Steven C. Hackett Environmental and Natural Reso PDF

Environmental
and Natural
Resources
Economics
Environmental Theory, Policy, and the
Sustainable Society
and Natural
Resources 3rd edition
Economics
Steven C. Hackett
M.E.Sharpe
Armonk, New York
London, England
Copyright 2006 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form
without written permission from the publisher, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,
80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hackett, Steven C., 1960

Environmental and natural resources economics : theory, policy, and the sustainable society /
Steven C. Hackett.3rd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7656-1472-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Environmental economics. 2. Environmental policy. 3. Natural resources.
4. Sustainable development. I. Title.
HD75.6.H33 2006
333.7dc22 2005024132
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of

American National Standard for Information Sciences
Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z 39.48-1984.
BM (c) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Mary
Contents
List of Tables and Figures xvii

Preface xxi
Part I. Theory and Fundamentals 1
1. Introduction to Environmental and Natural

Resources Economics 3
Introduction 3
Fundamental Concepts 5
Some Reasons for Optimism and Some Reasons for Concern 10
Reasons for Optimism 10
Reasons for Concern 13
Overview 14
Summary 16
Review Questions and Problems 17
Internet Links 18
References and Further Reading 19
2. Value Systems and Economic Systems 21

Introduction 21
Fundamentals of Ethical Systems 22
Deontological Ethics 23
Teleological Ethics 25
A Closer Look at Utilitarianism 26
Self-Interest, the Common Good, and Social Order 30
Private Property 32
Locke and the Liberal Society 33
vii
viii CONTENTS
Rousseau and the Civil Society 33

On Positive and Normative Economics 35
Economic Questions That All Societies Must Answer 36
Summary 36
Internet Links 39
References and Further Reading
3. The Economics of Market Allocation 41

Introduction 41
Market Capitalism 41
Conditions Required for a Well-Functioning Competitive Market 42
Market Demand and Supply 43
Market Demand 43
Market Supply 47
Market Equilibrium and Efficiency 51
Market Equilibrium 51
Efficient Resource Allocation 52
Market Failure 55
Monopoly, Cartels, and Market Power 55
Externalities 56
Common-Pool Resources and Public Goods: Collectively
Produced and/or Consumed Goods 57
Imperfect Information 58
Fairness, Equity, and Distributive Justice 58
Perspectives on Market Failures and Government Intervention 59
Summary 69
Internet Links 62
Appendix: A Calculus-based Derivation of Supply Curves 64
4. Externalities, Market Failures, and Policy Interventions 66

Introduction 66
Positive Externalities 66
Negative Externalities 69
Property Rights and Negative Externalities 70
Social Cost as the Sum of Private and External Cost 73
Competitive Markets Are Inefficient When There Are
CONTENTS ix
Pigouvian Taxes: The Theory of Policy Interventions for

Summary 82
Internet Links 85
5. The Economics of Natural Resource Systems

Part I: Theory and Concepts 88
Introduction and Overview 88
Allocating Nonrenewable Resources 90
The Industrial Organization of Energy Delivery in the
United States 90
The Theory of Dynamically Efficient Nonrenewable Resource
Pricing 92
Present Value Analysis 93
Dynamic Efficiency 94
Allocating Recyclable Resources 102
Allocating Renewable Resources 105
Allocating Common-Pool Resources 106
Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital 113
Resources for the Future: Factors Affecting Future Resource
Scarcity 114
Summary 117
Internet Links 120
Appendix: The Prisoners Dilemma and the Tragedy of the
Commons 123
Part II. Policy 127
6. The Economics of Natural Resource Systems,

Part II: Marine Capture Fisheries 129
Introduction 129
World Trends 130
Bioeconomic Model of a Fishery 134
Fishery Management 139
Individual Quotas 141
Aquaculture 146
Summary 148
x CONTENTS

Internet Links 150
7. Measurement and Analysis of Benefits and Costs 153

Introduction: Benefit/Cost Analysis 153
Efficiency 156
Maximizing Net Present Value (PV) 157
An Illustrative Example of Benefit/Cost Analysis 158
The Coase Theorem 161
Operationalizing Benefit/Cost Analysis in U.S.
Environmental Policy 163
Measuring Benefits 164
Overview 164
Measuring the Health and Ecological Benefits of
Regulation: Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and
the Value of a Statistical Life 166
Categories of Nonmarketed Environmental Benefits:
Use and Nonuse Values 170
Use Values 170
Nonuse Values 170
Measuring Nonmarketed Environmental Benefits:
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) 171
Examples of CVM Studies 174
The CVM Debate 176
The Travel Cost Method (TCM) 178
Hedonic Regression Method (HRM) 182
Other Valuation Approaches 184
Measuring Costs 186
Direct Costs 186
Indirect Costs 188
Summary 192
Internet Links 197
8. The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and

Resource Management 203
Introduction: What Is Political Economy? 203
CONTENTS xi
Economic Models of Political Economy and the Regulatory

Process 205
Introduction 205
The Political Market for Regulation 207
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation:
A Selective Survey 210
The Political Economy of Locally Self-Governed Common-Pool
Resources 212
The Political Economy of International Environmental Accords:
The Case of the Montreal Protocol 216
Theoretical Foundation 216
Case Study: The International Political Economy of CFC Control 217
Summary 221
Internet Links 225
9. Motivating Regulatory Compliance: Monitoring,
Enforcement, and Sanctions 229
Introduction 229
The Economics of Crime 229
The Economics of Deterrence 231
Criminal Penalties and Incarceration Versus Fines and
Monetary Damages 235
Market-based Reputational Enforcement and
Voluntary Overcompliance 236
Private Auditing 240
Incentive Enforcement Systems 241
EPA Enforcement 242
Selected Civil and Criminal Case Summaries from the
Department of Justice 245
California Enforcement 247
Compliance 249
Citizen Suits 250
Summary 250
Internet Links 252
10. Creating Economic Incentives for Environmental
Protection and Resource Management 255
Introduction 255
xii CONTENTS
Marketable Pollution Allowances 258

An Illustration of the Cost-Savings Potential from Marketable
Pollution Allowances 259
Case 1: Traditional Uniform Performance Standard and
No Marketable Allowances 260
Case 2: Cap and Trade 261
Case 3: Limited Allowance Trading 265
Advantages of Marketable Allowance Systems 266
Disadvantages of Marketable Allowance Systems 266
Marketable Pollution Allowances and the Clean Air Act (CAA)
Amendments of 1990: The Acid Rain Program 267
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 270
Emissions Trading 271
Other Experiments with Marketable Allowances 272
Environmental Taxes 274
Environmental Taxes in the United States 274
Environmental Taxes Around the World 275
Summary 276
Internet Links 280
11. Global Climate Change: Science, Policy, and Economics 283

Introduction 283
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Global Climate Change 286
Modeling Carbon Dioxide Emissions 286
Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions 288
Global Climate Change Predictions 290
The Evidence Regarding Global Climate Change 296
International Action on Global Climate Change 299
The Earth Summit 302
The Kyoto Protocol 303
Policy Studies: The Economics of Controlling Greenhouse
Gas Emissions 305
Summary 312
Internet Links 315
Part III. Topics on the Economics of Sustainability 321
12. Introduction to the Concept of Sustainability 323
Introduction 323
CONTENTS xiii
Sustainable Development 325

Conservation-based Development 328
A Working Definition of Sustainability 329
Summary 334
Internet Links 336
13. Recognizing Interdependencies and Thinking Long Term 339

Introduction 339
Recognizing Interdependencies 339
The Industrial Revolution and the Agrarian Transition 340
Income, Poverty, and Economic Growth 342
Education, Empowerment, and Justice 349
International Trade 355
The Argument for Free International Trade 356
The Argument Against Free International Trade 359
Population 365
The Demographic Transition Model 366
Population Forecasts 369
Taxes and Incentives 371
Thinking Long Term: Discounting and Policy Making 373
The Effect of Discount Rates on Environmentally Friendly
Investments and Sustainability: An Illustrative Example 375
The Opportunity Cost of Capital and the Social Rate of
Time Preference 377
The Opportunity Cost of Capital 377
The Social Rate of Time Preference 378
Are the Discount Rates Associated with Competitive
Financial Markets Consistent with Those Required for
Sustainability? 379
Summary 381
Internet Links 386
14. Sustainable Economic Development 391

Introduction 391
Conventional Economic Development Strategies 392
Conventional Economic Development Assistance Programs 392
Case Studies 396
xiv CONTENTS
Envisioning Sustainable Development: The Brundtland

Commission Report, the Earth Summit, the Millennium
Development Goals, and Beyond 398
Theories of Sustainability 402
Weak Sustainability 403
Strong Sustainability 404
Practical Policy Implications 405
Sustainability Indicators 406
Indicators of Weak Sustainability 408
Indicators of Strong Sustainability 413
Case Studies in Measuring Sustainable Economic Development 415
Scotland 415
United States 416
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean 417
Summary 417
Internet Links 419
15. Issues in Sustainable Production and Consumption 426

Introduction 426
More Sustainable Energy Resources, Technologies, and Processes 429
Solar Energy 429
Industrial Ecology 435
Policies Promoting Sustainable Production and Consumption 438
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) 438
Ecolabels 440
Factors Relating to the Success of Ecolabel Programs 441
Three Examples of Ecolabeled Goods 442
Taxes, Subsidies, and Ecological Tax Reform 443
Government Research and Development Funding 443
International Environmental Certification 444
Consumer Preferences and Sustainable Consumption 446
Summary 448
Internet Links 450
16. Issues in the Economics of Sustainable Local Communities 453

Introduction 453
Sustainable Local Self-Governance of CPR Systems 454
CONTENTS xv
Examples of Sustainable Local Communities and the Systems

They Use for Governing CPRs 455
Trbel, Switzerland 455
Japanese Village Commons 456
Spanish Irrigation Commons 456
Localized Self-Governance of Fisheries 457
Fodder and Fuelwood Use in Panchayat Community Forests 458
Ostroms Design Principles Associated with Sustainable Local
Self-Governance of Common-Pool Resources 459
Retrospective on CPRs and Local Self-Governance 461
Integrating Sustainability into Local Economic Development 462
A Model of the Local Economy 463
Different Approaches to Economic Development 467
Case Studies 472
Arcata 472
The Cogtong Bay Mangrove Management Project 474
Sustainable Local Economic Development in South Africa 475
Moving Toward Sustainable Urban Planning in Curitiba, Brazil 476
Summary 477
Internet Links 480
Glossary 483
Index 511
About the Author 525
List of Tables and Figures
Tables
3.1 Hypothetical Example of a Consumers Marginal Utility
from Successive Quantities of Different Lunchtime Meal
Alternatives 44
3.2 Hypothetical Example of Restaurant Production in the
Short Run 48
3.3 Hypothetical Example of Daily Production, Cost, and Profit 48
3.4 Hypothetical Example of Daily Production, Cost, and Profit
When Menu Price Increases 49
4.1 Marginal Private, External, and Social Costs 74
4.2 External Costs (in Euro Cents) per Kilowatt-Hour of
Electricity Generated from Various Energy Sources 82
5.1 Strategic Form of the Prisoners Dilemma Game 124
6.1 Quota-Based Management Systems for Marine Capture
Fisheries 142
6.2 Effects of Derby Reduction, Resulting from IQ Fishery
Management, on the Seafood Processing Industry 145
7.1 Hypothetical PV of Costs and Benefits for Control of Sulfur
Dioxide Emissions 158
9.1 Sample Programs, EPA Partners for the Environment 238
10.1 Summary of Economic Instruments for Environmental
Protection and Resource Management 256
10.2 Hypothetical Example of an Industry with Heterogeneous
Marginal Abatement Costs 259
10.3 Hypothetical Industrywide Cost of Cutting Emissions by
One-Half Using a Uniform Performance-based Standard
(Command and Control) 261
xvii
xviii LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

One-Half Under a Cap-and-Trade System with Fully
Tradable Allowances 263
One-Half with Limited Allowances Trading 267
11.1 Global Warming Potential, Mean Atmospheric Lifetime, and
Trend Growth in Emissions of Selected Greenhouse Gases 284
13.1 An Illustrative Example of Bilateral Trade 357
13.2 Hypothetical Example: Costs With and Without
Home Insulation 376
13.3 Hypothetical Example: Cost Savings from Home Insulation
for Different Discount Rates 377
13.4 Hypothetical Example: Cost Savings from Purchasing a More
Fuel-Efficient Furnace 385
14.1 Millenium Development Goals and Targets 400
16.1 Selected Economic Instruments for More Sustainable Local
Community Development 473
Figures
1.1 Production Possibilities Frontier 9

3.1 Individual Consumer Demand for Burritos 46
3.2 A Competitive Firms Marginal Cost Curve Is Also Its
Short-Run Supply Curve 50
3.3 Supply and Demand 51
3.4 Consumer and Producer Surplus 53
3.5 Profit-Maximizing Output 65
4.1 Positive Externalities and Market Failure 68
4.2 Marginal Private Cost, Marginal External Cost, and Marginal
Social Cost 75
4.3 Negative Externalities and Market Failure 76
4.4 Negative Externalities and Inefficient Resource Allocation 78
5.1 Total Surplus, Year 0 95
5.2 Total Surplus, Year 1 96
5.3 Dynamically Efficient Solution, Year 0 100
5.4 Dynamically Efficient Solution, Year 1 101
5.5 Commodity Market with Costly Recycled and Cheaper Virgin
Supplies 103
5.6 CPR Appropriation: Full Rent Dissipation Versus Group
Optimum 109
6.1 Biological Mechanics of a Fishery 135
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES xix
6.2 Bioeconomic Equilibria with H = FMAX 136

6.3 Bioeconomic Equilibria with H < FMAX 137
6.4 Bioeconomic Equilibria with Two Different Levels of
Fishing Effort 138
7.1 Level of Pollution Control That Maximizes Total Net Benefit
Occurs Where Marginal Benefit Equals Marginal Cost 159
7.2 Total Net Benefit Curve 160
7.3 Nonmarket Demand for an Environmental Amenity Estimated
from the Contingent Valuation Method 174
7.4 Nonmarket Demand for a Recreational Site Estimated from the
Travel Cost Method 181
7.5 Nonmarket Demand for an Environmental Attribute Estimated
from the Hedonic Regression Method 184
8.1 The Political Market for Regulation 210
9.1 Optimal Level of Crime Control 231
9.2 Equal Expected Penalty Curve 234
10.1 Industrywide Marginal Abatement Costs 260
10.2 Market Supply and Demand for Pollution Allowances 263
10.3 Allowance Sales by Firms with Upward-Sloping Allowance
Supply Curves 265
11.1 Simplified Global Carbon Cycle Circa 2000 285
12.1 The Bathtub Model of Capital Stocks and Flows 331
12.2 The Three Pillars of Sustainability 333
13.1 The Environmental Kuznets Curve 346
13.2 The Demographic Transition 368
16.1 Simplified Model of a Local Economy 464
16.2 Economic Impact of Export Income on the Local Economy 467
Preface
This textbook provides an accessible yet rigorous treatment of environmental

and natural resource economics, as well as the emerging subject of sustainability
and sustainable development. This third edition is built on the foundation of
more than ten years of classroom experience working with and learning from
thousands of students at Humboldt State University and other institutions. These
include undergraduate majors in business, economics, environmental science,
forestry, natural resources planning, and masters degree students from the
environment and community, environmental systems, and natural resource
graduate programs. Many of the noneconomists I have taught have little in the
way of prior training in economics, and approach the topics covered in this
textbook with a healthy dose of skepticism. As a result, this book was designed
to balance accessibility, breadth, and rigor, with the goal of creating a valuable
learning experience for students coming from economics as well as interdisci-
plinary programs focused on environmental science, resource management,
and public policy. Provocative issues are raised with the intention of stimulat-
ing interest and generating constructive debate. Chapters 111 can be used to
cover a traditional one-semester course in environmental and resource eco-
nomics. A nontraditional course on the economics of a sustainable society can
be built around chapters 13 (economic fundamentals), followed by chapters
1216 (issues in the economics of a sustainable society), likely in combina-
tion with outside materials. In a graduate course I find it productive to assign
spreadsheet simulation exercises to help cement a better understanding of the
workings and comparative-static properties of the economic models presented
in the chapters.
There are a number of topics that can be added or subtracted based on the
nature of the course being taught. For example, chapters 13 introduce basic
principles, and are included to make the book accessible to those who do not
xxi
xxii PREFACE
have a prior background in economics. If this book is to be used in an upper-

division undergraduate course for economics majors, students can cover these
quickly as a review. Those who are teaching an introductory course can skip
the mathematical models on dynamic efficiency in chapter 5 and on the
bioeconomics of marine capture fisheries in chapter 6 and focus on the con-
cepts. Since this textbook was designed for diverse student readers, the con-
tent covers both mainstream economic topics and topics that lie at the
boundary with other disciplines. Examples of the broader approach can be
seen in the coverage of philosophy in chapter 2, marine fisheries in chapter
6, the science of climate change in chapter 11, and the extensive material on
sustainability in chapters 1216. The textbook makes extensive use of cita-
tions to original material in each chapter, thus providing a starting point for
those wishing to pursue further study on a topic (such as for term papers or
theses). Since many of these scholarly works, policy studies, and govern-
ment research documents are available on the Internet, an annotated set of
Internet links is provided at the end of each chapter.
Those who are new to environmental and natural resource economics must
develop a new technical vocabulary. To make that process easier and less frus-
trating, technical terms introduced for the first time are italicized, with defini-
tions provided in an extensive glossary included at the end of the textbook.
A considerable amount of new material was added in creating the third
edition of this textbook. While every chapter was substantially revised, the
more significant changes are highlighted below. Chapter 6 was added to pro-
vide a marine fisheries application for the conceptual material in chapter 5
that covers the economics of renewable resources and of common-pool re-
source dilemmas. Somewhat more advanced mathematical models of natural
resource economics were added in chapters 5 and 6, and more advanced
spreadsheet simulation exercises were added at the end of chapters 3, 4, 5, 6,
and 7. A more extensive treatment of supply and demand was added to the
material on market capitalism in chapter 3, some of which was moved out of
chapter 4. The material in chapter 11 on global climate change was substan-
tially updated, as research and public policy have changed rapidly since the
second edition was written in 2000. Internet links at the end of each chapter
were updated, and new problems were added at the end of most chapters.
The glossary has also been expanded for the third edition, and there are
many new figures and tables. An updated Internet site accompanies this text-
book (http://www.humboldt.edu/~envecon). Readers will find helpful appli-
cations such as audio clips, Excel-based interactive simulations, lecture
outlines, sample essays, annotated Internet links, and much more.
I would like to acknowledge the support and understanding of my family
during the summers of 2004 and 2005 when I was writing the third edition
PREFACE xxiii
of this textbook. My colleagues Dan Ihara, Michal Moore, Yo Nagai, and

David Narum have used this textbook in their classes and offered many help-
ful suggestions that I have addressed in this third edition. I have also re-
ceived helpful input from my colleagues Chris Dewees, Dave Hankin, and
Lin Ostrom. Amber Jamieson and Jocelyn Godinho provided capable stu-
dent research assistance. I would also like to thank the many students who
have used this book in the classroom and have offered me valuable insights
and constructive criticism that are reflected in this third edition.
Part I
Theory and Fundamentals
1
Introduction to
Environmental and Natural
Resources Economics
Introduction
Traditionally, economists learned very little about the environment, and en-
vironmental scientists and resource managers learned very little about eco-
nomics. Yet economic and environmental systems interact in many important
ways, and an increasing number of economists, scientists, and resource man-
agers are finding that they need to work in an interdisciplinary fashion in
order to understand these interactions and develop effective public policy.
This book provides a foundation for you to learn more about a wide variety
of problems and policies at the interface of economic and environmental
systems. Economic systems derive many valuable inputs (some commodified,
some free) from the ecological, hydrological, geological, atmospheric, and
other systems and processes of Earth. For example, essential ecosystem ser-
vices such as nutrient cycling, sink functions of wetlands, and the hydrologi-
cal cycle have economic value, and methods are being developed to measure
these values. Economic activity can have negative impacts on the functional
integrity of these natural systems and processes, though in some cases these
impacts can be substantially reduced or even eliminated through careful public
policy. Environmentally harmful activity can be reduced (or environmen-
tally benign activity can be increased) by changing the incentives of people
and businesses through the use of taxes, subsidies, ecolabels, deposit/refund
systems, and liability, or through the use of caps, bans, and technology stan-
3
4 THEORY AND FUNDAMENTALS
dards. Markets for emission credits can be used in conjunction with emis-
sions caps to reduce the cost of compliance with environmental regulation.
While industry groups will oftentimes exert political influence to reduce or
overturn costly environmental regulations, under some circumstances firms
have an incentive to lobby to impose more stringent environmental regula-
tion on their industry. These are just a few of the topics addressed in this
book. As Berry (1987) observes, the thing that troubles us about the indus-
trial economy is exactly that it is not comprehensive enough, that, moreover,
it tends to destroy what it does not comprehend, and that it is dependent upon
much that it does not comprehend (pp. 5455). It is hoped that this book
will help introduce economists to relevant and important environmental is-
sues, and to help resource and environmental specialists develop a basic com-
petency in economics.
There are a number of themes covered in this book that usually come
together under the heading of environmental and natural resources econom-
ics, and there are some that are still new and developing. A primary focus of
this book is on environmental economics, which analyzes the economic ba-
sis for pollution problems, as well as the policies designed to resolve pollu-
tion. Much of the work in environmental economics studies the application
and performance of incentive regulatory practices, such as pollution taxes,
liability, or cap-and-trade systems. Some environmental economists also de-
velop or apply methods for estimating the benefits of environmental improve-
ments or the costs of pollution externalities. Others study the political economy
of environmental policy. Another important focus of this book is on natural
resource economics, which has traditionally addressed problems of govern-
ing common-pool natural resources, of finding dynamically optimal rates of
renewable or nonrenewable resource extraction, and of the workings of re-
source and energy markets. Fossil or renewable energy resources and policy
are an important area of study in natural resource economics. More recently
ecological economics has emerged as an area of study focused on under-
standing the economics of natural capital and the ecosystem goods and ser-
vices that flow from it. Another more recent area of inquiry, the economics of
a sustainable society, includes efforts at identifying, modeling, and measur-
ing the contribution of economic activities to a more sustainable society.
Sustainability studies focus on understanding the interactions between
economy, community, and environment over the long term, and on using this
information to fashion policies that move us closer to a sustainable society.
While some of these topics are complex, the book is also designed to be
accessible to readers who may have little in the way of an economics back-
ground, but who possess a compensatory motivation to learn.
There are threads of economic theory that connect the various chapters of
INTRODUCTION 5
this book. One of these is the principle of pollution taxation, first introduced
with externality theory in chapter 4. Various policy experiments in pollution
taxation are described in chapter 10. More ambitious programs of ecological
tax reform that call for a comprehensive shifting of taxes from beneficial
activities such as employment to pollution and resource degradation are de-
scribed in chapter 13. Another thread is the concept of dynamic efficiency,
which is an adaptation of static efficiency concepts to resource allocation
problems over multiple time periods into the future. The theoretical concept
is developed with regard to nonrenewable resources in chapter 5 and is also
applied to benefit/cost analysis in chapter 7. The concept arises again in chapter
13, where it is related to the challenge of making sustainability policy today
that generates benefit and cost flows in the future. Related to the concept of
dynamic efficiency, Hotelling rents occur when future demand for a scarce
and depletable resource is reflected in current prices and represent the differ-
ence between the price and the marginal extraction cost of a resource. A
theoretical model is developed in chapter 5 and applied again in chapter 14,
where it is shown how reinvestment of Hotelling rents contributes to
sustainability. Finally, the problem of governing common-pool resources (re-
sources such as fisheries that are used by multiple people and are subject to
depletion from overuse), first presented as a theoretical concept in chapter 5,
is revisited in application to marine capture fisheries in chapter 6, and again
in chapter 16 in the context of self-governance of localized common-pool
resources.
The section that follows introduces some basic economic concepts. This
section will help build a conceptual foundation for those who are new to
economics. Readers with a prior background in economics may find it to be
a useful review.
Fundamental Concepts
Many people approach economics with a preconceived notion of what eco-

nomics is about. An example is the common tendency to equate economics
with commercial activity and the stock market. These notions are embedded
in our culture and in the various news media. The purpose of this section is to
develop a clearer understanding of what economics is about. Lets start out
by defining economics. Economics is the study of how scarce resources,
goods, and services are allocated among competing uses. The key issue in
economics is that the choice problem of how to allocate is implied by the
condition of scarcity, and so economy or minimization of waste occurs when
resources are allocated to their highest-valued use. Thus at the center of
economics is scarcity. Scarcity means not having enough of something to
provide for all that is wanted. The condition of scarcity implies that not all
goals can be attained at the same time. While some aspects of scarcity are
social constructs, or are created or heightened by advertising, others are un-
avoidable aspects of life.
Examples of scarce resources:
A candy bar offered to a classroom full of hungry students.

A given hour of your time.
A popular campground at a mountain lake.
Old-growth trees in a national forest.
Your money income.
Clean water in rivers.
Fish in a fishery.
Your attention.
Tax revenues flowing to a city government.
A predators energy and time.
Net earnings at a profit-maximizing firm.
In each of the cases given above, there is a choice problem necessitated

by a condition of scarcity. It is interesting to note that the economic problem
of allocating scarce resources in the context of competing uses is not unique
to humans. Other forms of life also respond to conditions of scarcity, and one
can argue that natural selection tends to favor those organisms that are most
successful in allocating their time and energy in the context of scarcity. Scar-
city is one of the fundamental aspects of our world, both inside and outside
of markets. Scarcity makes choice unavoidable. Since so many aspects of
our world involve choices necessitated by a condition of scarcity, economics
is fundamental and ever-present in most everything we do, whether we are
aware of it or not. When you choose to buy a slice of pizza instead of a bowl
of vegetarian chili for lunch, that choice is an economic decision. When the
Forest Service chooses to manage a particular watershed to protect wilder-
ness-dependent species rather than for logging or intense recreation, then
that choice is also an economic decision.
Since scarcity forces us to make choices from a set of alternatives, on
what basis can we rank the various alternatives and choose the best one?
Economic analysis requires a system of value from which we can compare
alternatives and so distinguish good from less good allocations. Every day
you make economic choices that involve ranking alternatives. From a cogni-
tive point of view, many people develop decision rules and rules-of-thumb
that simplify the process of ranking and choosing alternatives to such an
extent that we are no longer consciously aware of those choices being made.
INTRODUCTION 7
Much of government policy making involves the ranking of alternatives.

Since people have different values, the best economic choice for one is not
necessarily the best for another. As a consequence, environmental policy
conflicts often have their basis in value conflicts, though they may be popu-
larly cast as conflicts between economy and environment.
While economics is a very broad field of study, there is a tendency to
more narrowly equate economics with commercial activity. For example,
consider the following hypothetical headline: The decision to manage a
segment of national forest as wilderness rather than as a timber production
area is a rare example of the environment winning out over economics. The
headline writer seems to be implying that wilderness values are noneco-
nomic, confusing commerce with economics. This implication is false. The
time and money that people spend in traveling to wilderness areas for recre-
ation is scarce, as is the time and money spent by those who lobby and advo-
cate for wilderness protection. People who do not visit wilderness areas
nevertheless may value their existence. Wilderness areas also provide valu-
able ecosystem services and natural resources that flow beyond the wilder-
ness boundary, such as clean air, fresh water, wildlife, and plants. These and
other wilderness benefits are no less economic than the price of admission to
Disneyland or the revenues generated from a timber harvest. While markets
are a prominent way of making allocation choices in the context of scarcity,
economics encompasses the study of both market and nonmarket allocation
of scarce resources. As Power (1996) observes, economic analysis of the
environment is challenging and important precisely because its value is not
conveniently revealed in a market and thus is subject to inappropriate use.
Even wilderness area management itself is partly an economic problem.
Managers have limited budgets to allocate for science and maintenance, and
allocating a popular section of wilderness for threatened and endangered
species habitat may require sharp cutbacks in recreational visitation. And so
it should be clear that the lack of a market for wilderness does not mean that
it has no economic value. In chapter 7 you will learn about various methods
that have been developed for measuring the value of resources and other
aspects of the environment that are not traded in markets and so lack a mar-
ket price as an indicator of value.
Continuing our example, protecting wildlands as a designated wilderness
area means that certain extractive activities such as logging, mining, and ski
area development cannot occur. Suppose that the next best use of the area
could be measured by the net revenue generated from timber harvest. Then
this net revenue is part of the cost of wilderness protection, in this case re-
ferred to as an opportunity cost. When something scarce is allocated to one
particular use, the opportunity cost of that choice is the value of the best
alternative that had to be given up. Everything that is scarce and so requires
an allocation choice has an opportunity cost. We can evaluate the rationality
of a particular choice by comparing the benefits that it generates relative to
its opportunity cost. Economic rationality, as the term is used in this book,
refers to behavior that is intended to be consistent with the values and objec-
tives of the decision maker, given the information that is available to the
decision maker. Or more simply, economic rationality refers to choices made
in the context of scarcity where the benefits to the decision maker are per-
ceived to exceed cost. There are several issues that should be addressed at
this point. First, rational and reasonable do not mean the same thing. One
persons rational choice may not seem reasonable to another who does not
share the same values. Second, underlying the notion of economic rational-
ity is the view that people (and economic organizations) are optimizers who
have the objective of maximizing net value. In the context of markets, for
example, consumer theory starts from the premise that consumers wish to
maximize their overall level of satisfaction, or utility, as constrained by their
income and by market prices, while firms wish to maximize their profits.
From an economic point of view, however, optimizing behavior is not lim-
ited to market exchanges designed to improve material well-being; to think
that is to confuse optimization with self-interest. Optimization more gener-
ally involves the process of ranking alternative uses of ones time, energy,
attention, resources, or income based on a particular set of values and prefer-
ences, and then selecting the alternative that yields the greatest increase in
net value. Thus, allocating scarce time and energy as a volunteer, a voter, or
an activist can be entirely rational, optimizing behavior for those who care a
great deal about their community.
The concepts of scarcity and opportunity cost can be illustrated in a pro-
duction possibilities frontier (PPF). In the simple illustrative example given
in Figure 1.1, we have an economy that has a set of resources (land, labor,
capital) that can be used to produce various combinations of food and cloth-
ing outputs.
The PPF in Figure 1.1 represents all the possible combinations of food and
clothing that can be produced in a given time period when available resources
are fully and efficiently employed. When resources are wasted, such as when
discrimination results in women being unable to obtain certain types of jobs
for which they are qualified, we are inside rather than on the PPF, such as at
point A in Figure 1.1. As we move along a PPF and increase the production of
one good, such as clothing, we must shift resources away from producing the
other good, food. The opportunity cost of a given increase in clothing is re-
flected in the amount of food (and the value we place on it) that is given up to
produce more clothing. For example, the movement from point B to point D
INTRODUCTION 9
Figure 1.1 Production Possibilities Frontier
Point A: Attainable but inefficient

combination of food and clothing.
Food
Points B and D: Two alternative
bundles of food and clothing that are
both attainable and efficient. Moving
C from B to D increases clothing, but
entails the opportunity cost of less
food, as indicated by the arrows.
B
Point C: Unattainable combination of
food and clothing.
A
Production
Possibilities
Frontier
Clothing
along the PPF in Figure 1.1 results in an increase in clothing and a correspond-
ing decrease in food. The bowed-out shape of the PPF is based on the idea
that the economic resources used to produce food and clothing are at least
somewhat specialized. As a result, each additional unit of clothing production
entails a larger and larger opportunity cost, as resources that are more produc-
tively deployed for food production are redirected to clothing production. In
economics this is referred to as the Law of Increasing Opportunity Cost. Out-
ward shifts in the PPF occur when more resources are available or when better
technologies are developed that increase the productivity of a given resource.
Preferences for food and clothing determine which combination along the
frontier is produced in this highly simplified economy.
So what situations do not have an economic dimension? The answer is
those things that are not scarce. Value systems, love, friendship, aspects of
culture, and spirituality are, or at least can be, outside of economics because
it is not clear that they are subject to scarcity. The range of possible thoughts
and ideas is also not subject to scarcity, though it is clear that a persons
cognitive capacities are scarce and thus subject to economics. Moreover, the
assertion that economics is fundamental to the human experience does not
necessarily imply that economists can measure and model everything of value
that is affected by environmental and natural resources policy. In addition,
the moral, ethical, and spiritual implications of a particular allocation prob-

lem may supersede the use of economic tools for determining what the proper
allocation might be. This does not invalidate economic analysis, but acknowl-
edges that social and political factors may play an equal or a greater role in
determining how a society ultimately chooses to allocate resources.
Some Reasons for Optimism and Some Reasons for Concern
In terms of trends there are reasons for both optimism and concern. Lets
first consider some reasons for being optimistic regarding economics and the
environment.
Reasons for Optimism
One reason for being optimistic is that regulations such as the Clean Air Act
and its amendments have led to substantial progress being made in reducing
nationwide emissions of the key air pollutants. For example, the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that between 1983 and 2002
emissions of nitrogen oxides fell by 15 percent, emissions of volatile organic
compounds fell by 40 percent, emissions of sulfur dioxide fell by 33 percent,
emissions of carbon monoxide fell by 41 percent, and emissions of lead fell
by 93 percent. Moreover, there is evidence that our investment in clean air
has generated substantial net economic benefits as well. In their benefit/cost
analysis on the Clean Air Act, the EPA found that over the period from 1970
to 1990, each dollar of compliance cost generated approximately $44.40 in
economic benefits, largely from improved human health (U.S. EPA 1997).
Another reason for optimism is the decline in toxic releases since the ini-
tiation of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program. Specifically, the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 requires firms
to report releases of many different toxic chemicals. Emissions of the toxic
chemicals originally included in the inventory declined by 55 percent be-
tween 1988 and 2001. Moreover, new chemicals and new facilities have been
added to the inventory, and total output of the industries covered by the TRI
has increased by 40 percent since 1991 (Pacific Research Institute website).
Analysis by Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) indicates that beginning in
1989 there was a highly significant downward shift in the relationship be-
tween the value of manufacturing output and toxic releases, indicating cleaner
production.
The increasing cost-effectiveness of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions in
the EPAs Acid Rain Program offers another reason for optimism. As de-
scribed in greater detail in chapter 10, the Acid Rain Program includes a novel
INTRODUCTION 11
approach to regulation that allows firms with lower cleanup costs to contract to
perform cleanup for firms with very high cleanup costs. This market contract-
ing process occurs in the context of a substantial overall reduction in allowed
sulfur dioxide emissions. Carlson et al. (1998) estimate that allowance trading
in the Acid Rain Program achieved cost savings of $700 million to $800 mil-
lion a year over what could have been expected from a command and control
program with a uniform emission-rate standard.
Optimists have had their positions supported by the failure of the pre-
dictions regarding the exhaustion of many important nonrenewable re-
sources provided by Meadows et al. (1972). In their publication Limits to
Growth (1972), Meadows et al. applied an exponential function for resource
consumption to the known reserves of various energy and mineral resources.
These analysts arrived at the conclusion that resources such as copper, gold,
lead, mercury, natural gas, petroleum, silver, tin, and zinc would all be
fully depleted by the year 2000. Petroleum provides about 40 percent of
the worlds energy, and the prospect that we were going to run out brought
substantial attention to the Club of Rome. In fact, none of these predictions
actually came true. One factor that was not addressed in the analysis was
the prospect of exploration and discovery of new reserves. For example,
the worlds proven petroleum reserves nearly doubled between the time of
the analysis and 1994, and estimates of world recoverable reserves increased
from 600 billion barrels in 1940 to as much as 2.3 trillion billion in 1995
(Campbell 1995). The 1973 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) oil embargo resulted in higher prices, which in turn spurred
exploration and development of new reserves. Another factor is techno-
logical progress that lowers the cost of extraction and so tends to increase
reserves. A third factor is the ability to substitute more abundant resources
for those that become extremely scarce and expensive. These issues are
discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
Another reason for optimism is that there is relatively little evidence in
favor of pollution havendriven trade. In their comprehensive review of the
literature on environmental regulation and international trade, Copeland and
Taylor (2004) refer to the idea that a tightening up of pollution regulation
will, at the margin, have an effect on plant location decisions and trade
flows as the pollution haven effect (p. 9). In other words, pollution regula-
tion, along with many other factors, influences the pattern of international
trade. They note that this idea derives from economic theory and is sup-
ported by recent empirical research. Copeland and Taylor use the term pol-
lution haven hypothesis to describe the notion that free (liberalized) trade
will result in pollution-intensive industry shifting from countries with strin-
gent regulations to countries with weaker regulations. They note that eco-
nomic theory does not strongly support the pollution haven hypothesis be-
cause many other factors, in addition to pollution regulation, affect trade
flows. Moreover, Copeland and Taylor note that there is little convincing
evidence to support the pollution-haven hypothesis. While there is evidence
of a pollution-haven effect, it is only one of many factors that determine trade
patterns, and there is no evidence that it is the dominant factor (p. 67).
Finally, while there have been localized job losses, such as at lumber mills
dependent upon timber sales from national forests where harvests have been
reduced, the evidence generally suggests that there is little to no national-
level trade-off between jobs and environmental protection. It has been ar-
gued that environmental protection measures have led to widespread shutdown
of manufacturing plants, encouraged the flight of U.S. manufacturing over-
seas, and reduced domestic investment in new jobs by hampering productiv-
ity growth. In fact, the aggregate data suggest that environmental regulations
have not been a major source of aggregate job losses. The U.S. Department
of Labor has compiled information on layoffs in which employers are asked
to list the primary cause of layoffs. During the period from 1990 to 2000,
for example, employers blamed environmental regulations as the leading
cause of mass layoffs in less than 0.12 percent of all mass layoffs nationwide
(Bureau of Labor Statistics website).
In the Pacific Northwest (including northwestern California) the impact
of logging on the environment has been a major ideological issue dividing
communities in the region. In 1994 President Clinton approved the North-
west Forest Plan, which protected spotted owl habitat by reducing logging
by more than 80 percent on federal lands in the region. Social divisions in
the region have been worsened by long-term timber-related job losses, with
questions raised about the extent to which environmental restrictions or
market-driven economic restructuring of the industry are to blame. In a
study designed to address this question, the U.S. Forest Service (2005)
reports that 30,000 timber-related jobs were lost in the Pacific Northwest
region between 1990 and 2000, and of this total, 11,000 occurred after
1994. According to this draft Forest Service report, only 400 of the 11,000
timber jobs lost in the Pacific Northwest since 1994 can be directly attrib-
utable to reduced logging activity under the Northwest Forest Plan. The
vast majority of timber-related job losses in the region, according to this
report, are attributable to economic restructuring in the timber industry
that would have occurred regardless of the Northwest Forest Plans restric-
tions. Most of these job losses have been focused in heavily impacted tim-
ber-dependent rural communities, many of which still have not recovered
from the economic restructuring of the timber industry. As the authors of
the draft report note:
INTRODUCTION 13
Many factors can influence the stability of forest-based communities. . . .

Demand for wood and commodity prices fluctuates; alternative sources of
supply are available; some firms prefer locating close to large labor mar-
kets rather than in geographically isolated areas; mills compete for timber
supply; communities compete for jobs; wood products manufacturing tech-
nology changes; and other federal and state policies affecting the business
climate change. All of these forces can affect jobs in the timber industry,
and neither agencies nor communities have much influence over them.
(U.S. Forest Service 2005, p. 18)
In contrast, the regions urban centers have experienced dramatic growth

and real estate price appreciation. As Power and colleagues (1995) have
observed, a key factor driving the Pacific Northwests vibrant economy is
the regions attractive social and natural environment. In this sense, envi-
ronmental protection can be seen as a form of investment in the regions
economic future, though this view provides little solace to declining timber-
dependent communities in the region.
Reasons for Concern
While there have been many notable environmental success stories in the
United States and elsewhere, there are also many reasons for concern. One
reason for concern is the potential for catastrophic change in the global cli-
mate because the increased burning of fossil fuels creates so-called green-
house gases that trap heat and may warm the earths biosphere. As described
in much greater detail in chapter 11, possible scenarios include rising sea
levels and inundation of populous low-lying areas such as the Ganges and
Nile Deltas, and desertification of vital cereal grainproducing areas, both of
which would result in mass hunger and dislocation as well as a more rapid
loss of biodiversity. Some degree of action on carbon dioxide emissions is
justified as a type of insurance premium in the context of uncertain but po-
tentially large future impacts. Yet while the benefits of controlling green-
house gas emissions remain uncertain, diffuse, international in scope, and
cast in the future, the costs of such control are easier to calculate, threaten
our lifestyles, and are cast in the present, which makes it politically difficult
to enact meaningful greenhouse gas control policy.
Another reason for concern is the continued loss of habitat for many of the
worlds species of animals and plants. Balmford et al. (2002) estimated that
between 1992 and 2002 the worlds biomes experienced a mean annual de-
cline of 1.2 percent. As a consequence, the capacity of natural systems to
deliver goods and services upon which we depend is decreasingly markedly
(p. 952). They estimate that this mean annual decline in the worlds biomes
costs the human enterprise, in net terms, on the order of $250 billion (p.
952). In other words, the economic gain from land conversion is outweighed
by the lost value of the ecosystem goods and services. Balmford et al. con-
tend that there are three reasons why economically inefficient habitat con-
version continues: (1) we lack information on the quantity and the value of
the ecosystem goods and services provided by wildlands; (2) the major ben-
efits associated with retaining intact natural systems are external to market
systems; (3) perverse government tax and subsidy policies exaggerate the
private benefits from land conversion. They argue that globally, the subset of
subsidies that are both economically and ecologically perverse totals between
$950 billion and $1.95 trillion each year.
Finally, many of the worlds environmental and natural resources prob-
lems are linked to failures of democratic process and empowerment, dispro-
portionate consumption of resources by the rich, and large numbers of very
poor people living in fragile environments. Very poor regions and countries
are the least resilient to stresses and shocks such as prolonged droughts and
political instabilities. With few options, the response to these shocks often
leads to intensified deforestation, farming on unstable slopes and nutrient-
poor rain forest soils, and other forms of resource degradation as well as
migration to crowded and highly polluted urban areas. Poor and politically
disenfranchised people are subjected to massive environmental degradation
in places such as Ogoniland in Nigeria. Two-thirds of the worlds illiterate
people are women, and there is a strong inverse relationship between womens
educational attainment and fertility, and yet worldwide female illiteracy rates
actually increased from 58 percent in 1960 to 66 percent in 1985.
What inference can we draw from these examples of policy successes and
areas of concern? Clearly we have made some progress, and environmental
and natural resources economics has played a role in some of those suc-
cesses. Just as clearly, we are faced with enormous challenges worthy of our
best efforts.
Overview
This book is divided into three parts. Part I introduces basic concepts about
the role of values and ethics in economics and public policy, the economics
of market allocation, externality theory, natural resource economics, and an
application to marine capture fisheries management and policy. We will learn
that indeed there is an unavoidable subjective element to how we rank the
choices that are available to us with regard to the environment. We will ex-
plore the economics of market capitalism, and learn about the conditions
INTRODUCTION 15
that are required for a well-functioning competitive market. This discussion

will extend into the development of the supply and demand market model
and the concepts of equilibrium and efficiency. The theory of the perfect
market will serve as a benchmark against which we can evaluate various
market failures. A more detailed treatment is given to the market failures
associated with positive and negative externalities, and how idealized regu-
latory interventions can internalize these externalities and enhance efficiency.
Our focus will then turn to the economics of renewable and nonrenewable
natural resources, and the dilemmas associated with common-pool resources.
The unifying themes in this first section of the book are core concepts and
theoretical models.
The second part of this textbook is focused on the economics of envi-
ronmental and natural resource policy. We will start out by applying some
of the tools of renewable-resource economics and the economics of com-
mon-pool resource dilemmas to marine capture fisheries. We will then
turn to a discussion of the concepts and methodological approaches of
benefit/cost analysis, which is a common way of expressing economic
tradeoff information in public policy analysis. Unfortunately we cannot
assume that policy is fashioned in the public interest, and thus to under-
stand policy outcomes, we explore the political economy of policy forma-
tion. Moreover, once we have public policy rules, we cannot assume that
people and businesses will automatically comply with them. As a result,
we will consider the economics of enforcement and compliance assur-
ance. Next we turn to the economics of incentive regulation. Economists
have been refining their models for efficient regulation to introduce in-
centives for polluters, and the EPA and other government agencies have
increasingly been experimenting with these incentive regulatory schemes.
The second part of this textbook ends with an analysis of the science,
economics, and public policy associated with climate-change policy. To a
greater extent than the other material in this section of the textbook, cli-
mate-change policy must contend with some degree of scientific uncer-
tainty, irreversibility of impact, and the international scope of the problem.
Global climate change is also an area in which policymakers must ac-
knowledge that impacts will occur over a very long time horizon, an issue
that provides a bridge to the material on sustainability in the last portion
of the book.
The economics of a sustainable society, the topic of Part III of this text-
book, is about sustaining economy, community, and environment over a
long-term time horizon. Unlike environmental and natural resources eco-
nomics, sustainability introduces a significant role for community and is-
sues of empowerment, demographic change, poverty, and social justice.
After a brief introduction, the material begins with a chapter covering the
linkages between poverty, growth in population and economic activity, and
the integrity of environmental and resource systems. Once we develop a
basic understanding of how social, economic, and environmental factors
interact, we will then discuss policies that are better targeted at improving
and sustaining the quality of peoples lives over time. One example is the
movement for sustainable development, which is the subject of an entire
chapter. Making sustainable development operational calls for methods
and strategies for sustainable production and consumption. Particular at-
tention is paid to the economics of renewable energy resources and tech-
nologies, and policies designed to promote more sustainable production
and consumption. The final chapter investigates concepts, methods, and
case studies related to sustainable local communities. Special attention will
be paid to linkages between local people and the local common-pool natu-
ral resource systems on which they depend.
It is hoped that this book fosters not only a better understanding of
economics and the environment but also an appreciation of the challenges
and rewards of forming environmental and resource policy in a diverse
society.
Summary
Environmental economics focuses attention on pollution problems and

on policies to resolve them. Attention is also given to measurement of
benefits and costs, and to understanding the political economy of envi-
ronmental policy. Natural resources economics studies the problems of
governing common-pool natural resources, of dynamically optimal rates
of resource extraction, and of resource markets. Many natural resource
economists focus on the economics and public policy of renewable and
nonrenewable energy resources and technologies. The sustainability
movement is concerned with maintaining or enhancing ecological in-
tegrity, economic vitality, and democratic political and social institu-
tions over time.
Economics is the study of how scarce resources are allocated among
competing uses. Something is said to be scarce when, at a zero price,
more is wanted than is available. Something scarce can be allocated to a
variety of different uses. When one use is chosen, the opportunity cost
of that choice is the value of the next best alternative, which was given
up. A rational choice from among competing options is anticipated to
yield benefits that exceed the opportunity cost.
There are a number of reasons for optimism. Environmental policies
INTRODUCTION 17
have generated substantial improvements in air quality in the United

States, and production methods are becoming cleaner. There does not
seem to be much support for the argument that environmental protec-
tion results in overall job loss in the United States. While production
facilities have moved from the United States to Mexico and other de-
veloping countries, there is not strong evidence that pollution havens
overseas are the primary driver for observed trends in international
trade and in plant relocations.
Yet there are important areas of concern, including loss of habitat, glo-
bal warming, and impacts due to various government failures.
Review Questions and Problems
1. You are an investigative reporter covering the issue of a trade-off be-

tween jobs and the environment.Your assignment is to write a 500-word col-
umn that provides:
a. a brief overview and description of the concept of a jobs versus

environment trade-off;
b. an explanation of situations in which environmental protection has
resulted in job losses;
c. a summary of the evidence for a jobs versus environment trade-off
using national-level (macroeconomic) data (see discussion in the
text in the chapter);
d. a conclusion that summarizes the jobs versus environment story and
perhaps strays a bit into the political economy of who benefits from
this persistent myth.
2. Price is a simple indicator of value for things traded in markets. Yet if

the economic problem also applies to something like a wilderness area, which
has no price to indicate value, then how are we to assign value to it? In your
answer, consider the following:
a. Think of some specific indicators of the monetary value of a wilder-

ness area that an analyst could measure.
b. What are some monetary indicators of the opportunity cost of wil-
derness preservation?
c. If we were to make a decision regarding how to manage the land
area under analysis based on the information you provided in (a)
and (b) above, what other elements of value might be omitted and
thus not be reflected in the policy decision?
3. Classroom debate activity: Debate consists of reasoned arguments

for or against a given proposition. Form two groups in your class (affirma-
tive and negative) for the purpose of debating the following proposition:
Resolved: Environmental regulation impairs the international competitive-
ness of U.S. manufacturers. Members of each group should be given a week
or so to research the issues. The debate will occur in a panel, moderated by
your professor. Two members of each group will serve as panelists, and any
additional group members can serve as researchers. There are a variety of
different ways to structure a debate, one of which is the Michigan cross-
examination method:
a. The first affirmative panelist presents the affirmative case (6 minutes).

b. The first affirmative panelist is cross-examined by the second nega-
tive panelist (4 minutes).
c. Questions from the audience are put to the members of the affirma-
tive team (5 minutes).
d. The first negative panelist presents the negative case (6 minutes).
e. The second affirmative panelist cross-examines the first negative
panelist (4 minutes).
f. Questions from the audience are put to the members of the negative
team (5 minutes).
g. The second negative panelist summarizes the negative case (2 minutes).
h. The second affirmative panelist summarizes the affirmative case (2
minutes).
Internet Links
Economic Report of the President (http://w3.access.gpo.gov/eop/): Ex-

tensive source of up-to-date U.S. economic information.
Environmental Protection Agencys National Center for Environmental

Economics (NCEE) (http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/
homepage): The NCEE analyzes relationships between the economy, envi-
ronmental health, and environmental pollution control.
Federal Reserve Economic Data (www.stls.frb.org/fred/index.html):

Comprehensive source of U.S. economic data.
FedStats (http://www.fedstats.gov/map.html): This site provides easy ac-

cess to the full range of statistics and information produced by over sev-
enty agencies of the U.S. government.
INTRODUCTION 19
Food and Agriculture Organization (www.fao.org/): A UN organization of-

fering extensive research reports and databases having to do with agriculture,
economics, fisheries, forestry, human nutrition, and sustainable development.
Major Schools of Economic Thought (http://www.frbsf.org/publications/

education/unfrmd.great/greattimes.html): An easy-to-read summary pro-
duced by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Textbook Internet Site (www.humboldt.edu/~envecon): Includes lecture

outlines, extensive annotated Internet links, interactive Excel-based simula-
tions, audio clips, interactive quizzes, and much more.
World Resources Institute (www.wri.org/): The World Resources Institute

provides information, ideas, and solutions to global environmental problems.
They publish the authoritative biennial World Resources.
Balmford, A., A. Bruner, P. Cooper, R. Costanza, S. Farber, R. Green, M. Jenkins, P.

Jefferiss, V. Jessamy, J. Madden, K. Munro, N. Myers, S. Naeem, J. Paavola, M.
Rayment, S. Rosendo, J. Roughgarden, K. Trumper, and R. Turner. 2002. Eco-
nomic Reasons for Conserving Wild Nature. Science 297: 95054.
Berry, W. 1987. Home Economics. San Francisco: North Point Press.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/).
Campbell, C. 1995. The Next Oil Price Shock: The Worlds Remaining Oil and Its
Depletion. Energy Exploration and Exploitation 13 (1): 1944.
Carlson, C., D. Burtraw, M. Cropper, and K. Palmer. 1998. Sulfur Dioxide Control
by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade? Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper 9844.
Copeland, B., and M. Taylor. 2004. Trade, Growth, and the Environment. Journal
of Economic Literature 42 (March): 771.
Goodstein, E. 1994. Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Trade-off.
Paper. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.
Jaffe, A., S. Peterson, P. Portney, and R. Stavins. 1995. Environmental Regulation
and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing. Journal of Economic Literature
33 (March): 13263.
List, J., and C. Co. 2000. The Effects of Environmental Regulations on Foreign Direct
Investment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 40: 120.
Maxwell, J., T. Lyon, and S. Hackett. 2000. Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The
Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism. Journal of Law and Econom-
ics 43 (2): 583618 .
Meadows, D.H., D.L Meadows, J. Randers, and W. Behrens. 1972. The Limits to
Growth. New York: Universe Books.
Moore, C., and A. Miller. 1995. Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and
the Race for Environmental Technology. Boston: Beacon Press.
Pearce, D., and J. Warford. 1993. World Without End: Economics, Environment, and
Sustainable Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Porter, M. 1991. Americas Green Strategy, Scientific American 264: 168.
Power, T. 1995. Economic Well-Being and Environmental Protection in the Pacific
Northwest: A Consensus Report by Pacific Northwest Economists. Missoula: Uni-
versity of Montana.
. 1996. Environmental Protection and Economic Well-Being: The Economic
Pursuit of Quality. 2nd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1997. The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air
Act, 19701990. Washington, DC: U.S. EPA.
U.S. Forest Service. 2005. Northwest Forest Plan: The First Ten Years, Socioeco-
nomic Monitoring Results, Volume I: Key Findings. Available at www.reo.gov/
monitoring/10yr-report/social-economic/final-report.html.
2
Value Systems and
Economic Systems
Introduction
Economics is concerned with the problem of allocating scarce resources

among competing uses. When something is scarce, allocating it to one use
means we forgo the opportunity for another use, creating an opportunity
cost. An allocation is good when it generates net benefits that exceed the
opportunity cost. Thus, at the most basic level, economics is about under-
standing opportunity costs. All human societies are confronted with this fun-
damental problem. Throughout time and around the globe, societies have
been motivated by widely different social and philosophical value systems
for determining benefits and costs and so have had different answers to the
question of what a good way to allocate things might be. As a consequence
we have observed many different kinds of economies. Understanding eco-
nomic systems provides insight into otherwise inexplicable aspects of our
lives and the choices that we make.
In this chapter we will investigate several fundamental questions related
to human values and economic systems. We will first consider the basis for
distinguishing a good economy from a bad one, or a good allocation choice
from a bad one. A response to this question might be that a good economy is
more efficient than a bad one, producing things of value with a minimum of
waste, and allocating resources to their highest-valued use, and indeed few
would deny that efficiency is a central element of a good economy. But the
judgment of what constitutes a wasteful resource allocation, and how we
determine highest-valued use, depends critically on the value system of the
judge. Even more fundamental is the question of whether an action (for ex-
21
ample, policy protecting old-growth forest) is to be judged on its intrinsic

rightness or based on the measurable benefits and costs that might result
from the allocation. We will also consider the problem of determining the
proper balance between individual self-interest and the common good. We
will conclude the discussion of value systems by presenting contrasting per-
spectives on the basis for and the merits of private property rights systems.
We will then turn to a discussion of some fundamental issues associated with
economic systems and methods. One of these has to do with different methods
of economic analysis. One branch of economic analysis is based on the Western
scientific method of describing, explaining, and predicting observable empirical
phenomena. A set of best methods for describing observable phenomena has
evolved that is generally accepted by the community of economic practitioners,
and analyses that properly follow these best methods yield findings that generate
little in the way of disagreement. For example, the hypothesis that a per-unit tax
on firms will result in a short-run increase in price and reduction in volume of
trade can be evaluated empirically, and this form of positive analysis can also tell
us the amount by which price rises and volume of trade declines. Another branch
of economic analysis proposes a set of best choices based on particular norma-
tive systems of value. Thus, a profit-maximizing corporation can be advised of a
system of compensation designed to best align the incentives of its employees
with the maximization of profit for the firm. Alternatively, a government can be
advised as to the best use of an old-growth forest based on the utilitarian value
system of benefit/cost analysis. It is important to distinguish these forms of analy-
sis; while the former yields something we can think of as fact, the latter naturally
generates disagreements among economists who articulate arguments derived
from widely different systems of value.
We will conclude the discussion of economic systems by describing the
fundamental choices required of all societies by the condition of scarcity,
regardless of the value system or criteria for efficiency that are employed.
These choices are responses to the basic economic questions of (1) what
should we allocate resources to produce (e.g., produce board feet of timber
or wildlife habitat), (2) by what method should we produce (i.e., choice of
engineering or management system), and (3) who receives what is produced?
The fundamental issues discussed in this chapter provide a broad foundation
for the analysis of markets, market failure, and social policy that is to follow
in the remainder of the book.
Fundamentals of Ethical Systems
Societies are frequently confronted with policy decisions that must be made
because of scarcity. Examples include the allocation of budget monies and
VALUE SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 23
the management of public land, water, and wildlife. These policy decisions
affect both human and nonhuman communities. Because of scarcity, any
choice made by policymakers will have an opportunity cost. What are the
values that will be used to rank policy alternatives? From an economic
point of view, a decision is good when it generates net value that exceeds
the opportunity cost. Yet different value systems will lead to a different
ranking of alternatives and so will provide different answers to the ques-
tion of which course of action is best. As you can see, in order to make
good economic decisions we need value systems to rank alternatives. When
individuals make choices in the context of scarcity they are guided by their
own values and preferences, as well as by those of their culture. In order to
make public policy decisions that serve the interests of the public, how-
ever, the economic and political aspects of policy making must embody
societys shared or dominant values, or aggregate individual values and
preferences. This is one reason why social institutions, such as those that
provide the structure for political and economic choices and interactions,
embody the shared or dominant values of the societies from which they
evolve.
Ethics is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with moral duty and
ideal human character. Morals are defined to be principles of right and wrong,
of good and bad. Ethical systems either describe particular shared values, or
provide a method for arriving at an aggregation of individual values and
preferences. Different ethical systems lead to different economic choices.
There are two traditional classes of ethics, deontological and teleological,
which are described below.
Deontological Ethics
Ethical systems in the deontological tradition develop theories of action based

on duty or moral obligation. Under this system, an action is judged by its
intrinsic rightness and not by the extent to which it serves as an instrumen-
tality in furthering ones goals or aspirations. Immanuel Kant, one of the
best-known proponents of this ethical system, argued in Metaphysics of Morals
(1785, p. 96) that there are two types of imperatives or rules that command
or direct our proper behavior:
All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former

presents the practical necessity of a possible action as a means of achiev-
ing something else which one desires (or which one may possibly desire).
The categorical imperative would be one which presented an action as of
itself objectively necessary, without regard to any other end.
As OBrien (1996) points out, a hypothetical imperative commences with

a statement such as If we want to limit acid rain, we ought to reduce emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Kant would refer to this as a
practical reason for taking an act. Kants major contribution to the develop-
ment of deontological ethics is the notion of a categorical imperative. Unlike
a hypothetical imperative that appeals to reason, a categorical imperative
asserts that a particular action is intrinsically necessary without regard to the
outcome or ends that might possibly derive from the act. Thus, from the
perspective of a categorical imperative, one could argue that a person should
never treat another person as a mere means to an end or a goal. The basis for
ethical behavior, according to Kant, was for autonomous people to freely
submit themselves to the same rules that they would prescribe for others, in
which case individual autonomy would lead to cooperative harmony.
Perhaps one of the best-known neo-Kantians is John Rawls, who devel-
oped the theory of justice as fairness. Justice here means the principle of
rightness of action. Rawls (1971) conceived of justice as arising from a state
of ignorance. In particular, Rawls proposed the following thought experi-
ment. If people could select some principle of justice (for example, that soci-
ety has the duty of assisting the less fortunate) before they were aware of
their own status and position, then under this veil of ignorance people
would not be biased toward justice systems that favor their particular situa-
tion. In the original position that exists prior to the revelation of differ-
ences in status and position, people would naturally agree on the intrinsic
value of a justice system that favors the least advantaged in society. Rawlsian
justice is deontological because the ethics of justice determine rightness of
action as a categorical imperative. The link between Kant and Rawls can be
seen in the following quote from Kants Foundations: There is, therefore,
only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to the maxim by
which you can at the same time will [i.e., make happen] that it should be-
come a universal law (p. 101).
Both Aldo Leopolds land ethic and Bill Devalls conception of ecosophy,
or earth wisdom, can be considered examples of deontological ethical sys-
tems, calling for ecosystem protection as a categorical imperative. The deep-
ecology movement promotes ecosophy by way of becoming grounded
through fuller experience of our connection to earth (Devall and Sessions
1985). In 1984 Naess and George Sessions articulated a set of deep-ecology
principles (Devall 1988):
The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth

have value in themselves (intrinsic value). These values are indepen-
dent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.
Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these

values and are also values in themselves.
Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to
satisfy vital needs.
The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a sub-
stantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhu-
man life requires such a decrease.
Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and
the situation is rapidly worsening.
Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies affect basic
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state
of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwell-
ing in situations of inherent worth) rather than adhering to an increas-
ingly higher (material) standard of living. There will be a profound
awareness of the difference between big and great.
Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly
or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary
changes.
We have seen that deontological ethical systems lead to expressions of

categorical imperatives that prescribe certain necessary actions. Deontological
ethics can serve to guide social policy for those circumstances for which
members of society share the same values. In diverse societies, however,
policies based on one groups system of intrinsic value may be oppressive to
those holding different values. If a community or society lacks common
ground on a set of deontological principles, then an alternative that is inves-
tigated below would be to aggregate individual preferences.
Teleological Ethics
Telos is a Greek term for end or purpose. Under teleological systems of eth-
ics, an action is judged not by its intrinsic value but by the extent to which
the action has instrumental value in providing advancement toward a desir-
able end. If an action is instrumental in yielding a desirable end, then gener-
ally the action itself is ethical. Thus the ethical focus is on goals rather than
actions. Central to teleological systems is the notion of consequentialism,
which argues that the moral worth of actions or practices is determined solely
by the consequences of the actions or the practices (Beauchamp and Bowie
1979). This ethical system was advocated by Aristotle and later by religious
philosophers exploring natural law ethics and utilitarian philosophers such
as David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. To avoid the obvi-
ous criticism that under teleological ethics the end justifies the means,
Aristotle argued that one must instead look at each individual action and
justify it in terms of its own goal. Of the various teleological ethical tradi-
tions, the one most relevant to environmental and natural resources econom-
ics is utilitarianism.
Under this system of teleological ethics, the merits of an action (e.g., a
social policy) are evaluated by considering the total benefits (utility) and the
total costs (disutility) created by the action for human society. Under act
utilitarianism a social rule is followed if, after adding up the utility and the
disutility the rule will cause for all members of society, the net utility is
positive. Thus this rule is sometimes imprecisely characterized as providing
the greatest good for the greatest number. This is not always true, however,
because it is possible that the utilitarian-ethical policy will generate large
benefits to a few and very small costs to many. Another problem with utili-
tarianism is that it can be used to impose the tyranny of the majority. Act
utilitarianism can therefore be used to justify throwing a virgin into a vol-
cano if it is believed that such an act will save a village from the ravages of
an eruption. Utilitarian ethics is teleological because the merit of a rule is
judged by its effect, or ends, rather than by the intrinsic rightness of the act
itself independent of any possible outcome or end.
Utilitarian principles are prominent in contemporary policy analysis. In
diverse societies where people cannot agree on the intrinsic merits of certain
actions, as is required by systems of deontological ethics, utilitarianism of-
fers an alternative that provides for the weighing of aggregate policy impacts
across diverse elements of society.
A Closer Look at Utilitarianism
Much of the traditional economic perspective on social policy has utilitari-

anism as its normative base, perhaps because economists prefer to avoid
commitment to a particular deontological system and the intrinsic values
that obtain. Benefit/cost analysis is a common method of policy analysis that
derives from a utilitarian ethical system. Thus it is worthwhile to consider
utilitarianism in greater detail. Utilitarianism as a means of social progress in
economics was perhaps best articulated by Jeremy Bentham, a younger con-
temporary of Adam Smith (who professed the natural utilitarianism of de-
centralized market processes). As Beauchamp and Bowie (1979) point out,
Bentham was particularly dissatisfied with the legal theories of William
Blackstone, which served to justify the British legal system. In particular,
Bentham thought that the British system of ranking crimes was wrong be-
cause it was based on an abstract moral theory rather than on the unhappi-
ness, misery, or disutility a crime caused to other members of society. Thus
in Benthams view the punishments prescribed by law should be proportion-
ate to the disutility created by the crime and not based on notions of intrinsic
rightness or morality. In his book Principles of Morals and Legislation (1790),
Bentham described utility as the principle that approves or disapproves of
actions according to their tendency to increase or decrease an individuals
pleasure. Bentham was a hedonist and so believed that pleasure is the only
intrinsic good or end against which acts are to be evaluated. As W.H. Auden
(1962) observed, pleasure is by no means an infallible critical guide, but it
is the least fallible.
While Smith argued in Wealth of Nations that in many commercial con-
texts the social welfare was best met through the invisible hand of the mar-
ket, Bentham identified conditions in which members of society needed to
act collectively to resolve social problems such as disease, waterworks, and
so forth. These were rather radical ideas at the time. Benthams notion of
utilitarianism is conceptually very simple: Suppose that each person in soci-
ety is affected by a set of possible policy options. For each option, the utility
gains to those benefiting from the policy, as well as the disutility (utility
losses) to those being harmed by the policy, are to be added up to arrive at net
social utility. The utilitarian-ethical policy is the one that maximizes net so-
cial utility relative to all the other options under consideration. Bentham there-
fore conceived of what we now call cardinal utility, which means that pain
and pleasure can be reduced to a positive or a negative number for each
person, and the social engineer can measure these numbers and simply add
them up. Therefore, one persons unhappiness with a policy yields a utility
number that can be directly compared to the utility number for someone
elses happiness. As you can see, the concept of cardinal utility is based on
the notion that utility is objectively measurable and comparable across indi-
viduals. From a mathematical perspective social utility is computed using
something called a social utility function. Utilitarian policy analysis calls for
the computation of net social utility for each of the new policies under con-
sideration, and the utilitarian-ethical policy option is the one (if any) that
generates the largest increase in net social utility relative to the status quo.
Note that status quo means the current way of doing things.
Amartya Sen (1987) reduced utilitarianism to three fundamental elements:
Welfarism: The goodness of a proposed rule depends on utility infor-

mation. In other words, the goodness of a proposed rule is determined
by the utility or disutility that it creates among members of society.
Sum ranking: The utility information regarding any proposed rule is
assessed by looking only at the sum total of all the individual utilities
associated with the rule. In other words, in evaluating a proposed rule,
utilitarianism requires that we add up the utilities and the disutilities
that it creates among all members of society.
Consequentialism: Every rule choice must ultimately be evaluated by
the goodness of the consequent state of affairs (the ends it moves us
toward). In other words, under utilitarianism the ethical policy is the
one that generates policy outcomes (ends) that lead to the largest net
social utility.
Utilitarianism also allows for the evaluation of efficiency. There are two
different efficiency criteria commonly used by economists for evaluating social
policy.
The Pareto efficiency criterion is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an early
economist, and it imposes a stringent requirement for any change from the
status quo. As an example, suppose there are five policy alternatives to the
status quo being considered. In order to determine whether any of them is
Pareto efficient we must evaluate the impacts of each policy alternative on
every member of society. If a policy alternative makes any member of soci-
ety worse off than under the status quo, then that policy alternative is elimi-
nated from further consideration. Continuing our example, suppose that four
of the five policy alternatives are eliminated because they make one or more
members of society worse off relative to the status quo. Thus there is only
one policy alternative that makes some people better off and nobody worse
off than under the status quo. This policy alternative is said to be Pareto
efficient relative to the status quo.
Unfortunately, few real-world policy alternatives can pass the Pareto cri-
terion since it is so difficult to assure that nobody is made worse off than
under the status quo. Because of this, economists consider the Pareto effi-
ciency criterion to be biased toward preserving the status quo. This can cre-
ate a serious social conflict when many in society see the status quo as being
unethical from a deontological perspective. A historically important example
is slavery in the United States. Slavery was widely seen in the North as being
unethical from a deontological perspective, but a policy alternative of ending
slavery would make slave owners worse off than under the status quo, and
thus would have failed the Pareto efficiency criterion. These arguments may
help you understand why the Pareto efficiency criterion is rarely used in
policy analysis.
An alternative approach that is more widely used is simply to rank policy
alternatives based on net social utility, as originally conceived by the utilitar-
ians, and to do away with the requirement that nobody be made worse off
relative to the status quo. This less rigorous efficiency criterion was pro-
posed by economists Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939). Going back to our
original example of five policy alternatives to the status quo, we would no
longer eliminate four of the five because they made some members of soci-
ety worse off. Instead, according to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion, we
must compute net social utility (adding up the gains and the losses for each
member of society) for each policy alternative to the status quo. The policy
alternative that generates the largest gain in net social utility is the Kaldor-
Hicks-efficient policy alternative. This also corresponds with the utilitarian-
ethical policy alternative.
The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion is sometimes referred to as being
potentially Pareto efficient because the potential exists for those made better
off under a policy change to compensate those made worse off and thus
share the net benefits with all members of society. We actually see crude
attempts at this sort of compensation scheme in certain social policies that
make some people worse off. For example, consider the Clinton admini-
strations preservation scheme for the northern spotted owl, which limited
the harvest of old-growth trees and thus made some local timber-dependent
communities in the Pacific Northwest worse off. The Northwest Economic
Adjustment Initiative, an element of the Northwest Forest Plan, allocated
$1.2 billion in general tax dollars to retrain dislocated workers, assist local
businesses, diversify the economy of the region, enhance community infra-
structure and technical capacity, and restore watersheds and create short-
term jobs through a Jobs in the Woods program. If those made worse off
under a policy alternative that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient could be fully com-
pensated, then the policy alternative would also satisfy the Pareto efficiency
criterion.
As you may have guessed, it is not possible to directly compare one persons
level of utility to that of another, and thus to construct a true social utility
function as envisioned by the classical utilitarian philosophers. Because of
this, economists and others who wish to rank policies based on a utilitarian
ethic usually approximate utility and disutility with estimates of monetary
benefits and costs. The implicit assumption is that since a dollar is a measure
of value in markets, the utility that one person can derive from a dollar (in
terms of the available goods and services that can be purchased with the
dollar) is the same as that of another. While this is a convenient assumption
that allows economists to conduct benefit/cost analysis, there is no reason to
believe it is true. In fact, many economists believe that the utility that a per-
son derives from the purchasing power of a dollar declines as the persons
income rises. In other words, a dollar creates less of a utility gain to a billion-
aire than to a homeless mother with a hungry child. We will discuss these
and other issues related to benefit/cost analysis in greater detail in chapter 7.

