Caste System in India
Caste System in India
Caste System in India
Varna may be translated as "class," and refers to the four social classes
which existed in the Vedic society, namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and
Shudras. Certain groups, now known as Dalits, were historically excluded from
the varna system altogether, and are still ostracised as untouchables.
Jti may be translated as caste, and refers to birth. The names of jtis are
usually derived from occupations, and considered to be hereditary
and endogamous, but this may not always have been the case.
The jtis developed in post-Vedic times, possibly from crystallisation of guilds
during its feudal era. Each of the thousands of jtis are often thought of as
belonging to one of the four varnas.
The varnas and jatis have pre-modern origins, and social stratification
may already have existed in pre-Vedic times. Between around 2200 BCE and
100 CE admixture between northern and southern populations in India took
place, after which a shift to endogamy took place. This shift may be explained
by the "imposition of some social values and norms" which were "enforced
through the powerful state machinery of a developing political economy".
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casteless social groups into differentiated caste communities. The British Raj
furthered this development, making rigid caste organisation a central
mechanism of administration. Between 1860 and 1920, the British segregated
Indians by caste, granting administrative jobs and senior appointments only to
the upper castes. Social unrest during the 1920s led to a change in this
policy. From then on, the colonial administration began a policy of positive
discrimination by reserving a certain percentage of government jobs for the
lower castes.
Caste-based differences have also been practised in other regions and religions
in the Indian subcontinent like Nepalese Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism
and Sikhism. It has been challenged by many reformist Hindu
movements, Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, and also by present-day
Indian Buddhism.
New developments took place after India achieved independence, when the
policy of caste-based reservation of jobs was formalised with lists of Scheduled
Castes (Dalit) and Scheduled Tribes (Adivasi). Since 1950, the country has
enacted many laws and social initiatives to protect and improve the
socioeconomic conditions of its lower caste population. These caste
classifications for college admission quotas, job reservations and other
affirmative action initiatives, according to the Supreme Court of India, are based
on heredity and are not changeable. Discrimination against lower castes is
illegal in India under Article 15 of its constitution, and India
tracks violence against Dalitsnationwide.
2
B. R. Ambedkar delivering a speech to a rally at Yeola, Nasik, on 13 October
1935. Ambedkar strongly campaigned against the Caste System in India, and
fought for the rights of dalits and other socially disadvantaged classes his entire
life.
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Definitions and concepts
Varna literally means color, and was a framework for grouping people into
classes, first used in Vedic Indian society. It is referred to frequently in the
ancient Indian texts. The four classes were the Brahmins(priestly people),
the Kshatriyas (also called Rajanyas, who were rulers, administrators and
warriors), the Vaishyas (artisans, merchants, tradesmen and farmers),
and Shudras (labouring classes). The varnacategorisation implicitly had a fifth
element, being those people deemed to be entirely outside its scope, such
as tribal people and the untouchables.
Jti
Jti, meaning birth, is mentioned much less often in ancient texts, where it is
clearly distinguished from varna. There are four varnas but thousands
of jtis. The jtis are complex social groups that lack universally applicable
definition or characteristic, and have been more flexible and diverse than was
previously often assumed.
Some scholars of caste have considered jti to have its basis in religion,
assuming that in India the sacred elements of life envelop the secular aspects;
for example, the anthropologist Louis Dumont described the ritual rankings that
exist within the jti system as being based on the concepts of religious purity
and pollution. This view has been disputed by other scholars, who believe it to
be a secular social phenomenon driven by the necessities of economics, politics,
and sometimes also geography. Jeaneane Fowler says that although some
people consider jti to be occupational segregation, in reality the jti framework
does not preclude or prevent a member of one caste from working in another
occupation. A feature of jtis has been endogamy, in Susan Bayly's words, that
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"both in the past and for many though not all Indians in more modern times,
those born into a given caste would normally expect to find marriage partner"
within his or her jati. In medieval India, the marriage regulations were required
to be followed.
Jtis have existed in India among Hindus, Muslims, Christians and tribal people,
and there is no clear linear order among them.
Caste
The term caste is not an Indian word. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, it is derived from the Portuguese casta, meaning "race, lineage,
breed" and, originally, "pure or unmixed (stock or breed)". There is no exact
translation in Indian languages, but varna and jti are the two most proximate
terms.
The sociologist G. S. Ghurye wrote in 1932 that, despite much study by many
people, we do not possess a real general definition of caste. It appears to me that
any attempt at definition is bound to fail because of the complexity of the
phenomenon. On the other hand, much literature on the subject is marred by
lack of precision about the use of the term.
Ghurye offered what he thought was a definition that could be applied across
British India, although he acknowledged that there were regional variations on
the general theme. His model definition for caste included the following six
characteristics,
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linguistic areas, hundreds of castes had a gradation generally acknowledged
by everyone
Restrictions on feeding and social intercourse, with minute rules on the kind
of food and drink that upper castes could accept from lower castes. There
was a great diversity in these rules, and lower castes generally accepted food
from upper castes.
Segregation, where individual castes lived together, the dominant caste
living in the center and other castes living on the periphery.[43] There were
restrictions on the use of water wells or streets by one caste on another: an
upper caste Brahmin might not be permitted to use the street of a lower caste
group, while a caste considered impure might not be permitted to draw water
from a well used by members of other castes.
Occupation, generally inherited. Lack of unrestricted choice of profession,
caste members restricted their own members from taking up certain
profession they considered degrading. This characteristic of caste was
missing from large parts of India, stated Ghurye, and in these regions all four
castes (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras) did agriculture labour
or became warriors in large numbers
Endogamy, restrictions on marrying a person outside caste, but in some
situations hypergamy allowed. Far less rigidity on inter-marriage between
different sub-castes than between members of different castes in some
regions, while in some endogamy within a sub-caste was the principal
feature of caste-society.
The above Ghurye's model of caste thereafter attracted scholarly criticism for
relying on the British India census reports,[38][51] the "superior, inferior" racist
theories of Risley, and for fitting his definition to then prevalent colonial
orientalist perspectives on caste.
