used the campaign to reclaim their
inuence and assert claims to leadership positions in their sharpening
rivalry with veteran party cadres now returning to their posts after years
in political limbo. For this reason the campaign encouraged popular mo-
bilization and street protests and was referred to as a second Cultural
Revolution, and in some places a second power seizure.20 While the
campaign bred unrest along these lines throughout China, it also sparked
a countermovement of protest against the Cultural Revolution itself.
Events in Hangzhou in 1974 were what many meant by the term
second Cultural Revolution. During the campaign against Lin Biao,
many veteran cadres were reappointed to leading posts, often at the ex-
pense of individuals who were associated with the earlier rebel move-
ment.21 During the last half of 1973 they began to mobilize their forces
to criticize the veteran cadres who headed the province and to demand
party membership and appointment to leading posts in provincial and
municipal governments and factories. A struggle for control of rebuilding

trade union organizations pitted young former rebels against veteran of-
cials.22 In late 1973 delegations of aggrieved rebels who had been de-
nied party membership and leading posts assembled throughout the
province, planning to travel to Beijing to complain about their treatment.
Wall posters challenging the provincial leadership appeared on the
streets of Hangzhou. Near the end of the year a procession of aggrieved
rebels marched on the provincial party headquarters and besieged the
top leaders, detaining and harassing them, and demanding more ap-
pointments. Rebel leaders prepared for broader attacks on the provincial
leadership, and began to make the rounds of major factories in the region
to encourage workers to rebel against the wrong political line.23
The Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign signaled that efforts
to defend the Cultural Revolution had backing at the highest levels. Pro-
vincial leaders were soon under concerted attack, as rebels organized
gigantic mass rallies declaring that it was right to rebel against reac-
tionaries and called for a ght against the bourgeois counter-attack to
settle old scores and to restore its inuence.24 The rebels presented a
series of demands to the provincial leadership, the most important of
which was the appointment of hundreds of their followers to leading
posts. On the defensive, the local authorities admitted 8,000 new party
members and promoted 3,000 of them to leading posts.25 A second de-
mand was the establishment of workers militias, which were soon or-
ganized throughout the province. Armed primarily with iron clubs, the
militias became feared in Hangzhou and other cities, and they engaged
in sporadic attacks against soldiers who guarded factories and other fa-
cilities. Hangzhous top rebel leader declared that the militias were pre-
pared to seize military control from the army. 26 Militias obtained more
lethal arms, and violent clashes occurred that were reminiscent of the
battles of 1967. The con icts spread to large state factories in Hangzhou
and disrupted the railway system. The authorities were powerless to stem
the rising tide of con ict.27
In Nanjing, however, the campaign took a very different turn, and
bred sustained large-scale protests by ordinary citizens who had been
victimized by recent political campaigns. In Nanjing veteran provincial
cadres used the campaign to nally move the military out of civilian
posts in Jiangsu Province. Rebel leaders in Jiangsu played only a sup-
porting role in this effort: they had been so completely crushed by the
298 China Under Mao
armys earlier suppression campaigns that they were not a major force
in Nanjing politics. Civilian cadres presented themselves as champions
of these former rebels, denouncing the military for the repressions meted
out to them in the Anti May 16 Elements Campaign of 1971. There were
popular protests in Nanjing, but they were spearheaded by those who
were victimized by the Cultural Revolution primarily the tens of thou-
sands who were given political labels and expelled from the cities.28
General Xu Shiyou had ruled Nanjing with an iron hand since 1968,
and he had dragged his feet in restoring civilians to key posts as party
committees were rebuilt in Jiangsu Province. By the end of 1973, more
than 2,000 army ofcers still held party and government posts. All of
the rst party secretaries at the prefecture level were still army ofcers,
as were thirty-nine of the sixty-eight rst party secretaries at the
county level.29Xu Shiyou was transferred out of the Nanjing Military
Region to Guangzhou at the end of 1973, permitting the civilian cadres
to move against the remaining military ofcials.
The veteran cadres in Nanjing conducted a campaign to criticize the
armed forces for their suppression campaigns, in particular the campaign
against former rebel leaders. But in doing so, they inadvertently mobi-
lized thousands of ordinary citizens into the streets to protest their own
suppression at the hands of the military authorities. The torrent of criti-
cism against the armys actions in previous years encouraged urban res-
idents who were expelled from the cities to attempt to return to their
homes and former jobs. More than 350,000 urban residents were relo-
cated to villages involuntarily during the rst years of military control,
130,000 of them from Nanjing alone. Many of them were from households
with exploiting class labels or suspect political histories. In late January
1974, several thousand of these expelled residents returned to Nanjing to
petition the authorities to restore their urban registrations and jobs. For
almost three months, the petitioners demonstrated at the provincial
and municipal party headquarters, put up wall posters detailing their
plight, and engaged in periodic street marches. Their activities attracted
large numbers of onlookers, tying up trafc in the downtown area. The
stalemate lasted until late April when the petitioners became agitated
and rushed the train station en masse, attempting to force their way onto
Beijing-bound trains to petition in the capital. After train crews refused
to let them board, they sat down on the tracks and tied up rail trafc to
Beijing and Shanghai for several days.
The Nanjing authorities negotiated an agreement with the protesters

and restored trafc on the rail lines. In promising to nd places for the
protesters in their former work units, however, they inadvertently cre-
ated an even larger problem. As word spread that the petitioners de-
mands had been met, another 50,000 swarmed into Nanjing from the
surrounding countryside, seeking the same deal. The authorities would
not negotiate with so many new petitioners and, when this became clear,
they clogged the downtown streets to protest, or rushed to take their
pleas to Beijing. The rail lines were disrupted again, and some of the pe-
titioners hijacked buses and trucks along the highway. Cadres sent to
intercept the protesters were roughed up, some of them wounded. It took
months to clear the streets of petitioners after the end of the campaign.
The campaign in Guangzhou saw the emergence of yet another coun-
tercurrent against the Cultural Revolution: a self-conscious campaign
of political criticism of the Cultural Revolution by former rebel activists.
In Guangzhou, politically conscious former rebels took to the streets to
protest their harsh suppression at the hands of military authorities. But
they went further and developed a critique of the Cultural Revolution
that contained the seeds of a different political consciousness. These ideas
were expressed in a long essay posted on city streets and widely discussed
and reprinted, which is widely viewed as the precursor of Chinas late
1970s democracy movement. It called for a thorough reform of the Chi-
nese political system by strengthening democracy and the rule of law.30
When rebel forces were suppressed in the Guangzhou Military Re-
gion in 1968, the Red Flag faction, which had opposed military control,
was hit particularly hard. In October 1972 former rebel leaders from Red
Flag gained their release from prison. A group of around thirty of them,
along with some purged veteran cadres, held discussions about the why
the Cultural Revolution had failed, and their critique focused on the ac-
tions of the local military. This led some of them to develop a critique
of the Lin Biao system and circulate drafts of essays in late 1973.
When the Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign began in Feb-
ruary 1974, the authors began to post their essays as wall posters under
the collective pen name Li Yizhe.31 The most famous of the essays, On
Socialist Democracy and the Legal System, was put up in a prominent
location in Guangzhou in November 1974. It was one of a series of wall
posters designed to pressure ofcials to release more imprisoned mem-
bers of the former Red Flag faction.
300 China Under Mao
The group coordinated a series of mass meetings and street marches

that made common cause with other aggrieved groups: demobilized
soldiers who demanded a pay increase, young factory workers unhappy
about pay and living conditions, youth sent down to the countryside,
and former Red Guards who demanded punishment for army ofcers
responsible for the massacres they perpetrated at the end of the 1960s.32
The groups activities were treated sympathetically by newly appointed
provincial party secretary Zhao Ziyang, who himself was purged during
the Cultural Revolution and who was interested in rolling back military
control. Several of the former Red Guard leaders who spearheaded the
campaign against military misconduct were placed in charge of the
Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign in their workplaces, and one
of them was appointed to investigate army abuses for the local party
newspaper. These positions afforded them the opportunity to publicize
their underground essays and present petitions to provincial leaders.33
While the essay On Socialist Democracy expressed allegiance to
Mao and the aims of the Cultural Revolution, it expressed a fundamen-
tally different political mentality. The primary target was the Lin Biao
system, whose characteristics were very similar to the highly critical
description of the Cultural Revolution contained in the documents cir-
culated during the earlier campaign against the Lin-Chen antiparty
clique. The authors ridiculed the boundless loyalty campaign of the
late 1960s as quasi-religious rituals more appropriate to feudal emperor
worship than to modern socialism.34 They lambasted the arbitrary per-
secutions of the Cleansing of the Class Ranks and One Strike, Three Anti
campaigns against vaguely de ned counterrevolutionary elements.
They warned against ofcials who wanted to return to the days of sup-
pression, beatings, and torture in searches for imagined traitors and class
enemies. All of these abuses, they charged, were signs that a new ruling
class was forming in China, one that used coercion and emperor wor-
ship to solidify their dictatorship and deny China the possibility of so-
cialist democracy. What made these abuses possible was the lack of gen-
uine democracy and legal restraints on ofcial power. Without safeguards
to defend the rights of the people against abuse, and restrictions on ar-
bitrary power in the form of legal rules, socialism would degenerate into
the kind of social fascism recently observed during the three years of
the Lin Biao system that is, during the Cultural Revolution.35
The essays primary purpose was to oppose the political turn repre-
sented by the Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign of 1974. The
authors argued that the new campaign was actually an effort to return
to the social fascism of the Cultural Revolution. What was really needed,
they argued, was not a campaign to oppose restoration of the pre
Cultural Revolution status quo, but to build a new set of institutions that
would protect the democratic rights of the people, restrain arbitrary per-
secutions, and curtail the special privileges currently enjoyed by those
who held political power.36 This was a new political mentality, and the
authors of the essay and others in their group became major actors in
the post-Mao democracy campaigns of 1978 and1979.37
Political gures in Beijing were alarmed by the essays criticism of
single-party rule. Most vociferous were the reactions of Politburo radi-
cals, especially Jiang Qing, who denounced the essay as the most reac-
tionary article yet since Liberation. In early 1975 a citywide denuncia-
tion campaign against the essay was orga nized in Guangzhou, with
several struggle sessions against the authors and additional mass meet-
ings to condemn the essay held in schools and factories throughout the
city. The authors were banished to the countryside, and an investiga-
tion targeted hundreds of individuals who had expressed approval of the
authors ideas.38
While the character of local protests varied widely, the rise of civil
disorder in many Chinese regions was creating serious economic prob-
lems by the middle of 1974. In factories, railway depots, and dockyards,
rebel leaders challenged veteran cadres who had tried to reassert their
authority and enforce work discipline. In addition to the widespread dis-
ruptions in Hangzhou and Nanjing described above, workers on the
Shanghai docks halted work to protest the reinstitution of piece rates,
and factional ghting in the railway system, especially in the pivotal
region of Xuzhou, disrupted Chinas transport system. When steel,
coal, and other crucial supplies piled up at the point of production due to
shipping delays, supply shortages slowed production. Industrial output
declined during the rst three quarters of 1974, reversing the modest
upward trend of recent years.
In October these problems nally caught Maos attention, and he
weighed in to call for unity and stability. While Mao clearly wanted
rebel forces to push back against the hasty restoration of pre Cultural
302 China Under Mao
Revolution practices, he did not want a return to the kind of disorder

that had prompted him to lean heavily on a military solution back in
1968. Near the end of the year Mao nally instructed Beijing ofcials
to act decisively to boost the national economy, and he put Deng Xiaoping
in charge of the effort, which began in earnest in early 1975.39
Restoring Order, Stabilizing the Economy, 1975
With Maos approval, Deng Xiaoping moved decisively to nish the re-
building of party organizations, completely remove the armed forces from
civilian administration, and halt the disruptive con icts that crippled
the economy in 1974. He was able to accomplish far more during 1975
than Zhou Enlai during his earlier stint, in large part by moving more
decisively than the cautious premier had dared.40 Dengs initiatives, how-
ever, were cut short by the end of the year. He had Maos support to re-
build the party and curtail factional con icts, creating unity and sta-
bility and thereby, in Maos view, consolidating the accomplishments
of the Cultural Revolution. However, Deng overstepped his mandate
when he moved to create conditions for the modernization of Chinas
industry, a stronger scientic establishment, and a restored system of
higher education. These initiatives in fact challenged cherished accom-
plishments of the Cultural Revolution itself and, like Zhou Enlai be-
fore him, Deng soon found himself sidelined and criticized.
Before he was sidelined Deng accomplished a great deal. He was able
to remove the armed forces completely from civilian administration. In
a series of speeches and directives to military leaders, he criticized the
armed forces as bloated and soft, having created comfortable government
positions for themselves with civilian perquisites and special privileges.
He called on the Peoples Liberation Army to refocus on military affairs
and withdraw from involvement in civil administration, which ham-
pered military readiness and weakened discipline. He ordered a renewed
focus on upgrading weapons systems, and initiated a campaign to ex-
tinguish factionalism within the armed forces. In August 1975 he or-
dered the withdrawal of all military personnel from civilian posts.41
Deng also reenergized the campaign to rebuild the national party or-
ganization. He reasserted the authority of party secretaries and continued
the rehabilitation of formerly disgraced ofcials and professional experts.
He made clear that party leadership was supreme, and that rebellion
against party authority would no longer be tolerated. He also ordered

the reexamination of the new party members admitted after 1968,
making clear that their qualications and sense of discipline should be
veried before their party membership was con rmed. Those who
lacked qualications or who retained factional allegiances should be
expelled. Newer members who clamored for elevation into leading posts,
or who had already attained them, should remain in low-level positions
to gain the necessary experience that comes with seniority.42
Deng directed a vigorous campaign to suppress factionalism, focusing
rst on the national railway system and then extending it to the key in-
dustrial sectors of coal and steel. The showcase for this effort was the
rectication campaign that he ordered in the Xuzhou Railway Bureau a
key railway junction in northern Jiangsu Province where persistent and
deeply entrenched factional con ict had created bottlenecks that
disrupted the delivery of industrial supplies in much of eastern and
northern China. In February 1975 he transferred authority over the
Railway System from separate provincial governments to the Ministry
of Railways, and issued a central document that labeled factional resis-
tance to ministry authority as bourgeois and damage to railway prop-
erty counterrevolutionary. He ordered a work team into the Xuzhou
Railway Bureau, headed by the minister of railways, and had the head
of the bureau, a former rebel leader, arrested. When his followers re-
sisted, they were arrested also. The work team conducted a series of mass
denunciation meetings to criticize factional disruption, pushed very
hard for a reduction in accident rates and the ful llment of quotas for
freight tonnage, and transferred large numbers of activists to different
posts, breaking up local factional networks. The Xuzhou experience was
promoted as a national model, and its methods were applied to problem-
atic railway bureaus that had created bottlenecks elsewhere in China.43
The methods employed in the railway system were quickly applied to
major coal and steel centers, which were similarly disrupted.44
Rebels in Zhejiang Province who had formed workers militias to ad-
vance their cause during the 1974 second Cultural Revolution resisted
these readjustment policies, and Deng dispatched a high-powered work
team to Hangzhou to sort out the problems. The rebels were put under
heavy pressure, and in a predawn raid on the factions headquarters, the
top rebel leader, Weng Senhe, was arrested. PLA troops were sent to major
factories in and around Hangzhou to avert further unrest. Other rebel
304 China Under Mao
leaders were punished, while the workers militias were disbanded, and
the provincial leadership was reshufed to strengthen the readjustment
program.45
The Last Radical Backlash
Dengs decisive actions to restore order and rebuild party authority were
entirely within his working mandate. Mao had long been clear that he
wanted the military removed completely from civilian administration,
and Deng completed the task. Mao was clear that he wanted the party
organization to be rebuilt and disgraced ofcials returned to useful ser-
vice, and Deng energetically pushed this agenda forward. Mao was also
clear that while he wanted to preserve the positive accomplishments
of the Cultural Revolution, chronic factional con ict that disrupted
production and social order was not one of them. Mao wanted order,
discipline, and stability, which he saw as consolidating the gains of the
Cultural Revolution. The methods that Deng employed to accomplish
these objectives were primarily politicalreasserting party authority
in unambiguous terms, and demanding discipline and unity. None of
this overstepped the limits of what Mao had asked Deng to do.
Deng, however, also went beyond these purely political measures to
create the foundations for a modern economy. It appears that these ini-
tiatives, as modest as they seem in retrospect, may have caused Mao to
lose condence in Dengs delity to the Cultural Revolution. Given Dengs
subsequent embrace of market-oriented reforms after Maos death, Maos
intuition can hardly be faulted. Deng initiated several measures that went
beyond reinforcing order and stability. He authorized the drafting of an
ambitious plan for reviving Chinese industry and boosting economic
growth, advocating the importation of advanced foreign technology, the
adoption of international trade practices that involved foreign credits,
and the strengthening of work incentives and industrial discipline by
implementing the principle of payment according to work. A second plan
called for the strengthening of science and technology, and in particular
the rebuilding of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The plan advocated
the revival of professional journals, the withdrawal of military ofcers
and propaganda teams, greater access to research materials and equip-
ment including foreign publications, the nal return of all former scien-
tic personnel who still remained in the countryside, and the targeting
of high-technology elds like computers, lasers, and remote sensing, as
well as basic research in nuclear energy and particle physics. The plan
also called for the revival of social science research and the creation of a
separate Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. A third initiative addressed
higher education: it reafrmed the value of faculty trained as specialists
before the Cultural Revolution, the admission of students directly from
high school instead of from factories and farms based on political recom-
mendations, the reduction or elimination of compulsory factory work as
part of university education, and the restoration of longer courses of spe-
cialized training with much higher academic standards.46 The subtext for
all of these initiatives was that Chinese industry and science had fallen
badly behind those of other countries, and that its system of higher edu-
cation was inadequate. The prescribed new policies clearly implied that
the Cultural Revolution had intensied Chinas backwardness.
Mao developed severe misgivings at the end of 1975. There are dif-
ferent views about what triggered his rapid loss of condence in Deng,
but his attitude began to shift decisively in September and by November
had reached the point where Mao authorized severe criticism of Deng
for policy errors.47 In retrospect it is hard to fault Maos perception that
Deng was interested less in consolidating the gains of the Cultural Rev-
olution than in rolling back its counterproductive initiatives and re-
building much of what it had destroyed. In January 1976 Deng stopped
appearing in public and was stripped of his leadership responsibilities.
After the death of Zhou Enlai that month, Hua Guofeng was named
acting premier and was promoted to rst vice premier, effectively re-
placing Deng Xiaoping.48 At the same time, a shrill denunciation cam-
paign against revisionism and restorationism began, focusing rst on
ofcials who had headed Dengs initiatives in industry, science and tech-
nology, and higher education. These ofcials were subjected to criticism
in the mass media, wall poster accusations, and mass meetings where
they were loudly denounced and repudiated in a style reminiscent of
the late 1960s. One ofcial collapsed during a struggle session and died
of a heart attack shortly thereafter.49 These ofcials were denounced for
following the designs of an unnamed unrepentant capitalist roader, a
scarcely veiled reference to the as-yet-unnamed Deng Xiaoping.
The Qingming Protests of 1976
The death of Zhou Enlai, the demotion of Deng Xiaoping, and the harsh
campaign to denounce restorationism, all occurring in mid-January
306 China Under Mao
1976, marked a shift in Chinas political atmosphere. Rebel leaders in

the provinces who were suppressed during Dengs recent campaign
against factionalism saw this as a sign that they could make a comeback.
In provincial capitals like Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Wuhan they mobi-
lized to attack local veteran cadres for the same errors committed by Deng
Xiaoping. In these cities rebel leaders once again challenged veteran
cadres, sought to unseat recently appointed ofcials, put up wall posters,
and held demonstrations in front of government ofces.50 To them, it
looked as if the tide had turned once again, and they were ready to seize
their chance at a comeback.
This new offensive incited, for the rst time, public resistance by or-
dinary citizens. The period after the death of Lin Biao had been one of
quiet ferment, with underground study groups reexamining Marxism-
Leninism, former Red Guards reecting on the defeat of their movement,
and ordinary citizens writing anonymous handbills and petitions that
denounced the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing, and even Mao himself.51
During the rst stages of this new campaign to criticize restorationism,
obviously targeting Deng and by implication Zhou, similar sentiments
surfaced in the form of handbills and wall posters.52
These underground stirrings became public in a dramatic fashion in
the early spring of 1976. They appeared to reect a much larger slice of
the population than the dissident rebels in the provinces, and represented
a reaction diametrically opposed to the January shift in political atmo-
sphere. The catalyst was the handling of Zhou Enlais state funeral, and
more importantly Beijings subsequent efforts to discourage local com-
memorations of the veteran revolutionary. Zhou was given a full and
proper ofcial state funeral on January 15, but the amount of publicity
devoted to it fell below what many citizens expected. Only a few scenes
from the funeral were shown on television, and Deng Xiaoping, who
gave the eulogy, was not mentioned in the media accounts. Shortly after
the funeral, the Central Committee issued a directive banning local com-
memorative meetings for Premier Zhou. Instead, citizens were instructed
to pour their energies into the criticism of the right deviationist wind
an obvious reference to Deng Xiaoping, but seemingly an indirect swipe
at Zhou Enlai, who was closely associated in the popular mind with the
kinds of policies that Deng pushed. This stance offended public opinion
and served as a trigger for massive street demonstrations that represented
a challenge to the Politburo radicals and indirectly to Mao himself.
The earliest and best-known protests were in Nanjing, and began at

Nanjing University, the cradle of the citys Red Guard and rebel move-
ments. Mourning for Zhou Enlai began spontaneously on the campus
and in other organizations around Nanjing shortly after his January
death was announced.53 A few days afterward, however, the Central
Committee issued a directive banning commemorative meetings, and
many workplaces and schools canceled their planned activities. Nanjing
University nonetheless went forward with theirs. Local citizens were of-
fended by the low level of publicity surrounding the state funeral, and
by the launching of a campaign to criticize the policies identied with
Zhou. The propaganda campaign met with little enthusiasm. Local rebels
who saw themselves as loyal followers of Maos line attacked Nanjings
party leaders for their lack of enthusiasm, and accused them of complicity
with Dengs revisionism.
Public reaction did not surface, however, until a March25 article in
the Shanghai newspaper Wenhui bao pointedly referred to an unrepen-
tant capitalist roader who helped an unrepentant capitalist roader come
back to the political stage.54 Whether intended or not, this was widely
interpreted to refer to Zhou Enlai, and the reaction in Nanjing was im-
mediate. The next day, wall posters went up all over the Nanjing Uni-
versity campus, emotionally repudiating the Wenhui bao article and chal-
lenging those who dared to attack Premier Zhou. The posters were openly
critical of the Politburo radicals, whose political base was in Shanghai.
Jiang Qing was insulted in a wall poster that claimed that the author
missed Yang Kaihui, one of Maos earlier wives, who was executed by
the Nationalists. Students marched to Nanjings train and bus stations
to paste slogans on departing vehicles, informing those in other cities
of the Nanjing movement to defend the memory of Zhou Enlai.
Two weeks before the April 4 Qingming festival to commemorate the
dead, wreaths dedicated to Zhou began to appear around the city, and
wall posters declared We will forever remember Premier Zhou. Large
numbers of wreaths appeared on a hill south of the city used by the Na-
tionalists as an execution ground, which had been a traditional place
for residents to lay wreaths after 1949. There were physical confronta-
tions at the entrance to the park when a delegation of 400 students was
barred from entering. Instead, the students marched through the city
center, displaying their wreaths on March28. This drew large crowds
onto the city streets. Even more pointedly worded wall posters defended
308 China Under Mao
Zhou and attacked Politburo radicals. One prominent wall poster warned
of Khrushchev-like conspirators who want to usurp power and an-
other named Zhang Chunqiao a careerist and double-dealer. Alarmed
by these reports, on April 1 the Central Committee ordered the suppres-
sion of street gatherings and the removal of wreaths and wall posters.
On April 2 Beijings ban on commemorations was distributed in Nan-
jing, and cadres and workers were ordered to cover up the offending wall
posters and slogans.55 These actions, however, failed to stem the rising
tide of protest against the rebel resurgence. Even larger protests broke
out on April 3, which were instigated by the directive banning wall
posters and wreaths. Protestors put up wall posters and chanted slogans
that were even more confrontational and aggressive: Commemorating
Premier Zhou is not counterrevolution and We are resolved to ght a
erce battle against careerists who raise the white ag and oppose Pre-
mier Zhou. An estimated 140,000 marched to a park south of Nanjing
on April 3. The crowds grew to a remarkable 600,000in the streets of
Nanjing in succeeding days, reaching a peak on April 4.56 The Nanjing
events sparked similar outpourings in other cities and county seats in
southern Jiangsu.57
Similar events occurred on a smaller scale in Hangzhou. The attacks
on Deng Xiaoping spurred a group of party cadres in one of the city of-
ces to put up a wall poster refuting the charge that cadres had degen-
erated into capitalist roaders. The Wenhui bao article that seemed to at-
tack Zhou as an unrepentant capitalist roader spurred wall posters that
attacked Shanghais party secretary, a protg of the Politburo radicals.
Party members from a steel mill placed a large commemorative wreath
in memory of Zhou at the labor bureau on April 1, on a agpole at the
top of the building, where it could be seen for several blocks. Other fac-
tories and work units in Hangzhou followed suit, as did individuals at
Zhejiang University. Wall posters in the city declared, Whoever opposes
Premier Zhou opposes revolution and Be strictly on guard against Lin
Biaotype bourgeois careerists and plotters seizing party and state power.
Excitement about these political expressions was focused on the main
downtown department store, the gates of the university, and several
major squares. As in Nanjing, slogans were painted on trains that were
scheduled to depart for Beijing and other cities.58
These provincial events may have helped to catalyze the much larger
and more momentous Beijing demonstrations on April 4 and5. The slo-
gans placed on trains bound for the capital had their intended effect: one
of the rst banners posted in Tiananmen Square reportedly declared,
We are determined to support the Nanjing people in their revolutionary
struggles.59 In Beijing, commemorative wreaths appeared in Tiananmen
Square as early as March19. These were quickly removed, and the Public
Security Bureau was ordered to compile lists of everyone who laid
wreaths at the square. On March30 and31, as news of the Nanjing move-
ment reached the capital, wreaths became more numerous, and anti-
radical poems and statements were posted on the square, as the number
of visitors increased rapidly. In the few days before April 4, more than
1 million people are estimated to have visited the square. The Public Se-
curity Bureau set up a joint command post at one corner of the square
that was staffed also by members of the workers militia and troops from
the Beijing Garrison. It broadcast statements that the Qingming festival
was a feudal custom, that work units should not send delegations with
wreaths, and that the Nanjing events were a reactionary incident. They
did not move against the crowds, however, and only made a few arrests
and removed some of the wreaths.60
On the day of the festival, April 4, the crowd on the square grew to
an estimated 2 million. Many more wreaths were carried to the square,
along with poems, handbills, wall posters, and spontaneous speeches
and shouting of slogans. The atmosphere grew increasingly tense as the
day went on, with sporadic stghts and injuries of public security of-
cers who intervened. Most statements were emotional eulogies for Pre-
mier Zhou, but as in Nanjing, some were sharply critical of Politburo
radicals, alluding especially to Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. More
noteworthy was the deance exhibited toward Mao himself. The dem-
onstrations were obviously in opposition to Maos new criticism cam-
paign, and more fundamentally against the Cultural Revolution. While
not being named directly, Mao was attacked in some of the posters and
speeches. One poem posted on the square that day referred to the Polit-
buro radicals thus:
Despicable are the demons who, overrating themselves,

Once gain attempt to stir up evil winds and bloody rains,
Talking glibly and carry ing their mistress train
what a ridiculous lot they are, a bunch of monkeys
Trying to crown themselves!
. . . Look around, you despicable lot:
310 China Under Mao
Flowers blanket Tiananmen Square like snow