The fundamental economic problem of allocating scarce resources among
competing ends exists regardless of whether society subscribes to a
deontological or a teleological system of ethics. The dilemma of endan-
gered species protection offers a good illustrative example. The existence
of an endangered species is subject to scarcity, since protection and resto-
ration of a species and the habitat it requires involves opportunity costs
associated with development activities and alternative uses of protection
and restoration funds. In a society that views the existence of a species as
being of intrinsic value (deontological ethics), the categorical imperative
calls for actions that make at least minimal provision for habitat preserva-
tion regardless of cost. The fact that the species is of intrinsic value places
its habitat above the value of human appropriation, unless perhaps the de-
velopment is required to prevent loss of human life (a potentially higher
intrinsic value). In a society that views the existence of a species as being
subject to a utilitarian calculus, the allocation problem is resolved by ben-
efit/cost analysis, and the opportunity cost is the value of whichever option
(species protection or development) yields the next highest net benefits.
The difference in cases is not whether an economic problem exists but how
that problem is to be resolved.
Self-Interest, the Common Good, and Social Order
One of the central dilemmas that all societies must confront is how to main-
tain social order and thus balance the sometimes conflicting imperatives of
self-interest and the common good. Hobbs (1651, p. 2728), for example,
argued that unless there exists a common power to keep people in awe,
the natural state of human society is one of war and conflict:
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called
war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. Whatsoever
therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to
every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other
security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish
them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navi-
gation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no com-
modious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of
time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.
If we assume for a moment that Hobbs is right, then what is this common
power that keeps people in awe and prevents violent and destructive con-
flict? Some argue that this is the role of religion. As Fukuyama (1999) ar-
gues, in Western society, Christianity first established the principle of the
universality of human dignity, a principle that was brought down from the
heavens and turned into a secular doctrine of universal human equality by
the Enlightenment (p. 80). Others, such as sociologist Max Weber, argue
that social order in an industrialized society must come from the rational
bureaucracy of a strong centralized government.
It should be pointed out, however, that self-interest and the common
good are not always in conflict, and that war and conflict may not be our
natural state. As you will learn in greater detail in chapter 3, Adam Smith
argued that self-interested interaction in a well-functioning competitive
market will yield outcomes that are consistent with the common good.
Moreover, it is argued that many small preindustrial communities around
the world were self-organizing and thus did not need external religious or
bureaucratic structures.
In the case of social order in modern industrial society, Fukuyama (1999,
p. 58) observes:
The modern liberal state was premised on the notion that in the interests of
political peace, government would not take sides among the differing moral
claims made by religion and traditional culture. Church and State were to
be kept separate; there would be pluralism in opinions about the most im-
portant moral and ethical questions, concerning ultimate ends or the nature
of the good. Tolerance would become the cardinal virtue; in place of moral
consensus would be a transparent framework of law and institutions that
produced political order. Such a political system did not require that people
be particularly virtuous; they need only be rational and follow the law in
their own self-interest.
This transparent framework of law and institutions must be supplemented

by at least a minimum level of social capital. As we shall discuss in greater
detail in chapter 12, social capital, according to Putnam (1993), refers to the
features of social organization including networks, norms, and trust that facili-
tate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Putnam recognized that
in regions with high social capital, residents are engaged in public issues, trust
one another, make and keep commitments, engage in reciprocity, and obey
laws. Social and political institutions tend to be organized horizontally, rather

than hierarchically, and solidarity, civic participation, and integrity all tend to
be highly valued. Putnam has observed that while social capital seems to be a
precondition for economic development and effective government, it tends to
be underprovided by private agents. Thus, the culture of individualism that is
reinforced by the modern liberal state undermines the shared values and the
contribution to social capital that creates social order.
Along the same lines, there have been a number of studies indicating that
classroom exposure to the model of the self-interested maximizer in econom-
ics affects student and faculty attitudes toward voluntary contributions. Frank,
Gilovich, and Regan (1993) analyzed the responses to a questionnaire from
576 college and university professors from a variety of disciplines. Frank and
his colleagues found that economists were among the least generous of the
group. For example, 9.3 percent of the economics professors gave no money to
charity, relative to a range of between 1.1 and 4.2 percent in other surveyed
fields. Additional support is offered by the work of Marwell and Ames (1981).
In a series of laboratory experiments, Marwell and Ames studied voluntary
contributions in a simulated environment in which the contributions are used
to create public goods that benefit the group as a whole. Economics students
were found to donate less than half as much as students from other disciplines.
Finally, Carter and Irons (1991) studied the ultimatum game, in which one
person decides how to share a pool of money with another, and the other per-
son can either accept the allocation or throw away the entire pool of money.
Economics majors were far more likely to allocate all but a cent or two to
themselves relative to nonmajors, who more commonly split the pool of money
equally. These findings are also consistent with those of Kahneman, Knetsh,
and Thaler (1986). These studies offer some remarkable evidence that expo-
sure to the model of the self-interested maximizer does indeed encourage self-
interested behavior outside the confines of markets where such behavior is
most likely to be appropriate.
Private Property
So far, we have discussed different conceptions of ethics, which provide a

guide to our relations with others, and of social capital, which serves as the
foundation for social order and helps resolve the conflict between self-inter-
est and the common good. Western notions of private property and its origins
also provide useful insights into our relationship with one another and with
the natural world. The origin and implications of private property rights can
be found in the liberal society described by John Locke and the civil society
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other Enlightenment philosophers. Lets take
a moment to consider these two perspectives on the origin and implications

of private property.
Locke and the Liberal Society
The liberal society is articulated in John Lockes Two Treatises on Govern-

ment (1690). Locke sees the fundamental goal of society as providing oppor-
tunities for people to exercise their talent and effort in the creation of valuable
personal property and the well-being that derives from this property. In his
conception of private property rights, Lockes Christian cosmology provides
as self-evident truth that God gave Earth to man in common. He then sets out
to explain that God also gave man the capacity and the imperative to make
the best use of Gods gift in satisfying mans support and comfort. Com-
pleting the construct, Locke (pp. 77, 81) concludes:
Every man has a Property in his own Person. . . . The Labor of his Body,
and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then
he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his Labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state
nature placed it in, hath by this Labor something annexed to it, that ex-
cluded the common right of other Men. . . . [Y]et there are still great Tracts
of Ground to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joyned
with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of Use of their common Money)
lie wasts, and are more than the People, who dwell on it, do, or can make
use of, and so still lie in common.
It is interesting to see some of the concepts of what later came to be the

U.S. Homestead Act of 1862 articulated in the writings of Locke, such as the
requirement in the Homestead Act for actual settlement and cultivation in
order to patent a claim on otherwise unappropriated public land. We also
gain insight into our cultural past by reading the argument Locke gives for
denying aboriginal people a private property right, which seemingly pro-
vided a justification for the taking of aboriginal lands.
Rousseau and the Civil Society
In Discourse on Inequality (1755), French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau

argued that an early golden age of social cooperation, interdependence, and
freedom existed prior to the emplacement of private property regimes that un-
derlie the civil society. From Rousseaus perspective, contemporary civil soci-
ety, and the private property rights systems that are its foundation, alienate
people from nature, lead to greater and greater inequality, and ultimately are
responsible for wars and other destructive conflicts. The transformation from
the early natural state to contemporary civil society occurred as human en-
lightenment led to the refinement of skills for the modification of nature. Per-
haps following Locke, Rousseau saw the introduction of private property as
occurring when a person applied his or her skill to create something of value
from nature, such as a hut or shelter. Family societies formed around these
dwellings and were bound together by mutual attachment and freedom. Spe-
cialization and teamwork in hunting and gathering led in turn to abundant
leisure time, which could be filled by the development of tools and other con-
veniences. This is the point at which Rousseau first sees the evils of civil soci-
ety, as tools and other conveniences degenerated into real needs, . . . and men
were unhappy to lose them without being happy to possess them (p. 67).
Rousseau (pp. 7072) goes on to argue that:
To the poet it is gold and silver, but to the philosopher it is iron and grain that
made men civilized and brought on the downfall of the human race. . . . When
men were needed for smelting and forging iron, others had to feed them. . . .
Since the artisans required food in exchange for their iron, the others finally
found means of using iron to increase the amount of food available. . . . The
division of land necessarily followed from its cultivation, and once property
had been recognized it gave rise to the first rules of justice. . . . It is work alone
that gives a farmer title to the produce of the land he has tilled, and conse-
quently to the land itself. . . . If this possession is continued uninterruptedly
from year to year, it is easily transformed into ownership. When the ancients,
says Grotius, called Ceres the lawgiver and gave the name Thesmaphoria to
a festival celebrated in her honor, they implied that the division of land had
produced a new kind of right: the right of property, different from that which
derives from natural law. . . . Things in this state might have remained equal if
abilities had been equal. . . . It is thus that natural inequality [skills, effort, etc.]
gradually becomes accentuated by inequalities of exchange, and differences
among men, developed by differences in circumstances, became more notice-
able and more permanent in their efforts, and begin to influence the fate of
individuals in the same proportion.
Rank and position in society, according to Rousseau, are gauged by prop-

erty and power to coerce others. Freedom was lost, as people became slaves to
the social demands for property, leading to competition and rivalry on the one
hand, opposition of interests on the other, and always the hidden desire to
profit at the expense of others. All these evils were the first effect of property,
and the inseparable accompaniments of incipient inequality (pp. 7273).
Society must balance individual liberty against environmental and com-

munity integrity. Where a particular society ends up depends on the evolu-
tion of its culture, laws, values, and economic, social, religious, and political
institutions. All along the spectrum from communal living to libertarian
anarchy, there will be economies that are alike in that they provide ways of
allocating things that are scarce, but which differ in how that allocation
occurs. Moroever, each ethical system implies its own economic system.
Thus, we have Amish and Mennonite communities that have social and
religious constraints that limit the scope of market exchange within and
outside their communities. Many scarce resources, goods, and services in
these communities are allocated in the form of gifts or based on need, and
the social structure provides considerable insurance in a nonmarket con-
text. These communities produce much of what they need and so engage in
only a limited trade for imports with the greater U.S. economy. In contrast,
most U.S. communities have a secular consumer culture, rely much more
completely on markets for the exchange of goods and services, and for the
provision of insurance, and goods and services are allocated based on will-
ingness to pay. Economies of scale and the extensive use of markets to
allocate scarce resources, goods, and services imply that these communi-
ties tend to specialize in producing a narrow range of products and engage
in extensive trade outside the community to meet their needs and desires.
These examples illustrate how economic systems and institutions embody
a communitys dominant values.
On Positive and Normative Economics
So what is the nature of our economy, and what should we do to change it? In
responding to these questions, it is useful to consider an illustrative example.
Suppose that policymakers are considering taxing products whose produc-
tion or consumption generates pollution. Two questions that arise are: (1)
what can we expect to be the observable effects of this tax in the short and
long term, and (2) should we do it?
Economics has two methodologically distinct branches that speak to these
questions. Positive economics is a method of analysis based on the Western sci-
entific tradition of modeling the world and then subjecting these models to em-
pirical testing using data from out there in the world. A set of best methods for
empirical research has evolved that allows for internal and external validation of
these models. Consequently, economists can broadly agree on how good a posi-
tive economic model is by how well the data support it. Modeling improves
through a process of scientific evolution in which weak and falsified models are
sloughed off. Thus positive economics seeks to explain the observable. Because
the real world is hopelessly more complex than we can ever hope to model com-
prehensively, a positive analyst must focus on what are thought to be the most
important elements of the phenomenon being studied. The selection process by
which researchers determine what is important enough to include in their models
and what can be ignored is subject to normative interpretation, deriving in part
from the culture and the values of the research community, as well as the role of
the researcher in that community.
As an example, positive economic analysis might use empirical methods
to estimate the impacts of a pollution tax on electricity prices, electricity
consumption, and pollution emissions. But what of the myriad other effects
of the tax, the values of which are difficult to measure, compare, and agree
on? For example, one might argue that the value of protecting personal lib-
erty exceeds the net benefits of remediating pollution. Another might argue
that knowingly allowing firms pollution to harm people without compensa-
tion is unethical to such a degree that pollution should be taxed even if the
net benefits of remediating pollution are negative. Normative economics is
about identifying what a person, a firm, or a society should do. Note that a
norm is defined as a rule or an authoritative standard. Economic policy rec-
ommendations are a form of normative analysis, and such an analysis is how
economists would try to answer the second question above.
Economic Questions That All Societies Must Answer
Societys dominant values determine how we answer the three fundamental

economic questions:
What goods and services are produced, including what services we

derive from natural resources systems (e.g., wilderness or timber)?
How they are produced, involving issues like technology, pollution, and
harvest techniques?
Who gets things, involving issues like the extent to which prices or other
factors are used to allocate and whether the rich subsidize the poor?
In the next chapter we will learn about how a pure system of market capital-
ism answers the three fundamental economic questions.
Summary
Economics is concerned with finding good ways (oftentimes termed

efficient ways) of allocating things (e.g., goods, services, resources,
time, land, air, and water) that are scarce.
How we judge the meaning of good or efficient depends on our value or

ethical system(s).
There are deontological and teleological systems of ethics, among others,
and different specific forms within each of these two categories. Such
ethical systems underlie all we do in economics, because they provide the
basis for ranking alternatives and determining opportunity cost.
We live in a diverse, pluralistic society in which honorable people sub-
scribe to different ethical perspectives and therefore differ in their per-
ception of what fairness and justice means and thus what the relative
value of different things might be.
A fundamental challenge is to forge durable social policy in the context
of this diversity.
Modern, mainstream, Western-style economics has utilitarianism as its
normative base. Utilitarianism as a normative underpinning is not re-
quired of economic systems, however. Economic systems built on natu-
ral law ethical underpinnings were quite common in the Middle Ages in
Europe and likely in village economies in many primary societies.
Social capital forms the foundation for social order and the capacity to
resolve conflicts between self-interest and the common good. A culture of
self-interested individualism is promoted by market capitalism and democ-
racy, and yet this culture can undermine the structure of social capital.
Positive economics is concerned with using scientific methods to de-
scribe the world around us, while normative economics is concerned
with articulating what we should do.
The three fundamental economic questions that all economies must an-
swer are what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce.
1. The Endangered Species Act calls for the protection and recovery of
listed species independent of cost. It has been argued that the act needs to be
modified to incorporate benefit/cost analysis.
a. Describe the ethical conflict at the heart of this debate.

b. Is benefit/cost testing of species protection necessary for the act to
be economically rational, or is this an argument based in utilitarian
as opposed to deontological ethics?
2. How do you think the three economic questions would be answered

in a pure market system of allocation? Be precise. How do you think the
three economic questions would be answered in a commune? What are
some of the advantages and the disadvantages of these two economic

systems?
3. Classroom debate activity: Debate consists of reasoned arguments for
or against a given proposition. Form two groups in your class (affirmative
and negative) for the purpose of debating the following proposition: Resolved:
All social policy should be utilitarian-ethical. Members of each group should
be given a week or so to research the issues. The debate will occur in a panel,
moderated by your professor. Two members of each group will serve as pan-
elists, and any additional group members can serve as researchers. There are
a variety of different ways to structure a debate, one of which is the Michi-
gan cross-examination method:

b. The first affirmative panelist is cross-examined by the second nega-
tive panelist (4 minutes).
c. Questions from the audience are put to the members of the affirma-
tive team (5 minutes).
e. The second affirmative panelist cross-examines the first negative
team (5 minutes).
minutes).
4. In his book Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1759; p. 25) says: And
hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain
our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfec-
tion of human nature. Compare that statement to this famous quote from
Smiths Wealth of Nations: by directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who
affected to trade for the public good. Can you reconcile these two state-
ments from Smith? For example, is Smith suggesting that the morality of
self-interest depends on the context, or that the ends (the public good) justify
the means? As a take-home assignment you can read both books on-line at
the Internet link below.
Internet Links
Internet Classics Archive (http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/index.html): Free

on-line classic texts, primarily of Greco-Roman origin.
McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought

(www.economics.mcmaster.ca/ugcm/3113/): Free full-text books on the Internet
by authors such as Aristotle, Locke, Ricardo, Rousseau, and Smith who wrote
about economics. This is a good place to get primary source material.
Aristotle. 1984. The Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J.
Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Auden, W.H. 1962. The Dyers Hand, and Other Essays by W.H. Auden. New York:
Random House.
Beauchamp, T., and N. Bowie. 1979. Ethical Theory and Business. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bentham, J. 1790. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press.
Carter, J., and M. Irons. 1991. Are Economists Different, and If So, Why? Journal
of Economic Perspectives 5 (Spring): 17177.
Devall, B. 1988. Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith.
Devall, B., and G. Sessions. 1985. Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered. Salt
Lake City: Peregrine Smith.
Ekelund, R., and R. Hebert. 1983. A History of Economic Theory and Method. 2nd
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Frank, R., T. Gilovich, and D. Regan. 1993. Does Studying Economics Inhibit Co-
operation? Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (Spring): 15972.
Fukuyama, F. 1999. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of
Social Order. Atlantic Monthly 283: 5580.
Hicks, J. 1939. The Foundations of Welfare Economics. Economic Journal 49:
696.
Hobbs, T. 1651. Leviathan. Reprinted in Leviathan / Thomas Hobbes, ed. R. Tuck.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. 1986. Fairness and the Assumptions of
Economics. Journal of Business 59 (October, part 2): s285s300.
Kaldor, N. 1939. Welfare Propositions in Economics. Economic Journal 49:
549.
Kant, I. 1785. The Categorical Imperative. In Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, tr. Lewis Beck. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1959. Reprinted
in Thinking About the Environment, ed. M. Cahn and R. OBrien. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1996.
Locke, J. 1690. Two Treatises on Government. Reprinted in Thinking About the
Environment: Readings on Politics, Property, and the Physical World, ed. M.
Cahn and R. OBrien. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.
Marwell, G., and R. Ames. 1981. Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experi-
ments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV. Journal of Public Economics 15
(June): 295310.
OBrien, R. 1996. Law, Property, and the Environment: An Introduction. In Think-
ing about the Environment: Readings on Politics, Property, and the Physical World,
ed. M. Cahn and R. OBrien. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Piderit, J. 1993. The Ethical Foundations of Economics. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, J-J. 1755. Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among
Mankind. Reprinted in Thinking about the Environment: Readings on Politics,
Property, and the Physical World, ed. M. Cahn and R. OBrien. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1996.
Sen, A. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Smith, A., 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. London: A. Millar.
Yezer, A., R. Goldfarb, and P. Poppen. 1996. Does Studying Economics Discourage
Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 10 (Winter): 17786.uu/
3
The Economics of
Market Allocation
Introduction
In this chapter, we will learn the fundamentals of neoclassical market

microeconomics, with particular attention to the conditions that are required
for the existence of a well-functioning competitive market. In the process,
we will develop a model of supply and demand. We will also learn what it
means to say that this market will efficiently allocate scarce resources in
equilibrium. The conditions required for such a market to function may fail
to hold, however, and so we will find out how markets are distorted and
efficiency is impaired by these market failures. This basic understanding of
market economics will then form the analytical framework for the chapter
that follows, which reviews the theory of externalities and forms the eco-
nomic argument for environmental regulations.
Market Capitalism
Market capitalism is a socioeconomic system in which scarce resources (and

the goods and services into which they are transformed) are allocated by way
of a complete set of decentralized markets. As used here, the term decentral-
ized means that systemwide resource allocation occurs because of many in-
dividual market transactions, each of which is guided by self-interest. Adam
Smiths famous invisible hand of the market refers to the remarkable out-
come of efficient systemwide resource allocation that results from individual
self-interest rather than the visible hand of socialist systems in which allo-
cation decisions are made by centralized planners at some level of commu-
41
nity or government control. While in all systems other than slave states, indi-
viduals own their own labor, under capitalism individuals rather than gov-
ernments or collectives also own the other factors of productionland and
capital. Thus the three economic questions identified in chapter 2(1) what
to produce, (2) how to produce, and (3) for whom goods and services are
producedare answered under capitalism by (1) goods and services de-
manded by the consumer, (2) using the least-cost production technology,
and (3) those consumers with the willingness to pay. A central tenet of neo-
classical microeconomic theory is that a well-functioning competitive mar-
ket in equilibrium is efficient. This result serves as the theoretical foundation
for normative arguments about the merits of the market system of allocation.
But what conditions must be met in order to have a well-functioning com-
petitive market?
Conditions Required for a Well-Functioning

Competitive Market
A well-functioning competitive market has the following properties:
There are well-defined and enforceable property rights that character-

ize the ownership of resources, goods, and services (described in detail
in chapter 4).
There is a functioning market institution that is made up of the various
rules governing how buyers and sellers interact, particularly how price
and other terms of trade are set. Examples range from ascending price
art or livestock auctions to posted prices at grocery stores.
There are large numbers of buyers and sellers, each of which is small
relative to the overall market. Consequently, no individual buyer or seller
has market powerthe capacity to affect market price by manipulating
the quantity they purchase or sell.
Buyers and sellers are unable to collude and form organizations (e.g.,
cartels) that can affect market price by coordinating member firms col-
lective purchase or sales quantities.
There are no positive or negative externalities (described below and in
chapter 4).
There is the potential for low-cost entry by new sellers or buyers, which
further limits the potential for market power by incumbent firms. Exit-
ing the market (e.g., going out of business) can occur at low cost due
to production equipment and other capital having a high salvage value,
which reduces the risk of entering the market.
Transaction costs, such as legal fees, taxes, or regulatory costs that must
THE ECONOMICS OF MARKET ALLOCATION 43
be paid before an economic exchange is transacted, are sufficiently low

that they do not choke off mutually satisfactory transactions.
Information on characteristics such as the quality, availability, pric-
ing, and location of goods and services is available at low cost to mar-
ket participants.
There are probably no real-world markets that perfectly satisfy these require-
ments. It has sometimes been argued that certain agricultural and natural
resource commodity markets come closest. Market failure occurs when one
or more of the above conditions for a well-functioning competitive market
are not met in a substantial way. We will discuss this in detail below. Before
we address market failure, however, we need to consider the concepts of
market demand and supply, equilibrium, and efficiency.
Market Demand and Supply
Markets are made up of a number of buyers and sellers trading a particular

type of good or service, and an institution governing how buyers and sellers
communicate and trade. Lets assume for now that all the conditions are met
for a well-functioning competitive market. Below we will develop the theory
of demand and short-run supply. If you have already been exposed to these
ideas in a microeconomic theory course, you may want to skip ahead.
Market Demand
In neoclassical microeconomic theory, demand originates from a set of

buyers known as consumers who are assumed to have the objective of maxi-
mizing their overall level of satisfaction, or utility, but are constrained in
this endeavor by their budget and by market prices. In other words, each
consumer tries to get as much utility as possible given his limited budget
and the market prices for various alternative goods and services. Each unit
of each good or service provides the consumer with an increment of utility
known as marginal utility. For example, in economic jargon the satisfac-
tion one gets from eating a slice of pizza represents the marginal utility
from that slice of pizza. Economists assume that when more than one unit
of a good is consumed in a reasonably short period, the marginal utility of
each successive unit consumed will decline. This phenomenon is referred
to as the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility. Continuing our pizza ex-
ample, if several slices of pizza are eaten for dinner, the second slice will
provide less marginal utility than the first, and the third slice will provide
less marginal utility than the second. Can you think of any circumstances
Table 3.1
Hypothetical Example of a Consumers Marginal Utility from Successive

Quantities of Different Lunchtime Meal Alternatives
Quantity
consumed
per week Marginal Utility
Pizza slice Sub Egg roll Burrito
1 8 28 18 24
2 7 26 16 22
3 6 24 14 20
4 5 22 12 18
5 4 20 10 16
6 3 18 8 12
7 2 8 6 6
8 1 4 4 4
9 0.5 2 2 1
where marginal utility would continuously increase rather than decrease as

more and more is consumed?
In the simplest version of the economic model of consumer choice, con-
sumers are assumed to be fully informed of the marginal utility and the price
of each unit of all the various goods and services available to them, and fully
expend their budget during the time under consideration. As utility maximiz-
ers constrained by a limited budget, consumers make successive purchase
decisions that generate the largest marginal utility per dollar spent. This should
make sense, since if one were to add up the marginal utility from these pur-
chases, the result would be the largest possible total utility that could be
gained from the total expended budget. For example, consider the marginal
utility that one might get from different quantities of various lunch alterna-
tives during a typical week, as shown in Table 3.1. One can see that this
hypothetical consumer experiences diminishing marginal utility for each lunch
alternative. If each menu item costs $4, and the consumer has a budget of
$24 per week to spend on eating out at lunch, what combination of lunch-
time meals will maximize her utility given her $24 budget?
Recall that as utility maximizers, consumers will make successive purchase
decisions that generate the largest marginal utility per dollar spent. Since each
menu item costs $4, one can simply divide each marginal utility figure in
Table 3.1 by $4 to get marginal utility per dollar spent. Our consumers first
choice will be to buy a sub, which generates 7 units (utils) of utility per
dollar spent. After eating the sub, say on Monday, what will be her choice on
Tuesday? In this case, she will buy another sub, as the second sub of the week
generates 6.5 units of utility per dollar spent. On Wednesday, she is indifferent
between her third sub of the week and her first burrito, so suppose that she
flips a coin and buys her third sub of the week, and her first burrito of the
week on Thursday. Likewise, on Friday and Saturday she will buy her second
burrito of the week and her fourth sub of the week. After having had six lunches
out this week she has spent all of her weekly lunch budget and has purchased
four subs and two burritos, which generated 146 units of total utility for her
this week. Could you have her purchase a different combination of lunchtime
meals and get more than 146 units of utility for her $24?
Now lets suppose that the following week our consumer has the same
marginal utility for different quantities of various lunch alternatives as shown
in Table 3.1, and has another $24 to spend, but the burrito stand has reduced
the price of burritos to $2. How will this lower price affect our consumers
utility-maximizing choice of lunchtime meals? First we need to recompute
marginal utility per dollar spent. Since pizza slices, subs, and egg rolls are
still $4 each, then just as before we divide these marginal utility numbers by
$4. Since burritos are now $2 each, however, we divide the marginal utility
numbers for burritos by $2, thereby doubling the marginal utility per dollar
spent relative to when burritos were $4 each. Following the consumer choice
procedure that we used before, we find that our consumer will be eating
more food than the previous week. In particular, this week she will start out
by buying five burritos (say, for example, two on Monday, two on Tuesday,
and one on Wednesday), then buy three subs (say, for example, one each on
Thursday, Friday, and Saturday), and then go back to the burrito stand and
buy her sixth burrito of the week (say on Sunday). Therefore, when the price
of burritos decreased from $4 to $2, our consumer increased her weekly
burrito purchases from two to six.
This example illustrates a number of important points related to consumer
demand. Notice that as the price of burritos declined, the number of burritos
eaten per week by the consumer increased. Usually there is an inverse rela-
tionship between the price of a good or service and the quantity demanded
by consumers. This inverse relationship price and quantity demanded is so
common that economists refer to it as the Law of Demand. Consider a dia-
gram with price on the vertical axis and weekly quantity on the horizontal
axis. In this diagram we can draw two points, one indicating a price of $4
and a quantity demanded of burritos, and another indicating a price of $2 and
a quantity demanded of burritos. If we were to draw a line connecting these
two points, we would have estimated this consumers demand curve for
burritos, as shown in Figure 3.1. Each point on this demand curve represents
the maximum amount of money the consumer is willing to pay for the indi-
cated quantity of burritos.
The demand curve in Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between price
Figure 3.1 Individual Consumer Demand for Burritos

Price
Demand
Curve
2
22 66
Quantity
of burritos and the quantity of burritos demanded by the individual con-

sumer, assuming that the consumers budget, meal preferences, and the
price of the various menu items all remain unchanged. If the consumers
budget, her preferences for various meal alternatives, or the price of other
lunch foods were to change, then her consumer choice behavior would
also change, resulting in an entirely new demand curve. For example, sup-
pose that her budget or the price of one or more of the other foods were to
increase. Then normally we would expect that her demand for burritos
would increase, which would be illustrated by a new demand curve drawn
to the right of the old demand curve in Figure 3.1. In other words, for a
given burrito price, her quantity of burritos demanded would increase. The
reverse is also trueif her budget or the price of one or more of the other
menu items were to decrease, then we would normally expect to see her
demand for burritos decrease.
There are many consumers who go out to eat at lunch, many of whom
have a demand curve for burritos. If we were to add up the quantity of burritos
demanded by all consumers at each price, we would get the market demand
curve for burritos. Therefore, the market demand for burritos will increase if
there are more consumers who like to eat burritos.
Market Supply
Sellers are assumed to be firms that have the objective of maximizing profit
in neoclassical microeconomics. Analogous to demand, a supply curve is a
graphical relationship between price and quantity supplied. We will be fo-
cusing on production in the economic short run, the time period for a firm
during which one or more inputs, usually land or capital, are fixed. For
example, capital is fixed over the time period of an equipment or office
space lease. Likewise, land is fixed over the growing season once it is planted
with a crop. In order to understand supply in the short run, we first need to
look at a firms short-run production and short-run cost. Note that the ap-
pendix to this chapter provides a simple calculus treatment of marginal
cost and supply.
The Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns characterizes production in
the short run. This law states that as more and more of a variable input is
added to a fixed input, the marginal productivity of each successive unit of
variable input will eventually become smaller. For example, each new worker
hired (variable input) to work in a restaurant kitchen (fixed input) will result
in increased production of food (the marginal product of labor), as shown in
Table 3.2. The Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns indicates that each
successive kitchen worker hired will result in smaller and smaller increases
in food production. In fact, it is possible that marginal productivity could
eventually become zero or negative if the kitchen gets too crowded. Would a
profit-maximizing restaurant knowingly hire additional workers if the mar-
ginal product of those additional workers were zero or negative?
Now lets introduce cost. Suppose that each worker generates $100 per
day in wages and employment benefits, and each unit of food produced
can be sold at a price of $5. In this case each unit of food sold generates
marginal revenue of $5. It is usually the case that marginal revenue is equal
to the products sales price in competitive markets. This is because the
seller is a price taker and is unable to affect market price by varying the
level of product sold. To keep the example simple, if unrealistic, we will
assume that labor is the only cost associated with producing food at the
restaurant. Marginal cost is equal to the change in total cost caused by an
incremental change in output. Marginal cost tells us how much total cost
increases when we increase the quantity of output by one unit. In our sim-
plified example, where an increase in food output is generated by hiring
another kitchen worker, marginal cost is found by dividing the $100 of
additional daily labor cost for the new worker by the marginal product of
this new worker. How many workers would be optimal for a profit-maxi-
mizing restaurant to hire? Economists use the method of marginal analysis
Table 3.2
Hypothetical Example of Restaurant Production in the Short Run
Workers per day Marginal product of labor Total product

1 30 30
2 28 58
3 26 84
4 24 108
5 22 130
6 20 150
7 18 168
8 16 184
9 14 198
10 12 210
Table 3.3
Hypothetical Example of Daily Production, Cost, and Profit
Profit
Number Marginal Marginal (total
of product Total Marginal Total revenue Total revenue
workers of labor output cost cost (price) revenue total cost)
1 30 30 3.33 100 5 150 50
2 28 58 3.57 200 5 290 90
3 26 84 3.85 300 5 420 120
4 24 108 4.17 400 5 540 140
5 22 130 4.55 500 5 650 150
6 20 150 5 600 5 750 150
7 18 168 5.56 700 5 840 140
8 16 184 6.25 800 5 920 120
9 14 198 7.14 900 5 990 90
10 12 210 8.33 1000 5 1050 50
Note: Marginal cost is the change in total cost divided by marginal product. We as-
sume here that each worker is paid $100 per day, there are no other production costs, and
each unit of marginal product (units of food) is sold at a price of $5.
in these sorts of problems. Perhaps it is easiest to understand by starting

with no kitchen workers, then successively increasing the kitchen staff by
one worker, and then comparing marginal revenue (price) and marginal
cost, as shown in Table 3.3.
The first kitchen worker hired generates 30 additional units of food per
day. Marginal cost is equal to the change in total cost ($100 for the worker)
divided by the first workers marginal product (30 units of food), or $3.33
per unit of food. Marginal revenue is equal to $5 (the price per unit of food).
Table 3.4
Hypothetical Example of Daily Production, Cost, and Profit When

Menu Price Increases
Profit
Number Marginal Marginal (total
of product Total Marginal Total revenue Total revenue
workers of labor output cost cost (price) revenue total cost)
1 30 30 3.33 100 6.25 187.50 87.50
2 28 58 3.57 200 6.25 362.50 162.50
3 26 84 3.85 300 6.25 525 225
4 24 108 4.17 400 6.25 675 275
5 22 130 4.55 500 6.25 812.50 312.50
6 20 150 5 600 6.25 937.50 337.50
7 18 168 5.56 700 6.25 1050 350
8 16 184 6.25 800 6.25 1150 350
9 14 198 7.14 900 6.25 1237.50 337.50
10 12 210 8.33 1000 6.25 1312.50 312.50
Note: Marginal cost is the change in total cost divided by marginal product. We as-
sume here that each worker is paid $100 per day, there are no other production costs, and
each unit of marginal product (units of food) is sold at a price of $6.25.
Since marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost, it is profitable to hire

the first kitchen worker. Would profit increase if a second kitchen worker is
added? The marginal product of the second worker is 28, implying that the
marginal cost of producing an additional unit of food when the second worker
is hired is equal to $100/28 = $3.57. Since marginal revenue ($5) again ex-
ceeds marginal cost ($3.57), profits are increased when a second worker is
hired. Marginal analysis suggests that profits will be the maximum possible
when you stop adding new workers where marginal revenue equals marginal
cost. In our example, profit is maximized at an output of 150 units of food,
which occurs when six workers are employed.
Now suppose that the price per unit of food increased to $6.25. How
would this change the restaurants profit-maximizing level of food output?
First, note that the only things that change are price, marginal and total
revenue, and profit, as shown in Table 3.4. Following the same marginal
analysis procedure, we find that eight kitchen workers will result in 184
units of food produced per day, which maximizes profit. Thus, an increase
in the price of food results in an increase in the quantity of food supplied by
the restaurant. Under competitive market conditions where sellers are price
takers, firms supply along their marginal cost curve. In other words, we
have shown that a firms profit-maximizing output level occurs where price
equals marginal cost. When price rises, profit-maximizing firms respond by
Figure 3.2 A Competitive Firms Marginal Cost Curve Is Also Its

Short-Run Supply Curve
$ per unit
Marginal cost = Supply
6.25
150 168
Quantity
increasing their output level. Higher prices are required to overcome rising
marginal costs, which in turn occur due to the Law of Diminishing Marginal
Returns. Since a supply curve shows the relationship between price and
quantity supplied, the firms supply curve is its marginal cost curve, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.2.
An increase in marginal cost, which might occur due to higher labor
costs, will cause the firms supply curve to shift inward to the left, which is
known as a decrease in supply. Likewise, a decrease in marginal cost, which
might occur due to lower labor costs, will cause the firms supply curve to
shift outward to the right, which is known as an increase in supply. In chapter
4 we will look at how supply is affected when firms are able to reduce their
marginal costs by using cheaper, polluting production methods. In our sup-
ply example, we can assume that there are many restaurants, each of which
has a supply curve for prepared food. If we were to add up the quantity of
food supplied by all restaurants at each price per unit of food, we would
get the market supply curve for the type of restaurant meal. Therefore, the
market supply of this food will increase if new restaurants open in the
same area.
Figure 3.3 Supply and Demand

Price
Supply
Excess supply
$5
Excess demand
Demand
Quantity
Market Equilibrium and Efficiency
We have determined that utility, product prices, and limited consumer bud-
gets determine consumer demand for goods and services. We have also de-
termined that profit-maximizing firms in a competitive market supply along
their short-run marginal cost curves. We also learned that market demand is
found by horizontally summing all consumers quantity demanded associ-
ated with each price, and that market supply is found by horizontally sum-
ming all firms quantity supplied associated with each price. We will now
address the concept of equilibrium in a well-functioning competitive market,
and how resources are efficiently allocated in equilibrium.
Market Equilibrium
Consider the supply and demand curves shown in Figure 3.3. If you like,
you can consider this a well-functioning competitive market for a particular
type of lunchtime meal. Note that at a price above $5, there is an excess
supply, meaning that quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded. When
there is excess supply, market forces lead to a reduction in price. For ex-
ample, if a retailer overestimated demand for a new line of clothing, then

unsold inventory would result unless price were reduced, perhaps through a
clearance sale. In contrast, at a price below $5, there is an excess demand,
meaning that quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied. When there is
excess demand, market forces lead to an increase in price. For example, if a
retailer or manufacturer underestimated demand for a new toy, then quantity
demanded would far outstrip quantity supplied unless price was increased.
Market equilibrium occurs at a price where the quantity supplied by sell-
ers equals the quantity demanded by consumers. Because quantity supplied
equals quantity demanded, there is neither excess supply nor excess demand.
This state of affairs is referred to as an equilibrium because the price and the
volume of trade will stay the same over time until some factor influencing
buyer or seller market behavior changes, which will then necessitate a period
of adjustment as price seeks its new equilibrium level. If markets are fre-
quently buffeted by shifts in buyer or seller behavior, price may be nearly
continuously shifting.
Efficient Resource Allocation
The generic definition of efficiency is the condition of producing something

beneficial or valuable with a minimization of waste. There are many differ-
ent ways that the word efficient is used, such as fuel-efficient, time-effi-
cient, and Pareto-efficient, and this multitude of different ways of specifying
efficiency can be confusing. For example, mutually satisfactory market trans-
actions, such as those that occur in well-functioning competitive markets,
satisfy the Pareto criterion compared to the status quo of no trade. Can you
explain why?
The concept of efficient resource allocation ultimately rests on how we
measure the welfare of market participants. Buyers have a maximum price
they are willing to pay for a given quantity of the good, as represented by
points along their demand curve, and receive a gain from trade called con-
sumer surplus when their willingness-to-pay value is larger than the price
they had to pay. When people get a bargain at an auction or a garage sale,
they are experiencing consumer surplus. Since the market demand curve rep-
resents the willingness-to-pay values of all the buyers in the market, total
consumer surplus is approximated by the area in Figure 3.4 between the
demand curve and market price. To be technically correct, an exact measure
of consumer surplus requires an income-compensated demand curve. Ex-
ploration of this technical issue goes beyond the scope of this textbook, but
interested readers are encouraged to pursue the topic in most any intermedi-
ate microeconomic theory textbook.
Figure 3.4 Consumer and Producer Surplus
Price
Supply
Consumer
Surplus
P
Producer
Surplus
Demand
Quantity
Sellers receive a symmetrical gain from trade, called producer surplus,

when market price exceeds those costs that must be covered to make a sale
worthwhile. Producer surplus is the area in Figure 3.4 between the supply
curve and market price. Producer surplus is essentially profit to the pro-
ducer before fixed costs are taken into account. The sum of consumer and
producer surplus is referred to as total surplus, or the total gain from trade
in this market. We measure the overall welfare of the market participants
based on total surplus.
Now we are going to develop the important concept of a well-functioning
competitive market being efficient. In the context of market analysis, re-
sources are efficiency allocated when the welfare of the market participants
(as measured by total surplus) is maximized. In other words, resources are
efficiently allocated when market participants receive the maximum pos-
sible gains from trade. Resources are efficiently allocated at the equilibrium
market price because in a well-functioning competitive market there is nei-
ther excess supply nor excess demand, and so there are neither too many nor
too few units of the good or service produced. If price were above the equi-
librium level, we would have excess supply, and so the amount actually traded
(equal to quantity demanded) would be less than the quantity traded at the
equilibrium price, thereby reducing total surplus. If price were below the
equilibrium level, we would have excess demand (also known as a shortage),
and so the amount traded (equal to quantity supplied) would be less than the
quantity traded at the equilibrium price, thereby reducing total gains from
trade (total surplus). As a result, when there is either excess supply or excess
demand, some mutually satisfactory transactions are prevented from occur-
ring that would have generated consumer and producer surplus, which is
why nonequilibrium prices are inefficient.
While there is a tendency to ignore the functioning of markets, or to
take them for granted, Hayek (1937, 1945) focused attention on the fact
that the price system in competitive markets provides a unique means of
conveying and exploiting information. While Adam Smith argued that
the self-interested interaction of many buyers and sellers results in effi-
cient production and allocation, Hayek went further by observing that
markets are the only way of bringing together the widely dispersed infor-
mation necessary for efficient production and allocation. Hayek said that
the reason why centrally planned socialist systems have such great diffi-
culties is that they require the central planners to embody all the informa-
tion held by producers and consumers in markets. In setting prices and
quantities, and in choosing technologies and levels of employment, the
central planner must somehow know the willingness-to-pay of all con-
sumers, the production costs of all sellers, and the most efficient means
of organizing production. Planners must also know how to adjust prices
and quantities in response to external factors such as fluctuations in the
price of substitutes, consumer income, input price changes, regulatory
impacts, new technologies, changes in the workforce, and weather. The
appropriate adjustment to prices, quantities, and methods of production
relies upon the knowledge held by large numbers of independent con-
sumers and producers, and according to Hayek, it is not possible for cen-
tral planners to gather, process, and act upon this dispersed knowledge.
According to this view, prices, quantities, and methods of production will
reflect dispersed information only when they are determined in competi-
tive markets.
Unfortunately, the conditions required for efficient markets are not al-
ways met. For example, if consumers are misled by exaggerated quality
claims, then demand for the good is overstated, leading to excessive con-
sumption and negative gains from trade for those who later realize that
their willingness to pay based on actual quality is less than the price they
paid. If sellers can shift costs to society as a whole by polluting rather than
paying for cleanup, then (as we will learn in chapter 4) the market supply
curve will be shifted out to the right and excessive consumption occurs. In
either case, the markets failure to integrate knowledge is not so different
from the failings of Hayeks central planners. When markets fail to be effi-
cient, there is an economic argument for some form of government inter-
vention, such as regulation.
Market Failure
Most markets are less than perfectly efficient. When these inefficiencies are
substantial, we refer to such a state as a market failure. Lets consider some
of the possible sources of market failure.
Monopoly, Cartels, and Market Power
A monopoly exists when there is a single seller in a market. A cartel is a

group of colluding sellers that collectively act like a monopolist. Competi-
tion fails under either of these conditions. In order to raise price and profit,
a monopolist or a cartel will need to reduce output from the competitive
level. This can be more difficult for cartels because the reduction in output
must be coordinated among all cartel members. If a monopolist or a cartel
is successful in reducing output relative to the competitive equilibrium level,
price will rise along the demand curve. Since price rises, monopolists and
cartel members are able to transform some consumer surplus into producer
surplus. Since output must be reduced in order for price to rise above com-
petitive levels, the decline in output implies that some mutually satisfac-
tory transactions that produce consumer and producer surplus do not occur.
By how much will monopolists and cartels reduce output relative to com-
petitive levels? A point will eventually be reached beyond which the pro-
ducer surplus lost from further reducing output will outweigh the producer
surplus gained from the resulting increase in price. Because monopolies
and cartels produce less than the competitive equilibrium level of output,
resources are not efficiently allocated in the market (too small a quantity is
produced), and the sum of producer and consumer surplus is less than in
the competitive equilibrium. In addition, from an equity or fairness per-
spective, monopolized or cartelized markets give undue power to the sell-
ers. The government intervention in the United States occurs by way of
state and federal antitrust laws, which provide criminal and civil sanctions
for monopolized or cartelized markets.
Externalities
As we shall discuss in detail in chapter 4, externalities are unpaid-for ben-

efits or uncompensated costs that impact society as a by-product of pro-
duction and exchange. The term externality refers to the fact that these
benefits or costs are not reflected in market demand and supply. Positive
externalities are external benefits generated from production and exchange
and enjoyed without payment by members of society. An example would
be the benefits received by neighbors when homeowners beautify their yards
and adjoining roads and sidewalks. Since those who benefit from positive
externalities do not pay for them, their willingness-to-pay is not included
in market demand, and accordingly market demand is too small. In the
example given above, the market for landscaping materials and services
will produce an inefficiently small quantity because the external benefits
enjoyed by the neighbors are not reflected in market demand. Other ex-
amples of positive externalities include the external benefits from vaccina-
tions for infectious disease (reduced likelihood of epidemic), the external
benefits from literacy and education in a democratic society (more informed
voting and civic participation), and the external benefits from land stew-
ardship practiced by farmers, ranchers, and timberland owners (reduced
likelihood of flooding, improved groundwater quality, open space, etc.). In
each case the buyers in the market receive private benefits, but there are
also external benefits that are not included in the market, which is why an
inefficiently small quantity is produced by the market.
Negative externalities are external costs generated from production and ex-
change and borne without compensation by members of society. The prime ex-
ample is pollution generated as a by-product of producing electricity.
Profit-maximizing firms in otherwise well-functioning competitive markets have
an incentive to pollute if doing so allows them to reduce their own costs and thus
raise their profits. As will be explored in detail in chapter 4, since firms that emit
external costs do not have to pay these costs, the market supply curve is too large,
and too large a quantity is produced in the market. In the example given above,
the market for electricity will produce an inefficiently large quantity of electric-
ity because the external costs borne by people and the environment are not re-
flected in market supply. Consequently, even well-functioning competitive markets
can be inefficient when there are substantial pollution externalities.
Government intervention for positive externalities takes the form of a sub-
sidy to consumers (or producers). For example, a city or county government
might provide subsidized vaccinations for infectious disease, provide free or
subsidized education, and use tax dollars to purchase conservation easements
to subsidize appropriate land stewardship from farmers, ranchers, and tim-
berland owners. In the case of negative externalities, government regulations

take the form of state and federal environmental regulations that impose crimi-
nal and civil penalties, taxes, or outright bans on polluters.
Common-Pool Resources and Public Goods: Collectively

Produced and/or Consumed Goods
Some goods and services have the characteristic that individual property rights
are not assigned, and so they are collectively produced and/or consumed. Ex-
amples include parks, highways, emergency services, marine fisheries, rivers,
groundwater basins, air, public radio, wilderness areas, and recreation sites.
The two categories of collectively consumed goods that are relevant to this
book are common-pool resources and public goods. A common-pool resource
(CPR) is distinguished by the characteristics that (1) it is difficult to exclude
multiple individuals who appropriate from the resource stock, and (2) the re-
source features rivalry in consumption or subtractability, meaning that resource
units appropriated by one subtract from what is available to others. In contrast,
while it is difficult to exclude multiple individuals who benefit from public
goods, these goods differ from CPRs in that they lack rivalry in consumption.
Thus a coastal fishery is a CPR because fish are harvested by one subtract from
what is available to others at a given point in time, while public television
broadcasts are public goods because one persons reception of the broadcast
does not subtract from what is available to other viewers.
These goods tend to be underproduced and/or overconsumed when they are
allocated in markets. For human-made goods that are collectively consumed,
such as public radio and television, self-interested individuals have an incen-
tive to free ride on the provision efforts of others. Since few are willing to pay
for something that they believe will be provided by others, market demand for
these goods and services is far too low, leading to an inefficiently small quan-
tity provided in markets. How many of us listen to public radio or watch public
television, but rely on others to support it? Because the inputs that people pro-
vide, such as effort or financial contributions, are privately owned, while the
output is collectively consumed, provision of the good is a positive externality
and thus is underprovided in market systems. If the benefits flowing to free
riders were included in the market, such as through compulsory taxes or user
fees, market demand would shift out, and a larger equilibrium quantity would
result. Thus, free riding leads to an inefficiently low quantity provided through
the market. Appropriate government intervention may be public provision by
way of taxes or compulsory user fees, such as the use of taxes to fund the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
While the problem of underprovision affects both CPRs and public goods,
the problem of overconsumption is specific to CPRs. Those who appropriate

from CPRs such as ocean fisheries, oil fields, groundwater basins, and con-
gested roads and public parks have an incentive to overuse the good, which
can lead to deterioration unless rule systems are put into place to limit use.
This process is sometimes known as the tragedy of the commons. At the heart
of the tragedy of the commons is an appropriation externality, where an
individuals appropriation activity yields benefits to the individual, but im-
poses the cost of reduced resource availability on all appropriators. Since
these incentives operate on all who use the CPR, the appropriation external-
ity leads to a race to appropriate resource units. In this case appropriate gov-
ernment intervention may take the form of rules and regulations limiting use
and harvest from CPRs. CPRs (and to lesser extent public goods) will be
discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 16.
Imperfect Information
If people are poorly informed of product quality, safety, or availability, then

their willingness-to-pay is distorted, which in turn implies that market de-
mand is either too large or too small. Consequently, either too much or too
little is produced relative to the full-information benchmark, leading to inef-
ficient resource allocation. For example, if buyers are poorly informed about
a products quality prior to purchase, there is an incentive for a fly-by-night
seller to overstate quality. In this case, demand is overstated because buyers
think quality is higher than it actually is, and so the equilibrium quantity
traded is inefficiently large. If employers understate workplace hazards, then
the supply of labor to these employers will be overstated, leading to a wage
below what workers would demand if true workplace safety were known. If
market participants do not resolve the imperfect information problem through
such things as product warranties and reputation, then either government or
nongovernment organizations may intervene by providing information. Ex-
amples include content labels required on processed food, or product testing
services provided by the Consumer Union.
Fairness, Equity, and Distributive Justice
The efficiency properties of well-functioning competitive markets have noth-

ing to say about the underlying fairness with which resources, wealth, and
income are distributed in society. Such a market is efficient because it maxi-
mizes the available gains from trade, yet others in society may place a high
value on the good or service being produced but lack the income to be able to
represent this value as willingness to pay. Yet it can also be argued that it is fair
that those who work harder, produce more, or find innovative ways to cut costs
or save energy should be compensated for their added contributions. If this is
not the case, then there is no financial incentive to work harder or innovate.
Since capabilities and access to education and skills are unevenly endowed in
the population, rewarding productivity leads to inequality in society. More-
over, those who succeed can provide their children with a better start, resulting
in intergenerational inequalities as well. Economies of scale in production,
sunk costs associated with entry and exit (e.g., new product promotional costs),
and government-created franchise monopolies and patents can all lead to con-
centrations of a few firms in many markets, resulting in a weakening of the
competitive process. Balancing incentives and equality is one of the central
dilemmas with which all societies are confronted.
Perspectives on Market Failures and Government Intervention
As we can see, there are almost no examples of real-world markets that do not
have some degree or another of market failure, often of various dimensions
and degrees. From an economic perspective, then, there is potential for regula-
tory intervention of some kind to resolve market failures in most markets. Such
intervention, however, can itself create problems and distortions. Thus, when
we see an opportunity for a regulatory intervention because of market failure,
it is also worthwhile to consider whether the form of intervention being con-
templated truly makes us better off. The particular form that regulations take
may at times be more a reflection of political expediency than economic effi-
ciency, a condition sometimes referred to as government failure. We will dis-
cuss this point in chapter 8, which addresses the topic of political economy,
and in chapter 10, which focuses on incentive regulation.
Summary
We have defined capitalism as an economic system based on the use of

a complete set of decentralized markets to allocate scarce resources,
goods, and services. (This as opposed to socialist systems, in which
allocation decisions are centralized at some level of community or gov-
ernment control.) Individuals (or other private entities) own capital, and
production and employment decisions are decentralized.
It has been pointed out that there have been no true tests of pure, laissez-
faire market capitalism (fully unregulated) in recent history. It is un-
likely to be in the best interests of society as a whole to practice pure
laissez-faire capitalism because of market failures and because of in-
equalities heightened by capitalism.
A well-functioning competitive market is the primary benchmark for

evaluating market failures and the need for public policy intervention.
For a market to be well-functioning and competitive, there must be many
individual buyers and sellers, each of whom is small relative to the overall
market. Market entry and exit costs must be inconsequential. Current
and potential market participants must be fully informed of prices, quali-
ties, and location; transaction costs must be low. There must be no col-
lusion among the market participants. There can be no consequential
positive or negative externalities.
When any of the above conditions is substantially absent, a market fail-
ure has occurred, meaning that the market no longer meets the condi-
tions for being well functioning and competitive.
Economists argue that market failures are a central justification for pub-
lic policy intervention in market capitalist systems if these interven-
tions are designed to correct for the market imperfections and the inter-
ventions do not create a larger distortion than the market failure itself.
Consumer demand can be derived from the level of their utility over
various alternative products, their budget constraint, and product prices.
Horizontally summing the quantity demanded of all consumers at a given
market price results in the market demand curve.
In a well-functioning competitive market, a firms short-run supply curve
is equal to its marginal cost curve. Horizontally summing the quantity
supplied by all sellers at a given market price results in the market sup-
ply curve.
We discussed the theoretical requirements for efficient markets to be in
equilibrium, namely that the quantity supplied by sellers equals the quan-
tity demanded by buyers at the prevailing price, so there is neither a
shortage nor a surplus.
The equilibrium market allocation is efficient because neither too much
nor too little is produced, and thus there is no waste. Another aspect of
efficiency is that total surplus (gains from trade) is as large as possible,
with none wasted, meaning that the sum of producer and consumer sur-
plus is maximized.
In the next chapter we shall discuss market failures based on externali-
ties and the role of this form of market failure in justifying environmen-
tal regulation.
1. Consider the demand and supply for used science textbooks. Sup-
pose that the used-textbook market is competitive, with supply given by
P = 10 + .1Q and demand given by P = 100 .08Q. Solve for the com-
petitive market equilibrium price and quantity of used textbooks in this
market. Determine the quantity of shortage or surplus that would occur if a
price ceiling (maximum allowable price) of $35 were imposed on this mar-
ket. Describe why the market fails to be efficient in the context of this
ceiling and what market participants commonly do to overcome the ineffi-
ciency caused by official prices below the equilibrium market price. If the
intention is to help low-income students, compare the effects of the price
ceiling to an alternative scheme of giving $25 purchase vouchers to low-
income students. In your answer, consider the effect of the vouchers on the
demand for textbooks.
2. Starting with a supply and demand diagram as in Figure 3.1, identify
producer and consumer surplus in the competitive equilibrium. Now sup-
pose that sellers form a cartel and wish to increase producer surplus. Illus-
trate in your diagram how a reduction in output will (i) transform some
consumer surplus into producer surplus, and (ii) result in a reduction in total
surplus due to the loss of some mutually beneficial transactions.
Due to overwhelming market failures, the invisible hand of the market must
be directed by the visible hand of government regulation. Members of each
group should be given a week or so to research the issues. The debate will
occur in a panel, moderated by your professor. Two members of each group
will serve as panelists, and any additional group members can serve as re-
searchers. There are a variety of different ways to structure a debate, one of
which is the Michigan cross-examination method:

b. The first affirmative panelist is cross-examined by the second negative
c. Questions from the audience are put to the members of the affirmative
team (5 minutes).
e. The second affirmative panelist cross-examines the first negative panel-
ist (4 minutes).
team (5 minutes).
minutes).
4. Classroom role-play activity: Before class, the instructor makes ten

seller cards (3x5 note cards), with opportunity cost values written on them.
The lowest opportunity cost card should be $1, and have them escalate in $1
intervals so that the highest opportunity cost card is $10. Likewise, make ten
buyer cards with maximum willingness-to-pay values written on them. The
highest willingness-to-pay card should be $16, with the other cards declin-
ing in $1 intervals so that the lowest willingness-to-pay card is $7. Each card
represents a single unit of a fictitious good that can be bought or sold. These
cards induce a step-function supply and demand curve that can be shown to
class after the activity. Hand these cards out in class. Explain that students
will be role playing as buyers and sellers. It is vital to the activity that (i)
sellers not sell below the opportunity cost value on their cards, (ii) buyers not
buy at a price above the maximum willingness-to-pay value on their cards,
(iii) students seek to maximize their gains from trade, and (iv) students with
a card engage in only one transaction of a single unit of the fictitious good in
the trading round. The instructor serves as auctioneer and conducts a double-
oral auction on a chalkboard, where improving buyer bid prices must rise,
and improving seller ask prices must decline. Conduct at least five trading
rounds, with students swapping cards after each round, and then show the
induced supply and demand curves to class. If students follow the rules above,
then auction market trading should result in an approximation of the equilib-
rium price and quantity, even when traders dont see supply or demand curves.
5. Spreadsheet simulation: Suppose that supply is given by the equation
P = c + dQ, and demand is given by the P = a bQ.
a. Create a spreadsheet file with these supply and demand equations. Let a
= 2000, b = 1, c = 100, and d = 2.
b. Plot the supply and demand curves for different P and Q parameter
values in a fully labeled diagram.
c. Solve for equilibrium price and quantity (P* and Q*) in the same sheet
(carefully label your answer) using the parameters in 5a above.
d. Build a table showing different (comparative-static) values for P* and Q*
when a is 1000, 2000, and 3000, and when c is 50, 100, and 200. Provide
a brief narrative economic interpretation of the change in a values and the
change in c values and their impact on equilibrium price and quantity.
Internet Links
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov/atr/

index.html): The mission of the Antitrust Division is to promote and protect the
competitive process through the enforcement of the antitrust laws. The antitrust
laws apply to virtually all industries and to every level of business, and they
prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade, such as price-fixing conspira-
cies, corporate mergers likely to reduce the competitive vigor of particular mar-
kets, and predatory acts designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power.
Consumer Products Safety Commission (www.cpsc.gov/): An indepen-

dent agency of the U.S. government, the CPSC helps keep American fami-
lies safe by reducing the risk of injury or death from consumer products.
Federal Trade Commission (www.ftc.gov/): The Federal Trade Commis-

sion enforces a variety of federal antitrust and consumer protection laws, and
seeks to ensure that the nations markets function competitively and are vig-
orous, efficient, and free of undue restrictions. The commission also works
to enhance the smooth operation of the marketplace by eliminating acts or
practices that are unfair, deceptive, or threaten consumers opportunities to
exercise informed choice.
European Union Competition Policy Website (http://europa.eu.int/comm/

competition/index_en.html).
Hayek Research Website (www.hayekcenter.org/friedrichhayek/

research.html).
History of Economic Thought Website (http://cepa.newschool.edu/het):

Produced by the New School for Social Research, here you can read about
the whole spectrum of economic thought.
International Association for the Study of Common Property

(www.indiana.edu/~iascp/): Lots of useful material related to common-pool
resources and the ownership regime of common property.
Writings of Adam Smith (www.economics.mcmaster.ca/ugcm/3113/smith/

index.html).
Writings of Alfred Marshall (www.economics.mcmaster.ca/ugcm/3113/

marshall/index.html).
Hayek, F. 1937. Economics and Knowledge. Economica N.S. 4: 3354.