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Ghurye added, in 1932, that the colonial construction of caste led to the livening
up, divisions and lobbying to the British officials for favourable caste
classification in India for economic opportunities, and this had added new
complexities to the concept of caste. Graham Chapman and others have
reiterated the complexity, and they note that there are differences between
theoretical constructs and the practical reality.
Ronald Inden, the Indologist, agrees that there has been no universally accepted
definition. For example, for some early European documenters it was thought to
correspond with the endogamous varnas referred to in ancient Indian scripts,
and its meaning corresponds in the sense of estates. To later Europeans of the
Raj era it was endogamous jtis, rather than varnas, that represented caste, such
as the 2378 jtis that colonial administrators classified by occupation in the
early 20th century.
Arvind Sharma, a professor of comparative religion, notes that caste has been
used synonymously to refer to both varna and jti but that "serious Indologists
now observe considerable caution in this respect" because, while related, the
concepts are considered to be distinct. In this he agrees with the
Indologist Arthur Basham, who noted that the Portuguese colonists of India
used casta to describe
... tribes, clans or families. The name stuck and became the usual word for the
Hindu social group. In attempting to account for the remarkable proliferation of
castes in 18th- and 19th-century India, authorities credulously accepted the
traditional view that by a process of intermarriage and subdivision the 3,000 or
more castes of modern India had evolved from the four primitive classes, and
the term 'caste' was applied indiscriminately to both varna or class, and jti or
caste proper. This is a false terminology; castes rise and fall in the social scale,
and old castes die out and new ones are formed, but the four great classes are
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stable. There are never more or less than four and for over 2,000 years their
order of precedence has not altered."
The sociologist Andre Beteille notes that, while varna mainly played the role of
caste in classical Hindu literature, it is jti that plays that role in present
times. Varna represents a closed collection of social orders whereas jti is
entirely open-ended, thought of as a "natural kind whose members share a
common substance." Any number of new jtis can be added depending on need,
such as tribes, sects, denominations, religious or linguistic minorities and
nationalities. Thus, "Caste" is not an accurate representation of jti in English.
Better terms would be ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic group.
Flexibility
Sociologist Anne Waldrop observes that while outsiders view the term caste as
a static phenomenon of stereotypical tradition-bound India, empirical facts
suggest caste has been a radically changing feature. The term means different
things to different Indians. In the context of politically active modern India,
where job and school quotas are reserved for affirmative action based on castes,
the term has become a sensitive and controversial subject.
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Origins
Perspectives
There are at least two perspectives for the origins of the caste system in ancient
and medieval India, which focus on either ideological factors or on socio-
economic factors.
The first school focuses on the ideological factors which are claimed to drive
the caste system and holds that caste rooted in the four varnas. This perspective
was particularly common among scholars of the British colonial era and was
articulated by Dumont, who concluded that the system was ideologically
perfected several thousand years ago and has remained the primary social reality
ever since. This school justifies its theory primarily by citing Manusmriti and
disregards economic, political or historical evidence.
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The second school of thought focuses on socio-economic factors and claims that
those factors drive the caste system. It believes caste to be rooted in the
economic, political and material history of India. This school, which is common
among scholars of the post-colonial era such as Berreman, Marriott, and Dirks,
describes the caste system as an ever-evolving social reality that can only be
properly understood by the study of historical evidence of actual practice and
the examination of circumstances verifiable in the economic, political and
material history of India. This school has focussed on the historical evidence
from ancient and medieval society in India, during the Muslim rule between the
12th and 18th centuries, and the policies of colonial British rule from 18th
century to the mid-20th century.
The first school has focused on religious ethnology and disregarded empirical
evidence in history. The second school has focused on empirical evidence and
sought to understand the historical circumstances. The latter has criticised the
former for its caste origin theory, claiming that it has dehistoricised and
decontextualised Indian society.
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majority without internal caste divisions and a minority consisting of a number
of small occupationally polluted groups".
Vedic varnas
The varnas originated in Vedic society (ca.1500-500 BCE). The first three
groups, Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishya have parallels with other Indo-
European societies, while the addition of the Shudras is probably a Brahmanical
invention from northern India.
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Jtis
According to Basham, ancient Indian literature refers often to varnas, but hardly
if ever to jtis as a system of groups within the varnas. He concludes that "If
caste is defined as a system of group within the class, which are normally
endogamous, commensal and craft-exclusive, we have no real evidence of its
existence until comparatively late times."
Onset of endogamy
A recent series of research papers, by Reich et al. (2009), Metspalu et al. (2011),
and Moorjani et al. (2013), make clear that India was peopled by two distinct
groups who split genetically ca. 50,000 years ago, and form the basis for the
present population of India. Reich et al. (2009) discern two genetic groups in
the majority of populations in India, which they called "Ancestral North
Indians" (ANI) and "Ancestral South Indians" (ASI). They found that the ANI
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genes are close to those of Middle Easterners, Central Asians and Europeans
whereas the ASI genes are dissimilar to all other known populations outside
India. These two distinct groups, which had split ca. 50,000 years ago, formed
the basis for the present population of India.
According to Moorjani et al. (2013) these two groups mixed between 4,200 and
1,900 years ago (2200 BCE-100 CE), whereafter a shift to endogamy took
place. Speaking to Fountain Ink, David Reich stated, "Prior to 4,200 years ago,
there were unmixed groups in India. Sometime between 1,900 to 4,200 years
ago, profound, pervasive convulsive mixture occurred, affecting every Indo-
European and Dravidian group in India without exception.". According to Reich
et al.,
Strong endogamy must have applied since then (average gene flow less than 1
in 30 per generation) to prevent the genetic signatures of founder events from
being erased by gene flow. Some historians have argued that caste in modern
India is an invention of colonialism in the sense that it became more rigid
under colonial rule. However, our results suggest that many current distinctions
among groups are ancient and that strong endogamy must have shaped marriage
patterns in India for thousands of years.