And tears fall in showers around the monument.
We cherish the memory of Premier Zhou; but you do not.
We offer our libation; but you do not.
China is no longer the China of the past,
And the people are no longer wrapped in utter ignorance,
Gone for good is Qin Shi Huangs feudal society,
. . . To hell with scholars who emasculate Marxism-Leninism!61
The obvious challenge to both the Politburo radicals and Mao could not
be tolerated, and the party leaders decided in a late-night meeting to clear
the square of all wreaths; the few remaining people who lingered on
the square late at night were detained. There was no public explanation
for the removal of the wreaths, but word spread rapidly and by 8 a.m.
on April 5 roughly 10,000 agitated people had already gathered in the
square, and the crowd grew several-fold into the afternoon. The crowd
was angry and confrontational: they massed on the steps of the Great
Hall of the People and demanded the return of the wreaths. A police
van that broadcast messages denouncing class enemies was overturned,
and the joint command post of the Public Security Bureau was overrun
by protesters and set on re. The police and militia did not move against
the crowd until after dark, when the lights were turned out and a re-
corded speech by Beijings mayor denounced bad elements who de-
ceived people and asked that everyone return home. After the speech
was played a number of times, at 11 p.m. the police and militia nally
moved in with clubs to beat and cart off the remaining stragglers on the
square, which was then cordoned off. Rumors of massive casualties ap-
pear to be unfounded, and the authorities were apparently able to re-
store control over the square with relatively little violence. The mood
the next day was calm: several thousand people came to pay their re-
spects, and one wreath was laid down and left undisturbed.
The Aftermath of Tiananmen and Maos Final Days
For obvious reasons, Politburo radicals and their supporters were alarmed
by the Tiananmen protests. Maos nephew, Mao Yuanxin, reported to
him on April 7 that the counterrevolutionary political incident . . . pub-
licly unfurled and embraced the banner of Deng Xiaoping [and] furi-
ously pointed its spearhead at the great leader Chairman Mao.62 Some
of the Politburo radicals charged that Deng Xiaoping had fomented the
protests as part of an antiparty plot, and that he had actually been on
the square to direct events. Mao was unconvinced, but he understood
clearly that the protests indicated a large popular following for a reversal
of Cultural Revolution policies, and that gures like Deng and Zhou were
becoming a rallying point. He ordered Deng removed from his leader-
ship posts and ofcially named Hua Guofeng as Zhous successor as pre-
mier (he had been acting premier since February). Hua was also ap-
pointed rst vice chairman, which suggested that he was Maos choice
as his successor. Deng Xiaoping was publicly denounced, and the four-
month campaign against the unnamed unrepentant capitalist roader
became a criticize Deng campaign.63 This turned out to be Maos last
decisive intervention in Chinese politics.
In the ensuing months, Politburo radicals and their supporters in the
capital and the provinces continued to push their criticism of earlier rec-
tication efforts. A nationwide hunt for individuals who sympathized
with the Tiananmen protests, or who had expressed similar sympathies,
led to the investigation of hundreds of thousands and the arrest of roughly
10,000 people. Mass rallies and parades were organized to celebrate the
smashing of the counterrevolutionary countercurrent.64 Resistance to
veteran cadres revived in the provinces, especially among those who had
been punished during Deng Xiaopings 1975 campaigns to quell faction-
alism. In cities like Hangzhou and Nanjing, former rebel leaders resumed
their push to overthrow veteran cadres who had cooperated with Dengs
campaign to quell factionalism at their expense.65 Hua Guofeng and other
leaders who tried to continue the policies of stabilization and revive the
economy within the boundaries set by Mao found that they were hemmed
in by harsh criticism from more radical ofcials who seemingly dogged
every effort, no matter how limited, to repair the damage of the Cul-
tural Revolution.
In this unsettled situation Maos health deteriorated rapidly. He had
a heart attack on May 11 and remained conscious but was bedridden.
He suffered another heart attack on June 26, another on September 2,
and died on September 9. Hua Guofeng became acting chairman. The
armed forces were placed on alert throughout the country to guard
against the recurrence of public protests. Daily memorial ser vices were
held in the Great Hall of the People from September 11 to 17. On Sep-
tember 18 a massive memorial meeting was held on Tiananmen Square,
312 China Under Mao
with an estimated 1 million in attendance. Hua Guofeng gave the me-

morial speech, praising Mao as the greatest Marxist-Leninist of the con-
temporary era. People stood in silence throughout the country at the
appointed time, while the whistles of all factories and locomotives blew
a three-minute tribute. Deng Xiaoping and his close associates, all of
whom had recently been removed from their posts, were not permitted
to attend.66
The ofcial account of the events leading to the arrest of the Polit-
buro radicals in early October portrays them as a Gang of Four who
plotted to usurp party power. This appears to have the same imsy re-
lationship to historical reality as the allegations about Lin Biaos plot to
seize power. The ofcials who engineered the arrests essentially a po-
litical coupmost certainly understood that these radical gures would
be a thorn in their side, and probably feared that they eventually would
attempt to promote one of their own to the top leadership. There is, how-
ever, little evidence that Politburo radicals coordinated any effort to usurp
the party leadership in the weeks after Maos death.67
To the contrary, the plotting appears to have been almost entirely
on the other side, and began barely a week after Maos death when Hua
Guofeng met with other senior ofcials to discuss how to resolve the
Gang of Four problem. Several senior ofcials had private and furtive
discussions about how to remove them from the leadership, but Hua
Guofeng took the initiative. He met with other Politburo members in late
September to discuss the issue, stating that he saw con ict with the rad-
icals as unavoidable. They considered calling a Politburo vote to remove
them, but saw this as too risky, providing an opportunity for counter-
mobilization by regional rebels.68 Planning accelerated and drew more
ofcials into the conspiracy. A list of the radicals prominent supporters
in Beijing, also designated for arrest, was drawn up. At the appropriate
time, the Beijing Garrison would be ordered to secure the New China
News Agency, Peoples Radio, Peoples Daily, the airport, and other stra-
tegic sites in the capital.
The scheme was set into motion by inviting key radicals to a Polit-
buro meeting on the morning of October 6. Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hong-
wen, and Yao Wenyuan were arrested as they arrived for the osten-
sible meeting; Jiang Qing and Maos nephew Mao Yuanxin were arrested
at their homes shortly afterward. The Beijing Garrison moved in to se-
cure strategic sites and the operation was completed in less than an
hour.69 Over the next week, ofcials from the provinces and military
regions were summoned to Beijing for brie ngs about what had trans-
pired. Around thirty of the radicals prominent allies in the capital were
also arrested. Party leaders in Shanghai, the radicals primary power base,
were puzzled by their inability to contact their allies in Beijing, and sus-
pected that revisionists had seized power. They held an emergency
meeting on October 8 and decided to mobilize the militia to resist. On
October 12 some Shanghai ofcials made plans to issue a message to the
entire nation supporting the rebel cause, and stage strikes, organize dem-
onstrations, and blow up bridges and resist in the manner of the Paris
Commune. The plan was never implemented. Shanghai ofcials were
pressured to go to Beijing for consultations, and after their return they
were tight-lipped about what they were told. When the arrest of the Gang
of Four was publicized nationally on October 14, Shanghai residents were
puzzled. As the names of those arrested became known the next day,
popular enthusiasm for the coup became evident, and all plans for or-
ganized resistance were dropped.70
In the waning weeks of his life, Mao appeared to realize that the game
might be lost. In a famous statement to Hua Guofeng during the summer
of 1976, he reected on the future of his last revolution:
I have accomplished two things in my life. First, I fought Chiang Kai-

shek for a few decades and drove him to a few islands. After eight years
of war against the Japa nese, they were sent home. We fought our way
to Beijing, at last entering the Forbidden City. There are not many people
who do not recognize these achievements. . . . The other matter you all
know about. It was to launch the Cultural Revolution. On this matter
few support it, many oppose it. But it is not nished, and its legacy must
be handed down to the next generation. How to do this? If not in peace,
then in turmoil. If it is not done well, then there will be bloodshed. Only
heaven knows how you are going to handle it.71
If Mao thought that Hua would balance a strongly divided leadership,

helping his radical loyalists to survive, he once again miscalculated.
Barely one month after his death, his wife and nephew were in prison
along with their political allies. In the years to come, Maos reputation
as a founding father would be preserved, but the legacy of his nal years
would be rejected. The partys subsequent campaign to thoroughly re-
pudiate the Cultural Revolution would so vilify the radical ofcials who
loyally did Maos bidding that it sometimes appeared to imply that they,
314 China Under Mao
not Mao, were really responsible for the decade of turmoil. But the par-
tys ofcial verdict, issued only ve years after his death in the 1981 Res-
olution on Party History, could not avoid stating the obvious: The cul-
tural revolution, which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was
responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered
by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the Peoples
Republic. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong.72
14

The Mao Era in Retrospect
A T THE TIME of his death Mao had accomplished very little of what
he hoped to achieve after the mid-1950s. His two major accom-
plishments the establishment of a unied Chinese state and the in-
stallation of a socialist economy modeled after that of the Soviet Union
were still basically intact. But both were severely damaged. Mao left
China with a divided party organization riven by factional discord and
a government that had yet to recover from the sustained assault of the
past decade. The industrialization drive had stalled. Rural poverty was
still widespread. Urban living standards had stagnated and in some re-
spects had deteriorated. The university system was backward, and sci-
ence and technology were decades behind world standards. Due to
Maos initiatives, China had fallen increasingly behind other nations in
its quest for development. Mao left a country that was backward and
weak, having ful lled few of the aspirations of the early 1950s.
Unwanted Outcomes, Frustrated Ambitions
Almost every one of Maos interventions after 1956 put his initial ac-
complishments in jeopardy, generating outcomes that were both unan-
ticipated and unwanted. The rst such instance was the Hundred
Flowers. Mao tried to position himself as a champion of post-Stalin
liberalization in a stable and secure new socialist regime, calling for
public criticism of party cadres, against strong opposition from other
party leaders. The crescendo of surprisingly harsh criticism and orga-
nized protest by students, a wave of strikes by industrial workers, the
rollback of collective farms, and occasional rural rebellions all showed
316 China Under Mao
that Chinas citizens were far less accepting of the new party-state than
Mao had imagined. The subsequent crackdown during the Antirightist
Campaign was in many ways a humiliating retreat for Mao, and it set
him on a course back toward his original Stalinist instincts that did not
bode well for the future.
An even more spectacular defeat was the disastrous Great Leap For-
ward. Mao was convinced that socialism could be built much more rap-
idly than Stalin and other Chinese leaders thought possible, and he
pushed for the rapid socialist transformation of the economy, completing
the process in 1957, years ahead of schedule. This gave him condence
that the new socialist institutions, driven forward by political cadres who
mobilized the population in ways reminiscent of the nal stages of the
civil war, would generate a quantum leap in Chinas economic develop-
ment. Mao was right to be condent about the ability of his party orga-
nization to mobilize Chinas population. The outpouring of energy and
nationwide activity was in many ways astonishing, and few modern
states could have contemplated such a campaign. The result, however,
was precisely the opposite of what Mao had intended. Quite apart from
the staggering death toll of the devastating famine, the campaign dam-
aged both agriculture and industry for many years to come. Maos failure
on this occasion was so total that he subsequently abandoned his early
preoccupation with rapid economic growth, embarking instead on a po-
litical offensive designed to cope with the political fallout from the di-
saster he had brought upon his own people. He continued that struggle,
with little success, until the end of this life.
On its own terms, the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution
were mixed at best. Ultimately it failed in the end, in icting enormous
damage in the process. From one perspective, though, it was remarkably
successful. Mao was able in short order to mobilize an extraordinarily
large insurgency against the party-state, which was effectively demolished
by 1967. Relying on the armed forces, he was able to destroy the old party
and government structures without leading to the complete disintegra-
tion of the nation-state. He subsequently put into place a new set of gov-
ernmental institutions in the form of revolutionary committees that
replaced the old parallel structures of party and government.
These were, however, hollow victories. Mao and his radical associ-
ates were able to instigate nationwide rebellions, but their efforts to di-
rect and shape the course of con ict were constantly frustrated. Mao
The Mao Era in Retrospect 317
had to shift course and change tactics repeatedly after his initial strate-
gies failed. The student movement was divided from the outset and re-
sisted repeated efforts to get student rebels to unite. After the Central
Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) intervened to favor one faction, aban-
doning the students who had helped them launched the movement, they
became the target of the faction they had cast aside. These dissident Red
Guards were suppressed, leaving the eld to student rebels loyal to the
CCRG. But these rebels, in turn, divided into two new factions that fought
one another to the very end.
After Maos disappointing experience with students, he shifted to the
mobilization of the working class. Initially this strategy looked prom-
ising. Large coalitions of worker rebels quickly overwhelmed local party
authorities, but the workers also developed unwanted tendencies. Many
of them demanded improvement in wages and living standards, and large
numbers mobilized to defend local party leaders and battle with other
workers, quickly paralyzing industry and transport. Shanghais January
power seizure appeared initially to be a solution a coalition of worker
rebels and loyal Maoist ofcials took over from the party authorities,
suppressed economic demands, and put down opposition. A few prov-
inces followed suit, but the effort soon fell apart. Similar power seizures
failed almost everywhere else early in 1967, forcing Mao to impose mil-
itary control. This had the unanticipated effect of injecting local armed
forces into con icts with rebel groups, which in turn deepened and
prolonged the splits in rebel forces, drawing local army units into fac-
tional struggles.
As large-scale armed battles between rebel forces broke out across
China in spring and summer of 1967, Mao tried to tip the scales toward
a favorable outcome. He called for distributing military arms to the Left
and sanctioned rebel attacks on army units that were taking the wrong
side in local struggles. This served only to escalate armed warfare and
the death toll from factional conicts, now fought with military arma-
ments. Entire districts of several regional cities were destroyed in the
battles, and provinces where an initially tenuous order had been created
were once again destabilized. Realizing that his initiative to strengthen
rebel forces and resolve regional conicts had badly backred, Mao
shifted sharply toward full support for the armed forces, purging scape-
goats in the CCRG who had loyally carried out his recent directives,
and called for mass factions to be disarmed. After a year of difcult and
318 China Under Mao
protracted negotiations to unite warring factions, Mao leaned increas-

ingly toward a harsh authoritarian solution and instituted a virtual
military dictatorship in which his once-treasured rebel leaders were
subjected to harsh suppression and replaced by more pliable mass rep-
resentatives. Most of those who managed to survive did so as mere
gureheads.
Throughout this confused period Mao tried to leave the impression
that these twists and turns were all unfolding in ways that were favor-
able for his ultimate plans. The new revolutionary committees installed
across most of China by late 1968 were celebrated as a great victory. In-
deed, they did represent a new form of government built on the rubble
of the old. But they did not operate as advertised, and they did not last
very long. Except for Shanghai and Beijing, almost all provincial revolu-
tionary committees were completely dominated by army ofcers, and
most were a thinly disguised form of military dictatorship. These networks
of revolutionary committees, which extended down to the grass roots,
soon unleashed a massive cleansing campaign, one of the largest and
deadliest traitor hunts in the history of the Peoples Republic. By 1969 it
dawned on Mao that that the enormous power he had been forced to
hand over to military ofcers made him excessively dependent on them.
His moves to reduce their power led to the crisis of the Lin Biao affair.
The death of Lin Biao undermined the entire political rationale for
the Cultural Revolution and signaled the end of Chinas brief period of
military rule. Mao spent the rest of his life in an erratic and ultimately
unsuccessful effort to preserve something of value from the earlier up-
heaval. He gave Zhou Enlai the task of rebuilding the party organiza-
tion and removing the army from civilian administration, and had him
lead a campaign that blamed Cultural Revolution atrocities on an ul-
traleftist Lin Biao. He then cast Zhou aside and turned to a second Cul-
tural Revolution to defend the legacy of the Cultural Revolution while
continuing to withdraw the army from civilian rule. When that cam-
paign destabilized large parts of China, paralyzing industry and trans-
port, Mao turned to Deng Xiaoping to reestablish discipline and order,
stabilize the economy, and resume the task of rebuilding the civilian
party-state. After Deng showed little regard for Cultural Revolution
dogma, Mao cast him aside as well, a nal turn that ignited large street
demonstrations in Nanjing, Beijing, and other cities that expressed dis-
dain for Maoist radicals and for the Cultural Revolution. Mao put the
centrist ofcial Hua Guofeng in charge, hoping that he could maintain
a balance between Maoist radicals and establishment ofcials in the party

leadership. Instead, Hua arrested and denounced the remaining Maoist
radicals only one month after Maos death, an act that was the rst step
on the path toward a very different post-Mao China.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Maos contributions to China
after 1956 were unsuccessful by his own standards and destructive in
ways that he surely did not imagine. During both the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the destructive aspects of Maos
initiatives far outweighed any outcomes that could be construed as pos-
itive. The Cultural Revolution succeeded in its agenda of destroying the
structure of Chinas party-state, and in sidelining the many ofcials who
might have harbored inner doubts about Maos vision, but it created
nothing lasting in its place. During the Cultural Revolution Mao tried
repeatedly to put a positive face on each unexpected and unwanted
development, asserting that out of disorder a greater order would even-
tually be born. But the public celebrations of the great victories of the
Cultural Revolution, accompanied by the escalating intensity of the
cult of Mao, all turned out to be as hollow as Maos earlier insistence
that the accomplishments of the Great Leap were nine ngers and the
shortcomings one nger. As Maos health failed during his nal two
years, he appeared to resign himself to the fact that his legacy was far
from assured, and that powerful forces in the leadership and in society
at large were arrayed against it.
After his death, Maos surviving colleagues had a similar view of his
legacy. Chen Yun, an ofcial who had long been sidelined by Mao for
his insistence that Chinas development had to be balanced and steady,
expressed this common view with a certain restraint near the end of
1978: Had Chairman Mao died in 1956, there would have been no doubt
that he was a great leader of the Chinese people, a respected, loved and
outstanding great man in the proletarian revolutionary movement of the
world. Had he died in 1966, his meritorious achievements would have
been somewhat tarnished but still very good. Since he actually died in
1976, there is nothing we can do about it.1
Chinas National Trajectory under Mao

The Mao era should not be judged exclusively through the lens of Maos
intentions and their outcomes. Even more important is the overall re-
cord of Chinas progress as a nation under the new state and economic
320 China Under Mao
system that the party installed during the 1950s. When Chinas new
leaders consolidated state power and chose to adopt a Soviet-inspired
model of economic development, they chose a model that promised
rapid industrialization. Mao pushed to put it into place more rapidly
than many of his colleagues thought wise, and after it was in place he
pushed even further to speed up its operations through political mo-
bilization. The model had already proven itself adept at rapid war time
mobilization and the creation of an impressive heavy industrial base
in the Soviet Union. Shortly after China put its version of the Soviet
model in place, Khrushchev had turned to improving the livelihoods
of Soviet citizens, and was boasting that the Soviet Union would soon
reach levels of development and prosperity that rivaled those of the
United States. These predictions seem foolhardy in retrospect, but at
the time they were made they did not seem so farfetched, and they
inspired Mao to follow suit.
In the Great Leap Forward, Mao pushed this development model to
the limit. Denigrating the expertise of technical specialists, he urged
party organizations nationwide to mobilize labor to speed up and work
longer hours, accelerating the pace of economic development. The re-
sult was a severe industrial depression and a famine of historic propor-
tions. Shortly after the economy recovered in the mid-1960s, Mao
attacked the economic bureaucracy once again during his Cultural
Revolution, placing ofcials and experts at all levels under political at-
tack, banishing most of them for several years of manual labor. After
the retrenchment that followed the Lin Biao affair, the economy became
a political battleground, as leaders at all levels were paralyzed by a struggle
over the role of technical experts, methods of enterprise management,
work incentives, and the workers livelihood.
As the Mao era drew to a close, the heavy costs of Maoism were im-
possible to ignore. In some respects, China exhibited the hallmarks of
successful economic development. Measures of public health improved
steadily. The crude death rate, 25.8 per thousand in 1953, had shrunk
to 7.8 per thousand in 1976. Infant mortality, which was 175 per thou-
sand births in 1953, was 45 per thousand in 1976. Life expectancy at
birth, which was only 40 years in 1953, had risen to 64 years, a level
usually attained only at much higher levels of economic development.2
These indicators were a testament to a government infrastructure that
had the capacity to improve public health and deliver basic medical care
to the vast majority of the population. This is the same government in-
frastructure that conducted the remarkably effective campaigns against
organized crime, the drug and sex trades, and urban and rural gangs
during the 1950s.
In addition to these genuine accomplishments, which survived to the
end of the Mao era, aggregate measures of Chinas gross domestic product
(GDP) were also impressive. Gross output of Chinas industry and agri-
culture grew in nominal terms almost tenfold during the Mao era; in-
dustrial output grew twice as fast.3 From this perspective, it appeared
that the Maoist version of the Soviet economic system performed in much
the way that had been originally anticipated.
But beneath the surface, severe problems were apparent. The rst ob-
vious problem was that Chinas population was growing as fast as the
economy: it had almost doubled after 1952, growing from 584 to 932
million. Population pressures prevented aggregate growth rates from
translating into improved living standards. This also was due to wrong-
headed political intervention. In the wake of the Great Leap, Mao or-
dered the repudiation of population experts who counseled fertility con-
trol, condemning such views as anti-Marxist, bourgeois Malthusian ideas
that blamed the poor for their own poverty. Moreover, he reasoned, pop-
ulation control made little economic sense, because human labor is the
source of all value, and therefore the more labor power, the more pros-
perous the economy.
The booming population, coupled with a development strategy pre-
mised on high levels of investment, meant that an increasingly large pop-
ulation would be condemned indenitely to living standards barely above
subsistence level. By the end of Maos life there were unmistakable signs
that both agriculture and industry were in serious trouble, and that the
problems were worsening. Chinas overall trend of economic growth,
as measured by per capita GDP, was still on an upward trajectory after
1952, despite the Great Leap depression of 19611962 and the Cultural
Revolution downturn of 19671968. The cumulative rate of economic
growth in real GDP per capita from 1950 to 1973, however, was only
2.9 percent per year. This placed China somewhere near the middle of
Asian nations during the same period, somewhat above the rates of
growth in the Philippines and Indonesia and twice Indias growth rate,
but far behind the six best performers in the region, including Thailand
(Table14.1).
322 China Under Mao
Table14.1. Growth of per capita GDP, Asian nations, 19501973
Country Annual Growth (%)
Japan 8.1
Taiwan 6.7
South Korea 5.8
Hong Kong 5.2
Singapore 4.4
Thailand 3.7
China 2.9
Philippines 2.7
Indonesia 2.6
Malaysia 2.2
Sri Lanka 1.9
Pakistan 1.7
India 1.4
Bangladesh 0.4
Source: Maddison (2006, 143).

Note: Growth rate is annual average compound growth, GDP per capita.
The pattern of economic growth was highly unstable, as Figure14.1

makes clear. Growth rates uctuated erratically throughout the Mao era,
and not only due to the Great Leap Forward and early Cultural Revolu-
tion. While generally positive except for those two periods, the economy
never exhibited the steady growth pattern associated with a Soviet system
that was designed to eliminate the boom-and-bust cycles of market capi-
talism. Most revealing is the fact that the economy did not revive after the
worst years of the Cultural Revolution, and in fact appeared to be settling
into a period of stagnation. After 1970, when the army was withdrawn
from civilian administration and white-collar experts were returned to
their posts, growth averaged only 2.4 percent. The economy registered
almost no growth in 1974, a year of political upheaval, and it fell into a
recession in 1976, the year of Maos death, shrinking by 3.4 percent.4
Economic growth slowed because of problems in both agriculture and
industry. Collective farms struggled to increase output per acre of culti-
vated land, and increases in output barely kept pace with Chinas rap-
idly growing population. Procurement of grain to feed the cities stag-
nated in the 1970s, and without rapid increases in agricultural productivity
a food supply crisis loomed in the near future. Industry was the primary
cause of looming economic stagnation, in partic ular the heavy indus-
30
25
20
15
Annual change in GDP (%)
10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
Year
Figure14.1. Annual change in gross domestic product, constant prices,

19521976. Source: Calculated from State Statistical Bureau (1983, 22 and 103).
trial sector, which by design absorbed the lions share of investment at

the expense of consumer goods, ser vices, and housing. China plowed
ever-greater resources into heavy industry, despite its inefciency. The
sector absorbed 52 percent of national investment in 1953; by the Great
Leap Forward it absorbed 87 percent, and remained well above 80 per-
cent almost every year until the end of the Mao era.5
Lavished with resources, heavy industry used them inefciently, a
problem that became most pronounced after 1970. Figure14.2 illustrates
trends in multifactor productivity. A gure above 1.0 means that industry
is producing more in output than it is receiving as inputs; a gure below
1.0 means that the products are less valuable than the resources expended
in producing them. The higher this gure is above 1.0, the greater is in-
dustrys efciency in the use of resources. The lower the gure is below
1.0, the greater is the waste of national economic resources and their
diversion from other uses. Figure14.2 makes clear that Chinese industry
was relatively inefcient until the 1970s and catastrophically inefcient
in the wake of the Great Leap Forward. Not until the early 1970s did
factor productivity rise to levels associated with rapid and sustainable
324 China Under Mao
Multifactor productivity (CobbDouglas) 1.6
1.4
1.2
.8
.6
.4
1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
Year
Figure14.2. Productivity trends in industry, 19531976. Source: Kuan et al.

(1988, 583).
economic growth. Immediately afterward, however, industrial efciency

began a steady decline, dropping every year except one through 1976.
These unmistakable signs of stagnation signaled aws at the very
heart of an economic system that was designed as a growth machine.
Inefciencies in the per for mance of Chinas economic institutions, par-
ticularly industry, were draining resources away from other urgent uses,
while showing very modest results. A wasteful industrial system was
literally sucking resources away from infrastructure, housing, wages,
and consumer goods production that would raise Chinas standard of
living. Chinas population was sacricing for a heavy industrial system
whose politically induced inefciencies were condemning China to
backwardness.
China could barely afford economic stagnation. In 1976, after twenty-
seven years of tful socialist development, its per capita GDP was equiv-
alent to only $163, virtually the same as a still-impoverished India ($164).6
While somewhat higher than Bangladesh ($140), a country that had by
this point in time become a symbol of severe economic misery, Chinas
level of development in 1976 was far behind agrarian Indonesia ($286).
China already lagged very far behind South Korea ($824), a nation dev-
astated by the war of 19501953 and whose level of development in 1953

was not much different from Chinas. Hong Kong, a seedy port that could
not compare with vastly more prosperous Shanghai before 1950, now
boasted a GDP per capita of $2,849. Japan, approaching the middle years
of its rapid postwar economic ascent, was already at $5,111. The underper-
for mance of Chinas Maoist economy is even more evident if we com-
pare its position in 1976 with Chinas subsequent record of growth. By
1990, after a decade of modest market reforms, Chinas per capita GDP
was $314. By 2000, it was $949; by 2010, $4,433.
The extent to which China was falling behind other comparable econ-
omies is evident in Figure14.3, which tracks per capita GDP in constant
prices, employing the purchasing power parity method that adjusts for
differences in price structures across countries that would otherwise dis-
tort the comparison. Chinas long-standing aspiration to catch up with
more advanced economies, or even with more developed state socialist
economies, clearly was in danger of becoming permanently beyond reach.
Chinas progress is barely discernible when plotted against the trajec-
tory of Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Eu-
rope, and the gap between them became progressively larger over the
years. Figure14.4 provides a somewhat different perspective on these
12000
Japan
GDP per capita (constant prices, PPP)
10000
8000
Soviet Union
6000
4000
Taiwan
Eastern Europe
2000
South Korea
China
0
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
Figure14.3. Economic growth trends, selected countries, 19501976.

Source: Maddison (2006, 304 and 479).
326 China Under Mao
5
Ratio GDP per capita 1976/1950
0
India China USSR East Europe So. Korea Taiwan Japan
Figure14.4. Economic expansion, selected countries, 19501976.