_______. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 35
(September): 51930.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collec-
tive Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosser, J.B., and M.V. Rosser. 1995. The Theory and Practice of Market Capital-
ism. In Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy. Burr Ridge,
IL: Irwin.
Scherer, F.M., and D. Ross. 1990. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perfor-
mance. 3rd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Viscusi, W., J. Vernon, and J. Harrington. 2000. Economics of Regulation and Anti-
trust. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Appendix: A Calculus-based Derivation of Supply Curves
This appendix is intended for those who have a calculus background but who
have not had a microtheory course in which they have derived a competitive
firms supply curve. Supply curves result from firms in competitive markets
trying to maximize profits. A firm in a perfectly competitive market is as-
sumed to be relatively small compared to the size of the overall market. As a
consequence, an individual firm will take the market price as a fixed param-
eter and vary its output to maximize its profits. In particular, for a competi-
tive firm, profits are given by
Profit = total revenue (TR) total cost (TC).
In the short run, total revenue is simply equal to market price multiplied
by the firms output (TR = PQ). Likewise in the short run, total costs will
have a functional form such as
TC = a + bQ + cQ2.
Note that a is the fixed cost of production, like the debt service on a fac-
tory, while b and c are coefficients for variable cost bQ + cQ2. Note that
variable costs increase with output Q.
Note that marginal cost (MC) in our simple example above is b + 2cQ (the
partial derivative of TC with respect to Q), meaning that as Q grows, so does
MC. Why? Recall from the text that in the short run a firm will eventually
experience congestion of its fixed facilities as it tries to increase output, which
means that marginal costs increase with increases in output. Similarly, mar-
ginal revenue (MR) is simply P, the market price.
A competitive firm selects its sales quantity, Q, to maximize profit:
Figure 3.5 Profit-Maximizing Output
Profit
Quantity of output
that maximizes profit
occurs where tangent
line has a zero slope.
Profit
Curve
Q* Quantity
Profit = PQ a bQ cQ2.
Note that since total revenue is linear, while total cost is convex, there is
an output level at which this profit function attains a unique maximum. As
shown in Figure 3.5, the profit function first rises, reaches a peak, and then
falls. The profit curve has a slope of zero at its peak, meaning that the deriva-
tive of the profit function with regard to Q is equal to zero. At this point a
one-unit increase in Q will generate marginal revenue that is equal to mar-
ginal cost. We can use this property of the profit function to determine the
profit-maximizing output level Q*. If you take the partial derivative of the
profit function with respect to Q, and set this equation equal to zero, you will
find that P = b + 2cQ. Since marginal revenue is equal to price for a competi-
tive firm (the derivative of total revenue with respect to Q is equal to P), this
equation simply shows us that the profit-maximizing output level occurs where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. As market price changes, the firm
sets quantity supplied where market price equals marginal cost. Therefore, a
firms supply curve is its marginal cost curve.
4
Externalities, Market Failures,
and Policy Interventions
Introduction
In this chapter, we continue the discussion of markets, market failures, and

efficiency from chapter 3 by evaluating the economic theory of externalities.
We will evaluate externalities in the context of an otherwise well-functioning
competitive market system. Externalities are positive or negative impacts on
society that occur as a by-product of production and exchange. These effects
are called externalities because they are not included in the factors that under-
lie market supply and demand, and their omission leads to the market failing to
efficiently allocate resources. The inefficiency due to externalities can be used
as a justification for government intervention in otherwise well-functioning
competitive market systems. Externality problems are not unique to market
systems, however, as illustrated by the profound pollution that occurred in the
former Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states.
In the section that follows, we will begin with a discussion of positive
externalities, the distortion they create in the market, and possible policy
interventions that have the potential for enhancing market efficiency. Next,
we will turn to negative externalities. Because pollution is such a persistent
and encompassing problem, we will evaluate the source and the consequences
of negative externalities in detail.
Positive Externalities
Consider pastureland near a growing urban area that can be used for live-
stock grazing or converted into new housing, schools, roads, and retail de-
66
EXTERNALITIES, MARKET FAILURES, AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS 67
velopment. Pastureland produces benefits for local residents such as open

space, vistas, wildlife habitat, and temporary floodwater storage. If local resi-
dents receive these benefits without having to pay for them, then these ben-
efits are external to the market process. Pastureland is bought and sold in
markets, however, and the market demand for pastureland is based on the
private benefits that flow to the buyers, such as revenues from grazing cattle,
stabling horses, producing hay, or selling to a developer. Consequently, the
market demand for pastureland ignores the external benefits received by oth-
ers who do not pay for them. Since market demand does not reflect the exter-
nal benefits of intact pastureland that flow to society, the market process will
allocate less than the socially optimal amount of such land as pasture, lead-
ing to excessive agricultural land conversion and urban sprawl.
A positive externality can be defined as an unpaid-for benefit enjoyed by
others in society that is generated as a by-product of production and ex-
change. Positive externalities are also known as external benefits. For ex-
ample, as a by-product of purchasing a college education, a college student
produces external benefits to society in the form of being an informed voter
and a resourceful citizen. Likewise as a by-product of a parent vaccinating
her child for infectious disease, an immunized child reduces the likelihood
of a disease epidemic spreading to others in society. The pastureland ex-
ample above offers yet another example of a positive externality.
While positive externalities are nice for those who benefit from them,
otherwise well-functioning competitive markets are not very good at provid-
ing them. Recall from chapter 3 that well-functioning competitive markets in
equilibrium are efficient. When there are substantial external benefits, how-
ever, those efficiency properties fail. Specifically, when buyers in a market
purchase goods, the market demand for the good reflects the private benefits
that flow to the buyers. Since those who receive positive externalities do not
pay for them, market demand does not include external benefits. The sum of
private benefit and external benefit is called social benefit. Figure 4.1 indi-
cates how the demand curve based only on private benefits is smaller than
(to the left of) the demand curve based on social benefits. The vertical differ-
ence between the private-benefit and the social-benefit demand curves is
marginal external benefit, or the external benefit per unit of output, as indi-
cated by the letter C in Figure 4.1. In the pastureland example, marginal
external benefit would be the external benefits from an additional acre of
intact pastureland (open space, vistas, wildlife habitat, and temporary flood-
water storage). The marginal concept will be developed more completely for
the case of negative externalities later in the chapter.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the market demand curve based on social benefits
exceeds (lies to the right of) the market demand curve based only on private
Figure 4.1 Positive Externalities and Market Failure
Price
Supply
PS
PP
Demand curve
C (social benefits)
Demand curve
(private benefits)
A
QP QS
Quantity
benefits. Since buyers willingness-to-pay only reflects their private ben-

efits, only the market demand based on private benefits will exist in the
market. Since the demand based on private benefits is smaller than the
demand based on social benefits, an otherwise well-functioning competi-
tive market will underprovide those goods (pastureland, education, vacci-
nations) that generate positive externalities. This underprovision is indicated
by the letter A in Figure 4.1. If society intervened in the market by using
tax revenues to subsidize buyers, then market demand would reflect social
benefits and the efficient quantity of those goods (pastureland, education,
vaccinations) that generate positive externalities. For example, in the case
of pastureland, many counties have open space districts that tax residents
and use those tax revenues to purchase conservation easements. When a
farmer sells a conservation easement on her land, she and any future owner
no longer have a right to convert the pastureland to housing, roads, or other
developments that might impair the open space and ecological services
provided by the land. By purchasing the easement, society internalizes the
positive externality.
It should be noted that not all positive externalities are limited to distort-
ing the market demand curve. One well-known example is a technology
spillover. For example, the Apollo space program led to the development
of many new products and technological innovations that spilled over into
commercial market applications. Similarly, military and National Science
Foundationsponsored efforts helped to create the basic Internet structure,
which has transformed the way that people communicate and conduct busi-
ness. Technology spillovers are unpaid-for benefits, and many of them re-
duce production costs, enhance productivity, and thus shift out the supply
curve. Commercial buyers in the market for research and technology only
take into account the private benefits that they hope to receive, and not
beneficial technology spillovers, and thus there is an inefficiently small
amount of basic research conducted by private enterprise. This is one rea-
son why government subsidizes basic research that has the potential for
technology spillovers.
Negative Externalities
Consider cabinet manufacturers that can use two alternative production pro-
cesses for making finished cabinets. Process A costs the firm less than non-
toxic process B, but process A allows toxic volatile organic compounds from
the wood-finishing process to escape into the atmosphere. These volatile
organic compounds contribute to smog and thus impose external costs on
people who breathe the polluted air but who are not compensated for these
harms. Since process A has lower private costs, profit-maximizing firms will
usually choose it over the nontoxic alternative, which allows them to supply
furniture at lower prices to consumers. Since the supply of cabinets in the
competitive furniture market does not reflect the external costs borne by
members of society, the market process will allocate more than the socially
optimal amount of cabinets when they are produced with the more polluting
technology.
A negative externality can be defined as an uncompensated harm to others
in society that is generated as a by-product of production and exchange. Many
negative externalities occur as a by-product of market transactions. Pollution
is the prime example of a negative externality, as illustrated in the cabinet
example above. The harms created by pollution are known as external costs.
As we will see below, when market exchange generates negative externalities,
market supply fails to reflect the true social cost of producing the good gener-
ating the externality, and so too much of the good is produced.
Following Scitovsky (1954), one can draw a distinction between techno-
logical and pecuniary externalities, and when economists refer to externali-
ties, they usually mean technological externalities. A pecuniary externality
occurs, for example, when a new firm enters a market. This entry will initially
increase market supply and will tend to reduce market price, reducing the
profit of other sellers. This is a negative pecuniary externality because it
affects the profits or financial circumstances of another individual or firm,
and the harm is directly transmitted by way of the market process. From an
economic perspective, however, pecuniary externalities do not generate a
misallocation of societys scarce resources, and thus are not considered a
market failure. In contrast, a technological externality is a peculiarity of the
production function (Scitovsky 1954, p. 145) in which the production pro-
cess generates external costs such as pollution, whose harms are not directly
transmitted by way of the market process. As we shall show below, techno-
logical externalities such as pollution do in fact result in a misallocation of
societys scarce resources and so represent a form of market failure. When
we refer to externalities in this textbook, we will mean the technological
form rather than pecuniary form.
Before we address how negative externalities result in market failure, lets
take a moment and look at the important topic of property rights and nega-
tive externalities.
Property Rights and Negative Externalities
If negative externalities are uncompensated harms generated as a by-product

of production and exchange, why dont those who bear these costs simply
use the legal process to sue polluters for damages? The common-law tradi-
tion in the United States and elsewhere protects the integrity of property
rights. Property rights represent an enforceable authority to undertake par-
ticular actions in specific circumstances (see Commons 1968). Thus if some-
one is known to have dumped garbage on your front yard, this act is punishable
(through criminal and/or civil penalties) because it impairs the value of your
property. Certain aspects of our environment, including the air, ocean, wild-
life, and groundwater, were not traditionally owned by anybody, and so dam-
age to them did not directly impair the value of someones property.
Consequently, the common law did not provide criminal and/or civil penal-
ties for damage to valuable but unowned aspects of the natural world. Both
government and common property rights regimes have been developed to
prevent degradation of valuable resources that are not privately owned (see
Bromley 1989 and Ostrom 1990).
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify five important property rights that
when bundled together make up ownership:
Access: The right to enjoy benefits of the property that do not subtract
from benefits that others can enjoy, such as walking along the beach.
Authorized entrants have access rights, such as those that are purchased
with entry fees at national parks.
Withdrawal: The right to withdraw the product of the property, such as
harvesting fish from a fishery. Authorized users have both access and
withdrawal rights, such as those that are acquired with the purchase of a
fishing license or a firewood gathering permit from a national forest.
Management: The right to regulate use and improvements. Ostrom (1997)
uses the term claimant to refer to those who hold access, withdrawal,
and management rights, such as farmers who participate in the manage-
ment of government-owned irrigation systems.
Exclusion: The right to determine who has access and who can be ex-
cluded from using the property. Ostrom (1997) uses the term proprietor
to refer to those who hold access, withdrawal, management, and exclu-
sion rights. Citizens of Swiss villages that possess and govern their own
common property pastures and forests are proprietors in this sense.
Alienation: The right to sell or lease. Owners possess all the rights of
proprietors along with the right of alienation. Private property falls under
this category, though owners can also be governments or communities.
We can see that there is more to property rights than ownership. It is not
unusual to unbundle a portion of these rights and assign them to nonowners.
For example, someone with a valid fishing or hunting license is an autho-
rized user with certain rights to harvest fish and game, while government
retains proprietary rights to the wildlife in a public trust capacity. Usufructu-
ary rights refer to certain use and withdrawal rights granted to property that
is owned by others. For example, treaties ceding Indian lands to the federal
government sometimes include clauses granting Indian tribes usufructuary
rights for hunting, fishing, and gathering on the ceded lands. These arrange-
ments reflect a melding of precontact Indian customary land tenure systems
governing the harvest of resources from land and water, and Euro-American
property rights systems. Likewise, the right to appropriate from navigable
waters in the United States is a usufructuary right, with the waterway itself
being owned by government in a public trust capacity. California water law
is built on the notion that the right of property in water is usufructuary. Cali-
fornia Water Code section 102 provides that [a]ll water within the State is
the property of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water [usu-
fructuary rights] may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided
by law.
We have already discussed the role of conservation easements as a mecha-
nism for internalizing positive externalities. When a conservation easement is
sold or donated by a landowner, the landowner is voluntarily transferring cer-
tain withdrawal and management rights tied to specified types of development

to the easement buyer (usually a not-for-profit land trust). Easements are thus
a set of legally enforceable property rights, and usually they are permanent
and run with the land, and thus are binding on all future landowners. The
owner of the easement is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the terms
of the easement. The seller of the easement retains ownership, but no longer
has the right to, say, subdivide the land for housing or commercial develop-
ment, or to use clearcut timber harvest methods. Conservation easements are
commonly used to protect the external benefits (viewsheds, floodwater reten-
tion, wildlife habitat) associated with working landscapesfarms, ranches,
and private timberlandswhile continuing to allow the farmer or rancher to
live on the land and work the land, and keeping the lands privately owned and
on the tax rolls. An additional benefit to the landowner is that the sale or
donation of an easement by definition reduces the development-based value
of the land, which can substantially reduce property tax (and inheritance tax)
liability. In the United States, nearly 2.6 million acres of land have been pro-
tected using conservation easements owned by local or regional land trusts.
Some areas under strong development pressure, such as the San Francisco
Bay area, have open space districts with the authority to levy taxes to fund the
purchase of conservation easements.
Property rights scholars distinguish four different classes or regimes of
property rights based on who holds these rights:
Private property rights: Rights held by individuals and business enter-

prises, usually with a legally recognized owner.
Common property rights: Rights held by an identified group of proprietors.
State property rights: Rights held by government.
Open access: No specific property rights recognized, and thus the re-
source is open to all under the common-law rule of capture with no
capacity for management or exclusion.
As we saw in chapter 2, property rights to land and other resources originate

from open-access conditions. Property rights can originate from being first in
time with a valid claim for an unallocated open-access resource (such as the
Homestead Act for land, or the prior appropriation doctrine for water in the
frontier west). Property rights can also originate by conquest (taking of other
peoples property), the assertion of government regulatory rights, or capture
(removing resource units from an open-access or a common-property resource
such as water, marine fisheries, or oil and gas). As Hanna (1996, p. 385) states:
Property rights regimes do not exist as two opposing types but rather as com-
binations along a spectrum from open access to private ownership. . . . Second,
no single type of property rights regime can be prescribed as a remedy for [all]
problems of resource degradation and overuse. . . . The key attribute of an
effective property rights regime is that it is context-specific, reflecting environ-
mental, economic, social, and political conditions.
Prior to the advent of environmental regulations, some types of pollu-
tion harms to private, common, or state property were punishable (at least
in theory) under traditional common law as trespass or as nuisances. Meiners
and Yandle (1998), for example, describe some cases in which common-
law penalties were extended to pollution affecting proprietors holding ri-
parian water rights. In his more comprehensive historical treatment of the
topic, however, McEvoy (1986) observes that this sort of enlightened ap-
plication of common-law remedies to resource and environmental harms
was not the norm in nineteenth-century America.
For our purposes, it is important to observe that pollution or other harms
to open-access resources such as breathable air were not usually punishable
under common law. Therefore, if a profit-maximizing firm could avoid cleanup
costs by polluting an open-access resource, there was generally no common-
law legal penalty to deter such an action. The same was true if those who
held private, common, or state property rights were unable to enforce their
rights. This problem with the common law and open-access resources led to
the development of environmental regulations. By vesting government with
the authority to manage and excluding certain uses of a resource, environ-
mental regulation establishes a system of property rights to formerly open-
access resources. We can see, then, that an important step in protecting the
environment is assigning appropriate property rights. The type of property
rights regime that is appropriate depends on factors such as the nature of the
resource, the culture and values of society, and the costs of monitoring and
excluding use. For example, resources such as air, oceans, groundwater, and
fisheries are fugitive resources, meaning that it is difficult or impossible to
brand individual resource units or partition the stock of the resource into
individually owned parcels. Fugitive resources are less likely to be private
property and more likely to be common property, state property, or open
access.
In the material that follows, we will explore how negative externalities
lead to market failure.
Social Cost as the Sum of Private and External Cost
Lets now return to our cabinet manufacturing example. Suppose the firm
chooses to use the cheaper but more polluting process A, as described ear-
lier. For example, the negative externalities could be volatile petroleum
Table 4.1
Marginal Private, External, and Social Costs
Output of 1. Marginal 2. Marginal Marginal Social

Cabinets Private Cost External Cost Cost (1 + 2)
100 2 3 5
200 3 3 6
300 5 3 8
400 7 3 10
500 10 3 13
600 13 3 16
700 17 3 20
800 23 3 26
distillates used in inexpensive stains and preservatives. Moreover, assume

that a lower-bound estimate of the harms caused by the use of this preser-
vative (the cost of impaired health and damage to the environment, for
example) is $3 on a per-cabinet basis. This $3 is an external cost per unit of
output, commonly referred to as a marginal external cost. Marginal exter-
nal cost can be difficult to estimate, and to keep the following example
simple we will assume that marginal cost is constant. Assume that non-
toxic, pollution-free wood preservatives are more costly, and so in the ab-
sence of regulation (and environmentally concerned consumers), the
profit-maximizing woodshop chooses to use the cheaper, more polluting
wood stain and preservative.
Social cost refers to a fuller accounting of the costs of production and ex-
change. Social cost is equal to the sum of private cost borne by producers and
external cost borne by affected members of society in the form of pollution
harms. Likewise, marginal social cost is the sum of marginal private cost and
marginal external cost. Since marginal external cost is a constant $3 in our
example, then at each level of output of cabinets marginal social cost is $3
greater than marginal private cost. A hypothetical numerical example of mar-
ginal private cost, marginal external cost, and marginal social cost is given in
Table 4.1, while Figure 4.2 provides a diagrammatic example of marginal pri-
vate, external, and social cost curves. It is assumed here that marginal external
cost is constant in order to keep the example simple, but in the real world mar-
ginal external cost might increase or decrease with the quantity produced. (Why?)
Recall our discussion of supply curves from chapter 3. In that chapter, we
described supply/demand equilibrium for the case of a well-functioning com-
petitive market. Now we are relaxing that assumption and allowing for market
failure in the form of negative externalities. When there are external costs there
are two market supply curves. One of these supply curves is operational in the
Figure 4.2 Marginal Private Cost, Marginal External Cost, and Marginal
Social Cost
$ per unit
Marginal social
cost
Marginal private
cost
Marginal
external cost
Quantity
market when firms are allowed to freely pollute. This is the supply curve de-
rived from the firms marginal private costs. The other supply curve is based on
marginal social costs, which considers both private and external costs. There-
fore, the vertical difference between these two supply curves is the dollar amount
of marginal external cost. The supply curve based on marginal social costs will
only be operational if firms internalize the external costs of production. These
two supply curves are illustrated in Figure 4.3. We will find out in the next
section of the chapter that if firms are allowed to freely pollute, otherwise well-
functioning competitive markets fail to efficiently allocate resources (cabinets
in our example). We will also learn that government intervention in the form of
a tax equal to marginal external cost will cause firms to internalize external
costs and supply along the social-cost supply curve.
Competitive Markets Are Inefficient When There Are Negative

Externalities
Figure 4.3 illustrates a well-functioning competitive market for a good or

service, such as cabinets, with two possible supply curves. As noted above,
Figure 4.3 Negative Externalities and Market Failure
Price
Supply curve
(social cost)
PS
Supply curve
B (private cost)
C
PP
Demand
curve
QS QP
Quantity
one supply curve is based on firms marginal private costs, with marginal
external costs borne by the environment and society. The other supply curve
is based on marginal social costs. This latter supply curve is operational only
if firms are made to internalize their negative externalities.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the quantity of cabinets produced where the pri-
vate-cost supply curve crosses the demand curve is the market equilibrium
quantity when firms are allowed to freely pollute, indicated by QP in Figure
4.3. The corresponding equilibrium price when there are unresolved nega-
tive externalities is indicated by PP in Figure 4.3. In contrast, the quantity of
cabinets produced where the social-cost supply curve crosses the demand
curve is the market equilibrium quantity when firms are forced to fully inter-
nalize all their external costs, indicated by QS in Figure 4.3. PS in Figure 4.3
indicates the corresponding equilibrium price when there are unresolved
negative externalities.
Therefore, when firms can freely pollute they will supply along the pri-
vate-cost supply curve, leading to an equilibrium quantity of the good or
service being produced and sold that is larger than when firms are made to
supply along the social-cost supply curve. This difference in output is de-
noted by the letter A in Figure 4.3 and reflects excess production that occurs
in competitive markets where firms are allowed to freely emit negative exter-
nalities. Moreover, when firms can freely pollute and supply along the pri-
vate-cost supply curve, the equilibrium market price PP only reflects marginal
private cost, whereas when negative externalities are internalized the equi-
librium market price PS reflects the full marginal social cost of production.
The difference in these two equilibrium prices is denoted by the letter B in
Figure 4.3, and indicates the distortion of the price signal sent to consumers
in the marketplace. This distorted price signal creates an incentive for con-
sumers to buy too much of the good or service in question. As we will see in
a moment, the market is not efficiently allocating scarce resources when
there are unresolved negative externalities.
Why is output QS, where the social-cost supply curve crosses the demand
curve, the efficient level of output? To answer this question we need to think
about the gains from trade and external costs. We also need to use some
simple geometry. Figure 4.4 will be our guide. Suppose firms are allowed to
freely pollute, and so they supply along the private-cost supply curve, yield-
ing an equilibrium price and quantity as shown in Figure 4.4. The buyers and
the sellers receive a gross gain from trade equal to the large triangle abc in
Figure 4.4. Recall from chapter 3 that the portion of this triangle above the
dashed price line is a simplified approximation for consumer surplus, while
the portion below the price line is producer surplus.
Since firms are freely polluting, however, there are external costs that we
have not yet taken into account. The parallelogram bcde in Figure 4.4 gives
us the total dollar figure for the harms to human health and the environment
caused by negative externalities. In our simplified example, total external
cost is equal to marginal external cost (height cd or be, which gives us exter-
nal cost for each cabinet) multiplied by the equilibrium quantity of cabinets
produced when firms operate on the private-cost supply and freely pollute
(length 0QP along the horizontal axis). After accounting for total external
costs, the true net gains from trade to all members of society when firms
freely pollute is area abc minus area bcde.
Now suppose that firms are forced by regulatory intervention or market
reputation to internalize their external costs and supply along the social-cost
supply curve. As we will learn in the next section of this chapter, one way to
internalize negative externalities is by way of a Pigouvian tax equal to mar-
ginal external cost. When firms supply along the social-cost supply curve,
equilibrium output is found at point f, where the social-cost supply curve
crosses the demand curve, as shown in Figure 4.4. Since firms have paid the
tax to society they have (at least in theory) compensated society for their
pollution, and thus have internalized the external costs. In this case, the total
Figure 4.4 Negative Externalities and Inefficient

Resource Allocation
Area abc: Gross gains from
trade to producers and
consumers when there are
negative externalities.
Area bcde: Total external

cost.
Price
Area [(abc) (bcde)]: True
net gains from trade when
there are negative
Supply curve externalities.
(social cost)
a e Area afd: Total gains from
trade when negative
externalities are internalized
with a Pigouvian tax of $eb
PS
per unit of output.
f
Supply curve
(private cost)
b
PP
d
Demand
curve
0
QS QP Quantity
gains from trade when firms fully internalize their external costs are given by
the triangle afd.
So now lets return to our question of why output set where the social-
cost supply curve crosses the demand curve is the efficient level of out-
put. We will continue to make use of Figure 4.4 in our analysis. The reason
is that area afd, the gains from trade when negative externalities are fully
internalized and firms supply along the social-cost supply curve, is larger
than area [(abc)(bcde)], the true gains from trade to all members of so-
ciety when firms freely pollute. In other words, internalizing externali-
ties improves the welfare of society. The difference between area afd and
area [(abe)(bcde)] is the little triangle bfe, known in microeconomic
theory as deadweight social loss, and it represents the resource alloca-
tion inefficiency caused by negative externalities. In our simple linear
example, deadweight social loss is a triangle with a base equal to the dif-
ference in equilibrium output (0QP 0QS) and a height equal to marginal

external cost eb.
Allowing firms to pollute for free amounts to society granting these firms
a production subsidy on each cabinet produced. Since society bears the
external costs when firms freely pollute, members of society subsidize pro-
duction along the private-cost supply curve. The amount of this implicit
subsidy per cabinet is equal to marginal external cost eb in Figure 4.4.
Some of this subsidy is passed along to consumers in the form of a lower
product price (0PP 0PS). Whenever firms freely pollute or cause environ-
mental harm in otherwise competitive markets, firms are being subsidized
by society and consumers are sharing in this subsidy by way of a lower
product price. This subsidy makes it particularly difficult for cleaner alter-
native technologies to succeed in the marketplace. If one firm were to adopt
a more expensive clean technology, it would be at a price disadvantage in
the marketplace relative to other firms. Unless consumers recognize and
reward products made with the use of cleaner technologies, such firms will
struggle and fail in the competitive marketplace. As we will see in the next
section of the chapter, Pigouvian taxes eliminate this subsidy and enhance
market efficiency.
Pigouvian Taxes: The Theory of Policy Interventions for

Negative Externalities
Economist A.C. Pigou suggested that the solution to the problem of nega-
tive externalities is to place a tax on each unit of output that is equal to
marginal external cost. Accordingly, taxes on each unit of output (such as
cabinets) equal to marginal external cost are called Pigouvian taxes. There-
fore, if we tax firms $3 per cabinet in our example, an amount equal to
the marginal external cost from producing each cabinet, two things will
happen. First, the social-cost supply curve will become operational in the
market, since firms are now paying both marginal private cost and mar-
ginal external cost. As a consequence fewer cabinets will be produced,
and each cabinet will sell at a price that reflects the marginal social cost
of production. Consequently, firms and consumers in the market inter-
nalize negative externalities, and society is reimbursed for bearing the
external costs of production. By internalizing negative externalities,
Pigouvian taxes enhance the allocative efficiency of markets, as shown
in Figure 4.4.
Second, profit-maximizing firms will now have an incentive to look for
ways to reduce the Pigouvian tax element of their production costs. Of course,
one way to do so would be to lobby for removal of the regulation. Assuming

that the regulation is stable, however, firms will have an incentive to look for
ways to reduce their emissions. Suppose first that a nontoxic alternative wood
preservative is available that costs firms $2 more than the standard toxic alter-
native. Since the firm no longer emits pollution, it is no longer liable for the
Pigouvian tax. In this case the Pigouvian tax will cause firms to immediately
switch to the nontoxic alternative, emissions will be eliminated, firms will no
longer by charged a Pigouvian tax, and the private-cost supply curve will shift
upwards by $2 to form a new clean production supply curve.
Now suppose that a nontoxic alternative wood preservative is available
that costs firms $4 more than the standard toxic alternative, and that also
eliminates their emissions and thus eliminates the need for a Pigouvian tax.
The problem is that since the cleaner production technology is more expen-
sive than the Pigouvian tax, firms will see the tax as a part of the cost of
doing business and will not adopt the nontoxic alternative. Note that some
emissions are eliminated even if firms do not adopt the nontoxic alternative,
since market equilibrium output is lower under the Pigouvian tax. Yet even if
the nontoxic wood preservative raised costs by more than $3 per cabinet, a
Pigouvian tax would encourage research and development to find a cost-
effective way of producing a toxics-free wood preservative.
We can see that Pigouvian taxes change the incentives of producers and
consumers in the market. Of course, taxes are also a way to generate gov-
ernment revenue. Ideally, these revenues would go toward compensating
people harmed by pollution and remediating environmental damage caused
by the pollution that is being taxed. In practice, there is no guarantee that
the political process will generate environmental policies that are consis-
tent in this manner.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how firms and consumers share in the cost increase
when a Pigouvian tax is imposed on producers. If firms were to pay the full
social cost of production, price would be PS, while if firms can avoid the mar-
ginal social cost of production, market price would be PP. If firms were to pay
the full social cost of production, consumers would pay an extra [PS PP] for
each cabinet they buy. Since demand for the good is downward sloping, firms
cannot pass along all of the Pigouvian tax to consumers; firms retain a portion
of the tax, which reduces their profit. This analysis also illustrates the reverse,
namely, that when firms can freely pollute in the absence of environmental
regulations, consumers share in the cost savings in the form of lower prices.
The fewer the number of substitutes available for a product the steeper is the
demand curve for the product (such as gasoline), and therefore the larger is the
share of the Pigouvian tax passed on to consumers.
In principle, we can argue for government regulatory intervention in the
case of pollution externalities based on efficiency alone. Namely, resources

are not efficiently allocated because too much of the good is produced when
externalities remain unresolved. There is also a fairness argument: unless we
have a positive externality that requires subsidy, why should society have to
absorb part of a firms costs? While economists generally accept the theory
of externalities, not all agree that externalities are very large or important.
Indeed, if external costs are small and insignificant, then little is lost by sim-
ply ignoring them as minor side effects of the wealth generated by markets.
While this may be true in some cases, it does not appear to be at all univer-
sally true. For example, as mentioned in chapter 1, recent estimates by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1997) indicate that the Clean Air
Act of 1970 created substantial benefits in the form of avoided external costs.
In particular, between 1970 and 1990 the Clean Air Act is thought to have
prevented an estimated $22.2 trillion in pollution harms to human health,
agriculture, and the environment in constant 1990 dollars. As will be de-
scribed in detail in chapter 6, these benefits were substantially larger than the
costs. Thus externalities can indeed be very large and are worthy of well-
designed environmental regulatory policy.
In the real world, measurement of external costs must take into account
the relationship between the action (e.g., pollution) and the impact (e.g.,
diminished human health), and between the impact and economic cost (e.g.,
healthcare expenditures, the value of foregone production, and the value
assigned to diminished quality of life). An example of estimated external
costs per unit of output is shown for the case of various European countries
in Table 4.2. Moreover, social policy often reflects political expediency as
well as economic efficiency. In chapter 10, we will return to the idea of
intervening in markets to mitigate the effects of pollution. In that chapter,
we will focus on the more general notion of pollution taxes as a tool of
environmental policy. Pollution taxes differ from the theoretically ideal
Pigouvian tax in that the former may not fully internalize negative exter-
nalities due to difficulties in measuring marginal external costs and due to
interest group rivalry and political expediency in the policy-making pro-
cess. Also in chapter 10 we will discuss the notion of command-and-control
regulation as an alternative to taxation. Command-and-control regulation
limits the quantity of pollution emissions at the source, and frequently speci-
fies the emissions-control technology to be used. Another alternative to
Pigouvian taxes is to let the polluters and those impacted by pollution nego-
tiate with one another and resolve their conflict without government inter-
vention, a process called Coasian contracting, in honor of economist Ronald
Coase. The effectiveness of direct contracting relative to regulation is a policy
issue addressed in detail in chapter 7.
Table 4.2
External Costs (in Euro Cents) per Kilowatt-Hour of Electricity Generated

from Various Energy Sources
Country Coal Oil Natural Gas Biomass Wind

Belgium 415 12
Denmark 47 23 1 0.1
France 710 811 24 1
Germany 36 58 12 3 0.05
Italy 36 23
Spain 58 12 35 0.2
United Kingdom 47 35 12 1 0.15
Source: European Commission (2003)
Summary
Positive externalities are unpaid-for benefits to society generated as a

by-product of production and exchange. When there are important posi-
tive externalities, market demand based on the private benefits of buy-
ers understates the full social benefits of the good or service generating
the external benefit. Consequently, too little of the good or service gen-
erating the positive externality is produced in otherwise well-function-
ing competitive markets. Subsidies represent a form of policy interven-
tion that can enhance market efficiency. Positive externalities can also
affect the supply curve, such as when there are technology spillovers.
While the legal system is designed to protect property, open-access re-
sources are not protected under law from pollution harms and thus are
subject to degradation. The legal system does not function perfectly, of
course, and so pollution harms to people, their homes, and other valu-
able objects that are property do regularly occur. One problem is in
determining the source of the pollution when there may be very large
numbers of emitters, as is the case with automobile exhaust.
Negative externalities are uncompensated harms to society generated
as a by-product of production and exchange. Profit-maximizing firms
have an incentive to transform private costs into negative externalities
(external costs) in the absence of regulation or reputation effects. When
there are important negative externalities, market supply based on pri-
vate costs to sellers is too large, leading to too much of the good or
service generating the negative externalities being produced in other-
wise well-functioning competitive markets. Pigouvian taxes represent a
form of policy intervention that can enhance market efficiency.
In the real world, it is difficult to craft Pigouvian taxes due to (i) practi-
cal problems measuring marginal external costs without controversy,
and (ii) the influence of rival interest groups and political expediency in
the policy-making process.
1. Suppose that there are 100 identical competitive firms, each of which
supplies a quantity where price equals marginal cost. Therefore if marginal
cost is 10 + Q, each individual firms supply curve is given by P = 10 + Q.
Since there are 100 such firms, the market supply curve is P = 10 + .01Q.
Also assume that market demand is given by P = 100 .005Q. Note that Q
refers to the quantity of some good, like shoes.
a. Solve for the competitive market equilibrium price and quantity.

b. Suppose now that in part 1a above firms were freely polluting by
emitting marginal external costs equal to a constant $20 for each
unit of output produced. Based on this information we know that
each firms social-cost supply curve is given by P = 30 + Q, and the
social-cost market supply is given by the function P = 30 + .01Q.
With demand as given above, solve for the competitive equilibrium
when firms must internalize their external costs, such as through a
Pigouvian tax.
c. Based on the correct answers to parts 1a and 1b, calculate the amount
by which quantity is too large and price is too low when firms can
freely pollute and supply along the private-cost supply curve. Calcu-
late the monetary value of total external cost when firms can freely
pollute (the area between the two supply curves up to the quantity traded
based on the private-cost supply) and the monetary value of deadweight
loss. In what specific way are resources inefficiently allocated when
firms can freely pollute?
d. Suppose that government intervention occurs in the form of a $20-per-
unit Pigouvian tax imposed on polluters. Also suppose that firms can
eliminate their emissions of pollution, and thus avoid the Pigouvian
tax, by using a different input that increases marginal private costs by
$10 per unit. Will firms pay the Pigouvian tax and continue to pollute,
or will they adopt the more expensive clean technology? More chal-
lenging: What will be the new market equilibrium price and quantity
traded with the more expensive, pollution-free input? Do the benefits
of cleanup exceed the cost? How would your answer change if the in-
put increased marginal private costs by $30?
2. Write a one-page essay in which you explain why, in the absence of

government subsidies, competitive markets underproduce goods that feature
positive externalities. Be sure to provide an example of a good that generates
a positive externality, explain the nature of the external benefits and the two
demand curves, and describe how they lead to different market equilibria.
Draw and carefully label a diagram to illustrate your arguments.
3. Write a one-page essay in which you explain why, in the absence of
government environmental regulation, competitive markets overproduce
goods whose production involves the creation of negative externalities. Be
sure to provide an example of a good that generates a negative externality,
explain the nature of the external costs and the two supply curves, and de-
scribe how they lead to different market equilibria. Describe why allowing
firms to pollute amounts to a production subsidy, and why this is inefficient,
creating an economic motive for government policy intervention. Draw and
carefully label a diagram to illustrate your arguments.
4. Describe the various reasons why it might be difficult for govern-
ment interventions to perfectly resolve positive and negative externali-
ties. Address the problem of measurement as well as the workings of the
political process.
Landowners whose property is diminished in commercial value due to envi-
ronmental regulations should be fully compensated by the government regu-
latory authority. Members of each group should be given a week or so to
research the issues. The debate will occur in a panel, moderated by your
professor. Two members of each group will serve as panelists, and any addi-
tional group members can serve as researchers. There are a variety of differ-
ent ways to structure a debate, one of which is the Michigan cross-examination
method:

b. The first affirmative panelist is cross-examined by the second negative
c. Questions from the audience are put to the members of the affirmative
team (5 minutes).
e. The second affirmative panelist cross-examines the first negative panel-
ist (4 minutes).
f. Questions from the audience are put to the members of the negative team
(5 minutes).

minutes).
6. Spreadsheet simulation (more advanced): Suppose that demand is given

by P = a bQ, private-cost supply is given by P = c + dQ, and marginal
external cost equals e.
a. Solve for the algebraic free market equilibrium price and quantity
(P#, Q#), total external cost, deadweight social loss, and true net gains
from trade. These are found using the private-cost supply curve and the
demand curve, and are reduced-form solutions described entirely as
algebraic expressions of parameters a, b, c, and d. Place these labeled
equations in your spreadsheet.
b. Solve for the algebraic socially optimal equilibrium price and quan-
tity (P*, Q*) and true net gains from trade. Assume that negative exter-
nalities are fully internalized and offset by a Pigouvian tax that is used
to compensate those harmed by pollution, and to restore the environ-
ment. These are found using the social-cost supply curve (private cost
+ e) and the demand curve, and are reduced-form solutions described
entirely as algebraic expressions of parameters a, b, c, and d. Place
these labeled equations in your spreadsheet.
c. Using the following parameters (a = 2000, b = 1, c = 100, d = 2, and e =
300), plot demand, social-cost supply, and private-cost supply in a dia-
gram for different values of price and quantity in a fully labeled dia-
gram. Provide a brief narrative economic interpretation of the two
different equilibria shown in your diagram.
d. For the parameter values in 6c above, derive the numerical values for
P#, Q#, P*, Q*, total external cost, deadweight social loss, and true net
gains from trade, using the equations in 6a and 6b.
e. Perform sensitivity analysis on deadweight social loss by varying the
parameter value for e (e = 100, 300, 500). Provide a brief narrative
economic interpretation.
Internet Links
EPAs National Center for Environmental Economics (http://

yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/homepage): You can access a wide
variety of EPA economic studies, including the benefit/cost analysis of the
Clean Air Act cited in the text.
Environmental Externalities in Electric Power Markets: Acid Rain, Ur-

ban Ozone, and Climate Change (www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/pubs_html/rea/
feature1.html): An article by John Carlin, sponsored by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration.
External Costs Associated with Electricity and Transport

(www.externe.info/externpr.pdf): Data on average external cost per kilo-
watt-hour for various European countries, from the European Commission.
Negative Externalities Audio Clip (www.humboldt.edu/~envecon/audio/

1.ram): A brief audio clip of the author describing negative externalities.
Oil Slickers: How Petroleum Benefits at the Taxpayers Expense

(www.ilsr.org/carbo/costs/truecosttoc.html): An article by Jenny B. Wahl,
sponsored by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance. Particularly relevant is
Section V on the environmental and health costs of petroleum.
Private and Common Property Rights (http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/

2000book.pdf): Article by Elinor Ostrom in the on-line Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics that clearly distinguishes private property, common prop-
erty, open-access regimes, and common-pool resources.
Pollution Taxes (http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/2500book.pdf): Article

by Britt Groosman in the on-line Encyclopedia of Law and Economics.
Nuisance (http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/2100book.pdf): Article by

Timothy Swanson and Andreas Kontoleon in the on-line Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics.
The Common Law: How It Protects the Environment (www.perc.org/

publications/policyseries/commonlaw_full.php?s=2): Article by Roger
Meiners and Bruce Yandle, sponsored by the Political Economy Research
Institute, describing how the common law can be effective in protecting the
environment.
The Real Price of Gasoline (www.icta.org/projects/trans/): A study pro-

duced by the International Center for Technology Assessment on the exter-
nal costs of gasoline.
Ayres, R., and A. Kneese. 1969. Production, Consumption, and Externalities. Ameri-
can Economic Review 59 (June): 28297.
Baumol, W. 1972. On Taxation and the Control of Externalities. American Eco-

nomic Review 62 (June): 30722.
Baumol, W., and W. Oates. 1988. The Theory of Environmental Policy. 2nd ed. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bromley, D. 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Framework
of Public Policy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3
(October): 144.
Commons, J. 1968. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press.
European Commission. 2003. External Costs: Research Results on Socio-
Environmental Damages due to Electricity and Transport. Brussels, Belgium:
European Communities.
Hanna, S. 1996. Property Rights, People, and the Environment. In Getting Down to
Earth: Practical Applications of Ecological Economics, ed. R. Costanza, O. Segura,
and J. Martinez-Alier. Washington, DC: Island Press.
McEvoy, A. 1986. The Fishermans Problem: Ecology and Law in the California
Fisheries, 18501980. London, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Meiners, R., and B. Yandle. 1998. The Common Law: How It Protects the Environ-
ment. PERC Policy Series Paper PS-13.
. 1997. Private and Common Property Rights. Section 2000, Encyclopedia
of Law and Economics (Internet publication http://encyclo.findlaw.com/lit/
2000art.html).
Schlager, E., and E. Ostrom. 1992. Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources:
A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics 68 (3): 24962.
Scitovsky, T. 1954. Two Concepts of External Economies. Journal of Political
Economy 62 (April): 14351.
Tietenberg, T. 1996. Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. 4th ed. New
York: HarperCollins.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1997. The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air
Act, 19701990. Washington, DC: U.S. EPA.
Young, O. 1982. Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions. Ber-
keley: University of California Press.
5
The Economics of Natural
Resource Systems, Part I:
Theory and Concepts
Introduction and Overview
Environmental economics is primarily concerned with identifying exter-

nalities and evaluating regulatory policies designed to control them. Tradi-
tionally, natural resources economics has been concerned with the optimal
use and management of natural resource systems. An element of nature is a
natural resource when it is directly useful to people, or when human tech-
nology can utilize it to form something valuable. For example, petroleum
bubbling up through the ground and fouling soil used to be considered a
nuisance to farmers until the development of refining and internal combus-
tion engine technology transformed this material into a valuable natural
resource. As will be shown below, the price of a natural resource reflects
the relative scarcity of the resource and the availability of substitutes, and
acts as a driver for technological innovation. Increasing scarcity will tend
to increase the resources price and promote the production and consump-
tion of substitutes. This process is illustrated by the increased production
and consumption of coal and natural gas (and increased research and de-
velopment spending on alternative energy) following the oil price shocks
in the mid-1970s caused by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) oil embargo.
The best methods for managing a given natural resource system depend
upon factors such as relative resource prices, available substitutes, environ-
88
NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS: THEORY AND CONCEPTS 89
mental impacts, societal values, and the physical characteristics of the re-
source. For example, some natural resource systemssuch as oil fields, natu-
ral gas fields, coal beds, and other fossil-fuel energy resourcesare inherently
nonrenewable. The question of interest for nonrenewable resource systems
has to do with optimal extraction rates over time: should the resource be
depleted immediately, very gradually, or not at all? In this chapter, we will
investigate the conditions required for efficient extraction of a nonrenewable
resource over time. Many nonrenewable mineral resources such as iron and
aluminum are also recyclable, in which case current primary production cre-
ates its own future competition in the form of increased secondary (recycled)
supplies. We will review this issue and consider the incentives and the legal
treatment of recyclable resource monopolists.
Another class of natural resource system is comprised of the renewable
resources associated with the self-regulating elements of life on earth. Is-
sues associated with renewable resourcessuch as pasturage, forests,
groundwater basins, rivers, the air, fisheries, and wildlife populations
include the maximum sustained yield that can be harvested from the re-
source without depleting the productive capacity of the resource system.
Private ownership has been suggested as a way of preventing the depletion
of commercially valuable resources such as timber and pasturage. Private
ownership is not a panacea, however, since private ownership does not re-
solve harms to aspects of the environment that lack commercial market
value. Moreover, resource systems having common-pool characteristics,
such as the stocks of air, groundwater, stratospheric ozone, and marine
fisheries, are difficult to partition as private property. In this chapter, we will
look at the economics of common-pool resources and the tragedy of the com-
mons in detail. In chapter 6 we will look at marine fisheries management as
a practical application of the economics of common-pool resources. Addi-
tional coverage of common-pool resources from the perspective of local
self-governance is provided in chapter 16.
Less obvious but no less important from an economic standpoint are the
various ecosystem services such as fresh water provided by the hydrological
cycle, fertility provided by topsoil, and oxygen provided by plants. Another
vital ecosystem service is the sink capacity of the biosphereits capacity to
absorb human wastes. Examples of sink functions include the capacity of
rivers, wetlands, and other bodies of water to absorb waste, and the capacity
of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems to absorb carbon dioxide generated as a
byproduct of the burning of fossil fuels. Ecosystem services can be thought
of as the flow of benefits that derive from the stock of natural capital. The
economics of ecosystem services is a new and emerging area of study that
will be briefly surveyed below.
Allocating Nonrenewable Resources
Examples of nonrenewable natural resources include:
oil fields
natural gas fields
coal beds
mineral deposits
In fact, nonrenewable resources are in large part synonymous with min-

eral and fossil fuel energy resources. The term nonrenewable means that the
resource system ultimately has a fixed stock (fixed size of total reserves)
within the human timeframe. Nonrenewable resources can be further divided
into two categories:
nonrenewable, nonrecyclable (fossil-fuel energy resources)

nonrenewable, recyclable (some mineral resources such as iron and alu-
minum and gold)
Lets begin by considering the nonrecyclable group.
The Industrial Organization of Energy Delivery in the

United States
When oil and natural gas were first developed on a large scale in the United
States, there was a need to invest in interstate pipelines to transport these
fuels from production fields to refineries (oil) or residential and industrial
distribution (gas). Many fields were served by only a single pipeline because
of economies of scale in pipe diameter, and the common practice was for
joint ownership of producing field and pipeline, which then sold the bundle
of fuel and transportation service. To prevent monopoly prices being charged
on this bundle, the Natural Gas Act of 1938 resulted in producer/pipeline
entities being subjected to public utilitiesstyle regulation of prices (i.e., price
is used to recover allowed capital expenditures, variable costs, and a nor-
mal rate of return on capital investment). This pricing system began to break
down following the oil price shocks caused by the OPEC oil embargo in
197374; administered prices designed for cost recovery could not adapt to
rapid price fluctuations following the embargo. At the same time, the devel-
opment of transportation network interconnectivity increasingly gave end
users access to a variety of potentially competitive producers.
The new system that has emerged for natural gas is very similar to that
which also exists for oil and which is emerging for electricity as well. In this
system, end users purchase the product (gas, oil, or electricity) under competi-
tive market conditions and then separately contract for transportation and de-
livery services, aspects of which still have monopoly characteristics and so are
regulated under public utility principles. As Lyon and Hackett (1993) have
shown, this form of partial energy market deregulation makes the problem of
transportation system load balancing in the context of continuous and decen-
tralized injections and withdrawals more complex. There are more transac-
tions and an increased need for system coordination to reduce the potential for
negative network externalities, which are more likely in partially deregulated
systems. Negative network externalities occur when consumer/producer trans-
actions impose harms on overall system function, leading to excess or inad-
equate pipeline pressure for gas or oil, or the potential for power surges or
blackouts in electric transmission and distribution grids.
The spectacular failure of partial deregulation of Californias electricity
markets highlights by its absence the importance of a well-functioning com-
petitive market for a product with few substitutes. While California has been
criticized by industry observers for NIMBYism (not in my backyard) when
it comes to the construction of new power plants, perhaps an even more
important failure was the institutional structure of the electric power market.
Developed in the mid-1990s when there was a large excess generating ca-
pacity, and when Californians were paying higher-than-average regulated
electricity rates, deregulation was seen as a way for industrial and other con-
sumers to access cheaper electric power. The public utilities were encour-
aged to sell their power plants to independent power producers as a way to
create a larger number of power sellers and promote competition. Retail elec-
tricity rates were cut by 10 percent but remained fixed, while wholesale elec-
tricity prices were set each day in the California Power Exchange (Cal PX)
market, subject to network load balancing done by the California Indepen-
dent System Operator (CAISO). Fixed retail rates and floating wholesale
rates were an element of the deregulation plan lobbied for by public utilities
anticipating profit due to what were then very low wholesale electricity prices.
In the first few years the California deregulation plan worked, though the
economic boom of the late 1990s increased baseload demand, which in com-
bination with no new plants being built resulted in much of the excess gener-
ating capacity being eliminated. Moreover, economic growth in neighboring
states reduced the generating capacity that could be imported from out of
state. Then, during hot summer days when demand increased to within sev-
eral percentage points of available generating capacity, independent power
producers and brokers discovered they could game the market in various
ways and trigger emergency prices that were many times higher than had
existed prior to deregulation. For example, an independent power producer

could take a power plant offline for bogus maintenance, trigger emergency
pricing, and then bring the plant back online at much higher prices. Perhaps
the most infamous villain of the California energy crisis, however, was Enron.
As the New York Times reported on May 7, 2002, [e]lectricity traders at
Enron drove up prices during the California power crisis through question-
able techniques that company lawyers said may have contributed to severe
power shortages. Examples of Enron market gaming tactics include:
Death Star: Enron gets paid for moving energy to relieve congestion
without actually moving any energy or relieving any congestion (ex-
cerpted from Enron memos, December 2000).
Loadshift: Enron created the appearance of congestion through the
deliberate overstatement of power to be delivered (excerpted from Enron
memos, December 2000).
Fatboy: Documents provided by Enron state that its Fatboy trading
strategy included parking energy on El Paso Electrics system (excerpted
from El Paso Electric federal lawsuit settlement).
Ricochet: Enron bought energy from the Cal PX and exported it to El
Paso Electric; El Paso sold it back to Enron, and Enron resold it back to
the CAISO in the real-time market (excerpted from El Paso Electric
federal lawsuit settlement).
As a result, Californians paid billions of dollars more for electricity than

they would have under the previous system of regulation. Various indepen-
dent power producers and brokers such as Enron have been the target of
federal and state prosecution efforts.
The Theory of Dynamically Efficient Nonrenewable Resource

Pricing
An important economic problem we now turn to is how to allocate a fixed stock

of resource, such as oil or natural gas, efficiently over time. If we were to develop
the stock of oil reserves rapidly, current prices would decline, but as the stock is
rapidly exhausted, prices in the future will also rapidly increase. Yet these high
future prices give owners of oil an incentive to reduce current production in order
to have oil to sell in the future at these high prices. Recall from chapter 3 that
well-functioning competitive markets are efficient in the sense that they maxi-
mize total surplusconsumer surplus plus producer surplus. Harold Hotelling
(1931) and other economists have derived a similar efficiency criterion, known
as dynamic efficiency, for determining the optimal balancing of current and fu-
ture sales in a competitive natural resource market. Before we consider dynamic

efficiency, however, we must first develop some tools for measuring the present
value of payments made or received in the future.
Present Value Analysis
Most of us can acknowledge that an individual would rather have $1,000

today than in the future. Reasons include the ability to spend the money right
away and avoid higher future prices due to inflation, or the opportunity to
invest the money now and receive interest or dividend income. The higher
value placed on receiving $1,000 today rather than in the future reflects the
fact that a future payment is discounted or diminished when considering its
present value. For example, suppose that the lowest interest rate that a lender
is willing to accept in order to make a one-year loan of $1,000 is 10 percent.
This information tells us that the lender is indifferent between having $1,000
today (the present value) and being repaid $1,100 in one year (the future
value). The future value of todays $1,000 will increase with the interest rate
and with the length of time of the loan. There is another way of looking at
this relationship. Suppose someone was going to receive $1,100 exactly one
year in the future, but the person needed that money in the present. What is
the smallest amount of money that that person would take right now in return
for giving up the inheritance next year? The answer to this question is that
persons present value of the future $1,100 inheritance. Economists use the
term discount rate to refer to the rate of time preference (such as an interest
rate) that equates present value and future value. The formula for determin-
ing the present value (PV) of a stream of payments into the future is as fol-
lows:
PV of a stream of future payments = i ($ payment, i years from the

present)/(1 + r)i, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n.
Note that i means summation over all i time periods, while i refers to
the number of years from the present that a particular payment is re-
ceived, and r refers to the discount rate. Interest rates or the average (risk-
adjusted) rates of return available from portfolios of stocks are examples
of discount rates.
If there is just one payment to be made in a future period that is i years
from the present, as in our $1,000 example above, then the PV of the single
future payment is found as follows:
PV of a single future payment = ($ payment, i years from the present)/(1 + r)i.

Continuing our $1,000 example above, suppose that the discount rate is
10 percent. Then using the formula above, i = 1, r = 0.1, and the PV of
$1,000 to be received next year is $1,000/(1.1)1 = $909.09. In other words,
if the discount rate is 10 percent, then one is indifferent between $909.09
received today and $1,000 received in one year. Another way to look at
this is to note that if you took $909.09 today and invested it in a bond that
pays 10 percent interest, then in one year your $909.09 will have grown
to be $1,000.
Dynamic Efficiency
A resource market is dynamically efficient when the sum of total surplus (in
PV terms) is maximized over the entire time horizon in which the resource is
allocated. We will now consider a very simple example of a competitive market
for oil to illustrate how one can solve for the dynamically efficient allocation
of the resource in question. We will see that the dynamically efficient alloca-
tion is also an equilibrium in that producers have no incentive to reallocate
resource sales from one year to the next.
There are a number of assumptions that we need to keep in mind as we
work through the analysis. We assume that there is a well-functioning com-
petitive market for the resource in question, and that market participants are
fully and completely informed of current and future demand, marginal cost,
discount rate, available supplies, and price.
To keep the example simple there will only be two periods in the analy-
sisthe present time, referred to as year 0, and year 1. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we will also assume that the marginal cost of producing oil is constant
and equal to $5 per barrel. As we learned in chapter 4, marginal cost is the
basis for the competitive market supply curve. Since marginal cost is con-
stant at $5, the market supply curve for the resource in question is also con-
stant at $5. Finally, we assume that market demand is the same in each of the
two periods.
Let the demand for oil in a given year be given by the following expression:
P = 20 .5q.
Note that q refers to quantity of oil in barrels. We will assume that there is a
fixed quantityQtotequal to 40 barrels of oil that can be allocated over the
two years, and that people in this market use a 15 percent discount rate.
In order to provide a basis for comparison with the dynamically efficient
solution, lets first suppose that market participants in year 0 fully ignore the
consequences of their actions on year 1 supplies, prices, and profit. Then in
Figure 5.1 Total Surplus, Year 0

$ per unit
20
Demand: P = 20 0.5q
Consumer surplus = $225

Producer surplus = $0
Total surplus = $225
5 Marginal cost = Supply
30 40 Quantity
year 0 the competitive market equilibrium quantity of oil traded is found at

that price ($5) where supply equals demand:
20 .5q = 5.
Solving for q we find that 30 barrels of oil would be traded in year 0. If we

now substitute 30 for q in the demand equation, we can confirm that equilib-
rium price is $5. Note, however, that we have only left 10 barrels of oil for
consumption in year 1.
As we can see in Figure 5.1, if market participants ignore the future, then
in year 0 total surplus in this market is:
.5(15 30) = $225.
Note that the entire total surplus in year 0 is made up of consumer surplus
(recall from chapter 3 that this represents a simplified approximation for the
exact value for consumer surplus). Producer surplus equals zero because firms
are selling at price equal to marginal cost. Since market participants have
Figure 5.2 Total Surplus, Year 1
$ per unit
20
Demand: P = 20 0.5q
15
Consumer surplus = $25
Producer surplus = $100
Total surplus = $125
PVTS = $108.70
10 40 Quantity
ignored the future period, there are only 10 barrels of oil available for year 1.
With only 10 barrels of oil supplies available, we can determine the price
of oil in year 1 by substituting 10 for q in our demand equation:
20 (.5 10) = $15.
In year 1 consumer surplus is considerably smaller ($25), while producer

surplus is considerably larger ($100), as illustrated in Figure 5.2, and conse-
quently total surplus in year 1 is $125.
The sum of total surplus (in PV terms) over the two time periods is:
$225/(1.15)0 + $125/(1.15)1 = $333.70.
Is the sum of total surplus (in PV terms) when market participants in year 0
ignore their gains from trade in year 1 the maximum available? Have we
achieved the dynamically efficient allocation of the resource stock? Are we in
a dynamic equilibrium? As we will see below, the answer is no. To help build
your intuition, suppose that you were a seller of oil in the market above, but
you no longer ignored prices and profit in year 1. If you knew that todays
price of $5 would rise to next years price of $15, would you want to hold off
selling some oil today and save some for next year? The answer is yes. Note
that the marginal profit from selling a barrel of oil is (P MC). The marginal
profit from selling a single barrel of oil in year 0 is $0, since the $5 price equals
marginal cost. If instead you were to save that one barrel of oil and sell it in
year 1, price in year 1 would be $(20 0.5 x 11) = $14.50 and the PV of
marginal profit in year 1 would be $(14.5 5)/(1.15)1, which equals $8.26.
Clearly, a profit-maximizing firm that is fully informed of current and future
market conditions has an incentive to shift this barrel of production from year
0 to year 1. Therefore, the allocation of 30 barrels of oil in year 0, and 10
barrels of oil in year 1, is not in a dynamic equilibrium. We will show below
how to find the dynamic equilibrium, and we will show that this equilibrium is
dynamically efficient and maximizes the sum of total surplus (in PV terms).
The dynamically efficient equilibrium with full information on current
and future market conditions is one in which the marginal profit of selling a
barrel of oil today is equal to the PV of marginal profit from selling a barrel
of oil next year (and in any future years). Economist Harold Hotelling (1931)
developed a rule for finding the dynamically efficient solution to resource
allocation problems such as ours. The rule for dynamic efficiency, called
Hotellings rule, requires that marginal profit (P MC) in year 0 must equal
the PV of (P MC) in year 1 (and in any other future years). Hotellings rule
simply formalizes our intuition that dynamic equilibrium occurs when the
marginal profit from selling a unit of the resource is the same today as it is in
a future period. As you might expect, if there are more than just two periods,
then Hotellings rule requires that the PV of (P MC) be equal across all
time periods in which the resource is to be allocated. When this condition
holds, the sum of total surplus (in PV terms) over all time periods in which
the resource is to be allocated will be maximized.
One can solve the dynamic resource allocation problem using the math-
ematics of optimization, or by repeated experiment. Since the reader is not
assumed to possess advanced mathematics, we will demonstrate the method
of repeated experiment. First, lets develop some intuition. We already know
that 30 barrels in year 0 and 10 barrels in year 1 is not a dynamic equilibrium
since firms will not produce these quantities in these years. We also know
that a firm can increase its profit by reducing production below 30 barrels in
year 0 and increasing production above 10 barrels in year 1. Since future
profits (and gains from trade in general) are discounted, do you think that the
dynamically efficient solution will lead to (i) a larger share of the total re-
source being consumed in year 0 than in year 1, (ii) an equal share of the
total resource being consumed in years 0 and 1, or (iii) a smaller share of the
total resource being consumed in year 0 than in year 1?
Since future payoffs are discounted relative to the present, market partici-
pants will generally prefer to get a larger share of their gains from trade now
rather than later, which means a larger share of the total resource is produced
and consumed in year 0, as in (i) above. Moreover, the higher the discount
rate the stronger the preference for current over future profit (or gains from
trade), and the less that will be saved for future production and consumption.
Therefore, the dynamically efficient solution to our problem will involve
allocating more of the total oil stock in year 0 than in year 1.
The repeated experiment method simply involves trying different divi-
sions of the resource and testing the allocation using Hotellings rule. For
example, given the intuition we developed above you might start out trying
22 barrels in year 0 and 18 barrels in year 1. Now you should test this alloca-
tion by computing the PV of (P MC) in the two years to see if they are equal.
With 22 barrels in year 0, price in year 0 is $9 and the PV of (P MC) in year 0
is $4. With 18 barrels in year 1, price in year 1 is $11 and the PV of (P MC)
in year 1 is $5.22. Therefore, an allocation of 22 in year 0 and 18 in year 1
does not meet Hotellings rule. When Hotellings rule is not met, you should
allocate more resource to the period in which the PV of (P MC) is larger,
and again check to see if Hotellings rule is satisfied. Continue this process
until you zero in on a sufficiently precise solution.
The exact solution to this problem derives from the mathematics of opti-
mization. Some of the key steps in this process require higher mathematics
than is assumed to be known by many readers. Suppose that demand in each
of two periods is given by the following equation:
P = a bq.
Marginal extraction cost (MC) is a constant and equal to c, which implies

that total extraction cost is cQ. As before, the constant discount rate is given by
r. Since MC is constant the supply curve is horizontal, and total surplus is
equal to the area under between the demand curve and MC (this is the same
total surplus [TS] as the area between the supply and demand curves that we
first explored in chapter 3). Integral calculus can be used to show that this total
surplus is given in algebraic form by the following equation:
TS = aq bq2/2 cq
The optimization problem is to choose an allocation of the fixed resource

stock over each of the time periods under analysis in order to maximize the
sum of TS, in PV terms, for each of the time periods. Since we are maximiz-
ing the sum of TS, in PV terms, this solution is dynamically efficient. The
optimization problem is constrained by the fact that the total resource allo-
cated over time cannot exceed the fixed stock available. Derivative calculus
is used to identify the optimal allocation. If there are only two time periods
under analysis (periods 0 and 1), then the optimal solution satisfies the fol-
lowing two equations:
a bq0 c)/(1+r)0 = (a bq1 c)/(1+r)1

and
q0 + q1 = Qtot
The solution to these equations will provide the exact solution to the prob-
lem of identifying the dynamically efficient allocation of the fixed resource
stock. In the example we have been working on, a = 20, b = 0.5, c = 5, r =
0.15, and Qtot = 40. As a result, the exact solution to our particular problem
satisfies the following two equations:
(15 0.5q0)/(1.15)0 = (15 0.5q1)/(1.15)1

and
q0 + q1 = 40
With two equations and two unknowns (q0 and q1), we can make use of
the fact that q0 = 40 q1 from the second equation and substitute 40 q1 for
q0 into the first equation, which reduces the problem to one equation that can
be solved for q1. Once q1 is found we can then solve for q0 = 40 q1.
Using this method in our problem, it can be shown that the exact solution
involves selling 20.7 barrels of oil in year 0, in which case market price in
year 0 is 20 (.5 20.7) = $9.65, and the marginal profit (P MC) from
selling the last barrel of oil in year 0 is $4.65. This allocation is illustrated in
Figure 5.3. We would then have the remaining 19.3 barrels of oil to sell in
year 1 at a price of $10.35. Therefore, you can see that consuming more
today and less in the future causes price to rise over time. In year 1 the PV of
(P MC) is $5.35/(1.15)1, or $4.65, which is the same as in year 0, as shown
in Figure 5.4. Since marginal profit in PV terms is equal in the two time
periods, Hotellings rule is satisfied.
This is a dynamic equilibrium because sellers have no incentive to shift
sales from one year to the next, since marginal profit in PV terms is equal in
the two time periods. The sum of total surplus (in PV terms) over the two
years is $374.14 in the dynamic equilibrium. One cannot rearrange the allo-
cation of the 40 units of resource in our problem between year 0 and year 1
and generate any more than $374.14 in total surplus (in PV terms over the
Figure 5.3 Dynamically Efficient Solution, Year 0
$ per unit
Total surplus, year 0 = $203.38

20
Consumer
surplus = $107.12
Demand: P = 20 0.5q
9.65
Producer surplus
(Hotelling rent) = $96.26
20.7 40 Quantity
two years), which indicates that this dynamic equilibrium also results in dy-
namically efficient resource allocation. One can see, however, that the sum
of total surplus (in PV terms) is larger in the dynamic equilibrium than when
30 barrels are allocated to year 0 and 10 to year 1.
This brings us to an important insight. When a nonrenewable resource is
abundant, then consumption today does not involve an opportunity cost of
forgone marginal profit in the future, since there is plenty available for both
today and the future. As the resource becomes increasingly scarce, however,
consumption today involves an increasingly high opportunity cost of for-
gone marginal profit in the future. Therefore the profit created by this form
of resource scarcity is called Hotelling rent (also known as resource rent or
by the Ricardian term scarcity rent). Hotelling rent is economic profit that
can be earned and can persist in certain natural resource cases due to the
fixed supply of the resource. Hotelling rent generated in year 0 by our dy-
namically efficient solution is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Due to fixed supply,
consumption of a resource unit today has an opportunity cost equal to the
present value of the marginal profit from selling the resource in the future.
This opportunity cost limits current supply, which in turn elevates current
Figure 5.4 Dynamically Efficient Solution, Year 1
$ per unit
Total surplus, year 1 = $196.38

20
PVTS = $170.76
Consumer
surplus = $93.12
Demand: P = 20 0.5q
10.35
Producer surplus
(Hotelling rent) = $103.26
5 Marginal cost = supply
19.3 40 Quantity
price above marginal cost, creating the rent. Likewise, marginal Hotelling
rent is defined to be the marginal profit received from a unit of the scarce
resource, (P MC). As a resource becomes increasingly scarce relative to
current and future demand, this scarcity is revealed in higher and higher
marginal Hotelling rent.
Applying this analysis to the world petroleum market is complicated by
several factors. First, proven and recoverable reserves have increased over
time due to new discoveries, and changes in technology have allowed for
recovery of stocks that had been considered unrecoverable in the past. Sec-
ond, the world petroleum market has not been well functioning and competi-
tive. The OPEC cartel has had periods of success in artificially limiting
quantity supplied in order to raise price, and the United States and other
countries have distorted competitive supply conditions by providing massive
subsidies for oil production and shipment through both tax policy and milita-
rization of key foreign production areas and shipping routes (more on this
topic in chapter 13). Third, petroleum usage generates large unresolved nega-
tive externalities in the form of pollution and climate change (see chapters 4
and 11) that distort competitive supply conditions in the world petroleum
market. Many petroleum experts believe that peak oil, the point at which
world oil production peaks, either has already occurred or will occur soon.
Uncertainty exists because it is possible that new reserves will still be dis-
covered, and that reserves reported by oil companies and governments may
be distorted by market or cartel incentives to overstate stocks. Once peak oil
production is reached, rising future demand will be confronted with declin-
ing future quantities supplied, and Hotelling-style pricing equilibria are likely
to become manifest in the global market.
As a final point, note that the discount rate has a powerful impact on the
dynamically efficient allocation of the scarce resource. For example, a zero
percent discount rate indicates that people are indifferent between a payment
today and a payment in the future. If you replaced the 15 percent discount rate
with a zero percent discount rate in the example given above, then you should
be able to prove to yourself that the dynamically efficient solution results in an
equal division of the resource over time. As the discount rate rises, however,
people increasingly prefer receiving their gain from trade in the present rather
than in the future. Therefore, the higher the discount rate the larger the share of
the resource consumed in the present rather than in the future. At the limiting
case of an infinite percent discount rate (indicating that people place no value
on a future payment, such as those who hold that the world will end after
today), then the dynamically efficient solution is to consume all of the resource
today. Therefore, the notion of sustaining a resource for future generations
relies upon people today having relatively low discount rates. This topic will
be addressed in detail at the end of chapter 13.
The simple two-period model with stable per-period demand and constant
marginal cost yields valuable insights into the way that a scarce resource is
efficiently allocated across time by a competitive resource market. Those
interested in the more general N-period analysis with increasing marginal
costs and substitute resources may wish to consult Tietenberg (2006). We
will return to the topic of Hotelling rents in chapter 13, where a model of
sustainable economic development is presented in which reinvestment of
these rents in natural or human-made capital, such as by way of a resource
depletion tax, contributes to sustainability.
Allocating Recyclable Resources
Many resources such as paper, plastic, and metal are recyclable. One inter-
esting aspect of recyclable resources is that salvaged or recycled resource
acts as a substitute for virgin resource. Suppose for a moment that virgin and
recycled sources for a resource result in an identical commodity (e.g., alu-
minum ingots). Suppose further that the supply of resource commodity gen-
Figure 5.5 Commodity Market with Costly Recycled and Cheaper