Moorjani et al. (2013) discerned two waves of admixture in this period, with
northern India showing later dates of admxiture.[99] GaneshPrasad et al. (2013)
studied "12 tribal and 19 non-tribal (caste) endogamous populations from the
predominantly Dravidian-speaking Tamil Nadu state in the southernmost part of
India."[100] According to GaneshPrasad et al., southern India was socially
stratified already 4,000 to 6,000 years ago, which is best explained by "the
emergence of agricultural technology in South Asia." GaneshPrasad et al.
conclude from their genetic study:
The social stratification (in Tamilnadu) was established 4,000 to 6,000 years
ago and there was little admixture during the last 3,000 years, implying a
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minimal genetic impact of the Varna (caste) system from the historically-
documented Brahmin migrations into the area.
The Vedic texts neither mention the concept of untouchable people nor any
practice of untouchability. The rituals in the Vedas ask the noble or king to eat
with the commoner from the same vessel. Later Vedic texts ridicule some
professions, but the concept of untouchability is not found in them.
History
During the time of the Rigveda, there were two varnas, the rya varna and
the dsa varna. The distinction oringally arose from tribal divisions. The Vedic
tribes regarded themselves as rya (the noble ones) and the rival tribes were
called dsa, dasyu and pani. The dsas were frequent allies of the Aryan tribes,
and they were probably assimilated into the Aryan society, giving rise to a class
distinction.[112] Many dsas were however in a servile position, giving rise to the
eventual meaning of dsa as servant or slave.
Towards the end of the Atharva Veda period, new class distinctions emerged.
The erstwhile dsas are renamed Shudras, probably to distinguish from the new
meaning of dsa as slave. The ryas are renamed visor Vaishya (meaning the
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members of the tribe) and the new elite classes of Brahmins (priests) and
Kshatriyas (warriors) are designated as new varnas. The Shudras were not only
the erstwhile dsas but also included the aboriginal tribes that were assimilated
into the Aryan society as it expanded into Gangetic settlements. There is no
evidence of restrictions regarding food and marriage during the Vedic period.
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engaged in low-ranked occupations such as basket-weaving and
sweeping. The gahapatis were an economic class of land-holding agriculturists,
who employed dasa-kammakaras (slaves and hired labourers) to work on the
land. They were the primary taxpayers of the state. This class was apparently
not defined by birth, but by individual economic growth.
While there was an alignment between kulas and occupations at least at the high
and low ends, there was no strict linkage between class/caste and occupation,
especially among those in the middle range. Many occupations listed such as
accounting and writing were not linked to jatis. Peter Masefield, in his review of
caste situation in India states that anyone could in principle perform any
profession. The texts state that the Brahmin took food from anyone, suggesting
that strictures of commensality were as yet unknown. The Nikaya texts also
imply that endogamy was not mandated.
The contestations of the period are evident from the texts describing dialogues
of Buddha with the Brahmins. The Brahmins maintain their divinely ordained
superiority and assert their right to draw service from the lower orders. Buddha
responds by pointing out the basic facts of biological birth common to all men
and asserts that the ability to draw service is obtained economically, not by
divine right. Using the example of the northwest of the subcontinent, Buddha
points out that aryas could become dasas and vice versa. This form of social
mobility was endorsed by Buddha.
Imperial rule and the end of population mixture (ca. 100 CE)
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forbade intermarriage between castes. Basu et al. (2016) conform the findings of
Moorjani et al. (2013), and further note that
... gene flow ended abruptly with the defining imposition of some social values
and norms. The reign of the ardent Hindu Gupta rulers, known as the age of
Vedic Brahminism, was marked by strictures laid down in Dharmaa sastra
the ancient compendium of moral laws and principles for religious duty and
righteous conduct to be followed by a Hinduand enforced through the
powerful state machinery of a developing political economy. These strictures
and enforcements resulted in a shift to endogamy.
The Chinese traveller Xuanzang in the 7th century AD made no mention of any
caste system.
Scholars have tried to locate historical evidence for the existence and nature of
varna and jati in documents and inscriptions of medieval India. Supporting
evidence for the existence and nature of varna and jati systems in medieval
India has been elusive, and contradicting evidence has emerged.
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rare temple donor records from warrior families of the 14th century CE claim to
be Shudras, one states that Shudras are the bravest, the other states Shudras are
the purest.[138] Richard Eaton, a professor of History, writes, "anyone could
become warrior regardless of social origins, nor do jati - another pillar of
alleged traditional Indian society - appear as features of people's identity.
Occupations were fluid." Evidence shows, states Eaton, that Shudras were part
of the nobility, and many "father and sons had different professions, suggesting
that social status was earned, not inherited" in the Hindu Kakatiya population, in
the Deccan region of India, between 11th to 14th century CE.
For northern Indian region, Susan Bayly writes, "until well into the colonial
period, much of the subcontinent was still populated by people for whom the
formal distinctions of caste were of only limited importance; Even in parts of
the so-called Hindu heartland of Gangetic upper India, the institutions and
beliefs which are now often described as the elements of traditional caste were
only just taking shape as recently as the early eighteenth century - that is the
period of collapse of Mughal period and the expansion of western power in the
subcontinent."
For west India, Dirk Kolff, a professor of Humanities, suggests open status
social groups dominated Rajput history during the medieval period. He states,
"The omnipresence of cognatic kinship and caste in North India is a relatively
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new phenomenon that only became dominant in the early Mughal and British
periods respectively. Historically speaking, the alliance and the open status
group, whether war band or religious sect, dominated medieval and early
modern Indian history in a way descent and caste did not."
Medieval era, Islamic Sultanates and Mughal empire period (1000 to 1750
CE)
Early and mid 20th century Muslim historians, such as Hashimi in 1927 and
Qureshi in 1962, proposed that "caste system was established before the arrival
of Islam, and it and a nomadic savage lifestyle" in the northwest Indian
subcontinent were the primary cause why Sindhi non-Muslims "embraced Islam
in flocks" when Arab Muslim armies invaded the region. According to this
hypothesis, the mass conversions occurred from the lower caste Hindus and
Mahayana Buddhists who had become "corroded from within by the infiltration
of Hindu beliefs and practices". This theory is now widely believed to be
baseless and false.
