Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

TERESITA T. BAYONLA, A.C. No. 4808

Complainant,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
-versus- BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.:
ATTY. PURITA A. REYES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

November 22, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
- Code of Professional Responsibility.

This canon of professional responsibility is at the center of this

administrative complaint for disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion,
and breach of trust filed against Atty. Purita A. Reyes by Teresita T. Bayonla, her
client.[1]

Antecedents
 Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel of
land situated in Butuan City in their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will.
Their land was thereafter expropriated in connection with the construction of the
Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was
to be paid to their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were
the compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Pazs granddaughter and son.[2]

On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty,
deceit, conversion, and breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993,
she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share
in the expropriation compensation from the Air Transportation Office (ATO),
Cagayan De Oro City,[3]agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of whatever amount
would be collected; that in November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million
from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees,
would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and
had failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that on
June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO;
that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would
be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to
deliver the balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for
depriving her of her just share.[4]

In her comment dated February 10, 1998,[5] Atty. Reyes admitted that
Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting
their share in the expropriation compensation; that as consideration for her
services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that
she had given to Bayonla more than what had been due to her; that Alfredo had
received from the ATO the check for the second release corresponding to the share
of both Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the
second release; that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second release by
the ATO only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed to bear
the expenses for the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel and other
expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be absolved from liability
arising from the complaint.

On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.[6]

On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro (Commissioner

Navarro) rendered a report,[7] whereby she found and recommended against Atty.
Reyes as follows:
 In so far as this case of disbarment is concerned, the issue hinges
only on the complainants position; one of the heirs of Paz Durban whose
legal services of the respondent was not revoked.

The parties were required to submit documents relative to their

respective defenses (sic) specially the actual amounts released by ATO,
actual amount due to the complainant as her share, the remittances made
by the respondent to the complainant of her share and receipts to prove
the same.

Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an answer without the

necessary documents required of them and attached only a xerox copy of
the computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya for the heir of Pedro Durban
which had already been previously attached to the records of this case.

In the said computation it appears that for the release on February

17, 1993, the heirs of Durban received P84,852.00 and for the second
release each of them as well as the complainant was
entitled P121,119.11. It could be inferred from here that complainant
was supposed to received (sic) P205,971.11 as her share.

Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of 40% was (sic) supported by

evidence instead of (sic) complainants allegation of ten [10%] percent;
then respondent was entitled to P82,388.45 as attorneys fees; leaving a
balance of P123,582.66 due to the complainant.

Respondents allegation that she gave more than what was alleged
by the complainant is untenable for she did not submit evidence to prove
the same, therefore, as it is complainants allegation that she received
only P79,000.00 for her share as a whole shall be considered for the
moment until such time that proofs to the contrary shall have been
submitted.

Considering that complainant was supposed to receive the amount

due her which was P123,582.66 and actually received only P79,000.00;
then respondent still has to remit to complainant the amount
of P44,582.66.

From the records of this case respondent alleged that she only
collected the 40% attorneys fees for the second release whereby Alfredo
Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban received the check from ATO and
got a large part of the same. Respondent did not mention how much she
got as attorneys fees against complainants share but on the whole
amounting to P496,895.00 which is unfair to the complainant.

As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein should

have been advised by the respondent and given a breakdown of whatever
amount was received or came to her knowledge as complainants counsel.
Short of the foregoing, respondent violated Rule 16.01 Canon 16
Chapter III of the Code of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
 Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.

Respondent was given a chance to rectify whatever errors or

misgivings (sic) she had done for her client but she unfortunately failed
to do so and did not comply with the Order dated October 29, 1998.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully

recommends that the respondent be required to render an accounting or
inventory duly confirmed by the complainant of all the collected shares
due the complainant and remit to the latter the said amount
of P44.582.66;

Until such time that respondent had complied with the

aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice of her legal
profession.

Respectfully submitted.

On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report of Commissioner Navarro through Resolution No. XIII-99-165.[8]

Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP
Board of Governors denied her motion for reconsideration through Resolution No.
XIV-99-117.[9]

Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for reinvestigation. However, through its
Resolution No. XV-2001-111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board of
Governors denied the motion for reinvestigation for lack of jurisdiction, stating
that the matter had already been endorsed to the Court.[10]

On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report
on whether Atty. Reyes had already accounted for and remitted the amount
of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[11]

On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that
per the manifestation of Bayonlas counsel Atty. Reyes had not yet rendered an
accounting and had not yet remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[12]

Through her manifestation dated September 4, 2002 to the Court,[13] Atty.

Reyes posed some queries, as follows: (a) whether she could be compelled to pay
the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the latters claims had been based on
perjured statements; (b) whether the payment of the amount would operate to
dismiss the estafa case previously filed by Bayonla against her for allegedly failing
to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share; and (c) whether she could deposit the
amount of P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of Governors or the Court.

Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors
did not accord to her the right to confront Bayonla during the investigation
conducted by the IBP Board of Governors; that Bayonlas counsel had induced
Bayonla to file the estafa charge against her; and that this had prompted her to
initiate a disbarment complaint against Bayonlas counsel.[14]

On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the
final resolution of this case.[15] The recommendation was noted by the Court on
June 29, 2010.[16]

Issue

Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of

Governors were proper.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, which were

supported by the records, but we modify the sanctions to be imposed on Atty.
Reyes.

I
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer

shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her
possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for
all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of
Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the
lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.

The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a

lawyer and her client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree
of fidelity and good faith. There is no question that the money or property received
by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. [17] Conformably with these
canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to
render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client.
This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money
collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.[18]

Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount
of P84,852.00 out of the first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the
second release. Her total share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty.
Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of
Bayonlas share, the net share of Bayonla was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes
actually delivered to her only P79,000.00,[19] which was short
by P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP
Board of Governors for her to remit the shortage,[20] Atty. Reyes refused to do so.

By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated
the aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of
Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to
the client.[21] The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client warrants
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer. [22] Without doubt, Atty.
Reyes failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand
was deceit, for it signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in
violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct
for which the penalty of suspension from the practice of law became justified
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by

a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or

disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension. (As amended by SC Resolution dated
February 13, 1992.)
 II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle
to administrative proceeding against respondent

The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of
the estafa charge by Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty
of Atty. Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla.
Nor did the pendency of such cases inhibit this administrative matter from
proceeding on its due course. It is indisputable that the pendency of any criminal
charges between the lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative
proceedings against the lawyer. We explained why in Suzuki v. Tiamson,[23] to wit:

The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will
not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. In this light, we refer to
this Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing In re Almacen, where
it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.

Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination

of respondents administrative liability and our findings herein
should not in any way be treated as having any material bearing on
any other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against
each other. [emphasis supplied]

Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents

Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza [24] that

xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
 respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar
finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a
favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative
liability of the lawyer.

It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous pendency of an

administrative case and a judicial proceeding related to the cause of the
administrative case, even if the charges and the evidence to be adduced in such
cases are similar, does not result into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or
deprivation of due process to the parties in either of the cases.[25]

III
No denial of due process to respondent

Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because
the IBP Board of Governors did not permit her to personally confront the
complainant.

We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention valid. She was accorded full
due process, for she in fact participated in all stages of the proceedings.

It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law until she has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
charges against her, to produce witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by herself
or counsel.[26] Contrary to Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of
Governors was under no legal obligation to conduct a trial-type proceeding at
which she could have personally confronted Bayonla. In other words, the lack of
such proceeding neither diminished her right to due process nor deprived her of the
right. A formal investigation entailing notice and hearing is required in
administrative proceedings for disbarment, but the imperative need of notice and
hearing does not always mean the holding of an adversarial trial-type proceeding.
Due process is still satisfied when the parties are afforded the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their respective
sides.[27] As the Court said in Samalio v. Court of Appeals:[28]

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-

type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met
in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long
 as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties
as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings
which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his
answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as other motions and papers.
He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And
any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. [bold emphasis supplied]

Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors actually conducted a formal

investigation of the complaint against Atty. Reyes upon the directive of the Court.
In her formal investigation of the complaint, Commissioner Navarro allowed both
parties to submit their respective proofs on the actual amounts released by the
ATO, the amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty. Reyes corresponding
contingent fees, the remittances by Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and the receipts
showing such remittances.[29] In due course, Atty. Reyes submitted her written
answer, attaching to the answer the documents supporting her
defenses.[30] Commissioner Navarro took all of Atty. Reyes submissions into good
and proper account, as borne out by her report.[31] And even after the IBP Board of
Governors had adopted Commissioner Navarros report (and its recommendation),
Atty. Reyes was still afforded the fair opportunity to challenge the adverse findings
by filing her motion for reconsideration, although such motion was ultimately
resolved against her.[32]

IV
Sanction

The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite
demand of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a
client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez,
Jr. v. Langit,[33] the lawyer who withdrew the rentals pertaining to his client
totaling P255,000.00 without the knowledge of the client and who ignored the
demand of the client to account for and to return the amount was suspended from
the practice of law for two years. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[34] the lawyer
received P155,000.00 from the adversary of his clients as partial payment of a final
and executory decision in favor of the clients pursuant to a secret arrangement
between the lawyer and the adversary, and deposited the amount to the lawyers
personal bank account without the knowledge of the clients; the lawyer thereafter
refused to surrender the money to his clients. The suspension of the lawyer for two
years from the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In Small v. Banares,[35] a
similar penalty of suspension for a period of two years from the practice of law
was imposed on a lawyer who had failed to file a case for the purpose of which he
had received an amount of P80,000.00, and to return the amount upon
demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero,[36] the Court suspended for a period of two years
from the practice of law a lawyer who had failed to immediately account for and to
return P300,000.00 received from a client for the purpose of depositing it in court,
after the lawyer had been found not to have deposited the money in court.

Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the
sins thus sanctioned in the aforementioned precedents, the proper penalty for her is
suspension from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar
offense by her will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67,

which the IBP Board of Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution.
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily
to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts
silence about the respondent lawyers legal obligation to restitute the complainant
will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct
concerning the clients funds or property should be required to still litigate in
another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as
the respondents liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required
restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases
of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, and Small v.
Banares, supra.

In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% per annum reckoned
from June 22, 1997, the date when she was formally charged with disbarment. This
rate of interest was prescribed by the Court in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and Small
v. Banares.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ATTY.

PURITA A. REYES guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the practice of
law for a period of two years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning
that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.
 The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla
within 30 days from receipt of this Decision the amount of P44,582.67, with
interest of 12% per annum from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the complainant
a complete written accounting and inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had
collected from the Air Transportation Office as expropriation compensation; (b)
the total amount due to the complainant; (c) the total amount she had actually
remitted to the complainant; and (d) the amount she had deducted as her contingent
fee vis--vis the complainant.

Within the same period of compliance, Atty. Reyes shall submit to the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, authentic written proof that her
accounting, inventory, and payment were furnished to and received by the
complainant in due course.

This Decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated

proceedings against Atty. Reyes.

Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, with a copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

B.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013

FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant) against
Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her late
husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.

After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred the complaint
to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
evaluation and recommendation.

The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located at Barangay
Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632
(property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the City Government of
Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former registered owner, Cirilo
Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC already fixed the
price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit 6,000,000.00 as just compensation
for the property.2

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case
as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged that the
respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he
left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent
further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Government when the RTC issues
the order to transfer the titles.3 The respondent then fraudulently without their knowledge and
consent, and contrary to their understanding converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos
So for 200,000.00.5

The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the 200,000.00 purchase price or that
they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least 6,000,000.00
as just compensation.6

The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mothers sister) are his uncle and his aunt,
respectively.7

The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8

The respondent argued that the complainants greed to get the just Compensation9 caused her to file
this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment case.10 He claimed that the sale was their
voluntary transaction and that he "simply ratified the document."11 He also claimed that Reynold and
Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000; that
they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold his share to Reynold
under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.12

The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any
"preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government.13 He also denied that the Deed of
Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it.14 That he filed for the spouses Ylaya and
Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there was no agreement
to use the document for the expropriation case.15 He also argued that it was clear from the document
that the intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because there were spaces for
the buyers legal age, marital status, and citizenship,16 and he was even constrained to file a
subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously
retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing them from his office.17 Lastly, he denied
violating the Rules on Notarial Practice.18

On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August
24, 2006 praying for the early resolution of the complaint.19

On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint
and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006.20

On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit21 affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000;22 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000;23 and the Deed of Absolute
Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to his
Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25

The IBPs Findings

In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad
Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).26 She recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.27

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the IBP Commissioners finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years
suspension and a warning:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner [in] the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years
with a Warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. [emphases
supplied]

On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008, attaching,
among others, a copy of the complainants Affidavit dated February 27, 2008, admitting the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Cirilo and
Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the complainant
dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case.29

On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court, requesting that
the IBP be directed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.30

By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,31 the IBP Board of Governors denied the
respondents Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or any cogent
reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.32

On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBPs
findings, as follows:33

a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and
fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal hearing
thus, violated the respondents right to due process as he was not able to cross-examine her.
This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to prove her
bare allegations;
 b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents (MOA and 2
other DOAS) duly executed by the parties therein and notarized by the respondent;

c) In totally ignoring the complainants Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale in issue;

d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya of the

subject lots despite the existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co-ownership of
Ylaya and So; and

e) In finding the respondent/appellants act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to the notarial
rules.

The Issues

From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:

(1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and

(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively
liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

The Courts Ruling

We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP
Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c),
Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34

We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties. We likewise
find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without
the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict of interests; and (2)
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

a. Due process violation

The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total
lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule, no denial of due process
takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case;35 what
is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not given the
"amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, to object to the
admissibility of documents or present controverting evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its conclusion
without requiring the complainant to adduce evidence in a formal hearing and despite the absence of
corroborative proof. He insists that these defects rendered the complainants allegations as hearsay,
and the IBPs report, recommendation or resolution null and void.

Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant when she
failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,37 the records reveal that
the respondent fully participated during the entire proceedings and submitted numerous pleadings,
including evidence, before the IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for reconsideration
supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its
Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.38

In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma,39 we held that due process, as
applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain ones side. In Samalio v. Court of
Appeals,40 due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in courts of justice. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The requirements
of due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,41 we held that "due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants
may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral
arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for
being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties."42

In this case, the respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground to
support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was heard through his
pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the
October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and testimony were received
and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendation,
and were the bases for the IBP Boards Resolution.

Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had
the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this case, the
requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent."43

We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24,
2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any further hearings. The motion, filed
almost one year after the mandatory conference on October 6, 2005, significantly did not contain any
statement regarding a denial of due process. In effect, the respondent himself waived his cross-
examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to resolve the case
based on the pleadings and the evidence on record. To quote his own submission:

1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;

2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments denying all
the allegations in the complaint;

3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the
respondent also filed his supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to this date, the
complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper thus, waived her right to file
the same;

4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses and
counter-arguments are supported by documentary evidence, it is most respectfully prayed
that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be ordered dismissed for lack of merit
without further hearing;

5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same property, and
such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in her Verified Complaint as shown in
the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright dismissal of this case is warranted,
hence, this motion; and

6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.44 (underscore ours; italics supplied)

Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:

No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be
considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds
that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the

Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of
the entire proceedings.

In this case, the IBP Commissioners findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30245 dated December 14, 2007, affirming the
IBP Commissioners findings, but modifying the penalty; the second review resulted in Resolution
No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,46denying the respondents motion for reconsideration. In
both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting a
remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.

We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither
purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers,47 not the trial of an action or a suit.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted]

The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not mandatory to
have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence.

From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary
proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative evidence of
her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP

Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondents misconduct to warrant the exercise
of its disciplinary powers.

b. Merits of the Complaint

"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of
the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief compared to
the presented contrary evidence.

Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance of evidence
exists, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, and the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.50 By law, a
lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary
is proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath.51

The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:

The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, finds that the
charges of the complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief based on the following:

First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses Ylanas
(sic) in the properties subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic)
is hard to believe despite the presentation of the Memorandum of Agreement.

It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are put in issue,
the best evidence would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and
Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties is only Laurentino L. Ylaya married to Fe A.
Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So was likewise a buyer together with Laurentino
Ylaya, or that the former paid half of the purchase price.

Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at that and who
allegedly paid half of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his name in the Deed of
Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently issued.

The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced by the
respondent cannot overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the Memorandum of
Agreement was executed more than a month AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and
the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that the complainant denied ever having
executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the signatories in the said
Memorandum of Agreement would reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the complainant and
her husband are not the same with their signatures in other documents.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid, thereby making
Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties (Please see Annex
"B" of respondents Comment), this Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would sell it
to Reynold So for 200,000 x x x when his minimum expenses for the purchase thereof is already
225,000.00 and he was expecting to receive 7,000,000.00, more or less. That would mean that if
Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners, the 7,000,000.00 would then be equally divided
among them at 3,500,000.00 each, far above the 200,000.00 selling price reflected in the pre-
signed Deed of Sale.

As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in
notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold So and
Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:

"Sec. 3. Disqualifications a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

(a) x x x.

(b) x x x.

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or

consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."

The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule becausehis
uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller Laurentino
Ylaya (please see page 3 of the respondents Supplemental Position Paper) is misplaced. Clearly,
both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are considered principals in the contract entered
into.

Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a principal
so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the Rules when
he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and his uncle
Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in the said
Memorandum of Agreement.52

The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioners findings are contrary to the presented
evidence, specifically to the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging the existence
of a co-ownership;53 to the complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To
Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she stated that the parties have entered into a
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment complaint arose from a
misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts;54to her Affidavit dated
February 27, 200855 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;56 and to the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in
2001.57

In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative
complaint against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra, the
complainants counsel in this administrative case, as the hand behind the complaint.58 According to
the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his family after his father filed several
administrative cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition of a warning and
a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.59

Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership between
him and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to Reynold because he
(Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino
agreed to the price of 200,000.00 as this was almost the same value of his investment when he
and Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was with the agreement and
consent of the complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale.60

After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the evidence
insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the evidence
against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to
mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the
conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no
prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is the
notarys relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent
notarized the documents.

In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP Commissioner concluded that the respondent is liable
for deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of a co-ownership between Laurentino
and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of the complainant and of her husband on the MOA "are
not the same with their signatures in other documents."62

We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions regarding
the respondents legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear evidence of the
respondents specific acts of fraud and deceit. His failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership
does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001
are spurious and that the respondent was responsible for creating these spurious documents. We
are further persuaded, after noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner failed to
specify what differences she observed in the spouses Ylayas signatures in the MOA and what
documents were used in comparison.

Apart from her allegations, the complainants pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632 and
162633;63 her Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated May 17, 2000;64 the RTC
order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000 fixing the price of just compensation;65 the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;66the spouses Ylayas Verified Manifestation dated
September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the Motion to Deposit Just
Compensation filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting the sale between
Laurentino and Reynold;67 the Provincial Prosecutors Subpoena to the complainant in connection
with the respondents complaint for libel;68 the respondents complaint for libel against the
complainant dated August 27, 2003;69 the complainants Counter Affidavit dated March 26, 2004
against the charge of libel;70 and the respondents letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan dated
April 5, 2004, requesting for "official information regarding the actual attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y.
PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar.71

We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting deceit or
fraud on the respondents part. The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the most, show the
breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between the respondent and the complainant. It is one
thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts
constituting these allegations.72

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence.73Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces
of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of
evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden of
proof.74

In this case, we find that the complainants evidence and the records of the case do not show the
respondents deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the complaint for
fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce
be dismissed.