Virgin Supplies
$ per unit
Recycled
supply
20
Virgin
supply
QR Market
P1 supply
P0
D1
D0
Q0 Q1 Quantity
erated from recycling involves higher marginal cost due to additional col-
lection, sorting, and shipping, and that these exceed any energy cost savings
that may accrue due to reduced processing costs for the recycled resource.
In this case the commodity market will have three supply curvesone for
the recycled source, one for the virgin source, and the market supply curve
that represents the horizontal sum of these two supply curves. This circum-
stance is illustrated in Figure 5.5. Two different cases are explored. With
low commodity demand (D0 in Figure 5.5), equilibrium price P0 is every-
where below the minimum price required to supply commodity from re-
cycled sources. In this case, firms (or recycling centers) cannot afford to
supply recycled material due to its higher marginal cost, and the entire equilib-
rium market quantity Q0 is generated from virgin material. Under this unfor-
tunate circumstance recycling will only occur if the higher collection, sorting,
and shipping costs are subsidized. In contrast, with high commodity demand
(D1 in Figure 5.5), equilibrium price P1 results in a total equilibrium market
quantity Q1, a portion of which (QR, as indicated by the arrow in Figure 5.5)
is generated from recycled material. In this case higher market demand
enables results in an equilibrium market price that is sufficiently high as to

support market-based recycling without subsidy.
An interesting problem for metals cartels and monopolists is in setting
production levels and prices for primary resources, knowing that these prices
and production levels directly affect future competition from secondary (re-
cycled) resources. Excessive current production of a durable resource or good
will increase the future used or recycled supplies that act as substitutes for
future primary production. Consider the problem of the manufacturer of a
durable good such as a textbook. College textbook authors and publishers
can mitigate the level of future competition in the used-textbook market by
producing new editions of the book. Thus, long before a textbook is obso-
lete, the authors and publishers will find the cheaper used-textbook supplies
squeezing out sales of new textbooks and so will have an incentive to intro-
duce new editions to make the existing stock of used books obsolete. This is
an example of planned obsolescence. Now consider the problem of the pro-
ducer of metals and other durable resources. In the case of metals, a higher
level of current production assures a higher secondary scrap market supply.
As the stock of scrap grows, the supply of (new + used) metal grows, driving
down price.
This is very similar to the story of Alcoa in the early decades of the twen-
tieth century. Alcoa had about 90 percent of the virgin aluminum market in
the United States (smelted from bauxite ore) and competed against recycled
material Alcoa had produced in previous years. Since current production
creates a negative (pecuniary) externality on future profits, the optimal amount
of metal to supply in the current year reflects not only the current years
profits but also the present value of all impacts on (forecasted) future profits.
Gaskins (1974) was able to show that in this circumstance Alcoa had an
incentive to produce less than the optimal monopoly output of primary alu-
minum in order to mitigate future secondary aluminum competition. Alcoa
was found guilty of monopolization of the U.S. aluminum market in 1945.
Judge Learned Hand argued in the decision that the competition of second-
ary must therefore be disregarded, as soon as we consider the position of
Alcoa over a period of years: it was as much within Alcoas control as was
the production of the virgin from which it had been derived (in Gaskins
1974, p. 254).
Even though Alcoa did not have a full monopoly in the (new + scrap)
aluminum market, Hand argued that Alcoa was able to use its monopoly in
the virgin aluminum market to control the supplies of its scrap supplier rivals
and thus exert market power in the (new + scrap) market.
Economists such as Milton Friedman have commented on the Alcoa deci-
sion by pointing out that the secondary market would eventually have cur-
tailed Alcoas monopoly in the primary market. Yet Gaskins (1974) found
that if aluminum demand is growing, as has been the case, then demand
growth almost totally mitigates the procompetitive effect of the secondary
market, which supports Judge Hands decision.
Allocating Renewable Resources
Unlike nonrenewable resources such as minerals, renewable resources are a

part of the self-regulating process of the living planet. Removing some trees,
fish, groundwater, forage, or dissolved oxygen in a river will not result in
permanent destruction of the resource stock. Renewable resources can be
depleted, however, if use exceeds the maximum sustainable yield over ex-
tended periods of time. Substantial work has been done on establishing maxi-
mum sustained yield from various renewable resource stocks, the results of
which underlie disciplines such as fisheries and forest management. The notion
underlying maximum sustained yield is to identify the largest harvest rate (a
flow variable) that can be sustained indefinitely from the existing resource
stock. A complicating factor is that resources on the living planet are not
independent of one anotherharvest of one affects availability of another.
Thus a harvest rate consistent with maximum sustained yield of one resource
(say, timber) can affect the level of the stock of another resource (say, a
fishery or wildlife).
This challenge of balancing multiple interdependent resource uses and
maximum sustained yield of a renewable resource is illustrated by the U.S.
Forest Service (USFS). The USFS is a federal agency created by the Organic
Act of 1897 and charged with managing federally owned lands, largely for-
ested, for multiple uses. Gifford Pinchot, an early leader of the USFS, gave
direction to USFS employees by arguing that multiple use meant that all
resources occurring on national forest landswilderness/recreation, water-
shed, timber, wildlifehad equal standing. Prior to the 1950s it was rare for
timber harvesting to adversely affect the other resources occurring on the
national forest lands. During the 1950s, however, the amount of timber har-
vested nationally more than doubled, as did recreational visitation. Thus,
conflicts began to arise between those who thought that timber harvest should
be the primary product of the national forests and those who believed that
protection of other resource values was the highest priority.
In 1960 the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act formally stated as law
Pinchots argument that all resource values had equal standing and arose in
part because of negative public reaction to the unconstrained timber harvest-
ing being conducted by USFS personnel. Respect for nontimber resource
values was further strengthened by passage of a series of laws during the
1960s and early 1970s. The Wilderness Act of 1964 allows Congress and the
president to grant formal wilderness protection under federal law to certain
tracts of federal land, and was a landmark law in recognizing nontimber
resource values. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 formally
requires the USFS and other agencies to conduct environmental impact analy-
sis and to provide for public participation. The Endangered Species Act of
1973 requires that projects such as logging in the national forests be contin-
gent on there being no adverse impact on any species listed as endangered or
threatened and requires mitigation for adverse impacts to these species. The
Resource Planning Act of 1974 requires the USFS and similar agencies to
propose long-term objectives and to construct long-term resource plans con-
sistent with these objectives. Concerns about the harms caused by clear-cut-
ting led to the passage of the National Forest Management Act of 1976, which
requires the USFS to create a forest plan for each national forest. This plan
provides key direction to timber harvest volumes, methods, and locations,
and explicitly requires a plan for managing nontimber resources. Forest plans
are contentious and allow for public comment and appeal, and so take a great
deal of time to develop, but nearly all projects are now open to public review
and appeal.
According to the U.S. Forest Service (1995), $130.7 billion in gross do-
mestic product were created by national forests in the year 2000. Of that,
$97.8 billion derives from recreation, plus $12.9 billion from fish and wild-
life benefits. The combined recreational and fish/wildlife values account for
85 percent of the total economic value generated by U.S. national forests.
Only $3.5 billion will be generated by timber harvest. Similarly, of the esti-
mated 3.3 million jobs directly or indirectly generated by activity in the U.S.
national forests for the year 2000, recreation and fish/wildlife accounted for
87.7 percent of the total. Recreational visitor-days totaled 730 million in
1993, nearly a quarter of which occurred in California, and overall recre-
ational use is projected to increase 63 percent by 2045. The budget process is
still largely driven by timber harvesting, however; while recreation accounts
for 75 percent of the economic benefits generated by national forests, only
21 percent of the Forest Service budget goes to support this activity.
Allocating Common-Pool Resources
As we first discussed in chapter 4, many natural resource systems are not

partitioned by private property rights. These resources may be held as state
property or common property (among a defined user group), or they may
simply be open-access. This ownership status may be based on tradition or
culture, or because certain resource stocks such as air, groundwater, or open-
ocean fisheries are fugitive resources that cannot effectively be partitioned

and privately owned.
When a resource stock is not partitioned by private property rights, there
is potential for rivalry among those who appropriate (harvest resource units)
from the resource stock. A common-pool resource (CPR) has the following
general characteristics:
It is difficult to exclude multiple individuals from appropriating from the

resource stock, such as is the case when the resource stock is not parti-
tioned by a well-defined and enforced private property rights regime.
The resource features rivalry in consumption, or subtractability, mean-
ing that resource units appropriated by one party subtract from what is
available to others.
Since multiple individuals (appropriators) appropriate resource units from

the CPR, subtractability implies that appropriation by one imposes an exter-
nal cost on all other appropriators. This external cost may take the form of
less abundant fish in a fishery, less fodder for livestock in a pasture CPR, less
water in an aquifer CPR, or less oil in an oil field CPR. This external cost in
a CPR is called an appropriation externality. Note that a pure public good
differs from a CPR in that it lacks rivalry in consumption. For example, pub-
lic television and radio broadcasts do not feature rivalry in consumption be-
cause one persons reception does not usually impair the ability of someone
else to receive the same broadcast.
As Gordon (1954) and others since then have shown, in the absence of
effective institutions (rule structures) that limit appropriation from a CPR,
people will over-appropriate from the CPR relative to the level of appropria-
tion that would be efficient for the group as a whole. For example, if a com-
mercially valuable CPR could be transformed into a privately owned
renewable resource, then the resource owner would select the dynamically
efficient appropriation level each year. As with nonrenewable resources de-
scribed earlier in the chapter, the efficient level of appropriation sustains the
resource and generates the largest possible present value of Hotelling rent.
Gordon constructed a simple model of a commercially valuable common-
pool resource under open-access conditions to illustrate the problems associ-
ated with appropriation externalities. Gordons model helps us understand the
economics of CPR depletion, such as in many of the worlds marine capture
fisheries. The diagram for Gordons model differs from the standard supply
and demand diagrams we have worked with so far. In Gordons model, the
problem is to find the optimal amount of effort input E instead of the optimal
quantity of output Q. Appropriation effort refers to inputs such as capital and
labor that are applied to harvesting resource units from the CPR. To keep the
example simple, assume that the market price of the resource being harvested
is not affected by the amount of effort applied to the fishery. For the same
reason we assume that marginal effort cost (MEC) and average effort cost
(AEC) are constant. MEC is the increase in total cost from an additional unit of
effort, while AEC is total cost divided by the total amount of effort applied to
resource harvest. For example, constant MEC and AEC imply that the cost of
operating an oil well or a fishing boat for an hour remains constant.
The economic benefits from effort are measured by revenue generation. As
with effort cost, there are two important revenue measures for effortmar-
ginal revenue product (MRP) and average revenue product (ARP). MRP is
simply the change in total revenue caused by an additional unit of effort, while
average revenue product is total revenue divided by the total amount of effort
applied to resource harvest. For example, the revenue generated by operating a
fishing vessel for an additional hour is MRP, while ARP is the average amount
of revenue generated by an hour of vessel operation. Low levels of total appro-
priation effort do not harm the productivity of the resource stock, and so ARP
and MRP are both high when total effort E is low. For example, if a fishery has
not been fished very much, then a vessel can catch many fish in an hour of
effort. As total appropriation effort grows, however, the resource stock de-
clines, and so both MRP and ARP decline. MRP declines more sharply than
ARP because MRP reflects revenue generated by an additional unit of effort on
an increasingly depleted resource, while ARP reflects the average of revenue
from both abundant and depleted resource conditions. Declining MRP pulls
ARP down, however, just as a bad set of semester grades will pull down a
students cumulative grade point average.
As shown in Figure 5.6, the group-optimum (efficient) level of appropria-
tion effort E* occurs where MEC = MRP. The intuition is similar to the rea-
soning behind why a profit-maximizing firm in a competitive market will
supply a quantity of output where market price equals marginal cost in chap-
ter 4. Starting at zero effort, one can incrementally increase effort in one-unit
intervals and compare MRP to MEC. As long as MRP > MEC then an addi-
tional unit of effort will increase profit. If MRP = MEC, then further effort
will cause MRP < MEC, which will cause profit to decline. The efficient
level of appropriation effort leads to maximum Hotelling rent to be shared
by all the appropriators. This simplified one-diagram model reflects the dy-
namic efficiency result developed earlier in the chapter. Under conditions of
open-access, or when other property rights regimes fail, individual appro-
priators are unable to work together to limit total effort and maximize
Hotelling rent. If one appropriator were to limit effort, someone else would
simply harvest the resource units. The result is that Hotelling rent is fully
Figure 5.6 CPR Appropriation: Full Rent Dissipation Versus

Group Optimum
$ per unit of effort
*
E : Level of total appropriation
effort that maximizes Hotelling
rent to CPR appropriators.
D
E : Level of total appropriation
effort that fully dissipates all
Hotelling rent to CPR
appropriators.
Hotelling
rent at group
optimum effort
MEC and AEC
ARP
MRP
*
E ED Units of
appropriation
effort
dissipated, which occurs as an outcome of rivalry among individual appro-

priators. Rents are fully dissipated at the level of total effort ED where AEC
= ARP, because at this point the average cost of a unit of effort equals the
average revenue produced by that effort, yielding zero profit or rent. Note
that if you multiply both AEC and ARP by total effort ED you get total cost
(TC) = total revenue (TR), which means that TR TC = 0.
Gordons model also indicates that managing a CPR for maximum net
social return results in a lower level of effort than what is required to
produce the CPRs maximum sustainable yield (MSY). To see this, note
that maximum sustainable yield in Gordons model occurs at a level of
total effort where total product appropriated from the CPR is maximized.
Therefore, at MSY the marginal product of a unit of effort is zero. Since
the market price of the harvested product is assumed constant, then MRP
at MSY is also zero. Consequently, MSY in Gordons model occurs at the
point in Figure 5.4 where MRP becomes equal to zero by crossing the
horizontal axis. Recall that the socially efficient level of appropriation
effort occurs where MEC = MRP. Since MEC is greater than zero, the
efficient level of appropriation effort for the appropriators as a group is
actually less than what would occur if the CPR were managed for MSY.
In the case of a fishery, the implication is that the efficient level of effort
for the fishers results in a larger stock of fish being maintained in the
fishery than what is required for MSY. In contrast, the open-access out-
come is not only economically inefficient, but also biologically ineffi-
cient because it results in a smaller stock of fish being maintained in the
fishery than what is needed to achieve MSY. We will discuss the eco-
nomic and policy issues associated with marine capture fisheries in detail
in chapter 6.
The dilemma with CPRs is that, unlike the invisible hand of Adam
Smiths competitive market, self-interested behavior in a CPR does not
yield the efficient outcome. Suppose a village has a common pasture for
grazing livestock but lacks effective rules for governing the number of
cattle that villagers graze on the pasture. In addition, suppose that the
pasture is currently being used at its carrying capacity. If a villager adds
one more milk cow to the village pasture, the villager gains 100 percent
of the benefit of increased milk production, but also creates an appro-
priation externality of reduced forage and a deteriorating pasture condi-
tion shared by all who graze livestock on the pasture. If all villagers act
in the same manner, the result will be destruction of the commons. As
Hardin (1968, p. 1244) argues:
The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another. . .
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman
sharing the commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a
system that compels him to increase his herd without limitin a world
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of
the commons.
Along the same vein, Gordon (1954, p. 135) concludes:
There appears, then, to be some truth in the conservative dictum that

everybodys property is nobodys property. Wealth that is free for all is
valued by no one because he who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper
time of use will only find that it has been taken by another.
Or for the case of fishery CPRs:

For years, [Sam] Novello had made a decent living off the abundant
groundfishcod, haddock, yellowtail flounderthat he hauled up off
the Atlantic Ocean floor. He used nets with a large-enough mesh size to
allow juvenile fish to pass through, and worked the best spots sparingly
with his tows. I didnt know I was a conservationist until somebody told
me, he says, but I believed in only taking the interest out of the bank.
But Novello watched many of his competitors make three times as much
money depleting vast areas and keeping thousands of pre-spawning-size
fish. And he has never forgotten the disdainful words of a local dealer:
What are you, stupid? One boat is gonna save every fish in the sea? So,
he adds sadly, Finally I said, OK, Ill fish like everybody else does.
(Russell 1996, p. 125)
Recall from chapter 3 that the process of rent dissipation in CPRs is re-
ferred to as the tragedy of the commons, a term coined by Garrett Hardin.
The theory behind Hardins tragedy of the commons is illustrated using a
simple strategic model in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
In the past, many economists have argued that the solution to the tragedy
of the commons is to assign private property rights. In developing their argu-
ments, these economists have often assumed that an open-access property
rights regime is in force, meaning that there are no rules limiting use. While
indeed transforming an open-access resource into a private property resource
will attenuate the tragedy of the commons when privatization is desirable
and feasible, increasingly those who study CPRs argue that appropriately
designed common property regimes may also work to prevent this tragedy
from occurring. Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues have argued that the grim
picture of CPR governance failure is not at all universal and that in fact there
are many examples of long-enduring, sustainable local CPR systems around
the world. Bromley (1992) provides additional case study analysis that sup-
ports Ostroms argument. Ostrom and her colleagues sought to learn what
makes these systems successful and to develop a set of design principles
from them that can guide the design of new CPR systems as well as predict
CPR success.
Ostroms central idea is that localized CPR systems can be durable and
sustainable in situations in which open-access conditions are displaced by a
common property regime established and governed by the local people who
depend on the CPR. Sustainable self-governance calls for a set of rule sys-
tems or institutions that define the physical boundaries of the CPR. These
institutions also specify the people who are allowed to use the CPR, the meth-
ods and extent of appropriations from the CPR, the methods and financing of
monitoring systems, a system for resolving conflicts, and a set of sanctions
that are proportionate with the importance of the transgression. An addi-

tional characteristic of successful self-governance is that the rule structures
must be capable of adapting to changing circumstances, such as those driven
by weather cycles or population growth. As Sethi and Somanathan (1996)
point out, a key element of the success of local self-governance is the ability
of the resource-dependent community to establish codes of conduct and to
impose sanctions such as cultural isolation and expulsion from the commu-
nity upon those who violate these rules of conduct. Local self-governance of
CPRs will be addressed again in chapter 15 in the context of sustainable
local communities; those who would like to further pursue this issue may
want to jump ahead.
It is interesting to consider factors that might explain why some resources
are held as common rather than private property. Clearly, some resource stocks
such as fisheries, groundwater basins, and mobile wildlife are not conducive
to being partitioned as private property. Moreover, in his study of common
property systems in Swiss alpine villages, Netting (1981) identified five en-
vironmental variables that tend to lead to resources being held as common
rather than private property:
The value of the harvestable resource is low per unit of area.

The amount of harvestable resource is highly variable.
Investment in improvements yields a relatively small increase in pro-
ductivity of the resource.
Overall costs can be reduced if people can coordinate activities such as
herding livestock or processing dairy products.
Fence, road, and other building costs can be reduced when done on a
larger scale.
There is evidence that this pattern also held for primary societies. McEvoy
(1986), for example, observes that highly productive locations for catching
salmon along the Klamath River in northwest California were privately owned
by individuals or partners in the Yurok tribe before contact with whites. As
private property, these productive fishing spots could be transferred by way
of market-like exchanges, and others were excluded from fishing at or im-
mediately below the spot. Yurok land that was farther from settlements or
that was less productive for catching fish had lower economic value and was
recognized as a common-property or an open-access resource.
Ostrom and her colleagues have also used laboratory experimental tech-
niques to evaluate aspects of CPR theory. Laboratory conditions replicate
the key incentives of the model under investigation with cash payments to
participants, and these cash payments vary based on the appropriation or
other decisions that they make. An important element of this research work
has been to determine the role of face-to-face communication in creating
social capital and informal rule systems that can prevent the dissipation of
Hotelling rents. Some of the basic results of this research include:
When participants appropriate from a commons but are unable to coop-

erate or communicate with one another, the result is that most or all
Hotelling rents are dissipated, as predicted by the tragedy of the com-
mons, yielding the rent dissipation outcome in Figure 5.4 (see Ostrom,
Walker, and Gardner 1992; and Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).
When these participants are allowed to communicate with one another
but cannot form enforceable agreements, they usually develop informal
rule structures that coordinate reduced appropriation and generate most
or all of the potential Hotelling rents shown in Figure 5.4, even though
the agreements were not enforceable (see Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner
1992; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).
When some participants pay to acquire a larger appropriation capacity
(e.g., buy a big fishing vessel), the informal rule systems devised through
face-to-face communication tend to allocate quotas proportionate with
appropriation capacity, which also matches the available evidence from
field CPR systems featuring heterogeneity (see Hackett, Schlager, and
Walker 1994).
Group discussion and communication have been found to be a major factor

in resolving many social dilemmas such as the tragedy of the commons. Orbell,
van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988) find evidence that communication fosters the
creation of a group identity, leading to a displacement of egoism for group
regardfulness, and allows for consensual promise making, where discussion of
the collective benefits of cooperation motivates consensus agreements on lim-
iting resource dissipation by way of promised behavior.
Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital
Imagine trying to set up a fully functional enclosed ecosystem like Biosphere

2 on the moon. What ecosystem services would such an enclosed system
need to include? What geological, atmospheric, and biophysical relation-
ships would need to be replicated? And like Noah, we would also need to
know what species of plants, animals, fungi, bacteria, and other life forms to
include. Unlike Noah we would also need to know how many to bring, which
to group together, and what their life requirements are. Daily (1997) includes
the following as essential ecosystem services:
Purification of air and water

Mitigation of floods and droughts
Detoxification and decomposition of wastes
Generation and renewal of soil and soil fertility
Pollination of crops and natural vegetation
Control of agricultural pests
Dispersal of seeds and translocation of nutrients
Maintenance of biodiversity for uses such as agriculture, medicine, and
industry
Protection from the suns ultraviolet rays
Partial stabilization of climate
Moderation of wind, wave, and temperature extremes
Support of diverse human cultures
Provision of aesthetic beauty and intellectual stimulation
Costanza et al. (1997) include seventeen such ecosystem services in their

comprehensive study. Clearly, it would be very complex and expensive to
replicate these ecosystem services on the moon. Since most ecosystem ser-
vices occur outside of commercial markets, for the most part, we take them
for granted, and they are assumed not to have economic value. Costanza et
al. (1997) observe that ecosystem goods (such as food) and ecosystem ser-
vices (such as waste assimilation) represent the benefits human populations
derive, directly and indirectly, from ecosystem functions (p. 253). These
ecosystem services represent flows of materials, energy, and information from
the stock of natural capital. Natural capital consists broadly of the stock of
nonrenewable resources, renewable resources, and the elements and rela-
tionships embodied in ecosystem functions. Depletion of an element of natural
capital, such as when fishery stocks are drawn down, implies that the corre-
sponding flow of harvestable fish also declines. Both constructed and human
capital, and more generally all the worlds economies, rely upon the func-
tional integrity of natural capital.
The economic value of ecosystem services will be touched upon in chap-
ter 7, and the extent to which technology can develop substitutes for natural
capital will be addressed in chapter 14.
Resources for the Future: Factors Affecting Future Resource

Scarcity
Are we going to be experiencing growing resource scarcity in the future, as

nonrenewable resources run out, renewable resources are depleted, and the
integrity of earths ecosystem services is fatally compromised? Alternatively,
will market price and technology seamlessly guide society to the more effi-
cient use of existing resources and develop alternatives for those that are
depleted? In addition, what is the role of population?
Thomas Malthus, in his book An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798),
argued that growth in human population would outstrip the natural resource
endowment of the planet. Malthuss arguments were originally focused on the
land resource and food production. Malthus believed in the notion of absolute
resource scarcity, meaning that most important natural resources have no sub-
stitutes available now, and technology cannot create substitutes. While in
Malthuss view food production could indeed grow, this growth would be out-
stripped by the growth in human population. Because of absolute scarcity,
human society will eventually exceed the carrying capacity of planet earth,
leading society to collapse. Many ecologists have been heavily influenced by
Malthusian thought. Neo-Malthusians have generalized the Malthusian ar-
gument to include an overall statement about the natural environment, human
population growth, and quality of life.
The argument from mainstream natural resources economics is that when
adequate property rights have been assigned and enforced, and a resource is
allocated through competitive markets, Hotellings rule indicates that price
will reflect the relative scarcity of the resource. Specifically, the scarcer the
resource, the larger the Hotelling rents, and thus the higher will be the price
of the resource. Therefore, market price offers a good indication of overall
scarcity. Technological change has allowed us to reduce consumption of in-
creasingly scarce resources by identifying more resource-efficient technolo-
gies and by utilizing substitute resources. The energy crisis of the mid- and
late 1970s offers another lesson: higher oil prices spurred domestic produc-
tion of coal and natural gas, and created an incentive for R&D into alterna-
tive energy sources such as solar and wind. Many people were able to reduce
their energy use substantially through home insulation and adapting to lower
household temperatures, as well as car-pooling and riding public transporta-
tion to work. Energy inputs per dollar of produced goods and services have
declined substantially in many industrialized countries. A further argument
made by many economists is that there is relatively little evidence of grow-
ing Hotelling rents in natural resource markets. The inflation-adjusted prices
of coal; oil; natural gas; metals such as aluminum, iron, and copper; and
basic foodstuffs such as wheat, soybeans, and cattle have not increased, and
in many cases have actually declined over the last thirty years, despite the
rapid growth in human population.
Economists argue that Malthus assumed static technologies, meaning that
resource productivity would remain at 1798 levels. Perhaps Malthus took
this position because he largely preceded the rapid technological change that
was associated with the industrial revolution. In any event, by ignoring the
role of technology in increasing resource productivity and facilitating the
development of substitutes, Malthus failed to predict that in fact from his
time to the present, food production actually outgrew human population.
Global resource prices may provide a false indication of resource scarcity,
however. As Cohen (1996) points out, prices can provide a false indication
of resource scarcity for at least two reasons. First, prices do not provide in-
formation on the scarcity of open-access resources or poorly enforced state
and common property resources being depleted due to tragedy of the com-
mons. Second, resource prices may decline because production shifts to coun-
tries where the lack of environmental taxes and regulation leads to a larger
proportion of the external costs of resource extraction, use, and disposal not
being reflected in price. A third reason one can offer for why prices do not
provide a comprehensive indication of resource scarcity is that many impor-
tant resources and ecosystem services are not and cannot be directly pro-
vided for and protected by the individual actions of buyers and sellers in a
market. One example is the ecosystem service of atmospheric gas regulation
(such as the CO2/O2 balance and stratospheric O3 for protection from ultra-
violet radiation). Atmospheric gas regulation cannot easily be partitioned
and sold as private property in the market. In the absence of government
intervention and a coordinated effort the necessary changes in fuel and land
use would not happen. Therefore, market price will not fulfill its role as the
signaler of scarcity and depletion, and technology is unlikely to offer us sat-
isfactory substitutes.
Economists such as Anderson and Leal (1991) argue that inadequate re-
source protection occurs because of an inappropriate property rights regime,
and they suggest that the solution is privatization when possible. Yet the stocks
of fresh air, marine fisheries, groundwater, stratospheric ozone, biodiversity,
and many other resources cannot effectively be partitioned as private prop-
erty. In addition, it is not clear that a resource such as topsoil fertility is
conserved in privately owned farms, or that non-income-generating aspects
of the environment such as old-growth-dependent species are adequately pro-
tected in privately owned forest lands. Even for those resources for which
privatization can effectively reverse degradation, it is not at all clear that
such a move would be consistent with community values. For example, in
societies with highly unequal distributions of wealth, the privatization solu-
tion will put park and open-space access beyond the reach of people with
low or modest incomes. Ostrom and others have shown that private property
regimes are not necessary for sustainable resource management; common
property regimes can sustain natural resources when they are governed by
locally devised and maintained rule structures.
This debate between ecologists and economists over the changing nature
of scarcity led to a rather famous bet. In 1980, economist Julian Simon and
ecologist Paul Ehrlich made a highly publicized bet on whether the price of
a set of metals selected by Ehrlich (copper, chrome, nickel, tin, and tungsten)
would rise, remain constant, or fall by 1990. One thousand dollars worth of
these metals was bought in 1980. Ehrlich agreed to pay Simon the difference
between the 1980 and 1990 value of this quantity of metals if their aggregate
(inflation-adjusted) market price declined, while Simon agreed to pay Ehrlich
the difference between the 1980 and 1990 value of these metals if their ag-
gregate (inflation-adjusted) market price rose. In 1990, Ehrlich paid Simon
$576.07, indicating that the inflation-adjusted aggregate price of the metals
had fallen from $1,000 to $423.93. Ehrlich lost his bet because new resources
were discovered, substitutes were developed for those that had become scarce,
and some metals markets became more competitive. The outcome of this bet
would have been different if they had bet on factors such as urban sprawl and
biodiversity.
Summary
For something to be a natural resource means that it is an aspect of

earths endowment that is useful to people in some way. A natural re-
source has either direct value or value contingent upon the existence of
technology that transforms the raw resource into something useful. Thus
petroleum was not a valuable resource until the internal combustion
engine technology, combined with the technology for cracking petro-
leum into refined products such as gasoline, allowed it to be converted
into something useful to people.
Nonrenewable resources are fixed in total quantity and thus are said
to have a fixed stock that does not recharge over the human timeframe.
Fossil fuels and mineral resources are examples of nonrenewable re-
sources. If steady declines in supply or increases in demand are an-
ticipated in the future, economists have argued that market forces
will mitigate against a sudden price shock or running out of the
resource in question. The reason is that resource owners anticipating
higher future prices will have an incentive to sell less today in order
to have more to sell at higher future prices. Consequently current
prices will also rise. Higher current prices in turn cause people to
conserve on use of the resource and provide incentive for R&D into
technology to make use of alternative resources, such as substituting
solar energy for oil, as well as into more resource-efficient technolo-
gies. Of course if unanticipated supply or demand shocks occur, or if
there is political manipulation of the process, this rational adjust-

ment may not occur.
Dynamic efficiency occurs in resource markets when the PV of surplus
is maximized. According to Hotellings rule, this occurs in nonrenew-
able, nonrecyclable resource markets when the PV of marginal Hotelling
rent (P MC) is equalized over time. If marginal extraction costs re-
main relatively constant over time, the implication of Hotellings rule is
that the price rises over time. This increase in price will spur conserva-
tion and the development of substitutes.
Recyclable resources such as glass, paper, and metals have a primary
market where the original resource is sold and a secondary or recycled
market where the salvaged resource is resold. Resources in the primary
market must thus compete against resources from the secondary mar-
ket. A monopoly or cartel that controls a recyclable natural resource
must anticipate future competition from the secondary market when it
sets output. Excessive production today will result in excessive compe-
tition from the secondary market in the future.
Renewable resources are aspects of the living planet and can regenerate
themselves under sustained-yield management, or become depleted when
yield rates exceed the maximum that can be sustained. Natural resource
systems are usually a complex of interdependent elements, and the maxi-
mum sustained yield of one element may result in overharvest in the
impact on another related resource. An example is overharvest of tim-
ber in its effects on watershed and fisheries resources.
Common-pool resources (CPRs) are resources for which it is difficult to
prevent multiple individuals from harvesting resource units, and resource
units harvested by one are not available for another. Thus CPRs differ
from private goods, where it is possible to exclude others from use, and
pure public goods like public radio, where my use does not impair your
use. Garrett Hardin coined the term tragedy of the commons to refer to the
situation in which individuals overuse the commons because of the pres-
ence of appropriation externalities: if you graze more cattle, you get the
financial gain, while the damage to the common pasture is borne by ev-
eryone in the community. Elinor Ostrom has argued that the tragedy of
the commons can be (and has been) avoided through the construction and
maintenance of carefully crafted CPR governance structures.
Ecosystem services, such as the supply of fresh water, soil fertility, and
climate regulation, are the benefits that human society receives, both
directly and indirectly, from ecosystem functions. Costanza and col-
leagues observe that these ecosystem services represent flows of mate-
rials, energy, and information from the stock of natural capital.
The argument has raged over whether or not there is growing resource
scarcity because of growing population, as Malthus originally argued.
In fact, the price of many marketed natural resources such as coal, oil,
natural gas, forest products, seafood, and pasturage has not risen as
rapidly as some predicted and in many cases has actually fallen. This
has reinforced the arguments of the technological optimists such as Julian
Simon. On the other hand, in many parts of the world, ecosystem ser-
vices as well as common-property and open-access resources are being
depleted. There is truth in both camps: human ingenuity has indeed
offset substantial amounts of resource limitations with technological
advances, but many unique and irreplaceable resources are under in-
creasing pressure, and many are failing.
1. Suppose that in the oil example given in the chapter for dynamic effi-
ciency, all else remains the same except that the discount rate r rises from 15
percent to 30 percent. Using the technique shown in this chapter (p. 94),
determine how this increase in the discount rate will change the dynamically
efficient allocation of oil across the two periods, and how it will change the
size of the marginal Hotelling rent on each barrel of oil.
2. Suppose that in the oil example given in the chapter for dynamic effi-
ciency, all else remains the same except that now there are 60 barrels of oil
rather than only 40. Using the technique shown in this chapter (p. 94), deter-
mine how this increase in the availability of oil affects the dynamically effi-
cient allocation of oil across the two periods and how it will change the size
of the marginal Hotelling rent on each barrel of oil.
3. Carefully define a common-pool natural resource relative to both pri-
vate goods and pure public goods. Provide an example. Use this example to
explain the tragedy of the commons. If resource users can govern themselves,
what sort of rules might prevent the commons from becoming damaged from
overuse?
4. Explain why the pure Malthusian outcome has not occurred, despite rapid
population growth since Malthuss time (1798). Carefully list the factors that
would explain why some resources have not grown increasingly scarce and
why some have substantially degraded. The role of technology and the possi-
bility of substitution should be at the center of your explanation.
5. Suppose there is a groundwater basin that is being drawn from faster
than it is being recharged from its aquifer, resulting in dropping water tables
in the area. Explain the different ways that people improve this situation.
6. Spreadsheet simulation (more advanced): Suppose that demand is given
by the equation P = 200 Q, and supply is given by the equation P = 10.

Suppose that the total resource stock Qtot = 100, and that it can be consumed
over two periods (0 and 1). Place these equations and other information into
a spreadsheet.
a. Solve for the dynamically efficient resource allocation for r = 0, 0.05,

0.10, 0.2, and 0.5. Note that from the exact solution we have q0 =
(bQtot + r(a c))/b(2 + r), and q1 = Qtot q0.
Build a table with columns showing r, q0, q1, PV of marginal

profit period 0 and PV of marginal profit period 1. There will be five
rows, one for each r value above. Confirm that Hotellings rule is
satisfied in each case. Provide a brief interpretation of the impacts of
rising discount rates on the dynamically optimal price and quantity path
over time.
b. Now suppose that Qtot = 70. Build a second table like the one in 6a
above. Provide a brief narrative economic interpretation of the impact
of a smaller resource stock on the dynamically efficient allocation of
the resource, as well as prices and marginal profit.
Internet Links
Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (www.peakoil.net): Learn
more about independent assessments of when we will reach global peak oil
production.
Californias Independent Electricity System Operator (www.caiso.com):

Learn about partial deregulation of Californias electric energy industry.
Economic Sustainability and Scarcity of Natural Resources (www.rff.org/

issue_briefs/PDF_files/tahvonen_naturalres.pdf): Olli Tahvonen of the
Finnish Forest Research Institute in Helsinki traces the history of economic
thinking about scarcity of natural resources and the sustainability of eco-
nomic growth. This is June 2000 Resources for the Future Issue Brief.
Food and Agriculture Organization (www.fao.org/): The United Nations

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is an excellent source of infor-
mation on important agricultural and natural resources, including fisheries
and forests. The FAOSTAT datebase (http://apps.fao.org/) is particularly
valuable.
Food and Agriculture Organizations Forestry Department (www.fao.org/

waicent/FAOINFO/Forestry/Forestry.htm): A good overview of global for-
estry issues.
Forest and Rangeland Ecosystem Science Center (http://fresc

.fsl.orst.edu): Learn more about forests and rangeland resources.
Hotellings Rule Audio Clip (www.humboldt.edu/~envecon/audio/2.ram):

A brief audio clip of the author describing Hotellings rule.

(www.indiana.edu/~iascp/): A good place to learn more about systems of
governance for common-pool resources.
Malthus Website (http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/

malthus/index.html): Read his original work on population.
Rangeland (http://uvalde.tamu.edu/rangel/home.htm): A publication of

the Society for Range Management.
World Resources Institute (www.wri.org/): Excellent source of global in-

formation on the state of the worlds natural resources.
World Resources Institutes Sustainable Agriculture Site (www.wri.org/

wri/sustag/): Learn more about sustainable agriculture.
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Self Governance Is Possible. American Political Science Review 86: 12845.
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Macmillan.
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Sethi, R., and E. Somanathan. 1996. The Evolution of Social Norms in Common
Property Resource Use. American Economic Review 86 (September): 76688.
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125.
Appendix: The Prisoners Dilemma and the Tragedy

of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons is most likely to occur under the conditions of
open-access or other poorly designed and enforced property rights regimes.
The tragedy of the commons outcome results from strategic behavior
behavior that an individual engages in based on how other people are ex-
pected to behave or respond. At the heart of the tragedy of the commons is
the belief that if one were to conserve the common-pool resources, others
will take what was conserved, and the CPR will still degrade. Mathemati-
cians refer to situations like this, in which people are taking strategic ac-
tions based on how other people are expected to behave or respond, as
games, and the theory used to analyze the outcomes of such situations is
referred to as game theory.
The tragedy of the commons can be described by a more general game
called the prisoners dilemma. In the prisoners dilemma there are two pris-
oners, Chang and Adams, who are being investigated in regard to a crime
punishable with a fine. Unless one or both of them confess, there is insuf-
ficient evidence to convict them, and they will go free and pay no fine. If
one of the prisoners were to confess and provide evidence to implicate the
other, while the other claims innocence, then the prisoner who confesses
will receive a $500 cash reward, while the prisoner claiming innocence
will be convicted of a crime and have to pay a $5,000 fine for lying and
claiming innocence. If both confess, then they both will be convicted of a
crime, but because they confessed, each will only have to pay a $1,000
fine. The prisoners are separated and do not know how the other will re-
spond to this situation and are unable to coordinate their actions. Assume
that the implicated prisoner cannot later punish the other prisoner for pro-
viding evidence.
Table 5.1
Strategic Form of the Prisoners Dilemma Game
Chang Claims Innocence Chang Confesses

Adams claims innocence A: $0 C: $0 A: $5000 C: $500
Adams confesses A: $500 C: $5000 A: $1000 C: $1000
Note: A denotes Adamss payoff, while C denotes Changs payoff.
The payoff structure that forms the incentives for this game is summa-
rized in Table 5.1.
In this situation, each prisoner is confronted with the choice of confess
or claim innocence and with a conjecture of what the other prisoner will
do. To determine the Nash equilibrium to this game (named after John Nash,
a game theorist), first consider the options available to Chang. Chang knows
that if Adams confesses, then Chang will be fined $5,000 if he claims inno-
cence or fined $1,000 if he also confesses. In this circumstance, Chang is
best off to confess. If instead Adams claims innocence, then Chang will re-
ceive a $500 cash reward for confessing or get off free and pay $0 fine if he
also keeps quiet. In this circumstance, Chang is also best off to confess.
Thus, Chang has what is known as a dominant strategy of confessing. This
strategy is referred to as being dominant because Chang will confess regard-
less of what Adams does.
Now consider Adams, whose situation is exactly the same as that of Chang.
If Adams thinks Chang will confess, then Adams will be fined $5,000 if he
claims innocence or fined $1,000 if he also confesses. In this circumstance,
Adams is best off to confess. If instead Adams believes that Chang will claim
innocence, then Adams will receive a $500 cash reward for confessing or get
off free and pay $0 fine for also claiming innocence. In this circumstance,
Adams is also best off to confess. Thus, Adams also has a dominant strategy
of always confessing regardless of what Chang does.
The Nash equilibrium outcome of the prisoners dilemma is (confess, con-
fess), and both parties are fined $1,000. Note that this outcome is inefficient
relative to the (claim innocence, claim innocence) outcome, in which both
parties pay no fine, but that outcome is not an equilibrium because both
parties have an incentive to defect and confess if they think the other will
claim innocence.
You may already see that the strategic structure of the prisoners dilemma
game is also that of the CPR dilemma. If we rename this game CPR di-
lemma, the strategy of claiming innocence is renamed sustainable use,
and the strategy of confessing is renamed resource depletion. Thus the
equilibrium of the CPR dilemma game is (resource depletion, resource deple-

tion), which is inferior to that of (sustainable use, sustainable use). If Adams
believes that Chang will use the resource sustainably, Adamss dominant
strategy is to capture the resources left by the other and deplete the resource.
Chang has the same dominant strategy, which yields the tragedy of the com-
mons outcome of the CPR dilemma game.
Of course, in the context of a CPR dilemma, the payoffs from (sustain-
able use, sustainable use) will be positive rather than the $0 payoff used in
the prisoners dilemma game for (claim innocence, claim innocence). Nev-
ertheless, the same result will occur with positive payoff values in the up-
per left cell of the bimatrix table, as long as the payoff to confessing given
that the other is claiming innocence is larger than the payoff when both
claim innocence.
Possible methods of avoiding the tragedy of the commons outcome in-
clude (1) changing the payoff structure of the game, (2) repeated play, and
(3) cooperative rather than noncooperative decision making. The payoff struc-
ture of the game can be changed, for example, if there is a CPR governance
structure that imposes substantial sanctions on those who violate the sustain-
able use rules and deplete the resource (akin to prisoners being able to cred-
ibly threaten to punish those who rat and implicate others through
confession). Under repeated play, it may be possible for the value of future
sustainable use to weigh against depleting the resource today, though this
may require an effectively infinite horizon of repeated play. If the noncoop-
erative nature of the game is transformed into a cooperative game through
some form of CPR governance structure, then the jointly optimal outcome
can be realized through coordination.
Part II
Policy
128 POLICY
NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS: MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 129
6
The Economics of Natural
Resource Systems, Part II:
Marine Capture Fisheries
Introduction
From an economic standpoint, a fishery refers to the interaction of human

harvest activities, environmental conditions, and the population dynamics
associated with one or more species of fish. The term capture fishery refers
to the enterprise of catching wild marine or inland fish, which can be con-
trasted with aquaculture, or fish farming. As was described in chapter 5,
capture fisheries frequently have the characteristics of common-pool re-
sources. Consequently, unconstrained rivalry among fishery participants, such
as under the property rights system of open access, can result in the deple-
tion of the resource and the economic rents that fishery participants derive
from that resource. Therefore, the assignment of property rights, particularly
the rights of management and exclusion, is an essential element of sustain-
ing fisheries. While some localized capture fisheries are held as common
property (see chapter 15), most of the worlds major marine capture fisheries
are state property, with some level of government responsible for regulating
harvest.
The focus of this chapter will be on the interaction of biological, economic,
and regulatory circumstances in marine capture fisheries. We will start out by
considering world trends in marine capture fisheries. We will then develop a
bioeconomic model of a fishery, a dynamic approach that links together the
biological conditions in the fishery to the economic circumstances of the par-
129
130 POLICY
ticipants. Next, we will consider some conventional, non-quota-based fishery

regulations, including their intended and unintended consequences. The prob-
lems of overcapitalization and derby conditions that plague many of these sys-
tems will serve as a motivation for the consideration of quota-based regulatory
systems. The biological and economic conditions in marine capture fisheries
are impacted in various ways by aquaculture operations, which is where we
will end our discussion in this chapter.
World Trends
Perhaps the best source of information for world trends is the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the statistics given below derive
from the FAO (United Nations FAO, hereafter FAO, 2002). The total quan-
tity of landings from marine and freshwater capture fisheries (excluding China)
grew from around 20 million metric tons in 1950 to a peak of 83 million
metric tons in 1989, and ranged between 70 and 80 million metric tons be-
tween 1996 and 2001. Marine capture fisheries represented approximately
90 percent of these total capture fishery landings between 1996 and 2001,
and peak production from marine capture fisheries (omitting China) was 75.5
million metric tons in 1995. China is believed to have overstated its landings,
particularly during the 1990s, and so world statistics are frequently cited
with China omitted. The northwest Pacific, west central Pacific, southeast
Pacific, and northeast Atlantic regions dominate worldwide landings from
marine capture fisheries, and total harvest from these regions has grown or
remained steady since 1970. China increasingly dominates the harvest from
the northwest Pacific region, and is thought to be the worlds largest har-
vester from marine capture fisheries. Anchoveta was by far the dominant
species landed from marine capture fisheries in 2000, though landings of
this species fluctuate considerably year to year due to ocean conditions.
The FAO (2002) notes that global fishing pressure continues to increase,
the number of underexploited and moderately exploited fishery resources
continues to decline slightly, the number of fully exploited stocks remains
relatively stable, and the number of overexploited, depleted, and recovering
stocks is increasing slightly. An estimated 25 percent of the major marine
fish stocks or species groups for which information is available are either
underexploited or moderately exploited. About 47 percent of the main stocks
or species groups are fully exploited and are therefore producing catches
that have reached, or are very close to, their maximum sustainable limits.
Approximately 18 percent of stocks or species groups are reported as being
overexploited. Prospects for expansion or increased production from these
stocks are negligible, and there is an increasing likelihood that stocks will
decline further and catches will decrease, unless remedial management ac-
tion is taken to reduce overfishing conditions. The remaining 10 percent of
stocks have become significantly depleted, or are recovering from depletion
and are far less productive than they used to be or could be. As a result,
landings from about 75 percent of the worlds major marine fish stocks are
expected either to remain constant or to decline in the future.
Changes in landings from major marine capture fisheries occur due to
both human and environmental causes. For example, the biomass of some
benthic or groundfish species groups such as cod, flounder, halibut, and rock-
fish (found on or near the seafloor) may not recover very easily after heavy
harvest. Many groundfish are long-lived, do not become sexually mature for
many years, and are slow to reproduce. Examples include the northwestern
Atlantic cod fishery and the eastern Pacific groundfish fishery. The Grand
Banks and Georges Bank fisheries in the northwest Atlantic had once been
some of the worlds most productive groundfish fisheries and yet are now
essentially closed following their collapse. The formerly dominant species
of groundfishincluding flounder, cod, haddock, and hakehave been fished
down to a small fraction of their previous abundance. The Georges Bank
codfish catch peaked at more than 60,000 metric tons in 1983 and declined
to nearly 20,000 metric tons by 1994.
The Atlantic cod fishery in eastern Canada had for centuries been an eco-
nomic mainstay for fishery-dependent communities, especially in Newfound-
land and Labrador. While annual landings in the nineteenth century ranged
between 150,000 and 400,000 metric tons, annual landings of cod reached a
peak during the 1960s at nearly two million metric tons. Eastern Canadas
annual cod landings declined dramatically during the 1970s, and by 1977
had fallen below 500,000 metric tons. Declining cod landings continued into
the early 1990s, at which time Canadas cod fishery was widely seen as be-
ing in crisis. In 1993 Canada announced that all major cod fisheries would
be suspended, and that quotas for other groundfish species would be sharply
restricted in 1994. The moratorium was maintained indefinitely beyond its
May 15, 1994, scheduled termination, and it was estimated that up to 35,000
fishery participants and plant workers were put out of work as a result of
these closures (Canadian Department of Fish and Oceans website). In 1998,
Canada announced a five-year, $730-million program called the Canadian
Fisheries Adjustment and Recovery Plan to address the permanent downsizing
of the Atlantic groundfish fishery. At that time Canadas fisheries minister
noted that Atlantic groundfish stocks could take many years (possibly de-
cades) to rebuild, and that even then, the industry would not be able to sup-
port the same number of fishermen and fishery workers.
The cod catch in the northwestern Atlantic peaked in the 1960s at about
132 POLICY
1.43 million metric tons per year, declined to 644,000 metric tons per year
in the 1980s, and collapsed to only 48,000 metric tons in 1994. Similarly,
the 1997 catch of cod, hake, and haddock in the northwest Atlantic was
only 16.5 percent of the 1990 catch (FAOSTAT database). The National
Marine Fisheries Service reports that in 1965 cod, haddock, hake, and floun-
der made up more than 70 percent of the common fishes in the Gulf of
Maine. By 1992 dogfish and skate (less desirable species of fish) made up
more than 75 percent of the common fish in these waters. The collapse of
New England cod stocks is estimated to have eliminated at least 20,000
regional fishing-related jobs, as well as an estimated $349 million in an-
nual revenues (Weber, 1994; McGinn, 1998). The New England Fishery
Management Council (NEFMC) estimates that recent groundfish catches
of 120 million pounds (valued at $105 million) could increase by approxi-
mately a factor of four (to 425 million pounds, with a value estimated at
$425 million), if New Englands groundfish fishery were fully restored to
potential levels (NEFMC, 2002). Restoration of slow-growing groundfish
stocks would involve additional fishing restrictions and economic hard-
ships for participants in these fisheries.
A similar pattern has developed on the west coast of the United States in
the Pacific groundfish fishery. The 1976 Magnuson Fishery Management
and Conservation Act displaced foreign factory trawlers with domestic ves-
sels within the newly established 200-mile exclusive economic zone in fed-
eral waters. As Young (2001) points out, programs such as the Investment
Tax Credit, Fishing Vessel Obligation Guarantee Fund, and Capital Construc-
tion Fund encouraged investment in new vessels, though at the time there
was poor information on what harvest rates the stocks could sustain. Fisher-
men responded by dramatically increasing the number of vessels in the west
coast fleet during the late 1970s, while increasingly sophisticated technol-
ogy made both existing and new vessels more efficient at harvesting fish.
During the early 1980s the west coast shrimp and salmon fisheries declined,
and many vessels shifted to the groundfish fishery. In 2000 the Scientific and
Statistical Committee of the Pacific Fishery Management Council estimated
that about 70 percent of the fishing vessels in west coast groundfish were
redundant (Pacific Fishery Management Council 2000). This overcapitaliza-
tion was seen as the fundamental cause of many problems in the fishery. In
2003 President Bush signed into law the Pacific groundfish vessel buyback
program, which retired 35 percent of the groundfish trawl permits held dur-
ing the 19982001 base years, accounting for 36.5 percent of all the trawl-
caught Pacific groundfish.
In contrast to groundfish, the biomass of some pelagic species groups
such as anchoveta, pilchards, sardines, and squid (found in the open ocean
off the seafloor) fluctuates due to oceanic conditions such as the El Nio
cycle. This cycle features a warming of the ocean surface in the eastern tropi-
cal Pacific that occurs every four to twelve years when upwelling of cold,
nutrient-rich water does not occur. These types of marine animals are rela-
tively short-lived and fertile, and can potentially recover from heavy harvest
over a period of years or decades. As reported by McEvoy (1986) in his
history of California fisheries, in the 193233 fishing season the west coast
sardine fishery reached its estimated maximum sustainable yield of approxi-
mately 250,000 to 300,000 tons. The majority of the sardine fishery occurred
in California waters, and there were 570 vessels fishing for sardine off the
California coast in 1936. By the 193637 fishing season, the sardine catch
had increased to nearly 800,000 tons. While California sardine processors
began as canneries (thus John Steinbecks Cannery Row set in Monterey),
increasingly sardines were being reduced into fishmeal and oil for use as
animal feed and fertilizer. Despite the lack of any sort of conservation mea-
sures, the sardine catch managed to hold at between 500,000 and 600,000
tons through the 194546 season.
By 1947 the number of vessels pursuing sardines in California waters had
nearly doubled to 1,100. Spawning failed in 1949 and 1950, and by the early
1950s total landings on the west coast of the United States fell to slightly less
than 15,000 tons. With high demand for sardines as feedstock for fertilizer,
pressure turned to the Peruvian anchoveta fishery, which like the California
sardine fishery went through a brief boom followed by collapse in the early
1970s. Following the same trend, the North Sea herring catch peaked at more
than 1 million tons in 196667. By 1977 the catch was less than 40,000 tons,
and a ban was placed on harvest in 1978. Both the California sardine fishery
and the Peruvian anchoveta fishery experienced a recovery in the late 1990s
into 2000. Total sardine landings in California were 62,600 tons in 1999, and
maximum sustainable yield of Pacific sardines off the west coast of the United
States is estimated to be about 22 percent of the spawning biomass (Wolfe,
Smith, and Bergen 2001).
In April 1994 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded
that excessive fishery harvest had caused drastic reductions in many of the
preferred species of edible fish. Moreover, the NAS reported that changes in
the composition and abundance of marine flora and fauna had been exten-
sive enough to endanger the functioning of marine ecosystems. While the
NAS recognized that fishing was only one of a number of different negative
human impacts on the marine environment, overfishing was considered the
most important single impact. Similarly, the FAO has concluded that sub-
stantial damage has occurred to the marine environment, and to the econo-
mies that depend on the fishery resource.
134 POLICY
With these issues in mind, we will now develop a dynamic bioeconomic

model of a fishery, following an approach similar to that of Hartwick and
Olewiler (1998).
Bioeconomic Model of a Fishery
Suppose that X(t) is the stock or biomass of economically valuable fish at

time t, and F(X) is the biological growth function for the stock over time (from
a calculus standpoint, think of this as the instantaneous growth rate of X, equal
to dX/dt). F(X) reflects the rate of net recruitment (number of new fish entering
a fishery, net of fish removed from the fishery). Suppose that for the particular
species in question F(X) can be described by a logistic function:
F(X) = rX(1 X/k).
Note that r is interpreted as the rate of growth of X when the stock X is

nearly zero. Note that k is interpreted as the maximum value for the stock
(carrying capacity) for a given habitat. Thus:
X = kF(X) = 0.
As shown in Figure 6.1, the flow of harvestable fish from the fish
stock(measured by F(X) starts out small when the stock is small,
and then rises to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) at FMAX. The flow
of harvestable fish at first grows as the stock of fish grows due to the
small stock only exploiting a small portion of the available food and habi-
tat, thus allowing for substantial reproductive success and recruitment of
new fish into the stock. Beyond XMSY the flow of harvestable fish then
falls as the stock increases toward k. The flow of harvestable fish eventu-
ally declines as the stock increases beyond XMSY because the large stocks
of fish increasingly exploit the available food and habitat, thereby limit-
ing reproductive success and recruitment of new fish into the stock. X =
k is the biological equilibrium where habitat is fully exploited and the
population is presumably in balance with nonhuman predation, so that
no net growth can occur.
Now lets introduce human harvest rate H into the model and develop the
idea of the bioeconomic equilibrium. We can use the bioeconomic model to
relate harvest rates to the growth rate of the fish stock. A bioeconomic equi-
librium occurs where H = F(X) and the net growth rate of the stock is equal
to zero. We can identify several different cases that relate harvest rate to the
flow of harvestable fish. For our first case, suppose that the harvest rate
Figure 6.1 Biological Mechanics of a Fishery

F(X)
Fish stock growth rate

F(X) = rX(1X/k)
FMAX
0
XMSY k Biomass X
exceeds the maximum sustainable flow of harvestable fish (H > FMAX). In

this case the net growth rate of the fish stock, F(X) H, will be negative and
the stock will decline. This harvest rate is not sustainable, and if it is not
reduced, the bioeconomic equilibrium will feature the elimination of the fish
stock (X = 0), at which point H = F(0) = 0.
In our next case, suppose that the harvest rate H is set equal to FMAX, as
shown in Figure 6.2. Since the harvest rate is equal to maximum sustainable
yield from the fishery, wont this assure that the fishery will be sustained over
time? It ends up that it depends critically on the size of the fish stock at the time
that the harvest rule is put into place. If the fish stock X is larger than XMSY at
the time that the harvest rule is put into place, then we can see in Figure 6.2 that
F(X) < FMAX, which means that the actual flow of harvestable fish is less than
the maximum sustainable yield. Since H > F(X)) we know that the net growth
rate of the fish stock will become negative and the stock will decline. Unlike
the first case, however, the stock will stop shrinking at H = FMAX, indicating
that the bioeconomic equilibrium occurs at XMSY. If the fish stock X is smaller
than XMSY, however, then once again we can see in Figure 6.2 that F(X) <
FMAX, which means that the actual flow of harvestable fish is less than the
maximum sustainable yield. Since H > F(X)) we know that the net growth rate
of the fish stock will become negative and the stock will decline, and the stock
will be fully depleted unless the harvest rate is reduced. Thus another
bioeconomic equilibrium occurs at X = 0 at which point H = F(0) = 0.
An interesting third case is illustrated in Figure 6.3, and features a harvest
136 POLICY
Figure 6.2 Bioeconomic Equilibria with H = FMAX
F(X)
FMAX Harvest
rate H
Fish stock
growth rate
F(X) = rX(1X/k)
0 X=0 X
XMSY = High biomass
Equilibrium equilibrium
rate H < FMAX. In this case there are three bioeconomic equilibria. One of these
occurs at XH. If at the time this harvest rule is put into place the stock of fish is
greater than XH, then H > F(X) and we know that the net growth rate of the fish
stock will become negative and the stock will decline. The stock will stop
shrinking at H = F(XH), indicating that the bioeconomic equilibrium occurs at
XH. If the time this harvest rule is put into place the stock of fish is such that XL
< X < XH, then we can see in Figure 6.3 that H < F(X) and we know that the net
growth rate of the fish stock will become positive and the stock will grow. The
stock will stop growing at H = F(XH), indicating again that the bioeconomic
equilibrium occurs at XH. Thus, we can see that the high biomass equilibrium
is stable for a relatively wide range of stock levels.
A second bioeconomic equilibrium exists at XL, but it only occurs when
X = XL, at which point H = F(XL). To see this, note that if XL < X < XH, then
we get the high biomass equilibrium as was shown in the previous para-
graph. Moreover, if X < XL then H > F(X) and the net growth rate of the
fish stock will be negative and the stock will decline. This harvest rate is
not sustainable, and if it is not reduced, then the (third) bioeconomic equi-
librium will occur at X = 0, at which point H = F(0) = 0.
So far, we have assumed that the harvest rate is constant. To be more
realistic, consider the following harvest function:
H(t) = G[E(t), X(t)].

Figure 6.3 Bioeconomic Equilibria With H < FMAX
F(X)

F(X) = rX(1X/k)
FMAX
Harvest
rate H
0 Low biomass High biomass X

equilibrium equilibrium
XL XH
X=0
Equilibrium
This harvest function tells us that the harvest rate H is a function of the size
of the fish stock X and the level of fishing effort E at time period t. Recall that
fishing effort is a measure of the inputs (such as deckhands, vessel, gear,
fuel, and bait) applied to catching fish. The harvest equation is simply a
special form of a production function, which in microeconomic theory re-
lates the transformation of inputs into outputs. For a given level of effort, we
would expect that an increase in fish stocks would result in an increase in
harvest (in calculus terms, that dH/dX > 0). Likewise, for a given stock level,
we would expect that an increase in effort would result in an increase in
harvest (in calculus terms, that dH/dE > 0). The Law of Diminishing Mar-
ginal Returns would suggest that in the short run, with the stock level fixed,
it would require successively larger and larger increments of effort to gener-
ate successive increases in harvest of a given size.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the bioeconomic equilibria that we first considered in
Figure 6.3, but now with two harvest functions. Harvest function H1 assumes a
relatively low level of total effort E1 applied by participants in the fishery, and
shows the level of harvest increasing linearly with increases in the size of the fish
138 POLICY
Figure 6.4 Bioeconomic Equilibria With Two Different Levels of

Fishing Effort
F(X)
H2 = G[E2, X]

F(X) = rX(1X/k)
FMAX
H1 = G[E1,X]
H*
0 Low biomass High biomass X

equilibrium equilibrium
XL XH
stock. Harvest function H2 is like the first, but assumes a relatively high level of
total effort E2. Lets assume that E1 corresponds to the group-optimum level of
effort identified in chapter 5, while E2 corresponds to the level of effort that fully
dissipates total Hotelling rents among the participants in the fishery. For a given
size of the fish stock on the horizontal axis, the greater level of fishing effort
assumed in H2 results in a larger harvest rate (measured on the vertical axis) than
in H1. You can see this in Figure 6.4 by assuming that fish stocks are at XL, and
then noting that H1 = G[E1, XL] < H2 =G[E2, XL].
Figure 6.4 reveals an important point. Each of the harvest functions has its
own bioeconomic equilibrium where harvest rate H equals fishery growth
rate F(X). The high biomass equilibrium is associated with the lower, group-
optimum level of effort E1, while the low biomass equilibrium is associated with
the higher, rent-dissipating level of effort E2. Interestingly, however, both of the
bioeconomic equilibria result in the same equilibrium harvest rate H*. There-
fore, we can see that the bioeconomic equilibrium associated with E1 is clearly
better for the fishery participants because it generates the same level of harvest
with less effort. As a result, we can clearly see that the group-optimum bioeconomic
equilibrium is also more economically efficient than the equilibrium associated
with full rent dissipation, as the former generates the same level of output as the
latter, but with fewer inputs employed. Moreover, we can also see in Figure 6.4
that the group-optimum solution also results in a higher steady-state stock of fish
than the equilibrium associated with full rent dissipation. Note that if fish are
sufficiently valuable, stocks grow slowly, and if fishing effort is sufficiently cheap,
it is possible for the harvest function associated with full rent dissipation to be so
steep as to lie strictly above F(X). In this unfortunate case the bioeconomic equi-
librium occurs at X = 0, where the fish stock is exterminated.
While this bioeconomic model does not fit the biomechanics of all fisher-
ies, it provides a relatively simple illustration of the dynamic interaction be-
tween fish stocks and human harvest rates. We will now turn to a discussion
of fishery management practices and the intended and unintended impacts
that they have had on stocks, fishery participants, and others.
Fishery Management
Traditional regulatory schemes used in marine capture fisheries in the United