Derryl MacLein, a professor of social history and Islamic studies, states that
historical evidence does not support this theory, whatever evidence is available
suggests that Muslim institutions in north-west India legitimised and continued
any inequalities that existed, and that neither Buddhists nor "lower caste"
Hindus converted to Islam because they viewed Islam to lack a caste
system. Conversions to Islam were rare, states MacLein, and conversions
attested by historical evidence confirms that the few who did convert were
Brahmin Hindus (theoretically, the upper caste). MacLein states the caste and
conversion theories about Indian society during the Islamic era are not based on
historical evidence or verifiable sources, but personal assumptions of Muslim
historians about the nature of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism in northwest
Indian subcontinent.
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Richard Eaton, a professor of History, states that the presumption of a rigid
Hindu caste system and oppression of lower castes in pre-Islamic era in India,
and it being the cause of "mass conversion to Islam" during the medieval era
suffers from the problem that "no evidence can be found in support of the
theory, and it is profoundly illogical".
Peter Jackson, a professor of Medieval History and Muslim India, writes that
the speculative hypotheses about caste system in Hindu states during the
medieval Delhi Sultanate period (~1200 to 1500 CE) and the existence of a
caste system as being responsible for Hindu weakness in resisting the plunder
by Islamic armies is appealing at first sight, but "they do not withstand closer
scrutiny and historical evidence". Jackson states that, contrary to the theoretical
model of caste where Kshatriyas only could be warriors and soldiers, historical
evidence confirms that Hindu warriors and soldiers during the medieval era
included other castes such as Vaishyas and Shudras. Further, there is no
evidence, writes Jackson, there ever was a "widespread conversion to Islam at
the turn of twelfth century" by Hindus of lower caste. Jamal Malik, a professor
of Islamic studies, extends this observation further, and states that "at no time in
history did Hindus of low caste convert en masse to Islam".
Jamal Malik states that caste as a social stratification is a well studied Indian
system, yet evidence also suggests that hierarchical concepts, class
consciousness and social stratification had already occurred in Islam before
Islam arrived in India. The concept of caste, or 'qaum' in Islamic literature, is
mentioned by a few Islamic historians of medieval India, states Malik, but these
mentions relate to the fragmentation of the Muslim society in India. Zia al-Din
al-Barani of Delhi Sultanate in his Fatawa-ye Jahandari and Abu al-Fadl from
Akbar's court of Mughal Empire are the few Islamic court historians who
mention caste. Zia al-Din al-Barani's discussion, however, is not about non-
Muslim castes, rather a declaration of the supremacy of Ashraf caste
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over Ardhal caste among the Muslims, justifying it in Quranic text, with
"aristocratic birth and superior genealogy being the most important traits of a
human".
Irfan Habib, an Indian historian, states that Abu al-Fadl's Ain-i Akbari provides
a historical record and census of the Jat peasant caste of Hindus in northern
India, where the zamindars (tax collecting noble class), the armed cavalry and
infantry (warrior class) doubling up as the farming peasants (working class),
were all of the same Jat caste in the 16th century. These occupationally diverse
members from one caste served each other, writes Habib, either because of their
reaction to taxation pressure of Muslim rulers or because they belonged to the
same caste. Peasant social stratification and caste lineages were, states Habib,
tools for tax revenue collection in areas under the Islamic rule.
Susan Bayly, an anthropologist, notes that "caste is not and never has been a
fixed fact of Indian life" and the caste system as we know it today, as a
"ritualised scheme of social stratification," developed in two stages during the
post-Mughal period, in 18th and early 19th century. Three sets of value played
an important role in this development: priestly hierarchy, kingship, and armed
ascetics.
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With the Islamic Mughal empire falling apart in the 18th century, regional post-
Mughal ruling elites and new dynasties from diverse religious, geographical and
linguistic background attempted to assert their power in different parts of
India.[166] Bayly states that these obscure post-Mughal elites associated
themselves with kings, priests and ascetics, deploying the symbols of caste and
kinship to divide their populace and consolidate their power. In addition, in this
fluid stateless environment, some of the previously casteless segments of
society grouped themselves into caste groups.[13] However, in 18th century
writes Bayly, India-wide networks of merchants, armed ascetics and armed
tribals often ignored these ideologies of caste. Most people did not treat caste
norms as given absolutes writes Bayly, but challenged, negotiated and adapted
these norms to their circumstances. Communities teamed in different regions of
India, into "collective classing" to mold the social stratification in order to
maximise assets and protect themselves from loss.[168] The "caste, class,
community" structure that formed became valuable in a time when state
apparatus was fragmenting, was unreliable and fluid, when rights and life were
unpredictable.
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While legal codes and state administration was emerging in India, with the
rising power of the colonial Europeans, Dirks states that the late 18th century
British writings on India say little about caste system in India, and
predominantly discuss territorial conquest, alliances, warfare and diplomacy in
India. Colin Mackenzie, a British social historian of this time, collected vast
numbers of texts on Indian religions, culture, traditions and local histories from
south India and Deccan region, but his collection and writings have very little
on caste system in 18th century India.
Although the varnas and jatis have pre-modern origins, the caste system as it
exists today is the result of developments during the post-Mughal period and
the British colonial regime, which made caste organisation a central mechanism
of administration.
