Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 161330 February 20, 2007

RENE CABARLES, Petitioner,

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the
Order1 issued by respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in Criminal Case No. 99-0878, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rene "Nonoy" Cabarles y Adizas, for murder, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch
275. The questioned Order dated April 1, 2003 cancelled the scheduled promulgation of judgment and reopened the case
for reception of evidence from two prosecution witnesses who were not presented during trial.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder under the following information:

The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE "NONOY" CABARLES Y ADIZAS of the crime of Murder, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a deadly
weapon (fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the following dates, to wit: pre-trial on
November 22, 2000; presentation of prosecutions evidence on April 18, May 4, 11, 18, and 23, 2001; and presentation of
defense evidence on June 20 and 27, July 4 and 18, and August 1, 2001. 3

The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa, the mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa,
the alleged eyewitness; Carlos Callosa, brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Police Senior Inspector of the
Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory to testify on the contents of the death certificate of Antonio Callosa.

Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates. Instead,
trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001 when the prosecution called Carlos Callosa to the witness stand. Since
defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Carlos would testify on matters in his May 13, 1999 Sinumpaang Salaysay, his
testimony was dispensed with.

The second prosecution witness, Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos, was presented in court during the June 20, 2001
hearing. His testimony was likewise dispensed with after defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Police Inspector Parejos
would testify on what was in the spot report of the stabbing incident. In the June 20, 2001 hearing, the prosecution said it
would offer its evidence and rest its case should the People fail to present a witness at the next scheduled hearing.4

When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the prosecution failed to present a witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen
appeared during the said hearing. Records show that four subpoenas were issued to Pedrosa informing her that she had
to appear on November 22, 2000,5 April 116 and 18,7 May 11 and June 20,8 and August 1, 2001.9 The first subpoena was
personally received by her; the second subpoena by her husband, Salvador Pedrosa; and the third and fourth subpoenas
had no proofs of service. Meanwhile, the three subpoenas issued to Dr. Salen requiring his attendance on May 11 10 and
23,11 June 20,12 and August 1, 2001,13 were all returned with the notation "addressee moved." There was no evidence,
however, that subpoenas were issued to these two witnesses requiring their attendance for the June 27, 2001 hearing,
which would explain why they were absent. Taking into consideration the absence of a subpoena issued to Pedrosa and
Dr. Salen and notwithstanding the vehement objection registered by Cabarles, Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a last
chance but warned:

It is however understood whether the subpoena is actually issued and served or not upon the prosecution witnesses
and service of such subpoena or notice will not relieved (sic) the prosecution to make a formal offer of evidence should
the prosecution failed (sic) to present any witness in the next scheduled hearing. 14

With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its evidence.15
Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it was denied by Judge Maceda.16 Two
witnesses were called for the defense, accused Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a fisherman.

A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the
questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified in the subpoena
and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the
first four of the five hearing dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that there was no
hearing conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued to Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11,
2001, which was not a date assigned for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that another
subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen requiring them to appear on May 11 and June 20, 2001. But, the May 11,
2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001 because the judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was
concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the prosecution. Judge Maceda further observed that the May
18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and May 25, 2001 was likewise not a hearing date set by the court. According to
Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates and there was
either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen,
the prosecution should have been given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor. His order in part
read:

As a consequence[,] the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is canceled. Set the reception of the testimony of the eye
witness and the doctor on May 1, 2003 at 2:00 [p.]m. to enable the prosecution to avail [of] the last chance granted by this
Court.

Issue the corresponding subpoena to Imelda Pedrosa and Dr. Romeo T. Salen directing them to appear on the aforesaid
date and time, to be served by the Branch Sheriff who is required to make a prompt return thereof.

SO ORDERED.17

Judge Maceda denied Cabarless motion for reconsideration in an Order dated April 25, 2003 and set the case for hearing
on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was
duly served,18 but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to the SPD Crime Laboratory.
Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa, the prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8, 2003
hearing. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the prosecution another chance, giving
the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional hearing dates. 19

Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination. A few days thereafter,
Cabarles filed the present petition questioning Judge Macedas order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public Attorneys Office conducted its cross-
examination of Pedrosa.