We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with Reynold,
whom the complainant alleges to be the respondents uncle because Reynold is married to the
respondents maternal aunt.75However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable
for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 4, 200176 and the MOA dated April 19, 200077 were notarized by the respondent prior to the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000 - 2001
was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the
present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are related to the notary public
within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for
violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03
for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the
complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties;
and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. [emphasis ours]

The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of
trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyers duty to
his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline professional
employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation of
the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a
lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to the
plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment from another in a matter adversely
affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline employment in any of these and
similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.78

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer would not be
called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of
the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."79 The sole exception is provided in Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility if there is a written consent from all the
parties after full disclosure.

Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon
15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show that the
respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The respondent admits to
acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same
proceedings,81 asserting Reynolds ownership over the property against all other claims, including
that of the spouses Ylaya.82

We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give the
respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case that the
respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively opposed the interests of his former client, the
complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We affirm the IBP Commissioners finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The respondent
admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold.83 According to
the respondent, the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by
Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from his office.84 Reynold confirms that the TCTs
were taken by the complainant from the respondents law office.85

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the original TCTs
of properties owned by another an act that could result in damage should merit a finding of legal
malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the
TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant
borrowed the TCTs,86 we nevertheless hold the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his
care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his clients properties that were in
his custody.

We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal
matter entrusted to him. Despite the respondents admission that he represented the complainant
and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene in their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a motion for the spouses Ylaya.
The complainant herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for
Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the case, which include the Motion for Leave
to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion.87

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to carelessness or
negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but
the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his
client is per se a violation.88

In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly
failed in this case in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion
for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find that there
was want of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the respondent liable for
violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

d. The Complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case
and her Affidavit

We are aware of the complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To
Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 200690 and her Affidavit91 affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000.92 The complainant explains that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because of a "misunderstanding,
miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts";93 she erroneously accused the respondent of
ill motives and bad intentions, but after being enlightened, she is convinced that he has no personal
or pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No. 2902; that such misunderstanding was
due to her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband during his lifetime.94 The
complainant now pleads for the respondents forgiveness, stating that he has been her and her late
husbands lawyer for over a decade and affirms her trust and confidence in him.95 We take note that
under their Compromise Agreement dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case,96 the
complainant and Reynold equally share the just compensation, which have since increased to
10,000,000.00.

While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case
and the Affidavit appear to exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration is not the necessary
legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit are immaterial for purposes of the present
proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."

In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent therein for
taking advantage of his clients and for transferring the title of their property to his name. In Bautista
v. Bernabe,98 we revoked the lawyers notarial commission, disqualified him from reappointment as a
notary public for two years, and suspended him from the practice of law for one year for notarizing a
document without requiring the affiant to personally appear before him. In this cited case, we said:

Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an
end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct
is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.99

In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainants desistance or withdrawal

does not terminate the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case where pecuniary
consideration has been given to the complainant as a consideration for her desistance. We note in
this regard that she would receive 5,000,000.00, or half of the just compensation under the
Compromise Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges against the respondent.101 From
this perspective, we consider the complainants desistance to be suspect; it is not grounded on the
fact that the respondent did not commit any actual misconduct; rather, because of the consideration,
the complainant is now amenable to the position of the respondent and/or Reynold.

e. Procedural aspect

We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely recommendatory
and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this
point that:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. 1wphi1

The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.102 It exercises
such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own
judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law or
disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and approval.

The Penalty

In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from the practice
of law on the respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon 16, Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Josefina M. Anion v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana,
Jr.,104 we suspended the respondent therein from the practice of law for one (1) year, for violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the circumstances, we find
a one (1) year suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated December
14, 2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board of Governors,
and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon
16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

C.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B.

JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19, 2009
Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the
practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and
Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of
the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

chanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners
of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander
filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of
their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of
Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise
refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street.9
The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with
respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a
decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law
firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellants brief had
expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also
stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of
time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as
members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and
willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that
although his law firm represented the homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was
actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised
general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer.
Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling
lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement
with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the
Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the
homeowners association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their
association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association
were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him
and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question,
among others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by
the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added
that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence,
there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the
imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless
complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and
Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14c ral lawlib rary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1415adopting the
recommendation with modifications as follows: chanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution [as] Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12,
Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent
is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-
2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondents motion was a mere
reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19,
2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him
administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no personality to file a
disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to
harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must
initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court
to a lawyers misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.17 crallawlib rary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that [a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may
initiate disciplinary proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor
is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof
of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel
for Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion
for extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file
said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowners association. To justify his
inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies
with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had
filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating
that a previous motion had been filed but due to the health condition of the undersigned counselhe was
not able to finish said Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him.19 Thus,
it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest
with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far
short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the same Code also states that: chanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his client as
amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held: chanRobles Vi rtua l awlibra ry
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del
Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a
serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in
the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs.
Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyers
failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in
grave cases, disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Under the
circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of law to be more
commensurate with the extent of respondents violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for
violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

A.C. No. 8658

FRANCIS C. ARSENIO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. JOHAN A. TABUZO, Respondents

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June 18, 2010 filed by Francis C. Arsenio (Arsenio),
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo (Atty. Tabuzo) for conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar.

The Facts

This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Arsenio before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) against JS Contractor, a recruitment agency.2 During a
scheduled hearing on May 10, 2000, Atty. Tabuzo, the Overseas Employment Adjudicator who was
assigned to hear the case, asked him to sign three blank sheets of paper to which Arsenio complied.

A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason why he was made to
sign blank sheets of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said, "Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman
mamaya pagdating.ng kalaban mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio called up the office of Senator Rene
Cayetano who advised him to make a clarification regarding the signed sheets of blank paper.
Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but the latter again shouted at him saying, "Bwiset!
Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty. Tabuzo
further said, "Sabihin mo sa Cayetano mo at abogado mo na baka masampal ko sa mga mukha nila
ang pinirmahan mong blanko! Sabihin mo na ang pangalan ko ay Atty. Romeo Tabuzo at kung hindi
ka bumalik bukas ay mawawala ang kaso mo!"3

Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS Contractor was dismissed. Hence, he filed a
complaint against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. "

In a Resolution4 dated February 1, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Wilfred Pascasio ordered that
an Information be filed against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo upon finding of probable cause against him.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that there is no Atty. Romeo
Tabuso in the POEA and that he was never handed any copy of summons. He claimed that he was
merely taking the initiative in filing the said motion to clear his name as he believed he was the
person referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Nonetheless, such motion
was subsequently denied in an Order dated July 16, 2002.

Meanwhile, in a Decision dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of
Mandaluyong City acquitted Atty. Tabuzo for violation of RA No. 3019. 1wphi1

Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-Affidavit before this Court. In a Resolution 5 dated
November 24, 2010, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)
docketed the case as CBD Case No. 11-2912, entitled "Francis C. Arsenio v. Atty. Johan Tabuzo ".

In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6 Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him,
claiming that the alleged unethical acts are baseless. He averred that he had never acted in any
conduct unbecoming of a public officer or uttered invectives and other alleged acts. To support his
claim, he attached the Affidavits7 of two (2) Overseas Employment Adjudicators (OEA) who occupied
the tables immediately adjacent to him in the Recruitment Regulations Branch. In said Affidavits, the
OEAs attested to the effect that no such incident or any untoward event that called for attention
transpired. Atty. Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due process was violated since he
was not notified of the case against him before the Office of the Ombudsman as he was never
served nor had personally received Orders from such Office.

The Resolutions of the IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors

In his Report and Recommendation, 8 Investigating Commissioner Atty. Eldrid Antiquierra

recommended that reprimand be imposed upon Atty. Tabuzo. The Investigating Commissioner ruled
in such wise on the basis of the sworn affidavit of Arsenio and the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
with modification the said Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner upon
finding that Atty. Tabuzo violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 8.01 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty. Tabuzo from the practice of law
for three months.

Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. 10

The Issue

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.

The Court's Ruling

After examining the records of this case, the Court resolves to dismiss the instant disbarment
complaint.

A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as
in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts. 11

Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant. 12 In the recent case of Reyes v. Nieva, 13 this Court had the occasion to
clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.

In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD in recommending
reprimand against Atty. Tabuzo is its consideration of the: (1) Resolution issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman, which states that there was probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA
3019; and (2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty. Tabuzo made offensive
statements.
However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree of proof indispensable
in a disbarment case was not met.

Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is predicated on the fact that the
allegations of Arsenio were uncontroverted; hence, the Office of the Ombudsman concluded that
such allegations were true.

However, there was a seeming discrepancy as to the name of Atty. Tabuzo when a case against him
was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Undisputedly, the case before said Office was filed
against a certain Atty. Romeo Tabuso, when the name of herein respondent is Atty. Johan Tabuzo.
As such, the respondent claimed that he failed to controvert Arsenio' s claims because he never
received any notice or order from the Office of the Ombudsman. In fact, the said Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman was made on the basis of the complaint of Arsenio alone since Atty.
Tabuzo failed to file his answer. 14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision reveals that Arsenio was
able to verify the identity of Atty. Johan Tabuzo, not as Atty. Romeo Tabuso, even before he filed his
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman. It is confusing, therefore, why there was discrepancy
as to the name of herein respondent when a clarification was already made. Nevertheless, Atty.
Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case filed against him on the basis of the Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate
one administratively. 16Thus, it is proper to deal with the other evidence presented by Arsenio.

The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio failed to discharge the necessary
burden of proof. In his Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive
statements and no other evidence was presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such
Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.

Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman together with the Affidavit of
Arsenio cannot be considered as substantial evidence. For one, the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman was decided on the basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to controvert the allegations of
Arsenio. Also, the Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence was further offeted to prove
the allegations contained therein.

While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is
not persuaded to exercise its disciplinary authority over Atty. Tabuzo.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolved to DISMISS the disbarment complaint
against Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

.C. No. 11043

LIANG FUJI, Complainant
vs
ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted
in the alien's wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to
administrative liability.

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji)
and his family, against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz
(Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to
her issuance of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.

Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa directed the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting documents
duly authenticated and/or affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged"3 in
the complaint.

Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O.
No. BOC-2015-357 (B.L.O. No. SBM- 15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for
Immediate Consideration, and Administrative Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative
Complaint),5 which Fuji filed with the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and
prayed that the same be treated as their verified complaint. Complainants further informed this Court
that they had difficulty obtaining certified true copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of
Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa, Summary Deportation Order dated June 17,
2015, and Warrant of Deportation from the Bureau of Immigration personnel who just gave them the
"run[-]around."6 They alleged that the Bureau of Immigration personnel were not particularly helpful,
and did not treat Fuji's case with urgency.7

The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a
Chinese national, was ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz was the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and
another person upon her finding that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013, with extension
expired on December 6, 2013.9 Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one
(1) year and six (6) months in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7).10 Her
investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo
alleging that Fuji and another person had defrauded him.11

On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration.12

On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of
Deportation, and thereafter arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance
from local police.13 Fuji was brought to and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility,
National Capital Region Police Office, Taguig City.14

On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's Motion for Reconsideratios.15

On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint.16 Subsequently,
on March 10, 2016, Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and
Release on Bail through counsel.17

On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation
charge against Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa valid until
30 April 2016 under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason."18 Fuji was directed to be
released from Bureau of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016.19

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was
not afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was
issued against him.20 Fuji further alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in
discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration records would
have revealed that he was not overstaying because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April
30, 2016.21

In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22 respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she
committed any grave misconduct.23 She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process during the
summary deportation proceedings.24 He was directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the
Legal Division, to submit his Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to do.25 Fuji was also
able to file his motion for reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case.26

Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration
- Management Information System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in
the country, hence, her formal charge had legal basis.27

Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her duties.28 She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any flagrant
disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other
persons.29 Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the complainant's
charges against her.30 She added that Fuji stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that
he had mistakenly signed some documents including the administrative complaint.31

We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain the
facts before levying the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in
government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to
the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or
employee or the Ombudsman.32

For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against
former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde,
Jr., and former

Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being
charged for actions involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman.34 In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from the Office
of the Ombudsman directing him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same administrative
complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant.35

Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint
against respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the
acts or omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions in the
[Civil Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or
the Office of the Ombudsman."37 It would seem that the complainant directly instituted a disbarment
complaint with this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the proper
administrative body.

This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records
here show that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative
complaint due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the
Bureau of Immigration, and considered the case closed.38

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his
release. However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
and the apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint,
this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority"39 over members of
the legal profession.40
Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to
dismiss this administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of this nature
cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."41 The primary object
of disciplinary proceedings is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is
conducted solely for the public welfare,42 and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What
will be decisive are the facts borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos:43

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.44

II

Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the
basis of the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum with
attachments was attached to respondent's Comment.46

However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working
visa expired on 8 May 2013 and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013"47 as respondent claims.
Relevant portions of the Memorandum read:

For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION
Re : REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA EXTENSION
PAYMENT, LATEST TRAVEL AND DEROGATORY OF THE
FOLLOWING:

1. MR.IMS. LIANG FUJI

2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE

3. MR.IMS. JACKY CHANG HE

Date : 04 June 2015

Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; Visa Extension

Payment and TRAVEL RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:

...
Result/s : 1. LIANG FUJI

- Derogatory Record Not Found

- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached files

for your ready reference. NOTE:

DOB: 18 October 1991)

- Immigration Status Found

 - Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the
attached files for your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18
October 1991)48

The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration records showing details of filing of
applications, such as official receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who
made the determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of the documents transmitted to her by the
BI-MIS.

Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer print-outs showing details of official
receipts dated June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor visa
extension and official receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an application for change of immigration status.
Also, the travel records of Fuji show the following details:

Date & Time : 4 June 2015 3:05 PM

Verifier : DIMARUCOT J

Database : TRAVEL-ARRIVAL
TRAVEL TRAVEL FLIGHT IMMIG PORT OFFICER ACTION REMARKS
DATE TIME NO. STATUS
10- 11:34PM CZ377 9G NAIAI MIJARES ALLOWED
FEBRUARY-
2014
06-JANUARY- 11:51PM CZ377 9A NAIAI PARANGUE ALLOWED
2012
22- l 1:25PM CZ377 9A NAIAI NUNEZ ALLOWED49
SEPTEMBER-
2011

Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the Philippines on February 10, 2014
under a work visa immigration status.50 Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela Cruz
should have verified whether or not the July 15, 2013 application for change of status had been
approved by the Bureau of Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had complete and easy
access to the immigration records.

Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of
Immigration should exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration
records, whenever the legal status and documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a
deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person.51 1wphi 1

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to
her by the BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
deportee. She should not have simply relied on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS
at the bottom portion of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A visa extension stating "Valid
until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she inquired further, she would have discovered that Fuji's application
dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved
by the Board of Commissioners on November 21, 2013 - or one (1) year and seven (7) months
earlier - with validity until April 30, 2016. Thus, even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired
on December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was still valid under the 9G work VISa.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official.52 However, if said misconduct
as a government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of
Professional Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court. 1avv phi 1

Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration,
she is the representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her task was to investigate and
verify facts to determine whether a ground for deportation exists, and if further administrative action -
in the form of a formal charge - should be taken against an alien.

Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval
of Fuji's application, which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji
was deprived of his liberty for almost eight (8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to, give attention to a task due to carelessness or
indifference.54 In this case, respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental right
of every person, including aliens, to due process and to the consequences of her actions.

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations
consistent with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards
under the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government
lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high
standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service.56 In this case, respondent's
negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high standards of public service
and the legal profession.

The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court.57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the
penalty for simple neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
In previous cases,59 this Court imposed the penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6)
months for erring lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for their clients. We find appropriate
the penalty of suspension of three (3) months considering the consequence of respondent's
negligence. This suspension includes her desistance from performing her functions as a special
prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz 1s SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve her suspension. She shall
formally manifest to this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of her manifestation on all adverse parties in all the
cases she entered her formal appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty.
Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz's personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment
against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty.
Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23,
1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes
xxx

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat
Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked
with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a
mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of
Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty.
Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong
sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit,
Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental
anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood
his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia
to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his
children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools;
all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.4 Atty.
Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the
past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the
bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them
was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty.
Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido,
as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty.
Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper
party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to
her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in view of the criminal complaint
for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity7 (of
marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since
Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not
committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the
acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline also denied this motion.9

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents,
arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six
(6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.11

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner
San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.12 The
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved
and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July
30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality
required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied
his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that
under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment.
He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-
Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She
recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that
disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts
and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty.
Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty.
Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in
a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or
her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the
filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied
for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed
before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to
the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after
admission to the Bar.19

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of
the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to
admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority
is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect
of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a
witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of
withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the
Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the
evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for
her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.20 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.21 We make these distinctions as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.22

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up
to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-
being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate
other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his
first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the
Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity.
We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not
only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during
the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this
Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already

married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence
of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission
of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages
were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his
actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act
of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past
actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against
him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him
to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he
entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a
good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law
and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be
used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law
to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.32 Lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.33Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.34

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got
married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a
condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x
Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.36 To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that
he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.37 The requirement
of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already
knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he
already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give
him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge
that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the
conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed
of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters
family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person
seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife
and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the
fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary
decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in
fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to
Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him,
upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their
children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even
left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of
immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law. 1avv phi 1

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the
strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos
marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country.
Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second
marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she
agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we
cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did
not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.
Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us,
is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral.
Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also
unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on
his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous
and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be
the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty.
Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She
simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to
these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to
withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar
is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the
dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into
question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia
from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on wellness leave) MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

 ROBERTO A. ABAD* Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(on leave)
JOSE P. PEREZ
JOSE C. MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On wellness leave.

** On leave.

1 Rollo, pp. 1-2, Vol. I.

2 Id. at 9.

3 Id. at 14-16.

4 Atty. Garrido submitted a Sworn Statement of Pablito G. Uplos, his secretary who attested
that he was the one who delivered the money for the financial support of Maelotisea and
their children.

5 Rollo, pp. 29-30, Vol. I.

6 Id. at 90-91.

7
Civil Case No. Q-95-25688, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City.

8 Rollo, pp. 142-144, Vol. I.

9 Id. at 167-168 and 182-183; Order dated February 7, 2003.

10 Rollo, pp. 192-193, Vol. I.

11 Id. at 195-196; Order dated November 7, 2003.

12 Id. at 290-293, Vol. I.

13Wilkie v. Limos, A.C. 7505, Oct. 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1, 8 and Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente,
393 Phil 554, 551 (2000).

14In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil 399, 400 (1928); Calo v. Degamo, A.C. No. 516, Aug. 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 447, 450; In re Lanuevo, 160 Phil 935, 981 (1975); Agripino Brillantes, 166 Phil
449, 461 (1977); Pangan v. Ramos, 194 Phil 1, 8 (1981).

15Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 1, 9 and Tomlinii v. Moya,
A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006, 483 SCRA 154, 159.

16 Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, supra note 13, at 551-552.

17 A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 658, 664.

18 Ibid.

19 Id. at 665.
 20 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 314.

21St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) and Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624.

22 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 314.

23 424 SCRA 42, 54 (2004) cited in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 315.