Basis
Jati were the basis of caste ethnology during the British colonial era. In the 1881
census and thereafter, colonial ethnographers used caste (jati) headings, to count
and classify people in what was then British India (now
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma). The 1891 census included 60 sub-
groups each subdivided into six occupational and racial categories, and the
number increased in subsequent censuses. The British colonial era census caste
tables, states Susan Bayly, "ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati
listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical
classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their
supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth". While
bureaucratic British officials completed reports on their zoological classification
of Indian people, some British officials criticised these exercises as being little
more than a caricature of the reality of caste system in India. The British
colonial officials used the census-determined jatis to decide which group of
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people were qualified for which jobs in the colonial government, and people of
which jatis were to be excluded as unreliable. These census caste classifications,
states Gloria Raheja, a professor of Anthropology, were also used by the British
officials over the late 19th century and early 20th century, to formulate land tax
rates, as well as to frequently target some social groups as "criminal" castes and
castes prone to "rebellion".
The population then comprised about 200 million people, across five major
religions, and over 500,000 agrarian villages, each with a population between
100 and 1,000 people of various age groups, which were variously divided into
numerous castes. This ideological scheme was theoretically composed of
around 3,000 castes, which in turn was claimed to be composed of 90,000 local
endogamous sub-groups.
Race science
Enforcement
From the 1850s, photography was used in Indian subcontinent by the British for
anthropological purposes, helping classify the different castes, tribes and native
trades. Included in this collection were Hindu, Muslim and Buddhist (Sinhalese)
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people classified by castes. Above is an 1860s photograph of Rajputs, classified
as a high Hindu caste.
The role of the British Raj on the caste system in India is controversial. The
caste system became legally rigid during the Raj, when the British started to
enumerate castes during their ten-year census and meticulously codified the
system. Between 1860 and 1920, the British segregated Indians by caste,
granting administrative jobs and senior appointments only to the upper castes.
Starting with the 19th century, the British colonial government passed a series
of laws that applied to Indians based on their religion and caste
identification. These colonial era laws and their provisions used the term
"Tribes", which included castes within their scope. This terminology was
preferred for various reasons, including Muslim sensitivities that considered
castes by definition Hindu, and preferred "Tribes" a more generic term that
included Muslims.
The British colonial government, for instance, enacted the Criminal Tribes Act
of 1871. This law states Simon Cole, a professor of Criminology, Law &
Society, declared everyone belonging to certain castes to be born with criminal
tendencies. Ramnarayan Rawat, a professor of History and specialising in social
exclusion in Indian subcontinent, states that the criminal-by-birth castes under
this Act included initially Ahirs, Gujars and Jats, but its enforcement expanded
by late 19th century to include most Shudras and untouchables such
as Chamars, as well as Sanyassis and hill tribes. Castes suspected of rebelling
against colonial laws and seeking self-rule for India, such as the previously
ruling families Kallars and the Maravars in south India and non-loyal castes in
north India such as Ahirs, Gujars and Jats, were called "predatory and
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barbarian" and added to the criminal castes list. Some caste groups were
targeted using the Criminal Tribes Act even when there were no reports of any
violence or criminal activity, but where their forefathers were known to have
rebelled against Mughal or British authorities, or these castes were demanding
labour rights and disrupting colonial tax collecting authorities.
The colonial government prepared a list of criminal castes, and all members
registered in these castes by caste-census were restricted in terms of regions
they could visit, move about in or people they could socialise with. In certain
regions of colonial India, entire caste groups were presumed guilty by birth,
arrested, children separated from their parents, and held in penal colonies or
quarantined without conviction or due process. This practice became
controversial, did not enjoy the support of all colonial British officials, and in a
few cases, states Henry Schwarz, a professor at Georgetown University
specialising in the history of colonial and postcolonial India, this decades-long
practice was reversed at the start of the 20th century with the proclamation that
people "could not be incarcerated indefinitely on the presumption of [inherited]
bad character". The criminal-by-birth laws against targeted castes was enforced
from early 19th century through the mid-20th century, with an expansion of
criminal castes list in west and south India through the 1900s to
1930s. Hundreds of Hindu communities were brought under the Criminal Tribes
Act. By 1931, the colonial government included 237 criminal castes and tribes
under the act in the Madras Presidency alone.
28
Religion and caste segregated human rights
Eleanor Nesbitt, a professor of History and Religions in India, states that the
colonial government hardened the caste-driven divisions in British India not
only through its caste census, but with a series of laws in early 20th
century. The British colonial officials, for instance, enacted laws such as
the Land Alienation Act in 1900 and Punjab Pre-Emption Act in 1913, listing
castes that could legally own land and denying equivalent property rights to
other census-determined castes. These acts prohibited the inter-generational and
intra-generational transfer of land from land-owning castes to any non-
agricultural castes, thereby preventing economic mobility of property and
creating consequent caste barriers in India.
Social identity
Nicholas Dirks has argued that Indian caste as we know it today is a "modern
phenomenon," as caste was "fundamentally transformed by British colonial
rule." According to Dirks, before colonialism caste affiliation was quite loose
and fluid, but the British regime enforced caste affiliation rigorously, and
constructed a much more strict hierarchy than existed previously, with some
castes being criminalised and others being given preferential treatment.
De Zwart notes that the caste system used to be thought of as an ancient fact of
Hindu life and that contemporary scholars argue instead that the system was
constructed by the British colonial regime. He says that "jobs and education
opportunities were allotted based on caste, and people rallied and adopted a
29
caste system that maximized their opportunity". De Zwart also notes that post-
colonial affirmative action only reinforced the "British colonial project that ex
hypothesi constructed the caste system".
Further development
Assumptions about the caste system in Indian society, along with its nature,
evolved during British rule. Corbridge concludes that British policies of divide
and rule of India's numerous princely sovereign states, as well as enumeration
of the population into rigid categories during the 10-year census, particularly
with the 1901 and 1911 census, contributed towards the hardening of caste
identities.
Social unrest during 1920s led to a change in this policy. From then on, the
colonial administration began a policy of positive discrimination by reserving a
certain percentage of government jobs for the lower castes.