On July 24, 2003, the defense counsel agreed on the facts contained in the death certificate of the victim, so the
testimony of Dr. Salen was dispensed with. Thereafter, Judge Maceda set the date for the reception of evidence on the
civil aspect of the criminal case on August 14, 2003, when Carlos, the deceaseds brother, was recalled to the witness
stand.20

Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.1avvphi1.net

On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the promulgation of judgment and ordered the case archived pending this
Courts resolution of the case.21

In his petition, Cabarles raises as issues the following:

[1] WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE
ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.

[2] WHETHER PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS
VIOLATED.22 1awphi1.net

Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April 1, 2003 Order reopening the case,
before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their
case? Did the said order violate Cabarless right to due process and speedy disposition of his case?

On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reopening of
the case before promulgation of judgment although both parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a
case may only be reopened after a judgment of conviction has been made but before its finality, as provided in Section
24,23 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case under Section 24
presupposes that judgment has already been promulgated, which is not the case here. According to petitioner, the cases
cited by the People are not at all applicable in this case since they were tried and decided before the introduction of
Section 24 under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that Section 24 is a new provision which merely
formalized the long accepted practice of judges of reopening a case to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case,
jurisprudence providing that a judge has the discretion to reopen a case even before promulgation of judgment still holds.

After a thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties, we find that the petition is meritorious.

A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized
procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage. 24 This lack of a specific provision
covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1,
2000.

The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing
jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued
only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.
However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and
its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.25 A motion to reopen may thus
properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment
is rendered,26 and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment27 and the only controlling guideline governing a
motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.28 This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.29

However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a
hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without
giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This failure, to our mind,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice
and opportunity to be heard.30 The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express
language of Section 24, Rule 119.

Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the case was
reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarless objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To
be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal. 31 Here, Cabarles filed the present petition seeking for a writ of
certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa was cross-examined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosecutions
formal offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its admission on the ground that the
same was inadmissible having been received by the court after Judge Maceda issued the questioned order.

On the second issue, Cabarles maintains that contrary to Judge Macedas observation, the prosecution was given ample
opportunity to present its case as seen by the issuance of several subpoenas to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues
that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty and should not be made to wait indefinitely for prosecution witnesses to
testify. To do so would violate his constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his case. According to
Cabarles, the reopening of the case is clearly detrimental to him since it meant another day in prison.

The OSG counters that the reopening of the case was made in accordance with Section 24 since the prosecution is
entitled to the reopening of the case to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Cabarless right to a speedy trial had
not been violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution witness are excluded when computing the time
within which trial should start under Section 3,32 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably. 33 In this
particular case, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure
of the prosecution to take full advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such
opportunities. Contrary to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not deprived of its day in
court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with the trial courts calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to
the prosecution did not push through and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing
dates which were different from those assigned for reception of prosecutions evidence, still the prosecution had a total of
four hearing dates when it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1, 2001. The
presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to
take the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial. 34

Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section 24, that there
be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for
having been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.35

On Cabarless right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the Constitution, all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful than in criminal
cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake. 36

Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the case is mooted by our nullification of Judge Macedas April
1, 2003 Order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of
speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.37 The right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 38

With regard to the OSGs allegation in its Comment and Memorandum, that Cabarles failed to observe the rule on
hierarchy of courts since the petition for certiorari was filed directly with the Supreme Court, Cabarles insists that he is a
detention prisoner needing immediate resolution of his case. He also argues that this case not only involves grave abuse
of discretion but also a pure question of law involving the application of Section 24, which is a new provision.39

It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the hierarchy of courts. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the
Court of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their respective regions. However, this
concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his
petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the
appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial
court should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Courts time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of its docket.40

Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle
of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information
against him was filed way back in June 1999,41 and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered.
Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issues raised.42 Since Section 24 is a new provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the
April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition.

As a final word, we find the Supreme Courts pronouncement in the case of People v. Monje instructive:

A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings, apparently to enable
the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous
precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an
accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to
augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the
remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the
constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the
prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, should not be
treated by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its
evidence.

In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand.
Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her
family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race,
color, creed, gender or political persuasion - whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor.
Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has
not proved.43

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order dated April 1, 2003 was issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and
offered in this case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the records of this case be
REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its appropriate action without further delay. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.