States and elsewhere include output controls, technical measures, and input
controls. Examples of output controls include total allowable catch (TAC) for
the fishery and trip or bag limits on vessel landings. Examples of technical
measures include restrictions on fish size and sex. Examples of input controls
on effort, the oldest type of fishery management tool, include gear restrictions,
vessel licenses, and seasonal restrictions. Most fisheries are managed using a
combination of such measures. In many cases, these regulatory tactics have
proved to be ineffectual in sustaining fishery stocks and have led to a number
of harmful unintended consequences for both fishers and consumers.
Consider, for example, the historical management practice used for Alas-
kan halibut and sablefish, which involved establishment of a TAC, gear re-
strictions, and seasonal restrictions. This set of management tools was typical
of many other fisheries. Since fishers do not have a property right to a share
of the TAC, they respond to limited seasons by acquiring more gear and
larger vessels so that they can capture more fish in a shorter period of time
during the open season. The result is an intense race for fish, or derby, which
in turn may require regulators to further reduce the season openings. The
central Gulf of Alaska halibut fishery, which has accounted for between one-
third and one-half of the total U.S. and Canadian catch since 1977, offers an
illustrative example of induced derby effects. The halibut season length fell
from over 150 days in the early 1970s to 23 days in the early 1990s, while
the total catch approximately tripled (National Research Council 1999).
Derby conditions can occur without a TAC as long as there is a relatively
fixed quantity of fish available for capture. For example, Californias Dunge-
ness crab fishery restricts harvest to male crabs with carapace diameter of at
least 6.25 inches during a season opening that begins in late fall and runs into
mid-summer. The fishery has been fully and intensely exploited for at least
140 POLICY
forty years. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the legal-sized male crabs are

harvested each season. Despite this intense harvest and high variability in
abundance, most scientists and industry participants feel that current regula-
tions are adequately protecting the crab resource. Dewees et al. (2004) esti-
mate that 171,090 traps were deployed in Californias crab fishery in
December 2000. While there have been no other estimates of California trap
numbers since the 197576 season, Didier (2002) estimated that from 1971
72 through 197576 California trap numbers averaged 29,115. Thus there
was nearly a sixfold increase in trap deployment in the California Dungeness
crab fishery from the mid-1970s to 2000. An economic analysis of the com-
bined California/Oregon/Washington fishery indicated that 60,000 traps would
maximize the net economic value of the fishery (PMFC 1978), while Dewees
et al. (2004) estimated that in 2000 there were more than six times this num-
ber of traps being fished in the combined fishery. Overcapitalization has con-
tributed to derby conditions in this fishery, and in recent years, approximately
80 percent of total annual landings in California are made in a few weeks in
December (Hankin and Warner 2001). This intense race has led to glutted
markets, increased densities of crab traps on the fishing grounds, and fishing
in dangerous conditions leading to loss of lives and vessels.
Derby fisheries suffer from a number of problems. First, derbies create an
incentive for fishery participants to acquire larger vessels and more gear than
they would otherwise need, thus leading to overcapitalization. Second, the large
pulse of fish landings, followed by long periods of inactivity, requires that the
fish be frozen and sold throughout the year, which can yield a lower-quality
product than live or fresh fish, and a more highly concentrated and thus less
competitive processing industry structure (Casey et al. 1995; Hackett et al.
2003). Hackett et al. (2005) show that the processing sector serving a derby
fishery will tend to be highly concentrated, featuring a small number of large
processors. Moreover, the need to invest in specialized and location-specific
processing capital equipment can serve as a means of limiting entry and main-
taining some degree of market power to dictate low ex-vessel prices paid to
fishermen. (These are termed ex-vessel prices because they mediate the sale
of fish off the vessel to the primary processor).Third, the race for fish can
induce fishing in hazardous seas and unnecessary loss of life. In their Census
of Fatal Occupational Injuries, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) lists com-
mercial fishing as the single most deadly occupation in the United States. The
BLS reports that in the five-year period 199296 there were 140 fatalities per
100,000 fishers in the United States compared to the national average of five
fatalities per 100,000 for all occupations.
Overcapitalized fishery participants loaded down with debt can put enor-
mous political pressure on policymakers setting catch limits. There are prac-
tical difficulties involved with reducing excess fishing capacity. One practi-
cal difficulty is that of measurement. Some gear and vessels can be deployed
in different fisheries, which makes it difficult to attribute a given amount of
fishing capacity to a particular fishery. Moreover, attempts at reducing fish-
ing capacity in one fishery can result in vessels and gear shifting to another
fishery. For example, efforts made by some developed countries to reduce
fishing capacity have led to the relocation of vessels to the fisheries of other
(usually developing and least developed) countries. This does not constitute
a reduction in capacity on a global scale. Moreover, the open-access nature
of high seas fisheries creates a particularly difficult situation with respect to
the control of fishing capacity. In the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, in particular, the issue of fishing capacity is largely ig-
nored (FAO 1998). As the FAO (1990, p. 78) observes:
The relative failure of international management to establish sustainable

fisheries in many areas, despite the high quality of the research base some-
times provided, is clearly demonstrated by the dwindling resources, exces-
sive catching capacity [number and size of boats and gear], uncontrolled
transfers of fishing effort between resources and oceans, and depletion of
many highly valuable resources. . . . The fact that uncontrolled develop-
ment of fishing effort leads to disaster has now been widely acknowledged
in the scientific literature and by high level fisheries management and de-
velopment authorities.
As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, there are a number of
new alternative management schemes that address excess capacity, the race
for fish, and the overfished status of many marine capture fisheries.
Individual Quotas
A key problem with both open-access fisheries and traditional fishery manage-
ment tools is that fishers do not have any property rights to a share of the
available fishery stock prior to capture. Because fishers do not have a property
right to fish until capture, the harvest by one vessel imposes a rule of capture
externality on all others by reducing the remaining stock of fish. When the rule
of capture externality is operating, fishery participants have an incentive to
overcapitalize in vessel, crew, and gear (Casey et al. 1995). We have also seen
that the rule of capture externality promotes a race for fish that leads to dimin-
ished product quality and increased fishing hazards. A number of alternative
management regimes have recently been implemented to address some or all
of these deficiencies of traditional management. Some of the more prominent
examples are summarized in Table 6.1 and will be discussed below.
142 POLICY
Table 6.1
Quota-Based Management Systems for Marine Capture Fisheries
Management
regime Purpose How it works Examples Discussion
Individual Eliminate derby, Quota shares to Alaskan Establishment
Fishing Quota reduce over- total allowable halibut and of initial quota
(IFQ) capitalization, catch (TAC) sablefish, shares may be
increase allocated to Australian contentious;
economic individual blue fin tuna, must be
efficiency fishers; may be Icelandic feasible to set
transferable herring and TAC and
cod, New monitor
Zealand landings;
fisheries, U.S. concentration of
Atlantic surf ownership is
clam and an issue
ocean
quahogs
Individual Eliminate derby, Similar to IFQ British Similar to IFQ
Vessel Quota reduce over- except that Columbian
(IVQ) capitalization, shares are halibut,
increase allocated among sablefish, and
economic registered groundfish;
efficiency vessels instead Norwegian
of individuals fisheries
Community Promote Quota shares to Chatham Like the closely
Fishing Quota community TAC allocated to Islands and related
(CFQ) cohesiveness a community Maori Community
and other goals defined by communities Development
geography, in New Quota system,
cultural identity, Zealand; CFQs promote
or some other Sambro, Nova community
factor(s) Scotia cohesion
Effort Quota Reduce effort Quota shares to Washington Only effective in
(EQ) and increase effort, including Dungeness controlling total
economic inputs such as crab pot catch if there
efficiency crustacean licenses, are no
traps, or time at Florida spiny substitutes for
sea; may be lobster crab the restricted
transferable trap input, and input
certificates, productivity is
scallop fleet predictable and
days-at-sea stable
limits
Sources: National Research Council (1999); Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (1997).
Individual quotas (IQs) were first implemented in Iceland and New Zealand
in the early 1980s, and since then have been implemented in an increasing
number of fisheries around the world (Wilen 2000). IQs assign a share of the
TAC to individual fishers (IFQs), vessels (IVQs), or communities (CFQs).
Those who hold quota shares own a share of the TAC. Therefore, the fishing
season does not end until all quota shares are filled, subject to biological
constraints. By assigning rights prior to capture, IQs eliminate the rule of
capture externality. As a result, derby conditions and the incentive for over-
capitalization are either substantially reduced or eliminated. Reduction or
elimination of derby conditions implies that the pulse of landings that occurs
due to the derby is instead spread out over a longer period of time. Reducing
overcapitalization increases the economic efficiency of the fishing industry
by reducing the total cost of harvesting a given quantity of fish. IQs can also
be transferable or tradable, which can introduce further gains in economic
efficiency. When IQs are tradable in a competitive market setting, economic
theory suggests that quota will flow to its highest-valued use. This is particu-
larly important in overcapitalized and depleted fisheries in which quota shares
are too small to allow for economically efficient and profitable vessel opera-
tion. In this case tradable quota shares will tend to be concentrated on a
subset of the original fishing fleet that can operate efficiently and profitably.
Those who exit the fishery can at least receive the value of their quota share.
An IQ operating on an isolated fishery undergoing consolidation can result
in vessels simply being redeployed in some other less-regulated fishery, which
reduces the global benefits of a tradable IQ.
There is some evidence that IQs have improved overall economic condi-
tions in fisheries, as well as in the processing industry complexes that serve
as the primary market for these fisheries. In the Atlantic surf clam/ocean
quahog fishery, imposition of an IQ system in late 1990 resulted in a de-
crease in excess capacity and a consequent increase in economic efficiency
(National Research Council 1999). The number of vessels working the At-
lantic surf clam/ocean quahog fishery fell by at least 50 percent following
the imposition of IQ fishery management. Likewise, the imposition of IQs
on the Icelandic herring fishery increased economic efficiency, reduced the
number of vessels from 200 to 29, and increased the profitability of fishing
firms (National Research Council 1999). Along these same lines, the OECD
(1997) reports that imposition of IQs in Australias bluefin tuna fishery re-
sulted in a 70 percent reduction in vessel numbers and an estimated fourfold
increase in Hotelling rent.
Moreover, as Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte (1996) and Hackett et
al. (2005) observe, displacement of derby fisheries through the imposition of
IQ fishery management also has implications for the structure and perfor-
144 POLICY
mance of the associated fish processing industry. Matulich, Mittelhammer,

and Reberte (1996) show that IQ fishery management will harm incumbent
fish processors, but assume that seafood product forms do not change. Hackett
et al. (2005) use a similar modeling approach, but take into account that
derby conditions and resulting pulse of landings necessitate freezing or can-
ning, and that spreading out landings through IQ fishery management allows
for an increase in production of fresh seafood products. They cite research
showing that in many (though not all) circumstances, consumers value fresh
seafood products at least as much as similar preserved products. Consequently,
unlike Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte, they find that after IQ fishery
management is put into place, processors no longer need extensive capital in
the form of freezers and canning equipment, potentially allowing for entry
by new and smaller fresh-fish processors. The implication is that there will
be more buyer competition for the catch coming out of the fishery, which in
turn raises ex-vessel prices and improves economic conditions in the fishery.
While incumbent processors may be made worse off, they may also convert
their operations to the less costly and perhaps more valuable processing of
fresh seafood products. To the extent that consumers prefer fresh to frozen or
canned seafood, additional economic value is created even further down-
stream due to the change in product forms.
There is evidence to support the predictions that derive from the Hackett
et al. (2005) model. For example, IQs in New Zealand have reduced over-
capitalization in vessels and gear (Clark 1993). IQs have also eased the derby
characteristic of some New Zealand fisheries and has resulted in increased
export sales of more valuable live product such as rock lobster. Perhaps the
best example comes from the British Columbian halibut fishery. The imposi-
tion of IQs in British Columbias halibut fishery resulted in the percentage of
halibut landings sold as a higher-valued fresh product to increase from 42
percent to 94 percent, thereby raising ex-vessel prices and profitability (Casey
et al. 1995). A summary of the changes in seafood product forms, processing
industry structure, and ex-vessel prices observed in actual fisheries that have
displaced derby conditions and the associated pulse of landings by way of
IQ fishery management is presented in Table 6.2.
Since an IQ grants the owner a right to catch a fixed percentage of the
TAC, the price of an IQ should reflect the present discounted value of the
expected flow of Hotelling rents from the quota. Therefore rising quota share
prices indicates an increase in Hotelling rents, which can be attributable to
increasing economic efficiency and the sustainable management of the fish-
ery. For example, the price for renting Icelandic cod fishing quota increased
from $0.05 to $0.09 per kilogram in 1984 to approximately $1 per kilogram
in 1994. Similarly, the price of quota shares in many of New Zealands fish-
Table 6.2
Effects of Derby Reduction, Resulting from IQ Fishery Management, on
the Seafood Processing Industry
Location Fishery Ex-vessel Number of Proportion
price processors product fresh
British Columbia Halibut and + + +
sablefish
Alaska Halibut and + + +
sablefish
Iceland Cod + +
New Zealand, Rock lobster + + Increased live
Australia
Scotia-Fundy, Groundfish + +
Canada
Source: Hackett et al. (2005).
eries has increased. For example, the average sales price of abalone quota
increased from $NZ50,000 per metric ton in 1991 to approximately
$NZ190,000 per metric ton in 1994 (National Research Council 1999).
There are a number of issues that can make IQs difficult to implement. First,
it must be possible to establish a TAC on the fishery, which from a biological
point of view may be difficult. Moreover, it must be feasible to monitor land-
ings to prevent cheating on quota shares. Second, quota shares must be allo-
cated to individuals, vessels, or coastal communities, and the initial quota
allocation can be contentious. A common practice is to allocate initial quota
shares based on historical landings. If conflict already exists on the fishery due
to significant capacity differences in vessels or due to recent entry by vessels
displaced from other fisheries, this conflict is likely to be manifested in initial
quota assignments. Conflict can also occur over whether processors are to be
allocated quota shares. Moreover, if individual quotas are being allocated, there
is an issue over whether crewmembers should receive quota shares, which
introduces further problems due to poor documentation of crewmember tenure
on the fishery. Third, a decision must be made about whether IQs are to be
tradable. If IQs are to be tradable, then a determination must be made regard-
ing who is allowed to purchase quota shares and whether there is to be an
upper limit on quota holdings by an individual, vessel, or community. Limits
on quota shares were not established on the IQs for the Atlantic surf clam/
ocean quahog fishery, which led to some degree of ownership concentration
and concerns about market power and rapid declines in total employment (Na-
tional Research Council 1999). Fourth, some see IQ systems as a giveaway of
public resources to private individuals, and so a decision must be made over
146 POLICY
whether some sort of auction or tax should be used to reclaim Hotelling rent
from fisheries, and to fund monitoring and enforcement.
Effort quotas have been used to limit effort and reduce overcapitalization
in fisheries. Most of the effort quotas used in the United States have been
trap certificate programs in pot fisheries for crustaceans such as Dungeness
crab and spiny lobster. In the case of trap certificates, a total number of traps
for the fishery is established, and trap quota shares or certificates are usually
assigned to fishers based on individual landings history in the fishery. As
with IQs, trap certificates can be tradable. Effort quotas have also been used
for Atlantic groundfish and scallops through fleetwide days-at-sea limita-
tions (National Research Council 1999). While effort quotas can reduce over-
capitalization and to some degree temporally spread landings, they do not
establish rights to fish prior to capture and thus do not resolve all of the
negative aspects of derby fisheries.
Unfortunately, there is even less information available on the performance
of effort quotas such as trap certificate programs than there is on IQs. A trap
certificate program was instituted in 1992 for the Florida spiny lobster fish-
ery. The purpose of the program was to stabilize the fishery and increase
yield per trap by reducing the total number of traps. Because of the trap
certificate program, the number of spiny lobster traps decreased by 42 per-
cent, from the 940,000 reported in 199192 prior to the certificate program,
to 544,000 in the 199899 season (Milon, Larkin, and Lee 1998). They also
report an increasing, though still small, degree of concentration in the spiny
lobster fishing industry. As a result of the reduction in traps the average price
of individual trap certificates sold to nonfamily members rose from about $5
in 1994 to about $20 in 1998 (Milon, Larkin, and Lee 1998).
Aquaculture
While most of the worlds marine capture fisheries have reached or exceeded
full exploitation, aquaculture, or fish farming, continues to grow in both ab-
solute levels and as a percentage of total fish production. According to the
FAO (2002), aquacultures contribution to global supplies of fish, crusta-
ceans, and molluscs continues to grow, increasing from 3.9 percent of total
production by weight in 1970 to 27.3 percent in 2000. In 2000, aquaculture
provided over 36 percent of the worlds food fish supplies. Aquaculture is
growing more rapidly than all other animal food-producing sectors. World-
wide, the sector has increased at an average compounded rate of 9.2 percent
per year since 1970, compared with only 1.4 percent for capture fisheries
and 2.8 percent for terrestrial farmed meat production systems. Approxi-
mately one-third of the shrimp consumed in 1996 were produced by aqua-
culture, and 60 percent of all salmon consumed in 2003 was farmed. Fresh-
water aquaculture production represents approximately 60 percent of total
aquaculture production. While freshwater aquaculture is dominated by fin-
fish production such as carp, shellfish dominate marine aquaculture. In 2000
China was by far the dominant producer of farmed fish in the world, produc-
ing nearly 68 percent of total world aquaculture production; 82 percent of
world aquaculture production occurs in lower-income food-deficit countries.
High-value aquaculture species include giant tiger prawns, Pacific cupped
oysters, various carp, and Atlantic salmon.
While aquaculture is an important source of food in food-deficit coun-
tries, in some cases aquaculture can harm wild fishery stocks. For example,
some shrimp farmers engage in large-scale biomass fishingfine-mesh
net fishing that catches large numbers of the juveniles from wild fishery
stocks. The construction of pens for coastal fish or shrimp farms accounts for
a substantial proportion of the decline in the worlds mangrove ecosystems,
which are essential as nurseries for many species of fish and as natural
water filtration systems. For example, Nixon (1996) reports that approxi-
mately 75 percent of the original mangrove forest existing in the Philip-
pines in the 1920s is gone, with the trees harvested for lumber and the sites
commonly transformed into shrimp farms. Safina (1994) reports that the
farming of groupers, milkfish, and eels requires that hatchlings be cap-
tured from wild stocks because they cannot be bred in captivity, which puts
further pressure on wild stocks. The density of fish in aquaculture facilities
increases the potential for diseases to spread, which increases the risk of
lost production to operators and creates the potential for the spread of dis-
ease to wild stocks.
In addition to impacts on marine ecology, aquaculture also has economic
impacts on marine capture fisheries. Consider, for example, the case of farmed
and wild salmon. The farming of salmon in net pens set up in protected
coastal areas was pioneered commercially in Norway in the 1970s. The origi-
nal perception was that farmed salmon would reduce pressure on wild stocks
and provide economic opportunities for coastal communities impacted by de-
clining wild stocks. Industry observers note that the idealistic vision for salmon
farming was based on small-scale operations producing farmed fish at prices
above those that prevailed for salmon from capture fisheries. Yet high prices
and increasing consumer demand under competitive conditions in the world
seafood market elicited large-scale entry by new salmon aquaculture operators
in coastal countries with suitable ocean conditions around the world, including
Canada, Chile, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Scotland. Falling prices
forced operators to exploit economies of scale, causing the industry to consoli-
date into a relatively small number of large operators, and these cost-cutting
148 POLICY
moves resulted in further downward pressure on prices. Farmed salmon is now

an international protein commodity that competes directly with salmon from
wild stocks, as well as beef, chicken, and other protein products.
According to the Alaska Salmon Industry Baseline Study (Alaska Depart-
ment of Community and Economic Development 2003), in Alaska, where salmon
farming is banned, wild salmon from the states stocks have been significantly
displaced in the world market by farmed salmon. In 1980 wild Alaskan salmon
represented 43 percent of all the salmon consumed worldwide, and farmed salmon
represented only 1 percent of world consumption. Over the following twenty-
one years, the market share captured by wild Alaskan salmon declined steadily
while that of farmed salmon increased. By 2001 wild Alaskan salmon held only
a 19 percent share of the world salmon market. This study goes on to note that
the development of large-scale salmon farming roughly tripled overall salmon
consumption and transformed product preferences.
While the wild salmon market was traditionally for canned or frozen as a
headed and gutted product, with a small, seasonal fresh salmon component,
farmed production provided fresh fish year round to consumers. The attrac-
tiveness of farmed salmon to retailers and secondary processors stemmed from
a number of factors, including overall quality, consistency of supply, and elimi-
nation of inventory requirements. Moreover, the strong U.S. dollar made farmed
salmon imports from Canada, Chile, and Norway even more price-competi-
tive, while reducing the price competitiveness of wild Alaskan salmon exports
to Japan. The result has been a price squeeze on Alaskan salmon fishermen
and processors. Currently industry participants from salmon capture fisheries
are focusing on providing quality fresh product and emphasizing the environ-
mental and possible health benefits of consuming wild salmon.
Summary
From an economic standpoint, a fishery refers to the interaction of hu-

man harvest activities, environmental conditions, and the population
dynamics associated with one or more species of fish.
The term capture fishery refers to the enterprise of catching wild
marine or inland fish, which can be contrasted with aquaculture, or
fish farming.
As was described in chapter 5, capture fisheries frequently have the
characteristics of common-pool resources. Consequently, unconstrained
rivalry among fishery participants, such as under the property rights
system of open access, can result in the depletion of the resource and
the economic rents that fishery participants derive from that resource.
Total landings from marine and freshwater capture fisheries (excluding
China) grew from around 20 million metric tons in 1950 to a peak of 83

million metric tons in 1989, and ranged between 70 and 80 million metric
tons between 1996 and 2001.
Global fishing pressure continues to increase, the number of
underexploited and moderately exploited fishery resources continues to
decline slightly, the number of fully exploited stocks remains relatively
stable, and the number of overexploited, depleted, and recovering stocks
is increasing slightly. Landings from about 75 percent of the worlds
major marine fish stocks are expected either to remain constant or to
decline in the future.
A bioeconomic equilibrium occurs when the harvest rate equals the
growth rate of fish stocks. With a logistic stock growth function, if the
harvest rate is set below the maximum sustainable yield, a given level
of harvest can be generated from high and low levels of effort. The
group-optimum level of total effort applied to a fishery maximizes total
Hotelling rent for fishery participants.
Marine fishery management programs that allow participants to com-
pete for shares of a fixed total quantity of available fish (such as with a
TAC) often become overcapitalized and feature a race for fish, or derby,
that results in temporally compressed landings, reduced profits for par-
ticipants, a more highly concentrated processing industry, and at times
less desirable frozen products.
In contrast, marine fishery management that allocates quota shares of a
fixed TAC to participants do not become overcapitalized and do not
feature derby conditions. If these individual quotas are transferable, then
remaining vessels can operate efficiently even in depleted fisheries,
though there is the potential for concentrated quota ownership.
In 2000 aquaculture provided over 36 percent of the worlds food fish
supplies. Aquaculture is growing more rapidly than all other animal
food-producing sectors.
While the farming of filter-feeding animals such as oysters can improve
water quality, there are significant environmental problems associated
with shrimp and salmon aquaculture.
1. Research project: Identify an interesting fishery not covered in this chap-

ter and write a three-page essay that describes (i) trends in landings, (ii) key
fishery management milestones, and (iii) prices and other economic condi-
tions in the fishery. Evaluate how well fishery management has performed in
terms of protecting the resource and providing for the needs of fishermen,
150 POLICY
processors, fishery-dependent communities, and consumers.

2. Californias Dungeness crab fishery includes relatively small vessels that
each fish an average of approximately 150 traps, medium-sized vessels that
each fish an average of 250 traps, and large vessels that each fish an average of
450 traps. If the overall economic performance of this fishery would be im-
proved by reducing the number of traps fished, what is the maximum number
of traps that each vessel should be allowed to fish? What are the pros and cons
of a single trap limit for all vessels versus a trap limit that varies proportion-
ately with vessel size? Who are the winners and the losers in each case?
3. In what way is a company town, where workers can be employed only
by a single firm, similar to the case of a monopsony processor that buys all
the fish from commercial fishermen in a coastal region? How would prevail-
ing wages (or fish prices) compare to markets where there are more employ-
ers (or fish processors)?
4. Spreadsheet simulation (more advanced): Suppose that stock growth is
given by F(X) = aX bX2, where (a = r, b = r/k). Note that steady-state
harvest H = E[a/b E/b]. If for simplicity we assume that P = 1 and total
costs are given by TC = cE, then the open-access equilibrium occurs where
TR = TC, implying that E[a/b E/b]= cE, or E0 = a bc. The group optimum
equilibrium occurs where MR = MC. With P = 1, then MR = a/b 2E/b. Thus
the group-optimum equilibrium occurs where a/b 2E/b = c, or E* = a bc
/2. Assuming that a = 1000, b = 1, p = $1, c = $100:
a. Solve for the group-optimum and open-access equilibrium values

for E, X, and H.
b. Create a table that shows F(X) values for 50-unit increments of X (starting
at X = 0 up to X = 1000). Plot the F(X) values from the table in a fully
labeled diagram and show the group optimum and open access equi-
librium values for X on the horizontal axis, and for H on the vertical axis.
Internet Links
Food and Agriculture Organizations Fisheries Department (www.fao.org/

fi/default.asp): The place to access various reports on the state of the worlds
marine capture fisheries, inland fisheries, and aquaculture.
National Marine Fisheries Service (www.nmfs.gov/): Learn about federal

regulation of U.S. marine capture fisheries.
World Resources Institute (www.wri.org/): Excellent source of global in-

formation on the state of the worlds natural resources.
Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development. 2003. Alaska Salmon

Industry Baseline Study. Alaska Department of Community and Economic Devel-
opment. www.dced.state.ak.us/oed/seafood/pub/BaseLineStudy.pdf.
Canadian Department of Fish and Oceans. A Recent Account of Canadas Atlantic
Cod Fishery. www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/kids-enfants/map-carte/map_e.htm.
Casey, K., C. Dewees, B. Turris, and J. Wilen. 1995. The Effects of Individual Vessel
Quotas in the British Columbia Halibut Fishery. Marine Resource Economics 10:
21130.
Clark, I. 1993. Individual Transferable Quotas: The New Zealand Experience. Ma-
rine Policy, September 17: 34042.
Dewees, C., K. Sortais, S. Hackett, M. Krachey, and D. Hankin. 2004. Racing for
Crabs: Costs and Management Options in Californias Commercial Dungeness
Crab Fishery. California Agriculture 58 (OctoberDecember): 18693.
Didier A. 2002. The Pacific Coast Dungeness Crab Fishery. Paper, Pacific States
Marine Fisheries Commission, Gladstone, OR.
Hackett, S. 2002. An Economic Overview of the California Wetfish Industry Com-
plex. In Californias Wetfish Industry: Its Importance Past, Present and Fu-
ture, ed. D. Pleschner-Steele. Santa Barbara, CA: California Seafood Council.
Hackett, S., M. Krachey, S. Brown, and D. Hankin. 2005. Derby Fisheries, Indi-
vidual Quotas, and Transition in the Fish Processing Industry. Marine Resource
Economics, 20 (1) (April): 4760.
Hackett, S., M. Krachey, C. Dewees, D. Hankin, and K. Sortais. 2003. An Eco-
nomic Overview of Dungeness Crab (Cancer magister) Processing in Cali-
fornia. California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigations Reports 44:
8693.
Hankin, D., and R. Warner. 2001. Dungeness Crab. In Californias Living Marine
Resources: A Status Report, ed. W. Leet, C. Dewees, R. Klingbeil, and E. Larson.
Sacramento: California Department of Fish and Game.
Hartwick, J., and N. Olewiler. 1998. The Economics of Natural Resource Use. 2nd ed.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Matulich, S., R. Mittelhammer, and C. Reberte. 1996. Toward a More Complete
Model of Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas: Implications of Incorporating
the Processing Sector. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
31: 11228.
Fisheries, 18501980. London: Cambridge University Press.
McGinn, A.1998. Rocking the Boat: Conserving Fisheries and Protecting Jobs.
Worldwatch Paper 142. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.
Milon, J., S. Larkin, and D. Lee. 1998. The Performance of Floridas Spiny Lobster
Trap Certificate Program. Paper, Gainesville: Florida Sea Grant College Program.
National Research Council. 1999. Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on
Individual Fishing Quotas. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
New England Fishery Management Council. Frequently asked questions. www.nefmc.org.
Nixon, W. 1996. Rainforest Shrimp. Mother Jones 21 (MarchApril): 3135, 7173.
OECD. 1997. Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Manage-
ment of Living Marine Resources. Paper, Paris: OECD.
152 POLICY
Pacific Fishery Management Council, Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC).

2000. Overcapitalization in the West Coast Groundfish Fishery: Background, Is-
sues and Solutions. www.pcouncil.org/Groundfish/ssc_report_all.pdf.
Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission (PMFC). 1978. Dungeness Crab Project of
the StateFederal Fisheries Management Program. Portland, OR: Pacific Marine
Fisheries Commission.
Ruitenbeek, H. 1996. The Great Canadian Fishery Collapse: Some Policy Lessons.
Ecological Economics 19 (November): 1036.
Russell, D. 1996. Fisheries in Crisis (Part II). E Magazine 7 (SeptemberOctober).
Safina, C. 1994. Where Have All the Fishes Gone? Issues in Science and Technol-
ogy 10 (Spring): 3743.
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 1990. Yearbook of Fishery
Statistics. Rome: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
______. 1998. Yearbook of Fishery Statistics. Rome: United Nations Food and Agri-
culture Organization.
. 2002. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Rome: United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization.
Weber, P. 1994. Net Loss: Fish, Jobs, and the Marine Environment. Worldwatch
Paper 120. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.
Wilen, J. 2000. Renewable Resource Economists and Policy: What Differences Have
We Made? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39: 30627.
Wolfe, P., P. Smith, and D. Bergen. 2001. Pacific Sardine. In Californias Living
Marine Resources: A Status Report, ed. W. Leet, C. Dewees, R. Klingbeil, and E.
Larson. Sacramento: California Department of Fish and Game.
Young, Richard. 2001. Buying Back the Groundfish Fleet. Fishermans Marketing
Association. www.trawl.org.
7
Measurement and
Analysis of Benefits and Costs
Introduction: Benefit/Cost Analysis
This chapter provides an overview of the methods used to measure the benefits
and the costs of environmental protection, as well as a description of benefit/
cost analysis (BCA). The goal is to introduce the reader to these concepts and
the ways in which they have been applied in assessing proposed projects, policy
changes, and man-made damages to the environment. Readers interested in
going beyond this introductory treatment and developing the technical skills
required to conduct nonmarket valuation studies, cost assessments, and other
elements of benefit/cost analysis can begin with the citations list and Internet
links to technical studies listed at the end of the chapter.
Enhancing environmental conservation and restoration entails opportunity
costs. Examples of these opportunity costs include the economic value of har-
vested timber, fishery, or mineral resources left undeveloped; the profitable
investment opportunities lost when firms are required to invest in pollution-
control machinery and equipment; and the alternative use of tax revenues allo-
cated by government for increased monitoring and enforcement. While there
are many philosophical and conceptual problems with benefit/cost analysis
(which we will explore below), policy decisions are made in the context of
scarcity, and so policy decisions entail opportunity costs. Informed decision
making ultimately requires that we rank alternatives and confront the net ben-
efits of one policy option with the opportunity cost of that choice. Unless soci-
ety can agree that certain environmental policies are intrinsically right, it is
very difficult to avoid some form of benefit/cost analysis of social policy.
153
154 POLICY
While costs are frequently measured in monetary terms, many of the

benefits of environmental policy derive from improvements in aspects of
the environment and human health that are not traded in markets, and so
their value is not expressed in monetary terms. Thus a common metric is
needed in order to compare the apples and oranges of benefits and costs.
People routinely make the apples and oranges comparison of benefits
and costs for themselves based on their values and preferences. When some-
one buys a good or service, they are comparing money cost with the utility
or pleasure of the good that they anticipate receiving in exchange. If people
know the quality of the good before purchase, then we can use the money
that they spend on a good or service as a measurable indicator of their
unmeasurable utility. If we aggregate the money spent on a particular good
or service by all buyers, we can get a (perhaps crude) measure of the ag-
gregate social utility generated by that good or service. Nevertheless, what
if we are trying to measure the social utility of protecting an aspect of the
natural environment that is not bought or sold in markets? We will discuss
various techniques for measuring the value of nonmarketed environmental
amenities later in this chapter.
Another metric for aggregating utility is provided by political systems. In
democratic systems, we can use voting patterns as a binary indicator of the
relative utility that voters have for various political candidates or ballot mea-
sures. Of course, because all human societies feature inequalities of wealth
and power, both markets and politics are flawed instruments for measuring
social utility. Benefit/cost analysis usually uses money as a measure of util-
ity, and thus monetizing benefits and costs is an important aspect of such an
analysis. In chapter 8 we shall discuss political economy, which evaluates
policy alternatives based on preferences revealed through voting and politi-
cal influence.
Jules Dupuit offers one of the earliest discussions of benefit/cost analysis
in his book On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works (1844). Dupuit
argued that the output of a project (e.g., water generated by a water filtration
system) multiplied by per-unit market price gives an estimate of the mini-
mum social benefit of the project. Some consumers are willing to pay more,
but this information may not be available for valuation purposes. One of the
first applications of BCA was in the U.S. Flood Control Act of 1936. In this
legislation, Congress declared that the benefits associated with federal projects,
to whomsoever they may accrue, should exceed costs. While benefits were
supposed to exceed costs, no consistent methods were offered for measuring
these benefits and costs. The Corps of Engineers, Soil Conservation Service,
Bureau of Reclamation, and so on, all used different approaches. In 1950 the
Federal Interagency River Basin Committee issued a publication called Pro-
BENEFITS AND COSTS 155
posed Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects, also known
as the green book, which provided a uniform best-practices guide for vari-
ous agencies involved with public projects.
In the current environmental policy debate, benefit/cost analysis has be-
come a highly charged, controversial issue. Some wish to increase the use of
benefit/cost analysis in order to enhance the efficiency of government regu-
lation. It can be argued, however, that benefit/cost analysis is inappropriate
as the single deciding policy factor in many circumstances where its use is
proposed. Elements of this argument include:
Using benefit/cost analysis as the single deciding factor in setting policy

assumes implicitly that the values of all objects and states of affairs are
commensurable, meaning that they can be ranked based on a single
characteristic of value such as money or utility. Yet issues of fairness,
ethics, and spirituality may not be commensurable with monetized costs
or benefits. Can we compare the value of a unique sacred place to the
revenues and jobs created by logging, mining, or grazing the site?
Scientists and others do not fully understand the interdependencies in
ecosystems, and so when we do benefit/cost analysis on one element of
the ecosystem (for example, on preserving a particular species or dam-
ming a segment of river), we cannot understand the benefit/cost impli-
cations for all the other elements of the ecosystem. In other words, so-
cial and ecological systems may be too complex to quantify compre-
hensively through benefit/cost analysis.
Some of the benefits of environmental improvements include the re-
duced loss of human life. Placing an infinite value on a human life in
benefit/cost analysis would lead to the conclusion that all of the worlds
resources should be allocated toward prevention of any one death, an
unlikely choice of social policy. Yet if we measure the value of a human
life based on income generation, then the analysis will tell us that a life
in a rich country is worth more than one in a poor country. In this case
benefit/cost analysis will yield the unethical conclusion that it is effi-
cient to dispose of toxics and other life-threatening pollutants in low-
income countries because lives saved in rich countries are worth more
than lives lost in poor countries. For example, Bowland and Beghin
(1998) estimated that the value of a statistical life saved in Santiago,
Chile, due to reduced air pollution is approximately $600,000, which is
only about 12.5 percent of the $4.8 million value of an American statis-
tical life used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1997).
The Nazis applied similar efficiency arguments regarding the differ-
ential value of human lives to justify the euthanasia of groups such as
156 POLICY
the disabled. Thus, benefit/cost analysis can lead to environmental dis-

crimination and racism.
When we use benefit/cost analysis to evaluate projects or policies that
affect future generations, we must somehow decide on how to bring the
benefits and costs accruing to these future generations into the present.
While discounting clearly makes sense in individual behavior, if we
apply discounting to benefit/cost analysis, are we robbing future gen-
erations to benefit the present? Moreover, since we do not know the
values and preferences of future generations, we must project our own
upon them.
When we monetize benefits and costs without regard to who receives
them, we are implicitly assuming that a dollar generates the same incre-
mental gain in pleasure or marginal utility to all people. Yet this is not
generally true when wealth is highly unequally distributed; for example,
a $10 gain to a mother with a hungry child likely generates substan-
tially higher marginal utility than it would to a billionaire. Thus, poli-
cies that generate the greatest net monetary benefit may in fact generate
a substantially inefficient level of human happiness when we assume
that the marginal utility of money is the same for all people.
While it is clear that monetization and benefit/cost analysis capture at best

only parts of the total impact of a policy, and so should not be considered a
sole guide to policy, data on benefits and costs can be informative and valu-
able. Along these lines Munda (1996) and others argue for integrated envi-
ronmental assessment, which combines benefit/cost analysis with other
ecological, social, and political factors in environmental policy analysis.
Efficiency
An economic process is said to be efficient if it produces something of

value with a minimum of waste. What we mean by waste, however, de-
pends on our norms and objectives. For example, if the objective is to maxi-
mize profit, then a timber company will want to use least-cost harvest
methods to prevent the waste of potential profit. Doing so, however, may
result in damage to the ecosystem of the affected area. Yet since the objec-
tive is to maximize profit, damage to the ecosystem is not counted as waste;
in this context, waste would be defined as lost profits created by more
costly sustainable forestry practices. On the other hand, if the objective
were sustainable forestry, then a clear cut would create waste because it
would damage aspects of the ecosystem that are integral to sustainable
forestry practices. In the specific context of benefit/cost analysis, efficiency
refers to the extent to which a particular policy improves upon status quo
social utility as measured by net (monetary) benefits.
If there is a range of possible policy options, then the efficient policy
option is the one that generates the largest improvement in social utility. As
was discussed in chapter 2, there are two different criteria for judging the
efficiency of social policy. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion states that
the efficient policy option generates the largest net monetary benefits rela-
tive to the other policy alternatives. In contrast, the more restrictive Pareto
efficiency criterion states that an efficient policy option makes some people
better off and nobody worse off when compared to the status quo. The
Pareto criterion is considered nearly impossible to satisfy in actual policy
analysis, and so Kaldor-Hicks is the usual efficiency criterion used. While
the usual method of performing benefit/cost analysis is to maximize the
present value (PV) of net monetary benefits (as described below), an alter-
native method is to select policies that generate the greatest amount of
monetary benefit for each dollar of cost; called the benefit/cost ratio method.
The ratio method tends to favor smaller projects, while the net monetary
benefit method tends to favor larger projects. In the presentation that fol-
lows, we will assume that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion is applied
to the PV of net benefits.
Maximizing Net Present Value (PV)
The concepts of PV and dynamic efficiency were first introduced in chapter

5. Here we will apply the PV methodology to benefit/cost analysis. To calcu-
late the PV of net benefits, we must first estimate the flow of benefits and
costs from various project alternatives for each year into the future. Then we
choose an appropriate discount rate (the rate of interest charged if you loan
money for a year rather than use that money yourself) and compute the PV of
the net benefits for each year into the future. As we learned in chapter 5, we
can calculate the PV of net benefits as follows:
PVNB = (B0 C0)/(1 + r)0 + (B1 C1)/(1 + r)1 + . . . + (Bn Cn )/(1 + r)n
Note that C = cost in a given time period, B = benefit in a given time

period, r = discount rate, and n is the end period of the project in years from
the present. (B1 C1), for example, refers to net benefits received one year
from the present. The expression (1 + r)n means that the sum (1 + r) is taken
to the nth power.
Discounting will tend to undermine those policies that have large up-
front costs, and benefits that are cast into the future, such as with green-
158 POLICY
Table 7.1
Hypothetical PV of Costs and Benefits for Control of Sulfur Dioxide

Emissions (in millions of dollars)
1. Percentage 3. Marginal 5. Marginal

of sulfur cost benefit
dioxide 2. (change in 2 (change in 6. Marginal 7. Total
emissions Total divided by 4. Total 4 divided by net benefit net benefit
eliminated cost change in 1) benefit change in 1) (5 minus 3) (4 minus 2)
10 30 3 500 50 47 470
20 80 5 970 47 42 890
30 160 8 1,370 40 32 1,210
40 310 15 1,700 33 18 1,390
50 560 25 1,950 25 0 1,390
60 920 36 2,100 15 21 1,180
70 1,400 48 2,175 7.5 40.5 7,75
80 2,010 61 2,205 3 58 1,95
90 2,760 75 2,220 1.5 73.5 5,40
100 3,670 91 2,225 .5 90.5 1,445
house gas emissions control and global warming. To see this, note that
the PV of $100 of benefit received fifty years from now, using a standard
10 percent discount rate, is only 85 cents. Therefore 85 cents deposited
today in a financial investment paying 10 percent interest will compound
in value to $100 in fifty years. If the federal government routinely uses a
10 percent discount rate, then spending more than 85 cents on a policy
today that will generate $100 of benefits fifty years from now will not
pass a benefit/cost test. This subject will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 13.
An Illustrative Example of Benefit/Cost Analysis
Acid rain in the eastern United States and Canada is caused by sulfur dioxide
emitted from sources such as the smokestacks of coal-fired power plants.
Acid rain (and other forms of acid deposition) lowers the pH of soil, streams,
and water bodies, thereby reducing biotic productivity and at times even
killing entire species of animals and plants. We can consider a variety of
different levels of sulfur dioxide control. Benefit/cost analysis can be used to
determine the policy alternative that yields the largest net monetary benefit.
Consider the hypothetical PV of costs and benefits (in millions of dollars)
associated with each incremental 10 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide in
Table 7.1. Assume for a moment that the monetary values given in the table
fully measure the benefits and the costs associated with controlling sulfur
dioxide emissions.
Figure 7.1 Level of Pollution Control That Maximizes Total Net Benefit
Occurs Where Marginal Benefit Equals Marginal Cost
MB, MC
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
50 Percentage of total
pollution emissions
reduced
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the relationship between marginal benefits
and costs, and total net benefits. When an additional increment of pollution
abatement generates marginal benefits that exceed marginal cost, then mar-
ginal net benefit is positive, and therefore total net benefit increases with
additional cleanup. At some point, an increment of additional pollution abate-
ment will generate a marginal benefit that is equal to marginal cost, which
means that marginal net benefit is zero, and total net benefit remains un-
changed. Any further increment of additional pollution abatement will gen-
erate marginal benefit that is less than marginal cost, which means that
marginal net benefit is negative, and total net benefit declines. Therefore,
total net benefit is maximized when marginal benefit equals marginal cost.
This illustrates a more general analytical tool used in microeconomics, called
marginal analysis, which helps us identify a maximum (such as the maxi-
mum total net benefit in Table 7.1) by evaluating marginal benefits and mar-
ginal costs. The equimarginal principle states that the optimal allocation
occurs when marginal benefit equals marginal cost. Recall that we used mar-
160 POLICY
Figure 7.2 Total Net Benefit Curve

$
0
50 Percentage of total
pollution emissions
reduced
Total net benefit
ginal analysis in chapter 4 to find the competitive market supply curve using
the price equals marginal cost rule.
The efficient level of sulfur dioxide pollution control is found where total
net benefits are maximized, which in the example above happens to occur at
the 50 percent level of control. To see how we arrive at the conclusion that
the 50 percent level of pollution control maximizes total net benefits, apply
the methodology described in the preceding paragraph. Note that as one be-
gins the first increment of the cleanup process, marginal net benefits are
positive, meaning that the initial 10 percent increment of cleanup adds mar-
ginal benefits that exceed marginal cost. Therefore, the first 10 percent in-
crement of cleanup causes total net benefits to increase. Likewise, as long as
an additional increment of cleanup generates positive marginal net benefits
they will continue to increase total net benefits. At some point, marginal net
benefits will become zero, which corresponds to maximum total net ben-
efits. When the marginal net benefits of further cleanup become negative
(which occurs when the level of pollution abatement increases from 50 to 60
percent in the example above), total net benefit declines with any additional
pollution reduction. Consequently, in our example the efficient level of sul-
fur dioxide pollution control occurs at the 50 percent level of control.
Note that in our example the marginal costs of cleanup are rising, while
the marginal benefits are falling. While this does not always have to be the
case, we generally expect marginal costs to rise. For example, the first 10
percent reduction in sulfur dioxide may be accomplished by rather inexpen-
sive replacement of low-sulfur for high-sulfur coal in coal-burning electric
generator facilities. Yet the last 10 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide (from
90 percent control to complete elimination of all sulfur dioxide emissions)
may require the immediate elimination of all fossil fuel burning in the world,
which would entail an enormous short-term cost. We may expect the mar-
ginal benefits of sulfur dioxide control to decline; the first 10 percent reduc-
tion occurs in a highly polluted situation, while the last 10 percent reduction
may have little noticeable effect because the environment can naturally as-
similate that last 10 percent of emissions.
It has been pointed out that we may not need regulations to achieve the
efficient level of pollution control described above. In particular, economist
Ronald Coase argued that the efficient outcome might also be realized if we
assign and enforce property rights and allow people to resolve pollution dis-
putes through negotiation. We will consider this point in detail below.
The Coase Theorem
The Coase theorem is based on a very simple and intuitive argument. Sup-
pose that environmental protection or enhancement benefits one group of
people and imposes costs on another. If the benefits of environmental protec-
tion exceed the costs, then the positive total net benefits from cleanup can be
thought of as a pie to be divided between members of society. The size of the
pie is maximized at the efficient level of pollution control, such as the 50
percent level of control in the example in the preceding section of the chap-
ter. Suppose that all stakeholders involved with a localized pollution prob-
lem are cognizant of the efficient level of pollution control. The Coase theorem
simply states that a way to achieve this efficient outcome would be to (i)
determine who holds the relevant property rights and (ii) arrange for a pay-
ment that makes it mutually satisfactory for all parties to adopt the efficient
pollution-control outcome.
For example, suppose there is an auto body shop near a new housing de-
velopment in the process of being built. The citys nuisance law has a thresh-
old of 125 decibels, and the auto body shop emits 120. In this case, the auto
body shop holds the relevant property rights and can legally operate. Sup-
pose that there are two ways to eliminate the noise. One is to move the auto
body shop at a cost of $300,000, and the other is to install sound-absorbing
materials in the shop for $100,000 that will eliminate the bothersome noise.
Also suppose that eliminating the noise will result in a $1 million increase in
residential property values in the development. In this case, the installation
162 POLICY
of sound-absorbing materials is efficient, generating a $900,000 pie to be

divided. With the rights held by the auto body shop, the Coase theorem sim-
ply states that the efficient outcome can be realized by having the developer
enter into a legally binding contract with the auto body shop in which the
developer pays to install the sound-absorbing material.
Now suppose that the auto body shop is exceeding the decibel threshold
for residential areas. Now the residential developer holds the relevant prop-
erty rights. As before, the efficient solution is to install sound-absorbing
materials in the auto body shop. With the rights held by the developer, the
Coase theorem states that the efficient outcome can be realized by having the
auto body shop enter into a legally binding contract with the developer in
which the auto body shop pays to install the sound-absorbing material. This
remains less expensive than moving the shop, and generates considerable
net benefits to society. Either way, the efficient outcome is achieved by way
of a negotiated contract, without government regulatory intervention.
What Coase and other economists found interesting is that the same over-
all social efficiency gain will result regardless of who owns the right to
control the environmental improvement. Under certain conditions, it does
not matter who holds the property rights. In particular, this Coase theorem
result will hold under the following conditions:
It is feasible to assign property rights to aspects of the environment

such as clean air, water, and earth.
There are positive net benefits from environmental improvement.
The transaction costs of coordinating people and conducting the nego-
tiation process are low.
There is no free-rider problem in gathering payment funds from a group
of stakeholders.
Any agreement that is reached is legally enforceable.
In addition to the problems mentioned at the start of the chapter concern-

ing monetization and benefit/cost analysis, transaction costs and free riding
also plague Coasian contracting. Transaction costs are simply the costs asso-
ciated with arranging a transaction. In the case of Coasian contracting, the
cost of bringing together and coordinating large numbers of stakeholders
would require large expenditures for coordination and communication. Free
riding refers to behavior in which people receive benefits from the creation
of a public good or a common-pool resource but choose not to make a volun-
tary contribution toward the production of those goods. Transaction costs
and free riding tend to become larger as more and more people are included
in the negotiation process.
For example, suppose that we tried to use Coasian contracting to resolve

the problem of halocarbons damaging the earths stratospheric ozone layer.
Billions of people benefit and would need to either be compensated or make
a payment, depending upon who holds the relevant rights. The cost of coor-
dinating such negotiations would entail prohibitive transaction expenses. In
addition, with large numbers of people benefiting from a cleaner environ-
ment trying to pool money to buy out a major polluter, a self-interested indi-
vidual may say, The plan will work even if I dont pay my $50, with the
result (possibly) being a failure of collective action. For these reasons, Coasian
contracting is far more likely to be used for small-scale environmental prob-
lems involving small numbers of affected individuals, such as neighbors
working out problems over a fence. When large numbers of people are in-
volved, government intervention can reduce transaction costs and the free-
rider problem that would otherwise exist under Coasian contracting.
Operationalizing Benefit/Cost Analysis in U.S.

Environmental Policy
Since Executive Order 12044, issued by President Jimmy Carter in 1978,

federal regulations such as those for protecting health, safety, and the envi-
ronment are required to be cost-effective, and federal agencies must quantify
the benefits and costs for the various regulations that they administer. As
Viscusi (1996) points out, this cost-effectiveness test did not tend to screen
out inefficient methods of regulatory administration because alternative regu-
latory methods were rarely identified. Since Executive Order 12291, issued
by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, the federal government must show that
regulations pass a benefit/cost test. In an important U.S. Supreme Court case
dealing with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
cotton-dust regulation in the workplace, however, the Court argued that the
legislative mandate placed a feasibility test rather than a benefit/cost test on
such regulation (American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490 [1981]). In UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Circuit, 1991), the
U.S. Court of Appeals allowed that OSHA was not foreclosed from using a
benefit/cost test in the promulgation of its regulations. Viscusi reports that
many federal regulatory agencies currently interpret their mandate as ex-
empting them from the executive orders regarding benefit/cost testing. In
Executive Order 12866, the Clinton administration broadened the definition
of benefits in Reagans executive order to acknowledge the difficulty of mon-
etizing all relevant regulatory benefits.
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), reauthorized in 1996, now re-
quires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to utilize benefit/cost
164 POLICY
analysis for new regulations. While the SDWA requires the EPA to publish
these benefit/cost analyses, it does not bind the EPA to reject regulations
based on their failure to pass a benefit/cost test. The Clean Air Act (CAA)
amendments of 1990 required the EPA to conduct a benefit/cost analysis of
the original CAA of 1970. In its report, the EPA (1997) states that the
benefits of the CAA between 1970 and 1990 had a central estimate of $22.2
trillion in constant 1990 dollars. Only a subset of the known negative ex-
ternalities associated with air pollution was included, primarily adverse
human health effects, along with some agricultural and visibility impacts.
Due to resource and data limitations, improvements in ecological and other
conditions were not quantified in the assessment. For this reason, the esti-
mated benefits can be considered understated. Estimates of the direct costs
of complying with the CAA during this period are approximately $0.5 tril-
lion in constant 1990 dollars. Thus each $1 of compliance cost to the
economy is estimated to have generated over $44 in benefits. It is interest-
ing to point out that the original CAA was widely seen as being more costly
than necessary. The CAA amendments of 1990 included an experiment in
incentive regulation (to be discussed in chapter 10) as a means of reducing
these compliance costs.
Now that we understand the concepts and the practices of benefit/cost
analysis, we will turn to a discussion of the methods for measuring benefits
and costs.
Measuring Benefits
Overview
People derive many benefits from ecosystems and natural resources, ranging
from recreation to wildlife habitat and from food and raw materials produc-
tion to nutrient cycling and soil formation. For example, swamps and other
wetlands used to be considered of little value and were frequently drained
for agricultural uses. More recently, ecologists have identified many vital
ecosystem functions performed by these areas, and economists have devel-
oped tools for estimating the monetary value of these functions. In a compre-
hensive study attempting to estimate the value of various ecosystem and
natural resource services, for example, Costanza et al. (1997) report that the
nutrient-cycling function of estuaries generates annual benefits worth $11,100
to $30,100 per hectare, while the water-supply function of swamps and flood-
plains yields annual benefits worth $7,600 per hectare. Likewise, Balmford
et al. (2002) found that the economic value of the services derived from
intact and fully functioning tropical mangrove ecosystems (Thailand) and
wetlands (Canada) exceeded the economic value of activities such as shrimp

aquaculture (Thailand) or intensive farming on reclaimed wetlands
(Canada). This section of the chapter provides an overview of the various
techniques that economists have applied to measuring the benefits of envi-
ronmental and natural resources.
To introduce the economic problem of measuring benefits, consider the
example of particulate emissions. Particulate matter will cause some harms
to commercially valuable goods and services. These damages will be mani-
fested in changes in market conditions that can be gauged using standard
supply and demand analysis. For example, as we will consider in detail in
the next section of the chapter, risk assessment methods can be used to mea-
sure the harms to human health caused by breathing a certain quantity of
particulate matter. Premature death and illnesses lead to lost earnings that
can be quantified when assessing the benefits of reducing particulate matter.
Particulate matter also damages exterior paint and necessitates the cleaning
of exterior walls and windows of buildings. Reduced particulate emissions
in a particular area will likely increase real estate values in a predictable way,
as people will find the area more desirable to live in. Moreover, when visual
aesthetics are an important part of a local economy, such as with tourism in
the Grand Canyon area, then reduced ambient concentrations of particulate
matter will generate measurable increases in tourism-based income. There
may also be measurable improvements in crop yields. More generally, envi-
ronmental cleanup will generate some benefits to things whose value is re-
vealed in markets.
As we have seen in the discussion above and in previous chapters, well-
functioning competitive markets are useful because they reveal value. For
goods and services that are marketed, we can derive consumer surplus from
market demand and thereby estimate the net value of the good or service to
consumers. Nevertheless, pollution such as particulate matter also affects
people and ecosystems in ways that cannot be deduced directly from market
impacts. The measurement process is more difficult when trying to deter-
mine the benefits provided by conserving or restoring nonmarketed aspects
of the environment because there is no market price or wage to indicate value.
Thus, economists have developed methods of nonmarket valuation to esti-
mate the demand for environmental conservation and restoration. Before we
address the various methods of demand estimation for nonmarketed envi-
ronmental qualities, however, we must first consider how to deal with situa-
tions in which environmental improvements result in reductions in health
and safety risks.
A particular challenge associated with policies such as toxic emissions
control is that many of the benefits to society are in the form of reduced
166 POLICY
probabilities or risks that an individual member of society will suffer mea-

surable harm, such as contracting cancer or some illness associated with the
pollution emissions. Thus quantitative risk assessment is an important ele-
ment of measuring benefits.
Measuring the Health and Ecological Benefits of Regulation:

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and the Value of a
Statistical Life (VSL)
Many environmentally damaging practices such as pollution generate harms

to human health that are recognizable in overall populations, but which have
uncertain effects on any single individual. A natural example is the emission
of toxic pollution into air or water, which elevates the risk of a person con-
tracting cancer, emphysema, or various reproductive disorders. In this case,
one way to view the harm is the elevated likelihood of a person becoming ill
or dying. Thus, a benefit of environmental protection is the reduction in the
probability of a person experiencing specific adverse health effects. Health
risk assessment provides a basis for quantifying the benefits of different regu-
latory options. Likewise, ecological risk assessment is used to evaluate the
potential adverse effects that human activities have on the plants and animals
that make up ecosystems.
The National Research Council (NRC 1983) defined risk assessment as
including some or all of the following components (paradigm): hazard iden-
tification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk charac-
terization. The EPAs National Center for Environmental Assessment (NCEA)
Internet site describes the risk assessment and management paradigm:
Risk Assessment is the process used to evaluate the degree and probability
of harm to human health and the environment from such stressors as pollu-
tion or habitat loss. The risk assessment process, as proposed by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 1983, consists of:
Exposure Assessmentdescribing the populations or ecosystems exposed

to stressors and the magnitude, duration, and spatial extent exposure
Hazard Identificationidentifying adverse effects (e.g., short-term ill-
ness, cancer) that may occur from exposure to environmental stressors
Dose-Response Assessmentdetermining the toxicity or potency of
stressors
Risk Characterizationusing the data collected in the first three steps
to estimate and describe the effects of human or ecological exposure to
stressors
Risk Management entails determining whether and how risks should be

managed or reduced. It is based on the results of the risk assessment as
well as other factors (e.g., public health, social, and economic factors).
Risk management options include pollution prevention or control tech-
nologies to reduce or eliminate the pollutant or other stressor on the envi-
ronment. The environmental or public health impacts resulting from risk
management decisions must then be monitored so that any necessary ad-
justments can be made.
The EPA has developed risk assessments for a variety of different pollut-
ants, such as mercury, particulate matter, and dioxin, as well as guidelines
for various human health and ecological risks. For example, the guidelines
for neurotoxicity risk assessment establish principles and procedures to guide
EPA scientists in evaluating pollutants that may pose neurotoxic risks, and
inform EPA decision makers and the public about these procedures. In con-
trast, the EPAs guidelines for ecological risk assessment are designed and
conducted to provide information to risk managers about the potential ad-
verse effects of different management decisions. Ecological risk assessments
are used to support many types of management actions, including the regula-
tion of hazardous waste sites, industrial chemicals, and pesticides, or the
management of watersheds or other ecosystems affected by multiple
nonchemical and chemical stressors. While risk assessment focuses on the
analysis and interpretation of data, acquiring the appropriate data for use in
the process is critical, and risk assessment may stop until necessary data are
obtained. The EPA describes the process as being more often iterative than
linear, since the evaluation of new data or information may require revisiting
a part of the process or conducting a new assessment.
Risk assessments play a direct role in the formulation and economic assess-
ment of environmental policy. For example, section 108 of the Clean Air Act
(CAA) directs the administrator of the EPA to list pollutants that may reason-
ably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, and to issue air qual-
ity criteria for them. The air quality criteria are to reflect the latest scientific
information useful in indicating the kind and extent of all exposure-related
effects on public health and welfare that may be expected from the presence of
the pollutant in ambient air. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, environ-
mental regulations such as those governing air quality are increasingly being
evaluated using benefit/cost methodology. A good example is the EPA (1997)
study of the benefits and costs of the CAA between 1970 and 1990, which was
required under the 1990 CAA Amendments. The dominant benefit identified
in that study was reduced premature mortality due to reductions in particulate
matter, which contributed $16.6 trillion of the estimated mean benefits of $22.2
168 POLICY
trillion (in constant 1990 dollars), or approximately 75 percent of the total

economic benefit. Nevertheless, how do researchers go from risk assessment
of a pollutant such as particulate matter to the economic value of premature
mortality prevented by regulation? The answer is the value-of-statistical-life
(VSL) approach described below.
There are a number of different ways to estimate the economic value of a
statistical premature death avoided due to environmental regulation. Most of
these use information on peoples willingness to pay for a reduction in the
probability of premature death. For example, one can use survey methods to
solicit hypothetical willingness-to-pay information from respondents (de-
scribed in detail in the section on contingent valuation) regarding changes in
the likelihood of premature death. One can also conduct wage-risk studies to
estimate the additional compensation demanded in the labor market for riskier
jobs. In particular, when jobs are similar in most all respects except that one
entails a higher risk of some harm, then competitive labor markets (with
well-informed workers) are expected to yield a wage premium paid to those
workers who accept the higher risk of premature death or workplace injury.
Of course these wage premiums may not be observed if some workers are
misinformed of risk, the labor market is not competitive, or if some people
are naturally less averse to risk than others. In one example of a wage pre-
mium, Olson (1981) estimated that, all else being equal, a 10 percent in-
crease in the probability of a nonfatal workplace accident is associated with
a 9.1 percent increase in wage. Workers in jobs of average risk1 in 30 of a
nonfatal accidentreceived on average $2,200 more per year in income when
compared to workers with similar educational attainment in virtually riskless
jobs. These numbers can be translated into the value of a statistical life, as
will be shown below.
Lets see how wage premiums paid for accepting riskier work environ-
ments can be used in the VSL approach. Suppose that a wage-risk study
estimates that when the annual risk of premature death on the job increases
by 0.0001 (1 in 10,000), workers receive an annual wage premium of $550
as compensation for this added risk. Assume that all other work character-
istics are held constant. If we assume that those workers are fully informed
and the labor market is competitive, then we can expect the following equa-
tion to hold:
Wage premium = (value of statistical life) (increased probability of death).
Thus, with a bit of algebraic rearranging, we get:
Value of statistical life = (wage premium) (increased probability of death).

Plugging in an increased probability of death of 0.0001 and a $550 wage

premium we arrive at a value of a statistical premature death avoided of
$5.5 million.
Based on twenty-six wage-risk and hypothetical willingness-to-pay stud-
ies, the EPA (1997) estimated a mean value of a statistical premature death
avoided to be $4.8 million (in constant 1990 dollars). Controversy surrounds
the VSL approach used by the EPA (1997). For example, while most of the
twenty-six studies used by the EPA in arriving at the VSL figure of $4.8
million involved the value of risks to middle-aged working people, those
who die prematurely from particulate matter are more likely to be aged and
past their working years. Moreover, job-related risks are more likely to be
borne voluntarily, and involve the risk of sudden and catastrophic death, while
pollution-related risks are borne involuntarily, and involve the risk of longer
periods of disease and suffering. Other controversies regarding the VSL ap-
proach have to do with differences in wages and earnings between rich and
poor countries. In poor countries with low wages, labor markets will pay
smaller wage premiums for a given increase in risk of death than in rich
countries, implying that a statistical life is more valuable in a rich country
than in a poor country. As mentioned at the start of the chapter, the study by
Bowland and Beghin (1998) offers a good example of VSL differences across
rich and poor countries. They estimated that the value of a statistical life
saved in Santiago, Chile, due to reduced air pollution is approximately
$600,000, which is only about 12.5 percent of the $4.8 million value of an
American statistical life used by the EPA (1997). The logic of benefit/cost
analysis might then suggest locating hazardous life-threatening industrial
activity and toxic wastes in the poorest regions of the world, which many
would consider an unacceptable example of environmental injustice. While
there are many problems with the VSL approach, simply ignoring the eco-
nomic cost of premature death and leaving it out of benefit/cost analysis
leads to a substantial underestimate of the benefits of environmental conser-
vation and restoration.
An alternative approach taken by Tengs et al. (1995) is to evaluate the cost
of regulatory intervention per statistical life-year saved by the intervention.
This type of analysis allows policymakers to allocate regulatory resources to
those interventions that generate the largest number of statistical life-years
saved per dollar of intervention. To arrive at cost per statistical life-year saved,
Tengs and her colleagues took the total cost of a regulatory intervention and
divided by the number of statistical life-years saved by that intervention.
They found, for example, that the cost per statistical life-year saved was only
$69 for mandatory seatbelt use laws but was $920 for mandatory smoke
detector laws. Chlorination of drinking water generated a cost per life-year
170 POLICY
of $3,100. Banning asbestos water pipe insulation generated a cost per life-
year of $65,000, while banning amitraz pesticide use for pears generated a
figure of $350,000 and the ozone-control program in southern California
generated a cost per life-year of $610,000. Banning asbestos in packing
generated a cost per statistical life-year saved of $5 million, and seismic
retrofitting of buildings in earthquake-prone areas generated a cost per life-
year of a whopping $18 million. It is important to note that the approach
taken by Tengs et al. assumes that the saving of statistical life-years is the
only benefit produced by the regulatory intervention, when in fact prevent-
ing premature death is only part of the benefit of many of these regulations.
Nevertheless, their work offers useful guidance on the most cost-effective
ways to save lives through regulatory intervention. It also illustrates how
risk assessment can be used to provide information on the cost-effective-
ness of various regulatory interventions without having to establish a par-
ticular value of a statistical life.
We will now address different types of values that people assign to vari-
ous aspects of the environment that are not directly traded in markets. Once
we have categorized these values, we will consider the various methods that
economists have devised to measure these values. These nonmarket valua-
tion methods can be used to estimate the benefits of various types of environ-
mental improvements such as limiting pollution, restoring watersheds, or
preserving parkland, open space, and agricultural working landscapes.
Categories of Nonmarketed Environmental Benefits: Use and

Nonuse Values
Use Values
Use value represents the utility enjoyed by people who directly use some
aspect of the environment. For example, a bird sanctuary yields use value to
bird watchers and to those who use the area as an open space (walking, jog-
ging, and observing the view). Likewise, a backcountry area provides use
value to hunters, hikers, backpackers, and equestrians, and the ocean shore
provides use value to surfers and fishers.
Nonuse Values
Nonuse values, also known as passive-use values or existence values, reflect

value that people assign to aspects of the natural environment that they care
about but do not use in a commercial, recreational, or other manner. For
example, someone might value the existence of grizzly bear habitat in Alaska
but have no interest in actually visiting such wildland habitat. Existence val-
ues are controversial because they are difficult to measure. As we will see in
the next section of the chapter, survey research methods have developed to
measure nonuse values. One type of nonuse value is option value. Option
value is prominent when (1) there is uncertainty over the ultimate environ-
mental impact of a given activity, and (2) that impact is irreversible. The
classic example is large-scale tropical rain forest destruction, where thou-
sands of species of plants and animals are made extinct before people even
understand them and their possible beneficial role in medicine, foodstuffs,
and so forth. Preservation has option valueit gives us time to learn about
the possible services that are provided to people by the rain forest. Another is
greenhouse gas production, where changes in the atmosphere are irrevers-
ible on the scale of human generations, and the extent and ultimate impact of
global warming are not fully known. There is an option value to controlling
greenhouse gas emissions today until we learn about their impact on our life-
support systems.
Measuring Nonmarketed Environmental Benefits: The

Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)
The CVM involves the use of survey questionnaires to elicit hypothetical will-
ingness-to-pay information. The CVM was first proposed by Ciriacy-Wantrup
(1947), who recognized that some aspects of soil erosion (e.g., clogging of
shared irrigation channels) have the attributes of a negative externality that is
not borne as a cost by the individual farmer. He did not actually conduct a
CVM. A Harvard Ph.D. student named Rob Davis did the first actual CVM
study in his dissertation, where he attempted to value nonmarketed aspects of
the Maine woods (hunting and recreation values). In his study, he compared
the results of the CVM against the travel cost method (described below) for the
same area and found that the two methods arrived at remarkably similar valu-
ations. Finally, since CVM studies are one of the few ways to measure nonuse
values, they became popular following the publication of a highly influential
paper by environmental economist John Krutilla (1967) that endorsed the real
nature of existence and other nonuse values.
An important event that hastened the development of best methods in con-
tingent valuation was the damage assessment following the March 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill disaster in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The description that
follows borrows heavily from Portney (1994). The oil tanker Exxon Valdez
struck Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound and punctured its hull, causing 11
million gallons of crude oil to spill into the ocean. A CVM analysis was con-
ducted by Carson et al. (1992) for the state of Alaska to determine lost exist-
172 POLICY
ence value for U.S. residents. Carson et al.s analysis yielded an estimate of $3
billion in lost existence value. In 1991 a lawsuit by the federal government and
the state of Alaska against Exxon was settled for $1.15 billion. Because the
case was settled out of court, it is impossible to know whether the study by
Carson et al. influenced the size of the settlement.
The federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was passed in response to the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, and a part of this legislation directed the National Oceano-
graphic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to draft regulations gov-
erning damage assessment. NOAA was pressured by environmentalists to
have lost nonuse values be fully compensable damages and to use the CVM
to measure them. Oil companies and others strongly lobbied against the in-
clusion of nonuse values and the CVM in damage assessment. In response to
these conflicting pressures, NOAA asked Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow
and Robert Solow to chair a panel of experts (including Paul Portney) to
advise NOAA on the CVM. NOAA wanted an answer to the question of
whether the CVM is capable of providing estimates of lost nonuse values
that are reliable enough to be used in natural resource damage assessments.
The NOAA panel completed its report in early 1993.
The NOAA panel concluded that CVM analysis, conducted appropriately,
can produce estimates reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial
process of damage assessment, including lost passive-use values. Neverthe-
less, what was the panels view of an appropriately conducted CVM study?
The panel established a set of guidelines for future CVM studies aimed at
producing reliable estimates of lost existence values for the purposes of dam-
age assessment or regulatory policy. These guidelines have contributed to
the development of the modern CVM survey, which is organized as follows:
1. Clearly identify the contingency to be studied. In the case of esti-

mating lost existence values in damage assessment, the NOAA panel
guidelines call for eliciting willingness to pay (WTP) to prevent a
future incident rather than the minimum compensation required for
damages that have already occurred. Examples of environmental or
resource contingencies include land management policy or river and
stream habitat restoration.
2. Perform a pretest in which you survey a small focus group. The
pretest can be used to identify problems with the survey instrument
and to determine the likely range of WTP values.
3. Use these preliminary values to make up a survey instrument. The sur-
vey instrument must accurately and clearly inform people of the precise
nature of the anticipated effects of the contingency. The survey instru-
ment must use a referendum-style format in eliciting WTP information.
A referendum is a vote in which people are asked to make a dichoto-

mous choice (yes or no) regarding a political question. Therefore, the
survey should ask respondents how they would vote if faced with a
referendum proposal in which the specific environmental improvement
is to be paid for by a specific increase in taxes or higher product prices.
As Portney (1994) observes, the NOAA panel reasoned that people are
frequently confronted with decisions involving specific posted prices,
and that stated responses are more likely to reflect actual valuations
than if confronted with an open-ended question asking maximum WTP.
The survey instrument must remind respondents that an affirmative WTP
response reduces funds that the respondent will have to spend on other
goods and services. The survey instrument must remind respondents of
the availability of substitutes for the environmental improvement being
proposed. For example, if the CVM is evaluating WTP to enhance salmon
habitat in a stream, the survey instrument should inform respondents of
other stream habitat that already exists. The survey instrument should
include follow-up questions to ensure that respondents understood the
issues and questions in the survey, and to determine the reasons for their
response.
4. Use repeated random sampling techniques with a different dollar
amount for each random sample of people to be surveyed. The NOAA
panel guidelines call for the use of personal interviews rather than
telephone interviews when possible. Telephone interviews are con-
sidered to be preferable to mail surveys.
5. Analyze the data using relevant statistical techniques to estimate a
demand curve (WTP function), which relates percentage of yes
responses to each of the surveyed WTP values, holding other re-
ported factors such as income, age, sex, educational attainment, and
concern for the environment constant.
One would normally expect that the higher the WTP value asked to one of
the random samples of people, then the smaller would be the frequency of
yes responses. Thus if one plots WTP on the y axis and frequency of
yes responses on the x axis, one would expect to observe an inverse
relationship in the responses to the questionnaire. Thus one can estimate a
demand curve for the environmental amenity under analysis by relating WTP
values to percentage of yes responses, as shown by the generic curve in
Figure 7.3. An estimate of consumer surplusthe net economic value of the
environmental improvementcan then be derived from this demand curve.
Contingent valuation is far more complex than the brief overview above
would suggest. One should be fully versed in survey design and methodol-
174 POLICY
Figure 7.3 Nonmarket Demand for an Environmental Amenity Estimated

from the Contingent Valuation Method
$ WTP
Demand
0
Estimated number
of yes responses
ogy, as well as econometric methods, before taking on a CVM study. The

researcher needs to know the geographic scope of the population to be sur-
veyed, as well as the variables required for demand estimation, before con-
structing the survey questionnaire. Moreover, the econometric techniques
required for demand estimation are more complex than one might normally
encounter in more conventional economic analysis. The interested reader is
referred to the excellent primer on contingent valuation by Boyle (2003).
Examples of CVM Studies
Loomis (1996) performed a CVM study on the benefits of removing dams

and restoring the Elwha River in Washington State. Loomis used a modern
dichotomous-choice voter referendum form of CVM study to obtain esti-
mates of willingness to pay for removing two dams on the Elwha River on
the Olympic Peninsula in Washington State and restoring the ecosystem, with
particular attention to the benefits of enhancing the salmon runs. Loomis
found that mean annual value per household was estimated to be $59 in
Clallam County, Washington, and $73 for the rest of Washington State. The
aggregate benefits to the residents of the state of Washington were estimated
to be $138 million annually for ten years.
Loomis (1987) used the CVM to quantify nonmarketed environmental
benefits from enhancing natural aquatic conditions. In this case, the problem
was to determine the public trust values of Mono Lake in California at alter-
native lake levels. Loomis found that the economic benefit to California resi-
dents of preserving Mono Lake could conservatively be estimated to be
$1.5 billion annually. Purchase of replacement water and power would cost
Los Angeles $26.2 million per year. Thus, on efficiency grounds the reallo-
cation of water for maintenance of public trust values in Mono Lake could
be warranted.
California has lost more than 90 percent of its historic wetlands, the larg-
est percentage of any state in the United States. Allen et al. (1992) surveyed
the literature to determine low, median, and high valuations for the various
services provided by wetlands, including flood control, water supply, wa-
ter quality, recreation, commercial fisheries, and wildlife habitat. Their over-
all median annual benefit was estimated to be $9.96 billion.
Schultze et al. (1983) used the CVM to study the economic benefits of
visual quality in the Grand Canyon. A large coal-fired electricity-generating
plant impaired visibility in the Grand Canyon and other nearby natural areas.
Schultze et al. surveyed residents of Albuquerque, Denver, Los Angeles, and
Chicago to determine the maximum a household would be willing to pay in
higher entry fees or higher utility bills to maintain the parks visual quality.
The average figure was $7 to $10 per month per household, leading to an
aggregate estimate (taking into account socioeconomic household character-
istics) of $6 billion per year. Note that for 99 percent of the households, these
represent existence values rather than direct consumption values, as only
about 1 percent visit the parksan indication of the important role of non-
use values.
Walsh, Gillman, and Loomis (1982) used the CVM to determine how much
people value allocating an additional 2.6 million acres as federal wilderness
in Colorado. Their survey was designed to gain insight into the relative im-
portance of key value areasuse, option, and existence. On average, recre-
ation was worth $18.50 per visitor-dayyielding a total of $28 million per
year. Passive-use values (existence, option) totaled $135 million per year.
This totals into the billions when one calculates present value of this stream
of benefits into the future.
Bell, Huppert, and Johnson (2003) used the CVM to estimate local coastal
residents willingness to pay for restoration and enhancement of coho salmon
habitat in five Oregon and Washington estuaries. Those surveyed lived within
thirty miles of the estuaries targeted for enhancementGrays Harbor and
Willapa Bay in Washington, and Tillamook Bay, Yaquina Bay, and Coos Bay
in Oregon. The specified annual household cost on the mail questionnaires
varied randomly from $5 to $500 based on a uniform distribution. Mean
willingness to pay by high-income Washington residents surveyed ranged
176 POLICY
between $117 and $122, while that of low-income Washington residents

ranged between $76 and $79. Results were much more variable for Oregon
residents, and in some cases estimated willingness-to-pay values were not
significantly different from zero. They also found that public confidence in
the effectiveness of the enhancement programs is inextricably linked to
peoples willingness to pay for these programs.
The CVM Debate
Despite the advances that have occurred in CVM technique, economists are
somewhat divided over the usefulness of the CVM in measuring value and
guiding policy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives published a sympo-
sium on the usefulness of the CVM in its fall 1994 issue. A number of the
issues discussed in that symposium by Diamond and Hausman (1994) and
Hanemann (1994) are summarized below.
A key problem with CVM analysis, as claimed by Diamond and Hausman
(1994), is the embedding effect. Embedding refers to the research methodol-
ogy of comparing the value of a particular good, such as protection of a
mountain lake, to a more inclusive good, such as protecting an entire moun-
tainous region that includes the lake. The embedding effect occurs when
willingness-to-pay responses for the particular good (protecting the moun-
tain lake) are approximately equal to the willingness-to-pay responses for
the more inclusive good (protecting the entire mountainous region). Dia-
mond and Hausman (1994) observe that the embedding effect arises from
the nonexistence of individual preferences for the good in question and from
the failure of respondents to consider the effects of their budget constraints
in hypothetical willingness-to-pay surveys. Hanemann (1994) disputes the
argument by Diamond and Hausman (1994) that CVM studies are prone to
embedding effects. Hanemann observes that the studies used by Diamond
and Hausman (1994) in making their argument violate the NOAA panel guide-
lines in a number of important ways, and therefore argues that the evidence
for the embedding effect does not apply to properly conducted CVM studies.
Diamond and Hausman (1994) state that embedding still infects even very
recent work done by experienced contingent valuation analysts who were
well aware of the problem (p. 52), and conclude that the embedding effect
implies that responses in CVM studies reflect warm glow feelings rather
than true WTP.
Another problem identified in some CVM studies is a difference in re-
sponses between WTP for an environmental improvement and willingness to
accept payment in return for giving up the environmental improvement. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that WTP and willingness to accept (WTA) should be
nearly the same, differing slightly due to income effects. Usually WTP is
considerably less than WTA for the same environmental improvement, which
is inconsistent with the economic theory of consumer choice. Hanemann
(1994) observes that the WTP-WTA gap is seen in CVM studies that violate
the NOAA panel guidelines by using open-ended payment questions that
solicit the respondents WTP rather than a closed-ended fixed WTP value
in referendum format that respondents are given the dichotomous choice of
either accepting or rejecting.
All surveys are vulnerable to response effects, in which small changes in
wording or order of survey questionnaire material can cause significant changes
in survey responses. As Hanemann (1994) states, surveys, like all communi-
cation, are sensitive to nuance and context and are bound by constraints of
human cognition (p. 27). Nevertheless, surveys are a central source of data
for traditional economic analysis and include the Current Population Sur-
vey, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Monthly Labor Survey, and Panel Study
on Income Dynamics. Therefore, if these sorts of response effects are a reason
to cast doubt on CVM studies, they should also cast doubt on the large number
of other survey-based data sets used by economists.
Another criticism of the CVM is that the survey process itself creates
the values reported as empirical datapeople just make something up when
asked. The standard view of rational humans in economics is based on
peoples having a preexisting valuation map in their heads that ranks all
the possible choices available in contemporary markets, yet as Hanemann
(1994) points out, this view is inconsistent with much of the contemporary
research in cognition. The issue is whether the preferences are stable, and
recent studies support this (comparing values over time). One can also ar-
gue that there is the potential for strategic bias in CVM survey data, in
which people may inflate their stated values because they do not have to
put their money where their mouth is. This is one of the reasons why the
NOAA panel called for closed-ended, referendum-style WTP questions.
Moreover, some referendum-style CVM studies have compared the hypo-
thetical responses to actual parallel referenda and have found that in mod-
ern CVM studies there is often no significant difference in responses. See
the cannot be verified criticism below.
Critics of the CVM also argue that ordinary people are ill trained for valu-
ing the environment in a referendum-style format. Note, however, that train-
ing is not a criterion for voting in democratic systems, and one could make
the argument that there is at least a core of rationality in voter behavior.
Critics also argue that responses to hypothetical contingent valuation ques-
tions do not match responses in real situations. As a result, the NOAA panel
stated that a critically important contribution could come from experiments
178 POLICY
in which state-of-the-art CV studies are employed in a context where they

can in fact be compared with real behavioral willingness to pay for goods
that can actually be bought and sold (Arrow et al. 1993). As Hanemann
(1994) has noted, real-world voting behavior, in which voters choose whether
to tax themselves to fund an environmental or other improvement, may be
the closest nonexperimental test of the contingent valuation method. In an
earlier study, Carson, Hanemann, and Mitchell (1987) compared survey re-
sponses with voter choices on a California bond issue addressing clean wa-
ter. Aggregate survey responses only matched aggregate voter choices when
undecided survey responses were allocated as 40 percent yes and 60
percent no.
In a somewhat more recent study, Vossler et al. (2003) sought to address
the NOAA panels suggestion by conducting research on the question of
whether respondents report the same decisions in nonbinding surveys as they
do in actual elections. They studied a November 1995 Corvallis, Oregon,
referendum to raise open-space funds. The amount of additional property tax
a person had to pay for open space was $0.35 per $1,000 of assessed prop-
erty value. Majority approval of the referendum would generate $950,000
annually for five years for the purchase of open-space lands. Just prior to the
election, in mid-October 1995, researchers conducted random telephone sur-
veys of Corvallis residents. Vossler and colleagues found that the telephone
survey only matched aggregate voter choices when all undecided survey
responses were coded as no. They also found estimated annual willingness
to pay for open space from actual voting behavior to be $48.89, which was
not statistically different from the mean willingness to pay of $49.67 from
CV survey data when undecided responses are coded as no.
In addition to the above-mentioned problems with the CVM, there is also
the problem of whether people understand the ecosystem function of the
particular aspect of the environment subject to the CVM analysis. The eco-
system role of an element of the environment may not be known unless or
until it is destroyed. It is also clear that many people do not want to partici-
pate in a process of monetizing the environment, just as Christians would not
want to monetize the value of their faith.
Measuring NonMarketed Environmental Benefits: The Travel

Cost Method (TCM)
The TCM was first proposed by economist Harold Hotelling in a 1947 letter
to the U.S. Park Service, in which he suggested that the full cost of visiting a
park must necessarily include the cost of getting there. The TCM is useful
for measuring active-use values of place-based aspects of the environment
like lakes, rivers, beaches, and wilderness areas used for recreational pur-
poses. The TCM offers a way of measuring the value of a nonmarketed recre-
ational resource by using data on trip costs incurred by people who visit the
area. Studies that estimate the value of a single site estimate a downward
sloping site demand curve in which price is the trip cost and the quantity
demanded is the number of trips taken to the site in a given time period. The
area under the site demand curve is consumer surplus, a measure of the eco-
nomic value of accessing the site for recreational purposes. If access to the
recreational use of a site has been curtailed due to a chemical spill or develop-
ment, for example, then the TCM can be used to assess economic damages to
recreationalists. Likewise, TCM values can be used to weigh the benefits and
costs of a proposed change in resource management. As with the contingent
valuation method described above, this section of the chapter will only pro-
vide a general overview of the methodology. The empirical estimation of
nonmarket values is complex, and readers interested in a more detailed expo-
sition might start with Parsons (2003) or Loomis and Walsh (1997).
The single-site model estimates the number of trips taken by a person
over a year (or season of use) as a function of the cost incurred to get to the
site, as well as personal characteristics (age, sex, income, experience level)
and travel cost to alternative sites. These explanatory variables are usually
gathered using survey research methods. Following Parsons, we can describe
the following steps in a single-site TCM study:
1. Define the boundaries of the site to be studied.