Source: Maddison (2006, 304 and 479).
trends. It displays net changes in per capita GDP over this period (not
adjusting for purchasing power parity). By this measure Chinas overall
growth was superior to that of India but lagged behind the other (revi-
sionist) socialist states, and far behind neighboring East Asian econo-
mies. China clearly was being left far behind its neighbors and was stuck
at a low level of development that placed it among the poorest countries
in the region.
Incomes and Living Standards
Spartan living conditions and the postponement of material prosperity

were inherent in the design of the Soviet growth model. Overinvestment
in heavy industry was the mechanism by which rapid growth was to be
ensured. The destructive interventions by Mao in the Great Leap For-
ward, and the political crusade that Mao launched during the Cultural
Revolution, however, took a model that had achieved sustained and dy-
namic growth earlier in Soviet history and turned it into an unstable
model that created stagnation even at low levels of industrial develop-
ment. Maos effort to forge a path of development that would permit
China to rival Soviet economic accomplishments had clearly failed. By

keeping the core of the Soviet model intact, and by elevating the role of
party ofcials and political activists and denigrating the expertise of ed-
ucated managers and engineers, Maos interventions had done little more
than exacerbate the inherent inefciencies of the system.
Although they were strongly favored relative to residents of collec-
tive farms, urban residents themselves suffered from stagnating incomes
and poor supply of consumer goods, housing, and ser vices. Industrial
wages were effectively frozen after the last national round of wage re-
adjustments in 1963, during which roughly 40 percent of the workforce
received promotions in grade and raises. There were no subsequent wage
readjustments until two years after Maos death. Bonuses linked to pro-
ductivity were banned on political grounds after 1966. Work units tried
to remedy the hardship of frozen wages by nding reasons to provide
small money supplements or deliver goods and ser vices in kind, but these
were stopgap measures. As new generations of workers were added to
the labor force at the lowest pay gradesand as they remained therethe
average wage for urban workers dropped steadily. Figure14.5 shows the
long downward trend in urban wages that began with the nationalization
900
800
Average annual wage (yuan)
700
600
500
400
300
200
1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
Year
Figure14.5. Average wages in Chinese state industry, 19521976. Source: State

Statistical Bureau (1983, 490).
328 China Under Mao
of industry in 1956 and continued over the next two decades. The only
break in the gradual pattern of decline was the sharp drop during the
Great Leap Forward, when millions of new workers were hired at the
lowest wage levels and then rapidly laid off as the economy collapsed.
The average annual wage was just under 700 yuan in 1957; by 1976 it
had dropped to a little more than 630 yuan.7
Increasingly tight household budgets were matched by a supply of
consumer goods that fell far short of meeting demand for either volume
or quality. The rationing system for industrial products was still in force
and would not be abandoned for more than a decade. The most valued
commodities were primitive by the standards of nearby market econo-
mies. Any urban resident in the period could recite a standard list of
the most sought-after household durables: sewing machine, wristwatch,
radio, and certain name-brand bicycles. The sewing machines were
foot-powered models that were copied from a 1950s Soviet design that
was in turn a copy of a 1920s model marketed by Singer in the United
States. The sewing machines were needed to make most efcient use of
the annual ration of cloth. The radios used vacuum tubes. The bicycles
were durable one-speed models that served as a primary means of urban
transportation.
The rationing system eliminated queues for major industrial goods,
but rationing did not solve the problem of shortages. Specic items were
always hard to nd: shoes and premade clothing in the right sizes and
styles, furniture, toilet paper, kitchen knives that would remain sharp
with use, and pots and pans that would not crack when heat was ap-
plied. Dissatisfaction with availability, quality, and size was rife. State
stores were periodically unable to meet demand for fresh fruit, vegeta-
bles, sh, and pork, and when they were able to do so the products were
often wilted, bruised, or malodorous. Vigilant shopping was required,
and the scarcity of consumer goods of the right size or quality fueled a
thriving culture of mutual help and cooperation among friends and
others to whom one developed mutually supportive connections. For-
eign visitors to China in the early post-Mao years, expecting to nd an
austere and egalitarian society unaffected by the rampant consumerism
of the West, found themselves pressed by urgent requests from acquain-
tances to purchase items on their behalf in special stores reserved for
foreigners. They were often surprised by the intense focus on procuring
scarce consumer items and the aggressive urban culture of trading fa-
vors for mutual advantage.8
The most visible manifestation of deteriorating urban living standards

was the housing stock. Housing was already overcrowded in the 1950s
and became progressively more so over the next twenty years. Housing
comprised 12.5 percent of national expenditures on capital construction
in 1953 and declined steadily thereafter as investment in producers goods
industries rose. In the decade after 1966, housing uctuated between
2.6 and6.5 percent of national construction expenditures.9 This trans-
lated into long waits for apartments for newly married couples, and even
longer waits for young families that needed larger quarters. It also trans-
lated into deferred maintenance of existing buildings, which deteriorated
badly over the years. In 1956 each urban resident occupied an average
of 4.3 square meters of housing space; by 1976 this number had shrunk
to 3.6 square meters. By ofcial standards, 50 percent was ofcially con-
sidered to be in poor repair, and10 percent dangerously so.10
By the mid-1970s it was not uncommon for a family of four to oc-
cupy a single room. A desk would be used for family meals, cleared for
study after dinner, and made up as a bed at night. Lack of space was
only one dimension of the problem. Urban apartments lacked basic in-
frastructure. Very few apartments had private toilets and bathing facili-
ties. Toilets were in the hallways of apartment blocks, in courtyards, or
on the street in older neighborhoods. Some apartments had running
water, but most families used communal sinks in their apartment build-
ings. Few apartments had private kitchens; cooking areas were typically
shared. Coal-red stoves were the most common form of indoor heating,
and the same coal briquettes were also the most common source of heat
for cooking. Inadequate ventilation could result in death by carbon mon-
oxide poisoning. Electric fans were still rare; air conditioning was un-
known. Private telephone lines were basically unavailable to anyone but
ranking cadres. In urban neighborhoods, telephone calls were typically
made at public telephones located in or near the residents committee
ofce. Individuals who received calls had to be summoned to the tele-
phone by the individuals often retireeswho worked as neighborhood
volunteers. International service was unheard of, and well after the Mao
era one still had to book a long-distance call at the municipal headquar-
ters of the State Post and Telecommunications Bureau, and wait in line.
A nal aspect of the neglect of citizens livelihood was the extraor-
dinarily limited scope of the urban ser vice sector. Before the elimina-
tion of the private sector in the mid-1950s, Chinese cities were crowded
with small family ser vice establishments: food stalls and restaurants,
330 China Under Mao
guest houses, tea houses, bars, small retail outlets of all varieties, barber
shops, repair shops, dentists, knife sharpeners, practitioners of traditional
medicine, bath houses, and so forth. By the early 1960s these had virtu-
ally all disappeared. They had either been shut down in attacks on the
private economy, or they had been merged into a small number of col-
lective or state ser vice establishments. The ser vice sector never recov-
ered. The government-run restaurants were few in number, large in
size, badly overcrowded, and famous for poor quality and rude ser vice.
Work units tried to compensate by providing many of these vanishing
ser vices for their employees. This is the main reason why so many work
units provided meal ser vices and shower and bathing facilities for their
employees. Work units tried to internalize many of the functions for-
merly lled by the private sector, but they could never fully compensate
for the loss of so many services, and those who were unfortunate enough
to work for poorly provisioned work units missed out.
Equality and Inequality
It is tempting to think that these depressed living standards were the

hallmark of an economic system that valued equality more than pros-
perity. As economic inequality skyrocketed in post-Mao China, one heard
frequent references to the Mao era as having one of the worlds most
egalitarian distributions of income. Although income inequality in China
today is vastly greater than it was in 1976, this egalitarian image of Maos
China is only partially accurate.
The most common measure of income inequal ity is the Gini index,
which ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a higher level
of inequal ity. By this measure, the worlds most egalitarian income dis-
tributions in the 1970s were to be found in the industrialized socialist
economies (see Table14.2). Several of them had Gini indexes of .20 or
.21, far below Chinas 1979 gure of .33. Even the Soviet Union, much
reviled by Maoist ideologues in China as a revisionist bastion of capi-
talist restoration, had levels of income inequal ity that were signicantly
lower than China. China was the worlds most unequal socialist economy.
On the other hand, Chinas income distribution was at the low end
among economies in Asia. It was considerably more equal than those of
Indonesia and the Philippines, and somewhat more equal than Indias.
However, Chinas level of income inequal ity was basically the same as
Table14.2. Comparative national measures of income inequal ity (Gini index), 1970s
Socialist Gini Asia Gini Industrialized Gini
East Germany .20 Taiwan .28 China .33

Bulgaria .21 China .33 United Kingdom .34
Czechoslovak ia .21 Pakistan .33 Canada .39
Yugoslavia .21 Sri Lanka .33 Sweden .39
Poland .22 India .38 West Germany .39
Hungary .25 Thailand .42 Italy .40
Soviet Union .27 Indonesia .44 United States .40
China .33 Philippines .47 Japan .42
Sources: For socialist and industrialized countries, Kornai (1992, 318) and Jain (1975, 41, 107);
for Asia, World Bank (1983, vol. 1, 94) and Jain (1975, 108). The gure for China is for 1979; all
others are for various years in the early 1970s.
those of Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Taiwans distribution of income was

signicantly more equal than Chinas. Chinas rank relative to the in-
dustrialized market economies was similar. It was considerably more
equal than the United States and Japan, somewhat more equal than
Canada and West Germany, but not much different than the United
Kingdom.
These gures would surprise visitors to urban China at the end of
the Mao era. Chinese cities exhibited almost no signs of conspicuous
wealth. Living standards seemed highly equal and very modest.
Clothing styles and modes of transportation (bicycle) appeared highly
uniform. The rationing system appeared to have a remarkable equalizing
effect. Wage differences in state enterprises were modest. And these im-
pressions would not be misleading. The distribution of income in urban
China was by far the most equal in the world. The Gini index for urban
Chinese incomes in 1981 was a remarkable .16. In Asian economies the
comparable gures ranged from Pakistans .36 to Malaysias .52 during
the 1970s.11 How could urban China have such a remarkably equal dis-
tribution of income, yet still have a nationwide income distribution that
was high for a socialist country but unremarkable compared to market
economies in Asia and the industrialized world?
The answer is that China had an unusually large gap between the
incomes of urban and rural regions, and between prosperous and poor
rural regions. There were two major reasons for this. The Soviet devel-
opment model, as we have seen, was designed to extract maximum
332 China Under Mao
amounts of grain from collective farms and keep prices low, and to keep
rural incomes and even rural consumption of staple foods at much lower
levels than in cities. The second reason, which exacerbated the rst, was
the very strict controls exercised by the household registration and grain
rationing systems. Farmers could not migrate to urban areas in search
of more highly compensated wage labor even temporarily and they
could not move from the most impoverished rural regions to more pros-
perous ones.12 The much higher levels of inequal ity in other Asian cities
were due to the migration of the landless poor to urban slums. This did
not happen in Mao-era China.
Household registration and grain rations kept Chinas poorest citi-
zens out of cities and permanently anchored in the most remote rural
regions, where grinding poverty was still widespread. In market econo-
mies labor migrates to cities or to other regions with stronger economies,
a migration that tends to equalize income levels between country and
city, as the rural poor move to cities. This also means that poverty is much
more visible in cities, where the poor congregate in slums that blight
many cities in developing countries. This created the impression that in-
equal ity and poverty was much worse in countries like India and Indo-
nesia than in China. The impression would not be incorrect, but it would
be limited to cities, and it reected the effectiveness of Chinas household
registration system in keeping the poor bottled up in isolated rural re-
gions, not the more egalitarian structure of the Chinese economy overall,
or its allegedly superior ability to eliminate poverty.
Rural Poverty
The failure to eliminate the most abject forms of rural poverty was
perhaps the most surprising fact revealed in the late 1970s, and it rep-
resented one of the most damning failures of Maoism. One would have
expected that the extraordinary organ i zational capacity of the new
state could deliver basic subsistence to the rural population, regardless of
where it was located. A regime that could mobilize hundreds of millions
to work around the clock during the Great Leap Forward, or millions
of Red Guards and rebels to attack revisionists in the party leadership,
could surely ensure at least that its poorest citizens had enough food to
eat. Such was not the case. By the end of the Mao era, large percentages
of the rural population were still mired in desperate poverty.
Surveys conducted in the late 1970s yielded a sobering picture of rural

living standards. One-fth of Chinas rural population had diets that were
below the level of daily calorie consumption de ned by the Chinese gov-
ernment at the time as permitting individuals a bare subsistence. And
the Chinese governments standard for subsistence was below the stan-
dard set by international agencies. Average total daily calorie consump-
tion in 1976 was at the average for poor countries in the region higher
than Bangladesh, slightly above India, and lower than Pakistan and In-
donesia.13 The quality of the average rural diet for the residents of col-
lective farms was low. Collective agriculture forced rural Chinese into
grain-centered subsistence agriculture, resulting in a steady decline in
the consumption of vegetable oils, meat, and other proteins. The per-
centage of calories supplied by staple grains in the rural Chinese diet
was high by international standards. When the post-Mao government
surveyed rural living standards, it found that in 1978, 30 percent of the
rural population, or 237 million people, were living on incomes below
ofcial poverty levels as de ned by the Chinese government a level
signicantly below that set by international agencies.14 It is hard to avoid
the observation that the Mao era was a long and tumultuous struggle
over many years that succeeded in producing outcomes that were far from
revolutionary. The nonrevolutionary approach to land reforms conducted
in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea during the 1950s created the foun-
dation for a prosperous rural market economy based on widespread
smallholding agriculture, leading to rising living standards and rapid
economic growthwithout the bloodshed of Chinas violent land revo-
lution. Levels of rural poverty were reduced drastically in China after
1978, as collective agriculture was abandonedan indication that the
failures of the Maoist era were self-induced.
The Human Costs of Maoism
These modest accomplishments were offset by enormous human costs.

The largest of such costs was the death through starvation of 30 million
people in the famine created by the Great Leap Forward. Recent studies
suggest that a signicant portion of this number were in fact executed or
beaten to death during regional campaigns against rightism or the
hiding of grain, or punitively denied food supplies in the midst of
famine. The enormous death toll generated by the Great Leap Forward
334 China Under Mao
can only be gauged against the more horric episodes in Chinas long
history. The total number of Chinese civilian and military deaths during
the war against Japan from 1937 to 1945 is generally estimated to be as
high as 12 million a gure that includes 2 million battleeld deaths
and an estimated 4 million dead in the Henan famine of 1943.15 The one
modern event that is directly analogous to Chinas Great Leap famine is
the starvation caused by forced collectivization in Russia, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan from 1932 to 1933. The estimates for that episode range from
5.7 to 8.5 million deaths, which represents roughly the same percentage
of the total Soviet population as Chinas famine.16
The human cost of the Great Leap Forward far outstrips the magni-
tude of the death toll from the deliberate episodes of bloodletting in post-
1949 China. The famine was vastly more costly than the wave of exe-
cutions that accompanied revolutionary land reform and the campaign
to suppress counterrevolution in the early 1950s, generally estimated to
have resulted in 1 to 2 million deaths. It also dwarfs the death toll
directly attributable to the con icts and political campaigns associated
with the Cultural Revolution. A conservative statistical procedure based
on data included in accounts from a near-complete set of published local
histories yields an estimate of 1.1 to 1.6 million dead during the ve years
from 1966 to 1971. These same sources suggest that three-fourths of these
deaths were generated by the actions of revolutionary committees or the
armed forces, primarily after the rst months of 1968, and well over
halfat least 600,000were generated by the Cleansing of the Class
Ranks alone. This was triple the number of estimated deaths generated
by the activities of rebels, almost all of which were due to armed battles
between mass factions.17 A signicant proportion of these battleeld
deaths were attributable to Maos misguided order to distribute military
arms to mass factions in the summer of 1967. It is sobering to realize
that the draconian campaign to restore order after a nationwide insur-
gency that Mao himself had fomented generated far greater numbers of
dead and other kinds of victims than the upheaval itself. As in the Great
Leap Forward, these lives were sacriced for a cause that was badly mis-
conceived and accomplished nothing of lasting value.18
The Limits of Maoism
In many quarters, both in China and abroad, Mao Zedong earned a rep-
utation as a daring and creative thinker who expanded the limits of
Marxism-Leninism, departed from Soviet doctrine, and proposed striking

solutions to the seemingly inevitable tendency of communist revolutions
to evolve into rigid bureaucratic autocracies ruled by self-perpetuating
elites. Mao in power could surely be described as daring indeed reck-
less. The rebellion he fostered against his own party-state during the
1960s was certainly a stunning departure from Soviet doctrines and
practices, and seemed to signal a exibility and creativity of thought that
placed him well outside the mainstream of Soviet-inspired communism.
It would be wrong, however, to view Maos actions and their out-
comes as the product of a creative and daringly innovative politician.
To the contrary, this account emphasizes the narrow limits of Maos
thinking, the rigidity and dogmatism with which he clung to old and
outmoded ideas, and his unwillingness to learn and adapt to changes
in the world socialist movement. His core commitments were inspired
by a relatively simple set of ideas that he adopted in the 1930s, while
still in Yanan. The most important of these were found in the Stalinist
party history, the Short Course, which crystallized Maos understanding
of class struggle and the building of socialism. These doctrines t well
with Maos earlier views, expressed in the 1920s, about the essential role
of violent struggle in generating revolutionary social change, and the
necessity for a unied and armed party to lead the masses. These com-
mitments were reinforced in the crucible of the civil war, during the all-
out mobilization in the late 1940s that achieved a seemingly impossible
victory over the Nationalists.
Mao was never willing to deviate from these commitments for the
rest of his life, and his actions during his last twenty years were essen-
tially a struggle against communists at home and abroad who had long
shown a willingness to depart from Maos core understandings, which
to many seemed increasingly outdated, anachronistic, and counterpro-
ductive. From this perspective, Mao was in many ways a reactionary who
clung to Stalinist doctrines long after their time.
Narratives designed to explain the course of events in the Mao era
inevitably focus on a series of decisions and interventions made by Mao
at crucial turning points, and our account has been no different. How-
ever, when we consider Maos core commitments, which were formed
before the communist victory in 1949, we are pointing to a deeper set
of causes that drove most of the developments that we have described.
These were decisions about the partys objectives and means for achieving
them that were not subsequently revisited. The course of the Chinese
336 China Under Mao
revolution after 1949 was driven by Maos unwillingness to alter these

earlier decisions, and indeed by his increasingly strong reaction to
what he perceived as the possibility that other leaders wanted to re-
vise them.
What were these core ideas that had such a decisive impact on China
after 1949? The rst was perhaps the oldest: Maos conviction that only
violent con ict could bring about genuine social change and liberate the
oppressed. These ideas were already clearly formed in Maos mind in the
1920s and were fully articulated in his essays on the peasant movement.
In these writings the young Mao insisted that violence in the course of
rebellion was an inevitable by-product of social change, and that it should
never be considered as deplorable excesses. Violence and humiliation
of elites is necessary for a decisive break from the old to the new. Mao
not only made a strong case for the functions of violence in the course
of genuine social change, he also condemned those who recoiled from
violence of the kind reected in the peasant movement he described. In
his view, they forfeited any claim to be part of the revolution and be-
came reactionary themselves.
These beliefs were reected through the subsequent history of the
Chinese Communist Party, from the struggle sessions staged by party
cadres during rural land reform, to the use of public struggle sessions in
consolidating control over Chinas cities in the 1950s, to the ritualized
humiliation and beating of party cadres and intellectual elites during
the Cultural Revolution. They are at the core of Maos conception of the
Cultural Revolution as a mass movement against an entrenched elite.
There is no way to conceive of the specic form that this movement took
without reference to this bedrock belief. These beliefs were also displayed
in Maos open disregard for the victims of Red Guard murders in Bei-
jing in the summer of 1966, or in his cavalier attitude toward the death
toll generated by the armed battles of the summer of 1967. They were
also evident in his disdain for party ofcials who viewed the Red Guard
violence as appalling, reecting their own reactionary nature. Mao called
on ofcials to applaud and support the Red Guardsit was a test of their
revolutionary mettle, much as attitudes toward the excesses of the
peasant movement in 1927 were a litmus test of the revolutionary or re-
actionary nature of Nationalists and Communists alike. Maos consis-
tent attitude, from the beginning of his revolutionary career to the end
of his life, was that the violence of class struggle is unavoidable and even
essential in accomplishing genuine revolutionary change, and one should

never shrink in the face of inevitable collateral damage.
The second idea was that class struggle exists under socialism; that
it becomes more intense as the nal push to socialism approaches; and
that different ideas about economic policy and the pace of socialist trans-
formation are expressions of class con ict. This was an idea that Mao
absorbed from the Soviet Short Course and it was the core Stalinist idea
to which he held dogmatically even after Stalin came to ignore it in his
later years, and after Stalins successors roundly rejected it as erroneous
and destructive. It was the inspiration for the destructive hunt for trai-
tors within the party during the 1943 rectication campaign in Yanan.
It was of course the core idea that justied Maos purges of ofcials who
were critical of the rash advance toward socialism, or who had the te-
merity to challenge the accomplishments of the Great Leap. It shaped
Maos interpretation of the disastrous outcome of the Great Leap
Forwardthat the lower reaches of the CCP in rural areas had been taken
over by remnants of the Nationalists and exploiting classes who were
sabotaging Maos great revolution. Only class enemies, he reasoned, could
show such inhuman cruelty toward starving peasants. It was the ani-
mating idea behind the Socialist Education Movement, an erratic and
incoherent campaign that Liu Shaoqi pushed with enthusiasm before it
was ultimately dropped. The USSRs rejection of this dogma was one of
the main reasons that Mao condemned the Soviet Union as revisionist,
on the road back to capitalism. Without this core idea, the Cultural Rev-
olution would have been unthinkable.19
The third idea is that the only way to achieve revolution and the con-
struction of socialism is through a hierarchically organized communist
party that is highly disciplined and unied in thought and action. More-
over, both of these characteristics are strengthened by a cultivated faith
in the correctness and ultimate infallibility of the party leadership and
especially of the supreme leader. What the post-Stalin Soviets condemned
as a leadership cult, Mao viewed as highly functional in generating
the discipline and faith in the party rank and le that made it possible
rst to defeat the Nationalists and then to transform China and build
socialism. The essential tenet of this doctrine is that the great leader alone
has the ability to de ne the correct course, to decide which policies are
revolutionary and which are reactionary. And because class struggle be-
comes more intense as the victory of socialism approaches, the great
338 China Under Mao
leader must be vigilant in rooting out bourgeois tendencies in the lead-

ership and the party at large. Mao, like Stalin, saw ironclad faith in a
single leader as essential to maintain the unity and discipline of the party
as a ghting force otherwise it degenerates into a mess of competing
factions. What was distinctive about Maos belief was that these features
of the revolutionary party must be maintained far longer than others
felt was necessary or desirable. Revolution did not end with the sei-
zure of power, nor did it end with the liquidation of class enemies and
the transformation of the system of ownership. Revolution had to con-
tinue for an inde nite period, which required inspired revolutionary
leadership.
The fourth idea is that the form of socialism created in the Soviet
Union in the 1930s in both agriculture and industry specically
one that rejected private enterprise, market mechanisms, and prot
incentiveswas the de nition of socialism. Moreover, this economic
model could and must be created rapidly, by revolution from above, in
the same way that it had been created in the 1930s under Stalin. Despite
the fact that Stalin himself counseled China to take a more measured
pace toward socialism, and that in his later years he began to credit new
ideas about objective economic laws that applied to both socialism
and capitalism, Mao held tightly to the older faith. Mao ultimately re-
jected any reconsideration of the role of political mobilization in pushing
the pace of economic change and development, and he ultimately re-
jected the claim that modern science and technology and highly trained
experts and professional administrators were an essential part of so-
cialist development. Mao was even more adamantly opposed to the
idea that the well-known inefciencies of the Soviet model could be al-
leviated by partial reliance on economic mechanisms borrowed from
capitalismprice mechanisms, competition, and the calculation of prot
for the sake of improved efciency. For Mao, these were completely
beyond the pale, ensuring that socialism would be replaced by capi-
talism. And those who irted with such ideas, Mao asserted, were ex-
pressing the interests of the capitalist class, domestically and interna-
tionally, to overturn socialism.
As Mao refused to budge from this narrow set of ideas, the socialist
world was changing around him. The moderation of Soviet doctrines
began after World War II, even before Stalins death, and accelerated in
the Soviet Union after 1953. By the time of Khrushchevs 1956 speech,
many of Maos core commitments were openly under attack. The new
doctrine did not deny the core Marxist idea that class struggle is the mo-
tivating force of human history, but once a socialist economy is put in
place, the foundation for classes and class struggle no longer exists, and
the task is to develop the economy and improve the lives of citizens. The
dictatorship of the proletariat and its mass repressions must be relaxed.
Class struggle does not exist under socialism this was roundly de-
nounced as Stalins most erroneous innovation, having little foundation
in Marxism. The glorication of the great leader that became so extreme
under Stalin was even more regrettable, an absurd fantasy that served
as a cover for Stalins cowardly and fanatical persecutions of his ene-
mies, perceived and real. These were not core tenets of revolutionary
Marxism-Leninismthey were deviations, distortions, and, in Khrush-
chevs terms, historic crimes against the party and people. No great
leader should ever be allowed to determine by at which policies were
revolutionary and which were reactionary.
Mao resisted these ideas from the outset. He refused to accept the
idea that Chinas socialist transformation had to be slow and gradual,
that economic development subsequently would be steady and bal-
anced, that the era of large campaigns and class struggles was over. He
resisted the excessive denigration of Stalin. Briey in 1956 and1957,
he tried to pose as a post-Stalin liberalizer, but after the Hundred
Flowers back red on him, he lurched back toward class struggle in an-
tirightist campaigns and crash mobilization for economic development
in the Great Leap Forward. After the Leap disaster, Mao doubled down
on the core Stalinist tenet of class struggle, and orchestrated an anti-
party conspiracy and mass movement to tear down the bureaucratic
party system and replace it with new revolutionary institutions. Maos
actions appeared to be those of an innovative and unorthodox revolu-
tionary, but his underlying motives were based on core ideas that in the
rest of the communist world, and indeed by some in his own party,
were viewed as essentially conservative, if not reactionary.
Mao is often said to have been uniquely concerned with the bureau-
cratization of communist regimes, and their tendency to generate self-
perpetuating elites that seize privileges for themselves and create new
forms of class oppression. That Mao took this problem seriously is evi-
dent from the fact that the Cultural Revolution sought not only to re-
move ofcials who lacked loyalty to Maos vision, but also to mobilize
340 China Under Mao
the entire population to smash the party-state machine and put some-
thing new in its place.
Here too, however, the remarkably narrow limits of Maos thinking
are evident. He refused to contemplate a radically different, yet pain-
fully obvious diagnosis of the problem: that the problems were inherent
in bureaucratic socialismin the placement of all means of production
in the hands of a state bureaucracy dominated by appointees of a single,
dictatorial party. Mao was dealing with the consequences of a bureau-
cratic monopoly over both property and power, and a privileged stratum
that was an inevitable consequence of a system of career mobility based
on political loyalty. Mao refused to rethink the Soviet economic model,
in par ticular its denial of any role for market competition, material in-
centives, and the calculation of prot, and he especially refused to re-
consider the Stalinist notion that there was only one right answerthe
top leaders and that disagreements about practical matters were ex-
pressions of class struggle.
Maos diagnosis of the Soviet Unions reversion to capitalism was
in fact extremely oddit was the Soviet leaders reliance on bureaucratic
experts and on piece rates and monetary incentives that made Soviet
socialism capitalist. Yet virtually none of the de ning features of capi-
talism existed in the USSR: there was no private ownership of means of
production, no market competition among rms, no use of price mech-
anisms to regulate supply and demand. The Soviet Union still had es-
sentially the same bureaucratic system as the one that China had copied
in the 1950s, with a few minor adjustments in the way that it operated.
Despite his reputation, Mao was not much of an antibureaucratic
thinker. He was not actually opposed to bureaucratic hierarchyhe
simply preferred one type of bureaucracy to another. Mao refused to cede
authority to individuals with professional expertise and scientic training.
He wanted party bureaucrats who were absolutely loyal to him and his
vision, individuals selected and promoted according to political loyalty.
Maos favored bureaucracy was operated by committed ideologues or,
less atteringly, dogmatic party hacks. His only answer, when the par-
tys monopoly of power and privilege inevitably solidied into a stable
and oppressive bureaucratic hierarchy, was to smash the machine and
begin again, replacing party hacks with new party loyalists with pre-
sumably more pure motivations. This, however, simply reproduced the
original circumstances that led to the problem in the rst place: monopoly
by a formally organized hierarchy staffed by party loyalists, who had a