In the round table conference held on August 1932, upon the request of
Ambedkar, the then Prime Minister of Britain, Ramsay Macdonald made
a Communal Award which awarded a provision for separate representation for
the Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans and Dalits. These
depressed classes were assigned a number of seats to be filled by election from
special constituencies in which voters belonging to the depressed classes only
30
could vote. Gandhi went on a hunger strike against this provision claiming that
such an arrangement would split the Hindu community into two groups. Years
later, Ambedkar wrote that Gandhi's fast was a form of coercion. This
agreement, which saw Gandhi end his fast and Ambedkar drop his demand for a
separate electorate, was called the Poona Pact.
Smelser and Lipset propose in their review of Hutton's study of caste system in
colonial India the theory that individual mobility across caste lines may have
been minimal in British India because it was ritualistic. They state that this may
be because the colonial social stratification worked with the pre-existing ritual
caste system.
The emergence of a caste system in the modern form, during the early British
colonial rule in the 18th and 19th century, was not uniform in South Asia.
Claude Markovits, a French historian of colonial India, writes that Hindu
society in north and west India (Sindh), in late 18th century and much of 19th
century, lacked a proper caste system, their religious identities were fluid (a
combination of Saivism, Vaisnavism, Sikhism), and the Brahmins were not the
widespread priestly group (but the Bawas were). Markovits writes, "if religion
was not a structuring factor, neither was caste" among the Hindu merchants
group of northwest India.
31
Contemporary India
Caste politics
Societal stratification, and the inequality that comes with it, still exists in
India, and has been thoroughly criticised. Government policies aim at reducing
this inequality by reservation, quota for backward classes, but paradoxically
also have created an incentive to keep this stratification alive. The Indian
government officially recognises historically discriminated communities of
India such as the Untouchables under the designation of Scheduled Castes, and
certain economically backward castes as Other Backward Castes.
Leonard and Weller have surveyed marriage and genealogical records to study
patterns of exogamous inter-caste and endogamous intra-caste marriages in a
32
regional population of India between 1900-1975. They report a striking
presence of exogamous marriages across caste lines over time, particularly since
the 1970s. They propose education, economic development, mobility and more
interaction between youth as possible reasons for these exogamous marriages.
A 2003 article in The Telegraph claimed that inter-caste marriage and dating
were common in urban India. Indian societal and family relationships are
changing because of female literacy and education, women at work,
urbanisation, the need for two-income families, and global influences through
television. Female role models in politics, academia, journalism, business, and
India's feminist movement have accelerated the change.
Caste-related violence
Main article: Caste-related violence in India
Affirmative action
33
The National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was
established to investigate, monitor, advise, and evaluate the socio-economic
progress of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
A reservation system for people classified as Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes has existed for over 50 years. The presence of privately
owned free market corporations in India is limited and public sector jobs
have dominated the percentage of jobs in its economy. A 2000 report
estimated that most jobs in India were in companies owned by the
government or agencies of the government. The reservation system
implemented by India over 50 years, has been partly successful, because of
all jobs, nationwide, in 1995, 17.2 percent of the jobs were held by those in
the lowest castes.
The Indian government classifies government jobs in four groups. The
Group A jobs are senior most, high paying positions in the government,
while Group D are junior most, lowest paying positions. In Group D jobs,
the percentage of positions held by lowest caste classified people is 30%
greater than their demographic percentage. In all jobs classified as Group C
positions, the percentage of jobs held by lowest caste people is about the
same as their demographic population distribution. In Group A and B jobs,
the percentage of positions held by lowest caste classified people is 30%
lower than their demographic percentage.
The presence of lowest caste people in highest paying, senior most position
jobs in India has increased by ten-fold, from 1.18 percent of all jobs in 1959
to 10.12 percent of all jobs in 1995.
In 2007, India elected K. G. Balakrishnan, a Dalit, to the office of Chief
Justice.
In 2007, Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state of India,
elected Mayawati as the Chief Minister, the highest elected office of the
34
state. BBC claims, "Mayawati Kumari is an icon for millions of India's
Dalits, or untouchables as they used to be known."
In 2009, the Indian parliament unanimously elected a Dalit, Meira Kumar, as
the first female speaker.
Recognition
Mandal commission
The Mandal Commission covered more than 3000 castes under Other Backward
Class (OBC) category, regardless of their affluence or economic status and
stated that OBCs form around 52% of the Indian population. However, the
National Sample Survey puts the figure at 32%. There is substantial debate over
the exact number of OBCs in India; it is generally estimated to be sizable, but
many believe that it is lower than the figures quoted by either the Mandal
Commission or the National Sample Survey.
The reservation system has led to widespread protests, such as the 2006 Indian
anti-reservation protests, with many complaining of reverse
discrimination against the Forward Castes (the castes that do not qualify for the
reservation).
In May 2011, the government approved a poverty, religion and caste census to
identify poverty in different social backgrounds. The census would also help the
36
government to re-examine and possibly undo some of the policies which were
formed in haste such as the Mandal Commission in order to bring more
objectivity to the policies with respect to contemporary realities. Critics of the
reservation system believe that there is actually no social stigma at all
associated with belonging to a backward caste and that because of the huge
constitutional incentives in the form of educational and job reservations, a large
number of people will falsely identify with a backward caste to receive the
benefits. This would not only result in a marked inflation of the backward
castes' numbers, but also lead to enormous administrative and judicial resources
being devoted to social unrest and litigation when such dubious caste
declarations are challenged.
37
their improvement lagged behind that of dalits and adivasis. The net percentage
school attainment for Dalits and Muslims were statistically the same in 1999.
A 2007 nationwide survey of India by the World Bank found that over 80
percent of children of historically discriminated castes were attending schools.
The fastest increase in school attendance by Dalit community children occurred
during the recent periods of India's economic growth.
A study by Darshan Singh presents data on health and other indicators of socio-
economic change in India's historically discriminated castes. He claims:
In 2001, the literacy rates in India's lowest castes was 55 percent, compared
to a national average of 63 percent.
The childhood vaccination levels in India's lowest castes was 40 percent in
2001, compared to a national average of 44 percent.
Access to drinking water within household or near the household in India's
lowest castes was 80 percent in 2001, compared to a national average of 83
percent.