24 101 Phil.313, 314 (1957) cited in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 315.

25 Supra note 20, at 308.

26 Rollo, p. 4, Vol. I.

27 In re Atty. Rovero, 189 Phil 605, 606 (1980).

28Namely: (1) "I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein;" (2) "I will do no falsehood or consent to its
commission"; (3) "and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients x x x"

29 SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.

30Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect
for law and legal processes.

31 Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331, 339.

32 Id. at 338.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Rollo, p. 292, Vol. II.

Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600; citing Bar Matter
36

No. 1154, 431 SCRA 146, 149 (2004).

37 Id. at 609.

EN BANC

BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, A. C. No. 6656

Complainant, (formerly CBD-98-591)
Present :

DAVIDE, JR. C.J.

PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. CARMENCITA
BAUTISTA LOZADA,
Respondent. Promulgated :

December 13, 2005

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In this disbarment case, we are faced with conflicting versions of

the incidents surrounding the filing of the verified complaint[1] for
deception and malpractice allegedly committed by Atty. Carmencita
Bautista Lozada.

For her part, complainant Bobie Rose Frias alleged that respondent
became her retained counsel and legal adviser in the early part of
1990. She entrusted to respondent documents and titles of
properties in November of that year. Sometime in December 1990,
respondent persuaded complainant to sell her house located at 589
Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City. Respondent
allegedly acted as broker as she was in need of money.

On December 7, 1990 respondent hastily arranged a meeting with

her and a prospective buyer, Dra. Flora San Diego, in Valenzuela,
Manila. She was allegedly made to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)[2] without her having read it because they had to
reach the bank before it closed at 3:00 p.m.
When they arrived at the Security Bank branch in Valenzuela, San
Diego handed respondent P2M in cash and P1M in check, instead
of P3M in cash as the down payment[3] indicated in the MOA.

Out of the P2M in cash, respondent took P1M as her commission

without complainants consent. When complainant protested,
respondent promised to sign a promissory note later. The P1M
check was later on dishonored by the bank because it was a stale
check.

San Diego eventually backed out from the sale. However, she
converted the aborted sale into a mortgage loan at 36% p.a.
interest, as provided for in the MOA.
Since the transaction between her and San Diego did not
materialize, complainant allegedly tried to recover from respondent
the title[4] to the property and other documents.[5] Respondent,
however, started avoiding her. Complainant recovered the
documents placed inside an envelope only on May 6, 1991. On the
same day, however, the envelope was allegedly stolen from her
Pajero. She reported the incident to the police.[6] She also informed
respondent about the incident, and the latter prepared an affidavit
of loss.[7] Complainant later offered this affidavit as evidence in a
petition for issuance of a duplicate copy of the title she filed in the
RTC of Makati, Branch 142.[8]

A perjury case[9] was then filed by San Diego against

complainant on the ground that the title to the property was never
really lost (as alleged by complainant in the affidavit of loss) but was
with San Diego all along. San Diego maintained that complainant
handed it to her on the day they signed the MOA. Complainant
denied these allegations. She instead claimed that the perjury case
was filed by San Diego, with respondent as counsel, to coerce her
(complainant) to assign the property to San Diego and to abandon
her claim of P1M from respondent.

San Diego also filed a case[10] for the return of the P3M she
paid complainant, at 36% p.a. interest. Complainant claimed that
her failure to return the money to San Diego was by reason of
respondents refusal to give back the P1M she took as commission.
Complainant was thus constrained to file a civil case against
respondent. Despite the favorable decision[11] of the trial court,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals[12], respondent refused
to return the money.

In her answer[13] to the disbarment complaint, respondent claimed

that, although complainant was engaged in the buy-build-and-sell
of real property, she represented her only in labor cases relative to
the latters overseas recruitment business. Respondent denied that
she persuaded complainant to sell the property in Ayala Alabang.
Rather, it was complainant who offered to sell or mortgage the
property to respondent. Since respondent did not have enough
money, complainant requested her to sell or mortgage the property
and offered her a loan, commission and attorneys fees on the basis
of the selling price.

According to respondent, complainant confided that on

October 29, 1990 she offered the Alabang property to a certain Nelia
Sta. Cruz. Complainant received P400,000 as earnest money in this
transaction on the condition that she would return the said amount
to Sta. Cruz in two weeks in case the latter decided not to proceed
with the sale.[14] The said amount would in turn be used to buy
another property.

Respondent also claimed that on December 4, 1990, she

introduced complainant to another client, Dra. San Diego, as a
prospective buyer. They visited the Alabang property to check on
the house. It was there that complainant offered the house to San
Diego for either sale or mortgage. They then discussed the terms
and conditions to be contained in the MOA.[15] The agreement was
thereafter signed in respondents office in Valenzuela, Metro Manila
on December 7, 1990, duly notarized by Atty. Manuel
Aguinaldo.[16] They then proceeded to Prudential Bank (not Security
Bank as alleged in the complaint) to withdraw P2M in cash. Upon
receipt of P2M in cash and P1M check down payment, complainant
gave San Diego the TCT.

Complainant then handed to respondent P900,000 as

commission and loan, duly receipted in a promissory
note.[17] Complainant further entrusted P100,000 to respondent to
be given to Nelia Sta. Cruz as partial reimbursement of
the P400,000 earnest money.[18]

Respondent maintained that when San Diego backed out from the
transaction, the latter demanded the return of only P2M, not P3M,
as clearly stated in San Diegos letter[19] to the complainant dated
March 20, 1991.
Respondent denied that complainant previously demanded the
return of the P1M until the civil case against her was instituted.
She expressed her willingness to pay the P900,000 plus the agreed
interest, but not the P1M plus interest baselessly demanded from
her by complainant. In an attempt to settle the controversy,
respondent offered to pay the P900,000 to complainant in the
presence of San Diego, so complainant could in turn pay San Diego
the P2M.
Respondent also denied that she prepared the affidavit of loss
which was offered as evidence by complainant in the petition for
issuance of lost title.
 Respondent further denied that she represented San Diego in
the criminal cases of perjury and false testimony which the latter
filed against complainant.

In a report and recommendation dated July 25, 2000, the IBP

Investigating Commissioner[20] found respondent guilty of
dishonesty and malpractice for concealing the identity of the person
in actual possession of complainants documents and for preparing
an affidavit of loss even if she knew that the documents were in San
Diegos custody. A suspension for six months from the practice of
law was accordingly recommended.
A careful study of the records reveals that the IBP recommendation
relied solely on complainants self-serving and unsupported claims.
A re-examination of the differing claims of the parties, however,
discloses that, instead of the grounds relied on by the IBP,
respondent should be held accountable for certain serious
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct,

act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present[21] or former client.[22] He may not also undertake to
discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent
antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles
of public policy and good taste.[23] It springs from the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence.
 The test of conflict of interest is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in its performance.[24] The
conflict exists if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represented him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against the first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[25]
In this case, respondent not only admitted that she
represented both complainant and San Diego in unrelated actions
but also counseled both of them in the sale of the Alabang property.

As their lawyer, she was duty-bound to protect both of their

interests. She should have therefore refrained from jumbling their
affairs. Yet she introduced complainant to another client of hers as
a buyer of the property. She even had the temerity to broker the
transaction. At that early stage, she should have realized that her
role as their lawyer had been seriously compromised. Since buyer
and seller had evident antagonistic interests, she could not give
both of them sound legal advice. On top of this, respondents
obvious tendency then was to help complainant get a high selling
price since the amount of her commission was dependent on it.

After several suits were filed as an offshoot of the transaction

between her two clients, respondent found herself in a very tight
situation. Although she denied that she represented any of them,
her active participation in the transaction was obvious and it clearly
displayed an utter disregard of the rule against discharging
inconsistent duties to her clients. The great likelihood was that she
would be called upon to use against either the complainant or San
Diego information acquired through her professional connection
with them.
 Furthermore, her role as their counsel in the other unrelated
cases was also compromised. Both parties had, at this point,
become wary of her since she had by then taken for her own
convenience San Diegos side by refusing to return the P900,000 to
complainant until San Diego was paid. It was not surprising
therefore that complainant filed this administrative case because of
the suspicion that respondent had double-crossed her.

The records further establish that respondent collected her full

commission even before the transaction between complainant and
San Diego was completed. This unmasked respondents greed which
she now wants us so badly to ignore. Her integrity was placed in
serious doubt the moment her promised commission started
motivating her every move. Her behavior was, sad to say, simply
distasteful.

Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a

violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case and by
independent advice.

A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent

did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as
abuse of clients confidence. The canon presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on her obligation.

Finally, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer should,

at all times, comply with what the court lawfully requires.[26] Here,
respondent continues to disregard the final order of the Court of
Appeals finding her liable for the P900,000 she received from
complainant. We see no justification for her continued delay in
 complying with an order that has long become final. Respondent
adamantly insists that she and complainant should simultaneously
settle their obligations. As a lawyer, she should have known that
her obligation to complainant was independent of and separate
from complainants obligation to the buyer. Her refusal to comply
with the appellate courts order is, therefore, a willful disobedience
to its lawful orders and must not be left unpunished.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada

is hereby found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be
entered in respondents personal records.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WECONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194578 February 13, 2013

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, Petitioner,

vs.
PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA OQUENDO,
ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA, MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG,
REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK INC., through its
new editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA DEDACE, ABS-CBN
CORPORATION, through the Head of its News Group, Maria Ressa, CECILIA VICTORIA
OREA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty
Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE STAR represented by its Editor-in-Chief
Isaac Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun (petitioner) against
Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma Oquendo (Gemma), Dennis Ayon
(Ayon), Nenita Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose Pavia (Pavia),
Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond Batario (Batario), Malou
Mangahas (Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo (Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas and the other respondents, who
are not from the media, are referred to in this case as Atty. Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner also named
as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network) through its news editors Raffy Jimenez and
Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of
its News Group Maria Ressa (Ressa), Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Inc. (PDI) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres),
Philippine Star (PhilStar) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu Punay (Punay).
Respondents Atty. Quinsayas, et al. and respondent media groups and personalities are collectively
referred to in this case as respondents.