monopoly over property, power, and the allocation of career opportu-
nities and privileges. Moreover, by threatening his apparatus of party
loyalists with the charge of treachery and class conspiracy, he drove his
loyal agents into repeated bouts of destructive overconformity. This was
at the core of the disastrous Great Leap, when party cadres pledged huge
increases, lied about accomplishments, and then extracted grain from
starving villagesall under threat of a harsh campaign against rightism.
This was also at the core of the 1968 cleansing campaign, as Maos new
agents at the local level responded zealously to calls to search for trai-
tors, unable and unwilling to restrain the wildly escalating persecutions.
Maos diagnosis was fundamentally wrong: the problem was not the
resurgence of capitalism but the tenacity of bureaucratic hierarchies. The
problems that he decried were an inevitable outcome of the system that
he insisted was the only correct one, one not to be altered, but only re-
vitalized back into its original form. Maos diagnosis led to a prescribed
remedy that promised only continuing cycles of con ict and destruction,
with his country mired increasingly in backwardness. This was, for
China, a tragic failure of vision by a rigidly dogmatic leader with ex-
tremely narrow and outdated ideas. Only after the aging dictators death
could Chinas leaders break out of the circular logic of Maoist doctrine
and consider organ izational and economic alternatives that genuinely
departed from Soviet models. Given the spectacular collapse of the So-
viet Union and its empire a decade later, it appears that this was a timely
decision.
The Road Ahead
Mao Zedong left China in a quiet crisis, an unsettled state and society
very much in ux. After the arrest of the ofcials on whom Mao de-
pended to launch the Cultural Revolution and ght to preserve its legacy,
there was little doubt that the Cultural Revolution, and the core ideas
that had inspired it, would be repudiated. There was obvious popular
yearning for social and political stability and a rise in living standards.
In many ways, the devastation that Mao left in his wake gave his suc-
cessors the opportunity for a new start. So much of the Soviet-inherited
institutions had been smashed and had yet to be rebuilt. There was
great uncertainty about the direction that China should take. Mao
342 China Under Mao
inadvertently gave his successors an opportunity to make choices that

fell far outside the narrow limits of Maoist doctrine, and more orthodox
varieties of Marxism-Leninism as well.
Post-Mao China was in some ways back to square one, looking once
again for models that would hasten it along the path to prosperity and
national strength. In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union presented a plau-
sible choice, and indeed that system continued to work well into the
1960s. But the world had changed drastically since the late 1940s, when
Chinas leaders last faced a fundamental choice. By the late 1970s the
Soviet Union was no longer the attractive development model that it had
been thirty years earlier. Growth rates in the Soviet Union and its satel-
lite states had long since slowed, and they had entered the years of stag-
nation that would soon lead to their demise. Hungary had become an
oasis of prosperity in the Soviet bloc through limited market reforms
and concessions to the small-scale private sector. Unreformed Poland
was experiencing scal problems that would soon lead to price hikes
that touched off the Solidarity movement and the near collapse of the
regime.
Enviable growth models were now on Chinas doorstep: most star-
tlingly Japan, but also South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Unlike the situation in the 1940s, it was now clear that market capitalism
was not going to collapse, and it did not again experience the kind of
destabilizing depressions that occurred in the 1930s. Of these increas-
ingly prosperous regions, only Japan was constitutionally a multiparty
system, and even then it had been under virtual single-party control for
decades. Singapore had a more rigid form of single-party rule. South
Korea and Taiwan were harsh dictatorships, and Hong Kong a colonial
possession ruled from London. Yet all of these regions were integrated
into the world economy, with considerable state direction of private eco-
nomic activity, thriving on export-led growth. It therefore dawned on
Chinas post-Mao leaders that it would be possible to greatly accelerate
Chinas development by adopting market mechanisms, opening to the
outside world, and yet maintain their partys dictatorship.
Maos designated successor, Hua Guofeng, began this process, well
before Deng Xiaopings return to power at the end of 1978.20 The list of
new policy departures that violated Maos core commitments grew
slowly, but within a few years there was a breathtaking reversal. The
new leadership expressed unreserved support for the adoption of modern
science and technology; they made their peace with scientic and tech-
nical experts; they revived Chinas scientic infrastructure, rebuilt the
university system, and reestablished social scientic elds; they pushed
to increase Chinas research capacities through educational and research
exchanges with advanced capitalist economies; they sent tens of thou-
sands of students abroad; they abandoned collective agriculture in favor
of household farming; they removed restrictions on small private and
family enterprises, especially in the ser vice sector; they loosened re-
strictions on emigration; invited foreign experts to advise them; they
took out foreign loans and accepted foreign aid; they began to experi-
ment with price and prot mechanisms in an effort to reform a woe-
fully inadequate state industrial sector; and in special economic zones
they began tentatively to welcome capital investment by foreign private
enterprises.
It would be tempting to say and the rest is history. Not quite: China
was still badly shattered; it was still deeply divided. Youths were alien-
ated, and many repudiated not only the Mao era but also the Commu-
nist Party itself, which suffered a terrible loss of trust. In 2009 the CCP,
ever self-congratulatory, celebrated thirty years of successful reform and
opening. But it is often forgotten that the rst decade, from 1979 to 1989,
was tumultuous, marked by leadership divisions over the extent and pace
of both political and economic reform. There were, in addition, repeated
popular campaigns for more democracy: the democracy wall campaign
of 19781979, student mobilization for democratic elections to local
peoples congresses in 1980, a nationwide student movement to demand
political reform and greater democracy at the end of 1986, and eventu-
ally the student democracy movement in the spring of 1989, which spread
into a nationwide upheaval that shook the regime to its very foundations,
leading to the massacre of activists and bystanders in the nations cap-
ital, and to martial law that lasted for almost a year. 21 It would take a
long time to work out the problems that had accumulated during Maos
reign, and the regime would have to weather a major political crisis in
1989, the year that saw the unraveling of communism in Eastern Eu-
rope and the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.
Today, half a century after the launch of the Cultural Revolution, Mao
has been reduced to a benign cultural icon. His image is displayed on
Chinas national currency, replacing the workers, peasants, tractors, and
steam shovels of the Mao era. His face adorns the ubiquitous badges,
344 China Under Mao
posters, and other artifacts produced in the hundreds of millions during

the era of the Mao cult, now marketed everywhere to tourists. Theme
restaurants with Cultural Revolution era decor entertain diners with
songs and dances from the Red Guards and loyalty to Mao era. New
left intellectuals, dissatised with the corruption and inequality spawned
by Chinas turn toward market-oriented state capitalism, hark back to
the Mao era for its positive accomplishments; ordinary citizens reect
with nostalgia on the Mao era as a simpler, less money conscious, more
egalitarian, and less corrupt time. The party leadership celebrated the
110th anniversary of Maos birth by emphasizing the positive accom-
plishments of his reign, seeking to solidify the partys legitimacy, cele-
brate its history, and reinforce national pride. These views of Mao, and
of the Mao era, are very different from the ones that prevailed in the
late 1970s, as China began the long process of recovering from the damage
of his misrule. They are based on highly selective historical memory and
a great deal of forgetting.
NOT ES
R EFER ENCES
I N DEX
Notes
1. Funeral
1. Nathan (1983), Wilbur (1983).

2. Kuhn (1980), Rowe (2009, 149296).
3. Kuhn (1978), Platt (2012), Spence (1996).
4. Esherick (1987), Silbey (2012).
5. A superb synthesis is in Rowe (2009, 149296).
6. Young (1983, 217228).
7. Chi (1976), Nathan (1976), Gasster (1980).
8. Isaacs (1961), Wilbur (1983).
9. Mitter (2013, 56).
2. From Movement to Regime
1. Wilbur (1983, 620672) describes the protracted course of the split and
purge, which also divided the Nationalist Party itself. The cited party mem-
bership gures are from Lee (1991, 1617).
2. Chen (1986, 204216; troop estimates, 198), Dreyer (1995, 185200; troop
estimates, 186187 and199).
3. Apter and Saich (1994, 190194) describe the region in vivid detail.
4. See Stinchcombe (1965, 169180) and Tilly (1978, 189222).
5. An early statement of this view is in Schwartz (1951).
6. The earliest version of this argument is in Taylor (1940), later elaborated
by Johnson (1962).
7. Selden (1971) was an inuential early advocate of this interpretation.
8. This is consistent with broader explanations for revolution in China and
Vietnam as expressions of class con ict, for example, Moore (1966) and
Paige (1975).
9. Thaxton (1983) and Marks (1984), following Scotts (1976) ideas about the
moral economy of rebellion.
348 Notes to Pages 1823
10. Hofheinz (1969, 1977). Bentons (1992) detailed account of the activities
of Communist forces left behind in South China after the evacuation of
the Jiangxi Soviet reinforces this point.
11. Van Slyke (1986, 651652).
12. Ibid., 674676.
13. Westad (2003, 61).
14. Dreyer (1995, 317318), Van Slyke (1986, 621).
15. Taylor (2011, 142).
16. These events are known as the Xian Incident (Chen 1986, 226229).
17. Taylor (2011, 150).
18. Chi (1982, 4243), Mitter (2013, 98108), Yang Tianshi (2011). Harmsen
(2013) is a dramatic book-length account of the Nationalists ill-fated de-
fense of Shanghai in 1937.
19. Mitter (2013, 124144).
20. Taylor (2011, 168169); also MacKinnon (2011).
21. Van Slyke (1986, 613), Benton (1999), Pantsov and Levine (2012, 290).
22. Van Slyke (1986, 613614).
23. Ibid., 631.
24. The advocates of more aggressive military resistance included Zhou Enlai,
Wang Ming, Peng Dehuai, and Zhu De (Apter and Saich1994, 5859;
Pantsov and Levine 2012, 313314).
25. Van Slyke (1986, 672673).
26. Ibid., 676681; also Yang Kuisong (2011). Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden
(1991, 4451) describe the destruction of the resistance movement in one
county in central Hebei during this period.
27. Taylor (2011, 168169).
28. Chi (1982, 6881), Van Slyke (1986, 705709), Wang (2011).
29. Chi (1982, 81).
30. Eastman (1984, 156).
31. van de Ven (2011) analyzes this bias and its sources.
32. Eastman (1984, 130); see also Drea and van de Ven (2011).
33. Eastman (1984, 136).
34. Taylor (2011, 297298).
35. Lthi (2008, 2526).
36. Wilbur (1983, 719720).
37. Chi (1982, 23).
38. Ibid., 37.
39. Ibid., 4082.
40. Ibid., 3.
41. Eastman (1984, 130).
42. Kirby (1984, 157158).
43. Chi (1982, 235).
44. Liu Shaoqi ([1939] 1984, 136137).
Notes to Pages 2431 349
45. Taylor (2011, 157).

46. Eastman (1984, 207208).
47. Dickson (1993), Eastman (1981), Taylor (2011, 191196, 212217).
48. Averill (1995, 9699; 2006, 389391), Guillermaz (1972, 216217).
49. Averill (2006, 390); see also Pantsov and Levine (2012, 239245).
50. Rowe (2007, 310316, at 313).
51. Ibid., 313315; Benton (1992, 313314).
52. Benton (1992, 239240, 264, 282283, 316317, 337339). Apter and Saich
(1994, 4954) describe these purges as con icts between local guerrilla
forces and the central party command. See also Saich (1996, 530550).
53. The text was the rst major document studied by senior cadres during
the campaign (Apter and Saich1994, 275, 277).
54. Teiwes and Sun (1995, 341342), Van Slyke (1986, 616).
55. Benton (1975, 341342); see also Apter and Saich (1994, 5459).
56. Lthi (2008, 2629), Pantsov and Levine (2012, 317318), Teiwes and Sun
(1995).
57. Leese (2011, 812).
58. Wylie (1980, 1012).
59. Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union (1939), Hua-Yu Li (2006, 91101).
60. Hua-Yu Li (2006, 101102).
61. Tucker (1977), Walder (1991).
62. Hua-Yu Li (2010), Pantsov and Levine (2012, 335), Wylie (1980).
63. Teiwes (1976, 2032).
64. Of the 800,000 party members at the time, 90 percent had recently joined
(Apter and Saich1994, 267).
65. Ibid., 279281.
66. These criticisms are described in Apter and Saich (1994, 5964), Cheek
(1984, 3037), Goldman (1967, 1932), and Dai (1994, 330).
67. The campaign against the critics and their treatment is described in Cheek
(1984, 3744), Goldman (1967, 3250), and Dai (1994, 3175). Translations
of Wang Shiweis essays, and those of like-minded critics, are in Benton
and Hunter (1995, 6983), and Dai (1994), which also includes translations
of critical accusations against Wang.
68. MacFarquhar (1997, 290292).
69. Apter and Saich (1994, 289292), Teiwes and Sun (1995, 370375).
70. Seybolt (1986, 5765).
71. Teiwes and Sun (1995, 364365, 370375).
72. Seybolt (1986, 66).
73. Ibid., 67.
74. Teiwes and Sun (1995, 373375), Walder (2009, 1516).
75. Seybolt (1986, 40).
76. Pantsov and Levine (2012, 348).
77. Westad (2003, 122123).

78. Ibid., 148.
79. Pepper (1999, 741), Westad (2003, 69).
80. Eastman (1984, 8081).
81. Ibid., 8687; see also Pepper (1999, 118131).
83. Westad (2003, 152).
84. Levine (1987, 224226).
85. Diktter (2013, 6474), Westad (2003, 134).
86. Levine (1987, 229). Thaxtons (2008, 8388) account of a village in North
China also emphasizes the transformative effect of mobilization during the
civil war on the Communist Party, which intensied a coercive stance to-
ward the rural population.
87. Westad (2003, 168172).
89. Westad (2003, 175178).
90. Ibid., 181211; Pepper (1999, 4293, 132195).
91. Westad (2003, 197).
92. Ibid., 198199.
93. Ibid., 199208.
94. Diktter (2013, 38, 2022).
95. Yick (1995).
96. Diktter (2013, 2232), Westad (2003, 221255).
97. Brook (2010, map on 41).
98. Rowe (2009, 7178).
99. Rossabi (2005, 3031).
100. Chen (2001, 27).
101. Chen (2007, 13132), Westad (2003, 118119).
102. Chen (2007, 132133), Westad (2003, 234235). This shift in position mir-
rored a similar one in the Soviet Union that took place after World War
II the role of Russia in bringing culture, enlightenment and order to its
borderlands was emphasized by Stalin for the rst time (Ser vice 2004,
496497).
103. Gao (2007).
104. Goldstein (1989, 5866).
105. Ibid., 522610; Westad (2003, 9294).
106. Goldstein (1989, 619690).
107. Ibid., 690736; Westad (2003, 9294).
108. Chen (2007, 157159).
109. Levine (1987, 93101), Westad (2003, 172178).
110. Teiwes and Sun (1999, 13).
111. Levine (1987, 247248).
3. Rural Revolution
1. Skocpol (1979).
2. Another early advocate was the Guangdong party activist Peng Pai, who
created the rst rural Soviet in eastern Guangdong Province in 1927 and
was executed by the Nationalists in 1929 (Galbiati 1985).
4. Mao (1926a).
5. Mao (1926b).
6. Mao (1926e).
7. Mao (1926d).
8. Wilbur (1983, 591594).
9. Brandt (1958, 8890), Taylor (2011, 6162), Wilbur (1983, 606608).
10. Mao (1927b).
11. Mao (1926c).
12. Mao (1927a, 430).
13. Ibid., 446.
14. Ibid., 434435.
15. Ibid., 467.
16. Ibid., 433.
17. Schram (1995, 36); see also Pantsov and Levine (2012, 196).
18. Wilbur (1983, 673681, 690696).
19. Hinton (1966, 110117).
20. Ibid., 132138.
21. Ibid., 139146.
22. Ibid., 222240.
23. Ibid., 275311.
24. Ibid., 332366. Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden (1991, 92110) describe
a similar sequence of violent events in another North China village during
this period; an initially terroristic land reform via manufactured class
struggle and then two waves of work teams to correct the errors of the
previous campaigns.
25. Thaxton (2008, 7083) provides another account of the revolutionary pro-
cess in a village not far from Hintons, one that changed hands more than
once during the civil war. The erce contest between the Nationalists and
Communists was marked by violent retribution against collaborators each
time the region changed hands. This had the effect of elevating the most
ruthlessly violent militia leaders into top positions in the new village
governments.
26. Ch (1962), Rowe (2009, 4862), Siu (1989, 4187).
27. Barkan (1990), Duara (1990), Watson (1990).
28. Yang (1959, 103, 106). See also Siu (1989, 88115) for a parallel descrip-
tion of a nearby county.
29. Yang (1959, 109110).
30. Yang (1945, 143156 and 173189) describes a similar village in the
northern province of Shandong.
31. Yang (1959, 146166).
32. Ibid., 167175.
33. Ibid., 169, 174. See also Huaiyin Li (2009, 5) and Siu (1989, 116142).
34. Riskin (1987, 51).
35. Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden (1991, 84, 86, 105) and Huaiyin Li (2009,
1119) detail this transformation of landholding at the village level.
36. Wang (1999, 324328), Tien (1989, 2324).
37. Bernstein (1968).
38. Ibid.
39. Brown (2007). Diktter (2013, 7680) documents widespread collective
resistance and isolated rebellions in a range of locations in the southern
half of China.
40. Strauss (2006).
41. Diktter (2013, 83).
42. Schoenhals (2008b, 72). This number includes both urban and rural re-
gions but excludes deaths during land reform. Schoenhals (2008b, 6873)
provides a critical review of various estimates. Strauss (2006, 91) notes the
range of estimates, which have run as high as 5 million executions.
43. Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden (1991, 111122), Lardy (1987b).
44. Oi (1989, 4344), Shue (1980, 214245).
45. Cheng and Selden (1994, 660).
47. Oi (1989, 1342), Siu (1989, 143167).
48. Tucker (1990, 69145).
49. According to Ser vice (2004, 566), Stupendous hypocrisy was on display
here. If ever there had been an attempt to transform an economy through
sheer will and violence, it had been at the end of the 1920s under Stalins
leadership.
50. Mao (1977).
51. Hua-Yu Li (2006, 6194).
52. Teiwes and Sun (1999, 2052, 7077).
53. Riskin (1987, 86).
54. Bernstein (1967), Conquest (1986).
55. Bernstein (1967), Diktter (2013, 208225). Friedman, Pickowicz, and
Selden (1991, 122198), Huaiyin Li (2006; 2007; 2009, 2349), and
Thaxton (2008, 89117) trace the halting course of change from household
farms to collectives. All of them detail the serious problems encountered at
each stage, and the subtle and open resistance by many farm households
most pronounced in the later stages. Bernstein (1967) and Liu and Wang
(2006) analyze the political pressures on local cadres that accelerated
collectivization faster than originally planned.
56. Oi (1989, 132145).
57. Ibid., 5.
58. Ibid., 4365.
59. Ash (2006), Oi (1989, 55).
60. Oi (1989, 135137), Walder (1986, 5456).
61. Burns (1981), Oi (1989, 138141).
62. Huaiyin Li (2009, 4447).
63. Ibid., 5.
4. Urban Revolution
1. Pepper (1999, 332).

2. Gao (2004, 1416), Pepper (1999, 376380).
3. Pepper (1999, 386390), Wakeman (2007).
4. Strauss (2006) also mentions a fourth type of campaign, designed to mo-
bilize the population to complete community-oriented tasks, like planting
trees, eradicating rats and mosquitoes, or cleaning up health hazards
in urban neighborhoods.
5. Gao (2004, 6979), Vogel (1969, 4651).
6. Gao (2004, 4751), Vogel (1969, 5155).
7. Brown (2012, 1622), Gao (2004, 5164), Vogel (1969, 5560), Wakeman
(2007).
8. Wakeman (2007, 2325).
9. Ibid., 43.
10. Diktter (2013, 5051, 5355), Wakeman (2007, 5258).
11. Diktter (2013, 104120, 124127), Hooper (1986).
12. Lieberthal (1980, 5377), Strauss (2002). Diktter (2013, 8399) provides
a vivid description of the campaign, based primarily on party archives.
13. Gao (2004, 140146), Vogel (1969, 6265), Yang (2008).
14. Gao (2004, 144).
15. Schoenhals (2008b, 72); also Gao (2004, 140), Strauss (2002, 8789; 2006,
901). Diktter (2013, 99100) nds a gure of 2 million executions in both
urban and rural regions a more credible estimate based on archival
materials.
16. Yang (2008, 109).
17. Diktter (2013, 8992), Strauss (2002, 8992), Yang (2008, 110).
18. Yang (2008, 112120).
19. Diktter (2003).
20. Ibid.; Diktter (2013, 243254).
21. Hung (2010, 400).
22. Ibid., 401403; Lieberthal (1973, 243244; 1980, 1416).
23. Hung (2010, 403404).
24. Ibid., 404417; Lieberthal (1980, 108119). Diktter (2013, 196206) sur-
veys the broader assault on Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and Islam
during the 1950s.
25. Lieberthal (1973, 245250; 1980, 2225), Hershatter (1986, 120131).

26. Martin (1996, 79189), Wang (1967).
27. Lieberthal (1973, 250255; 1980, 6077).
28. Lieberthal (1973, 261264).
29. Diktter (2013, 5153).
30. Henriot (1995), also Hershatter (1997).
31. Henriot (1995).
32. Hershatter (1986, 210240), Perry (1993, 109237).
33. Perry (2007).
34. Ibid.
35. Andreas (2009, 2022).
36. Chen (1960, 33).
37. Ibid., 3133.
38. Gao (2004, 146151).
39. Diktter (2013, 180187).
40. Chen (1960, 2).
41. Ibid., 45. See Chen (1960, 3850) for an account of some of the other
famous educators and scholars who were targeted for this kind of
denunciation.
42. Ibid., 2.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 6263.
45. Ibid., 6364.
46. Joravsky (1970, 4054).
47. The Soviet scientist Medvedev (1969, 134) described Lysenkos scientic
ndings, published in his own journal, as fraudulent and lamented that
these illiterate, shameful articles were advertised as achievements of pro-
gressive science with mythical transformations that were supported
primarily with reference to Stalins authority.
48. Quoted in Medvedev (1969, 134).
49. Joravsky (1970), Medvedev (1969). The Chinese leadership eventually re-
alized that Michurin was wrong and that Lysenko was a charlatan, and
in 1956, with Zhou Enlais encouragement, Chinese scientists debunked
his theories (Lthi 2008, 5253).
50. See the China memoir of the Soviet scientist Klochko (1964, 1033, 64
65, 8288).
51. So (2002, 694).
52. Ibid., 698.
53. Diktter (2013, 157163), Gao (2004, 159163), Sheng (2006).
54. Sheng (2006, 7279).
55. Diktter (2013, 163), Sheng (2006, 76).
56. Diktter (2013, 163173), Dillon (2007), Gao (2004, 160179), Gardner
(1969), Lieberthal (1980, 125152).
57. State Statistical Bureau (1983, 214).
58. Dillon (2007).

60. Brown (2012, 2947), Cheng and Selden (1994, 652653).
62. Ibid., 655657.
64. Whyte and Parish (1984, 2223).
65. Ibid., 1822.
67. Whyte and Parish (1984, 3742), Walder (1986, 6874).
68. Davis-Friedmann (1991, 102116), Walder (1986, 4445), Whyte and
Parish (1984, 7176).
69. Henderson and Cohen (1984, 1046), Whyte and Parish (1984).
5. The Socialist Economy
1. Kirby (2006, 881882).

2. Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union (1939), Hua-Yu Li (2010).
3. Hua-Yu Li (2006, 1, 170).
4. Kirby (2006, 882), Lthi (2008, 3940).
5. Dittmer (1992, 1725).
6. Kaple (1994).
7. Gatrell and Harrison (1993).
8. Calculated from the downloadable database that accompanies Maddison
(2006).
9. Ibid., 478, and calculations from the downloadable database.
10. Calculated from ibid., 279.
11. Halpern (1993, 110).
12. These features of the growth model are outlined in Kornai (1992, 160
202); its origins and evolution in the Soviet Union are examined in Za-
leski (1980).
13. See Baran and Sweezy (1966) for an extended example of this kind of
critique.
14. Kornai (1992, 131159).
15. The following paragraphs are based on my transcripts of interviews in Hong
Kong during 1979 and1980 with retired factory managers who had re-
cently emigrated from China, as part of a study of authority in Chinese
industry (Walder 1986, 270272, in for mants number 5, 23, 55, and65).
Kornai (1992, 110130) provides a structural overview of the planning pro-
cess and how it operated in practice.
16. Kornai (1992, 228261) provides an overview of the impact of hoarding
from a macroeconomic perspective. This is a condensation of his classic
work on the subject (Kornai 1980).
17. Kornai (1979).

18. See, for example, Berliner (1957), whose work was based on interviews
with migr Soviet managers in postwar Europe.
19. Walder (1992).
20. Calculated from data in Kornai (1992, 175). The gures cover eight socialist
and seven capitalist countries over two separate periods, 19651973
and19731983. The socialist countries ranged from a low of 34 percent in
Hungary to a high of 54 percent in China. The capitalist countries ranged
from a low of 16 percent in Denmark to a high of 32 percent in the United
Kingdom. According to Gregory (2004, 122123), comparative appraisals
reveal that the command economies produced economic outcomes quite
different from market economies. The USSR and Eastern Europe consis-
tently produced more heavy industry and defense goods, fewer ser vices,
less foreign trade, higher investment rates, and lower urbanization than
market economies at a similar level of economic development.
21. Calculated from data in Kornai (1992, 187). The study compared Czecho-
slovak ia, Poland, and the Soviet Union with France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom.
22. Henderson and Cohen (1984), Walder (1986).
23. Other socialist economies permitted greater labor turnover; Chinas dra-
conian limits on job changes were due to the necessity to curb migration
from countryside to city and its oversupply of urban labor (Walder 1986,
6875).
24. Ibid., 4043; Whyte and Parish (1984, 7176).
25. This gure refers to the city of Tianjin and comes from the survey data
cited in Walder (1992). The same survey found that 44 percent of the pop-
ulation lived in public housing provided by the local government, and18
percent lived in privately owned housing that was primarily a family legacy
from before 1949.
26. Walder (1986, 5967).
27. Walder (1992, 532).
28. Ibid.
29. The dossier system is described by Lee (1991, 329342) and Walder (1986,
9193).
30. Whyte and Parish (1984, 2526).
31. Zaleski (1980, 465481).
32. Huenemann (1966), Whyte and Parish (1984, 85100).
33. Walder (1986, 210212).
34. Kornai (1959), Lewin (1974).
35. Baylis (1974).
36. The earliest discussions predated the postwar period. See Dunayevskaya
(1944). The best-known postwar economists who forwarded these ideas
were Kornai (1959), Lange (Lange and Taylor 1964), Liberman (1971), and
ik (1966; 1967; 1972).
37. Fung (1982), Lin (1981).

38. Mao (1977) laid out his objections to late Stalinist economics in his unpub-
lished reading notes on Stalins last work, The Economic Problems of Socialism,
and a 1950s Soviet textbook on political economy. Service (2004, 566567)
describes the key themes of these late Stalin-era views of socialist eco-
nomics and how they revised earlier doctrines from the prewar period.
6. The Evolving Party System
1. Vogel (1967) was one of the rst to analyze these implications.