2. Define the recreational uses and season(s) of use.
3. Develop a sampling strategy for surveying recreational users.
4. Specify a demand estimation model, including all the variables to be
used in that model.
5. Address the issue of multiple purpose recreational trips.
6. Design and conduct the survey.
7. Measure trip cost.
8. Estimate site demand using trip cost and data from the survey.
9. Calculate the access value of the site.
Decisions, assumptions, and estimates must be made at each step. For

example, some sites host multiple recreational uses, such as rivers where
people swim, sunbathe, fish, and engage in boating. A travel cost study may
focus on certain types of recreational uses, or researchers may be able to
aggregate similar classes of recreational use. A key decision regarding sam-
pling strategy is whether to conduct on-site surveys of visitors, or a random
survey of the overall population. On-site surveys have the advantage of be-
180 POLICY
ing better targeted, requiring fewer survey solicitations to get the desired
sample size. On the other hand, on-site surveys omit from the sample people
who take zero trips during the time period under study, which impairs the
estimation of the vertical intercept of the site demand curve. Likewise, an
on-site survey strategy will oversample frequent visitors (endogenous strati-
fication). The researcher must correct her econometric model for these prob-
lems. Off-site surveys of the overall population can avoid these problems,
but a very large number of surveys must be sent out in order to receive back
a sufficiently large sample of completed questionnaires from recreationalists
who visit the site. Moreover, off-site surveys require the researcher to make
some assumptions about the geographical scope of the market containing
site visitors. As mentioned earlier, the researcher will develop a demand model
that explains the number of site visits as a function of the visitors trip cost
price, income, trip cost to substitute sites, and other visitor characteristics
that might influence their frequency of visits.
A further complication in using the TCM has to do with whether trip cost
was expended for the sole purpose of visiting the recreational site under
study, or whether the trip encompassed multiple purposes including other
sites or visiting friends or family along the way. Parsons (2003) suggests that
if the nature of the study is to focus on day-use trips, then one can usually
assume that the trip cost is single-purpose in nature. In contrast, if the recre-
ational use identified in the second step involves one or more overnight stays,
the researcher should include the question of single-purpose or multiple-
purpose travel in the questionnaire. The researcher can then choose whether
to drop multiple-purpose trips from the data set, or develop a more compli-
cated demand model that explicitly incorporates multiple purposes for travel.
As with the CVM, those considering the use of the TCM should have a back-
ground in survey methods and design, which goes beyond the scope of this
book. In addition to introductory material, the questionnaire will include
questions for the variables identified in step 4, as well as the number of site
visits over the time period in question and detailed questions on trip cost and
other aspects of the most recent visit, which are presumably easiest for the
subject to recall.
Trip cost includes the cost of travel, opportunity cost of time, and other
direct expenditures required for a site visit. Travel cost via automobile would
be measured as the product of round-trip distance multiplied by the average
cost per mile from an authoritative source such as the U.S. Department of
Transportation. The opportunity cost of a visitors time is difficult to esti-
mate and represents a large portion of the economic value estimated from the
TCM. Many researchers make the assumption that some portion of time in
transit and at the site involves the opportunity cost of forgone earnings from
Figure 7.4 Nonmarket Demand for a Recreational Site Estimated from

the Travel Cost Method
Travel cost
Demand
0
Estimated number
of visits
work, though this is obviously flawed for retired people, students, the unem-
ployed, and those with paid vacation time. It is difficult to apportion part of
the capital cost of recreational gear and equipment owned by the recreationalist
to a particular trip. While rental rates on equipment can be used to estimate
equipment and gear costs on a per-trip basis, many researchers omit these
costs altogether. Once the data are tabulated from returned surveys, the re-
searcher uses econometric techniques to estimate a site demand function such
as the one shown in Figure 7.4.
Lets take a moment and consider the results of some TCM studies. Sohngen
(2000) used the TCM to estimate the economic value of access to beaches on
Lake Erie in Ohio. Sohngen estimated that on average a visitor received be-
tween $25 and $38 each day in access value (consumer surplus). Englin and
Shonkwiler (1995) used the TCM to estimate the economic value to hiking
in the Cascade mountain range of Washington and Oregon. Their preferred
estimate was that an average hike generated between approximately $16 and
$24 (1985 dollars) in net benefits. Using similar methodology Casey, Vukina,
and Danielson (1995) estimated a mean consumer surplus per visit of ap-
proximately $513 for hiking in the Grandfather Mountain Wilderness Pre-
serve in North Carolina. This large value for consumer surplus occurs in part
because the opportunity cost of time revealed by individual visitors was quite
high, averaging nearly $47 per hour. Bell and Leeworthy (1990) used the
individual survey approach to estimate the recreational economic value of
182 POLICY
Floridas beaches. They gathered data on days spent on the beach, expenses
incurred while visiting, the cost of recreationalists travel to Florida, as well
as other factors that influence visiting the beach such as age, children, in-
come, and perceived quality of such an experience. Using the statistical tech-
nique of multiple regression analysis, they were able to isolate the impact of
travel cost and number of beach visits. The average tourist spent nearly five
days on the beach and spent on average $85 per day. From this information,
Bell and Leeworthy estimated average daily consumer surplus of $38. With
70 million tourists annually visiting the Florida beaches, these beaches were
found to yield a lower-bound estimate of $2.7 billion annually in active-use
value.
Measuring Nonmarketed Environmental Benefits: Hedonic

Regression Method (HRM)
As Taylor (2003) notes, hedonic regression techniques can be used to esti-

mate the value of product quality attributes in markets that feature product
differentiation. If instead all products were identical, then one could not use
regression analysis to estimate the impact of varying a products quality at-
tributes. HRM is most commonly used to evaluate the contribution of envi-
ronmental attributes of housing, including view, air quality, proximity to parks,
and neighborhood safety. While these environmental attributes are not di-
rectly traded in markets, they are aspects of a houses location and as such
are inextricably bundled with the market value of a house. The term he-
donic refers to people assigning value to product attributes that induce plea-
sure, while the term regression refers to an econometric technique for
estimating these values.
For example, suppose that there are a large number of otherwise identical
homes in a community and they all have backyards bordering on undevel-
oped land, the scenic and recreational quality of which is marred by illegal
dumping of old appliances and tires. Suppose that the equilibrium price of
these homes is $100,000. Now suppose that a portion of the undeveloped
land is county property, and the county cleans up its property, installs a gate,
and manages the area as protected parkland. We would expect that those
homes with backyards bordering on the parkland would now be more desir-
able than those homes adjacent to the illegal dump. At the old equilibrium
price, therefore, we would expect an excess demand for the more desirable
homes, which would result in a new, higher equilibrium price for those homes
bordering the parkland. Suppose that in the new equilibrium, the houses bor-
dering the dump are still priced at $100,000, while those bordering the
parkland are now priced at $400,000. The $300,000 difference in home prices
represents the implicit price that homebuyers are willing to pay for the incre-
mental improvement in a homes quality attributes resulting from proximity
to land that has been cleaned up and protected as parkland.
Since real-world houses have many quality attributes that vary from loca-
tion to location, there are few simple natural experiments such as the hypo-
thetical example given above. Suppose we can quantify these quality attributes
(e.g., size, age, condition, lot size, air quality, presence or absence of view,
distance to parks and schools, crime rates, and the like) in a data set that
includes sales prices. Then we can use the econometric tool of regression
analysis to estimate a model that explains sales price as a function of each
quality attribute. This is the first stage of hedonic regression analysis. We can
use this first-stage analysis to estimate how a quantitative improvement in
environmental quality (all else held constant) increases the value of a home.
This increase in the value of the home represents the implicit price of the
incremental increase in the quality attribute. In the second stage of hedonic
regression analysis, researchers use implicit price information to estimate
the demand curve for the environmental attribute. As shown in Figure 7.5,
the attribute demand curve shows the relationship between implicit attribute
price and the quantity of the attribute demanded.
Consider some examples of the use of the HRM. Pollard (1982) found that,
holding other characteristics constant, Chicago apartments with views of Lake
Michigan commanded on average a 26 percent rental price premium. Given
that housing typically accounts for 2025 percent of an individuals income,
the amenity value of scenic beauty was worth a sacrifice of 56 percent of
overall income. Grimes (1983) estimated that land fronting on Lake Michi-
gan sold at prices twice as high (on a per-acre basis) as land just 500 feet
inland. As the distance from the lake increased to 1,500 feet, the value fell to
one-fifth that of lakefront property. Brown and Pollakowski (1977) found that,
holding constant other factors such as house size and age, on average a house
within 300 feet of Lakes Washington, Green, or Haller commanded a price
premium of approximately $24,800 (1993 dollars) relative to houses farther
away from the lakes. Brookshire et al. (1982) estimated that the hedonic value
of clean air in the Los Angeles area was approximately $381 (1993 dollars)
per month for locations with more direct access to fresh air off the Pacific
Ocean (not necessarily beachfront). Diamond (1980) estimated that approxi-
mately 7.5 percent of the value of a home in Boston was based on the crime
characteristics of its location. More recent studies have used the HRM to esti-
mate the attribute demand for local parks (Shultz and King 2001) and for air
quality (Sieg et al. 2000).
Readers interested in learning the specific steps involved with hedonic
regression analysis will need to have a solid understanding of econometric
184 POLICY
Figure 7.5 Nonmarket Demand for an Environmental Attribute Estimated

from the Hedonic Regression Method
Indirect attribute price
Demand
0
Quantity of environmental attribute
analysis, and are encouraged to review the excellent primer on the HRM by
Taylor (2003).
Other Valuation Approaches
Several additional valuation approaches can be used to estimate the value of

environmental improvements such as pollution reduction or land restoration
or preservation. In this section, we will consider the ways in which defensive
behavior and damage costs indicate value, followed by an exploration of the
technique of benefits transfer and a brief discussion of replacement cost.
Defensive behavior refers to actions taken by people to reduce their expo-
sure to harm caused by pollution, diseases, and other hazards. For example,
suppose that a leaking garbage dump creates a plume of contaminated ground-
water that adversely affects wells used for residential water supplies. If resi-
dents respond to groundwater contamination by building water tanks and
having uncontaminated water trucked in, then these actions are examples of
defensive behavior. The cost of the defensive behaviorpurchases of water
tanks and waterreveals something about the economic value of the envi-
ronmental quality attribute of clean, safe household water supplies. Dickie
(2003) develops a model (based on Harrington and Portney 1987) in which
defensive behavior is a substitute for pollution reduction. He shows that if
defensive behavior is cheap and effective, or when pollution has little impact
on health, then people will have a lower willingness to pay for pollution
reduction. Likewise, if defensive behavior is expensive or ineffective, or if
pollution has a large impact on health, people will have a higher willingness
to pay for pollution reduction.
Continuing our water contamination example above, suppose that if the
residents had not taken defensive action, then they would have experienced
harms to their health. The direct expenditures required to treat illnesses suf-
fered by residents and their pets or livestock that is caused by contaminated
water, as well as indirect costs associated with foregone earnings and pro-
ductivity when residents are ill, all represent damage costs. If residents know
in advance that they are being exposed to water contamination and under-
stand both damage costs and the cost of defensive behavior, then economi-
cally speaking we would expect that residents would only bear damage costs
if they are cheaper than the cost of defensive behavior. Of course, many
contamination cases are not detected in time to avoid damage costs, which
makes the question moot.
Conducting original research on nonmarket valuation is complex, costly,
and time-consuming, and relatively few specialists have the expertise to do
this sort of work. When budget or time limitations restrict the ability to
conduct original nonmarket valuation research, in some circumstances one
can use the technique of benefits transfer. As Rosenberger and Loomis
(2003) note, the term benefits transfer is an informal term used by econo-
mists for the practice of adapting information derived from an existing
study to a new setting or context. One can transfer specific numerical esti-
mates, such as an estimate of willingness to pay, or one can transfer an
entire estimated function, such as those described for CVM, TCM, and
HRM. As Rosenberger and Loomis suggest, in most cases the researcher
needs to first define the characteristics of the context under study, and then
conduct a broad and thorough literature review to find related original re-
search, both published and unpublished. The researcher should then screen
the original research studies to identify those of high quality that best cor-
respond to the context under study.
While transferring specific numerical estimates is simpler than an entire
function, specific numerical estimates cannot be adjusted for significant dif-
ferences between the context of the original research and the current study
context. Transferring an entire function usually increases the precision of
benefits transfer, but involves more steps. One must gather data on the cur-
rent study context to use as inputs to the function being transferred in order
to get a tailored estimate. The transfer of an entire function assumes that the
statistical relationship between the dependent and independent variables from
the original study will hold for the new context. This may not be the case.
186 POLICY
In chapter 6, we touched on the topic of ecosystem goods and services.

The nonmarket value of ecosystem services, such as natural nutrient cycling
and filtering, can be valued using replacement cost (or avoided cost) meth-
ods that price the service provided in terms of equivalent man-made services
(Folke 1991). Perhaps one of the best examples is given by the Catskill/
Delaware watershed, which provides most of New York Citys drinking wa-
ter supplies. The 1989 Federal Safe Drinking Water Acts Surface Water Treat-
ment Rule requires filtration of public surface water supplies, but managers
can receive a waiver from the rule if they can meet standards for waterborne
disease contamination, phosphorus loads, and turbidity in their waters with-
out filtration. The city of New York was able to get a filtration waiver from
the EPA through a commitment to watershed restoration and protection.
Therefore, it has been argued that the natural filtration processes in their
watershed can be valued based on the avoided capital and operating costs
of a filtration plant.
With a sense of how benefits are estimated, we will now turn to the sub-
ject of measuring and assessing the costs of complying with environmental
and natural resource regulations.
Measuring Costs
In this section of the chapter, we will consider a number of different con-

cepts related to the cost of complying with environmental and natural re-
source regulations. We will begin by investigating direct costs, followed by
indirect costs.
Direct Costs
Direct costs of compliance with environmental and natural resource regula-

tions are the visible consequence of compliance. They include the capital
costs of investment in appropriate equipment (e.g., smokestack scrubbers,
wastewater treatment), operating and maintenance costs of this capital equip-
ment, and personnel costs (e.g., equipment operators, monitors, regulatory
compliance staff). Direct costs also include forgone revenue flows that can
be directly attributable to regulation. For example, streamside buffer zones
required in timber harvest operations in California reduce the quantity of
harvestable timber available to the firm. Consequently, an element of direct
regulatory cost must include the forgone net revenue flows due to harvest
restrictions. Likewise, restrictions on development of wetlands and other
environmentally sensitive lands generate a direct cost in the form of forgone
net revenue flows. Direct costs are borne by government agencies, firms, and
consumers. According to Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih (2001), direct expen-

ditures for environmental protection in the United States are estimated to
exceed $150 billion annually, or about 2 percent of GDP. They note that
reported expenditures in the manufacturing sector reflect expenses that the
plant manager identifies with environmental protection. It is likely that this
accounting of direct costs omits opportunity costs in the form of forgone
revenue flows due to natural resource regulation. There is also the possibility
that cost accounting systems used by firms themselves may inadequately
accumulate direct costs of compliance with environmental regulation.
Each year between 1973 and 1994, and again for a one-year pilot study in
1999, the Census Bureau reported on pollution abatement costs and expen-
ditures (PACE) (omitting opportunity costs). In the earlier series of reports,
PACE was divided into spending on pollution abatement (about 90 percent
of total PACE), government regulation and monitoring, and research and
development (the latter two are about 10 percent of total PACE). Pollution
abatement capital expenditures by manufacturing establishments with twenty
employees or more amounted to $7.88 billion in 1994. Of this total, $7.58
billion was attributable to a particular media: $4.31 billion for air, $2.43
billion for water, and $838 million for solid/contained waste. Operating costs
related to pollution abatement activities totaled $20.67 billion. Of this amount,
$18.77 billion was attributable to a particular medium: $6.14 billion for air,
$7.03 billion for water, and $5.60 billion for solid/contained waste. Spend-
ing for the nonmedia and other category was $1.90 billion.
The 1999 PACE survey differed from the earlier PACE surveys described
above. While these changes prevent direct comparisons to earlier surveys,
the Census Bureau states that the changes were designed to better reflect
industry terminology and enhance the accuracy of the survey estimates. The
survey collected data on pollution abatement and prevention capital expen-
ditures and operating costs for air, water, solid waste, and multimedia. The
survey also collected data on disposal, recycling, site cleanup, habitat pro-
tection, environmental monitoring, and testing and administrative costs as
well as other payments, such as permits, fees, fines, penalties, and tradable
permits bought or sold. Of these, habitat protection, monitoring and testing,
administrative expenses, permits, fees, fines, and penalties were not collected
in the earlier PACE surveys. According to the Census Bureau, 1999 pollution
abatement capital expenditures by regulated industry amounted to $5.81 bil-
lion, three quarters of which was borne by the manufacturing sector. Of this
total, $3.46 billion was attributed to air, $1.80 billion to water, $361.9 mil-
lion to solid waste, and $182.3 million to multimedia. Pollution abatement
operating costs amounted to $11.86 billion in 1999, and 86 percent of these
costs were borne by the manufacturing sector. Of this total, $5.07 billion was
188 POLICY
attributed to air, $4.59 billion to water, $2.01 billion to solid waste, and $195.5
million to multimedia.
Viscusi (1996) reported that of the estimated $500 billion in annualized
regulatory costs in the U.S. economy from all forms of regulation, about
one-half are attributable to paperwork costs. Of the estimated $200 billion in
annualized direct regulatory costs to business and elsewhere, about one-half
can be attributed to environmental regulations.
Indirect Costs
In addition to direct costs, environmental regulations also impose various kinds

of indirect costs, sometimes known as hidden costs. The indirect costs, or sec-
ondary costs, of complying with environmental and natural resource regula-
tions occur as a side effect or consequence of direct expenditures in compliance
efforts. For example, expenditures for complying with environmental or natu-
ral resource regulation may crowd out other productive investments, dis-
courage investment in more efficient production technologies, and reduce
operational flexibility, thereby further reducing future productive output, prof-
its, and (in aggregate) economic growth. This value of this reduced future eco-
nomic output would represent an indirect cost of regulation. Moreover,
cost-accounting systems (from which direct compliance cost information is
drawn) may fail to properly accumulate significant elements of materials, mana-
gerial, and certain overhead costs that should be allocated to compliance with
environmental and natural resource regulations.
The study by Joshi, Krishnan, and Lave (2001) provides a good example
of indirect cost analysis. They studied the full economic cost of compliance
with environmental regulations using plant-level data from fifty-five steel
mills, as well as structured interviews of corporate-level managers and plant-
level accountants. While the U.S. steel industry had experienced a 58 per-
cent decline in production between 1974 and 1995, and industry blamed a
portion of this decline on the cost of environmental regulations, direct com-
pliance costs in this industry were estimated to be less than 5 percent of total
cost. While some may see this as unwarranted scapegoating of environmen-
tal regulations, Joshi et al. found that a $1 increase in the visible (direct) cost
of environmental regulation is associated with an increase in total cost (at the
margin) of $1011, of which $910 are hidden or indirect.
Indirect benefits (negative indirect costs) may also be generated because
of direct expenditures in compliance efforts. In this case, for example, re-
ported environmental costs may overstate true economic costs due to
complementarity between pollution-control technologies and other produc-
tion activities, meaning that the total cost of jointly producing goods and a
cleaner environment is lower than if each were produced separately. There-

fore, when direct compliance costs are reported by themselves, they over-
state true economic costs because they do not take into account indirect
benefits in the form of increased productivity. The Porter hypothesis (named
after its proponent, Professor Michael Porter) suggests that these sorts of
indirect benefits will be generated by direct environmental compliance ex-
penditures. The idea is that regulations require a firm to reexamine its pro-
duction processes, which in turn results in a probability of innovative new
processes or technologies being found that produce indirect benefits (Porter
and van der Linde 1995). In addition, a second strand to this theory (dis-
cussed in chapter 1) adds that environmental regulation in particular may
lead to improved competitiveness, as pollution represents wasted resources
that could be more effectively used. Therefore, according to the Porter hy-
pothesis, regulation that requires reduced pollution therefore inherently fa-
vors processes that are more productive.
Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih (2001) used empirical methods to explore
the relationship between reported direct expenditures in compliance with
environmental regulations and indirect costs or benefits in the manufactur-
ing sector. Their study focused on a large plant-level data set at the four-digit
standard industrial classification (SIC) level, and used a cost function mod-
eling approach that treated both environmental compliance and nonenvi-
ronmental production activities as distinct, unrelated cost-minimization
problems for each plant. They then explored the possibility that these activi-
ties are, in fact, related by including reported direct regulatory expenditures
in the cost function for nonenvironmental output. In contrast with Joshi et
al., they found that reported direct environmental expenditures tended to gen-
erate indirect benefits in some industries and indirect costs in others. Their
strongest results focused on the four most heavily regulated industries in the
United States, where they found that each dollar of reported direct environ-
mental expenditure resulted in eighteen cents of indirect benefit, with a stan-
dard error of forty-two cents. This is equivalent to saying that total direct and
indirect costs associated with compliance with environmental regulation rise
by eighty-two cents for every dollar increase in reported direct environmen-
tal expenditures.
In 1999, the Environmental Law Institute convened a conference on cost,
innovation, and environmental regulation. Proceedings from that conference
(Environmental Law Institute 1999) suggest that the design of environmental
regulation exerts a significant effect on the cost of compliance. The conference
proceedings note that a central problem with U.S. environmental and natural
resource regulations is that the design of emissions standards based on avail-
able or feasible control technologies under the Clean Water Act and Clean
190 POLICY
Air Act strongly discourages innovation. The proceedings also noted that small
changes in regulatory standards are unlikely to trigger the reexamination of a
firms production processes that is central to the creation of indirect benefits in
the Porter hypothesis. Specifically, significant increases in the stringency of
regulatory standards, combined with flexibility in how firms comply, are most
likely to promote innovation and the generation of indirect benefits.
In an earlier study, the EPA (1997) reported on estimated indirect macro-
economic impacts from the Clean Air Act (CAA) during the period from 1970
to 1990. These impacts were estimated from a general-equilibrium economic
model that evaluated the feedback effects of the CAA regulatory controls rela-
tive to a hypothetical no-control scenario. They grouped these macroeconomic
impacts into two broad classes: sectoral impacts and aggregate impacts. The
EPA (1997) reported that compliance with the CAA had the greatest sectoral
impacts on large energy producers and consumers, particularly those sectors
that relied most heavily on consumption of fossil fuels. Production costs in-
creased more for capital-intensive industries than for non-capital-intensive in-
dustries due to a projected increase in interest rates. Interest rates were projected
to have been increased by the CAA because the CAA required significant
investment in capital PACE that increased the demand for loanable funds. Indi-
rect regulatory impacts on the electric utility industry were estimated to have
generated a 2 to 4 percent increase in consumer prices and a resulting 3 to 5
percent reduction in output by 1990. Many other manufacturing sectors saw an
output reduction effect in the 1 percent range. A key aggregate impact of the
CAA was an estimated one-twentieth of 1 percent annual reduction in eco-
nomic growth due to CAA-mandated investment in capital PACE reducing the
level of investment available for capital formation. Consequently, GNP was
estimated to have been reduced by 1 percent ($55 billion) relative to the no-
control scenario.
There are also potential microeconomic impacts on certain capital-inten-
sive industries. Environmental regulations may not only increase the cost per
unit (e.g., per piece of furniture, per BTU of electricity), but perhaps more
important they increase fixed costs (those costs that do not vary with how
much a firm produces, such as the cost of scrubbers on smokestacks). When
fixed costs increase substantially, it requires that a firm have a larger output
level to maintain profitability. Thus large fixed costs can lead to market struc-
tures with fewer, larger firms (increased market concentration). Firms gain
larger market shares because each is compelled to expand production capac-
ity in order to cover these additional fixed costs. Unless demand for the goods
these firms produce somehow changes, firms will merge, reducing the num-
ber of competitors and reducing the degree of rivalry. Pashigian (1984) found
that, all else being constant, industries with higher burdens of environmental
regulation also had more rapid growth in mean plant size and more rapid
decreases in the number of production facilities in an industry, compared to
less regulated firms. To illustrate the role of increased fixed costs on market
concentration, consider the following example.
Suppose that a wood table manufacturing firm has an annualized fixed cost of
$100,000 (production equipment, facility, owners time), while on average, each
table has $50 worth of wood and labor and fasteners and stain in it. What is the
breakeven output level of this firm if market demand is such that tables sell for
$300 each? To answer this, note that breakeven occurs when output is such that
the average table costs $300 to produce. Currently, on average, each table costs
$50 in variable costs, so we need to find the output level at which fixed cost on
average is $250 per table. This is found by computing the following:
$100,000/x = $250, x = 100,000/250 = 400 tables.
Therefore, the firm breaks even at an output of 400 tables per year, has
positive economic profits for output greater than 400 tables, and suffers nega-
tive economic profits for output less than 400 tables.
Suppose that there are ten firms each producing 400 tables, so at the market
level there are 4,000 tables per year sold at around $300 each. In addition,
suppose that each firm must install a collection chamber that increases its an-
nualized fixed cost from $100,000 to $500,000. Assuming that market demand
does not change, the new break-even output level for a firm is:
$500,000/x = $250, x = 2,000 tables.
Note that the market will only absorb 4,000 tables at a price of $300 per
table (and even less at table prices greater than $300), so at most the market
can support only two firms where it used to support ten firms at the prevail-
ing price. Now these two firms will each be as big as the five former firms,
and will hire many of the workers laid off by those exiting the industry.
The potential problem with a reduced number of firms in this industry is
that many believe a smaller number of competitor firms are more likely to
collude. The argument is that it is much easier to police cheating with only
two firms than with ten. Thus, we may see price rise above $300. As price
rises, market quantity demanded falls. So the cartel must choose its price
carefully, based on how sensitive consumers are to price increases (factors:
number of substitutes, etc.). For example, if price rises to $400 per table, the
breakeven output for each firm is:
$500,000/x = $350, x = 1,429 tables.

192 POLICY
So as long as market demand is relatively price-inelastic so that quantity

demanded is more than twice the single-firm break-even output (more than
2,857), these remaining firms will enjoy positive economic profits rather
than just breaking even. With fewer firms, however, the industry is more
susceptible to collusion. Thus, an indirect cost associated with environmen-
tal regulation that requires substantial new fixed-cost investments in pollu-
tion control is that market concentration rises, competition falls, and firms
may be able to exercise more market power, making consumers worse off.
Moreover, with less competition there may be less pressure to minimize costs
(X-inefficiency), further raising consumer prices.
In closing, recall from chapter 1 that some argue that another indirect cost
of environmental regulations is overall job loss, the export of production
facilities to pollution havens, and declines in productivity and competi-
tiveness in international trade. It was shown in the introductory chapter of
this book that these arguments have little currency when confronted with
empirical research on the job and productivity implications of environmental
regulations. In particular, pollution control and clean technologies tend to be
labor-intensive, and the exportation of production facilities to low-income
countries has primarily been driven by enormous labor cost differences rather
than environmental regulations. Finally, there is little evidence that environ-
mental regulations are responsible for more than a small fraction of the de-
cline in productivity growth rates experienced in the United States.
Summary
Benefit/cost analysis is the way in which utilitarian concepts of ethical

social policy are operationalized in policy making. In this context, an
environmental or other policy is said to be efficient if it generates the
greatest net benefit to society.
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency judges a policy based on the
extent to which aggregate net benefits to society are maximized.
The more restrictive Pareto criterion for efficiency requires that any
change from the status quo not only generate positive net benefits, but
also not make any member of society worse off. Thus, the Pareto effi-
ciency criterion is concerned with how benefits and costs are distrib-
uted in society, while the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is not.
A requirement of benefit/cost analysis is that benefits and costs be mea-
surable and comparable on a common metric.
Dynamic efficiency occurs when the policy option is selected that gen-
erates the largest PV of net benefits or, alternatively, that generates the
largest PV of benefits per PV dollar of cost.
It is particularly challenging and important to measure the benefits of

proposed regulations for protecting or enhancing aspects of the natural
environment that are not marketed. The reason is that in well-functioning
competitive markets, price provides extensive information on the value
of the object being traded. In particular, one can estimate a demand
curve for the good and estimate consumer surplus, the excess of maxi-
mum willingness to pay over and above the price actually paid.
Economists have developed a number of techniques for measuring the
benefits of environmental protection and enhancement that are not di-
rectly traded in markets. These methods include quantitative risk as-
sessment of pollutants affecting human health and various methods for
measuring the value of environmental conservation, including the con-
tingent valuation method, the travel cost method, and the hedonic re-
gression method.
Quantitative risk assessment uses health data to determine the relation-
ship between pollution or workplace hazards and the statistical likeli-
hood of mortality or morbidity in a given-sized population. This infor-
mation can then be compared to the cost of incremental reductions in
various pollutants or workplace hazards, and thus regulatory policies
can be made consistent with one another.
The contingent valuation method is the only one of the three that is
capable of measuring passive-use values such as existence and option
values. A disadvantage of this method, however, is that data are gath-
ered by way of a hypothetical survey. Nevertheless, studies indicate that
well-constructed surveys using the dichotomous-choice referendum for-
mat perform remarkably well in parallel studies with actual referenda.
The travel cost method offers a way of acquiring information on the
active-use value that people assign to an area. The data are based on
actual expenditures rather than hypothetical surveys, but cannot mea-
sure passive uses in which people do not travel to an area.
The hedonic regression method is also based on actual expenditures
and measures the indirect value of individual environmental attributes
associated with something that is marketed, such as the value of safety
or a scenic view associated with residential real estate.
The cost of defensive behavior associated with avoiding pollution and
other harms provides an indication of the value of pollution reduction,
as can damage costs borne when people cannot or do not take action to
avoid harm.
Benefit transfer is an approach designed to use information from existing
studies in estimating benefit values for a new study. Benefit transfer may
be faster, cheaper, and simpler than conducting an original valuation study.
194 POLICY
Replacement cost can be used to assign economic value to nonmarketed

ecosystem services, such as water filtration services provided by a natural
watershed. Were the watershed to be impaired through resource extrac-
tion or development, the value of the lost filtration service could be
measured by way of the cost of a constructed filtration facility.
The cost of environmental regulation can be divided into direct and
indirect costs. Direct compliance costs include visible pollution abate-
ment and expenditures by firms, consumers, and government, as well as
opportunity costs that can be attributed directly to regulation.
There are also a variety of different indirect costs that represent either
hidden compliance costs or result as feedback effects from environ-
mental regulation, such as reduced rates of investment in productive
capital, lower rates of productivity growth, reduced output, higher in-
terest rates, reduced economic growth rates, and allocative inefficien-
cies due to market power in more concentrated industries.
Many factors limit the applicability of benefit/cost analysis in envi-
ronmental regulatory applications. For example, ethical, spiritual, and
religious values cannot be reasonably quantified. Benefits are
oftentimes diffuse and, because they are not traded in markets, do not
have prices that reveal value, making them difficult to measure com-
prehensively. In addition, it may be difficult to attribute environmen-
tal improvements to a single action. Moreover, the benefits (or costs)
to future generations of people affected by current regulations are
discounted as a requirement for dynamic efficiency, but this discount-
ing biases us away from policies with up-front costs and benefits en-
joyed by future generations. It is impossible to know what prefer-
ences future generations will have regarding the environment. Ag-
gregate benefits and costs may not be equitably distributed, and a
dollar will generate substantially more utility for a poor person than
for an extremely wealthy person. The impact of environmental regu-
lations is not easy to estimate with certainty, and so risk assessment
is often required.
1. Make up a hypothetical table for the cleanup of some pollutant as in the

present chapter to illustrate the use of the efficiency standard and benefit/
cost analysis. Set up your table with:
the first column showing equal 10 percent increments of reduction in

the pollutant;
the second column showing the total (cumulative) cost of cleanup up to

that point;
the third column showing the marginal cost of cleaning up for each 10
percent increment;
the fourth column showing the total (cumulative) benefit of cleanup;
the fifth column showing the marginal benefit of cleanup for each 10
percent increment;
the sixth column showing the marginal net benefit (marginal benefit/
marginal cost) for each 10 percent increment;
the seventh column showing the total (cumulative) net benefit (total
benefit/total cost).
a. Construct and carefully label your table.

b. Carefully graph your marginal benefits and marginal costs data.
c. Briefly explain why the trend in marginal benefits and marginal costs in
your table makes sense for the pollutant you are using in your example
(e.g., why you might have diminishing marginal benefits and increas-
ing marginal costs, or constant marginal benefits and increasing mar-
ginal costs).
d. Identify the level of cleanup that yields the maximum possible total net
benefit. Briefly describe the conditions that must be true for this level
of cleanup to be truly socially optimal. In other words, for what reasons
is it true that existing best methods may still undermeasure or
overmeasure benefits or costs?
2. Do some library research and find a study that uses nonmarket valua-
tion techniques to measure the benefits of some natural resource or environ-
mental amenity. Likely journals include the Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, Land Economics, or Ecological Economics.
Write a one-page review of the study, including the target area of analysis,
the methods used, the research findings, and any policy implications.
3. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods ad-
dressed in this chapter for measuring the nonmarket value of environmental
amenities in the context of valuing a neighborhood park. Which method, or
combination of methods, would you use and why?
4. Access the Internet site for the National Center for Environmental
Assessment (http://cfpub1.epa.gov/ncea /). Find a risk assessment report
for a particular toxic pollutant and summarize the findings. What was the
role of economics in the assessment? How has the risk assessment affected
regulatory policy?
5. Access the Internet study Dying Too Soon: How Cost-Effectiveness
196 POLICY
Analysis Can Save Lives (www.ncpa.org/studies/s204/s204.html) by Profes-

sor Tammy Tengs. If the value of a statistical life is approximately $5 mil-
lion, and if preventing premature death is the only benefit of the regulation,
then based on Tengss cost-effectiveness analysis what are some examples of
regulatory interventions that fail the benefit/cost test? How might your an-
swer change if there are other benefits associated with the regulatory inter-
vention? How might your answer change if the value of a statistical life is
considerably lower, such as in a developing country?
6. Use the Internet or your library and find an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) that addresses an important management or policy change, and
that contains a socioeconomic element with a benefit/cost analysis. Write a
report that summarizes the elements of the benefit/cost analysis, including
the types of nonmarket and market-based valuation methods employed, the
types of cost included, and the discount rate used to calculate the present
value of net benefits.
7. Spreadsheet simulation (more advanced): Consider the following sim-
plified fitted TCM linear regression equation: VISITS = 50,000 + 0.5*INC +
50*TCSUB 100*TCTARGET, where VISITS is the annual number of vis-
its to the target area under study, INC = per capita personal income, TCSUB
= travel cost to a substitute destination, and TCTARGET = travel cost to the
target area. Suppose that the mean value of INC is $50,000, the mean value
of TCSUB is $500, and the mean value of TCTARGET is $200. Enter all this
information into a spreadsheet.
a. What does the fitted TCM regression forecast as the annual number of
visits to the target area when the independent variables are evaluated at
their mean value?
b. Create a table with two columns, one labeled travel cost and one
labeled estimated number of visits. Continue to use the mean values
for INC and TCSUB in the regression equation, but now progressively
increase the mean value of TCTARGET in $10 increments. This will
tell us the marginal effect of an increase in the travel cost price on the
estimated number of visits. Record (TCTARGET + $10 increment) and
the associated forecast number of visits in each row of the table. Stop
adding increments of $10 to the mean value of travel cost when the
forecasted number of visits reaches zero.
c. Plot these data in a diagram where the y axis is labeled travel cost
and the x axis is labeled estimated number of visits. Label the curve
as the resource demand curve. It should be downward-sloping and
linear.
d. Use geometry to calculate the area under this resource demand curve
and above the $200 average travel cost price line. This figure repre-
sents a simplified estimate of the net economic recreational use value
(consumer surplus) derived from the target area. Provide a brief narra-
tive economic interpretation of your findings. Given that the mean value
of TCTARGET can be interpreted as the average actual price paid for
the recreational experience, explain why the area under the resource
demand curve represents a simplified estimate of the consumer surplus
derived from recreational visitation.
Internet Links
EPAs Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (http://

yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html): The Guide-
lines provide guidance on analyzing the economic impacts of regulations
and policies, and assessing the distribution of costs and benefits among vari-
ous segments of the population, with a particular focus on disadvantaged
and vulnerable groups.
EPAs National Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE) (http://

yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/homepage): The NCEE analyzes
relationships between the economy, environmental health, and environmen-
tal pollution control.
National Center for Environmental Assessment (http://cfpub1.epa.gov/

ncea/): A division of the EPAs Office of Research and Development, the
National Center for Environmental Assessment serves as the national resource
center for the overall process of human health and ecological risk assess-
ments. This includes the integration of hazard, dose-response, and exposure
data and models to produce risk characterizations.
Resources for the Futures Cost/Benefit Analysis Website (www.rff.org/

rff/Cost-BenefitAnalysis.cfm): Access a large number of research reports
and other studies on benefit/cost analysis as it relates to the environment and
natural resources.
Dying Too Soon: How Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Can Save Lives

(www.ncpa.org/studies/s204/s204.html): Work by Professor Tammy Tengs
on the cost effectiveness of various regulations in which she divides the total
cost of a regulatory intervention by the number of statistical life-years saved
by the regulation. Site sponsored by the National Center for Policy Analysis
(NCPA Policy Report 204).
198 POLICY
Studies of the Environmental Costs of Electricity (www.emanifesto.org/

OTAEnvironmentalCost/): An accessible description of the methods and
the role of environmental cost studies for electricity, from the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (U.S. Congress).
Survey of Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (www.census.gov/

econ/www/mu1100.html): PDF file provides access to the Pollution Abate-
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years 197394, and the one-year 1999 pilot study.
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8
The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and
Resource Management
Introduction: What Is Political Economy?
Political economy is not a unified discipline. Political economy was the term
originally used to describe the discipline of economics. Adam Smith, Karl
Marx, and John Stuart Mill, for example, were deeply concerned with the
interconnectedness of social, economic, and political phenomena. Much of the
focus was on what we might now call the economics of public policy. In con-
temporary usage, political economy is distinct from the discipline of econom-
ics in that it is more interdisciplinary in nature, draws upon related fields such
as law and political science, and often has a broader scope. Within
microeconomics, political economy is an approach used to understand how
political and legal institutions influence the economic behavior of people, firms,
and markets, as well as the economics of how interest groups influence the
formation of laws and regulatory policy. From the standpoint of international
economics, political economy is concerned with understanding how national
policies influence international trade, investment, and finance, with the pro-
cesses that lead to the formation of international economic treaties and institu-
tions, and with the economic consequences of these laws and institutions. These
relatively recent approaches to political economysometimes referred to as
the new political economyborrow economic approaches for modeling in-
centives as a way to understand the political and economic forces that shape
public policy. In contrast to the economic approach, political scientists have a
203
204 POLICY
tradition of viewing political economy as a means for analyzing economic and

power relationships among nation-states. Many sociologists use a framework
for political economy drawn from Marx to understand how the structure of
production influences the social interaction of individuals and groups. The
political economy framework used by anthropologists provides an understand-
ing of the relationship between the capitalist system and local cultures around
the world. The role and functioning of the market economy in a social context
is perhaps the most important relationship studied in all the various branches
of political economy. A comprehensive presentation of the full range of thought
on political economy is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we will
focus on the application of new political economy theory to environmental
economics, policy, and the collective-choice problems associated with the gov-
ernance of common-pool resources (CPRs).
In chapter 4 we developed the economic theory of efficiency-enhancing
environmental regulation. But since environmental regulation is an outcome
of political processes, the nature of environmental regulation will reflect the
economic forces at work in the political process. Therefore, new political
economy models can help us understand how regulation comes about. Ratio-
nal-choice models of political economy develop a linkage between the insti-
tutional structure of the political process, the preferences of decision makers,
and the preferences of those affected by regulation. We will see, for example,
that the process of developing environmental regulation can be modeled in a
supply and demand framework. The supply and demand framework is not
the only way to model environmental political economy, and we will con-
sider a number of other approaches, including those addressing the gover-
nance of locally self-governed common-pool resources. Studying political
economy also helps us understand cases of government failure, in which
policymakers fail to design environmental policies that adequately resolve
market failures at reasonable cost. Therefore, while market failures provide a
theoretical or conceptual justification for regulatory intervention, one must
also critically evaluate the efficiency of the regulatory intervention itself.
Such a critical evaluation can help us understand why existing regulatory
schemes do not function as expected and can thus be a first step in the design
of more effective regulatory incentives and institutions.
In this chapter we will first develop a political-economic model of the
regulatory process that uses supply and demand methodology. Next, we will
describe some of the more important models of political economy that have
been developed by economists studying the regulatory process. We will then
discuss how these models have been applied to the political economy of
environmental regulation, to the governance of CPR systems, and to the pro-
cess of forming international environmental accords.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 205
Economic Models of Political Economy and the

Regulatory Process
Introduction
Economists who study the political process are interested in explaining gov-
ernment policies as a function of (1) optimizing, rational choice behavior by
the policymakers (behavior consistent with optimizing over some set of ob-
jectives), (2) modified by incentives from various sources, and subject to (3)
political and other institutions (the rules of the game). Ordeshook (1990) has
argued that the extension of this rational choice paradigm to politics, which
is the foundation of thought in political economy today, represents a case of
imperialism (expansion of territory using power) by microeconomic theo-
rists such as Arrow (1951) and Olson (1965).
Political economy models can be used to help explain and predict policy
outcomes. For example, consider the choice between a state government gath-
ering revenues through a sales tax or an income tax. Sales taxes tend to be
more regressive, meaning that they take a larger percentage of the income of
poor people relative to rich people. The reason is that poor people spend a
much larger share of their income on items subject to sales tax than rich
people, who save and invest a substantial portion of their income. In con-
trast, income taxes are usually graduated, and so taxes take a larger share of
the income of rich people, making them progressive. Thus, income taxes will
tend to be the preferred method of taxation for political candidates who posi-
tion themselves to represent the interests of low-income people, while sales
taxes will tend to be the preferred method of taxation for candidates who
represent upper-middle-class and wealthy people. Thus, in those states where
the very poor have a very low voter participation rate, and so represent a
minority of voters, one could predict that the tax structure will tend to make
greater use of sales taxes relative to income taxes.
Early work in the rational-choice approach to political economy by
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) led to the creation of the branch of political
economy known as the public choice school of thought. Instead of assuming
that politicians select policies that best serve the public interest, traditional
public choice models start from the premise that politicians, like other eco-
nomic agents, are motivated by incentives such as ideology, wealth, reelec-
tion, and power. From this foundation, one can model the supply of legislation
or administrative rules. For example, Kalt and Zupan (1984) find that the
voting behavior of legislators can be explained as a function of both indi-
vidual ideology and the requirement to satisfy the economic and other inter-
ests of the constituents whose votes are needed to remain in office. While
206 POLICY
factors such as ideology, reelection, and the like help us understand the sup-
ply of regulation, legislative and administrative outcomes also depend on the
institutional structure within which these activities occur. Shepsle and
Weingast (1987) offer an accessible survey of the work that has been done
on the institutional structure of the U.S. Congress. For example, issues such
as party control, seniority, the role of committees and committee chairs, vot-
ing rules, and other aspects of procedure are important elements in under-
standing legislative outcomes. A different institutional structure governs the
administrative rule-making process.
While some economists and political scientists were studying the behavior
of legislators and others on the supply side of regulation, a number of econo-
mists associated with the Chicago school of economics were developing a
political economic model of the demand for regulation. Stigler (1971) argued
generally that firms will lobby legislators for regulation when such regulation
provides (1) direct monetary subsidies, (2) constraints on substitute products
or subsidies on complementary products, (3) easier price-fixing/collusive at-
mosphere, and (4) incumbent firms with the ability to control entry by poten-
tial new rivals. Together with the work of Peltzman (1976), Stigler is credited
with the development of the capture theory of regulation. In this model, firms
(or others) capture the regulatory process because each firm potentially bears a
high cost if regulation constrains its behavior, so each firm has a lot at stake. In
contrast, while the public as a whole has a lot at stake, generally, any one
person has only a very small stake in the regulatory process and so has little
incentive to invest resources in affecting the regulatory process. At the same
time, there are comparatively few firms relative to the overall public, so the
cost of organizing the firms is low compared to the cost of organizing the
public. As a result, firms have both the incentive and the better opportunity to
invest resources successfully in lobbying for favorable regulation. As with the
later work of Becker (1983), the capture theory of regulation ignores the sup-
ply side of the regulatory process, and assumes that regulation is an outcome
of interest group competition.
There is evidence consistent with the capture theory of regulation. One
example is revolving-door deals, in which high-level regulators and other
officials leave government and find high-level jobs in the same industry that
they had been responsible for regulating. While it is difficult to prove a
causal relationship between regulatory decisions and future employment,
careful attention to the interests of regulated industries can be a highly lu-
crative career-building strategy for senior government regulators. Sanjour
(1992) provides a remarkable accounting of the possible revolving-door re-
lationship between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the haz-
ardous waste industry. For example, Sanjour reports that chief EPA
administrator William Ruckelshaus became a director of Weyerhauser,

Monsanto, and CEO of Browning Ferris, all regulated by the EPA. Chief
EPA administrator Douglas Costle became chair of Metalf and Eddy, a
Superfund contractor. Chief EPA administrator Lee Thomas became CEO
of Law Environmental, a hazardous waste firm. Similarly, various deputy
administrators, acting administrators, assistant administrators, and regional
administrators, as well as enforcement attorneys, gained high-level employ-
ment in hazardous waste firms such as Waste Management, Chemical Waste
Management, Browning Ferris, and Rollins Environmental Services. Like-
wise, Greenberg (1993) found that 80 percent of top EPA officials who had
worked with toxic waste clean-ups and left the government between 1980
and the time of his study joined firms holding Superfund clean-up contracts
or having consulted with or given legal advice to companies about dealing
with Superfund. More generally, Lewis (1998) found that between 36 and
40 percent of senior staffers serving members of key congressional budget-
ary committees left to become registered lobbyists between 1991 and 1996.
In a July 1999 news release, the group Common Cause reported that 128
former members of Congress were lobbyists in 1998, and that at least 22
percent of lawmakers leaving office became lobbyists in the 1990s, com-
pared to only 3 percent in the 1970s.
Additional support for the capture theory of regulation comes from a 1997
Los Angeles Times analysis of political giving by major U.S. corporations.
That report found that the largest contributors tended to be those most heavily
regulated by government or most dependent upon government for subsidies
(Vartabedian 1997). Clearly, these firms have a high demand for favorable
regulation. By the same token, firms with a reputation for sound manage-
ment, and which therefore have a relatively lower demand for favorable regu-
lation, were found to be below-average contributors. From a sectoral point of
view, the largest political contributors came from the financial, military, oil,
telecommunications, and tobacco industries.
The Political Market for Regulation
In this section of the chapter, we will see how the two strands of the rational-
choice theory of political economy described in the preceding section can be
brought together in a simple equilibrium supply and demand framework.
Since regulation may have its origins in both legislation and administrative
rules, we will use the term regulator to refer to the agent (either legislator
or administrator) who participates in the production of regulation. We will
assume a competitive market in which the equilibrium level of effective sup-
port for a particular regulation is the outcome of interaction between interest
208 POLICY
groups and regulators. This section of the chapter is loosely based on the
work of Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins (1999).
The demand for regulation derives from the various groups whose inter-
ests are served by regulation. Since regulation is a public good, and since
political influence is costly, individuals are unlikely to find it worthwhile to
participate on their own. Interest groups are effective because they pool the
resources of many individuals and reduce the total cost of lobbying activity.
Since regulation is a public good, however, interest groups suffer from free-
riding problems (Olson 1965). Effective interest groups are able to over-
come the free-rider problem by offering membership benefits such as
solidarity, access to regulators, and information. Interest groups organize
around a common set of preferences, and therefore express a groups will-
ingness to pay for effective support of a regulation that reflects the marginal
utility derived from the regulatory outcome. This willingness to pay is mani-
fested as political currency that includes money payments, votes, volunteer
effort, and endorsements. Stigler (1971) and Peltzmans (1976) capture theory
of regulation focuses on the advocacy behavior of regulated firms, and sug-
gests that interest groups are most likely to be successful in affecting regula-
tory outcomes when individual members have a large willingness to pay for
favorable regulation, and when the interest group is able to effectively orga-
nize and focus its collective preferences.
Those who study the demand for regulation characterize several specific
types of interest groups. Firms often organize themselves in trade associations.
As Stigler and Peltzman observed, these trade associations are likely to seek
regulations that reduce their production costs, provide subsidies, erect entry
barriers and constrain substitutes, and provide an environment more condu-
cive to collusion. Environmentalists organize themselves into groups that lobby
for regulation that conserves or restores the environment. Likewise, consum-
ers may organize themselves into interest groups seeking lower product prices
and product quality assurance, and workers may organize into interest groups
seeking more jobs, higher pay, and better working conditions.
In terms of environmental interest groups, Agnone (2004) performed an
analysis of 406 pro-environmental bills passed by Congress between 1960
and 1994. He found, for example, that taking to the streets to demonstrate
and protest is more effective than working inside the system to influence the
passage of pro-environment legislation in the United States. The actual im-
pact of individual protest acts on whether legislation passes is relatively small,
with each protest event that occurs in a given year increasing the number of
pro-environment bills passed by about 2.2 percent. Thus in a year in which
twenty protests occurred, about 44 percent more pro-environment bills would
be approved. Moreover, the impact of individual protest actions is small com-
pared to which party controls Congress, and whether or not it is an election

year. Agnones research indicates that a piece of environmental legislation
has a 75 percent better chance of passage when Democrats control both houses
of Congress, and a bill is more than 200 percent more likely to be passed in
a congressional election year.
As Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins (1999) argue, the supply of regulation
has three components, each reflecting the cost of supplying effective support
for a particular regulatory outcome. First, the supply of regulation is a func-
tion of the opportunity cost of the time and effort invested by the regulator in
shepherding environmental legislation or administrative rules through the
political process. Second, the supply of regulation is a function of the psy-
chological cost of supporting regulation that may be in opposition to the
personal preferences of the regulator. It is possible that this cost becomes
negative if the regulation is in accord with the regulators personal prefer-
ences. Third, the supply of regulation is a function of the opportunity cost of
supporting regulation that can impair the regulators probability of reelec-
tion or reappointment. As with the regulators personal preferences, this op-
portunity cost can become negative if the regulation is in accord with the
interests of the regulators constituency and thus increases the likelihood of
reelection or reappointment. Each of these three components of the supply
of regulation affects the utility of the regulator.
The equilibrium concept as it applies to a supply and demand model is
described in chapter 3. In this more complex political market, the price of a
unit of effective support, denominated in political currency, reflects the mar-
ginal willingness to pay for the groups whose interests are reflected in the
demand curve. The equilibrium quantity of effective support is found where
the demand for regulation intersects the supply of regulation, as shown in Fig-
ure 8.1. What factors might displace this equilibrium and cause an increase or
a decrease in the equilibrium level of effective support for a particular regula-
tion? An increase in demand might occur, for example, if a new interest group
joins the coalition demanding the regulation. All else equal, an increase in
demand would cause an increase in the equilibrium level of effective support.
Likewise, if polls indicate that constituents more strongly favor the regulation
then this would increase the supply of regulation and therefore increase the
equilibrium quantity of effective support. Each regulatory alternative will have
its own supply and demand, and thus will have its own equilibrium level of
effective support. Different regulatory alternatives will derive their demand
from a different mix of interest groups, and will derive their supply from dif-
ferent regulator opportunity costs.
Nevertheless, how do these equilibrium levels of effective support relate
to regulatory outcomes? That is the role of political institutions. For example,
210 POLICY
Figure 8.1 The Political Market for Regulation
Political currency
Supply: A function of
regulators opportunity
costs (time & effort,
reelection prospects), as
well as psychological
costs.
Demand: Reflects the

willingness to pay of
interests that support the
particular regulation.
0
Equilibrium quantity of Quantity of
effective support effective support
the rules of governance may require a threshold level of equilibrium support

in a legislature in order for a particular regulation to become law. In the case
of administrative rule-making processes, the process may involve selecting
from among regulatory alternatives based on which receives the largest level
of equilibrium support.
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: A

Selective Survey
In this section, we will review a number of studies that have used the tools of
political economy to evaluate environmental regulation. One issue has to do
with determining the political economy of how pollution-control laws are
implemented by the EPA and other relevant administrative agencies. Imple-
mentation involves diverse elements of government, including enforcement
policy, field monitoring, sanctioning decisions, and legal activity. Downing
(1981) has studied the political economy of the process of implementing
pollution-control laws, and his model includes three groups: the polluter,
those bearing the pollution costs, and the regulatory agency. The first two
groups invest resources to influence the regulatory agency. Downing assumes
that the manager(s) of the regulatory agency have the twin objectives of maxi-
mizing agency budget and discretionary control and of improving environ-
mental quality. Polluters, and those suffering from pollution, invest resources
in influencing the politicians who set the agency budget, and thus indirectly
control the level of pollution-control activity.
This is a useful structure for analyzing the role of interest groups in deter-
mining the nature of particular environmental policies. For example, this
model indicates that there is a feedback effect between the type of environ-
mental regulation we observe (e.g., effluent fees, technology forcing) and
the pattern of lobbying pressure exerted by the regulated firms. Milliman
and Prince (1989) studied a polluting firms incentives for spending money
on research and development (R&D) to find innovative and less expensive
ways of meeting the requirements of pollution-control laws. One relation-
ship they studied was the way in which firms that succeeded in finding an
innovative and lower-cost means of complying with pollution-control laws
might influence the introduction of even more stringent environmental regu-
lations. They argue, firms, not regulatory agencies, often initiate [environ-
mentally friendly] innovation and diffusion (p. 248).
What sort of influence might such a firm with a cost-reducing innova-
tion exert on policymakers? Hackett (1995) investigated the question of
whether polluting firms would ever have an incentive to lobby policymakers
for more restrictive regulation of their own industry and used a Stigler-
style model of regulatory influence. This counterintuitive scenario can ac-
tually occur when doing so would raise the cost of rival firms more than
the firms own cost, as argued by Salop et al. (1984). In Hacketts model,
firms are engaged in a patent race to develop less expensive methods of
clean production technology. The incentive to engage in this patent race
need not be some external threat from the government. Instead, the winner(s)
of the patent race have found a much cheaper method of clean production
than other industry members, and so have an incentive to lobby govern-
ment for pollution-control regulations. Such regulations raise their costs as
well but they raise production costs of noninnovating rivals by much more.
As a result, the innovating firms have a cost advantage in the regulated
setting, which increases their profits.
The viewpoint offered above is that there are circumstances in which pol-
luting firms actually have an incentive to invest money in pollution-control
R&D and, if successful, to lobby for more restrictive environmental laws.
There are other, somewhat less benign, reasons why firms might engage in
voluntary pollution abatement. In particular, Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett
(2000) look at the situation in which polluting firms face the possibility of
more restrictive environmental laws in the future. They use a demand-side
political economy model in which rival interest groups compete with one
another to influence policymakers, as in Becker (1983). They find that if the
cost of organizing those harmed by pollution to lobby for more restrictive
212 POLICY
environmental law is sufficiently high, the polluting firms may have an in-
centive to engage voluntarily in clean-up activities. Nevertheless, how much
voluntary overcompliance will firms select? The answer is just enough to
keep those suffering from pollution from organizing, but less than what the
firms think they would be forced to clean up if they had to compete in the
influence process. Consequently, firms are able to foreclose the influence
process through some voluntary pollution control.
Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) use data on the Toxics Release In-
ventory (TRI) to evaluate whether declines in the cost of organizing politi-
cal resistance to pollution emissions lead to a greater threat of increased
government regulation, driving firms to self-regulate and reduce emissions.
The TRI requires firms to self-report their emissions of certain toxic com-
pounds and thus works to lower the information cost to citizen groups that
lobby government for stricter regulations. Since the TRI was instituted in
1989, toxic emissions per unit of manufacturing output have steadily de-
clined, which is consistent with Maxwell, Lyon, and Hacketts prediction.
Moreover, states such as California that have a very high density of self-
identified environmentalists are shown to have a more rapid reduction in
toxic emissions per unit of manufacturing output than states with a lower
density of environmentalists. Thus, by simply providing information on
pollution emissions, the TRI makes it easier for citizens to threaten pollut-
ers with more stringent regulation, which in turn works to lower emissions
by way of voluntary self-regulation in order to attenuate the threat of more
stringent regulation.
We will now look at applications of political economy that have been
used to explain successes and failures in CPR governance.
The Political Economy of Locally Self-Governed