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-
mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the
Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatus Certificate of
Candidacy1 when they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio
Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to ten kilometers from their destination.2The group was taken
hostage and brought to a hilly and sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman,
Ampatuan, Maguindanao.3 The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later discovered and
shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed by shooting them at close range with
automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered with
the use of a backhoe.4 These gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A
total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were
filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal
Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10- 163766. Petitioner is the
counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before this
Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still pending.

Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted an article,
written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of
which reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed a 33 page
complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in every conceivable
chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies
available."5

On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by Torres, which
according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as follows:

"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct, impede and
degrade the administration of justice by filing countless causes of action, all in the hope of burying
the principal issue of his clients participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that ill-fated day of
November 23, 2009," the petitioners said.6

Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article, written by Punay,
which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:

"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under the rules,
muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the cases, read
the complaint.

***** ***** *****

"Respondent Attorney Fortuns act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a
dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read the complaint.

"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession, rendering him
unfit to be called a member of the Bar."7
Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national television a
program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon, the
programs host, asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case
against petitioner, including its principal points. Petitioner was allegedly singled out and identified in
the program as the lead counsel of the Ampatuan family.

Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities
conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective
media platforms. Petitioner pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty.
Quinsayas in a television program viewed nationwide

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed this
Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged that
opinion writers wrote about and commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his
professional and personal reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in
publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign his personal and professional reputation,
considering the following: (1) the bases of the charges were not new but were based on incidents
that supposedly took place in January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the
Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for Ampatuan, Jr. and his counsel and
violated the accuseds right to presumption of innocence and due process; (3) it was published
following articles written about petitioners advocacy for the rights of an accused and negated the
impact of these articles on the public; and (4) respondents knew that the charges were baseless as
petitioner always opted for speedy trial and protection of the accuseds rights at trial. Petitioner
further alleged that in announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case, respondents were
only seeking the approval and sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication where it could
have printed the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint on its television
station. GMA Network alleged that the publication had already been done and completed when Atty.
Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the members of the media who
reported the news and the media groups that published it on their website, including GMA Network,
did not violate the confidentiality rule. GMA Network further alleged that Dedace, a field reporter for
the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice when she forwarded the news to the news desk.
GMA News also acted in good faith in posting the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it
conspired with the other respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it posted the
disbarment complaint, without any unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only after it was
"published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et al. who furnished copies of the disbarment complaint to the media
reporters. GMA Network alleged that it had no intention to malign petitioners personal and
professional reputation in posting the news about the disbarment complaint on its website.

In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network and not a writer
of the GMA News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
Department of Justice. Dedace alleged that on 22 November 2010, she received an advice from
fellow field reporter Mark Merueas that the lawyer of Mangudadatu would be filing a disbarment
case against petitioner. She waited at the Supreme Court. At around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas
arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the petition to news reporters and Dedace received one.
Dedace prepared and sent her news story to GMA Network where it went to the editor. Dedace
alleged that she did not breach the rule on confidentiality of disbarment proceedings against lawyers
when she reported the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner. She alleged that she
acted in good faith and without malice in forwarding her news story to the news desk and that she
had no intention to, and could not, influence or interfere in the proceedings of the disbarment case.
She further alleged that she honestly believed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner was newsworthy and should be reported as news.

PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website through a syndication
but the latter has its own editors and publish materials that are not found on the broadsheet. It
alleged that Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two different corporations,
with separate legal personalities, and one may not be held responsible for the acts of the other.

Torres8 alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told her and
several other reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against petitioner. The disbarment
case was actually filed on 22 November 2010 when Torres received a copy of the complaint. Since
the lead of the story came from a lawyer, Torres did not consider that writing a story about the filing
of the disbarment complaint might amount to contempt of court. Torres alleged that the writing of the
story was an independent act and she did not conspire with any of the other respondents. Torres
maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news report because the Maguindanao
Massacre was a matter of public concern and the allegations in the disbarment complaint were in
connection with petitioners handling of the case. Torres further asserted that petitioner is a public
figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs and character.

In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBNs News and Current
Affairs Group and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she was on terminal leave
beginning 30 October 2010 in advance to the expiration of her contract on 3 January 2011. Ressa
alleged that she had no participation in the production and showing of the broadcast on 23
November 2010. Ressa adopts the answer of her co-respondents ABS-CBN and Drilon insofar as it
was applicable to her case.

ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN News Channel,
commonly known as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok Network News (SNN) and not
by ABS-CBN. SNN, which produced the program "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the
Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-CBN but it has its own juridical personality although
SNN and ABS-CBN have interlocking directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon alleged that the presentation
and hosting of the program were not malicious as there was no criminal intent to violate the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that the program was a commemoration
of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a report solely on the disbarment complaint against
petitioner which took only a few minutes of the one-hour program. They alleged that the program
was not a publication intended to embarrass petitioner who was not even identified as the
respondent in the disbarment complaint. Drilon even cautioned against the revelation of petitioners
name in the program. ABS-CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the broadcast of the program
on 23 November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was already the
subject of widespread news and already of public knowledge. They denied petitioners allegation that
they conspired with the other respondents in violating the confidentiality rule in disbarment
proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt charge violates their right to equal protection
because there were other reports and publications of the disbarment complaint but the publishers
were not included in the charge. They also assailed the penalty of imprisonment prayed for by
petitioner as too harsh.

In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma alleged that petitioner
failed to prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of the disbarment complaint
against him. They alleged that while they were the ones who filed the disbarment complaint against
petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who caused the publication of the
complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not provide the name of any particular person, dates,
days or places to show the alleged confederation in the dissemination of the disbarment complaint.

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members of the Board of
Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and Atty. Quinsayas, former
counsel for FFFJ, also filed a joint Comment claiming that the alleged posting and publication of the
articles were not established as a fact. Respondents alleged that petitioner did not submit certified
true copies of the articles and he only offered to submit a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the
televised program where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by Drilon. Respondents alleged
that, assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to support his allegations that they
actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.

In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et
al. went to this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were not able to file it on that
day.9 Atty. Quinsayas, et al. were able to file the disbarment complaint the following day, or on 23
November 2010. PhilStar and Punay alleged that their news article, which was about the plan to file
a disbarment complaint against petitioner, was published on 23 November 2010. It came out before
the disbarment complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article on the disbarment
complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that the article was a true, fair, and
accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article was straightforward, truthful, and accurate,
without any comments from the author. They alleged that Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu,
et al. to file the disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he
perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the news article is not a
privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom of expression, speech, and
of the press under the Constitution. They also alleged that the case is a criminal contempt
proceeding and intent to commit contempt of court must be shown by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. They further alleged that they did not commit any contemptible act. They maintained that the
news article did not impede, interfere with, or embarrass the administration of justice. They further
claimed that it is improbable, if not impossible, for the article to influence the outcome of the case or
sway this Court in making its decision. The article also did not violate petitioners right to privacy
because petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and
character.

Pavia died during the pendency of this case10 and was no longer included in the Comment filed for
the FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees and was no longer represented
by the FFFJ counsel in filing its comment.11 Gozo did not file a separate comment.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment
proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

The Ruling of this Court

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v.
Godoy,12 this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein
and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense
against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which
raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive.
On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of
the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony
nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one
can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt
proceedings is remedial, the defendants intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence,
good faith or the absence of intent to violate the courts order is not a defense in civil contempt.13

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner had
been published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups and
personalities.

We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.

GMA Network, Inc.

GMA Networks defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article could be
printed; it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station; and that the publication
was already completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to the
media.

GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its website. It
merely said that it has no publication where the article could be printed and that the news was not
televised. Online posting, however, is already publication considering that it was done on GMA
Networks online news website.

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication. PDI attached a
photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements between PDI and
Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net."14

A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, the Philippines most widely circulated broadsheet, and a member of the Inquirer Group of
Companies."15 PDI was not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.

ABS-CBN Corporation

ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking directors, SNN has
its own juridical personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls
the line-up of shows of ANC.

We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an independent and
separate juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company and that any suit against the
the latter does not bind the former and vice-versa.16 A corporation is an artificial being invested by
law with a personality separate and distinct from that of other corporations to which it may be
connected.17 Hence, SNN, not ABS-CBN, should have been made respondent in this case.

Maria Ressa

Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the
Maguindanao Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. Ressas
defense was supported by a certification from the Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN,
stating that Ressa went on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010.18 This was not disputed by
petitioner.

Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon,

and Edu Punay

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the disbarment
complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and without malice; that petitioner is a
public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest; and that there was no
conspiracy on their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news
reports were part of privileged communication.

In Drilons case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner.
Even as the disbarment complaint was briefly discussed in her program, petitioners name was not
mentioned at all in the program.

Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups and Personalities

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients
and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto
without authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim
reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters
may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either
a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. x x x19

In People v. Castelo,20 the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of
privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both
constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our
Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The
same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of
expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in
favor of appellant.21

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech."22 As a general rule, disbarment
proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In
this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public
concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is
not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate to
petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.