2. Lee (1991, 16), Van Slyke (1986, 621).
3. Lee (1991, 16).
4. See Kraus (1981). A third designation applied to those who were the off-
spring of someone who died after sacricing for the cause: revolutionary
martyr. Barnett (1966) and Vogel (1967) describe further status distinc-
tions among the revolutionary generation.
5. Oksenberg (1968, 92) put it less charitably: The Party, representing the
best avenue for upward mobility, attracted opportunists.
6. Orga ni zation Department, Central Communist Party Ofce for Research
on Party History, and Central Party Archives (2000, vol. 12, 1227).
7. Ibid., vol. 9, 4048.
8. Ibid., vol. 12, 1227.
9. Ibid., vol. 12, 1229.
10. See Lee (1991, 5657).
11. These gures are calculated from the survey data analyzed in Walder, Li,
and Treiman (2000).
12. The same pattern was observed in the Soviet Union: Hough (1977).
13. Vogel (1965) was the rst to write about the variations in political pres-
sures across social settings; Whyte (1974) analyzed these differences in a
more systematic fashion.
14. Schoenhals (2013, 1726, 3046). Schoenhals based his account on
internal ministry documents, training manuals, and professional pub-
lications.
15. Ibid., 6364.
16. Ibid., 5.
17. Ibid., 5882.
18. Ibid., 93.
19. The three types of agents are described in ibid., 85109.
20. The prescribed recruitment strategies are described in ibid., 138169.
21. Ibid., 170204.
22. Lewis (1963, 106107).
23. This paragraph is based on Li and Walder (2001).
24. Oksenberg (1968, 6465) was perhaps the rst to describe the choices
facing young Chinese as they navigated career opportunities presented
by this system, and the way that opportunities narrowed by early

middle age.
25. The gures in this paragraph and the next come from Walder, Li, and
Trei man (2000). These gures are not percentages, as in earlier para-
graphs, but are odds ratios estimated in event-history models. They rep-
resent an estimate of how the net odds of subsequently joining the party
are affected by the given individual characteristic. Similar estimates are
reported in Li and Walder (2001, 1385).
26. Walder, Li, and Treiman (2000).
27. Fitzpatrick (1993).
28. Fitzpatrick (1979).
29. Fitzpatrick (1978), Tucker (1977).
30. Fitzpatrick (2005, 24, 3749).
31. Ibid., 1418.
32. Walder and Hu (2009).
33. See, for example, Brown (2015), Leese (2015), and Yang (2015).
34. Croll (1984), Unger (1984).
35. Stacey (1983).
36. This paragraph is based on Walder and Hu (2009, 1413); similar estimates
are reported in Li and Walder (2001).
37. This paragraph is based on gures in China Education Yearbook (1984,
965966, 969, 971, 1001, 1023).
38. Rosen (1982, 1266), Unger (1982, 1147, 83109).
39. Lang (1946).
40. Andreas (2009, 2332) vividly documents the operations of the partys con-
trol over the allocation of political credentials and opportunity at an elite
university.
41. Shirk (1982), Unger (1982).
42. Walder (2009, 23).
43. Walder (1995). Long before the availability of data from life history sur-
veys, Oksenberg (1968, 67) made essentially the same observation: Once
someone had opted for goals found outside the political system, he could
not decide at a later date to pursue the goals offered by the system.
44. This paragraph and the one that follows is based on Walder, Li, and Treiman
(2000, 200). Parallel ndings from a different set of survey data are
reported in Bian, Shu, and Logan (2001).
45. Li and Walder (2001, 1398, 1402).
46. Orga ni zation Department (2000, vol. 14, 12241231).
47. Schoenhals (1985).
48. Oksenberg (1976) analyzed the implications for leaders who reached the
apex of the political system, but he noted earlier that the lack of the exit
option applied to all careers within the bureaucracy (Oksenberg 1968,
6667).
7. Thaw and Backlash
1. Baring (1972, 349), Bruce (2003, 159165).

2. Kramer (1999, 13).
3. Ibid., 15.
4. Ibid., 1517.
5. Ibid., 1722; Ostermann (2001, 113142).
6. Baring (1972, 51113), Bruce (2003, 165199), Kramer (1999, 4045, 48
50, 5254), Ostermann (2001, xxxixxxvi, 121).
7. Brown (2009, 234), Kecskemeti (1961, 4046), Knight (1993, 194200,
203224), Taubman (2003, 250263).
8. Nagy (1957) wrote a book-length defense of these more moderate post-
Stalin policies in 19551956, making him the standard bearer of Hungarian
de-Stalinization.
9. Applebaum (2012, 437), Kramer (1999, 56), Taubman (2003, 275277).
10. Brown (2009, 203209), Johnson (1972, 65121), Rusinow (1977, 3270).
11. Brown (2009, 272276), Milenkovitch (1971, 54120).
12. Brown (2009, 236243).
13. Ibid., 240243; Taubman (2003, 270271).
14. Khrushchev (1962, S20 S21).
15. Taubman (2003, 271273). A full English-language text of the speech is
Khrushchev (1962).
16. Taubman (2003, 274).
17. Lthi (2008, 4849), Taubman (2003, 277282).
18. Taubman (2003, 290).
19. According to one account, an Israeli intelligence ofcer in Warsaw obtained
a copy and passed it to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which soon
relayed it to the Times through the U.S. State Department (Taubman 2003,
284). In another, the rst secretary of the Polish party recalled that he
had personally given copies to correspondents of foreign newspapers (Leese
2011, 2930).
20. Leese (2011, 30).
21. Chen (2015, 108114).
22. Machcewicz (2009, 3586).
23. Kramer (1998, 168174), Machcewicz (2009, 97124).
24. Machcewicz (2009, 125157).
25. Kramer (1998, 168174), Machcewicz (2009, 158189, 241252), Taubman
(2003, 291294).
26. Kecskemeti (1961, 1739, 7182).
27. Ibid., 4770. The Pet Circle was named after the national poet who had
helped inspire the Hungarian revolution of 1848. Many of its members
were young party members and youth league activists who were in favor
of a new reform-oriented course (Applebaum 2012, 448455; Brown 2009,
279280).
28. Kecskemeti (1961, 4782), Taubman (2003, 290). Sebestyen (2006) recounts
these events and adds a detailed and dramatic description of the street
ghting in Budapest and its subsequent suppression.
29. Brown (2009, 278288), Kramer (1998, 175210), Taubman (2003, 294
299). See also Ekiert (1996, 4998).
30. Goldman (1967, 5866, 119122, 129139).
31. Lin (2009, 484495).
32. Ibid., 523525.
33. Chen (1960, 8890), Diktter (2013, 187189), Goldman (1967, 129157),
Lin (2009, 501521).
34. Lin (2009, 520521).
35. Ibid., 558; Vogel (1969, 136138).
36. Leese (2011, 3036), Lthi (2008, 4950), MacFarquhar (1974, 4348).
37. Lthi (2008, 5053), MacFarquhar (1974, 4348; 1989, 67).
38. MacFarquhar (1974, 7885).
39. Ibid., 100102.
40. Shen (2008, 322323).
41. MacFarquhar (1974, 148, 165), Organization Department (2000, vol. 9, 36,
4041).
42. Leese (2011, 3846).
43. MacFarquhar (1974, 120121).
44. Ibid., 178183, 189199; Shen (2008, 491501).
45. MacFarquhar (1974, 177178); Shen (2008, 501522).
46. Leese (2011, 5154), Lthi (2008, 63, 70), MacFarquhar (1989, 9).
47. Mao (1957), Shen (2008, 470476). See also Goldman (1967, 187191).
48. Leese (2011, 5760).
49. MacFarquhar (1974, 184199).
50. See the series of ten speeches translated in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu
(1989, 191362); Shen (2008, 476490).
51. Cheek (1997, 174175), Goldman (1967, 179186), MacFarquhar (1974,
178180). The short story by a twenty-two-year-old writer, Wang Meng, A
Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department, was published in Peo-
ples Literature in September 1956. It is translated in Nieh (1981b, 473511).
52. Cheek (1997, 175182), MacFarquhar (1974, 192194).
53. MacFarquhar (1974, 200207).
54. Shen (2008, 523551).
55. MacFarquhar (1960, 5153).
56. Ibid., 5976.
57. Ibid., 117120; similar complaints are described in Andreas (2009, 3438),
Chen (1960, 152170), and Shen (2008, 579581).
58. Nieh (1981b, 323324). The author was Xu Mouyong, in an essay titled
Random Notes from Chanzaoju. Goldman (1967, 191202) surveys the
range of criticism offered by novelists and poets, and Nieh (1981a) provides
translations of essays that criticize the partys doctrines regarding litera-

ture and poetry.
59. MacFarquhar (1960, 8889).
60. Ibid., 106107.
61. Ibid., 49. Other harsh criticisms along these lines are described in Zhu
(2005, 195201).
62. MacFarquhar (1960, 73). The speaker was Ge Yang, a veteran communist
and journalist. Similar calls for fundamental change are detailed in Shen
(2008, 573579).
63. Wang etal. (1998, 515516).
64. Leese (2011, 61).
65. Goldman (1962), MacFarquhar (1960, 130141).
66. According to Moody (1977, 189192), Lin Xiling was the pen name of
Cheng Haiguo, a Peoples Liberation Army veteran discharged in 1953 who
later enrolled at Chinese Peoples University.
67. Doolin (1964, 2325).
68. Ibid., 27.
69. Ibid., 2728.
70. Ibid., 31.
71. Ibid., 3233.
72. Ibid., 38, 4142.
73. Ibid., 16.
74. Ibid., 4546.
75. Ibid., 60.
76. Ibid., 6162.
77. Ibid., 6566. This writer was echoing the criticism of Chinas top leaders
made by Wang Shiwei during the Yanan rectication movement, described
in Chapter2.
78. Shens (2008, 584596) description of student and worker agitation is based
primarily on these internal bulletins.
79. MacFarquhar (1974, 221), Wang etal. (1998, 517).
80. Shen (2008, 587590), Zhu (2005, 218222).
81. Shen (2008, 590591).
82. MacFarquhar (1960, 143164), Shen (2008, 591).
83. Perry (1994), Shen (2008, 591593).
84. Huaiyin Li (2009, 57).
85. Ibid., 5576; Huziyin Li (2007).
86. Shen (2008, 593594).
87. Wang (2015).
88. MacFarquhar (1974, 218219, 225240, 248249, 261269), Shen (2008,
597608).
89. Chen (1960, 171201), Shen (2008, 637673). It was not only those with
strong grievances who criticized the party during the Hundred Flowers.
U (2012) analyzes the motives that drove privileged regime loyalists to offer
criticisms of the party, despite the potential risks.
90. See, for example, Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden (1991, 209213).
91. MacFarquhar (1974, 266269). Schoenhals (1986) analyzes these changes
in detail. A translation of the original version is Mao (1957).
92. Leese (2011, 6566), Shen (2008, 673680).
93. Shen (2008, 662). The devastating impact on prominent literary gures is
detailed in Goldman (1967, 202242).
94. Hoffmann (1974, 146147), MacFarquhar (1974, 224).
95. MacFarquhar (1974, 283289).
96. Ibid., 289310; Leese (2011, 6364) disputes this interpretation, viewing
Mao as more rmly in control.
97. Taubman (2003, 310324).
98. Lthi (2008, 7174).
8. Great Leap
1. Bernstein (1969), Teiwes and Sun (1993; 1997; 1999, 2052).

2. Teiwes and Sun (1999, 6769).
3. MacFarquhar (1983, 16). Important products included iron ore, pig iron,
steel, coal, petroleum, electric power, cement, and selected consumer items
like sugar, woolen textiles, and leather footwear.
4. Ibid., 17; Teiwes and Sun (1999, 7071).
5. MacFarquhar (1983, 17).
6. Lardy (1987a, 360).
7. Ibid., 362.
8. Lieberthal (1987, 300). Chen Yuns writings on Chinas development
strategy during this period are translated in Lardy and Lieberthal (1983).
9. In Lardys (1987a, 363) view, The Great Leap Forward was predicated on
Maos misunderstanding of the constraints facing Chinese agriculture.
10. MacFarquhar (1983, 5263), Teiwes and Sun (1999, 7377).
11. Diktter (2010, 1524), Teiwes and Sun (1999, 8586).
12. Teiwes and Sun (1999, 9093).
13. Lieberthal (1987, 301).
14. Teiwes and Sun (1999, 9697).
15. MacFarquhar (1983, 8890), Teiwes and Sun (1999, 100105).
16. Lardy (1987a, 367).
17. Ibid., 366.
18. Ibid., 363365; Yang (2012, 163167).
19. Diktter (2010, 4755), MacFarquhar (1983, 103106), Yang (2012,
167170).
20. Yang (2012, 168169).
21. Diktter (2010, 5663), Yang (2012, 7778). Friedman, Pickowicz, and
Selden (1991, 216240) and Thaxton (2008, 118156) document the prac-
tices associated with the Great Leap in two villages in Hebei Province.
Huaiyin Li (2009, 82102) chronicles the campaign in a Jiangsu village and
Siu (1989, 170188) in the Pearl River delta in Guangdong.
22. Yang (2012, 168169).
23. Oi (1989, 5962).
24. For these and other examples, see Yang (2012, 274275).
25. Diktter (2010, 166173).
26. Ibid., 174188. Zhou (2012, 7290) translates internal party documents
that described this kind of destruction after the fact.
27. These are quotations from local interviews conducted by Yang (2012, 32).
28. Ibid., 52.
29. Ibid., 5256.
30. Xue Muqiao, quoted in ibid., 257.
31. Xue Muqiao, quoted in ibid., 258.
32. Yang (2012, 258).
33. Bernstein (2006), Diktter (2010, 6772), Zhou (2012, 416).
34. Maos speech to the Second Zhengzhou Conference, February 27, 1959,
as translated in Yang (2012, 438439).
35. Diktter (2010, 8687).
37. Li and Yang (2005, 845846) compare the initially reported output with
the subsequent gures adjusted in the years after the Leap.
38. Diktter (2010, 85).
39. Ibid., 8586, and the document translated in Zhou (2012, 2325, at 25).
40. Quoted in Yang (2012, 49).
41. Yang (2012, 335336). In this commune, more than 1,000 local leaders
were dismissed from their posts, and173 people were beaten to death.
42. For extensive documentation of this surprisingly little-known campaign,
see Yang (2012, 2837, 224229, 335338), and Zhou (2012, 1819,
2536).
43. An internal report submitted in Sichuan Province in 1961 reported that
local ofcials set up private jails and labor camps to which peasants were
summarily consigned, and used methods of torture that included hanging
people up, beating them, forcing them to kneel on burning charcoal,
piercing their mouths, clipping off their ngers, stitching their lips, pushing
needles into their nipples, force-feeding them feces, stuf ng dried beans
down their throats, and so on (Zhou 2012, 21). An internal report sub-
mitted to Henan Province in 1961 listed additional tortures: tearing out
hair, cutting off ears, driving bamboo strips into the palms of the hand,
driving pine needles into the gums, forcing burning embers into the mouth,
tearing out pubic hair, piercing genitals, burying alive, and a torture known
as lighting the celestial candle stripping people naked, hanging them
up, dousing them with oil, and lighting them on re (Yang 2012, 3031).
44. Thaxton (2008, 188198) provides a village-level view of these events.
45. There are many accounts of the events at the Lushan Plenum: see Diktter
(2010, 9099), Lthi (2008, 126135), MacFarquhar (1983, 193251),
Teiwes and Sun (1999, 202212). The specic claims in this paragraph are
from Yang (2012, 350393).
46. By Stalin in his later years, these ofcials almost certainly did not mean
the massive purges and executions of 19371938, for which there was no
parallel in China at this point in time. Instead, they appear to be refer-
ring to Stalins capricious and bullying behavior toward members of the
Politburo in the last few years of his life, something that was complained
about loudly by Khrushchev and other top Soviet ofcials immediately
after Stalins death in 1953 (Ser vice 2004, 531540).
47. Bernstein (2006) traces the evolution of Maos shifting and erratic response
to bad news during the Leap and the reasons for his defensive reaction at
the Lushan Plenum.
48. Bernstein (2006), Yang (2012, 384385).
49. This included Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai: Yang (2012, 367383).
50. Ibid., 385386.
51. Ibid., 387.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 388.
54. Ibid., 390, 392. Thaxton (2008, 143156) details the pressures placed on
village leaders during this period to enforce party directives with enthu-
siasm and the punishments applied to those who failed.
55. Yang (2012, 445).
56. Ibid., 6061.
57. Ibid., 62.
58. Speech by Second Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CCP Wang
Renzhong, December 6, 1960, translated in Yang (2012, 63).
59. Ibid., 61.
60. Ibid., 6164.
61. Ibid., 406407.
62. Aird (1982, 278), Coale (1981, 89).
63. Professional demographers have generated de nitive estimates of famine
deaths, based on the analysis of population age structures in successive na-
tional censuses. Ashton and colleagues (1984, 614, 619) estimated excess
mortality of 29.5 million, Banister (1987) 28.9 million, and Coale (1984)
30.7 million with substantially the same data. Yang (2012, 421425, 428
430) reviews various estimates based on alternate estimation methods from
noncensus data by Chinese scholars and nds 36 million to be the most
plausible number. Others (e.g., Diktter 2010, 324334) believe that ar-
chival records could actually support numbers as high 50 million. Such
numbers cannot be reconciled with age-specic population data. For larger
estimates to be plausible, the national censuses would have to underreport
population gures in the early census and overreport population gures
in the later censuses in exactly the right age groupsan unlikely propo-
sition. Coale (1984, 6474) explains the life-table methodology.
64. The ofcial story also minimizes the number of famine deaths, setting the
death toll at 17 million, calculated according to an undisclosed optimi-
zation method that attributes huge percentages of excess mortality to nat-
ural causes. Yang Jisheng (2012, 421425) critically reviews the range of
estimates by Chinese authors.
65. Peng (1987, 651).
66. Li and Yang (2005, 843). Kung and Lin (2003, 6667) reached similar con-
clusions about the contribution of weather to regional death rates.
67. Lardy (1987a, 369370).
68. Li and Yang (2005, 845).
69. Ashton etal. (1984, 626).
70. Brown (2011; 2012, 5375).
71. MacFarquhar (1997, 3).
72. Ashton etal. (1984, 630632). Frequent reports of famine issued by anti-
communist sources were generally dismissed as biased.
73. Diktter (2010, 7283), Lthi (2008, 109111, 153154).
74. See MacFarquhar (1997, 2331).
75. Ashton etal. (1984, 622).
76. Diktter (2010, 269273).
77. Ibid., 145154.
78. MacFarquhar (1997, 3336).
80. Ibid., 103; Brown (2012, 77107).
82. Estimates for the Soviet famine range from 5.7 to 8.5 million (Davies and
Wheatcroft 2004, 414415). As percentages of the population, the two fam-
ines were of roughly equal severity.
83. Lardy (1987a, 395).
9. Toward the Cultural Revolution
1. MacFarquhar (1997, 1319).

2. Ibid., 1213; excerpts from the Twelve Points on Agriculture are trans-
lated in Yang (2012, 437). These measures were extended and formalized
in the Sixty Articles on Agriculture in 1961 (MacFarquhar 1997, 45
48, 6365).
3. Yang (2012, 437438), Central Documents Research Ofce (1996,
364367).
4. The political secretaries included Tian Jiaying, Hu Qiaomu, and Chen Boda
(Yang 2012, 61, 436).
5. MacFarquhar (1997, 3943, 4863).
6. Ibid., 61120.
7. Ibid., 137145.
8. Ibid., 145152.
9. Ibid., 152158.
10. Yang (2012, 502).
11. Lieberthal (1987, 325331), MacFarquhar (1997, 158168), Yang (2012,
502503).
12. Yang (2012, 505).
13. Ibid., 508.
14. MacFarquhar (1997, 209233).
15. The conversation was reported in a biography of Liu Shaoqi written by his
wife and son, as translated in Yang (2012, 506507). See also Diktter
(2010, 337). The Three Red Banners is a slogan that stood for the Gen-
eral Line, the Great Leap Forward, and the peoples communes. It em-
bodied Maos emphasis on pushing forward the pace of economic devel-
opment as fast as possible (Yang 2012, 87).
16. Goldman (1987, 432444).
17. Ibid., 436; MacFarquhar (1997, 244248).
18. MacFarquhar (1997, 234235).
19. Goldman (1969, 5960).
20. Goldman (1987, 437438).
21. Goldman (1969, 6263).
22. Fung (1982, 82110).
23. Goldman (1969, 6163).
24. Ibid., 6973.
25. MacFarquhar (1997, 155157).
26. Cheek (1997, 176187).
27. Goldman (1969, 7983; 1987, 442447), MacFarquhar (1997, 250252).
28. MacFarquhar (1997, 254256).
29. Goldman (1969, 74).
30. Goldman (1981, 3236), MacFarquhar (1997, 252253).
31. Lieberthal (1987, 331335), MacFarquhar (1997, 274281).
32. Yang (2012, 510511).
33. MacFarquhar (1997, 283286).
34. Yang (2012, 512).
35. Guo and Lin (2005, 929).
36. Ibid., 3099; MacFarquhar (1997, 334348).
37. Brown (2012, 111136), Chan, Madsen, and Unger (1984, 3773), Guo and
Lin (2005, 99156), MacFarquhar (1997, 403407).
38. Guo and Lin (2005, 156187, 204252).
39. MacFarquhar (1997, 410415).
40. Lthi (2008, 285301).
41. Brown (2009, 264265), MacFarquhar (1997, 416417), Taubman (2003,
317, 614619).
42. Guo and Lin (2005, 253274).
43. MacFarquhar (1997, 419425), Yang (2012, 516517).

44. Guo and Lin (2005, 274296), MacFarquhar (1997, 425428).
45. MacFarquhar (1997, 409410).
46. This account is based on Dong and Walder (2011a, 1819).
47. The account in these paragraphs is based on Walder (2006, 10251027).
See also Guo and Lin (2005, 187203).
48. This was a general pattern across the country cleavages opened up during
the later phases of the Socialist Education Movement folded directly into
grassroots con icts in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution (Guo and
Lin 2005, 296349).
49. Lthi (2008, 236245).
50. Ibid.; MacFarquhar (1997, 353354).
51. Lthi (2008, 260272), MacFarquhar (1997, 349350).
52. MacFarquhar (1997, 360362).
53. Ibid., 363.
54. Ibid., 363364.
55. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 1517).
56. Leese (2011, 122124), MacFarquhar (1997, 382384, 439440).
57. Leese (2011, 94107). A full account of the compilation, printing, and dis-
tribution of the little red book is in Leese (2011, 108122).
58. MacFarquhar (1974, 148, 165).
59. MacFarquhar (1997, 439440), Walder (2009, 1516).
60. See Chapter2; and Walder (2009, 16).
61. MacFarquhar (1997, 434435).
62. Ibid., 447448; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 1920, 3637).
63. MacFarquhar (1997, 448450), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
2027).
64. MacFarquhar (1974, 180184, 195196, 202207, 270273).
65. MacFarquhar (1997, 445447), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
1718).
67. Ibid., 3844.
68. Ibid., 4851.
10. Fractured Rebellion

2. Ibid., 4344.
3. The same fate befell the CCPs International Liaison Department (han-
dling relations with other communist parties) and Central Investiga-
tion Department (which directed the intelligence community) (ibid.,
9598).
4. Kang Sheng and Chen Boda, the two highest-ranking gures, were alternate
members of the Politburo in May 1966.
5. For more biographical detail on these individuals, and more detail on the
evolution of the CCRG, see Walder (2009, 1418).
7. Ibid., 9899.
8. This paragraph and the next are based on MacFarquhar and Schoenhals
(2006, 277, 281284) and Schoenhals (1996).
9. Schoenhals (2008a).
10. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 7981), Walder (2009, 169170).
11. Walder (2009, 154171).
12. Leese (2011, 129134).
13. Walder (2009, 148150).
15. Walder (2006, 10251026; 2009, 3536).
16. Walder (2006, 10271028; 2009, 3637).
17. Dong and Walder (2011a, 1112).
18. It is plausible to assume that Mao was setting up Liu Shaoqi for a fall; he
had a good idea how Liu would attempt to implement his campaign, given
his earlier approach to the Socialist Education Movement, and did not ob-
ject to the sending of work teams and refused to state clearly either his
support or opposition to sending them (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals
2006, 6365, 7678, 8185).
19. The evidence for this conclusion is in Walder (2009, 2858).
20. Ibid., 5657.
21. Ibid., 3738; similar gures were reported at a series of other major uni-
versities in the capital (ibid., 3857).
22. This account is based on Walder (2006, 10281029; 2009, 6162).
23. Walder (2009, 6263, 7084).
25. This summarizes a much longer analysis in Walder (2009, 88119).
26. Ibid., 129135; Maos full statement is at 133134.
28. Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1980), Rosen (1982, 109118), Walder (2009,
136138).
29. Walder (2009, 137142).
30. Based on entries in Wang (2004), who details twenty such cases during
this period.
31. This summarizes a longer presentation in Walder (2009, 142145). In
Shanghai during September there were 354 beating deaths and704 sui-
cides, and high school students beat more than 10,000 people, severely
injuring almost 1,000 (Perry and Li 1997, 1112). See also MacFarquhar
and Schoenhals (2006, 117131) for a longer account of Red Guard activi-
ties during this period of red terror nationwide.
32. Walder (2009, 145).
33. Ibid., 146.
34. The next several paragraphs are based on ibid., 148150.

35. The next several paragraphs are based on ibid., 150153.
36. The following paragraphs are based on ibid., 119122.
37. The following paragraphs are based on ibid., 156157.
38. The next few paragraphs are based on ibid., 157163; also MacFarquhar
and Schoenhals (2006, 133135).
39. Walder (2009, 6773).
41. Walder (2009, 164166).
43. Walder (2009, 167171).
44. The next several paragraphs summarize a much longer account in ibid.,
174184.
45. Ibid., 184186.
46. Walder (2006, 10321034; 2009, 106107).
47. The following paragraphs are based on Walder (2009, 186200).
48. Ibid., 201202.
49. This section is based on ibid., 203217.
50. Ibid., 204207.
11. Collapse and Division

2. Perry and Li (1997, 3133, 4547). Nie Yuanzi of Peking University also
spent several weeks in Shanghai beginning in mid-November, during
which she encouraged rebellion against the Shanghai party leadership
(Walder 2006, 1034; Wang 2001, 754762).
3. Perry and Li (1997, 3236).
6. Walder (1996).
7. Perry and Li (1997, 7185). Similar developments are reported in Hang-
zhou and Wuhan by Forster (1990, 2029) and Wang (1995, 9094).
8. Dong and Walder (2011a, 1822). Divisions among factory party ofcials
also de ned the cleavages that split worker factions in Shanghai, cleav-
ages that were opened up and exacerbated during the Socialist Education
Movement (Perry and Li 1997, 3031, 4547, 132136).
9. Perry and Li (1997, 97111), Walder (1978, 3946). Forster (1990, 2728)
and Wang (1995, 112113) allude to similar trends in Hangzhou and
Wuhan.
10. For examples, see Dong and Walder (2011b, 428430), Perry and Li (1997,
1718, 86), and Walder (2009, 203207).
11. See Dong and Walder (2010, 679680), Forster (1990, 2432), Walder
(1978, 3536).
12. Perry and Li (1997, 8688, 114116), Walder (1978, 4650).

14. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 164165), Perry and Li (1997, 89).
16. Ibid., 166169; Perry and Li (1996, 126127), Walder (1978, 6063). In
1976, these three leaders, along with Maos wife Jiang Qing, were purged
and labeled the Gang of Four.
17. Walder (1978, 5163).
18. Perry and Li (1997, 2021), Walder (1978, 60).
19. Perry and Li (1997, 119144), Walder (1978, 5859).
20. Bu (2008, 390392). MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 171) report that
Pan originally put the leader of a mass orga ni zation in the top spot, but
this was overruled by Beijing.
21. Dong and Walder (2010, 678682).
22. Bu (2008, 306307, 383390), Central Documents Research Ofce (1998,
124125), Wang (2001, 750753).
23. Dong and Walder (2010).
24. Yan (2014).
26. See, for example, Dong and Walder (2011b).
27. Dong and Walder (2011a, 2011b), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
177181), Yan (2014).
29. Ibid., 180182.
30. This account is based on Dong and Walder (2010, 2011b).
31. This account is based on Yan (2014).
32. A parallel split developed in the rebel forces in Hangzhou. The alliance that
clashed with the armed forces and subsequently opposed military control
was known as the United Headquarters, and the rebels who avoided clashes
with the military and later supported their actions became known as Red
Storm (Bu 2008, 414416; Forster 1990, 2933; Jin 2000, 242246).
33. Wang (1995, 113121).
34. Ibid., 121128.
35. Ibid., 128132.
36. Ibid., 138141.
37. Ibid., 144146, 148.
38. Ibid., 147148.
39. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 206208), Wang (1995, 149150).
43. Wang (1995, 170175).
44. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 214216), Schoenhals (2005, 279
282, 284289), Wang (1995, 161163).