The poverty level in India's lowest castes dropped from 49 percent to 39
percent between 1995 and 2005, compared to a national average change
from 35 to 27 percent.
The life expectancy of various caste groups in modern India has been raised; but
the Mohanty and Ram report suggests that poverty, not caste, is the bigger
differentiation in life expectancy in modern India.
While identified with Hinduism, caste systems are found in other religions on
the Indian subcontinent, including groups of Buddhists, Christians and Muslims.
38
Christians
Main article: Caste system among Indian Christians
Muslims
Main article: Caste system among South Asian Muslims
Caste system has been observed among Muslims in India. They practice
endogamy, hypergamy, hereditary occupations, avoid social mixing and have
39
been stratified. There is some controversy if these characteristics make them
social groups or castes of Islam.
Indian Muslims are a mix of Sunni (majority), Shia and other sects of
Islam. From the earliest days of Islam's arrival in South Asia, the Arabic,
Persian and Afghan Muslims have been part of the upper, noble caste. Some
upper caste Hindus converted to Islam and became part of the governing group
of Sultanates and Mughal Empire, who along with Arabs, Persians and Afghans
came to be known as Ashrafs (or nobles). Below them are the middle caste
Muslims called Ajlafs, and the lowest status is those of the Arzals. Anti-caste
activists like Ambedkar called the Arzal caste among Muslims as the equivalent
of Hindu untouchables, as did the controversial colonial British
ethnographer Risley.
In Bengal, some Muslims refer to the social stratification within their society
as qaum (or Quoms), a term that is found among Muslims elsewhere in India, as
well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Qaums have patrilineal hereditary, with
ranked occupations and endogamy. Membership in a qaum is inherited by
birth. Barth identifies the origin of the stratification from the historical
segregation between pak (pure) and paleed (impure) - - defined by the family's
social or religious status, occupation and involvement in sexual crimes.
Originally, Paleed/Paleet qaum included people running or working at brothels,
prostitution service providers or professional courtesan/dancers (Tawaif) and
musicians. There is history of skin color defining Pak/Paleed, but that does not
have historical roots, and was adopted by outsiders using analogy from Hindu
Caste system. The term is still used to show hate for entertainers and musicians,
who are not respected in some societies and categorized (falsely) as decendents
of the people identified as Paleed qaum in history, referring to Tawaif Dancers
and Brothels of the Mughal era.
40
Similarly, Christians in Pakistan are called "Isai", meaning followers of Isa
(Jesus). But the term originates from Hindu Caste system and refers to the
demeaning jobs performed by Christians in Pakistan out of poverty. Efforts are
being made to replace the term with "Masihi" (Messiah), which is preferred by
the Christians citizens of Pakistan.
Some assert that the Muslim castes are not as acute in their discrimination as
those of the Hindus, while critics of Islam assert that the discrimination in South
Asian Muslim society is worse.
Sikh
Although the Sikh Gurus criticised the hierarchy of the caste system, one does
exist in Sikh community. According to Sunrinder S, Jodhka, the Sikh religion
does not advocate discrimination against any caste or creed, however, in
practice, Sikhs belonging to the landowning dominant castes have not shed all
their prejudices against the Dalits. While Dalits would be allowed entry into the
village gurudwaras they would not be permitted to cook or serve langar (the
communal meal). Therefore, wherever they could mobilise resources, the Dalits
of Punjab have tried to construct their own gurudwara and other local level
institutions in order to attain a certain degree of cultural autonomy.
41
The Sikh literature from the Islamic rule and British colonial era
mention Varna as Varan, and Jati as Zat or Zat-biradari. Eleanor Nesbitt, a
professor of Religion and author of books on Sikhism, states that the Varanis
described as a class system, while Zat has some caste system features in Sikh
literature. In theory, Nesbitt states Sikh literature does not recognise caste
hierarchy or differences. In practice, states Nesbitt, widespread endogamy
practice among Sikhs has been prevalent in modern times, and poorer Sikhs of
disadvantaged castes continue to gather in their own places of worship. Most
Sikh families, writes Nesbitt, continue to check the caste of any prospective
marriage partner for their children. She notes that all Gurus of Sikhs married
within their Zat, and they did not condemn or break with the convention of
endogamous marriages for their own children or Sikhs in general.
Jains
42
Table 1. Distribution of Population by Religion and Caste Categories
Distribution
43
shrunk to 41% by 2006 when the National Sample Survey Organisation took
place.
Criticism
There has been criticism of the caste system from both within and outside of
India. Since the 1980s, caste has become a major issue in the politics of India.
The caste system has been criticised by many Hindu social reformers.
Jyotirao Phule
Vivekananda
44
Gandhi
45
cannot be judged by a caricature of its worst specimens. Gandhi stated that one
must consider the best it produced as well, along with the vast majority in
impoverished Indian villages struggling to make ends meet, with woes of which
there was little knowledge.
Ambedkar
A 1922 stereograph of Hindu children of high caste, Bombay. This was part of
Underwood & Underwood stereoscope journey of colonial world. This and
related collections became controversial for staging extreme effects and
constructing identities of various colonised nations. Christopher Pinney remarks
such imaging was a part of surveillance and imposed identities upon Indians
that were resented.
46
laws of India, but they derived no benefit from this. They lived on the outskirts
of a village. Segregated from the rest, bound down to a code of behaviour, they
lived a life appropriate to a servile state. According to this code, an Untouchable
could not do anything that raised him or her above his or her appointed station
in life. The caste system stamped an individual as untouchable from birth.
Thereafter, observed Ambedkar, his social status was fixed, and his economic
condition was permanently set. The tragic part was that
the Mahomedans, Parsis and Christians shunned and avoided the Untouchables,
as well as the Hindus. Ambedkar acknowledged that the caste system wasn't
universally absolute in his time; it was true, he wrote, that some Untouchables
had risen in Indian society above their usually low status, but the majority had
limited mobility, or none, during Britain's colonial rule. According to
Ambedkar, the caste system was irrational. Ambedkar listed these evils of the
caste system: it isolated people, infused a sense of inferiority into lower-caste
individuals, and divided humanity. The caste system was not merely a social
problem, he argued: it traumatised India's people, its economy, and the
discourse between its people, preventing India from developing and sharing
knowledge, and wrecking its ability to create and enjoy the fruits of freedom.