The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the massacre, 30 were
journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered
a matter of public interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as
public figure. The Court explained it, thus:

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily follow that
he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance, if and when he
would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense
the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest is in
the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and
significance of the conduct, not the participants prior anonymity or notoriety.23(Boldface in
the original)

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish
such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and
personalities merely acted on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not
sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since
petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of
public concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against
petitioner is a matter of public concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment
case as legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner was
about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the confidentiality provision of
disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If there
1wphi 1

is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news
report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment
complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during
its pendency. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and confidential until
their final determination.24 Only the final order of this Court shall be published like its decisions in
other cases.25

Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and personalities acted
in bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their postings and publications of the filing of
a disbarment complaint against him. Respondent media groups and personalities reported the filing
of the disbarment complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as it was a news item.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondent media groups and personalities acted with malicious intent.
Respondent media groups and personalities made a fair and true news report and appeared to have
acted in good faith in publishing and posting the details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised
broadcast of the commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case
was briefly discussed but petitioner was not named. There was also no proof that respondent media
groups and personalities posted and published the news to influence this Court on its action on the
disbarment case or to deliberately destroy petitioners reputation. It should also be remembered that
the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner entered the public domain without any act on the
part of the media. As we will discuss later, the members of the media were given copies of the
disbarment complaint by one of the complainants.

Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon, Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo

Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the disbarment complaint
against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they were the ones who disseminated the
disbarment complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Mangudadatu,
Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma were the ones who caused the publication of the disbarment complaint
against him. There was nothing in the records that would show that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and
Gemma distributed or had a hand in the distribution of the disbarment complaint against petitioner.

Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas, and Atty.
Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that petitioner was
not able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint, and
that assuming the posting and publication had been established, petitioner failed to support his
allegation that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint. They further
alleged that they did not cause the publication of the news articles and thus, they did not violate the
rule on privacy and confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents, namely De
Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did not file his separate comment, had a
hand in the dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It would appear
that only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint.
In its Comment, GMA Network stated that the publication "had already been done and completed
when copies of the complaint for disbarment were distributed by one of the disbarment
complainants, Atty. Prima Quinsayas x x x."26 Dedace also stated in her Comment that "Atty.
Quinsayas gave copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun and she received one."27

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in
the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty.
Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of
preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De
Leon,28 the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of
disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule.29 In that case, Atty. Relativo, the
complainant in a disbarment case, caused the publication in newspapers of statements regarding
the filing and pendency of the disbarment proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.

Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable
by a fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both.30 Atty.
Quinsayas acted wrongly in setting aside the confidentiality rule which every lawyer and member of
the legal profession should know. Hence, we deem it proper to impose on her a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing
copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media
and we order her to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1The Ampatuan Massacre: a map and timeline., 25 November

2009. http://gmanetwork.com/news/story/177821/news/specialreports/the-ampatuan-
massacre-a-map andtimeline(visited 4 December 2012).

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Rollo, pp. 5-6, Contempt Charge.

6 Id. at 6.

7 Id. at 6-7.

8 Ma. Theresa Torres in her Comment. Id. at 209.

9 From Dedaces Comment, it appeared that Quinsayas,

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5408, February 07, 2017

ANITA SANTOS MURRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELICITO J. CERVANTES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

We sustain, with modification, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVI-
2004-4811 and Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711.2

Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XV-2002-599.3 The latter
ruled that respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes must be reprimanded and ordered to return to complainant
Anita Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00.4 Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified this with the penalty of
one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law, with an additional three (3)-month suspension for every
month (or fraction) that respondent is unable to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.5 Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-711 denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.6

On February 2, 2001, complainant filed before this Court a Complaint7 charging respondent with violating
Canon 188 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she sought the services of a lawyer to assist in the
naturalization (that is, acquisition of Philippine citizenship) of her son, Peter Murray, a British national.
Respondent was later introduced to her. On June 14, 2000, she and respondent agreed on the latter's
services, with complainant handing respondent the sum of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee.9

About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything substantial."10 Thus, on September 11,
2000, complainant wrote respondent to inform him that she was terminating his services. She explained:

I am not satisfied with the way things are going regarding my petition. I am expecting that you keep me
abreast of your activities but I am left in the dark as to what have you done so far. You do not show up on
our scheduled appointments nor do you call me up to let me know why you cannot come. You stood me up
twice already which shows that you are not even interested in my case.

....

Since I already paid the P80,000.00 acceptance fee in full, I expect to get a refund of the same from you.11

As respondent failed to return the P80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant instituted the Complaint in this
case. She also instituted criminal proceedings against respondent for violation of Article 315(1)(b)12of the
Revised Penal Code.13

This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its investigation, report, and
recommendation.14

After the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B.
Raval (Commissioner Raval) furnished a Report 15 dated September 9, 2002 recommending that respondent
be reprimanded and required to return the sum of P80,000.00 to complainant. In its Resolution No. XV-
2002-599,16 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Raval's
recommendations.

Respondent filed before this Court a Motion for Leave to Admit Additional Evidence with Motion to
Dismiss.17 He asserted that he never required complainant to immediately pay him P80,000.00 as
acceptance fee.18 This Motion was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines19 and was treated as
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.20 For her part, complainant filed several manifestations and
motions asking that a heavier penalty be imposed on respondent.21

Acting on the pending incidents of the case, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (Commissioner
Funa) furnished a Report22 recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) year, with an additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or fraction) that respondent fails
to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.

Commissioner Funa justified the penalty of suspension by emphasizing that, in a hearing conducted by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on August 18, 2004, respondent was "orally directed" to return the
P80,000.00 not later than the end of August 2004.23 Respondent acceded to this; however, he failed to
return the P80,000.00.24

In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-481,25 the Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Puna's
recommendation.

The Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 later denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.26

It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services that he committed to
complainant despite receiving the amount of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. Although respondent asserted
that he did not actively solicit this amount from complainant, it remains, as Commissioner Funa
underscored, that respondent accepted this amount as consideration for his services.27 Moreover, following
complainant's engagement of his services, respondent failed to communicate with complainant or update
her on the progress of the services that he was supposed to render. Not only did he fail in taking his own
initiative to communicate; he also failed to respond to complainant's queries and requests for updates.

Respondent's failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking justifies the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines' conclusion that he must restitute complainant the amount of P80,000.00.

Luna v. Galarrita28 has explained the parameters for ordering restitution in disciplinary proceedings:
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. However, respondent did not
turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to
complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant
complainant's prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.

Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited
to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar."

Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary proceedings
"remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." This court has thus ordered in administrative
proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees.

This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when respondent's
civil liability was already established:

Although the Court renders this decision m an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding
what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability. That has been the
reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited
cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, Small v. Banares.29 (Citations and emphases
omitted)

It is proper, in the course of these disciplinary proceedings, that respondent be required to return to
complainant the amount of P80,000.00. This amount was delivered to respondent during complainant's
engagement of his professional services, or in the context of an attorney-client relationship. This is neither
an extraneous nor purely civil matter.

By the same failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking (despite having received
fees for his services), as well as by his failure to keep complainant abreast of relevant developments in the
purposes for which his services were engaged, respondent falls short of the standards imposed by Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. (Emphasis supplied)

Disciplinary sanctions more severe than those considered proper by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
warranted.

We emphasize that, during the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00. He then made a
commitment to return that sum to her. To date, however, he has failed to deliver on the commitment made
almost twelve and a half years ago.

We clarify that the oral instruction given to respondent in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' August 18,
2004 hearing was not a juridically binding order. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and spells out
the terms of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' involvement in cases involving the disbarment and/or
discipline of lawyers. The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is only recommendatory.
Under Article VIII, Section 5(5)30 of the 1987 Constitution, only this Court has the power to actually rule on
disciplinary cases of lawyers, and to impose appropriate penalties.

Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. With the
exercise of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines refers proposed actions
to this Court. Recognizing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' limited competence in disciplinary cases
impels a concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action by this Court on its recommendations, its
determinations and conclusions are only provisional. Therefore, rulings on disciplinary cases attain finality
and are enforceable only upon this Court's own determination that they must be imposed.

The oral instruction given to respondent in the August 18, 2004 hearing has, thus, not attained such a
degree of finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply justifies additional
or increased penalties. Penalizing him for non-compliance is premature.

Nevertheless, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00
and made his own commitment to make this compensation.31 He may not have been bound by a juridical
instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to his own freely
executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he has miserably failed to live up to
the "high standard of ... morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing"32 that is apropos to members of the
legal profession.

For this reason, we exact upon respondent a penalty more severe than that initially contemplated by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Moreover, to impress upon respondent the urgency of
finally returning to complainant the amount he received, we impose on him an additional penalty
corresponding to the duration for which he fails to make restitution. We adopt the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors' position in Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 that an additional period of
suspension must be imposed on respondent for every month (or fraction) that he fails to pay in full the
amount he owes complainant. However, instead of a three (3)-month suspension for every month (or
fraction) of non-payment or incomplete payment, he is to be suspended for one (1) month for every such
period of failure to make full payment.

This approach hopefully underscores the burden that respondent must justly carry. By automatically
extending his suspension should he not return the amount, we save complainant, the victim, from the
additional costs of having to find and retain another counsel to compel the return of what is due her.
Counsels who have caused harm on their clients must also suffer the costs of restitution.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and six (6) months. He is ORDERED to restitute complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of
P80,000.00. For every month (or fraction) the he fails to fully restitute complainant the sum of P80,000.00,
respondent shall suffer an additional suspension of one (1) month.

He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were
consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the Office of the
Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married
Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and
Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia
alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually
granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35
years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreo and
Garcias children learned abouthis return, Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against him.
Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is
only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreo
should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against
him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed
as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreo alleged that Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment
and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.

In the Courts Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment
against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreo is practicing law despite his
previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is
only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted
his verified complaint against Sesbreo alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No.
7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase
"with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if
the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the
sentence. Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo
claimed that Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate
against him for representing Garcias daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the
sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-
CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreo guilty of murder and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide
and sentenced Sesbreo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD
found that Sesbreo was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the
conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations
Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting
Sesbreo for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the
victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a
foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have
wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning
of June 3, 1993.