46. Schoenhals (2005, 292293).
47. Dong and Walder (2011b).
48. Guangdong Annals Editorial Committee (2005, 595597), Hai (1971,
150175).
49. Forster (1990, 4450).
50. Dong and Walder (2011b).
51. Forster (1990, 4748).
52. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 229233), Schoenhals (2005, 296).
53. Dong and Walder (2011b, 437438).
54. Schoenhals (2005, 297).
55. Dong and Walder (2011b, 438).
56. This account is based on Dong and Walder (2012a).
58. Su (2011).
59. Guangxi Cultural Revolution Chronology Editorial Group (1990,
116117).
60. Ibid., 125.
62. Dong and Walder (2012b, 901).
63. Walder (2009, 204222).
64. Ibid., 223242.
65. This account of the nal battles at Peking and Tsinghua universities is based
on ibid., 242245.
66. This account of Maos encounter with the Red Guard leaders is based on
ibid., 245247.
12. Military Rule
1. This account is based on Walder (2006, 10441045; 2009, 247248).

2. This account is based on Walder (2009, 248249). Andreas (2009, 138142)
describes the imposition of propaganda team control at the university.
3. See Andreas (2006) for a description of this period.
4. This account of Jiangsu Province is based on Dong and Walder (2012a,
2429).
5. Forster (1990, 5691) describes a similar process in Zhejiang Province and
its capital of Hangzhou.
6. This camp is described in Yue and Wakeman (1985, 251273). For a memoir
of an intellectuals experience in a Henan Province camp, see Yang (1984).
8. Andreas (2009, 188210).
9. Bernstein (1977a, 3644), White (1978; 1979).
10. Bernstein (1977a, 121171; 1977b), Unger (1982).
11. China Education Yearbook (1984, 969).
12. Brown (2012, 137168) describes the practice and its impact in the city;
for deportation gures, see pp.139 and144.
13. Contemporary China Editorial Ofce (1993, 262).
16. Contemporary China Editorial Ofce (1991a, 109).
17. Contemporary China Editorial Ofce (1991b, 118).
18. Schoenhals (1996, 109).
20. Ibid., 254255.
21. Ibid., 255256.
22. Walder (2006, 10441045), Wang (2006). This period at the university is
described in Yue and Wakeman (1985, 233250).
23. See the range of examples in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
256262).
24. Xu (1990).
25. Contemporary China Editorial Ofce (1991b, 118).
27. Walder (2014).
28. Leese (2011, 210219).
30. Ibid., 263.
31. Leese (2011, 195202).
32. Urban (1971, 127).
33. Leese (2011, 187194).
34. Baum (1969), Leese (2011, 219221).
35. The following account is based on Chau (2010, 257259).
36. Leese (2011, 221).
37. A book produced in conjunction with a museum exhibition about the
mango phenomenon covers the episode in considerable detail, with pho-
tographs of mango worship and the entire range of mango-related arti-
facts (Murck 2013, 113233). The plot of the 1976 lm Song of the Mangoes
is detailed by Chau (2013).
38. Leese (2011, 204206), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 264).
39. Leese (2011, 174, 206207).
40. Ibid., 207.
41. Ibid., 226231.
43. Ibid., 306307.
44. Walder (2014).
46. Walder (2009, 248249).
47. Wang (1995, 224225).
48. Dong and Walder (2012b, 900901).

49. Ibid., 901, 905.
13. Discord and Dissent
1. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 3132). Maos collapse during treatment of his lung
infection in January 1972 was nearly fatal (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals
2006, 356).
2. Teiwes and Sun (1996) convincingly make the case for this view.
4. See Jin (1999, 163199), Leese (2011, 231237), MacFarquhar and Schoen-
hals (2006, 325336), Teiwes and Sun (2007, 3134).
5. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 337339), Teiwes and Sun (2007,
3435).
6. Kau (1975, 81, 84).
7. Ibid., 84.
8. Ibid., 83.
9. Ibid., 89.
10. Ibid., 8384. Chin Shi-huang (or Qin Shi Huang) was the founder of the rst
Chinese dynasty. Widely credited with uniting China for the rst time
through armed force, he became an arbitrary despot, slaughtering educated
ofcials, and his dynasty soon collapsed.
11. According to Teiwes and Sun (2007, 35), at least one important Politburo
member, Ji Dengkui, opposed distributing the material, given the highly
unattering portrait of Mao that it contained. Ever unpredictable, Mao
overruled Ji and ordered the material distributed nationwide.
12. Leese (2011, 238239).
14. Ibid., 360365; Teiwes and Sun (2007, 4285).
16. Forster (1990, 116118).
17. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 85109, 132146), Vogel (2011, 6179).
18. Forster (1990, 118), Goldman (1975), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
366373).
110118, 146171).
20. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 111, 172178).
21. Forster (1990, 110114).
22. Ibid., 120128.
23. Ibid., 133139.
24. Ibid., 144145.
25. Ibid., 148151.
26. Ibid., 152155, 163164.
27. Ibid., 155159, 172.

28. The account of Nanjing in these paragraphs is based on Dong and Walder
(2012b).
29. Ibid., 902.
30. Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1985, 916, 3186).
31. Ibid., 26. The pen name borrowed one character from the names of each
of three coauthors: Li Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang, and Wang Xizhe.
32. Ibid., 912; Rosen (1985, 45).
33. Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1985, 69).
34. Leese (2011, 243244).
35. A full translation of the essay is available in Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1985,
3285).
36. Ibid., 1013. Moody (1977, 209216) was one of the rst to summarize
the essay and provide an analysis.
37. Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1985, 1628), Rosen (1985).
38. Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1985, 1328) detail the subsequent careers of
the authors, who were arrested and imprisoned shortly after Maos death,
nally to be released from prison and exonerated in 1979.
39. Forster (1990, 164172), Teiwes and Sun (2007, 197199).
41. Ibid., 388391; Vogel (2011, 9798).
42. Vogel (2011, 121).
43. Ibid., 103109.
44. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 382387), Vogel (2011, 109114).
45. Forster (1990, 198219; 1992), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
386387).
324348), Vogel (2011, 125133, 137140).
47. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 363381, 388399) trace the shift in Maos atti-
tude in detail, and see the dispute over higher education at Tsinghua Uni-
versity, one of Maos favored model units, and the intervention of Maos
nephew Mao Yuanxin, a radical leader in Liaoning Province, as decisive
in crystallizing Maos views. See also MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006,
404412) and Vogel (2011, 140151).
49. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 416426).
50. Dong and Walder (2014), Forster (1990, 235242), Wang (1995, 258265).
51. Heilmann (1993, 1996), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 349352).
53. This account of the Nanjing events is based Dong and Walder (2014), Gar-
side (1981, 110114), and Louie and Louie (1981).
54. Louie and Louie (1981, 339); also Zweig (1978).
55. The account in these two paragraphs is based on Dong and Walder (2014).
56. Wu (2002, 22).
57. Yan and Gao (1996, 492).

58. Forster (1986).
59. Louie and Louie (1981).
60. This account is based on Teiwes and Sun (2004; 2007, 471475) and Mac-
Farquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 422427). See also Garside (1981, 115
135) and Yan and Gao (1996, 492501).
61. Garside (1981, 127).
62. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 489).
64. Heilmann (1994, 4653), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 431432).
65. Dong and Walder (2014), Forster (1990), MacFarquhar and Schoenhals
(2006, 434).
66. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 551552), Vogel (2011, 174175).
67. Teiwes and Sun (2007, 536568, 572579).
68. Ibid., 570571.
69. Ibid., 579580.
70. Ibid., 584585. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 443449) offer an
account of the planning and the arrest that differs only in details.
71. Quoted in Teiwes and Sun (2007, 595).
72. Quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 3).
14. The Mao Era in Retrospect
1. Quoted in Lardy and Lieberthal (1983, xi).

2. Banister (1984, 254), Henderson (1993).
4. Calculated from data in Figure14.1.
6. The data in this paragraph and the next are from http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
7. Walder (1986, 195).
8. Ibid., 179186, 194205.
10. Walder (1986, 194196).
11. Riskin (1987, 249).
12. The Soviet Union and Eastern Eu rope had long since become predomi-
nantly urban economies, and without the enormous rural population of
China, they had never exercised similarly strict control over population
movements. The freer movement of the population reduced income dif-
ferences between rural and urban populations.
13. World Bank (1983, 101), adjusting Chinas 1979 gures for the 19 percent
increase over 1977.
14. Oi (2008, 3).
15. Mitter (2013, 56).
16. Davies and Wheatcroft (2004, 414415). Based on an estimated Soviet pop-
ulation of 150 million in 1933, the famines death toll ranged from 3.8 to
5.7 percent of the population. Chinas 30 million famine deaths represented
4.6 percent of a population of 653 million. The estimates for the Soviet
famine range so widely because, unlike China, the Soviet Union had no
census for the period preceding and immediately following the event,
forcing historians to rely on extrapolations from incomplete archival
records.
17. Walder (2014).
18. The death toll of the Cultural Revolution is roughly of the same magni-
tude as Stalins great terror of 19371938, during which an estimated
800,000 to 1.2 million died. However, due to the large differences in the
base populations, the Soviet gures represent a death rate due to political
persecution that is at least ve times that of China during the Cultural
Revolution (ibid.).
19. Walder (1991).
20. Teiwes and Sun (2011; 2013).
21. See Baum (1994).
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Index
Aeronautics Institute, 21920, 221, 225, Beijing Commune, 230, 240

230, 265 Beijing Garrison Command, 230, 312
agriculture: and de-Stalinization, 136, 137; Beijing General Knitting Mill, 27879
diversion of labor from, 158, 160, 174; and Beijing Municipal Party Committee, 186,
export of grain, 173; and grain procure- 187, 193, 199
ment, 53, 171, 172, 322; and grain Beijing Normal Girls High School, 214, 215
production, 154, 15760, 16364, 17074, Beijing Normal University, 230, 258, 265
332, 333; and grain rationing, 54, 57, 58, Beijing Revolutionary Committee, 230, 259,
95; and Great Leap, 153, 15455, 15761, 260, 262, 264, 318
17071, 178, 316; and income inequal ity, Beijing Textile Factory, 280
33132; and Mao Zedong Thought, 338; Beria, Lavrentiy, 128
methods in, 16061; private plots in, 182, Berlin Wall, 125
184, 188; and retreat from Great Leap, bicycles, 85, 93, 96, 118, 328, 331
180, 181, 183, 184; and socialist economy, Bierut, Bolesaw, 130, 131
86, 321, 322, 332, 333; state control of, birth control campaigns, 79
5660; statistics on, 17071; subsistence, black market, 58. See also barter trade
8, 14, 58, 333; targets for, 15455. See also Bolsheviks, 25, 26
collectivization; peasants; rural areas border regions, 105, 148, 350n102.
All- China Federation of Trade Unions, 70 See also minority nationalities
Anhui, 164, 251, 253 Boxer Uprising (1900), 23
anti-Japanese resistance. See Japa nese Bo Yibo, 222
invasion Buddhism, 67, 353n24
Anti May16 Elements (fan wu yao liu fenzi) Bukharin, Nikolai, 26, 154
campaign, 284, 298 Bulgaria, 12526, 331
Antirightist Campaign (1957), 910, 14851, bureaucracy: and barter trade, 88; and
185, 316; and Cultural Revolution, 211; CCP,xii, 2, 27, 40, 100, 123; and civil war,
and Great Leap, 152, 153, 156, 160, 175, 16, 27; and class categories, 108; and
178 Cultural Revolution, 122, 200, 201,
April 6 directive, 24445, 246, 248 2025, 285, 320; and de-Stalinization,
April22 faction, 257, 258, illus. 1517 121, 127; and economy, 81, 9899, 123,
340; and employment, 63, 79, 358n48;
Bangladesh, 333 and Great Leap, 156, 15869, 174; and
barter trade, 87, 8889, 93, 176 labor reform, 263, 27071; and Mao, 89,
Beijing: CCP takeover of, 35; and cleansing 81, 121, 340; and Mao Zedong Thought,
campaign, 27172; and Cultural 335, 339, 34041; militarized, 39;
Revolution, 19697, 202; and One Strike, Nationalist, 80; rural, 5657, 59, 15859;
Three Anti campaign, 283; and Qingming self-deception of, 15962; Soviet model
protests, 30810; rebel factions in, of, 80, 81, 12021, 123, 174, 201, 340;
25862; Red Guards in, 206, 223, 22930, traditional Chinese, 48, 79, 80; urban, 62,
235; religious sects in, 67 63, 7881
400 Index
cadres: abuses by, 47; and Antirightist revolutionary committees, 24344, 255;
Campaign, 149; in civil war, 27, 3334; and students, 213, 214, 215, 219, 22829;
class backgrounds of, 29; and collectiviza- and worker rebels, 232, 233, 235; and
tion, 55, 56, 59, 352n55; and Cultural Wuhan Incident, 250
Revolution, 200, 291; and death of Lin Central Party Work Conference (October
Biao, 286; vs. experts, 17475; in Great 1966), 222
Leap, 152, 15556, 15859, 161, 16465, Changchun (Manchuria), 35
16869, 17475; and Hundred Flowers, charities, private, 64, 77
138, 13940, 141, 14748, 205; and Chen Boda, 365n4, 367n4, illus. 10; and
information, 11819; and labor unions, CCRG, 202, 203; and Cultural Revolution,
70; and land reform, 33; after Lin Biao, 19798, 199, 22223, 261; after Lin Biao,
288; and Mao Zedong Thought, 336; and 290; and Mao Zedong Thought, 2627,
Party discipline, xi, 2425, 3839; and 197, 290
political campaigns, 52, 271, 274, 306; Cheng Haiguo (Lin Xiling), 14344, 361n66
privileges of, 59, 11719; purges of, 25, Chen Yiyang, 374n31
2728, 120, 136, 159; and Qingming Chen Yun, 154, 156, 319
protests, 311; ranking system for, 11719; Chen Zaidao, 24748, 249, 250
and rectication campaigns, 28, 29, 120, Chiang Kai-shek: and1927 purge of CCP,
135, 137, 193, 197, 199, 203, 337; 3, 15, 22, 44, 45, 68; on CCP discipline,
rehabilitation of, 29395, 296; and 2324; in civil war, 16, 31, 32, 33, 34,
religious sects, 67; restrictions on, 11920; 35; and Green Gang, 68; and Japa nese
revolutionary, 101, 113, 115; rural, 5152, invasion, 19, 20, 2224; and land reform,
59, 61, 16869; in Second Cultural 41, 51; Mao on, 313; and minority
Revolution, 29798; vs. secret societies, nationalities, 3637; personality cult
6869; and Socialist Education Move- of, 26; in Taiwan, 2324
ment, 18990, 191; in universities, 210; Chinese Academy of Sciences, 304
urban, 61, 63, 270; in USSR, 25, 26, 27 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 305
Campaign to Eliminate Counterrevolution Chinese Communist Party (CCP): 1927
(1955), 135, 137 purge of, 3, 15, 22, 44, 45, 68; 1949
Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolution victory of, 2, 4, 1539; and anti-Japanese
(19501951), 49, 69, 77, 106, 124, 142; in resistance, 6, 1516, 17, 18, 1922, 27,
rural areas, 5253; in urban areas, 62, 64, 100; and Antirightist Campaign, 151;
6566 backlash against, 12351; and bureau-
capitalism: and class struggle, 26, 72, 228; cracy, xii, 2, 27, 40, 100, 123; and civil
global, xii, 17, 342; and Mao, 8, 11, 188, war, 15, 1619, 3839, 100, 123; and
338, 340, 341; market- oriented state, 344; cleansing campaign, 272; and Cultural
and science, 75, 99; and socialist Revolution, 13, 19599, 201, 2025, 214,
economy, 89, 91, 99, 186, 322; Stalin on, 314, 316, 367n3; and Deng Xiaoping,
55; in USSR, 194, 195; weaknesses of, 84, 3023; discipline in, xi, 2329, 31, 3839,
85, 90 120; and economy, 60, 99, 155, 327;
Catholic Church, 47, 53, 64, 73, 131 evolution of, 100122; explanations for
CCP. See Chinese Communist Party victory of, 1619; in Great Leap, 15962,
censorship, 64, 127, 13435, 140, 142, 186 320; hierarchy of, 1014; and Hundred
Central Case Examination Group, 2045, Flowers, 13948, 149, 210; and January
271, 272 Revolution, 237; and Khrushchevs secret
Central Committee: and Cultural Revolu- speech, 130; and labor unions, 7071;
tion, 201, 202, 203, 205, 212, 265, 294; loyalty to, 11217; and Mao, 8, 102, 278,
and Great Leap, 16566, 168, 182; and 314, 315, 344; and Mao Zedong Thought,
Qingming protests, 306, 307, 308 335, 336, 33738; militarization of, 16, 19;
Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG), and Nationalists, 34, 15, 19, 22, 23, 27,
2023; and Anti May16 campaign, 284; 31, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 68, 100; and North
and attacks on military, 251, 252, 253; Korea, 130; organ i zational structure of,
backlash against, 22429; and Hei- xi, 6, 8, 23, 100122, 102; and post-Mao
longjiang, 239; and January Revolution, reform, 3023, 343; post-victory status in,
237, 238; after Lin Biao, 288, 290; and 100101; Propaganda Department of, 186,
PLA, 24344; and power seizures, 240, 193, 199, 202; purges within, 25, 2728,
241; purges of, 317; and rebel factions, 120, 136, 159, 200201; rebuilding of, 14,
245, 246, 247, 249, 259, 317; and Red 293, 294, 304, 318; and Rectication
Guards, 2057, 22030, 231; and Campaign, 2829, 31; and Red Guard
Index 401
factions, 223, 229; and religious sects, 67; 17, 4045, 61, 347n8 (ch.2), 351n24; Mao
in rural areas, 15, 20, 24, 5153, 52, 61, on, 4243, 188; in Mao Zedong Thought,
100, 103104, 106, 350n86, 351n25; 335, 33637, 339, 340, 341; within Party,
secret ser vice of, 29; Secretariat of, 193, 26, 188; in post-Stalin USSR, 121; and
203, 211; and Socialist Education science, 72, 7475; and Sino-Soviet split,
Movement, 18993; and Soviet model, 194; under socialism, 6, 151, 181, 189,
8081, 82; Stalinization of, 25, illus. 1; 337; and Socialist Education Movement,
student attacks on, 20713; surveillance 189, 191, 193; and socialist transforma-
by, 1046; in urban areas, 43, 6162, 100, tion, 14849
103, 104, 106; and USSR, 67, 1516, 25, Cleansing of the Class Ranks (qingli jieji
100; and worker rebels, 232, 234, 236; in duiwu), 12, 27177, 318, illus. 1314;
Yanan, 67, 16, 19, 25, 2731, 34, 38, 120. criticism of, 294, 300; death rates in, 275,
See also bureaucracy; cadres; Politburo, 276, 277, 334; and Mao cult, 28182; and
CCP Mao Zedong Thought, 341; and One
Chinese Communist Party, membership in, Strike, Three Anti campaign, 28384
15, 100101, 270, 358n25; and class collectivization, 7, 5360, 86, 12324; and
categories, 107, 108, 110, 112; Dengs agricultural cooperatives, 54, 55, 93;
review of, 303; and discipline, xi, 2425, bonded labor in, 57; and Great Leap, 153,
3839, 120; and education, 11213; and 154, 156, 15758, 163, 180, 181; and
elites, 8, 104, 108; and Hundred Flowers, household registration, 77; and Hundred
142, 144; incentives for, 8, 116, 12021; of Flowers, 14748, 315; and industry,
peasants, 103, 104; and political activism, 5758; and land reform, 53, 56, 123; and
11516, 117; recruitment for, 1068, 117; living standards, 5859, 333; of manufac-
and Second Cultural Revolution, 296, 297 turing, 62, 63; and Mao, 5455, 188; and
Chongqing, 3, 20, 35, 251 Mao Zedong Thought, 338; and orga ni za-
Christianity, 60, 67, 73. See also Catholic tion of communes, 5657; and peasants,
Church 40, 53, 57, 59; in Poland, 131, 132; and
civil war (19451949), 3135; and CCP, post-Mao reform, 343; rapid completion
15, 1619, 3839, 100, 123; and class of, 5556; resistance to, 9, 56, 352n55;
categories, 110; end of, 3537, 38; vs. and rural economy, 5659, 60; of ser vice
Great Leap, 174, 179; hyperin ation in, sector, 62, 63; and social structure, 5659;
32, 34; land reform in, 18, 33; legacies of, Soviet, 129, 178, 334; stages of, 352n55;
3839; Lin Biao in, 3132, 34, 35, 197; and state procurement system, 5760
and Mao Zedong Thought, 335; mass Communist Youth League, 9, 67, 106, 116,
mobilization in, 16, 31, 3334, 39, 151, 148
179, 201, 350n86; Nationalists in, 34, 15, Confucianism, 67
16, 18, 3135, 38; in rural areas, 18, 32, consumer goods, 85, 86, 93, 9497, 11819,
33, 38, 53, 351n25 324, 327; rationing of, 14, 328. See also
class labels: and Antirightist Campaign, living standards
15051; categories of, 10812, 113, 357n4; corruption, 59, 119, 159; attacks on, 62,
and CCP membership, 107, 108, 110, 112; 7677, 80; and Maos legacy, 344; of
and cleansing campaign, 274; and college Nationalists, 68, 80; and One Strike,
recruitment, 269; couplet on, 215; in Three Anti campaign, 283; and Socialist
Cultural Revolution, 210, 21517, 223; Education Movement, 189, 190, 191
and gender, 112; and Great Leap, 169, 181; crime: campaigns against, 53, 62, 321; drug
and Hundred Flowers, 145; inheritance of, and sex trades, 7, 62, 6970, 80, 321; Mao
111, 113; and land reform, 47, 49; vs. on, 41; rural, 60; suppression of, 7, 49,
meritocracy, 11315; and opportunities, 6365, 67, 68, 80; and traditional local
11217; and punishment, 270, 298; and government, 48; urban, 6364
Rectication Campaign, 29; and Red criticism/self-criticism: in Cultural
Guards, 227, 229; registration of, 63 Revolution, 193, 198, 247, 249; and Great
class struggle: and Antirightist Campaign, Leap, 156, 162, 181; and intellectuals,
150, 151; and capitalism, 26, 72, 228; and 7172, 73; and military control, 264, 290;
class categories, 109; and Communist and revolutionary committees, 255, 256.
victory, 1718; and de-Stalinization, 127, See also struggle sessions
137; in East Germany, 125; and Great Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius campaign,
Leap, 152, 153, 155, 163, 166, 167, 168, 295302
180, 181; and Hundred Flowers, 139, 144; Criticize Lin Biao campaign, 288, 28993,
and intellectuals, 185; and land reform, 295, 296
402 Index
Cultural Revolution, Great Proletarian 182, 184; and Socialist Education