Common-Pool Resources
We have discussed a number of different ways that the techniques of politi-

cal economy have been used to help explain environmental laws and their
implementation. The techniques of political economy can also be applied to
appropriator groups that form self-governing organizations for managing CPR
systems. One of the clearest applications of this methodology is in under-
standing how appropriator groups solve the problem of internally allocating
harvest rights when overall harvest must be reduced in order to protect the
productive capacity of the CPR.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) have argued that the percentage of voters
needed for a voting organization (e.g., a legislature or a condominium own-
ers association or a group of groundwater pumpers) to reach agreement has
important cost implications. Building on this notion, Hackett (1992) studied

voting rules in CPR systems in which the appropriators differ in one or more
important ways. For example, from prior use, some groundwater pumpers
may have drawn very large volumes of water from the aquifer, while others
may have appropriated only very small volumes. Suppose that the CPR sys-
tem has been abused from overuse, and the appropriators have just self-orga-
nized to reduce overall appropriation levels in order to manage the CPR more
sustainably. The question is how the overall reduction in use will be divided
among the individual appropriators.
Rule systems that change the original status quo shares redistribute wealth
from one type of appropriator to another, and are therefore more likely to
generate conflict. For example, suppose that a groundwater basin is found to
be in overdraft and new rules are developed to reduce the daily quantity of
water to be withdrawn from the aquifer. Wealth will be redistributed from
historically small appropriators to historically large appropriators if all ap-
propriators must cut back by the same number of gallons per day. Wealth
will be redistributed from large appropriators to small ones if groundwater
quota shares of equal size are assigned without regard to historical pumping
levels. In contrast, a rule system that requires all appropriators to cut back by
the same percentage from historical use levels is neutral and does not redis-
tribute wealth. Self-governed CPR appropriators must resolve this distribu-
tional conflict in order to achieve more sustainable use of the CPR.
The larger the percentage of voters required to reach agreement on a dis-
tributional rule, the more inclusive the voting rule. The extreme case would
be a consensus rule. Hackett (1992) developed a model that identifies the
following trade-off: heterogeneous groups with highly inclusive voting rules
will take a longer time to reach agreement because such voting rules make it
easier to block agreements. This delay allows the CPR to continue to decline
in productivity. Distributional rules that are approved, however, are less likely
to result in large redistributions of wealth relative to the status quo, and so
individual appropriators are less likely to fight and violate such rules, reduc-
ing future monitoring and enforcement costs. In contrast, less inclusive vot-
ing rules, such as a simple majority rule, are more likely to result in a
redistribution of wealth from the minority to the majority of voters, and so
repair of the CPR system is not delayed. Yet if the majority does manage to
pass highly redistributive rules, the agreement is more likely to be fought
and violated by the minority in the future, resulting in higher monitoring and
enforcement costs.
Thus self-governed yet highly heterogeneous CPR appropriator groups
may have to trade off delay costs against higher monitoring and enforcement
costs when they devise their voting rule. Hackett, Schlager, and Walker (1994)
214 POLICY
used laboratory experimental techniques to look at how groups resolve this

problem. Laboratory experiments such as this have people role-play the in-
teractions of CPR appropriator groups. The incentive to take this seriously is
created by using cash payments to re-create the incentives that are present in
naturally occurring CPR systems. The advantage of laboratory techniques is
that they allow researchers to test the hypotheses of models for which data
are not available from naturally occurring sources. Hackett, Schlager, and
Walker created heterogeneity in appropriator sizelarge appropriators had
the capability (and the history) of harvesting a much larger volume from the
CPR than the small appropriators harvest. After allowing appropriators to
abuse the CPR, they were given the opportunity to communicate freely and
devise a sharing rule to (1) reduce overall harvest on the CPR and (2) allo-
cate these reduced harvest rights among the appropriators themselves. Hackett,
Schlager, and Walker found that this form of heterogeneity did not seriously
deter appropriators from forming successful sharing rules. When large ap-
propriators had to pay for their added harvest capacity, sharing rules allo-
cated larger harvest shares to them relative to those with smaller harvest
capacity. These proportionate sharing rules were seen as being fair and pre-
vented the large-capacity appropriators from cheating on the agreement.
There have been a number of field studies as well. For example, the ef-
fects of appropriator heterogeneity and voting rules on the performance of
CPR governance structures have been looked at for the case of oil and gas
fields by Wiggins and Libecap (1985) and Libecap and Wiggins (1985). As
Wiggins and Libecap (1985) point out, [c]onflict over estimated lease val-
ues and unit shares [sharing rules] is the heart of the contracting problem
(p. 372). Self-governance on oil and gas fields with many individual mineral
rights holders is important, because excessively rapid competitive pump-
ing races deplete the natural pressurization in the oil pocket that allows the
oil to be brought to the surface. They found, for example, that self-gover-
nance was far more successful in the state of Wyoming, where oil fields are
primarily on federal land and federal policy encourages agreements prior to
pumping when heterogeneities could set in. By 1975, 82 percent of Wyo-
ming oil came from fields with sharing rule agreements and controls on
overpumping. Agreements were far less common in Texas, where pumping
could occur prior to talks on self-governance, allowing heterogeneities to
set in. Moreover, unanimity is required for agreement in Texas. As a result,
while major oil fields were developed in Texas in the late 1920s and early
1930s, only 20 percent of the states overall oil production came from self-
governed pumpers by 1975. Oklahoma, in contrast to Texas, allowed for
legally binding sharing rule agreements when at least 63 percent of the pump-
ers (weighted by acreage of mineral rights) agreed to a sharing rule. By
1975, nearly 40 percent of Oklahoma oil came from fields with sharing rule
agreements and controls on overpumping. Thus, heterogeneity and highly
inclusive voting rules both contribute to delay in forming effective CPR gov-
ernance structures.
Libecap and Wiggins (1985) also investigated the political economic ef-
fects of large- and small-firm oil field appropriator groups on the form of
state and federal oil field quota rules. They found evidence that state and
federal resource allocation rules vary as a function of the political influence
of these two appropriator groups. In Texas, small lease owners were numer-
ous and influential; they successfully delayed productivity-enhancing oil field
CPR rules that favored large lease owners. On the other hand, the federal
government is both a large lease owner and a supplier of rules for oil fields
on public lands and so selected rules that favored large lease owners.
Johnson and Libecap (1982) provide a similar analysis of CPR gover-
nance structures designed to resolve overuse and to allocate harvest rights.
They studied the Texas shrimp industry, where fishers vary principally with
regard to fishing skill (p. 1005). There is also a biological interdependence
between inshore and offshore fisheries, where the productivity of the off-
shore fishery depends in part on number of shrimp that migrate there from
shallower inshore waters. While fishers unions and trade associations devel-
oped along the U.S. coast to limit entry in order to control overfishing, a
series of Supreme Court decisions during the 1940s interpreted these as car-
tel agreements (cartels like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries [OPEC], for example, are illegal under U.S. law), and required that they
be dismantled. Johnson and Libecap point out that heterogeneity in skill cre-
ated conflict over the type of government fishery regulations the various fishers
preferred: For example, total effort [in catching fish] could be restricted
through uniform quotas for eligible fishermen. But if fishermen are hetero-
geneous, uniform quotas will be costly to assign and enforce because of
opposition from more productive fishermen (p. 1010).
Field research generally indicates that rules linking CPR output shares to an
appropriators size and historical level of CPR harvest (number of fishing boats,
acres under irrigation) or contribution (effort or financial contributions for up-
keep or monitoring and enforcement) are far more common than rules that
simply divide CPR output equally. There is an aspect of fairness in rewarding
greater contributions with larger shares, and sharing rules that differ markedly
from historical use patterns tend to undermine individual cooperation with
group efforts directed at improving the conditions of the commons.
Thus we have seen that the techniques of political economy and public
choice are helpful in understanding the problems and challenges associated
with successful self-governance of localized CPRs as well as the nature of
216 POLICY
the rule structures these groups develop. Heterogeneity and highly inclusive
voting rules for reaching agreement explain a substantial amount of the de-
lays, high costs, and failures of CPR governance. These problems occur be-
cause incompatible incentives of individuals create distributional conflict,
and highly inclusive voting rules increase the strategic power of individual
appropriators to hold up agreements for special treatment.
The Political Economy of International Environmental

Accords: The Case of the Montreal Protocol
The methods of political economy can also be used to help us understand the
nature of international environmental accords. One of the most prominent of
these is the Montreal Protocol, which sets an international schedule for the
banning of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and related chemicals that deplete
atmospheric ozone. Oye and Maxwell (1995) offer a comprehensive politi-
cal economic analysis of the Montreal Protocol, and we will draw heavily
upon their work in this case study.
Oye and Maxwell argue that successful environmental management oc-
curs when narrow, self-interested behavior is also consistent with the com-
mon good, and thus those interested in the common good should look for
opportunities to foster these linkages. This is something like Adam Smiths
notion that the invisible hand of the marketplace transforms narrowly self-
interested behavior into efficient outcomes. In particular, their case study
analysis of the Montreal Protocol and other environmental agreements indi-
cates that environmental regulations work most effectively when they create
benefits for those firms being regulated.
Theoretical Foundation
Consider two different regulatory situations. One of these we shall refer to as

Olsonian cases, using the terminology developed by Oye and Maxwell for
regulatory situations matching those described in the work by Olson (1965)
on privileged groups. In Olsonian situations regulatory benefits are diffuse,
spread thinly across many entities, while regulatory costs are concentrated,
weighing heavily on a few entities. In Olsonian situations the many who
receive relatively small benefits from regulation have little incentive to in-
vest in policy influence activities, and moreover, as Stigler argued, they also
face high organizational and coordination costs because of their large num-
bers. On the other hand, the few who bear a particularly heavy regulatory
burden (e.g., large polluting firms) have an incentive to organize opposition
and by being small in number also face smaller organizational costs. Thus in
Olsonian situations it is more difficult to get stable systems of regulation,

meaning that regulatory controls for protecting the environment, for example,
are relatively likely to be overturned due to the lobbying efforts of the few
who bear the costs.
In contrast to Olsonian regulatory situations are Stiglerian cases, named
after Nobel Prizewinning economist and regulatory scholar George Stigler.
Recall that in Stiglerian situations the benefits of regulatory controls are con-
centrated heavily on a few entities, while the costs are rather thinly spread
across many entities. Regulatory controls are more stable in Stiglerian situa-
tions because the influence advantage falls to those who benefit from the
regulation, while those who would like to overturn the regulation have rela-
tively little incentive to do so, and face high organizational costs.
Oye and Maxwell argue that the Montreal Protocol case features con-
straints on substitute products or subsidies on complementary products,
and the ability of an incumbent firm to control entry by potential new ri-
vals. These conditions exist because the protocol, which outlawed CFC
production by the year 2000, gave a particularly strong advantage to firms
like DuPont that came up with CFC alternatives over their rivals that did
not. In particular, Oye and Maxwell find that the DuPont and Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI) experience with restrictions on CFCs rep-
resents a classic Stiglerian illustration of producers benefiting from regula-
tions mandating product substitution (pp. 19394). The material below
closely follows that of Oye and Maxwell.
Case Study: The International Political Economy

of CFC Control
Halocarbons, two prominent forms of which are CFCs and halons, are sub-
stances that combine chlorine, fluorine, iodine, and bromine. CFCs were
invented in the 1930s and up to the 1970s were considered one of the most
successful products of the chemical industry. In particular, CFCs are stable,
easy to produce, and have wide application in refrigeration, as aerosol pro-
pellants, and in industrial cleaning and manufacturing uses. In an important
study published in 1974 in the journal Nature, however, scientists Molina
and Rowland argued that CFCs could reach the upper atmosphere through
surface turbulence, despite their heaviness. Once in the stratosphere, time
ultraviolet radiation would cause the CFCs to decompose into free chlorine,
each molecule of which is capable of consuming large quantities of strato-
spheric ozone. Moreover, CFCs can persist in the atmosphere for 100 or
more years. In 1976 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) called
for elimination of all nonessential uses of CFCs. In contrast, the British De-
218 POLICY
partment of the Environment was much more cautious, calling for further
research before any regulatory actions. In the face of state-level bans and
rising consumer concerns motivated by environmental activism in the United
States, firms such as Johnson Wax announced in 1975 that they would vol-
untarily phase out CFCs in aerosol applications. Other U.S. consumer prod-
ucts companies followed. In 1978 the United Statesalong with Canada,
Denmark, Norway, and Swedenbanned the use of CFCs as aerosol propel-
lants. Interestingly, in Great Britain 80 percent of CFC use in the late 1970s
was in aerosol applications, while in the United States air conditioning made
up approximately 50 percent of CFC use. ICI, at the time Britains largest
single manufacturing firm and a major producer of CFCs, would thus have
been disproportionately harmed by an aerosol ban, which Britain opposed.
In 1979 the NAS estimated that a 16 percent reduction in the ozone
layer would result in several thousand more cases of skin cancer each year,
both fatal and nonfatal, and the reduction in ozone would harm crop yields.
Following this, the Carter administrations EPA sought to reduce U.S. pro-
duction of CFCs further and pressed European countries to also ban aero-
sol and other nonessential applications of CFCs. Only token regulation
followed. Thus weak European regulation together with the U.S. ban on
aerosol applications led to less U.S. production and in fact to a manufac-
turing overcapacity in the United States, while in Britain expensive new
production facilities were being added to accommodate its increased share
of worldwide CFC production.
By the early 1980s the new Reagan administration was opposed to further
CFC controls. Moreover, the new scientific evidence coming in during the
early 1980s supported the more cautious British perspective on CFCs; for
example, the NAS adjusted downward its estimate of ozone layer reductions
from 16 percent to 24 percent in 1984. Low-level international negotiations
commenced, culminating in the Vienna Convention, which called for the in-
ternational community to control ozone-depleting chemicals eventually but
lacked specific measures. The research programs begun in the mid-1970s for
CFC alternatives by DuPont and ICI were discontinued in the early 1980s
because of a lack of a market for CFC alternatives at the time.
This rather rosy picture of CFCs and ozone depletion was smashed by
Farman, Gardiner, and Shanklins 1985 study, also published in Nature, in
which they reported for the first time that there was a hole in the strato-
spheric ozone layer in the Antarctic polar vortex. This information was widely
reported and public awareness was high, and like Rachel Carsons book
Silent Spring, it resulted in a translation of public concern into policy. The
U.S. position in reopened international negotiations was that CFCs should
be totally phased out by 1995. Importantly, DuPont adopted the position in
1986 that international regulations should limit worldwide production to

then-existing levels. Thus, DuPont revealed a willingness to shift its capac-
ity to the manufacture of CFC alternatives. In contrast, the British govern-
ment argued for a cap at existing production capacities. The British were
quite concerned about protecting ICI, which had recently invested in profit-
able new CFC production facilities, while in the United States DuPont and
other CFC makers were continuing to experience excess capacity in older
facilities, low profit margins, and the very real possibility of an outright
domestic production ban.
Thus DuPont wanted an international restriction so that ICI would be dis-
proportionately harmed. The CFC alternatives market promised profit-mak-
ing opportunities for DuPont, which had developed CFC alternatives.
Production of these alternatives would require substantial fixed-cost (capi-
tal) investment in precision manufacturing facilities, which would eliminate
smaller producers and would thus likely feature higher profit margins for
DuPont. The new chemicals were projected in the mid-1980s to sell for be-
tween five and ten times the price of CFC 11 and 12, so major users (e.g., the
automotive and appliance industries) would not voluntarily switch without
government regulation.
Note here the Stiglerian nature of the situation. Financial benefits were
concentrated on DuPont, while the costs were spread across many manufac-
turers. Yet since the increased cost of the CFC alternatives was still only a
small fraction of overall manufacturing cost, their cost burden was relatively
small. These costs could be further mitigated by a phase-in period to allow
manufacturers time to adjust compressors and other technologies to the CFC
alternatives. This transition would require a public/private coordination that
DuPont was eager to provide. Thus DuPont saw that it needed to promote
this regulation to create a profitable new market for itself, which would ben-
efit DuPont more than ICI.
Representatives of twenty-four countries signed the Montreal Protocol
on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, agreed to under the auspices
of the United Nations, in 1987. The Montreal Protocol called for the twenty-
four signatory countries to reduce CFCs and halons by 50 percent relative to
1986 levels. Two weeks after the signing of the Montreal Protocol, new evi-
dence was presented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA)/World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Ozone Trends Panel
that substantially more ozone depletion was occurring over mid- and high-
northern latitudes during winter than had been anticipated by earlier sci-
ence. Within ten days of the NASA/WMO studys release, DuPont announced
plans to eliminate CFC production voluntarily and to speed transition to
CFC alternatives. ICI later followed DuPonts lead. At a European Commu-
220 POLICY
nity meeting in March 1989, British officials attempting to look good by

proposing an 85 percent reduction in CFCs by 1999 were upstaged by repre-
sentatives from other European countries, who forced an agreement for sig-
natory countries to phase out production of CFCs completely by 2000. The
agreement became known as the London Revisions to the Montreal Proto-
col, and was signed in June 1990. The London Revisions call for high-CFC-
consuming signatory countries to end CFC production and consumption by
2000. Some countries have unilaterally used an accelerated phase-out sched-
ule; for example, the United States committed to a complete phase-out by
the end of 1995. The London Revisions also included a phase-out of carbon
tetrachloride by 2005 and established a schedule for phasing out haloge-
nated CFCs (HCFCs).
While developing countries argued that 80 percent of CFC consumption
was by developed countries, it was clear that the Montreal Protocol would be
jeopardized if developing countries refused to ratify it. Accordingly, the Lon-
don Revisions gave low-CFC-consuming countries a ten-year grace period
on the phase-out of CFCs. As Alberty and VanDeveer (1996) have observed,
these exemptions were required to get key developing countries to support
the agreement. Moreover, Alberty and VanDeveer go on to report that India
and China later refused to ratify the Montreal Protocol unless an additional
side agreement was reached in which rich countries would provide a fund to
be used to subsidize the costs of installing technologies for utilizing CFC
alternatives in poor countries. As a consequence, the London Amendments
created this multilateral fund, and estimates at the time were that approxi-
mately $2 billion would be required. Alberty and VanDeveer report that while
rich signatory countries originally pledged $240 million if India and China
were to sign, actual contributions are far below the pledges. Nevertheless,
these side payments from rich to poor countries have become a model for
international environmental agreements, such as those attempted for climate
change and biodiversity.
CFCs produced in developing countries like China and India and smuggled
into developed countries where their production is banned was a problem in
the early years of the phase-out, but more recent estimates indicate that much
of the smuggling has been curtailed. For example, the Economist (1995)
reported that CFC production in developing countries increased 87 percent
following the phase-out, and exports by 1,700 percent, between 1986 and
1993. The EPA (1999) estimates that between 7.5 and 15 million pounds of
Freon (CFC 12 or R 12) was smuggled into the United States each year
between 1994 and 1995. The Economist article estimated that 20 percent of
all CFCs in use in 1995 had been bought on the black market. Since then the
U.S. government has clamped down on smuggling. The EPA (1999) esti-
mates that between 5 and 10 million pounds of Freon were smuggled into the
United States each year between 1996 and 1997. By mid-1997, 2 million
pounds of Freon had been impounded by U.S. Customs, and by the end of
February 1999 over ninety individuals and businesses had been charged for
smuggling into the United States. The remaining stockpile of Freon in the
United States was estimated to be between 24 and 48 million pounds at the
beginning of 1999. As the price of the dwindling stocks of Freon continues
to rise, the cost of converting to Freon substitutes will become increasingly
attractive.
As we have seen, international regulations mandating a CFC ban offered
firms like DuPont the Stiglerian solution of new and more profitable mar-
kets, which because of higher fixed costs would be more concentrated and
thus less competitive than the former CFC marketplace. The financial cost of
adjusting to CFC alternatives was diffuse across the many consumer prod-
ucts companies and was still only a small part of overall manufacturing costs,
weakening the companies incentive to organize resistance.
Summary
Political economy is a method of analyzing the incentives, institutions,

and outcomes of governance problems.
Environmental laws and policies are outcomes of political processes,
and so political economy can be used to explain why particular laws
and policies occur. The techniques of political economy are also use-
ful in helping us understand cases of government failure to design
environmental policies that adequately resolve market failures at rea-
sonable cost. Such a critical evaluation can help us understand why
existing regulatory schemes do not function as expected and can thus
be a first step in the design of more effective regulatory incentives and
institutions.
Economists who study the political process are interested in explaining
government policies as a function of (1) optimizing, rational choice
behavior by the policymakers (behavior consistent with optimizing over
some set of objectives) and (2) behavior modified by incentives, subject
to (3) political and other institutions (the rules of the game).
Stigler (1971) is credited with the development of the capture theory
of regulation. In this model, firms (or others) capture the regulatory
process because each firm potentially bears a high cost if regulation
constrains its behavior, so each firm has a lot at stake. In contrast,
while the public as a whole has a lot at stake, generally any one per-
son has only a very small stake in the regulatory process and so has
222 POLICY
little incentive to invest resources in affecting the regulatory process.

At the same time, there are comparatively few firms relative to the
overall public, so the cost of organizing the firms is low compared to
the cost of organizing the public. As a result, firms have both the in-
centive and the better opportunity to invest resources in lobbying for
favorable regulation.
There is evidence consistent with the capture theory of regulationfor
example, the infamous revolving-door deals, in which high-level regu-
lators (EPA administrators, for example) leave government and find high-
level jobs in the same industry that they had been responsible for regu-
lating.
Economists have modeled the regulatory process using the tools of po-
litical economy by developing a supply and demand framework. The
supply of regulation reflects the opportunity cost of effort in developing
and shepherding regulation, the psychological cost of supporting regu-
lation that may be inconsistent with the regulators preferences, and the
impacts on the likelihood of reelection. The demand for regulation re-
flects the willingness to pay of groups that aggregate the interests of
those who receive a benefit from regulation. The equilibrium level of
effective support for a particular regulation occurs where the supply
and the demand for regulation intersect.
While firms generally have an incentive to lobby for less environmental
regulation, there are situations in which firms might actually lobby for
more regulation. A firm may lobby for regulation when the regulation
would raise its rivals costs more than its own. Firms may also engage in
voluntary clean-up when doing so gives those suffering from pollution
just enough relief to keep them from organizing to lobby for regulations
that are even more restrictive.
Political economy models can also be used to explain the sharing rules
and voting rules used by self-governing CPR appropriator groups. Het-
erogeneity in appropriator characteristics and the requirement that nearly
all appropriators agree before rules are implemented are two of the lead-
ing causes of rule failure in oil, gas, and fishery CPR systems.
The balance of pressure from various interest groups can also be used
to explain the nature of international environmental accords. Oye and
Maxwell (1995) show that the Montreal Protocol agreement on control
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) was driven by scientific information and
pressure by DuPont to phase out CFCs. DuPonts pro-phase-out posi-
tion is consistent with Hacketts model, since DuPont had developed
CFC alternatives and saw an opportunity to dominate in the CFC alter-
natives market.
1. Consider the supply and demand model of the political market for regu-
lation described in the chapter. How would the equilibrium level of effective
support change if industry groups opposing regulation conducted a success-
ful advertising campaign that cast doubt among the public on the factual
basis for the environmental problems addressed by the regulation? Be spe-
cific about demand and supply shifts.
2. Suppose that gunk is a pollution by-product of manufacturing com-
puter processors. Environmental activists propose regulation to limit emis-
sions of gunk. The proposed regulation leads to pollution-control costs that
are heavily concentrated upon the small number of firms that produce com-
puter processors. Control costs under the proposal are estimated to be ap-
proximately $100 million per manufacturing facility per year. The benefits
of reduced gunk emissions are thinly spread out among the 12 million or
so people who live in the region where computer processors are manufac-
tured. It is estimated that each of the 12 million people living near a facility
will typically incur around $50 per year in external costs associated with
uncontrolled gunk emissions, mostly from occasional mild coldlike symp-
toms, but gunk is not known to be linked to any deaths, debilitating inju-
ries, or birth defects.
a. Using Oye and Maxwells terminology, is this an example of a

Stiglerian or an Olsonian regulatory situation? Carefully explain
your reasoning.
b. Describe the most likely political economic outcomes of proposed gunk-
control regulation. Will regulation occur? If so, what form might it take,
and how stable will it be? Carefully explain your reasoning.
3. Suppose that the standard industry process for transforming wood

chips into pulp for paper manufacturing leads to badstuff being flushed
into adjacent bodies of water. Badstuff is estimated to create health- and
food-related external costs of nearly $1 billion per year and is widely known
to elevate cancer risks and birth defects in many localized hot spots around
the country. Several firms have patented a new process for making pulp
that eliminates badstuff pollution. While this patented new process is more
expensive than the current industry standard process, it is much, much
cheaper than other existing methods of badstuff-free pulp processing. These
firms would like to make money from the patent by leasing the technology
to other pulp makers and so have an incentive to lobby for more stringent
environmental regulations in order to create a market for their new tech-
224 POLICY
nology. Because the benefits of cleaning up badstuff are large and concen-
trated on people who live in the hot-spot areas, pressure groups have devel-
oped around environmental groups, physicians groups, sport fishers, surfers,
rafters, and concerned parents of small children. The firms that have devel-
oped a badstuff-free pulp-processing technology also have a concentrated
benefit in more stringent regulation and have begun a high-profile lobby-
ing and public information campaign in partnership with the other pressure
groups.
a. How might this scenario be different from that described in problem (1)
above? Using Oye and Maxwells terminology, what aspects of this
scenario is more Stiglerian than that in problem (1)? Carefully explain
your reasoning.
b. Describe how the most likely political economic outcome of proposed
badstuff-control regulation might differ from that of gunk-control regu-
lation in problem (1) above. Carefully explain your reasoning.
4. Alberty and VanDeveer (1996) have compared the political economics

of the Montreal Protocol to that of international attempts at controlling green-
house gas emissions. Greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, are emit-
ted from the burning of fossil fuels, especially coal. While North America
and Western Europe have been responsible for approximately 60 percent of
the human-caused increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide, developing coun-
tries such as India and China that will be developing their coal resources are
expected to surpass the emissions levels of rich countries in the first third of
the twenty-first century. These countries interpret attempts at controlling their
coal-based economic development as another example of rich countries try-
ing to keep poor countries from raising incomes and attaining international
power.
a. Relative to the Montreal Protocol, is the international effort to control

greenhouse gases more Stiglerian or Olsonian in nature? Why might
the political economic outcomes be different from that of CFCs?
b. In the late 1990s, BP Amoco and Royal Dutch Shell left the Global
Climate Coalition, an industry association that has lobbied heavily
against the Kyoto Protocol for limiting greenhouse gases, and have
have signed on with the pro-treaty group International Climate
Change Partnership. How might this development change your an-
swer in 4a above? You can access information on the Business Envi-
ronmental Leadership Council on the Internet site for the Pew Center
on Climate Change (www.pewclimate.org/belc/index.html) to learn
more about the corporations that are supporting action on global

warming.
5. Go to the Opensecrets.org website (www.opensecrets.org) and research

the most recent campaign finance profile of one or more members of the
U.S. Senate or House of Representatives. As of 2005, this site also provides
a link to the legislation sponsored by the legislator you selected (from the
Library of Congresss thomas.loc.gov website). See if you can discern a rela-
tionship between the pattern of campaign contributors and the pattern of
legislation sponsored by the legislator you selected. See if your results are
consistent with the interest group performance evaluations at Project Vote
Smart (www.vote-smart.org).
Internet Links
Center for Public Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org): A nonprofit, non-

partisan educational organization that conducts investigative reporting on
the role and influence of campaign contributions in the political process.
Lost in Transit: Global CFC Smuggling Trends and the Need for a Faster
Phase-Out (http://usembassy.state.gov/ircseoul/wwwf4095.pdf): A 2003
report by the Environmental Investigation Agency, a nonprofit NGO based
in London and Washington, D.C., committed to investigating and exposing
environmental crime.
Montreal Protocol for Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer

(www.unep.org/ozone/montreal.htm): The primary site for information on the
Montreal Protocol, maintained by the United Nations Environment Program.
Opensecrets.orgThe Online Source for Money in Politics Data

(www.opensecrets.org): This site provides comprehensive information on
campaign contributions and is provided by the Center for Responsive Poli-
tics. The Center for Responsive Politics is a nonpartisan, nonprofit research
group based in Washington, D.C., that tracks money in politics and its effect
on elections and public policy.
Project Vote Smart (www.vote-smart.org): Project Vote Smart is a nonpar-

tisan organization offering an Internet library of factual information on can-
didates for public office at the federal and state level. Coverage is provided
in five basic areas: backgrounds, issue positions, voting records, campaign
finances, and performance evaluations made by various special interest groups.
226 POLICY
The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental

Policy (www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-9725.pdf): An informative de-
scription of environmental political economy by Nathaniel O. Keohane, Ri-
chard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins.
Agnone, J. 2004. Explaining Federal Environmental Policy: The Impact of the U.S.
Environmental Movement. MA Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of
Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Alberty, M., and S. VanDeveer. 1996. International Treaties for Sustainability: Is the
Montreal Protocol a Useful Model? In Building Sustainable Societies, ed. D.
Pirages. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Alt, J., and K. Shepsle, eds. 1990. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cam-
Arrow, K. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Becker, G. 1983. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics (August): 371400.
Birney, P.W., and A.E. Boyle. 1992. International Law and the Environment. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bromley, D.W. 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Founda-
tions of Public Policy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
. 1991. Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy. Ox-
ford: Basil Blackwell.
Buchanan, J., and G. Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Dasgupta, P. 1992. An Enquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Dasgupta, P., and K.-G. Maler. 1992. The Economics of Transnational Commons.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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ment Research Program No. 39, London School of Economics.
Downing, P. 1981. A Political Economy Model of Implementing Pollution Laws.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 8: 25571.
Dryzek, J. 1987. Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. London:
Basil Blackwell.
Economist. 1995. Holed Up. 337 (December 9): 63.
Engelberg, S. 1995. Wood Products Company Helps Write a Law to Derail an E.P.A.
Inquiry. New York Times, April 26, A16.
Falk, R. 1989. Revitalizing International Law. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Farman, J., B. Gardiner, and J. Shanklin. 1985. Large Losses of Total Ozone in
Antarctica Reveal Seasonal ClOx/Nox Interaction. Nature 315 (16 May): 20710.
Gamman, J.K. 1994. Overcoming Obstacles in Environmental Policymaking. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Greenberg, E. 1993. Toxic Temptation: The Revolving Door, Bureaucratic Inertia and
the Disappointment of the EPA Superfund Program. Report 12, Center for Public
Integrity, Washington, DC.
Gunderson, L.H., C.S. Holling, and S. Light. 1995. Barriers and Bridges to Renewal
of Ecosystems and Environment. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hackett, S. 1992. Heterogeneity and the Provision of Governance for Common-Pool
Resources. Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (July): 32542.
. 1995. Pollution-Controlling Innovation in Oligopolistic Industries: Some
Comparisons between Patent Races and Research Joint Ventures. Journal of En-
vironmental Economics and Management 29 (November): 33956.
Hackett, S., D. Dudley, and J. Walker. 1995. Heterogeneities, Information, and Con-
flict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts. In Local Com-
mons and Global Interdependence, ed. R. Keohane and E. Ostrom. London: Sage.
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of the Fishery. American Economic Review 72: 100522.
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9
Motivating Regulatory
Compliance: Monitoring,
Enforcement, and Sanctions
Introduction
To what extent do government administrative agencies monitor and enforce

environmental regulations? Is there sufficient deterrence to prevent large-
scale noncompliance by polluting industries? To answer these and other ques-
tions, we will first look at the economics of crime and then turn to a more
detailed description of how the EPA and other agencies actually administer
environmental law. We will also discuss the role of market-based reputational
enforcement, voluntary compliance programs, and citizen lawsuits in creat-
ing an incentive for compliance.
The Economics of Crime
Law enforcement agencies have limited budgets and must choose the best
way of allocating these scarce resources among competing ends. Some law
enforcement activities are driven by legislative and other mandates, others
by political pressure. From an economic point of view, the efficient method
of allocating law enforcement resources is to evaluate enforcement benefits
and costs. For example, analysis of crime records may indicate that the inci-
dence of property crime is highest during summer months and lower in the
winter. In contrast, alcohol-related automobile accidents may peak around
popular holidays. A police department that assigns a fixed number of per-
229
230 POLICY
sonnel to property crime and drunk-driving deterrence throughout the year

may instead find that seasonally adjusting the allocation of these enforce-
ment resources can reduce the incidence of crime without increasing the
overall law enforcement budget. Given that government funds are scarce, it
is important from the perspective of society that law enforcement resources
be spent efficiently. A municipal government, for example, must allocate its
tax income over a set of obligations to its citizens that include road building
and maintenance, operation of public schools, law enforcement, and fire con-
trol, among others. Increasing the budget share allocated to law enforcement
necessarily reduces the budget share allocated to other uses.
To illustrate the economics of law enforcement, consider the following
example. To begin, suppose that law enforcement receives a very small bud-
get share, while other municipal programs are well funded. In this case, there
may be a relatively high level of crime, and so the marginal benefits of in-
creasing law enforcement spending by some increment (such as hiring a new
police officer) will tend to be high. Given that other municipal activities are
relatively well funded, then shifting resources from other programs to fund
this increase in law enforcement leads to a marginal opportunity cost of this
shift (the foregone benefits of the money being spent on roads, schools, etc.)
that is likely to be relatively low. In this case, spending more on law enforce-
ment entails high marginal benefits and low marginal costs, and so from an
economic perspective would seem to make sense.
Now suppose that law enforcement receives a very large share of the mu-
nicipal budget, while other programs are relatively poorly funded. In this
case, the level of criminal activity is likely to be relatively low, as the high
level of law enforcement activity will tend to create deterrence, and so the
marginal benefits of increasing the law enforcement budget even more may
be low. Given that other municipal activities are poorly funded, if we were to
shift some additional resources away from these programs to fund additional
law enforcement, the marginal opportunity cost of this shift will be relatively
high. In this case, spending more on law enforcement entails low marginal
benefits (there is already substantial crime deterrence from existing law en-
forcement activities) and high marginal costs, and thus would not seem to
make sense from an economic perspective.
This hypothetical example illustrates several general relationships that
economists consider to be important in determining the efficient level of law
enforcement activity. First, the marginal benefits of law enforcement spend-
ing are presumed to start out high but to decline as more and more resources
are allocated to law enforcement activities. Second, the marginal opportu-
nity cost of law enforcement spending may start out low but will rise as more
and more resources are allocated away from other beneficial uses to fund
MOTIVATING REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 231
Figure 9.1 Optimal Level of Crime Control
$ Marginal costs of reducing

criminal activity
Marginal benefits of
reducing criminal activity
0
Level of crime reduction that Reduction in
maximizes total net benefits criminal activity
additional law enforcement. From a conceptual perspective, as marginal ben-

efits decline and marginal costs rise, there will be a level of law enforcement
spending where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. This is another ap-
plication of the equimarginal principle, first used in chapter 4 to describe a
firms optimal (profit-maximizing) output level, and later used in chapter 6
in the discussion of the optimal (net benefit-maximizing) level of environ-
mental protection or improvement. In the case of the economics of law en-
forcement, when resources are allocated to law enforcement up to the point
where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, then total net benefits (total
benefit minus total cost) will be largest. Any further law enforcement spend-
ing will generate marginal benefits that are smaller than marginal costs, which
reduces total net benefits in a manner similar to that shown in chapter 6. If
society is using an efficiency standard, then the optimal level of law enforce-
ment spending occurs where net benefit is maximized and marginal benefit
equals marginal cost, as illustrated in Figure 9.1.
The Economics of Deterrence
A primary goal of law enforcement is to create an adequate deterrent to

criminal activity. Deterrence is complex, and involves the probability of be-
ing caught (detected), the probability of being punished (sanctioned) once
you have been detected, followed by the prospect for various penalties (sanc-
232 POLICY
tions) being imposed, and the perpetrators preferences regarding risk, among
other factors. Before continuing, we need to address the subject of risk pref-
erence. Ones risk preference regarding a particular risky situation falls into
one of three categories. To understand these, suppose you are offered the
following choice: (a) $1,000, or, (b) based on outcome of the flip of a fair
coin, either $0 (heads) or $2,000 (tails). Of course, the coin is not tossed
until after you choose between (a) and (b). Note that the expected value of
(B) equals 0.5*$0 + 0.5*$2,000 = $1,000, which equals the guaranteed value
of (a). A risk-averse person prefers (a) over (b), even though they have the
same expected value, since choice (a) avoids risk. A risk-neutral person is
indifferent between (a) and (b), as they have the same expected value. A risk-
loving person will prefer (b) over (a), even though they have the same ex-
pected value, since choice (b) includes risk. A persons risk preference usually
varies across different types of choices. It is common to assume that large
firms are risk-neutral, though this is not necessarily the case.
Lets first look at deterrence in the context of risk neutrality. To create a
sufficient deterrent against violating environmental law, enforcement sys-
tems must create an expected penalty (the expected value of the gamble of
being detected as a lawbreaker and being sanctioned) that exceeds the eco-
nomic gain from violating environmental law. People, organizations, and firms
that are risk-neutral can be thought of as seeking to maximize the expected
net benefits from their activities. The economic gain from violating environ-
mental law may include the avoided cost of compliance, higher revenues
(such as from illegally harvesting fish, game, or timber for commercial gain),
competitive advantage over rival firms, or higher utility (such as from ille-
gally riding a four-wheel-drive truck in sand dunes that are home to endan-
gered plovers). Sanctions can include various levels of fines, damage claims,
the disutility of confinement (such as jail or prison), as well as the costs of
restitution and court expenses. To keep the analysis simple, we will assume
that the only sanction is a fixed monetary fine.
In the case described above, deterrence in any given time period requires
that the following relation must exist for a risk-neutral firm:
Expected penalty > economic gain.
And:
Expected penalty = [probability of detection] [probability of being

sanctioned given detection] $ sanction.
If a person contemplating violating environmental law is risk-averse,

but faces the same circumstances described above that deterred a risk-neu-
tral person from breaking the law, will the risk-averse person also be de-
terred? The answer is yes, since the risk-averse person gains disutility from
risk itself, and will therefore be even more strongly deterred by the risk of
being sanctioned than the risk-neutral person. In contrast, a risk-loving
person may not be deterred unless the expected penalty is far greater than
the economic gain from violating the law (why?). In general, adequate de-
terrence exists when potential environmental lawbreakers evaluate the ex-
pected benefits and costs of violating the law and find that the crime does
not pay.
In practice, different people, firms, or organizations will have different
subjective views of the probability of being detected, and of being sanc-
tioned. As a result, in a given circumstance some risk-neutral or risk-averse
people may fail to be deterred because they have the most optimistic views
of the chances of being detected or sanctioned. As a result, we cannot make
generalizations about whether a given level of environmental law enforce-
ment, prosecution, and sanction will fully deter all environmental crimes.
One indicator of whether a given law enforcement system is achieving suc-
cessful deterrence is the recidivism ratethat is, the extent to which past
offenders lapse back into past patterns of lawbreaking behavior.
As a final point, our analysis so far has assumed economic rationality,
meaning that people, firms, and organizations are able to perceive and weigh
benefits and costs, and choose the path that provides the highest net benefits.
In practice, crimes also occur due to mental derangement from powerful
emotions, drugs, or mental illness. Rational economic models of deterrence
are invalid when a persons mind is clouded by factors such as acute anger,
methamphetamine abuse, or severe psychosis.
As we have noted, sanctions against lawbreaking activity are only real-
ized when the lawbreaking activity is detected. If a law enforcement agency
does not spend much time on monitoring, then a proportionately higher sanc-
tion must be available in order to keep the expected penalty the same. Figure
9.2 illustrates an equal expected penalty curve, showing that as the probabil-
ity of successful detection falls, the sanction must rise to keep the expected
penalty constant.
It is tempting to think that in practice we could maintain a given level of
deterrence by reducing monitoring activities and increasing sanctions, as
shown in the upper left-hand portion of the curve in Figure 9.2. This would
save public funds that would otherwise be needed for monitoring activity
by police or wardens. The problem with this idea is that in the event that a
violation is detected, courts may not be willing to impose large statutory
penalties for modest violations. To do so would violate the legal norm that
234 POLICY
Figure 9.2 Equal Expected Penalty Curve
$ sanction
To keep the expected penalty

constant, as shown in the curve to the
left, there must be an inverse
relationship between the probability
of being detected and sanctioned, and
the size of the sanction.
0
Probability of being detected
and sanctioned
penalties should be proportionate to the violation. Moreover, if we reduce

the intensity of polluter monitoring relative to other forms of law enforce-
ment, then to maintain deterrence, we may have to impose sanctions on
moderate levels of pollution that are larger than the sanctions for more
intensely monitored violations such as violent crime. In actual practice,
judges and politicians will be unlikely to support large sanctions for mod-
est violations, and therefore it is unlikely to be feasible to operate on the
upper left-hand portion of the equal expected penalty curve. If society holds
to the legal norm of penalties being proportionate to the harms, then deter-
rence will be maintained only when society commits sufficient resources
to monitoring activity.
It is sometimes argued that the sanction imposed on polluters should be
equal to the economic gain from polluting. Yet deterrence will fail if we ignore
the probability of detecting and sanctioning polluters. For example, suppose
that by being out of compliance with pollution laws, a firm can save $10 mil-
lion for certain each year in pollution-control costs. Suppose that the statutory
penalty is set equal to the economic gain to the polluter from being out of
compliance (in this case $10 million). Also assume that there is a 75 percent
chance that the firm will be detected as being out of compliance and a 90
percent chance that a judge will impose the sanction if the violation is de-
tected. Has effective deterrence been created? No, because the expected ben-
efit of polluting is $10 million each year; the expected cost of polluting is:
0.75 0.90 $10 million = $6.75 million.
Thus in the example above it pays to be out of compliance, and no effec-

tive deterrence has been created. Even if the firm is risk-averse and places a
subjective probability of 85 percent rather than 75 percent on the likelihood
of detection, it still pays to pollute.
Criminal Penalties and Incarceration Versus Fines and

Monetary Damages
Fines and monetary damage claims usually result in lower social costs than
incarceration, as Becker (1968) has argued, because society must pay to keep
someone behind bars, because criminal cases are more expensive to pros-
ecute and more difficult to prove, and because the person is no longer gener-
ating taxable income. But there are a variety of reasons why fines may not
generate sufficient deterrence:
Statutory fines may be too low to provide a deterrent given existing

levels of monitoring.
The value of the lawbreakers assets may be smaller than the fine.
Violators may have a subjective probability of being caught that is less
than the actual probability.
Monitoring and penalties may be based on violators having a neutral
attitude toward risk, when some violators may actually have a prefer-
ence for risk.
Fines may be bargained down in out-of-court settlements, or adminis-
trators and judges may fail to impose adequate penalties when viola-
tions are observed. Russell (1990) finds, for example, that from 1977 to
1983 the average fine per notice of violation (NOV) issued across vari-
ous states was less than $100 in many cases and rarely exceeded $2,000.
He reported that in many cases firms received fines in fewer than 10
percent of the instances in which a state agency issued an NOV.
A large component of a fine can often be shifted to insurers, consumers,
or taxpayers. For example, monetary damages reduce corporate income
and thus can be used as a corporate tax write-off.
A clear advantage of incarceration is that it cannot be shifted, as can fines.

Moreover, successful criminal prosecutions create quite a bit of publicity,
236 POLICY
and the adverse publicity may generate an additional market-based

reputational cost for the environmental criminal. On the other hand, there are
problems with using criminal sanctions and incarceration to create deter-
rence. As mentioned above, criminal sanctions impose incarceration costs
on society, and the families of those who are incarcerated will experience a
loss of income. In addition, criminal sanctions have a higher burden of proof
(beyond a reasonable doubt) than do administrative fines or monetary penal-
ties generated from civil lawsuits (preponderance of evidence). As a result,
criminal cases are more costly to prosecute and may be less likely to succeed
in passing the higher burden of proof. Another problem with criminal sanc-
tioning is that apparently judges have been hesitant to impose prison terms
for environmental crimes. In particular, Cohen (1992) finds that out of a
sample of 116 cases of firms successfully prosecuted for environmental crime
in federal courts from 1984 to 1990, executives were sentenced to prison
terms in only 25 (fines were issued in the remainder). Of these 25 cases of
prison terms being imposed, 23 were from small firms of less than $1
million in sales or with fewer than 50 employees. Finally, many have criti-
cized the club fed minimum-security facilities at which many environ-
mental and other white-collar criminals are imprisoned as not promoting
much in the way of deterrence.
As Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) argue, the traditional penalty struc-
ture used in enforcement of environmental laws has involved monetary pen-
alties imposed on firms rather than fines and prison terms imposed on
individuals. The effectiveness of this approach in changing the behavior of
employees who violate company policies on compliance with environmental
law depends critically on firms being able to impose adequate internal sanc-
tions on those employees responsible for the violation. In their model of
internal firm organization, Segerson and Tietenberg find that traditional pen-
alties operate efficiently only when employee behavior is fully observable
and the firms compensation structure is sufficiently flexible that it can shift
penalties onto guilty employees. Yet the same incentives can be provided by
directly penalizing the employee. In practice, however, these conditions are
unlikely to be met. Segerson and Tietenberg show that incarceration can be
the socially efficient form of deterrence mechanism in more real-world
circumstances.
Market-based Reputational Enforcement and Voluntary

Overcompliance
As we have seen, fines, monetary damages, and criminal penalties are coer-
cive, costly, and will sometimes fail to foster deterrence. Market reputation
provides an alternative method of aligning the incentives of firms with those

of society. We know, for example, that many corporations care about how
they are perceived, as evidenced by the substantial image advertising bud-
gets of many oil, forest products, chemical manufacturing, and other corpo-
rations. A particularly striking example is offered by a 1996 civil rights
settlement against Texaco. Texaco was involved in a civil rights lawsuit brought
by several black employees. After approximately two and a half years with-
out a settlement, an incriminating tape surfaced in November 1996 that
strongly supported the claims of the black employees. Black leaders such as
Jesse Jackson threatened boycotts. Eleven days after the recording surfaced,
and with mounting press coverage of the boycott threats, Texaco settled for
$176 million. This costly settlement was widely seen as a way for Texaco to
limit harm to its corporate reputation.
Market reputations are most likely to foster deterrence in an environmen-
tal context when the following conditions are met:
Objective information is available on the environmental performance

of firms at low cost.
Consumers and environmentalists can be organized into an effective in-
terest group capable of boycotting environmentally harmful products.
Quality substitute products are readily available.
A boycott imposes meaningful costs on firms with a poor environmental
record, and meaningful benefits on firms with a strong environmental
record. These costs and benefits may derive from price premia or product
market shares that derive from the image of the brand or the firm.
In the context of a profit-maximizing firm, reputational enforcement oc-

curs when the economic benefits that derive from that reputation exceed the
economic benefits from cheating on its reputation. For example, suppose
that the gain to a firm from cheating on its reputation is the present value of
annual savings from less rigorous environmental performance. There is a
cost to cheating, however, which is that consumers discover that the firm no
longer warrants a reputational price premium for its product, and price there-
after is lower than before. In this case, it pays for the firm to continue invest-
ing in its reputational asset (the firms image and good name) through
strong environmental performance when the present value of annual savings
from less rigorous environmental performance is smaller than the expected
present value of the portion of the firms future profit stream that depends
upon an intact reputational asset. There are a variety of practical problems
that constrain the effectiveness of reputational enforcement, however, in-
cluding the ability of firms to hide destructive practices through subcontrac-
238 POLICY
Table 9.1
Sample Programs, EPA Partners for the Environment
Program Description
Agricultural programs:
AgSTAR Promotes the use of biogas recovery systems to
methane emissions at dairy and swine operations.
Pesticide Environmental Promotes integrated pest management and
Stewardship reduces pesticide risk in agricultural and
nonagricultural settings.
Air quality programs:
Indoor Environments Promotes simple, low-cost methods for reducing
indoor air-quality risks.
Energy efficiency and global
climate change programs:
Climate Leaders Encourages companies to develop long-term
comprehensive climate change strategies and set
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction goals.
Energy Star Maximizes energy efficiency in commercial,
industrial, and residential settings by promoting
new building and product design and practices.
Landfill Methane Outreach Reduces methane emissions from landfills by
installing products to capture gases and produce
electricity, steam, or boiler fuel.
Natural Gas STAR Encourages natural gas industry to reduce leaks
through cost-effective best management practices.
Voluntary Aluminum Industrial Reduces perflouorocarbon gas emissions (a
Partnership potent and long-lived greenhouse gas) from
aluminum smelting.
Labeling programs:
Consumer Labeling Initiative Promotes easier-to-read labels on household
cleaners and pesticides to improve consumer safety.
tors or overseas production, and limits to the number of boycotts that con-
sumers can juggle at any given time.
An increasing number of corporations are finding that an environmentally
friendly reputation serves as a substitute for conventional advertising. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a wide variety of
voluntary pollution-control programs, described collectively as Partners for
the Environment. A sample of nationwide Partners for the Environment pro-
grams is given in Table 9.1. As the material in the table indicates, the Part-
ners for the Environment programs are focused on producing environmental
improvements that are not currently required by regulation. A key benefit
received by participating firms is the ability to self-identify as being in
Pollution prevention programs:

Design for the Environment Helps businesses incorporate environmental
considerations into the design of products,
processes, and technical and management
systems.
Green Chemistry Promotes the design of chemical products and
processes that reduce or eliminate the use and
generation of hazardous substances.
Regulatory innovation
programs:
Performance Track Recognizes and encourages top environmental
performance among private and public facilities
that goes beyond compliance with regulatory
requirements to achieve environmental
excellence.
Waste management
programs:
Carpet America Recovery Aims to increase the amount of recycling and
Effort reuse of postconsumer carpet, and reduce the
amount of carpet going to landfills.
WasteWise Encourages business, government, and
institutional partners to reduce municipal solid
waste through waste prevention, recycling, and
buying/manufacturing products with recycled
content, benefiting their bottom lines and the
environment.
Water programs:
Adopt Your Watershed Challenges citizens and organizations to join EPA
and others who are working to protect and restore
rivers, streams, wetlands, lakes, groundwater, and
estuaries.
Source: U.S. EPA (www.epa.gov/partners/).
overcompliance with environmental law and thereby improve their reputa-

tion. This reputational benefit has been explicitly stated on the EPA Partners
Internet site: showing statistically that your organization saved thousands
of gallons of water or prevented thousands of tons of waste sends a clear
green message to your customers.
Energy Star is one of the more prominent of these voluntary overcompliance
programs. According to the EPA (2003b), in 2003 the Energy Star program
saved about 110 billion kilowatt hours of electricity and 20,000 megawatts of
peak power, the amount of energy required to power about 20 million homes.
To earn the Energy Star label on products, manufacturers must meet strict en-
ergy efficiency guidelines set by the federal government. In 2003, more than
240 POLICY
1,400 manufacturers met Energy Star requirements across a total of 28,000

individual product models in over 40 product categories. Through 2003, Ameri-
cans had bought more than one billion Energy Starqualified products.
The 33/50 program was the first of the EPA voluntary overcompliance
programs, and it was designed to reduce the 1.5 billion pounds of seventeen
high-priority toxic chemical emissions identified in the 1988 Toxic Release
Inventory by 33 percent in 1992 and by 50 percent in 1995. A total of 1,300
firms signed up with the 33/50 program, and toxic emissions were ultimately
reduced by 55 percent from 1988 levels. Once the goals were reached, the
program was discontinued.
Arora and Cason (1995) find that those firms that participate in the EPA
voluntary overcompliance programs tend to be large firms in less concen-
trated industries (more competitive), and that public recognition (i.e., repu-
tation) is an important element in fostering participation. The research
nonprofit organization Resources for the Future (1997) evaluated the perfor-
mance of the EPAs Common Sense Initiative, 33/50 program, and Project
XL, along with several other environmental, health, and safety programs.
The researchers argue that these voluntary programs for the most part have
had only a peripheral impact on solving important pollution problems. While
some of the voluntary programs have had a positive impact, particularly 33/
50, they argue that it is difficult to create strong incentives for industry action
in the absence of legislation.
Private Auditing
There is a growing movement to have firms and other organizations develop

environmental management systems that utilize private, third-party audits of
their emissions and wastes. These include programs by the EPA, various
states, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 14001).
Independent third-party auditing companies conduct environmental audits,
with neutrality similar to that of auditors of financial statements for the share-
holders of publicly traded corporations. There are a number of reasons why
firms may want to utilize private third-party environmental audits. One is
that the audit may reveal substandard practices that significantly elevate the
chances of an environmental disaster, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which
can cost a firm enormous amounts of money in fines and damage claims. For
example, having a certified environmental management system utilizing neu-
tral third-party environmental auditors demonstrates a higher standard of care,
which from a legal perspective can shield a company from punitive damage
claims. Moreover, failure to reveal a publicly traded corporations excessive
exposure to such financial hazards to its shareholders can result in the firms
being further exposed to class-action lawsuits brought by shareholders. Au-

dits can also help companies identify areas where costly waste of energy or
materials can be reduced.
A potential problem with environmental audits can arise if the information
can be used to fine a company or sue for damages resulting from discovery of
past noncompliance or past tortious acts. To maintain the incentive for envi-
ronmental auditing, currently a number of states grant environmental audit
privilege, which means that the right to employ a private third-party environ-
mental auditor is deemed more important from a policy perspective than the
information generated by the audit. This is the privilege given to disclosure to
ones spouse or attorney or priest. Some states grant amnesty to firms that
discover violations of environmental law using an environmental management
system and correct the problems causing the compliance failure.
In 2000 the EPA issued final policy guidelines for auditing and self-
policing. As Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) note, the EPA audit policy serves as
a guideline for federal prosecution and settlement negotiation. From a tech-
nical standpoint, the policy concerns the component of fines linked to the
significance or gravity of the offense. As Pfaff and Sanchirico report, un-
der the EPA audit policy the gravity component of a fine is eliminated when
a firm discovers a violation through an internal audit program, voluntarily
discloses the violation within 21 days of discovery without prompting, cor-
rects the violation within 60 days, takes steps to prevent recurrence, and
cooperates with the EPA throughout. In order to eliminate the gravity com-
ponent of a fine, the violation cannot be part of a pattern of repeated viola-
tions or be one that has caused or may cause serious harm.
Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) provide evidence that the vast majority of
violations uncovered from self-audits represent relatively minor reporting or
record-keeping violations, rather than actual emissions violations, and ques-
tion whether the EPAs audit policy provides sufficient incentives for firms to
report serious emissions violations. Since the policy represents a guideline,
not an enforceable promise of reduced fines, firms may be hesitant to report
serious emissions violations voluntarily. Moreover, the policy does not cover
the economic benefit component of fines, and thus may not offer sufficient
incentive to report. As a final point, Pfaff and Sanchirico note that firms may
volunteer relatively insignificant violations to distract regulator attention from
more serious, undisclosed violations.
Incentive Enforcement Systems
Unlike environmental audits, which are designed to help firms identify waste-
ful and hazardous processes, incentive enforcement systems are designed to
242 POLICY
give polluting firms an incentive to comply with environmental regulations,

thus reducing monitoring and enforcement costs while maintaining deter-
rence. To illustrate how they work, consider the following regulatory scheme.
The Clean Water Act, the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) amendments, and the
enabling legislation for the Toxics Release Inventory all require that firms
monitor and self-report their emissions. Falsifying is a criminal offense, pri-
marily followed up on by citizen groups in citizen lawsuits. Moreover, both
the EPA and the Department of Justice have developed incentive policies in
which those who self-report and resolve environmental violations can qualify
for reduced or suspended penalties.
Economists have also researched the question of incentive-based enforce-
ment systems. For example, consider the following system:
Firms self-report their emissions and pay fines if they exceed allowed
emissions.
The government monitors more vigorously the lower the reported level
of emissions.
If actual emissions exceed reported emissions, the firm pays additional
pollution fines plus an additional fine for having made a false claim.
The advantage of this scheme, devised by Malik (1993), is that with some
level of government monitoring and an adequate penalty for falsification, the
scheme gives firms an incentive to report their actual emissions and lowers
the cost of government monitoring efforts.
EPA Enforcement
The Office of Regulatory Enforcement in the EPAs Office for Enforcement

and Compliance Assurance works with states, EPA regional offices, tribes,
and other federal agencies to ensure compliance with the nations environ-
mental laws through facility inspections, civil enforcement actions, and com-
pliance assistance and incentives. The EPA does not have the resources to
monitor all pollution sources for compliance with environmental law. Moni-
toring resources tend to be focused on the major point sources of air and
water pollution. In the case of water pollution discharges, for example, the
EPA requires by law that the firms submit a record of the nature of the dis-
charge to the EPA and that each firm report the status of its compliance with
the pollution permit that it has been given.
The nature and the source of the pollution affect the feasibility of effec-
tive enforcement. Hazards that arise on a decentralized basissuch as toxic
wastes, agricultural runoff, radon in homes, and asbestos in buildings
oftentimes pose substantial enforcement problems because of the large num-

ber of pollution sources involved and the difficulty in monitoring the respon-
sible parties. The process of screening chemicals and regulating the sale of
commercially produced chemicals is a relatively easy monitoring function
for the EPA, as is the process of monitoring the use of hazard-warning labels.It
is much more difficult to monitor to assure that hazardous products are used
appropriately. Moreover, the disposal of chemical containers and the dilu-
tion of insecticides are among the decentralized activities that pose nearly
insurmountable monitoring problems. Providing hazard information and
hoping that people adopt the appropriate ethic may be all that an administra-
tive agency can do in such cases. In order to increase the impact of the fed-
eral governments enforcement efforts, both the EPA and the Department of
Justice have recently instituted incentive policies in which firms and indi-
viduals that self-report and resolve violations can qualify for reduced or sus-
pended penalties.
EPA compliance monitoring involves the following range of activities:
Surveillance: a pre-inspection activity that consists of obtaining general

site information prior to actually entering the facility. Examples may
include ambient sampling at the property line or observations of activ-
ity at the site.
Inspections (on site): may include record reviews, observations, sam-
pling, or interviews.
Record reviews: may be conducted at EPA, state or local offices, or at
the facility, and may or may not be combined with fieldwork. Records
may be derived from routine self-monitoring requirements, inspection
reports, citizen/employee tips, or remote sensing.
Investigations:generally more comprehensive than inspections and may
be warranted when an inspection or record review suggests the potential
for serious, widespread, and/or continuing civil or criminal violations.
In terms of EPA sanctions, there are two options:
Impose administrative penalties, which are legislatively established in

environmental law, and are usually modest in size and limited in terms
of the circumstances in which they can be levied.
Refer cases to the Department of Justice for criminal or civil prosecution.
The EPAs Office for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance has es-
tablished specific enforcement policies for air, water, and other pollution
media. The various policies contain the special designation of significant
244 POLICY
noncompliers for facilities that commit the worst offenses; the air program
calls them high-priority violators. The exact criteria for significant
noncompliers vary with each statute. For example, under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, operating a treatment, storage, or disposal facil-
ity without a permit classifies the facility as a significant noncomplier. Within
the framework of these enforcement policies, the EPA periodically estab-
lishes national enforcement and compliance priorities based on new scien-
tific knowledge, social and political pressures, and the extent to which
performance goals are being met.
An analysis contained in EPA (2003a) was critical of the effectiveness of
EPA enforcement efforts. The report noted that data for enforcement efforts
by the EPA and the states for the period 19992001 show that only a low
percentage (913 percent) of enforcement actions were taken in a timely and
appropriate manner, only 3940 percent of formal actions resulted in penal-
ties, and average penalties that were imposed were low (about $5,000 per
action). One of the recommendations from EPA (2003a) was to establish a
Facility Watch List. The EPA anticipates that the Facility Watch List will be
a key effort to address significant noncompliance at the facility level, since it
identifies facilities that have been in significant noncompliance for lengthy
periods with no apparent formal enforcement response from the EPA or the
relevant state.
As an agency of the administrative branch of the federal government, the
EPA and its enforcement efforts are politicized and tend to reflect the priori-
ties of the president. External events such as the terrorist attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, can change law enforcement priorities to the detriment of
environmental enforcement. Data from the George W. Bush administration
of the EPA indicate, for example, that the number of EPA civil referrals to
the Department of Justice declined from previous levels, as did the total dol-
lar value of civil lawsuit settlements and the number of facilities inspected
by the EPA.
It is important to note that the majority of environmental enforcement
activity in the United States is carried out by state environmental agencies,
since most states have received authority from the EPA to administer federal
environmental laws under EPA oversight. Of course, states also administer
and enforce their own state laws. There is considerable variation in the vigor
with which states enforce environmental laws. Some states have a strong
record of performance in following EPA mandates, while others are rela-
tively lax. In the latter case, there may be inadequate compliance monitor-
ing, and when violations are detected, those responsible for enforcement
may rarely respond with meaningful penalties.
Before we turn to civil and criminal referrals to the Department of Justice,
it is useful to see how legislation creates administrative penalty tools for the
EPA. For example, under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, the EPA was
granted additional administrative authority to assess penalties without filing a
court case and involving the Department of Justice. This administrative au-
thority allows the EPA to order payment of penalties of up to $200,000 and/or
order that violations be corrected. Those who receive an EPA order can ap-
peal to an administrative law judge. The EPA can also issue field citations
of up to $5,000 per day to violators when an EPA inspector finds certain types
of violations, such as nonfunctioning monitoring equipment. These new au-
thorities allow the EPA to act on smaller cases without having to incur the
time and expense of a federal court action. The amendments also expand the
notion of emergency actions to include threats to the environment, rather
than specifically to human health. These emergency orders have fines that
range from $5,000 to $25,000 per day, and add a criminal penalty of up to five
years in prison for knowingly violating an emergency order. Other criminal
penalties include five years for knowingly and seriously violating the CAA,
doubled for second offenses; fifteen years for knowingly releasing hazardous
air pollution that places people in imminent danger of death or bodily injury;
one year for negligent releases; one year for tampering with a monitoring
device; and the criminalization of the falsification of pollution data.
Selected Civil and Criminal Case Summaries from the

Department of Justice
The civil and criminal case summaries in this section are taken from Depart-
ment of Justice records and press releases.
A 2005 settlement will require Weyerhaeuser Company to clean up the
Plainwell Mill and 12th Street Landfill in Plainwell, Michigan, which are
portions of the Kalamazoo River Superfund site. Weyerhaeuser will pay $6.2
million, which the EPA will use to fund the clean-up of polychlorinated bi-
phenyl (PCB) contamination in the Kalamazoo River. Weyerhaeuser is one
of several companies responsible for PCB contamination at the Kalamazoo
River Superfund Site, which includes the mill, the landfill, a portion of the
Kalamazoo River, and other areas. The PCB contamination at the site re-
sulted primarily from paper companies that produced and processed PCB-
containing carbonless copy paper along the river between the 1950s and 1970s.
The EPA estimates that there are hundreds of thousands of pounds of PCBs
in the soil and sediment at the site. Investigations at the site indicate that PCB
contamination has had an adverse impact on bird and fish populations. For
several decades, fish consumption advisories have urged consumers to limit
the type and amount of fish that they eat from the river.
246 POLICY
A 2004 settlement gained by the U.S. Department of Justice in collabora-

tion with the State of Indiana resulted in eight companies having to pay nearly
$60 million to restore natural resources in the Grand Calumet River and In-
diana Harbor Canal. In addition to the payments that will be made to fund
restoration projects in the waterway, the companies have agreed to set aside
for habitat protection 233 acres of land that contain important fish and wild-
life habitat. Led by the Indiana Department of Environmental Management
and the U.S. Department of Interior through its Fish and Wildlife Service, a
team of seven federal and state agencies had been working since 1996 to
determine the extent of natural resource damages from a century of indus-
trial releases of oil and other hazardous substances into the waterway. Stud-
ies showed that the releases contaminated the rivers water and streambed,
affecting migratory birds, fish, invertebrates, and aquatic insects.
A 1999 settlement with seven heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers led
to the largest Clean Air Act penalty up to that time. The settlement resolved
charges that the companies violated the CAA by installing software that al-
lowed engines to meet EPA emission standards during testing but disabled
the emission control system during normal highway driving. The settlement
is expected to prevent 75 million tons of nitrous oxide air pollution over the
next twenty-seven years and reduce such emissions from diesel engines by
one-third by 2003. The initiative also resulted in an $83.4 million penalty
payment, the largest civil environmental penalty imposed up to that time.
In 1999 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld imposition of a Clean
Water Act (CWA) civil penalty in excess of $12 million, the largest penalty
awarded under the CWA up to that time. The appellate court affirmed a lower
court ruling that Smithfield Foods and its subsidiaries violated the CWA by
discharging illegal levels of phosphorous, ammonia, cyanide, and fecal coliform
from their slaughterhouse into the Pagan River in Virginia. The court held that
an agreement between the company and the state of Virginia that allowed
Smithfield to exceed its permit limits did not excuse Smithfields violations
because the agreement was not part of the permit approved by EPA and be-
cause Virginias state law was not comparable to the federal law.
In 1999 the District Court in Arkansas entered final judgment for the United
States in the amount of $100.5 million, plus future costs, concluding eigh-
teen years of litigation at the Vertac Superfund Site. The Vertac Site, the
location of an herbicide manufacturing plant that operated from the 1960s to
the 1980s and manufactured, among other things, Agent Orange, was one of
the worst dioxin-contaminated sites in the country. This was the largest adju-
dicated Superfund judgment up to that time.
In January 1999 Buddy Frazier and his associates, Chance Gaines and James
Bragg, were sentenced to prison for thirty, thirty-three, and twenty-four months,
respectively, for multiple asbestos work practice and worker identification vio-
lations in connection with the demolition of a manufacturing building in
Marshfield, Wisconsin. The defendants had recruited untrained homeless men
from a community kitchen in Chattanooga, Tennessee, obtained fraudulent
asbestos training identification cards for these workers, and directed them to
strip asbestos pipe insulation without first wetting the material, thereby expos-
ing them to the severe health risks associated with asbestos inhalation. In con-
nection with this prosecution, the Environment and Natural Resources Division
of the Department of Justice launched a nationwide project with the EPA and
the National Coalition for the Homeless to halt the exploitation of homeless
and itinerant workers for illegal asbestos work.
In 1998 the Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with the
FMC Corporation resolving numerous violations of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) at an FMC facility on the Shoshone-Bannock
tribes Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Pocatello, Idaho. The facility is the
worlds largest producer of elemental phosphorus, which is used in deter-
gents, beverages, foods, synthetic lubricants, and pesticides. The most seri-
ous of the RCRA violations involved mismanagement of phosphorus wastes
in ponds. The wastes burn vigorously when exposed to the air, and also gen-
erate toxic gases that can cause serious health and environmental problems.
FMC agreed to spend approximately $158 million to settle this case as well
as another $11.8 million as a civil penalty, the largest obtained under RCRA
up to that time.
In September 1996 U.S. District Court Judge Hector Laffitte sentenced three
corporationsBunker Group Puerto Rico, Bunker Group Incorporated, and
New England Marine Servicesto each pay a $25 million fine and complete a
five-year term of corporate probation. On April 25, 1996, a federal jury con-
victed the companies of sending out an unseaworthy vessel, negligently dis-
charging oil, and failing to notify the Coast Guard that a hazardous condition
existed on the vessel. As a result, 750,000 gallons of oil were spilled into the
waters off Puerto Rico and onto its popular Escambron Beach at the height of
the tourist season in January 1994. At the time, this was considered one of the
largest fines ever imposed for an environmental crime.
California Enforcement
Most states have environmental laws that mirror those at the federal level.
California offers a good illustration. Most California environmental statutes
contain provisions allowing for criminal liability of both firms and individu-
als who violate these statutes. Civil liability in the form of civil penalties and
injunctive relief can also be imposed. Criminal penalty provisions are in-
248 POLICY
cluded in the following California environmental and other related statutes

(and their federal counterparts):
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (federal counterpart:

