15) HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

LINO VELASCO
(OWNER OF 22 HECTAR LAND WHICH INCLUDES LOT 9864 A)

SON 1: 2: GREGORIO 3: EDUARDO 4: ESTEBAN + MAGDALENA

VIRGILIO

ARISTEDES

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.

Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than thirty (30) years.

Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Aristedes testified that the property was
originally from a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
the fourth being Aristedess grandfather.

Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco
sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them
in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land X X X as approved on March 15, 1982."

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the CA, arguing that Malabanan;

1) had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and
2) that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and
for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the application of Malabanan. It held that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), states that:

any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.

Thus, since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.

During the pendency of the case Malabanan died, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the CA.

Petitioners averred the following:

1. With respect to Sec 14 (1), they rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit (handed down just 4
months prior to Herbieto) which ruled that with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. They aver that Naguit is the
correct interpretation of the Court.

2. With respect to Sec 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into
private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).

-According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property
had already been converted into private property through prescription.

In defense, the OSG submits that:

The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands,
said period should be calculated from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

ISSUES:

WON petitioners are entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under the Property
Registration Decree

WON it is sufficient to establish that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in order to
register the land under the Property Registration Decree.

RULING:

1. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree1, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act2 recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

- Since Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

- The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

2. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code3. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

- Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of

1
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

2
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

3
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

-There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property
for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership
over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according
to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended
for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the
Civil Code.

The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code4. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

4
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;