(19661976), 45, 1013, 200262, illus. Movement, 193
712; accomplishments of, 302, 304, Deng Zihui, 55, 154
31617; and bureaucracy, 122, 200, 201, de-Stalinization, 150, 197; and bureaucracy,
2025, 285, 320; campaign against, 121, 127; and Mao, 128, 134, 13536, 137;
31314; and CCP, 13, 19599, 201, 2025, and personality cult, 9, 127, 128, 137, 194,
214, 314, 316, 367n3; criticism of, 286, 195; and Sino-Soviet split, 11, 194; in
29193, 296, 298, 299301, 306; death Soviet bloc, 11, 12528, 151
rates in, 317, 334, 368n31, 376n18; and Ding Ling, 28, 134
Dengs reforms, 305; and economy, 97, 99, dossiers, personal, 63, 94, 104, 105, 116,
321, 322, 326; and Gang of Four, 1, 341; 135; and CCP membership, 107; and class
and Great Leap, 97, 99, 162; high school categories, 10910
students in, 21319; vs. Hundred Flowers, drug trade, 7, 62, 69, 80, 321
21011; leadership purges in, 200201; Du Yuesheng, 68
and Lin Biao, 287, 29394; local govern-
ment in, 23336; and Mao, 1112, 82, Earth (rebel faction), 25859, 261
26061, 313, 31718; and Mao Zedong Eastern Eu rope: and China, 80, 83; collapse
Thought, 201, 285, 336, 337, 339; Maos of communism in, 343; economy of, 97,
preparations for, 19599; mass mobiliza- 154, 186, 325, 326, 356n20; and Great
tion in, 201, 20513, 23233, 316, 332; Leap, 157; income inequal ity in, 331; and
origins of, 18099; and PLA, 4, 12, 198, Khrushchevs secret speech, 12829, 130,
220, 235, 316; and popu lar protests, 5, 11, 151; post-Stalin, 12528; uprisings in,
13, 318; and Qingming protests, 309, 311; 136, 148
regional power seizures in, 23942; East Germany (German Democratic
reversal of, 26386; and Socialist Republic), 104, 125, 126, 147
Education Movement, 191, 192, 208, East Wind (rebel faction), 247, 25152, 275
209; souvenirs from, 344; students in, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR
11, 12, 13, 21319, 231, 317; unintended (Stalin), 5455
outcomes of, 319; universities in, 115, economy, market: demand-restrained,
20713; and USSR, 10, 13, 194, 195, 205, 8991; depression in, 83, 84, 176,
233; violence in, 21011, 212, 368n31; 178; and de-Stalinization, 128; global,
workers in, 4, 11, 205, 23133, 234, 259, xii, 17, 123, 342; inequal ity in, 93, 119,
261, 263, 285, 317; and Zhou Enlai, 13, 331; and Mao Zedong Thought, 89, 338,
198, 295. See also Central Cultural 340; and post-Mao reform, 325, 342,
Revolution Group; factions, rebel; Red 344; rural, 56, 58, 181, 182, 333; vs.
Guards socialist economy, xii, 89, 356n20
Cultural Revolution Bulletin, 206 economy, socialist, 8299; and Antirightist
Czechoslovak ia, 126, 147, 331, 356n21 Campaign, 150, 151; and bureaucracy, 81,
9899; and consumer austerity, 9497;
Dalai Lama, 37 depression in, 1314, 176, 17879, 181;
Daoism, 67 and de-Stalinization, 12728; disruptions
Darwin, Charles, 74 of, 3012; export-oriented, 14; aws of,
democracy, 27, 71, 73, 121, 145, 166, 167, 9799; GDP of, 32126; and Great Leap,
227; socialist, 144, 299301 97, 99, 159, 16465, 167, 168, 17879,
democracy movements, 286, 289, 299, 301, 18384, 186, 316, 32022, 326, 328;
343 growth of, 8386, 91; hoarding in, 8889,
democracy walls, 142, 146, 149, 90, 98, 159, 16465, 167, 168, 182,
343 355n16; income inequal ity in, 33032;
Deng Tuo, 139, 187 under Mao, 315, 31926; and Mao Zedong
Deng Xiaoping: backlash against, 3045; Thought, 338, 339; vs. market economy,
campaign against, 306, 308, 311; and xii, 89, 356n20; market mechanisms in,
civilian control, 295; in Cultural 89, 98, 99, 186, 304; and mass mobiliza-
Revolution, 200, 203, 204, 209, 211, 212, tion, 79, 9899, 151; and political loyalty,
223; demotion of, 13; and economy, 302; 155; price controls in, 86, 9495;
in Hundred Flowers, 138; and Mao, 11, productive vs. unproductive investment
3025, 312; and post-Mao reform, 318, in, 8486, 94; recovery of, 185, 3025,
342; and Qingming protests, 31011; and 304, 318; reforms of, 302, 311, 325,
Red Guard dissidents, 228; rehabilitation 34143; resource- constrained, 8991,
of, 29495; and retreat from Great Leap, 173, 176; scientic management of, 9798,
Index 403
99; Stalin on, 55; and worker rebels, 235, 247, 249, 259, 317; and cleansing
236. See also Soviet model, economic campaign, 274, 27576; Earth, 25859,
economy, traditional: and collectivization, 261; East Wind, 247, 25152, 275; Heaven,
5659, 60; hyperination in, 32, 34, 70; 25859, 261; after Lin Biao, 28889; and
and land reform, 4951; rural, 53, 5659, Mao, 26061, 31718; and military
60; socialist transformation of, xii, 61, control, 26366; Million Heroes, 248,
14849, 352n49; urban, 61, 62, 79 24950; and One Strike, Three Anti
education: and CCP, 101, 108, 123; and class campaign, 283; and PLA, 24249, 25758,
categories, 108, 109; and Cultural 261; Red Flag, 247, 25152, 275, 299; vs.
Revolution, 215; Dengs restoration of, Red Guards, 223; Red Storm, 370n32; in
302, 305; foreign, 211; and Hundred Second Cultural Revolution, 296, 29798,
Flowers, 140, 142; and Mao, 374n47; and 301; suppression of, 26367; United
opportunity, 116; and political activism, Command, 257, 258; United Headquar-
116; and political loyalty, 11214; and ters, 370n32; and violence, 24549,
post-Mao reform, 343; in work units, 92, 25961; and weapons, 251, 25355, 275,
117. See also high schools; students; 317, 334; and workers, 259, 261, 263, 317
universities famine: and civil war, 32, 47; death rates
Eighth Route Army, 2022 from, 33334, 364n63, 365n64, 376n16;
Eleventh Plenum, 214 and Great Leap, 4, 10, 159, 16164,
elites, political: and CCP, 8, 104, 108; and 16973, 178, 181, 182, 184, 316, 320,
class categories, 109; in Mao Zedong 376n16; in Henan (1943), 334; in USSR,
Thought, 336, 339; privileges of, 118. 5556, 124, 334, 365n82, 376n16
See also Chinese Communist Party, Feng Xuefeng, 134
membership in nancial sector, 76, 84, 86, 87, 89
elites, traditional rural, 59, 11415; Five Anti campaign, 62
destruction of, 7, 40, 80; and land reform, Five-Year Plans, 83, 154
4142, 45, 46, 60; and local government, foreigners, 64, 105, 106, 328, 343
48 Fourth Machine Building Ministry, 234
elites, urban, 7, 77 Frontline (journal), 187
employment: bureaucratization of, 63, 79,
358n48; and class categories, 108; Party Gang of Four, 1, 292, 31213, 319, 341,
control of, 101; and political activism, 116; 370n16. See also Jiang Qing; Wang
and rebel leaders, 26869; in state Hongwen; Yao Wenyuan; Zhang
enterprises, 90, 91, 92 Chunqiao
examinations: civil ser vice, 48; college GDP (gross domestic product), 32126
entrance, 207, 26768, 269 General Line for the Transition Period
experts: and class categories, 109, 110; (Mao Zedong), 53, 82
economic, 322, 327; foreign, 7273, 343; Geng Jinzhang, 238
and Great Leap, 154, 155, 17475, 180, Geology, Ministry of, 21920, 221
185, 320; after Lin Biao, 288; and Mao, Geology Institute East Is Red, 21920, 221,
99, 279, 321, 338, 340; professional, 109, 228, 230, 258, 265
110, 117, 121, 137, 142; rehabilitation of, Germany, 7, 32, 73, 83. See also East
182, 302, 343 Germany
Ger, Ern, 132, 133
factionalism: after Lin Biao, 28889, 290; Ge Yang, 361n62
and Mao Zedong Thought, 338; and Maos Gomuka, Wadysaw, 131, 132
legacy, 315; in Nationalist Party, 23, 31; Gottwald, Klement, 126
and Qingming protests, 311; among Red government: in Cultural Revolution, 45,
Guards, 209, 21213, 215, 21822, 223, 23336; local, 4549, 52, 23336; Party
229, 230, 317; in Socialist Education control of, 1014; traditional, 48. See also
Movement, 367n48, 369n8; among bureaucracy
students, 21213; suppression of, 302, Great Depression, 83, 84
303, 304; among workers, 23336, 237, Great Leap Forward (19581960), 15279,
23839, 369n8; and Wuhan Incident, 250 197, 199; accountability for, 18285; and
factions, rebel (zaofan pai), 45, 11, 12, 13, agriculture, 153, 15455, 15761, 17071,
367n48; and Anti May16 campaign, 284, 178, 316; and Antirightist Campaign, 152,
285; April22, 257, 258, illus. 1517; in 153, 156, 160, 175, 178; and bureaucracy,
Beijing, 25862; and campaign against 156, 15869, 174; CCP in, 15962, 320;
restorationism, 306; and CCRG, 245, 246, class struggle in, 152, 153, 155, 163, 166,
404 Index
Great Leap Forward (continued) high schools, 267, 270; in Cultural

167, 168, 180, 181; and cleansing campaign, Revolution, 21319, 221, 225, 226
282; and collectivization, 56, 153, 154, Hinton, William, 4647, 52
156, 15758, 163, 180, 181; communal History of the Communist Party of the Soviet
mess halls in, 157, 158, 180; construction Union (Short Course), 2526, 54, 55, 82,
projects in, 15758, 160; and Cultural 154, 167, 335, 337
Revolution, 97, 99, 162; death rates in, Hong Kong, 49, 72, 342; GDP of, 322, 325
33334, 364n63, 365n64; demographic household registration system, 62, 63, 104,
impact of, 16970; and economy, 97, 99, 110, 145, 332; in urban areas, 64, 7778,
159, 16465, 167, 168, 17879, 18384, 234
186, 316, 32022, 326, 328; false reporting housing, 14, 85; and industrialization, 86,
in, 10, 159, 16164, 167, 168, 182; and 324; and living standards, 327, 329; and
famine, 4, 10, 159, 161164, 169173, Party status, 101, 118; rationing of, 9596;
178, 181, 182, 184, 316, 320, 376n16; and Soviet model, 233; and state
and household registration, 78; and enterprises, 9091, 9293; urban, 356n25
industry, 15355, 157, 158, 160, 17378, Hua Guofeng, 1, 305, 311, 312, 313, 31819,
180, 323, 362n3; and Mao, 82, 160, 163, 342
164, 168, 174, 178, 337, 339, 341; mass Hubei, 247, 258, 271
mobilization in, 154, 155, 167, 17374, Hu Feng, 128, 134
179, 316, 332; oppression in, 16269; Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Clique
origins of, 15357; retreat from, 18088; campaign, 134, 137, 142, 143
self- deception in, 15962; and Sino- Hui (Chinese Muslims), 37
Soviet split, 193; and Soviet model, Hunan, 3, 21, 43, 183, 265
15357, 180; statistics on, 162, 17071; Hundred Flowers Campaign (1957), 9, 10,
targets in, 15657, 159; unintended 13548; backlash against, 14851; and
outcomes of, 277, 316, 319; in urban CCP, 13948, 149, 210; and collectiviza-
areas, 171, 173, 184; violence in, 162, tion, 14748, 315; vs. Cultural Revolution,
16465 21011; and intellectuals, 75, 14041,
Green Gang, 68 142; and Mao, 137, 138, 139, 14546, 150,
Guan Feng, 203, 225, 284 339; open-door vs. closed-door rectica-
Guangdong, 271, 351n2; cleansing tion in, 13739, 146, 148, 149, 150, 205;
campaign in, 275; Cultural Revolution in, popu lar response to, 13948; and retreat
24142, 258; in Great Leap, 164; land from Great Leap, 185, 186, 187; and Soviet
reform in, illus. 34; socialist transforma- model, 140, 143, 210, 211; in universities,
tion in, 4849, 148 14347; and workers, 140, 142, 147, 148,
Guangxi, 21, illus. 1517; Cultural Revolution 315
in, 25758, 258, 267 Hundred Flowers speech (Mao; 1956), 137,
Guangzhou, 146, 298; Cultural Revolution 139
in, 243, 24647, 248, 25152; Nationalists Hungary, 342, 356n20, 359n27; and
in, 35; Second Cultural Revolution in, de-Stalinization, 127, 128; and Hundred
299, 301 Flowers, 138, 139, 144; Soviet model in,
Guangzhou Military Region, 25152, 299 98, 128; uprisings in, 131, 13234
guerrilla warfare, 7, 1621, 31, 39 Hu Qiaomu, 365n4
Guizhou, 5253, 66, 240 Hu Shi, 72
Hai Rui Scolds the Emperor (Wu Han), Ichigo Campaign, 21

18788 India: economy of, 321, 322, 324, 326, 333;
Han Aijing, 265 income inequal ity in, 330, 331, 332; and
Han Chinese, 36, 37 Tibet, 36, 37
Hangzhou, 65, 199, 303, 306; Cultural Indonesia, 321, 322, 324, 330, 331, 332, 333
Revolution in, 248, 252, 370n32; and industry: and collectivization, 5758;
Qingming protests, 308, 311; Second and contract law, 88; and Cultural
Cultural Revolution in, 29697, 301 Revolution, 247; depression in, 176; and
health care, 32021 de-Stalinization, 127, 136, 137; in East
Heaven (rebel faction), 25859, 261 Germany, 126; end of private, 7677;
Heilongjiang, 3, 241, illus. 6, 1114; Cultural and Great Leap, 15355, 157, 158, 160,
Revolution in, 239, 240, 242, 243 17378, 180, 323, 362n3; heavy, 82, 85,
Henan, 21, 158, 168, 169, 271; famine in, 91, 154, 157, 32223, 356n20; hoarding
334; violence in, 243, 363n43 mentality in, 8889; incentives in, 182,
Index 405
195; joint state-private ownership in, 79; committee of, 25557, 285; in Second
and living standards, 86, 97, 324, 32627; Cultural Revolution, 29798
and Mao, 315, 320, 321, 338; market Jiangsu Party Committee, 240, 245
mechanisms in, 304; modernization of, Jiangxi Soviet, 15, 20, 25, 28, 45, 348n10
302; nationalization of, 62, 123, 127, 128, Ji Dengkui, 373n11
32728; orga ni zation of, 8689; output of, juche (self-reliance; North Korea), 130
177, 183, 32324; quantity vs. quality in, June18 incident (1966), 21012
17576; rural, 5758, 158, 160, 174, 178;
and Second Cultural Revolution, 301; in Kang Sheng, 367n4, illus. 10; and cleansing
socialist economy, 8586, 356n20; and campaign, 27374; and Cultural
Socialist Education Movement, 191; Revolution, 197, 198, 199, 203, 204, 208,
socialist transformation of, 54, 61, 79, 215, 227, 256, 261; and de-Stalinization,
125, 153; Soviet model of, 8283, 86, 91, 137; and Rectication Campaign, 29, 30;
124, 233, 234; surveillance system in, and Sino-Soviet split, 19495; and
105; uprisings in, 147. See also state Socialist Education Movement, 192, 193
enterprises; workers Khrushchev, Nikita, 9, 10, 127, 195, 320;
Inner Mongolia, 36, 37, 243 criticism of Stalin by, 364n46; and
Inner Mongolian Peoples Party, 272 Hungary, 133; and Mao, 15354, 292,
intellectuals: and Antirightist Campaign, 33839, illus. 5; and North Korea, 130;
149, 150; attacks on, 29, 62, 7175, 124, and Poland, 132; removal of, 190; and
134; CCP control of, 123; and CCP Socialist Education Movement, 190.
membership, 108; and class categories, See also secret speech
109, 110; criticism/self- criticism of, 7172, Kick Aside the CCRG and Make Revolution
73; and de-Stalinization, 127; and on Your Own (wall poster), 225
Hundred Flowers, 75, 14041, 142; and Kim Il Sung, 130
labor reform, 269, 27071; and Mao, 336, Korean War (19501953), 52, 64, 67, 73, 80,
344; in Poland, 131; and retreat from 82, 123
Great Leap, 180, 181, 182, 18588; in Kornai, Jnos, 89
urban areas, 61; and USSR, 7275; in Kuai Dafu, 222, 22930, 258, 259, 260, 261,
Yanan, 27 265
Internal Reference (neibu cankao), 118, 146,
206 labor reform: and Campaign to Suppress
Islam, 67 Counterrevolution, 65, 66; criticism of,
291, 294; and Cultural Revolution, 263,
January Revolution (Shanghai), 12, 23639, 265, 267, 269, 27071; and Hundred
317 Flowers, 148; and political campaigns,
Japan: economy of, 13, 322, 325, 326, 342, 135, 150; in rural areas, 267, 269; in
356n21; income inequal ity in, 331; land USSR, 127
reform in, 51, 333; surrender of, 15 labor unions: and CCP, 7071; in Cultural
Japa nese invasion: and CCP, 6, 1516, 17, Revolution, 232, 234, 247; vs. gangs, 68;
18, 1922, 27, 100; and civil war, 3, 32; and Hundred Flowers, 147; and Second
and class categories, 110, 111; and Cultural Revolution, 297; and secret
cleansing campaign, 27273; collabora- societies, 6869
tors with, 66; death toll of, 334; Mao on, Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste, 74
313; military impact of, 1922; and landlords, 72, 110, illus. 34; and cleansing
Nationalists, 15, 1924; political impact campaign, 274; and collectivization, 53;
of, 2224, 31; in urban areas, 64 and Great Leap, 168, 169; and land
Jiang Qing, 28, 370n16, illus. 10; arrest of, reform, 45, 47, 50, 51; Mao on, 41, 42
1, 312; and cleansing campaign, 274; land reform, illus. 34; in civil war, 18, 33;
criticism of, 306, 307; and Cultural and class labels, 47, 49, 109; as class
Revolution, 199, 203, 214, 215, 227, 253, struggle, 17, 4045, 61, 347n8 (ch.2),
261; and literature and art, 196; and 351n24; and collectivization, 53, 56, 123;
Qingming protests, 30910; and Second and Communist victory, 17; death toll of,
Cultural Revolution, 301; on violence, 217 334; economic impact of, 4951; in Japan,
Jiangsu: and Anti May16 campaign, 51, 333; and landlords, 45, 47, 50, 51; and
28485; attacks on military in, 251, 252; living standards, 333; and local elites,
Cultural Revolution in, 240, 241, 245, 4142, 45, 46, 60; and military control,
246; Hundred Flowers in, 148; military 4041, 4647; and Nationalists, 4142,
control in, 253, 266, 267; revolutionary 45, 51; political impact of, 4549; and
406 Index
land reform (continued) Manchuria, 36, 62; in civil war, 4, 1516,

religious sects, 67; and rural elites, 4142, 19, 3132, 33, 34, 35; conventional
45, 46, 60; violence in, 33, 46, 47, 5051, warfare in, 83; Japa nese invasion of, 3;
52, 211 mass mobilization in, 98, 100, 179;
Li, Huaiyin, 59 Nationalists in, 4, 22
Liao Mosha, 187 manufacturing: collectivization of, 62, 63;
Liaoning, 3, 258 household, 58, 343. See also industry
Liberation Army Daily, 206 Mao Yuanxin, 310, 312, 374n47
Li Lisan, 70 Mao Zedong, illus. 1, 5, 8, 9; and anti-
Lin Biao, illus. 9; aftermath of death of, 5, Japanese resistance, 2021; and Anti-
286, 28889, 290, 318, 320; campaigns rightist Campaign, 151; and bureaucracy,
against, 13, 288, 28993, 295302; in civil 81, 121; and Campaign to Suppress
war, 3132, 34, 35, 197; and Cultural Counterrevolution, 65, 66; CCP verdict
Revolution, 196, 197, 198, 204, 261, 287, on, 314; and CCRG, 203; in civil war, 3,
29394; death of, 5, 13, 286, 287, 289, 31, 3435, 38, 39; and civilian control,
306; and Mao, 1213, 197, 198, 244, 278, 294; on class struggle, 4243, 188, 335,
28788; and PLA, 197, 242, 287, 28990; 33637, 339, 340, 341; and cleansing
plot of, 1213, 312; and Qingming campaign, 272, 277; and collectivization,
protests, 308; and retreat from Great Leap, 5455; criticism of, 187, 286, 29193, 300,
183; and Zhou Enlai, 296 306, 373n11; as cultural icon, 34344;
Lin Biao system, 299300 and Cultural Revolution, 1112, 19599,
Lin Xiling (Cheng Haiguo), 14344, 31314; death of, 31112; and Deng
361n66 Xiaoping, 29495, 3025; and de-
literature, 28, 13435, 186, 196; and Stalinization, 128, 134, 13536, 137; and
Hundred Flowers, 141, 143 economy, 82, 89, 91, 9799, 315, 31926,
little red book (Quotations from Chairman 338, 339, 340; funeral for, 1; and Gang of
Mao Zedong), 197, 261, 287, 294 Four, 12; gift of mangoes from, 27981;
Liu Shaoqi: and Antirightist Campaign, and Great Leap, 82, 160, 163, 164, 168,
151; and civil war, 35; and cleansing 174, 178, 337, 339, 341; and high school
campaign, 274; on collectivization, 55; students, 21314; and Hundred Flowers,
and Cultural Revolution, 196, 199, 200, 137, 138, 139, 14546, 150, 339; and
204, 209, 211, 212, 222, 223, 228, 262; Hungary, 133; and January Revolution,
death of, 13, 294; demotion of, 223; and 237, 239; legacy of, xi, 5, 14, 31519; after
de-Stalinization, 137; and Great Leap, 10, Lin Biao, 289; and Lin Biao, 28788; and
181, 18284, 185; and Hundred Flowers, Liu Shaoqi, 10, 11, 18283, 368n18; and
138; and Mao, 10, 11, 18283, 368n18; Marxism, 2526, 27, 154, 202; and mass
and Party discipline, 23; and Socialist mobilization, 39, 320, 338; and military,
Education Movement, 18990, 191, 192, 198, 24245, 25258, 263, 264, 267, 278,
337 28990, 302; on minority nationalities,
living standards: and cadre rank, 11718; 37; and peasant revolution, 41, 43; on
criticisms of, 143, 293; and de- peoples war, 22; personal loyalty to,
Stalinization, 127, 128; and industrializa- 19698, 201, 202; and post-Stalin USSR,
tion, 86, 97, 324, 32627; and Mao, 315, 12122; and power seizures, 240; purges
321, 32630; post- Cultural Revolution, by, 27, 136; and Qingming protests,
1314; and post-Mao reform, 341; protests 31011; and rebel factions, 26061,
about, 233, 23435, 286, 289, 300, 317; 31718; and Rectication Campaign, 30;
rural, 5859, 333; and Soviet model, and Red Guards, 4, 11, 205, 207, 208,
32627; urban, 54, 9497, 32730, 331; in 22125, 228, 229, 231, 336, illus. 89; and
USSR, 320; and work units, 9394, 327 retreat from Great Leap, 18084, 187, 188;
Li Yizhe, 299, 374n31 and revolutionary committees, 255, 256;
Li Zhengtian, 374n31 and rural vs. urban revolution, 6162;
Long March, 15 and Second Cultural Revolution, 296,
Lu Dingyi, 198, 199 300, 3012; and Socialist Education
Luo Ruiqing, 198, 199 Movement, 19091; and Soviet model, 82,
Lu Ping, 193 91, 124, 315, 321, 335, 340, 341, 357n38;
Lushan Plenum (1959), 16567, 178, 183, and Stalin, 129, 136, 149, 166, 18485,
184, 187, 197 292; and Stalinism, 82, 84, 135, 316; and
Luzhou, 251 students, 212, 213; and unintended
Lysenko, Tro m, 7475, 354nn4749 outcomes, xii, 6, 9, 10, 277, 316, 319; and
Index 407
USSR, 1011; in USSR, 15354; on migration, rural-urban, 57, 77, 78, 332,
violence, 4344, 217, 224, 228; and 356n23, 375n12
women, 28; and worker rebels, 232, 233, military, CCP. See Eighth Route Army; New
235; and Wu Han, 188; and Wuhan Fourth Army; Peoples Liberation Army;
Incident, 24950; and Zhou Enlai, 11, Red Army
295, 318 military control committees, 263, 272, 278,
Mao Zedong, personality cult of, 27782, 286
319, illus. 2; and Chen Boda, 26, 197; and militias: local, 41, 44, 238, 239, 241;
cleansing campaign, 28182; and traditional, 48, 60; workers, 297, 3034,
de-Stalinization, 9, 127, 128, 137, 194, 30910
195; and Hundred Flowers, 9, 135, 136, Million Heroes (rebel faction), 248, 24950
137, 143, 144, 210; and Lin Biao, 13, 286, Ming dynasty, 3536
292; loyalty dance in, 12, 281; in Mao Ministry of Defense, 21920, 221
Zedong Thought, 124, 278, 33738, 339, minority nationalities, 3637, 105, 281
340; under military control, 263; and mobilization, mass: against bureaucracy,
retreat from Great Leap, 187; and reversal 122, 285; in civil war, 16, 31, 3334, 39,
of Cultural Revolution, 285; rituals of, 12, 151, 179, 201, 350n86; for conventional
27882, 294, 300; and Sino-Soviet split, warfare, 7, 1819, 3334, 83; in Cultural
194 Revolution, 201, 20513, 23233, 316,
Mao Zedong Thought, 33441, illus. 1; on 332; in Great Leap, 154, 155, 167, 17374,
bureaucracy, 335, 339, 34041; and Chen 179, 316; and Mao, 39, 320, 338; in rural
Boda, 2627, 197, 290; and Cultural areas, 46, 350n86; and socialist economy,
Revolution, 201, 285, 336, 337, 339; death 79, 9899, 151; and Socialist Education
toll of, 33334; and de-Stalinization, 137; Movement, 189; in urban areas, 62, 64,
on economy, 89, 338, 339, 340; on 353n4
experts, 99, 279, 321, 338, 340; and Mongolia, 35, 36, 37; plane crash in, 286,
intellectuals, 71, 72; and Lin Biao, 197; 289. See also Inner Mongolia
and Mao cult, 124, 278, 33738, 339, 340; More on the Historical Experience of the
vs. Marxism-Leninism, 335, 339; and Proletarian Dictatorship, 138
military control, 264; and propaganda mutual aid teams, 54, 55
teams, 262; and Stalinism, 335, 337, 338, Mu Xin, 203
339; and USSR, 337, 33839, 341; violence
in, 33536 Nagy, Imre, 127, 132, 133
markets, rural, 56, 58, 181, 182 Nanching (Guangdong), 4849
marriage, 79, 94, 96, 112 Nanjing: and Anti May16 campaign, 285;
martial law, 5, 12, 126, 133, 260, 343 and campaign against restorationism,
Marxism-Leninism: and class categories, 306; in Cultural Revolution, 240, 24546,
108; and Hundred Flowers, 138, 140, 145; 247, 248, 256; Cultural Revolution in,
and intellectuals, 71, 72; after Lin Biao, 243; Japa nese massacre in, 20; military
306; and Mao, 2526, 27, 154, 202; vs. control of, 24546, 258, 26667;
Mao Zedong Thought, 335, 339; and Nationalists in, 20, 23, 24, 35; Party
post-Mao reform, 342; vs. Soviet Committee of, 19192, 234; protests in,
revisionism, 195; on urban vs. rural 144, 146, 147; and Qingming protests,
revolution, 38, 41 307, 308, 309, 311; in Second Cultural
May 7 Cadre Schools, 201, 269, 27071, Revolution, 29799, 301
286, 294 Nanjing Military Region, 238, 241, 246,
May Fourth Movement (1919), 146, 211 253, 298
media, mass: and Cultural Revolution, 11, Nanjing University, 209, 307
206, 208, 247, 256; and Gang of Four, Nationalist Party (Guomindang; GMD): and
312; and Hundred Flowers, 140; and anti-Japanese resistance, 15, 1924; and
January Revolution, 237; and Khrush- CCP, 34, 15, 19, 22, 23, 27, 31, 41, 42, 43,
chevs secret speech, 130, 359n19; and 44, 45, 68, 100; in civil war, 34, 15, 16,
Mao cult, 279, 280; and military control, 18, 3135, 38; and class categories, 111;
264; and political campaigns, 305; and and cleansing campaign, 272, 274;
Qingming protests, 307; and Red Guards, collaborators with, 66; corruption of, 68,
11, 207, 216, 230. See also New China News 80; and Cultural Revolution, 205; factions
Agency; Peoples Daily in, 23, 31, 347n1 (ch.2); and gangs, 68;
Medvedev, ZhoresA., 354nn4749 and Great Leap, 168; and Hundred
Michurin,I.V., 74, 75, 354n49 Flowers, 141; and labor unions, 70; and
408 Index
Nationalist Party (continued) Peking University: and cleansing campaign,

land reform, 4142, 45, 51; and Mao 274; Cultural Revolution at, 2078, 226,
Zedong Thought, 335, 336, 337; military 230, 25859; faculty of, 269; Hundred
of, 2324, 32; and minority nationalities, Flowers at, 14344, 146, 211; June18
3637; and private charities, 77; in rural incident at, 21011; and military control,
areas, 4142, 45, 51, 61, 351n25; and 26465; and rebel factions, 25859; Red
secret societies, 67; and Socialist Guards at, 226, 230; Socialist Education
Education Movement, 191; and Stalin, 37; Movement at, 19293; wall posters at,
and underground communists, 205; illus. 7
underground operatives of, 53, 64, 65; in Peking University High School, 214, 215, 225
urban areas, 64; weaknesses of, 2224, 31 Peng Chong, 257
neighborhood organizations, 64, 7879, Peng Dehuai, 10, 180, 183, 197, 348n24; and
9697, 104 Great Leap, 166, 167; and Mao, 188, 198
New China News Agency, 118, 206, 312 Peng Pai, 351n2
New China Printing Plant, 27273 Peng Peiyun, 193
New Fourth Army, 2021, 22 Peng Zhen, 137, 187, 193; and Cultural
New York Times, 130 Revolution, 19899; and Hundred
Nie Yuanzi, 20810, 22930, 25961, Flowers, 138, 139
369n2; and cleansing campaign, 274; and Peoples Daily (newspaper), 214, 231, 250,
military control, 26465; and rebel 272, 280, 312
factions, 258; and Red Guard dissidents, Peoples Liberation Army (PLA): and April 6
226; and Socialist Education Movement, directive, 246, 247; attacks on, 25052;
192, 193 and Campaign to Suppress Counterrevo-
Ningxia Muslim Autonomous Region, 265 lution, 65; and CCRG, 24344; in civil
Ninth Party Congress (1969), 265, 282, 290, war, 3135; vs. civilian control, 293302,
294 304; in Cultural Revolution, 4, 12, 198,
Ninth Polemic (1964), 195 220, 235, 24249, 25758, 261, 316; and
Northern Expedition, 4142 death toll, 334; in Heilongjiang, 239; and
North Korea, 130 January Revolution, 238; and Jiang Qing,
Notes from Three Family Village (column; 196; and land reform, 4041; after Lin
Frontline), 187 Biao, 288; and Lin Biao, 197, 242, 287,
nuclear weapons, 3, 194 28990; and Mao, 198, 242, 24344, 245,
28990, 302; mass mobilization for,
Ochab, Edward, 131 1819, 31, 3334, 80; military control by,
One Strike, Three Anti (yida sanfan) 26386, 317; motivation vs. weaponry in,
campaign, 28384, 300 197; and political campaigns, 28283; and
On Socialist Democracy and the Legal power seizures, 240, 241, 24245, 246;
System (wall poster), 299301 and rebel factions, 24249, 25758, 261;
On the Correct Handling of Contradictions and Red Guards, 207, 218, 221; and
among the People (Mao), 13839, 14950 revolutionary committees, 230, 318; in
On the Historical Experience of the rural areas, 52, 61; and Second Cultural
Proletarian Dictatorship, 136, 138 Revolution, 298; size of, 100; in urban
On the Ten Great Relationships (Mao), areas, 62, 63; and Wuhan Incident, 24951
13637 personality cults: of Chiang Kai-shek, 26;
and de-Stalinization, 9, 127, 128, 137,
Pakistan, 279, 322, 331, 333 194, 195; in Eastern Eu rope, 125; of Kim
Pan Fusheng, 239, 241 Il Sung, 130; and Sino-Soviet split, 194; of
Paris Commune, 42 Stalin, 9, 26. See also Mao Zedong,
peasants: as bonded labor, 57; as CCP personality cult of
members, 103, 104; class categories of, Pet Circle, 132, 359n27
109, 110; and collectivization, 40, 53, 57, Philippines, 321, 322, 330, 331
59; and Cultural Revolution, 291; and Picket Corps, Western District, 21819, 220,
Great Leap, 154, 162, 186; and Hundred 22324, 227, 228, 229
Flowers, 14748; and land reform, 50, 60; Poland, 342; de-Stalinization in, 127, 128,
Mao on, 41, 43; and military control, 266; 130, 131; economy of, 356n21; and
nationalism of, 17; and revolution, 4045; Hundred Flowers, 144; and Khrushchevs
traditional morality of, 17; vs. urban secret speech, 130; uprisings in, 13132,
workers, 61. See also agriculture; rural 133, 147
areas police. See public security forces
Index 409
Politburo, CCP, 1012; and Cultural Rajk, Lszl, 132