The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks
of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the
respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have
shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud
bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondents inordinate over reaction to the
ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness
to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive without a cause; he was
cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for
having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreo be
disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On 6 May 2013, Sesbreo filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreo alleged
that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the
attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He further
alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was
restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreo alleged that after his wife died in an
ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia
and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia already
withdrew the complaints against him.

On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying
Sesbreos motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the Office
of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In
the Courts Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C.
No. 10457.

The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-
19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP
Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.5

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this
Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
1wphi 1

Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not
always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always
be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se
or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral
turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must
be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.7
In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and
hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of 50,000.00 and to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show
the presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher
Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreos house when the latter,
without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at
them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of
Sesbreo when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw
Sesbreo aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An
eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his
house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreo was firing his firearm
rapidly, hitting Rabanes house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall
down after being shot, then saw Sesbreo in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and
walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the
indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreo that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. Sesbreo cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty.
Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and
political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13 did not
state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned
when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not
mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon
me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1
day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of 50,000.00 is/are hereby
commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment
and to pay an indemnity of 50,000.00.14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term
of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation
is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The
penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for
which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and
Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not
been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here.
Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a
full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege.19 It is
granted only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of
the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the
penalty of disbarment.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt
of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(no part)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1
G.R. No. 97239, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 760.

2
Rollo (A.C. No. 10457), pp. 275-276.

3
515 Phil. 635 (2006).

4
Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA 366.

5
Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, 24 July 2012, 677 SCRA 352.

6
Supra note 1.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015

 ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other
unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims
that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines
(UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their
classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they
were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations
involved:ChanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already
married to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and
while still being romantically involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the
Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by
representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him,
when in truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.4 c ralawred nad

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000,
respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the
interest of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against
Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its
case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.3 cralawred nad

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the
cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case,
respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo.
The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by
respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself.6 cralaw rednad

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in
a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation
of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue
Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and
prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment
or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.7 cralawred nad

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to
conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B.
Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of
time. Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was
the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8 cra lawredna d

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding
probable cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9 cralaw rednad

Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon
University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced
his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his
female students in exchange for passing grades.10 cralaw rednad

The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in support of his
defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive
infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent
pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal
requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-
mail messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the
allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly established. Respondent further
argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant
consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint
were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in
his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of complainant's
accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity thereof."16
cralaw rednad

On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid)
set the case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears
that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference
allegedly due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by
complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order19dated August 28, 2007. In the
same order, complainant's Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was
scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective
subpoenas21 were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,22praying
that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the
third week of October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or
more commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two
weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical certificates,
stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing
that based on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting.
Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew
that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in
complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.23cra lawredna d

Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda),
Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty.
Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of
respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted
by complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly,
the email messages which contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and
respondent's high blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that
sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to
his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with
CCC, whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent
had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students during their drinking sessions and had even
one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations
with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to
inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty.
Corpus surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his
actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in
February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their
testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was
terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting
documentary evidence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After
which, the case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments),24pertaining to
respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from
Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the
first scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's
Compliance (with Comments),25 submitting the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report
cralaw red

No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30,
2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and
that any decision or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.28 cralaw rednad

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a
Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in
the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that
despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant
documents which support his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's assertion
that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on
the Report, complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email
messages pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner
Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having
illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
ChanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath
to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law. nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession".32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation: ChanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing
Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. this Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his
conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility."33

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of
Governors disbarred respondent, thus: ChanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article
XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is
hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which
complainant was required to submit his comment.36 cralawred nad

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28,
2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in
an Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to
the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration).39 c ralaw rednad

Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with
Leave40dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition41 dated September
20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court
on November 11, 2014.43 cralaw rednad

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his
disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution
finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ChanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be
retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a
member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.: ChanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether
or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof according to the equipoise
doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment
proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.46

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has
been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.

This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only
failed to retain good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery
of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.47 cralawre dnad

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice
law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled: ChanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not
save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds
expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to. cover
any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.49

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court disbarred
respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to
various legal strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of
his first marriage. We said: ChanRoble s virtua lLawl ibra ry

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
'a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 51 (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations
with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own
wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating
testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with
DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving
averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend
the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD
and CCC remain uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
ChanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath
to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage,
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.52(emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings that respondent
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ChanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending
case for graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit: ChanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees
to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final
Report No. 367" herein attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for
graft and corruption against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan.''53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to
adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were
merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically
denied complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz: ChanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to
mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the
same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant"
s position of being not present in the country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt
the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as
well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the
candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the
foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which
intention was more so established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the
form of certified true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he
took before admission to the Bar, which states: ChanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; [will
support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations
without any menial reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and
refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTYof
gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise,
let copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. ChanRoblesVi rtualawl ib rary

Reyes, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

A.C. No. 10911

VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment dated October 16, 2009 filed
by complainant Virgilio Mapalad, Sr. against respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 1

The Facts

Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 1635-1-784 before the Municipal Trial
Court in Santiago City, Isabela, complainant was one of the plaintiffs while respondent was the
defendants' counsel therein. As the said case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed
a Notice of Appeal dated May 22, 2009, in which respondent indicated his Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038 without indicating the date of issue
thereof. 2 On appeal, respondent filed the appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE
Compliance Number. 3

In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573, respondent, for the same clients, filed a
Petition for Injunction wherein he once again only indicated his MCLE Compliance
Number. 4 Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of Court datedJuly13,2009 in the said special
civil action, indicating his MCLE Compliance Number without the date of issue. 5 1wphi 1

Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that respondent had no MCLE
compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a Certification dated September 30, 2009, stating that
respondent had not yet complied with his MCLE requirements for the First Compliance Period (April
15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007). 6

Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately and unlawfully
misleading the courts, parties, and counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with the
MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct. 7 The
complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment to this Court. 8

In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required the respondent to file a comment on the
complaint within 10 days from notice. 9

Despite receipt thereof, however, respondent failed to comply with the said resolution. 10 This Court,
thus, issued another resolution dated July 11, 2011 requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and, again, to file a
comment to the complaint. 11 However, the respondent again failed to comply. 12

On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission- on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing. 13 On the date of the hearing, however, none of the parties appeared despite
due notice. 14Nonetheless, the IBP directed the parties to submit their respective position papers
within 10 days from notice. 15only the complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the allegations
and arguments in his complaint. 16

After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD rendered a report 17 dated
December 17, 2013 with the following recommendation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of evidence submitted by the complainant, it
is recommended that ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be DISBARRED and that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys upon finality of the decision.

So ORDERED. 18

On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence
on record and applicable laws, and for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified his
MCLE Compliance Number and used it in his pleadings in Court, including his having ignored the
Orders and notices of the Commission on Bar Discipline and his having been previously sanctioned
twice by the IBP, Atty. Anselmo Echanez is hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. 19

No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Issue

Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and
evidence on record?

The Ruling

We answer in the affirmative,

Preliminarily, let it be stated that there is no denying that the respondent was given ample
opportunity to answer the imputations against him and defend himself but he did not do so despite
due notices.

At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus, warranting the exercise by
this Court of its disciplinary power.

First. It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850 20 . No less than the
MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that respondent had not complied with the first and
second compliance period of the MCLE. 21

Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance
number in his pleadings before the trial courts. 22 In indicating patently false information in pleadings
filed before the courts of law, not only once but four times, as per records, the respondent acted in
manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants - his
own clients included - professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on such
pleadings containing false information. 23

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of
the courts, especially this Court, considering that it is this Court that authored the rules and
regulations that the respondent violated. 24

The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying
laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client, among
others, viz.:
I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will
support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these, voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (emphasis supplied)

Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise states:

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.

In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his own clients at
risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings with such false
information produce no legal effect. 25 In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his
clients. 26 Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR provide:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Third. The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and
also this Court despite due notice. In the special civil action above-cited, the trial court directed the
respondent to file a comment on a motion which raised in issue respondent's use of a false . MCLE
compliance number in his pleadings but he did not file any. 27 This Court also directed respondent to
file a comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so. 28 We then issued a show cause order
against the respondent to explain why he should not be disciplined or held in contempt for failing to
file the required comment but again, respondent did not heed this court's order. 29 The IBP- Court
orders should be respected not only because the authorities who

issued them should be respected, but because of the respect and

consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the

government, which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a

government of laws and not of men. 31CBD also notified the respondent to appear before it for
mandatory conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored. 30

Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who issued them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the government, which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of
laws and not of men. 31

Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite notice violates the lawyer's oath
and runs counter to the precepts of the CPR. By his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.

Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that, as cited by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution, respondent had already been sanctioned by the IBP twice. In a decision
dated April 11, 2013 by this Court en bane, respondent was found guilty of engaging in notarial
practice without a notarial commission, and was thus suspended from the practice of law for two
years with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more
severe sanction. 32 In another decision dated May 31, 2016, this Court en bane again found
respondent guilty of performing notarial acts without a notarial commission and was thus suspended
from the practice of law for two years and barred permanently from being commissioned as notary
public with a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely. 33 It is
noteworthy that in both cases, respondent already manifested his lack of regard, not only for the
charges against him, but most importantly to the orders of the IBP and the courts. In the said cases,
the respondent likewise failed to file answers, comments, or position papers, or attended mandatory
conferences despite due notices. 34

Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance number in his
pleadings 35 , his repeated failure to obey legal Orders 36 , and the fact that he had already been
sanctioned twice by this Court On separate cases 37 , We are constrained to affirm the IBP Board of
Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, recommending his disbarment to prevent him from further
engaging in legal practice. 38 It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice. 39 As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain legal
proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. 40 Also, of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. 41 He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and
ignore the very bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a detrimental
example to the society. 42

WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

AssociateJustice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO P. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

Footnotes