The philosophy supporting the social stratification system in India had
discouraged critical thinking and cooperative effort, encouraging instead
treatises that were full of absurd conceits, quaint fancies, and chaotic
speculations. The lack of social mobility, notes Ambedkar, had prevented India
from developing technology which can aid man in his effort to make a bare
living, and a life better than that of the brute. Ambedkar stated that the resultant
absence of scientific and technical progress, combined with all the
transcendentalism and submission to one's fate, perpetrated famines, desolated
the land, and degraded the consciousness from respecting the civic rights of
every fellow human being.
47
According to Ambedkar, castes divided people, only to disintegrate and cause
myriad divisions which isolated people and caused confusion. Even the upper
caste, the Brahmin, divided itself and disintegrated. The curse of caste,
according to him, split the Brahmin priest class into well over 1400 sub-castes.
This is supported by census data collected by colonial ethnographers in British
India (now South Asia).
Islam
Sikhism
Christianity
Caste politics
Economic inequality
48
ranking groups. A report published in 2001 note that in India 36.3% of people
own no land at all, 60.6% own about 15% of the land, with a very wealthy 3.1%
owning 15% of the land. A study by Haque reports that India contains both the
largest number of rural poor, and the largest number of landless households on
the planet. Haque also reports that over 90 percent of both scheduled castes
(low-ranking groups) and all other castes (high-ranking groups) either do not
own land or own land area capable of producing less than $1000 per year of
food and income per household. However, over 99 percent of India's farms are
less than 10 hectares, and 99.9 percent of the farms are less than 20 hectares,
regardless of the farmer or landowner's caste. Indian government has, in
addition, vigorously pursued agricultural land ceiling laws which prohibit
anyone from owning land greater than mandated limits. India has used this law
to forcibly acquire land from some, then redistribute tens of millions of acres to
the landless and poor of the low-caste. Haque suggests that Indian lawmakers
need to reform and modernise the nation's land laws and rely less on blind
adherence to land ceilings and tenancy reform.
In a 2011 study, Aiyar too notes that such qualitative theories of economic
exploitation and consequent land redistribution within India between 1950 and
1990 had no effect on the quality of life and poverty reduction. Instead,
economic reforms since the 1990s and resultant opportunities for non-
agricultural jobs have reduced poverty and increased per capita income for all
segments of Indian society. For specific evidence, Aiyar mentions the following
Critics believe that the economic liberalisation has benefited just a small elite
and left behind the poor, especially the lowest Hindu caste of dalits. But a recent
authoritative survey revealed striking improvements in living standards of dalits
in the last two decades. Television ownership was up from zero to 45 percent;
cellphone ownership up from zero to 36 percent; two-wheeler ownership (of
motorcycles, scooters, mopeds) up from zero to 12.3 percent; children eating
49
yesterday's leftovers down from 95.9 percent to 16.2 percent ... Dalits running
their own businesses up from 6 percent to 37 percent; and proportion working
as agricultural labourers down from 46.1 percent to 20.5 percent.
Cassan has studied the differential effect within two segments of India's Dalit
community. He finds India's overall economic growth has produced the fastest
and more significant socio-economic changes. Cassan further concludes that
legal and social program initiatives are no longer India's primary constraint in
further advancement of India's historically discriminated castes; further
advancement are likely to come from improvements in the supply of quality
schools in rural and urban India, along with India's economic growth.
Sociologists Kevin Reilly, Stephen Kaufman and Angela Bodino, while critical
of caste system, conclude that modern India does not practice apartheid since
there is no state-sanctioned discrimination. They write that casteism in India is
presently "not apartheid. In fact, untouchables, as well as tribal people and
members of the lowest castes in India benefit from broad affirmative action
programmes and are enjoying greater political power."
50
same race." Various sociologists, anthropologists and historians have rejected
the racial origins and racial emphasis of caste and consider the idea to be one
that has purely political and economic undertones. Beteille writes that "the
Scheduled Castes of India taken together are no more a race than are the
Brahmins taken together. Every social group cannot be regarded as a race
simply because we want to protect it against prejudice and discrimination", and
that the 2001 Durban conference on racism hosted by the U.N. is "turning its
back on established scientific opinion".
51
In popular culture
Mulk Raj Anand's debut novel, Untouchable (1935), is based on the theme of
untouchability. The Hindi film Achhoot Kanya (Untouchable Maiden, 1936),
starring Ashok Kumar and Devika Rani, was an early reformist film. The debut
novel of Arundhati Roy, The God of Small Things (1997), also has themes
surrounding the caste system across religions. A lawyer named Sabu Thomas
filed a petition to have the book published without the last chapter, which had
graphic description of sexual acts between members of different castes.
52
Conclusion
country has been weakened to such a degree that they could not properly defend
themselves in a unified way from the invasions and modern fundamentalism.
This sort of fragmentation was also a factor that helped force Indians to endure
two centuries of British persecutions. social disharmony, Ethnic intolerance is
on the rise in many parts of India.
A Caste can exist only within a system of Castes. An enclosed unit called a
Caste has no meaning if it does not exist in the midst of other enclosed units.
The Caste system is one in which doors and windows to other Castes are closed.
To open or to break the doors cannot be a decision of just one Caste. It has to be
a decision by consensus. The breaking of Caste boundaries involves an exit as
53
well an entrance. Whilst one Caste may make a decision to exit from its
boundaries, entering into boundaries held by others requires their consent.
When the most socially and politically powerful Castes want to remain
enclosed, lower Castes' decisions to break open can have little effect. When
higher Castes rules of internal discipline require strict observance of enclosure,
revolts by lower Castes can make very little progress.
54