Revolution, 202; and Lin Biao, 290; Rkosi, Mtys, 127, 132
radicals in, 306, 3078, 30910; and rationing: and cadre rank, 119; of consumer
Second Cultural Revolution, 301; goods, 14, 328; in East Germany, 125; of
Standing Committee of, 1, 102, 166, grain, 54, 57, 58, 95; and household
202, 204, 217; and Zhou Enlai, 295 registration, 77, 78; of housing, 9596;
population growth, 321, 322; vs. death rates, and income inequal ity, 332; methods of,
27577, 317, 33334, 364n63, 365n64, 9495; and neighborhood orga ni zation,
368n31, 376nn1618; and Great Leap, 79; urban, 63, 64; in USSR, 95
16970 rectication, open- vs. closed-door, 13739,
power seizures, 23942, 317; and PLA, 240, 146, 148, 149, 150, 205
241, 24245, 246; in Second Cultural Rectication Campaign (19421944), 25,
Revolution, 296; and Zhou Enlai, 240, 2731
241, 242, 246 Red Army: and class categories, 101, 110;
price controls, 86, 9495 and conventional warfare, 7, 16, 1819;
private sector, 7677, 93, 181, 32930, 342 and land reform, 4647; and Long March,
propaganda teams, 269, 304; and cleansing 15. See also Peoples Liberation Army
campaign, 274; and Mao cult, 27980; Red Flag (journal), 198, 2023, 222, 226, 250
and military control, 264, 267; and rebel Red Flag (rebel faction), 247, 25152, 275, 299
factions, 261, 262, 263 Red Guards (hongweibing): and Anti May16
Protestant churches, 53, 64, 125 campaign, 284; in Beijing, 206, 223,
protests, popu lar, xiii; and Cultural 22930, 235; and CCRG, 2057, 22030,
Revolution, 5, 11, 13, 318; and death of 231; control of, 2012; death toll of,
Lin Biao, 286; in Eastern Eu rope, 126; 368n31; dissident, 206, 22429, 230, 235;
and Hundred Flowers, 9; after Lin Biao, end of, 22930, 26162; factionalism
289, 293; on living standards, 233, among, 209, 21213, 215, 21822, 223,
23435, 286, 289, 300, 317; in Nanjing, 229, 230, 317; in Heilongjiang, 239; in
144, 146, 147; in Second Cultural high schools, 21319, 221, 224; after Lin
Revolution, 296, 29798, 301; in Biao, 13, 286, 287, 291; and Mao, 4, 11,
Tiananmen Square, 13, 293, 30910, 205, 207, 208, 221, 22224, 225, 228, 229,
343. See also Qingming Protests 231, 336, illus. 89; mass mobilization of,
Public Security, Ministry of: recruitment 332; and media, 11, 207, 216, 230; and
for, 1056; and revolutionary committees, military control, 263; protests by former,
230; surveillance network of, 1046 13, 225, 286, 299, 300, 306; and public
public security forces: and Campaign to security forces, 207, 218, 221, 227; and
Suppress Counterrevolution, 65; in Qingming protests, 13, 306, 307;
Cultural Revolution, 216, 235; and souvenirs from, 344; unintended
de-Stalinization, 137; vs. gangs, 68; and outcomes of, 277; in universities, 20713;
household registration, 78; and January violence of, 21519, 220, 223, 224; and
Revolution, 23839; and labor unions, 70; worker rebels, 23132
and Qingming protests, 30910; and Red Red Revolutionaries (rebel faction), 238, 245
Guards, 207, 218, 221, 227; and religious Red Storm (rebel faction), 370n32
sects, 67; Soviet model for, 82, 104, 105; Reference Materials (cankao ziliao), 118
in urban areas, 63, 64, 80 Reference News (cankao xiaoxi), 118
religion: and private charities, 77; suppres-
Qi Benyu, 203, 225 sion of, 53, 65, 6667, 80, 353n24;
Qing dynasty, 23, 36, 123 traditional, 59. See also Buddhism;
Qinghai, 243 Catholic Church; Daoism; Protestant
Qingming Protests (1976), 13, 30510, churches
illus. 1819; aftermath of, 31014 Report on the Peasant Movement in
Qin Shi Huang, Emperor, 145, 292, 293, Hunan (Mao Zedong), 43
373n10 Residents Committees, 78, 96
Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong (little Resist-America, Aid-Korea campaign, 73
red book), 197, 261, 287, 294 Resolution on Party History, 314
revolutionary committees, 26667, 283,
railways: in Anti-Japanese war, 2021; 316; and Anti May16 campaign, 284; and
disruptions of, 232, 235, 236, 256, 297, attacks on military, 252; and banishment,
298, 299, 301, 303; restoration of, 299, 270; in Beijing, 230, 259, 260, 262, 264,
303; security on, 105 318; and CCRG, 24344, 255; and
410 Index
revolutionary committees (continued) Seven Thousand Cadres Conference (1962),

cleansing campaign, 271, 272, 27477; 182, 183, 187, 197, 199
and death toll, 334; end of, 294; in sewing machines, 96, 328
Jiangsu, 25557, 285; after Lin Biao, 288; sex trade, 7, 62, 6970, 80, 321
and Mao, 255, 256, 280; and military Shaanxi, 15, 19, 267
control, 263, 265; and PLA, 230, 242, Shandong, 240, 352n30
243, 318; and power seizures, 239, 240; Shanghai: CCP takeover of, 35, 6364; and
in Shanghai, 237, 318 cleansing campaign, 27475; crime in, 68,
Revolution of 1911, 3 69; Cultural Revolution in, 19697, 245,
rightists, campaigns against: and class 248; and Gang of Four, 313; GDP of, 325;
labeling, 15051; in Great Leap, 15253, high school students in, 270; January
155, 162, 16568; and Mao, 188; and Revolution in, 12, 23639, 317; labor
retreat from Great Leap, 181, 184, 185; in unions in, 70; manual labor reform in,
rural areas, 52 271; military control in, 242, 243, 266; as
rural areas: and Antirightist Campaign, 149; model, 240, 255; protests in, 147; and
armed force in, 60; banishment to, 235, Qingming protests, 307; Second Cultural
26970, 284; Campaign to Suppress Revolution in, 301; secret societies in, 67;
Counterrevolution in, 5253; CCP in, 15, worker rebels in, 23132, 23438, 245
20, 24, 5153, 61, 100, 103, 104, 106, Shanghai Party Committee, 232, 236, 237,
350n86, 351n25; CCP members in, 103, 238, 248
104, 106; civil war in, 18, 32, 33, 38, 53, Shanghai Peoples Commune, 237, 238, 240
351n25; and class categories, 112; and Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, 237,
Communist victory, 1617; Cultural 318
Revolution in, 232; grain rationing in, 54, Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebel
57, 58, 95; Hundred Flowers in, 148; General Headquarters, 232, 23438, 245
industry in, 174, 178; labor reform in, 267, Shanxi, 46, 148, 240, 258
269; and Maos legacy, 315; migration Sichuan, 243, 265, 363n43
from, 57, 77, 78, 332, 356n23, 375n12; Singapore, 322, 342
military control of, 5153; Nationalists in, Socialist Education Movement, 18993, 234,
24; and One Strike, Three Anti campaign, 277, 368n18, 369n8, illus. 6; and Cultural
283; population of, 176; poverty in, 331, Revolution, 208, 209; and Mao Zedong
33233; refugees from, 173; return of Thought, 337
exiles from, 29899; revolution in, 38, socialist realism, 134, 186
4060, 6162; social structure in, 7, socialist transformation: and de-
4045; and Socialist Education Move- Stalinization, 12728, 136; in Eastern
ment, 189; violence in, 258. See also Eu rope, 125; of economy, xii, 61, 14849,
agriculture; collectivization; Great Leap 352n49; of industry, 54, 61, 79, 125, 153;
Forward; land reform and violence, 352n49
Russia, 83. See also Soviet Union social structure: and cadres, 59, 11719; CCP
control of, 123; and collectivization,
Scarlet Guards, 234, 235, 236, 237 5659; inequal ity in, xiii, 7, 33132; and
science: Mao on, 338; restrictions on, 140, land reform, 4549; Mao on, 41;
185, 187, 315; revival of, 186, 3045, traditional rural, xii, 7, 4045
33334; socialist, 72, 7475, 121, 279. Song Jiaoren, 3
See also experts South Korea, 13, 342; GDP of, 322, 324, 325,
Second Cultural Revolution, 295302, 303, 326; land reform in, 51, 333
318 Soviet model: bureaucratic, 80, 81, 12021,
Second Regiment, 238, 245 123, 174, 201, 340; and Hundred Flowers,
secret societies: and labor unions, 6869; 140, 143, 210, 211; and Mao, 26, 82, 91,
Mao on, 41; suppression of, 53, 65, 6668, 99, 315, 321, 335, 340, 341, 357n38;
80; traditional, 59 political, 8081, 82, 84, 104, 105, 140,
secret speech (Khrushchev; 1956), 12830, 143, 210, 211; revisions to, 154, 156, 186,
193; and Eastern Eu rope, 125, 12829, 357n38
130, 132, 151; and Hundred Flowers, Soviet model, economic, xi, xiii, 6, 26, 99;
14244; and Mao, 11, 135, 136, 14950, depression in, 176, 17879, 181; and Great
184, 33839; publication of, 130, 359n19 Leap, 15357, 180; and income inequal ity,
Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 188 33132; for industry, 8283, 91, 124, 233,
ser vice sector, 62, 63, 77, 85, 32930, 234; and land reform, 53, 12324; and
343 living standards, 78, 14, 9497, 233,
Index 411
32627; resource constraints in, 8991, 76; and Socialist Education Movement,
173, 176; successes of, 7, 84, 320, 322 191; and socialist transformation of
Soviet Union (USSR): advisors from, 64; industry, 79; and Soviet model, 82, 83;
border regions of, 36, 350n102; bureau- supply and production in, 8691;
cracy of, 80, 81, 174; and CCP, 1516, 100; uprisings in, 147; as welfare providers,
Chinas split from, 11, 82, 97, 19395; 9194
Chinese cadres in, 25, 26, 27; and Chinese State Statistical Bureau, 162
civil war, 19, 31, 32, 35; and Chinese struggle, criticize, transform campaign,
intellectuals, 7275; Chinese propaganda 26364, 266, 271
against, 19495, 203; class categories in, struggle sessions, 305, illus. 1112; and
1089, 110; and cleansing campaign, 272; cleansing campaign, 273; in Cultural
collapse of communism in, 343; collectiv- Revolution, 236, 259, 264; in Hei-
ization in, 5455, 57, 59, 124; and longjiang, 239; and Mao Zedong Thought,
Cultural Revolution, 10, 13, 205, 228; 336; and Second Cultural Revolution,
deaths in, 376nn1618; de-Stalinization 301
in, 9, 11, 121, 124, 12528, 151; in East Struggle to Smash the Lin- Chen Antiparty
Germany, 126; economy of, 89, 91, 97, Cliques Counterrevolutionary Coup,
325, 326, 356nn2021, 375n12; famine 29193, 300, 373n11
in, 5556, 124, 334, 365n82, 376n16; and students: admissions of, 305; and Anti
Great Leap, 157; and Hundred Flowers, May16 campaign, 284; and Antirightist
138, 140, 143; and Hungary, 131, 13234; Campaign, 149, 150; in Beijing, 25862;
income inequal ity in, 330, 331; KGB of, and closing of universities, 26769; in
104, 105; and land reform, 42; and Lin Cultural Revolution, 231, 285, 317; in
Biao, 287, 289; and Mao, 99; and Mao democracy movements, 343; factions
Zedong Thought, 337, 33839, 341; and among, 21213; high school, 21319,
Nationalists, 35; and North Korea, 130; 267, 268, 26970, 368n31; and Hundred
and Poland, 13132; and post-Mao reform, Flowers, 14248, 315; and January
342; purges in, 128, 129, 200201, 205; Revolution, 238; and labor reform, 263,
rationing in, 95; satellite launch by, 84; 26970; Mao on, 150; and military
and Socialist Education Movement, 190; control, 266, 267; numbers of, 231; in
U.S. test-ban treaty with, 194; in World universities, 20713; and violence,
War II, 7, 83. See also Eastern Europe; 368n31; and work teams, 21013; and
secret speech worker rebels, 233. See also Red Guards
special economic zones, 343 suicides, 135, 146, 165; and cleansing
Sri Lanka, 322, 331 campaign, 27274; and Cultural
Stalin, Joseph: and border regions, 350n102; Revolution, 189, 198, 199, 200, 211, 216,
and CCP, 67, 25; and Chinese civil war, 263, 368n31; and socialist transformation,
21, 31, 35; and class categories, 109; and 47, 72, 76
collectivization, 5455; death of, 124; and Sun Yatsen, 3
economy, 154, 352n49; and genetics, Sun Yefang, 98, 186
7475, 354n47; and Great Leap, 316; and surveillance, 1046
Hundred Flowers, 143, 144; and land syndicalism, 70
reform, 42; later years of, 364n46; and
Mao, 129, 136, 149, 166, 18485, 292; and Taiping Rebellion (18501864), 2
minority nationalities, 37; personality cult Taiwan, 4, 34, 35; Chiang Kai-shek in,
of, 9, 26; purges by, 27, 134, 135; 2324; economic model of, 342; GDP of,
repudiation of, 9, 11, 125, 127, 184, 193; 322, 325, 326; income inequal ity in, 331;
and revisions to Soviet model, 357n38. See land reform in, 51, 333
also secret speech Tan Houlan, 265
Stalinism: denunciations of, 127, 132, 138; Tenth Party Congress (1973), 294
and Hundred Flowers, 138, 210; and Mao, Thailand, 321, 322, 331
82, 84, 135, 316; and Mao Zedong Third Headquarters, 221, 222
Thought, 335, 337, 338, 339; and purges, thought reform campaigns, 62, 71, 75, 124,
2731. See also de-Stalinization; History of 211, 264, 268
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Three Anti, Five Anti campaign, 76, 77, 124
State Council, 198, 218, 219, 223, 228 Three Anti campaign, 62, 76
state enterprises: barter trade in, 93; CCP Tiananmen Square: protests in, 293, 343;
members in, 103; hoarding in, 8890; rebel factions in, 260; Red Guard rallies
labor reform in, 271; and private sector, in, 207, 214, 216, 219, 239, illus. 89
412 Index
Tiananmen Square Incident (April 4, 1976), Education Movement, 191, 192; surveil-
illus. 1819. See also Qingming Protests lance system in, 105; suspension of classes
Tian Jiaying, 365n4 and exams at, 207; violence in, 210, 211;
Tianjin, 35, 67, 68, 270, 271 work teams in, 20813, 233; and Wuhan
Tibet, 19, 35, 36, 37, 52 Incident, 249. See also Peking University;
Tito, Josip Broz, 127, 138 Tsinghua University
torture, 24, 25, 300, 363n43; in cleansing urban areas: banishment from, 235, 26970,
campaign, 273, 277; in Cultural Revolu- 284; bureaucracy in, 62, 63, 7881; cadres
tion, 205, 252, 259; in Great Leap, 164, in, 61, 63, 270; Campaign to Suppress
165; Khrushchev on, 129; in land reform, Counterrevolution in, 62, 64, 6566; CCP
33, 47; and military rule, 5, 263, 272, 273, in, 43, 6162, 100, 103, 104, 106; in civil
274, 277; in Rectication Campaign, war, 34; class categories in, 10910, 112;
2930, 197; and Three Anti Movement, 76 crime in, 6364; in Cultural Revolution,
trade policy, 14, 173, 304 23536; Great Leap in, 171, 173, 184;
trade unions. See labor unions household registration system in, 64,
travel, 63, 7980, 94, 118. See also migration, 7778, 234; and Hundred Flowers, 140;
rural-urban living standards in, 54, 9497, 32730,
Trotsky, Leon, 26 331; and Maos legacy, 315; migration to,
Trotskyism, 28, 29 57, 77, 78, 332, 356n23, 375n12; and
Tsinghua University, 230, 25859, 260, 265, Nationalists, 24; population of, 176;
269, 374n47; Mao cult at, 27980 return of exiles to, 29899; revolution in,
Tsinghua University High School, 214, 215, 38, 6181; and rural collectivization,
21617, 225 5758; social structure in, 7, 77; and
Socialist Education Movement, 189;
Uighurs, 37 surveillance system in, 105; in USSR,
Ukraine, 56, 334 375n12; work unit system in, 9294
Ulanfu, 272
ultraleftism: campaigns against, 265, 284, Vietnam, 347n8 (ch.2)
318; criticism of, 288, 293, 295, 296 violence: in civil war, 351n25; and cleansing
United Action (liandong), 22526, 228 campaign, 272, 275; and collectivization,
United Command (rebel faction), 257, 258 55; in Cultural Revolution, 21011, 212,
United Front (19251927), 15, 19, 41, 42, 43 240, 368n31; factional, 24549, 25961;
United Headquarters (rebel faction), 370n32 in Great Leap, 162, 16465; in Henan,
United Kingdom, 71, 73, 95, 154, 156; 243, 363n43; in land reform, 33, 46, 47,
economy of, 331, 356nn2021; and Tibet, 5051, 52, 211; Mao on, 4344, 217, 224,
36, 37 228, 33536; and military control, 243,
United Nations (UN), 37 266, 268; opposition to, 224, 22526;
United States (U.S.): and Chinese civil war, and rebel factions, 24549, 25961; of
34; economy of, 83, 178, 320, 331; and Red Guards, 21519, 220, 22329; in
Great Leap targets, 156; and Hundred revolution, 4345; in Second Cultural
Flowers, 140; and intellectuals, 71, 73; Revolution, 297; at universities, 210, 211;
Khrushchevs secret speech in, 130; in in urban areas, 62; in USSR, 352n49; and
Korean War, 123; and private Chinese weapons, 25355; against women, 211.
charities, 77; rationing in, 95; and Red See also torture
Guard dissidents, 228; and science, 75;
and Tibet, 37; and USSR, 153, 194; and wall posters, 293, 305, 306; and high
Zhou Enlai, 295 schools, 214; in Hundred Flowers, 210;
unity of ve nationalities, 36, 37 and January Revolution, 238; by Li Yizhe,
Unity Sect (yiguandao), 67 299, 374n31; and military control, 265;
universities: admission to, 11314, 116, 207, On Socialist Democracy and the Legal
26768, 269, 270; and Antirightist System, 299301; at Peking University,
Campaign, 149; attacks on, 7175; closing 2078, illus. 7; in Qingming protests,
of, 26769; and Cultural Revolution, 14, 3078; and Red Guard backlash, 224, 225;
115, 206, 20713, 21922, 230; Hundred and Second Cultural Revolution, 297, 298;
Flowers in, 14347; and Maos legacy, 315; and worker rebels, 232
under military control, 263; and post-Mao Wang Dabin, 265
reform, 343; Red Guards at, 20713, Wang Dongxing, 198
21922, 230; reopening of, 294; sciences Wang Guangmei, 222
in, 72, 7475, 3045; and Socialist Wang Hongwen, 1, 232, 237, 238, 266, 312
Index 413
Wang Li, 203, 24950, 253, 284 Xie Fuzhi, 204, 21718, 227, 249, 250, 274
Wang Meng, 360n51 Xinjiang, 19, 35, 36, 37, 243
Wang Ming, 25, 27, 29, 348n24 Xu Mouyong, 360n58
Wang Renzhong, 364n58 Xu Shiyou, 241, 251, 285, 298; and military
Wang Shiwei, 28, 146, 361n77 control, 253, 266, 267; and revolutionary
Wang Xizhe, 374n31 committees, 255, 256, 257
warlords, regional, 22, 32, 42 Xuzhou, 301; railway bureau of, 303
Warsaw Pact, 131, 133
Wei Guoqing, 257 Yanan, 67, 19, 197; in civil war, 16, 34, 38;
Weng Senhe, 303 purges in, 25, 2728, 120; Rectication
Wenhui bao (newspaper), 307, 308 Campaign in, 25, 2731
women: as CCP members, 107; and class Yang,C.K., 4849
categories, 112; and loyalty dance, 281; in Yang Kaihui, 307
rural labor reform, 270; in sex trade, 69; Yang Shangkun, 198, 199
violence against, 211; in Yanan, 28 Yangzi River Machine Works, 19192, 234
workers: and Anti May16 campaign, 284; Yao Wenyuan, 1, 196, 203, 237, 238
and Antirightist Campaign, 149, 150; as Ye Qun, 204
CCP members, 103, 104; class categories Yuan Shikai, 3
for, 109; in Cultural Revolution, 4, 205, Yugoslavia, 127, 128, 134, 138, 143, 144
23133, 234, 259, 261, 263, 285, 317; and Yunnan, 52, 258
death of Lin Biao, 286; demands of,
23435, 237; factions among, 23336, Zhang Chunqiao, 1, 12, 308, illus. 10; arrest
237, 23839, 369n8; in Great Leap, of, 312; and Cultural Revolution, 196,
17374, 175, 180; and Hundred Flowers, 203, 222, 232, 253; and January
140, 142, 147, 148, 315; and January Revolution, 23738, 239; and Qingming
Revolution, 238; and military control, protests, 30910
266; numbers of industrial, 177; protests Zhao Ziyang, 24142, 300
by, 300; and rebel factions, 259, 261, 263, Zhejiang, 71, 148, 252, 303, 371n5.
317; and Second Cultural Revolution, 297; See also Hangzhou
and Socialist Education Movement, 191; Zhejiang Military District, 252
wages of, 32728, 331; white- collar, Zhejiang University, 7172, 308
23536, 27071, 286 Zhengzhou Conference, Second (1959),
workers militias, 70, 71 363n34
work points, 57, 58, 157, 181 Zhou Enlai, illus. 10; and anti-Japanese
work teams: in campaigns, 76; in high resistance, 21; and campaign against
schools, 214, 215, 219; in land reform, restorationism, 306; in civil war, 35,
351n24; and Liu Shaoqi, 368n18; vs. 348n24; on collectivization, 55; and
military control, 262; opposition to, Cultural Revolution, 13, 198, 204, 21819,
21920, 225; at Peking University, 221, 227, 228, 24042, 246, 253, 25557,
20813; and Red Guards, 219, 22122, 261, 294; death of, 305; vs. Deng
226, 228; and restoration of order, 303; Xiaoping, 302; funeral of, 3067; and
and Socialist Education Movement, 189, Great Leap, 154, 155, 156, 169, 181, 182,
192, 193; in universities, 20813, 233; and 184; after Lin Biao, 288; and Mao, 11,
violence, 217, 219; and worker rebels, 232 295, 318; and Picket Corps, 21819, 220,
work unit system, 7980; and cadre rank, 22324, 22729; and Qingming protests,
118; and education, 92, 117; and housing, 13, 30510, 311; in Rectication
9597; and identity, 94; and living Campaign, 30; and Red Guards, 21819,
standards, 9394, 327; and ser vices, 221, 227, 228; and revolutionary
9294, 330; and surveillance, 104 committees, 255, 256, 257; and worker
World War II, 3, 7, 15, 32, 83, 95 rebels, 231, 232; and Wuhan Incident,
Wu Han, 18788 249
Wuhan, 24749, 284, 306 Zhou Peiyuan, 7374
Wuhan Incident (July 1967), 24950, 253 Zhu Chengzhao, 22829
Wuhan Military Region, 248, 249, 250 Zhu De, 348n24

China Under Mao

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Illustrations follow page230.

1. Mao Zedong, Yanan, 19371938

2. National Day parade, Mao images, Beijing, 1949

3. Land reform tribunal, Guangdong, 1952

4. Execution during land reform, Fukang, 1952

5. Mao and Khrushchev, Beijing, 1958

6. Socialist Education Movement denunciation meeting, 1965

7. Wall posters at Peking University, 1966

8. Mao and Red Guards, August 18, 1966

9. Mao and Lin Biao, Tiananmen Square, August 31, 1966

10. Zhou Enlai and Central Cultural Revolution Group, 1967

11. Struggle session, Harbin party secretary, August 26, 1966

12. Struggle session, wife of Heilongjiang governor, August 29, 1966

13. Execution grounds, cleansing campaign, Harbin, April 1968

14. Kneeling at execution grounds, Harbin, April 1968

15. Burning buildings, Nanning, July 1968

16. Mass surrender of April 22 ghters, Nanning, August 1968

17. Summary executions of April 22 ghters, Nanning, August 1968

18. Wreaths for Zhou Enlai at Tiananmen Square, April 4, 1976

19. Tiananmen Square protests, April 4, 1976

research support provided by Stanfords Freeman-Spogli Institute for

A T 3 P. M .on September 18, 1976, Beijings vast Tiananmen Square

charged with counterrevolutionary subversion. In reality, their crime was

Twenty-seven years before, on October 1, 1949, the fty-ve-year-old

disintegrated as a political force after suffering a series of crucial battle-

victorious banner of Chairman Mao went unheeded, and this phase of

political system, as well as the consequences of these leadership decisions

techniques for enforcing draconian demands on its members for loyalty

savings and investment, which by design ensured that consumption and

Selected leaders of student protests and industrial strikes were exe-

accommodation by Soviet bureaucrats to the imperialist world system,

By the end of 1966, most provincial governments were on the verge of

A two disastrous setbacks in its early years and

initially went very badly. Communist divisions in Manchuria were

Explaining Communist Victory

Political revolutions can be viewed as a contest between two organiza-

proponent, Mao Zedong. By jettisoning Marxist dogma about proletarian

the CCP successfully mobilized peasants and created village-level political

The Military Impact of the Japanese Invasion

Our account of this historic contest between two organizations begins

armies to disperse into small units and engage in recruitment, political

The Political Impact of the Japanese Invasion

Sources of Communist Party Discipline

Marxist credentials, solidifying his control of the party organization, and

creation developed in collaboration with Chen Boda, known as Mao

The Partys First Stalinist Purge

The rectication campaign of 19421944 completed this process.63 As

Yanan. In essays published in that paper and posted as wall newspa-

generated manufactured evidence of what appeared to be a surprisingly

conformity to Communist policy.75 The discipline and conformity that

The Civil War

Chiang Kai-shek understood these structural weaknesses and lacked

provisions, horses, and transportation equipment. Compliance was

Completing the Military Conquest

Once again Maos condence proved prescient. Chiangs armies collapsed

This position was reversed completely in 1949 and replaced by a plan

overconformity and overimplementation even when conformity with di-

A LT HOUGH T H EY OF T EN begin as insurgencies against oppressive rule,