Clean Water Act). California is authorized to implement the provisions
of the CWA in its state waters. California law provides for substantial
felony penalties for knowingly violating its own Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act.
California Clean Air Act (federal counterpart: Clean Air Act and amend-
ments). The California Clean Air Act provides for criminal penalties for
violation of a permitees emissions permit. The criminal sanction is in-
creased if the violation occurred knowingly or as a result of negligence.
An emission that causes or threatens serious bodily injury or death can
result in a fifteen-year prison term and a fine of up to $1 million.
The Hazardous Waste Control Act (federal counterpart: Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act). Under California law, criminal penalties
exist for failure to properly transport, store, handle, or maintain records
of hazardous waste. This law also provides for civil liability and injunc-
tive relief that can be imposed cumulatively with the criminal penalties.
Violations that result in great bodily injury or cause a substantial prob-
ability of death can result in up to three years in prison and fines of
$250,000 per day of violation.
The Hazardous Substances Account Act (federal counterpart: Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
[CERCLA]). Under California law, criminal penalties exist for failing
to report a release, or a threatened release, of a hazardous material, for
particular failures to file disposal reports, and for certain record-keep-
ing violations. Penalties for subsequent violations range up to fines of
$50,000 per day and imprisonment for two years.
California Corporate Criminal Liability Act. Also known as the be a
manager, go to jail law, it makes corporations and their managers crimi-
nally liable when they fail to warn their employees of, or report to a Cali-
fornia regulatory agency, the existence of serious concealed dangers of
which the corporation and its managers have actual knowledge. . . . A
serious concealed danger is normal or foreseeable use of a product or
practice that creates a substantial probability of death, great bodily harm,
or serious exposure to an individual to whom the danger is not readily
apparent (Pen C sect. 387[b][3, 4]). Up to three years in prison and
fines of $25,000 can be imposed on individuals, and fines of up to $1
million can be imposed on corporations (Criminal Penalties and Con-
siderations 1993).
Compliance
The Clean Water Act, the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, and the enabling
legislation for the Toxics Release Inventory all require that firms monitor
and self-report their emissions. Falsifying is a criminal offense, primarily
followed up on by citizen groups in citizen lawsuits.
One issue is initial compliancehas the firm installed the necessary tech-
nology and/or established the necessary monitoring/control functions? An-
other issue is compliance over timecontinuous compliance. There are
no comprehensive estimates of the extent of continuous compliance. There
are indications, however, that while initial compliance rates tend to be high
(8090 percent), continuous compliance rates are much lower, approximately
45 percent or so (Russell 1990). Why might compliance rates be exagger-
ated? Perhaps because the EPA had commonly relied upon pre-announced
on-site inspections of stationary/point-source polluters, which gives firms an
opportunity to install, fix, or turn on pollution-control equipment. Typical
inspection rates are once a year, with the inspection usually restricted to
making sure that pollution-control equipment is functioning properly.
According to the EPA (1999), regional EPA staff conducted 23,237 in-
spections in 1998, an increase of 19 percent over 1997. Nevertheless, these
inspections covered only 1.7 percent of the 1,366,634 core regulated facili-
ties that were required to comply with environmental regulation (or just 0.29
percent of all core and noncore regulated facilities). The EPA found a wide
range of different rates of significant noncompliance with environmental regu-
lations in 1998. For example, 11.8 percent of automobile assembly facilities,
19 percent of pulp manufacturers, 45 percent of petroleum refineries, and
72.7 percent of integrated iron and steel mills were found to be in significant
noncompliance with air quality regulations. Overall, in 1998 the EPA esti-
mated that 7 percent of air pollution sources were found to be in significant
noncompliance, though a review by the inspector general suggests that vio-
lations are underreported. Approximately 20 percent of waste combusters
and landfill operators were in significant noncompliance with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, and about one-third of tank owners and
operators are likewise out of compliance with the Underground Storage Tank
program requirements. Finally, about one-quarter of all drinking water sys-
tems are out of compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Mintz (2004) reports there were 20,417 EPA field inspections in 2000 and
17,668 in 2002. This decline may reflect a change in law enforcement priori-
ties following the September 11th terrorist attack, or the different political
priorities of the George W. Bush administration relative to the Clinton ad-
ministration. According to the EPA (2003a), approximately 25 percent of
250 POLICY
major facilities were in significant noncompliance with their Clean Water

Act (CWA) permits at any given time. Moreover, that rate of significant non-
compliance had effectively remained constant since 1994.
Citizen Suits
Most environmental laws have provisions that allow for private citizens to
sue polluters for violating statutes. The possibility of citizen lawsuits lever-
ages government enforcement efforts by empowering people who are di-
rectly harmed by pollution to do something about it. These suits can force
compliance, may require damages restitution, and can impose sanctions as
wellfor hazardous waste (RCRA) and Superfund (CERCLA). Successful
citizen lawsuits are difficult, however, because of the evidentiary require-
ments. Such suits have been most common in Clean Water Act cases where
monthly self-reporting is required and where private citizens can monitor
waterways. Citizen suits are very important because they can counteract po-
litical pressure brought to bear on the EPA and the revolving-door motive for
ignoring pollution violations.
Prior to the 1990 CAA amendments, citizens could only sue violators to force
compliance; under the 1990 amendments, citizen suits can include cash penal-
ties, which, if the suits are successful, go into an enforcement fund. Congress
authorized awards of up to $10,000 to citizens who provide information leading
to criminal convictions or civil penalties for violation of the CAA. Unfortunately,
state and federal employees are exempt. Recent state law in Arizona has elimi-
nated the right of citizens to sue a company for polluting private or public prop-
erty. The public may still sue the state to take action, but only if the state agrees
that there has been a violation. Thus if the state decides to ignore violations,
citizens in Arizona no longer have recourse through citizen suits.
Summary
The economics of crime is such that the marginal benefits decline as

more and more enforcement effort is exerted, while the marginal costs
tend to rise. As a result, the level of enforcement activity that maxi-
mizes total net benefits will generally imply less than complete preven-
tion of illegal activity.
Fines and prison time are the common ways that state and federal agen-
cies enforce environmental laws. While fines generate fewer social costs
and can be imposed with a lower burden of proof, prison time cannot be
shifted onto insurance companies, consumers, or taxpayers, and can
have a substantial deterrent effect on individuals.
Deterrence occurs when crime does not pay. In the context of risk-neu-
trality, deterrence occurs when the expected penalties associated with a
violation exceed the economic gains from being out of compliance. The
expected penalty is the monetary or criminal sanction, weighted by the
probability of detection and the probability of the penalties actually being
imposed given detection. Since the probability of being caught and pe-
nalized is less than 100 percent, the actual penalties that are imposed
must exceed the gain from being out of compliance.
In practice, it is difficult to know whether a given level of compliance
monitoring and a given penalty structure is sufficient to create deter-
rence for particular firms, organizations, and members of the public.
People (and managers of firms and organizations) have different prefer-
ences for risk and different, subjective, views of the probability of be-
ing caught and of being punished. Moreover, not all environmental law
violators are economically rational, and consequently may not respond
in their own best interest to the legal incentives for compliance.
Market reputations can also play a role in providing an incentive for
firms to be environmentally friendly. Consumer boycotts are one ex-
ample, and voluntary overcompliance programs such as the EPAs Green
Lights Program can act as substitutes for image advertising. Consumers
must be environmentally conscious and well informed for these
reputational systems to function.
Incentive schemes have been developed and implemented in laws such
as the Clean Water Act that require self-reporting and provide for penal-
ties for false reporting. These schemes have the potential for generating
deterrence while saving the government some monitoring costs.
Citizen lawsuit provisions of environmental and natural resource pro-
tection laws give members of the public legal standing to sue alleged
lawbreakers. These provisions can provide an important source of de-
terrence.
1. Suppose that a firm can increase its profits by $1 million each year by
choosing not to comply with environmental regulations. The firm is a risk-
neutral expected profit maximizer. The probability that the firm will be de-
tected and found to be out of compliance is 40 percent, and the probability
that a judge will impose a penalty given detection is 75 percent. If the only
penalty is a fine, what is the minimum fine necessary to get this firm to
comply with environmental regulations?
2. Suppose that a firm can increase its profits by $2 million each year by
252 POLICY
choosing not to comply with environmental regulations. The firm is a risk-

neutral expected profit maximizer. The firm anticipates that if it is detected
and found to be out of compliance, it will have to pay a penalty of $3 million.
If the only penalty is this fine, what is the minimum probability of detection
and being fined necessary to get this firm to comply with environmental
regulations?
3. Economist Gary Becker (1968) has argued that fines are a more effi-
cient form of penalty than prison terms. While fines can be calibrated to
create deterrence, prison terms create higher social costs because they elimi-
nate a persons productive income and require society to pay tens of thou-
sands of dollars annually to hold the person in prison. Give some reasons
why there may be economically good arguments for making environmental
violations punishable by prison terms.
4. Go to the Internet site for the Environmental and Natural Resources
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov/enrd). Going
beyond the examples given in the textbook, find an example of a recent and
significant civil penalty or criminal sentence being imposed for violation of
environmental law. Summarize the key elements of the case, including the
name of the company or individual, the relevant environmental law, the na-
ture of the violation, and the penalty imposed.
Internet Links
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr): Read

about actual monitoring procedures and administrative and criminal penal-
ties embedded within various environmental regulations. The Clean Air Act,
for example, is contained in Chapter 85 of Title 42 of the CFR.
Cornell University Legal Information Institutes Coverage of Environ-

mental Law (www.law.cornell.edu/topics/environmental.html): Read about
federal and state statutory environmental law, major federal and state court
decisions having to do with the environment, and international environmen-
tal law.
Environmental and Natural Resources Division of the Department of

Justice (www.usdoj.gov/enrd): The nations environmental lawyer. Areas
of responsibility include litigation concerning the protection, use, and devel-
opment of the nations natural resources and public lands; wildlife protec-
tion; Indian rights and claims; clean-up of the nations hazardous waste sites;
the acquisition of private property for federal use; and defense of environ-
mental challenges to government programs and activities.
Environmental Investigation Agency (www.eia-international.org): The

Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) is an independent, international
campaigning organization committed to investigating and exposing envi-
ronmental crime.
EPA Compliance and Enforcement Portal (www.epa.gov/compliance):

Source of information on compliance monitoring and enforcement efforts.
EPA Partners for the Environment Programs (www.epa.gov/partners):

Read more about EPA-sponsored voluntary overcompliance programs.
EPA Enforcement Actions, Criminal Referrals, and Settlements (http://

cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/newsroom/): Read about administrative actions,
penalties, and criminal referrals by the EPA.
Arora, S., and T. Cason. 1995. Why Do Firms Overcomply with Environmental Regu-
lations? Understanding Participation in EPAs 33/50 Program. Working paper,
University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
Becker, G. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Po-
litical Economy 78: 169217.
Cohen, M. 1992. Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory
and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Environmental Statutes. Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 8284: 10531108.
Criminal Penalties and Considerations. 1993. California Civil PracticeEnviron-
mental Litigation. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Law Publishers.
Cushman, J. 1996. States Shield Businesses from Ecological Liability. San Fran-
cisco Examiner, April 7, A-2.
Klein, B., and K. Leffler. 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance. Journal of Political Economy 89 (August): 61541.
Magat, W., and K. Viscusi. 1990. Effectiveness of the EPAs Regulatory Enforce-
ment: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards. Journal of Law and Economics
33 (October): 33159.
Malik, A. 1993. Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic
Pollution. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 24157.
Mintz, J. 2004. Treading Water: A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement
During the Bush II Administration. Environmental Law Reporter 34: 10,93353.
Pfaff, A., and C. Sanchirico. 2004. Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assess-
ment of EPAs Self-Audit Policy. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
23(3): 41532.
Polinsky, A., and S. Shavell. 1979. The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines. American Economic Review 69: 88091.
Resources for the Future. 1997. Voluntary Incentives Are No Shortcut to Pollution
Abatement. Resources 126 (Winter): 18.
Russell, C. 1990. Monitoring and Enforcement. In Public Policies for Environmen-
tal Protection, ed. P. Portney. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
254 POLICY
Russell, C., W. Harrington, and W. Vaughn. 1985. Enforcing Pollution Control Laws.
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Segerson, K., and T. Tietenberg. 1992. The Structure of Penalties in Environmental
Enforcement: An Economic Analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 23: 179200.
Tietenberg, T., ed. 1992. Innovation in Environmental Policy: Economic and Legal
Aspects of Recent Developments in Liability and Enforcement. Cheltingham, U.K.:
Edward Elgar.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1999. Enforcement and Compliance Assur-
ance: FY 1998 Accomplishments Report. Washington, DC: EPA.
. 2003a. A Pilot for Performance Analysis of Selected Components of the Na-
tional Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program. Washington, DC: EPA.
. 2003b. Protecting the EnvironmentTogether: Energy Star and Other Vol-
untary Programs, Climate Protection Partnerships Division, 2003 Annual Report.
Washington, DC: EPA.
10
Creating Economic Incentives
for Environmental Protection
and Resource Management
Introduction
Broadly speaking, incentive regulation is concerned with the design of regu-

latory schemes that use economic instruments such as prices, taxes, subsi-
dies, bonds, liability, or markets to align individual incentives with the
common good. Many incentive regulatory schemes are indirect; policymakers
control pollution emissions or other environmental standards indirectly by
modulating incentives rather than through direct controls and standards. A
common example is the can and bottle redemption deposit schemes used by
states such as California, Michigan, and Oregon to promote recycling, thus
limiting littering and landfill flows. In California, for example, when one
purchases a canned or glass-bottled soft drink or beer, included in the pur-
chase price is a return deposit, such as those charged by equipment rental
firms to assure that the equipment is returned in good condition. This deposit
is returned when the empty beverage container is taken to a recycling center.
Glass and aluminum container deposits are a form of indirect control and
can be contrasted with a direct-control requirement that mandates the recy-
cling of glass and aluminum containers. Another example of incentive regu-
lation is the German take-back system (discussed in chapter 14) whereby
manufacturers are required to take back the products that they make once
they are worn out. The take-back program gives manufacturers an incentive
to design products for low-cost reuse or recycling and so is an indirect way
255
256 POLICY
Table 10.1
Summary of Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection and

Resource Management
Instrument Effects and impacts

Allowance trading systems Lowers the cost of complying with environmental
regulations
Environmental bonds (such as Fosters deterrence and provides funds for
deposit-refund systems) clean-up, restoration, and mitigation; promotes
recycling
Environmental liability systems Fosters deterrence and provides funds for
clean-up, restoration, and mitigation
Market-based reputations Environmentally conscious consumers reward
green businesses
Property rights systems Allows for effective resource governance, may
prevent tragedy of the commons, and can
create an incentive for productivity-enhancing
investments
Pollution or effluent taxes and Reduces market distortions by internalizing
use fees exernalities and causing price to reflect
marginal social cost; promotes less-harmful
alternatives
Subsidies, loans, and grants for Promotes investment in clean technology and
environmentally friendly voluntary overcompliance
investments
of lowering the cost of materials reuse and recycling. Liability standards and
the potential for civil and criminal penalties offer another form of incentive
regulation, as described in chapter 8. Still another example of incentive regu-
lation is offered by funding garbage collection based on per-bag charges
rather than through a fixed fee. The per-bag fee creates an indirect incentive
to reduce the amount of garbage created by households.
A summary of some regulatory schemes that use various economic instru-
ments to foster more environmentally friendly behavior is given in Table 10.1.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a complete accounting of
the various incentive systems. Instead, the chapter will focus on two promi-
nent forms of market-based environmental policy instruments, namely, mar-
ketable pollution allowances and environmental taxes and subsidies. Some
additional incentive schemes will be presented in chapter 15. The discussion
on environmental taxes in this chapter builds on the theoretical foundation
regarding externalities and Pigouvian taxes that was developed in chapter 4.
Early environmental regulation has been criticized for its lack of beneficial
incentives. The common approach was to use direct controls, also known as
CREATING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 257
command-and-control regulation. Command-and-control regulation speci-

fies how pollution is to be reduced through the application of uniform stan-
dards for firms, most prominently technology-based (technology-forcing)
or performance-based standards. Technology-based standards specify the meth-
ods and equipment that firms must use in order to comply with environmental
regulation. Performance-based standards set uniform control targets for all
regulated firms, but unlike with technology-based standards, firms are given
some choice over how the target is actually met (Stavins 2000). An example of
a technology-based standard is the regulatory requirement that automobile
manufacturers install catalytic converters rather than allowing automobile com-
panies to find the cheapest or most effective method of control. Performance-
based standards that establish uniform control targets for particular industries
and pollutants do not allow for the trading of allowed emissions across sources.
There are at least two problems with command-and-control regulation. First,
command-and-control regulation tends to lock in specific environmental tech-
nologies, and therefore retards the development of new and improved methods
of pollution control. Second, as we will see in the next section of the chapter,
uniform performance standards imposed on an industry in which firms have
widely different pollution abatement costs results in a higher cost for achiev-
ing a given level of aggregate control. The original Clean Air Act (CAA) of
1970 provides one example of the problems associated with using command-
and-control environmental regulation (Ackerman and Hassler 1981). At the
insistence of U.S. senators from eastern states with high-sulfur coal, the CAA
required that costly scrubbers be installed on coal-burning electricity-generat-
ing facilities, even though many could have generated the same clean-up by
shifting to low-sulfur coal. While this requirement was politically efficient
the CAA could not otherwise have passed Congressit fails to be economi-
cally cost-efficient. In his survey of eight empirical studies, Tietenberg (1985)
found that the ratio of aggregate pollution abatement costs under command-
and-control regulation to that of a least-cost benchmark method of control
ranged from 1.07 for sulfate emissions in the Los Angeles basin to 22.0 for
hydrocarbon emissions at all U.S. DuPont chemical manufacturing facilities.
Thus there are potentially large cost savings to be achieved from more flexible
alternative regulatory systems.
The market-based environmental policy instruments described below dif-
fer from traditional command-and-control regulatory schemes in several ways.
Stavins (2000) argues that market-based environmental policy instruments
are regulations that encourage behavior through market signals rather than
through explicit directives regarding pollution-control levels or methods.
Marketable allowance systems are one type of market-based instrument that
is embedded in the structure of an overall emissions reduction program, but
258 POLICY
which allows the degree of abatement to vary across sources in a manner that
reduces overall compliance costs. Marketable allowance systems regulate
the quantity of emissions but do not generally force the use of a particular
technology. Environmental taxes, such as those on pollution emissions, regu-
late the price of emissions and give firms an incentive to reduce their tax
liability by reducing their emissions, thus indirectly reducing emissions. In
addition, pollution taxes result in market prices that more closely approxi-
mate the marginal social cost of production and so make cleaner alternative
technologies more price competitive. Finally, since pollution taxes do not
mandate a particular technology, they create a dynamic incentive for research
and development in ways to reduce the cost of cleaner technologies.
This chapter will begin with a discussion of marketable pollution allow-
ances and their cost-saving properties, and will then move on to describe
various environmental taxes and emission charges.
Marketable Pollution Allowances
There have been a number of policy experiments with marketable quotas or

allowances, including individual transferable quotas (ITQs) used in fisheries
management (chapter 6), marketable development rights, and marketable pol-
lution allowances. In the context of regulating pollution, there are two types of
allowance markets. Tradable pollution credits are created when a pollution
source reduces its emissions below some individual source-specific target. If
pollution regulation caps aggregate rather than individual emissions, then emis-
sion permits or allowances take the form of quota shares that are assigned to
individual polluters. This latter program is sometimes called a cap-and-trade
system because it involves the establishment of an aggregate rather than an
individual cap on emissions, and tradable allowances take the form of indi-
vidual quota shares to the aggregate emissions cap. The emphasis in this sec-
tion of the chapter will be on cap-and-trade systems. Allowance markets are
designed to help reduce compliance costs for those firms that are operating
under environmental regulations. The cost savings generated by allowances
trading will be illustrated by considering pollution allowances trading systems.
It is important to recognize that marketable pollution allowance systems do not
directly reduce pollution emissions but are designed to reduce compliance costs
in the context of an overall reduction in emissions.
The elements of a well-functioning cap-and-trade pollution allowance
system include:
An overall cap on pollution emissions.

A partitioning of the cap into tradable quota shares assigned to the vari-
Table 10.2
Hypothetical Example of an Industry with Heterogeneous Marginal

Abatement Costs
Firm Marginal abatement cost ($) Historical baseline, annual emissions

A 12 50
B 18 50
C 24 50
D 30 50
E 36 50
F 42 50
G 48 50
H 54 50
Note: For analytical simplicity, it is assumed that marginal abatement costs are con-
stant, and that historical baseline emissions levels are identical across firms. Thus firms
differ only in terms of their marginal abatement costs.
ous pollution sources; these allowed emissions are usually set as a frac-
tion of historical emissions during a baseline time period; the sum of
these allowances is equal to the desired level of emissions.
A well-functioning competitive market for trading allowances.
A requirement that new firms must buy allowances from existing firms.
Effective deterrence against emissions in excess of firms allowances
(see chapter 9).
Sufficient policy stability over time so that firms have incentive to in-
vest in pollution-control technology and become sellers of allowances.
Now that we see the basic structure, lets look at an illustrative example of
how an allowances-trading system can work to reduce the overall cost of
attaining a given level of pollution control.
An Illustration of the Cost-Savings Potential from

Marketable Pollution Allowances
Consider the highly simplified example in Table 10.2, which features an industry
made up of eight polluting firms that have different pollution-abatement costs
(i.e., the cost of reducing emissions, such as from smokestack scrubbers or alter-
native production methods). To keep the example analytically simple, at the cost
of being a bit unrealistic, we assume that each firms marginal abatement costs
are constant. Normally we would expect that a firms marginal abatement costs
would be directly related to the level of pollution abatement (why?).
Using the data from Table 10.2, we can plot the marginal abatement costs
260 POLICY
Figure 10.1 Industrywide Marginal Abatement Costs
$ per unit of
pollution reduced Industrywide marginal
abatement cost curve
Firm
H
Firm
G
Firm
F
Firm
E
Firm
D
Firm
C
Firm
B
Firm
A
Quantity of pollution
emissions reduced
for all the firms in this industry, as shown in Figure 10.1. Each segment of
the step function in Figure 10.1 represents the marginal abatement cost for
one of the firms in the industry. The first segment of the step function repre-
sents the marginal abatement cost for firm A, the firm with the lowest mar-
ginal abatement costs in the industry. Once firm A has exhausted its potential
for reducing emissions, the next segment on the industrywide marginal abate-
ment cost function represents that of firm B, the firm with the next lowest
marginal abatement costs in the industry. This process continues in ascend-
ing order of firms marginal abatement cost.
Case 1: Traditional Uniform Performance Standard and No

Marketable Allowances
Lets first assume that a uniform environmental performance-based standard

of cutting emissions by 50 percent is applied across the firms in this industry
based on their historical baseline annual emissions levels. Table 10.3 illus-
Table 10.3
Hypothetical Industrywide Cost of Cutting Emissions by One-Half Using a

Uniform Performance-based Standard (Command and Control)
Historical
baseline, Number of tons
Marginal annual of emissions to Total abatement
Firm abatement cost emissions be reduced cost ($)
A 12 50 25 300
B 18 50 25 450
C 24 50 25 600
D 30 50 25 750
E 36 50 25 900
F 42 50 25 1,050
G 48 50 25 1,200
H 54 50 25 1,350
Total 400 200 6,600
trates the industrywide cost of reducing emissions by 50 percent under this

form of regulation. The total cost of reducing emissions by 50 percent is
$6,600 per year under a performance-based standard in which each of the
eight firms must cut its emissions by 25 tons.
Case 2: Cap and Trade
Now consider the same level of pollution abatement under a cap-and-trade

system that features marketable pollution allowances. As before, each firm
had been emitting 50 tons of pollution each year, and under the cap-and-
trade system total industrywide emissions must be cut by 200 tons, or one-
half of the 400 tons that had been emitted each year by the industry. This is
accomplished by allocating a quota share of 25 tons to each firm, which is
equal to one-half of their historical emissions. In the cap-and-trade system
the 25 tons of quota per year that firms are allowed to emit are referred to as
pollution allowances, and these allowances can be traded across the various
firms in the industry. In our example, one allowance is equal to the right to
emit one ton of pollution for one year. Thus, trading rearranges the level of
clean-up each firm engages in but keeps the overall level of pollution reduc-
tion constant.
To determine the distribution of emissions across the regulated industry in
a cap-and-trade system, we first need to predict the pattern of allowances
trade. This means that we determine which firms will be buyers of allow-
ances (purchasing the right to emit more pollution from other firms in the
industry), and which firms will be sellers of allowances (selling the right to
262 POLICY
emit pollution to other firms in the industry). Going back to Figure 10.1, in
general any firm in the industry would be willing to sell its allowances at a
price above its marginal abatement cost. Recall from chapter 3 that each firm
supplies along its marginal cost curve in a competitive market. Thus, we can
construct a market supply curve for allowances, which in our example is
equivalent to the industrywide marginal abatement cost step function in Fig-
ure 10.1, except that each step is only half as wide, since each firm only has
allowances equal to one-half of its historical emissions. Moreover, in general
any firm in the industry would be willing to purchase allowances at a price
below its marginal abatement cost. For simplicity, we assume that only regu-
lated firms in the industry can purchase pollution allowances. Thus, we can
construct a market demand curve for allowances, where each firms mar-
ginal abatement cost represents its maximum willingness to pay for allow-
ances. The maximum quantity of allowances demanded by each firm in our
example is 25 (the quantity of each firms total emissions [50] minus each
firms allowed emissions [25]). The market supply and demand for allow-
ances is shown in Figure 10.2.
As noted above, the predicted pattern of allowances trade involves firms
with low marginal abatement costs selling allowances to firms with higher
marginal abatement costs. For example, firm As marginal abatement cost is
only $12 per ton. If firm A were to sell an allowance to firm H for, say, $33,
then firm A receives producer surplus $(33 12) = $21, and firm H receives
consumer surplus $(54 33) = $21. Essentially, this allowance trade involves
firm A taking on the task of cleaning up an extra ton of pollution emissions
on behalf of firm H, and charges firm H $33 for this service. Recalling what
we learned about the competitive market equilibrium in chapter 3, we can
see in Figure 10.2 that the equilibrium quantity of allowances traded oc-
curs where the market supply and demand curves intersect. At this equilib-
rium the firms with relatively low marginal abatement costs (firms AD)
are selling a total of 100 tons of allowance to the firms with relatively high
marginal abatement costs (firms EH). The equilibrium price of allowances
will fall somewhere between $30 and $36 (why?), and with equal bargain-
ing power on both sides of the market, an equilibrium price of $33 would
be reasonable.
At $33 per allowance, firms EH find it cheaper to buy allowances than to
reduce their emissions, and firms AD find it more profitable to sell their
allowances and perform all of the pollution abatement for the entire industry.
Table 10.4 illustrates how marketable allowances systems reallocate clean-
up activity and reduce overall abatement costs.
In this highly simplified example, the industrywide cost of meeting the
emissions capcutting pollution by one-half in the airshedis $4,200, which
Figure 10.2 Market Supply and Demand for Pollution Allowances

Allowance
price
Market supply
of allowances
H H
G G
F F
Equilibrium E E
price
D D
C C
B B
Market demand
for allowances
A A
Equilibrium Quantity of
quantity of allowances
allowances
Table 10.4
Hypothetical Industrywide Cost of Cutting Emissions by One-Half Under a

Cap-and-Trade System with Fully Tradable Allowances
4. Final
1. Initial tons of
Historical tons of emissions
Marginal baseline, emissions 2. 3. to be
abatement annual to be Allowances Allowances reduced
Firm cost emissions reduced sold bought (1 + 2 3)
A 12 50 25 25 0 50
B 18 50 25 25 0 50
C 24 50 25 25 0 50
D 30 50 25 25 0 50
E 36 50 25 0 25 0
F 42 50 25 0 25 0
G 48 50 25 0 25 0
H 54 50 25 0 25 0
Total 400 200 100 100 200
264 POLICY
is somewhat less than two-thirds of the cost of meeting the same overall
pollution-control target under the performance-based command-and-
control standard. However, what about the revenues and costs associated
with the sales and purchases of allowances? Does the cost of buying al-
lowances count as a part of the total cost of compliance with the cap? For
an individual firm, the cost of purchasing allowances represents a cost of
compliance, without a doubt. If only industry members are involved with
allowance trades, as in this example, then the industrywide cost of allow-
ances purchased by the demand side of the allowance market is, from an
accounting standpoint, equal to the revenues from allowance sales by the
supply side of the allowance market. In other words, intra-industry al-
lowances trade has no aggregate net compliance cost impact, as purchase
expenditures simply represent offsetting revenue flows to other firms in
the industry.
We made the simplifying assumption that each firms marginal abate-
ment costs are constant, which resulted in firms with low marginal abate-
ment costs selling all of their allowances, thus fully eliminating their
emissions. Admittedly, it may be a bit farfetched to assume that the pol-
luting facilities owned by firms AD can completely eliminate their emis-
sions, but this simple example illustrates the more general concept. The
remarkable aspect of a cap-and-trade system is that it harnesses the cost-
minimizing incentives of profit-maximizing firms and the competitive
market process to reduce the costs of complying with pollution-control
regulations.
More generally, if firms AH each had different upward-sloping mar-
ginal abatement cost curves rather than constant marginal abatement costs,
the equimarginal principle would come into play. To see this, consider
Figure 10.3, which shows three firms, each with different, upward-slop-
ing marginal abatement cost curves. To simplify this example, we focus
on firms that supply allowances. If the horizontal dotted line indicates
the equilibrium market price of an allowance, then one can see that firm
3 (with the highest marginal abatement cost curve) supplies the smallest
quantity of allowances, while firm 1 (with the lowest marginal abatement
cost curve) supplies the largest quantity of allowances. As the equimarginal
principle would suggest, at the equilibrium allowance price, the marginal
abatement cost of each firm for the last ton each cleans up is equal to the
equilibrium allowance price. As a consequence, the firm with the lowest
marginal abatement cost curve sells the most allowances and reduces
emissions the most, followed by the firm with the next-to-lowest mar-
ginal abatement cost curve, and so on.
Figure 10.3 Allowance Sales by Firms with Upward-Sloping Allowance

Supply Curves
Allowance
Allowance Supply, Firm 3
Price
Allowance
Supply, Firm 2
Allowance
Supply, Firm 1
Equil.
Price
QS, Firm 3 QS, Firm 2 QS, Firm 1 Quantity of

Allowances
Case 3: Limited Allowance Trading
If the pollutant being regulated in the cap-and-trade system is not perfectly

uniformly mixed in the atmosphere, there may be localized hot spots near
point sources that, by buying up allowances, firms can continue to pollute as
before. For example, in July 1997 the group Communities for a Better Envi-
ronment filed a federal civil rights complaint against the South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD) and oil companies in the Los An-
geles region. This group was arguing that the acquisition of pollution credits
from buying and scrapping older, high-polluting cars violates the civil rights
of lower-income and minority people who live near the oil refineries. Conse-
quently, unconstrained trading of allowances may generate an asymmetry in
the distribution of emissions that generates greater harms than if emissions
reductions were more uniformly applied across the firms. In this case, there
266 POLICY
is a balancing of cost savings from allowances trading against the need for
all sources to limit emissions.
Suppose that we cap trades at 10 tons for each firm. In the example below,
we will cap sales as well as purchases, but if dealing with localized hot spots
is the concern, it is only necessary to cap purchases by each firm. A cap on
both sales and purchases is used here to illustrate the somewhat more realis-
tic case in which all firms clean up to some degree, and yet no firm can
completely eliminate its emissions. Table 10.5 shows what will happen un-
der this constrained allowances-trading scheme.
Under this final case, all firms must cut pollution by at least 15 tons per
year, which limits localized hot-spot effects. The result, however, of limiting
trading is that the cost of meeting the overall standard of cutting pollution by
half rises to $5,640, roughly intermediate between the cost with no trading
($6,600) and the cost with unconstrained trading ($4,200). Thus we can mea-
sure the opportunity cost of limiting localized hot spots by the foregone cost
savings that would have been realized under more complete tradingin this
case $5,640 $4,200 = $1,440.
Advantages of Marketable Allowance Systems
There are both static and dynamic advantages associated with marketable
allowance systems. A clear static advantage of marketable allowances is that
substantial cost savings are realized from allowing low-abatement-cost firms
to sell allowances to high-abatement-cost firms. Consequently, an overall
pollution abatement target can be realized at lower total cost when allow-
ances are tradable. Moreover, since firms with high abatement costs are pay-
ing someone else to do clean-up for them, this payment becomes a cost and
so gives these firms an incentive to find a cheaper way to reduce emissions
R&D. A dynamic advantage of marketable allowance systems is that they
give firms an incentive to invest in cleaner technology and cut their emis-
sions below their allowance. The firms can then specialize in selling allow-
ances to those that have not made a similar investment.
Disadvantages of Marketable Allowance Systems
When a firm has market power, such as with monopolies or colluding

oligopolists, and lower abatement costs than potential entrants, and new en-
trants must buy emissions allowances from the existing firm, then the exist-
ing firm can use its dominant position to withhold allowances from potential
rivals and so maintain its market power over time (Misiolek and Elder 1989).
Another possible problem occurs when there are few market participants
Table 10.5
Hypothetical Industrywide Cost of Cutting Emissions by One-Half with
Limited Allowances Trading
4. Final
1. Initial 2. 3. tons of
Historical tons of Allowances Allowances emissions
Marginal baseline, emissions sold bought to be
abatement annual to be (maximum (maximum reduced
Firm cost emissions reduced of 10) of 10) (1 + 2 3)
A 12 50 25 10 0 35
B 18 50 25 10 0 35
C 24 50 25 10 0 35
D 30 50 25 10 0 35
E 36 50 25 0 10 15
F 42 50 25 0 10 15
G 48 50 25 0 10 15
H 54 50 25 0 10 15
Total 400 200 40 40 200
and an ineffective market institution or other barriers to efficient market pro-

cesses. In this case the transaction costs of exchanging emissions allow-
ances may be larger than the value of the allowance itself, in which case
allowance market failure results (Foster and Hahn 1995). For example, al-
lowances-tracking systems are necessary so that regulatory agencies know
each firms allowed emissions, and there have been cases in which the cost
of registering trades has been so high as to discourage otherwise mutually
beneficial allowances transactions.
Policymakers must also be careful to make the allowances short-term in
nature so that they do not become a permanent right that could not be ad-
justed further in the future if new scientific information comes along and
policy makers decide to reduce pollution even more. This is part of the rea-
son why the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has set the life of an
allowance equal to one year.
Finally, as previously mentioned, a problem with unconstrained market-
able allowances trading is that it can lead to hot spots of localized, high-
concentration pollution (known as concentrated pollution as opposed to
uniformly mixed pollution) occurring because the particular firm has bought
an extensive number of emissions permits.
Marketable Pollution Allowances and the Clean Air Act (CAA)

Amendments of 1990: The Acid Rain Program
Acid deposition occurs as a by-product of burning fossil fuels. Emissions of

sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) react with water droplets,
268 POLICY
oxygen, and various oxidants in the atmosphere, usually in cloud layers, to

form solutions of sulfuric and nitric acid. These reactions are hastened by
sunlight. Rainwater, snow, fog, and other forms of precipitation containing
those mild solutions of sulfuric and nitric acids then fall to earth as acid rain.
Interestingly, about half the acidity created through such atmospheric reac-
tions falls to the earths surface in the form of dry depositions, which are
then carried by the wind or washed into waterways by subsequent rainfalls.
While normal rainfall has a pH of 6, acidification of rain has lowered this pH
in many areas of the northeastern United States and southeastern Canada to
values ranging from 4.2 to 4.4, approaching the pH levels in cola soft drinks
(National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program website). A reduction in pH
values of the soil and water bodies that absorb acid rain results in damage or in
extreme cases sterility to the associated terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems. Be-
sides the northeastern United States and southeastern Canada, other primary
deposition areas are associated with intense burning of fossil fuels in northern
Europe and parts of East Asia. Terrestrial ecosystems particularly damaged by
acid rain occur at high altitudes, as in the Appalachian and Adirondack moun-
tains of the eastern United States, where acid rains and fogs frequently bathe
and envelop the forests, meadows, streams, and lakes of the area and have
made many of these waters uninhabitable to native fish and other aquatic life.
In the United States, electric utility power plants that burn fossil fuels gen-
erate about 75 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions. Many of these plants are
concentrated in the Midwest. Emissions of the other major source of acid rain,
nitrogen oxides, are somewhat more equally distributed between motor ve-
hicles and electric utilities. Acids can remain in the atmosphere for weeks at a
time and be transported by prevailing winds for hundreds of miles before they
are deposited. In 1984 the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment estimated
that in addition to the environmental damage caused by acid rain, acidic
aerosolssmall water droplets containing compounds of sulfur, nitrogen, and
chlorinemay be responsible for as many as 50,000 deaths in the United States
each year and pose a serious threat to people with respiratory illnesses.
When the U.S. Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990, the amend-
ments included an experiment with the use of markets in reducing the cost of
meeting sulfur dioxide emissions reductions. Title IV of the Clean Air Act
addresses the control of acid rain and sets the overall goal of reducing annual
SO2 emissions to one-half of 1980 levels by 2010, or 8.95 million tons per
year. These reductions were to be achieved through a two-phase process that
places increasingly tight restrictions on the emissions of coal and other fos-
silfuel-powered utilities. Information on the EPAs Acid Rain Program, some
of which is summarized below, can be found on the Internet at www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/arp/overview.html.
The first phase of the Acid Rain Program began in 1995 and affects 445
coal-burning electricity units located in twenty-one eastern and midwestern
states. Interestingly, preliminary data reported by the EPA indicate that 1995
sulfur dioxide emissions at these units were reduced by almost 40 percent
below their required level. The second phase, which began in 2000, extends
restrictions to many smaller, cleaner plants and imposes a further tightening
of the phase 1 standards on the larger and dirtier plants. The program affects
existing utility plants having generators with an output capacity of greater
than 25 megawatts as well as all newly built plants. The Clean Air Act re-
quires that by 2010 the scope of the Acid Rain Program be broadened to
include more than 1,000 U.S. electricity-generating facilities. The Clean Air
Act also addresses emissions of nitrogen oxides, and requires a total reduc-
tion of 2 million tons relative to 1980 levels by 2000. The EPA claims that a
significant portion of this reduction will be achieved by coal-fired utility
boilers that will be required to install new burner technologies.
Under the trading system devised by the EPA, affected utility plants are
allocated allowances based on their historic fuel consumption and emissions
rate. Each allowance permits a plant to emit one ton of S02 during or after a
specified year. Once a ton of sulfur dioxide is emitted in a particular year, the
allowance is retired and can no longer be used. These allowances may be
bought, sold, or banked. Any person may acquire allowances and participate
in the trading system. The EPA must be able to keep track of the ownership
of allowances in order to determine whether a plant has exceeded its allowed
emissions. The EPA does so through the Allowance Tracking System, which
monitors the transfer of ownership of allowances. As of 2003, firms that
emitted more than their allowances permitted were fined $2,900 per ton, a
figure that is indexed each year to inflation. Finally, regardless of the number
of allowances a utility holds, the plant may not emit at levels that would violate
federal or state limits set under Title I of the Clean Air Act to protect public
health. This is a cap-and-trade regulatory system because the Acid Rain Pro-
gram regulates overall emissions, and tradable allowances are quota shares.
An interesting phenomenon in allowance trading is the rise of groups
that purchase allowances and simply retire them as a market-oriented strat-
egy for cleaning the environment. For example, in the 2000 spot auction
(allowances purchased for use in 2000), the Acid Rain Retirement Fund
purchased 13 allowances, the Maryland Environmental Law Society purchased
10, and the Isaac Walton League, VA/Clean Air Conservancy purchased 5 al-
lowances. Other groups purchased smaller quantities. Environmental groups
have purchased and retired sulfur dioxide allowances each year since the
EPA auction has been conducted. One of the largest such purchases was by
the National Healthy Air License Exchange and the Glens Falls (NY) Middle
270 POLICY
School, which raised over $20,000 to purchase and retire nearly 300 tons of
sulfur dioxide.
Between 1998 and 2003, the average price of an allowance fluctuated be-
tween approximately $125 and $220. In 2003, 4,200 individual allowance trans-
fers representing roughly 16.5 million allowances (of past, current, and future
vintages) were recorded in the EPA Allowance Tracking System. Of the allow-
ances transferred, 8 million (49 percent) were transferred between economi-
cally unrelated parties. Most of the allowances exchanged between economically
unrelated parties were acquired by electricity-generating companies. It is inter-
esting to note that the price of allowances is substantially below the levels
anticipated when the program was established in 1990. In particular, some origi-
nally anticipated that allowance prices would be around $850, and the EPA
originally estimated that allowances would trade at around $750. These low
allowance prices have resulted in a substantial cost savings for the S02 reduc-
tion target. In his survey of the literature on the cost of complying with the Acid
Rain Program, Burtraw (1998) compares early and more recent studies to show
how implementation has affected cost estimates. Early studies estimated an-
nual compliance costs of between $2 billion to $5 billion (1995 dollars), while
more recent studies, which have taken into account the actual performance of
the Acid Rain Program, estimate annual compliance costs of approximately $1
billion (1995 dollars). Carlson et al. (1998) attribute annual cost savings of
approximately $780 million to allowance trading, which represents an esti-
mated 42 percent savings relative to command-and-control projections.
One concern regarding allowance trading is the potential for creating
localized hot spots. Swift (2000) has found that in fact the largest coal-
burning plants, with the largest sulfur dioxide emissions, reduced their emis-
sions by the largest percentage under the Acid Rain Program. These firms
are able to spread pollution abatement costs over a larger dollar value of
capital. Consequently, Swift argues that the data allay concerns about local-
ized hot spots under the Acid Rain Program. There have been some problems
with implementation of the Acid Rain Program. For example, McCormack
and Shaw (1996) report that the New York legislature tried to ban interstate
allowances trades on the grounds that an electricity generator in New York
might profit from selling allowances to generators in the midwestern United
States, and with the prevailing wind pattern, increased midwestern emis-
sions would result in increased acid rain deposition in New York.
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
A number of states have imposed an RPS on the electricity that is consumed at

the retail level. The electricity consumed at the retail level (by households,
commercial businesses, and organizations) is a generic commodity, but is gen-

erated from a mix of generation sources such as coal-fired power plants, large-
scale hydroelectric facilities, nuclear power plants, as well as various qualified
renewable sources (photovoltaic, wind, small-scale hydroelectric, biomass,
geothermal). An RPS works by setting a minimum percentage of generation
that must come from qualified renewable sources. In most applications of RPS
systems, this minimum percentage starts out relatively low and gradually in-
creases over time, steadily decreasing a states dependence on traditional en-
ergy sources while simultaneously building a renewable energy infrastructure.
As of November 2004, sixteen states have passed an RPS, and Californias,
which requires 20 percent of its retail electricity consumption be from renew-
able sources by 2017, is the most stringent.
Some states allow retail energy companies to meet their RPS obliga-
tions through the purchase of renewable energy credits (RECs). In these
systems, generators of qualified renewable energy receive an REC for each
megawatt of electricity generated from renewable energy sources. Retail
energy companies can either meet RPS requirements through their own
generation, or buy RECs from renewable energy generators. RECs can be
tracked through establishment of certificate-issuing entities that are respon-
sible for monitoring renewable energy generation. The tracking system will
typically be an electronic database that tracks trades and ownership. There
is an active market in RECs, also known as green tags and tradable renew-
able certificates (TRCs).
Emissions Trading
So far, we have focused on cap-and-trade systems. Lets now consider a trad-

able pollution credit system in which individual credits are created when a
polluter reduces emissions below the maximum level allowed by law. The
various EPA emission-trading programs have existed since the mid-1970s.
These are regional, state-controlled programs designed and operated in co-
operation with the EPA. Hahn (1989) estimates that cumulative cost savings
created by the various emissions-trading programs range from $500 million
to $12 billion. Target pollutants include volatile organic compounds, carbon
monoxide, sulfur dioxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxide. Emission reduc-
tion credits (ERCs) are earned whenever a polluter reduces emissions below
the level required by law. ERCs are usually earned from exceeding compli-
ance standards (usually resulting from either the installation of a new pro-
duction process or a plants closing down). An ERC gives the owner the right
to emit one ton per year of the stated pollutant while the ERC is valid. ERCs
can be transferred within a multiplant firm or by way of external trading.
272 POLICY
In highly impacted nonattainment areas (like Los Angeles), firms must ac-
quire more than one ERC for every unit of emissions (typically 1.2 ERCs
bought for every 1 ton of pollution) so that overall emissions are reduced.
ERCs can then be traded in a number of ways.
ERCs can be used to offset new facilities (and their emissions) locating in
nonattainment areas that have not met a specified ambient air quality stan-
dard. The CAA specified that no new emissions sources would be allowed to
locate in nonattainment areas after 1975. Concern that the prohibition would
stifle economic activity led the EPA to develop offset ERCs. An offset is a
type of ERC specifically designed for new factories or other new sources of
pollution to be built in areas that exceed emissions standards. Offsets can be
traded internally within a multiplant firm or via external trading.
Another way that ERCs are traded is in a process called netting. Netting
allows a firm that creates new sources of emissions in a plant to avoid the
stringent emissions limits that would normally apply by reducing emissions
from another source in the same plant. A firm using netting is allowed to
obtain the necessary ERCs only from its own sources (internal trading).
Yet another way that ERCs can be traded is by way of trades within a
given bubble. The bubble program is similar to the offsets program but ap-
plies to ERC trades involving existing factories rather than newly constructed
ones. The term bubble refers to placing an imaginary bubble over a given
plant, with all emissions exiting from a single outlet to the bubble. Thus,
bubbles allow a firm to sum its total plant emissions and adjust individual
sources of pollution within the plant so that the aggregate limit is not ex-
ceeded. This part of the program began in 1979. Bubble credit transfers have
not generated a lot of transactions; some say this is because of regulator
opposition, the nonuniform mixing nature of the pollutants, and thin regional
markets, among others.
Finally, ERCs (unlike allowances in the Acid Rain Program) can be banked
for future sale or use. States decide the specific rules and administer ERC
banking. Foster and Hahn (1995) find that banking acts to reduce the trans-
action costs of ERC trading, especially for small-scale trades.
Other Experiments with Marketable Allowances
Fox River oxygen trading: Under this Wisconsin program, pulp paper mills
and sewage treatment plants were required to purchase oxygen depletion
allowances. See ONeil et al. (1983).
Lead banking: In this pollution credit trading program, refiners were al-
lowed to bank and trade lead allowances to meet a short timeline phase-out
of leaded gasoline in a more cost-effective manner. Refiners that reduced
lead content below the standard requirement received credits that could be
banked and used in the future. Half of all refiners participated, 15 percent
of allowances were traded, and 35 percent of production rights were banked.
Hahn (1989) estimated $228 million in cost savings.
Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) trading: As discussed in chapter 8, the Montreal
Protocol was an international environmental agreement in which signatory
countries agreed to a 1998 CFC cap equal to 50 percent of 1986 levels. Devel-
oped countries such as the United States later agreed to a complete phase-out
of production. During the phase-out period, the U.S. EPA instituted a cap-and-
trade system for the phase-out of CFCs. It is estimated to have saved several
billion dollars in compliance costs. Similar production quotas were utilized in
Canada, the European Union, and Singapore (Stavins 2000).
Heavy-duty motor vehicle engine emissions trading system: Engine manu-
facturers that produce heavy-duty engines that emit less nitrogen oxide that is
required by law are granted credits that can be used to offset engines that fail to
meet the standard. These credits can be used by the firm that produced them, or
they can be traded to other firms. Credits can also be banked for future use.
Joint implementation of greenhouse gas controls: Countries that had rati-
fied the Framework Convention on Climate Change established a joint imple-
mentation program in the 1995 Berlin Conference of the Parties. The 1997
Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B countries (countries that have an agreed ceil-
ing on emissions) to meet their ceiling by way of emissions trading with
other Annex B countries, and through joint implementation programs. In the
pilot joint implementation program Annex B countries finance projects in
other countries that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and these emis-
sion reductions are then credited toward meeting the Annex B countrys ceil-
ing. The U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation has approved twenty-two
such projects through 1997, and the worldwide total through 1999 was ninety-
four (Stavins 2000). Most of these projects have funded the transition to less-
polluting energy production processes or have focused on land use in Latin
America and other lower-income regions.
Regional Clean Air Incentive Market: In October 1993 Californias South
Coast Air Quality Management District initiated a new cap-and-trade regula-
tory system for controlling emissions of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, called
the Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM), a prominent element
of which features the trading of pollution allowances on the Internet. Ander-
son (1997) predicted that this cap-and-trade system would reduce compli-
ance costs by 42 percent, the same percentage cost savings estimated for the
Acid Rain Program allowance market.
Transferable development rights: As Convery (1998) observes, jurisdic-
tions use transferable development rights in environmentally sensitive or
274 POLICY
unique areas where development should be limited or prohibited. Landowners

in these sending areas are given development units that can be exercised
only in a less sensitive receiving area such as within an urban boundary, and
developers in the receiving area wishing to exceed density restrictions can
purchase these rights. For example, Clallam County, Washington, has an ordi-
nance that transfers development rights from agricultural land to receiving ar-
eas in the Sequim Urban Growth Area. Likewise, Seattle residential properties
occupied primarily by low-income households with annual incomes at or be-
low 50 percent of median income, and structures designated as Seattle land-
marks by Seattles Landmarks Preservation Board, became sending sites
eligible to sell TDRs to office, hotel, and retail receiving sites.
Environmental Taxes
Recall from chapter 4 that environmental taxes, such as those charged to
polluters, are another form of incentive regulation in which something bad
(pollution) is taxed in order to provide an incentive for it to be reduced.
Pigouvian taxes are a particular form of pollution tax that is designed to
internalize external costs, but given the difficulties in precisely measuring
external costs and the vagaries of the political process, most pollution taxes
are not designed to internalize external costs perfectly. Pollution taxes can
take the form of a per-unit (excise) tax on inputs such as coal or outputs such
as electricity that generate pollution. When monitoring data permit, pollu-
tion taxes and charges can be directly assessed on pollution emissions them-
selves (these are sometimes called effluent taxes). A negative environmental
tax is a tax credit that subsidizes environmentally friendlier goods and ser-
vices. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provides a 1.5 cent per
kilowatt-hour credit for energy generated from wind or biomass sources, and
solar and geothermal energy projects can receive up to a 10 percent tax credit.
Jaffe and Stavins (1995) provide evidence that tax credits can be more effec-
tive than taxes in promoting environmentally friendly energy. As Barthold
(1994) points out, systems of taxation have for a long time had consequences
for environmental quality, though those consequences have oftentimes been
unintended. The oil crisis of 197374 led to some of the first tax policies
designed with the purpose of promoting energy conservation and use of al-
ternative energy. In 1978, for example, the U.S. Congress passed the gas-
guzzler tax, an excise tax that varies inversely with the EPAs fuel economy
rating of automobiles.
Environmental Taxes in the United States
The list below describes a number of environmental taxes used by various
states. This list is designed to be representative rather than comprehensive:
E-Waste Recycling Fee: The state of California imposes a fee that ranges
between $6 and $10 on the retail sale or lease of a new or refurbished
video display device that has a screen size of more than 4 inches mea-
sured diagonally. The tax is used to fund the recycling of these products,
which contain lead and other hazardous materials.
Hazardous Waste Tax: The state of Vermont charges a tax of 11 cents
per gallon of liquid or 1.4 cents per pound of solid for hazardous waste
destined to be recycled for a beneficial purpose, or a tax of 23.6 cents
per gallon of liquid or 3 cents per pound of solid for hazardous waste
destined for any form of management other than recycling. The tax
goes to an environmental contingency fund used to investigate and
mitigate the effects of hazardous waste released into the environment.
Minnesota also charges fees on hazardous waste. In 2004 it was $2.75
per gallon.
Oil Spill Tax: The state of Washington imposes a tax (currently 4 cents
per 42-gallon barrel of oil, with another cent per barrel that can be
charged, depending on the fund balance in the oil spill response ac-
count) on the transportation of crude oil or petroleum products, by ship
or barge, into navigable waters of the state and off-loaded at an in-state
terminal. This tax is used for oil spill prevention, response, and restora-
tion programs. Likewise, the state of Alaska imposes a 5 cent tax per
barrel of oil, of which 2 cents go to oil spill response and 3 cents go to
oil spill prevention.
Pesticide and Fertilizer Tax: The state of Iowa imposes a tax of one-
tenth of 1 percent on gross sales for pesticides at the retail level, and
one-fifth of 1 percent of gross sales on the manufacturers of pesticides.
It also imposes a tax of 75 cents per ton on nitrogen fertilizer. The tax is
used to fund groundwater protection.
Environmental Taxes Around the World
So far, we have focused on market-based regulatory systems in the United

States, but there is a wide variety of such systems in place around the world.
In the case of the European Union (EU), the use of environmental taxes and
charges is widespread and growing. These environmental taxes are imposed
at the national level, as there is no international taxing authority, which re-
sults in concerns about the international competitiveness of the country im-
posing the taxes on their domestic industries. In the EU, environmental taxes
and charges are imposed on products, such as pesticides, on services, such as
sanitary landfills, on air and water pollution, and on resource use. An eco-
nomic analysis of EU environmental taxes and charges found that, by and
276 POLICY
large, these were set at relatively low levels, and focused more on revenue
generation than on the incentive effects of the taxes or charges (European
Union 2001). This analysis indicated that while the price signals from the
EU environmental taxes were generally quite modest, there was a dispropor-
tionately larger behavioral effect, which the report attributed to the role of
the taxes in raising public awareness and creating moral concern about the
environment. Moreover, due to the generally modest level of taxation, and
the extensive number of exclusions, the impact of these taxes on economic
competitiveness was found to be small.
The OECD (1997) provides a comprehensive list of environmental taxes
in OECD countries (OECD members include the United States, Canada,
Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea, Turkey, Greece,
and many European countries). For example, most OECD countries that still
allow lead in gasoline also impose a differential environmental tax on lead
that favors the use of unleaded gasoline. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden impose an environmental tax on energy based on car-
bon emissions. Belgium, Denmark, France, Japan, Norway, Poland, and
Sweden all have developed environmental charges on energy based on sulfur
emissions. The Czech Republic, France, Poland, and Sweden impose a nitro-
gen oxide charge on energy. Eleven of the twenty-eight OECD countries
utilize water effluent charges and impose noise charges on aircraft. France
taxes water pollution and reinvests the revenues in pollution remediation,
and Polands stringent effluent fees include a penalty for emissions that ex-
ceed the regulatory standard. Belgium taxes disposable razors and cameras,
Sweden taxes the production of various chemicals and uses the proceeds to
fund monitoring and enforcement, and Iceland imposes a differential import
levy to promote smaller and more fuel-efficient automobiles. Mexico has
reduced taxes on new cars and increased them on older, dirtier cars in order
to limit air pollution, and Argentina and Colombia offer subsidies for indus-
trial pollution abatement investments, and tax rebates for those who adopt
cleaner technology. Chile has developed a tradable permit system for par-
ticulate matter from stationary sources in the Santiago area, and Singapore
has had a tradable permit system for ozone-depleting chemicals since 1991
(Stavins 2000).
Summary
Incentive regulation refers to economic instruments such as cap-and-

trade systems or environmental taxes that foster more environmentally
friendly behavior and reduce compliance costs. Incentive regulation fre-
quently operates indirectly by changing the incentives of firms, con-
sumers, and government in a way that promotes the environment and

public health.
Command-and-control regulation specifies how pollution is to be reduced
through the application of uniform standards for firms, most prominently
technology-based (technology-forcing) or performance-based standards.
Technology-based standards specify the methods and equipment that
firms must use in order to comply with environmental regulation.
Performance-based standards set uniform control targets for all regu-
lated firms, but unlike with technology-based standards, firms are given
some choice over how the target is actually met (Stavins 2000).
The original Clean Air Act of 1970 includes elements of command-and-
control regulation. The Clean Air Act required that costly scrubbers be
installed on coal-burning electricity-generating facilities, even though
many could have generated the same clean-up by shifting to less expen-
sive low-sulfur coal.
Marketable pollution allowances are one form of incentive regulation.
Marketable pollution allowances reduce compliance costs when pollut-
ers have different marginal abatement costs. Regulators give firms a
reduced level of emissions as an allowance or permit and then grant
firms the right to trade some or all of that allowance to other firms. The
cost savings result when firms with high abatement costs purchase al-
lowances from firms with low abatement costs, meaning that firms with
low abatement costs subcontract to do some of the clean-up for the
high-abatement-cost firms.
In order for markets for pollution allowances to function, regulators
must monitor and enforce the allowances so that firms cannot simply
exceed allowed emissions, which would eliminate the incentive to pur-
chase allowances.
Tradable pollution credits are created when a pollution source reduces
its emissions below some individual source-specific target. If pollution
regulation caps aggregate rather than individual emissions, then emis-
sion permits or allowances take the form of quota shares that are as-
signed to individual polluters. This latter program is sometimes called a
cap-and-trade system because it involves the establishment of an ag-
gregate rather than an individual cap on emissions, and tradable allow-
ances take the form of individual quota shares to the aggregate emis-
sions cap.
A prominent example of a cap-and-trade system is the EPAs Acid Rain
Program, in which sulfur dioxide allowances are traded on the Chicago
Board of Trade, and allowance prices are much lower than had origi-
nally been anticipated.
278 POLICY
One potential limiting factor for marketable allowances is the problem

of localized hot spots, which can occur when a firm buys so many
allowances that it does not have to clean up at all (other firms have
subcontracted for the clean-up). If the pollutant is not uniformly mix-
able in the atmosphere, then there could be substantial localized impact
from this outcome. As a result, regulators may limit marketable allow-
ance schemes to require all firms to clean up some minimum amount.
While these restrictions limit the cost-savings potential, they can pre-
vent localized hot spots from developing.
Another form of incentive regulation is pollution taxes, also known as
environmental excise taxes. A.C. Pigou and other economists have long
argued for environmental taxes as a way to cause firms to internalize
external costs and cause consumers to be confronted with prices that re-
flect the full marginal social cost of production. The incentive effect of
pollution taxes is that they create a new cost that profit-maximizing firms
then have an incentive to minimize. For example, pollution taxes make
environmentally friendly technology more attractive and thus promote
R&D and adoption of these technologies as a way to avoid the excise tax.
Environmental taxes can be charged on polluting inputs such as coal,
on goods and services such as electricity, or directly on pollution
emissions. Direct taxes on pollution emissions are sometimes called
effluent taxes or charges. Examples of U.S. environmental taxes in-
clude hazardous waste, oil, and pesticides. There are a large and
growing number of environmental taxes and charges that are being
used worldwide.
1. Go back to the tables and figures in the chapter for the illustration of the
cost savings from marketable allowances.
a. Redo the illustrative example of the cost savings from fully market-
able pollution allowances relative to command-and-control regula-
tion (case 2), assuming that emissions will be cut by 60 percent
rather than 50 percent. It may help to redraw Figure 10.2. Calculate
the cost savings from fully marketable allowances relative to tradi-
tional command-and-control regulation. Assume that a firm cannot
clean up beyond its historical baseline emissions level.
b. Independent of your work in part 1a above, redo the illustrative
example of the cost savings from constrained allowances trading
in the text (case 3) but now impose a constraint that no more than
15 tons of emissions can be bought or sold by a particular firm as

a means of reducing the creation of localized hot spots of pollu-
tion. Calculate the total clean-up cost relative to unconstrained
market trading and traditional command-and-control regulation.
What is the opportunity cost of imposing the 15-ton trading con-
straint to limit localized hot spots relative to unconstrained mar-
ket trading?
2. One of the criticisms of using indirect controls such as pollution taxes

to limit pollution is that firms will simply view the taxes as a part of the cost
of doing business and pass the cost along to their consumers while continu-
ing to pollute as before.
a. Explain the relationship between the size of a firms marginal abate-

ment costs and the pollution tax that is implied by the above state-
ment.
b. Describe the shape of the market demand curve implied by the
above statement. For what industries might this condition come
closest to being true?
c. Might the shape of the demand curve for the industries you described
above change over time if a pollution tax is imposed? If so, then why?
(Hint: consider the dynamic incentives for developing substitutes.)
3. Draw a diagram in which firms AH each have upward-sloping mar-
ginal abatement cost functions, as in Figure 10.3. Draw a uniform price for
allowances such that the total quantity of emissions reduced sums to one-
half of the industrys total emissions.
a. Indicate on your diagram how much pollution abatement each firm

will perform in equilibrium after complete market trading.
b. Explain why the equimarginal principle results in cost-minimizing
pollution abatement.
4. Download information on the volume of trade and allowance prices from

the EPAs Acid Rain Program web page (www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/
overview.html). How have allowance prices and the volume of trade changed
from the numbers given in the chapter? What are the factors that led to the
changes you have identified?
5. Access the Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 0424 by Joseph
Kruger and William Pizer, which provides a critical analysis and discussion of
the European Union Emissions Trading Directive (www.rff.org/rff/Documents/
RFF-DP-0424.pdf). Note that the full paper is a PDF file, which requires the
280 POLICY
free Adobe Acrobat program. (1) Summarize their arguments, and (2) relate
the EU Emissions Trading Directive to the workings of the allowance trading
system in the EPAs Acid Rain Program.
6. Access the European Union report, Study on the Economic and Envi-
ronmental Implications of the Use of Environmental Taxes and Charges in
the European Union and Its Member States (http://europa.eu.int/comm/en-
vironment/enveco/taxation/environmental_taxes.htm). Write a summary of
one or more environmental taxes being used in Europe, including the pur-
pose, the tax rate, and the effectiveness of the tax.
Internet Links
Acid Rain Program (www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/overview.html): Read

about the trading of sulfur dioxide allowances at this EPA site.
Clean Air Markets (www.epa.gov/airmarkets): Learn more about allow-

ances trading, the Acid Rain Program, and cap-and-trade systems.
Cost Savings, Market Performance, and Economic Benefits of the U.S.

Acid Rain Program (www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-9828-REV.pdf):
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper by Dallas Burtraw.
Environmental Policy Implementation in the Netherlands (www.rri.org/

envatlas/europe/netherlands/nl-inst.html): Read about the economic in-
struments used in the Netherlands to control pollution and improve the envi-
ronment. Produced by the Resource Renewal Institute.
Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments

(www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-0158.pdf): Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper 0158 by Robert Stavins reviews the use of economic-
incentive or market-based environmental policy instruments around the world.
Harnessing the Tax Code for Environmental Protection: A Survey of Ini-

tiatives (www.rprogress.org/newprograms/sustEcon/taxcode.shtml): An ac-
cessible and comprehensive study by J. Andrew Hoerner of the Center for a
Sustainable Economy that describes the rationale for environmental taxation
and identifies 462 environmentally motivated state-level tax provisions.
Interactive Marketable Pollution Allowances Simulation (ftp://

sorrel.humboldt.edu/pub/envecon/module4.xls): A simple and informa-
tive interactive simulation produced by textbook author Steven Hackett
that operates on an Excel platform. The user does not need to know any-
thing about Excel to use the simulation. Be sure to enable macros when
asked.
International Experiences with Economic Incentives for Protecting the

Environment (http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-
048701.pdf): 2004 EPA report.
Pollution Allowances Audio Clip (www.humboldt.edu/~envecon/audio/

3.ram): Audio clip provided by textbook author Steven Hackett on tradable
pollution allowances.
Study on the Economic and Environmental Implications of the Use of

Environmental Taxes and Charges in the European Union and Its Mem-
ber States (http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/taxation/
environmental_taxes.htm):
Ackerman, B., and W. Hassler. 1981. Clean Coal/Dirty Air. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Anderson, R. 1997. The U.S. Experience with Economic Incentives in Environmental
Pollution-Control Policy. Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute.
Barthold, T. 1994. Issues in the Design of Environmental Excise Taxes. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 8 (Winter): 13351.
Boyd, R., K. Krutilla, and W.K. Viscusi. 1995. Energy Taxation as a Policy Instru-
ment to Reduce CO2 Emissions: A Net Benefit Analysis. Journal of Environmen-
tal Economics and Management 29 (July): 124.
Bryner, G. 1993. Blue Skies, Green Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Burtraw, D. 1998. Cost Savings, Market Performance, and Economic Benefits of the
U.S. Acid Rain Program. Discussion Paper 9828-REV. Washington, DC: Re-
sources for the Future.
Carlson, C., D. Burtraw, M. Cropper, and K. Palmer. 1998. Sulfur Dioxide Control
by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade? Discussion Paper 9844.
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Center for Global Change. N.d. State Carbon Tax Model. College Park: University of
Maryland.
Convery, F. 1998. The Types and Roles of Market Mechanisms. In Using Market
Mechanisms in Environmental Regulation. New York: The Conference Board.
European Union. 2001. Study on the Economic and Environmental Implications of
the Use of Environmental Taxes and Charges in the European Union and Its Mem-
ber States (http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/taxation/
environmental_taxes.htm).
Foster, V., and R. Hahn. 1995. Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los
Angeles Smog Control. Journal of Law and Economics 38 (April): 1948.
282 POLICY
Jaffe, A, and R. Stavins, 1995. Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations:

The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 29: S43-S63.
Hahn, R. 1989. Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Pa-
tient Followed the Doctors Orders. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (Spring):
95114.
McCormack, C., and J. Shaw. 1996. Emissions Trading: Clearing the Air. PERC
Reports 14 (June): 1011.
Misiolek, W., and H. Elder. 1989. Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for Pollu-
tion Rights. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16: 15666.
National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program. http://www.oar.noaa.gov/organiza-
tion/napap.html.
ONeil, W., M. David, C. Moore, and E. Joeres. 1983. Transferable Discharge Per-
mits and Economic Efficiency: The Fox River. Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 10 (December): 34655.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1997. Evaluat-
ing Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy. Paris: OECD.
Roodman, D. 1996. Harnessing the Market for the Environment. In State of the
World 1996, ed. L. Brown. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.
Stavins, R. 2000. Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments.
Discussion Paper 0009. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Swift, B. 2000. Allowance Trading and Potential Hot Spots: Good News from the
Acid Rain Program. Environmental Reporter 31: 95459.
Tietenberg, T. 1980. Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary
Source Air Pollution. Land Economics 5 (November): 391416.
. 1985. Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy. Wash-
ington, DC: Resources for the Future.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1984. Acid Rain and Transported
Air Pollutants: Implications for Public Policy. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
11
Global Climate Change:
Science, Policy, and Economics
Introduction
The earths energy budget is the net result of a complex balance of energy
flows over time, and exerts a primary influence on global climate. Light from
the sun is absorbed by land, water, and vegetation on the surface of the earth,
where it is transformed into heat and is reradiated in the form of invisible
infrared radiation. Earths atmosphere contains molecules that absorb this
heat and reradiate the heat in all directions. These greenhouse gaseswhich
include carbon dioxide, various halocarbons, methane, nitrogen oxides,
nonmethane volatile organic compounds, ozone, sulfur hexafluoride, and
water vaporall have a molecular structure made up of more than two com-
ponent atoms that are able to vibrate with the absorption of heat. Eventually,
a vibrating molecule emits the radiation again, which is often reabsorbed by
yet another greenhouse gas molecule. The absorption-emission-absorption cycle
that occurs among greenhouse gases effectively holds heat in the atmosphere
near the earths surface, just as clear glass walls hold heat in a greenhouse,
thereby slowing the process of heat being lost into space. Without the green-
house effect, the mean surface temperature of the earth would be about 33
degrees Celsius lower than it is today, and most of the worlds oceans would
freeze over. As we can see, greenhouse gas molecules are responsible for the
fact that the earth enjoys temperatures suitable for life as we know it in our
complex biosphere.
Water vapor is the most abundant and dominant greenhouse gas in the
atmosphere, but most attention is given to carbon dioxide due to increasing
283
284 POLICY
Table 11.1
Global Warming Potential, Mean Atmospheric Lifetime, and Trend Growth

in Emissions of Selected Greenhouse Gases
100-year global Trend growth rate

warming Global mean in the 1990s
potential atmospheric (parts per trillion
Gas (relative to CO2) lifetime (years) per year)
Carbon Dioxide 1 5-200 1,500,000
Methane 23 8.4 7,000
Nitrous Oxide 296 120 800
Hydrofluorocarbon-134a 1,300 13.8 2
Perfluoromethane 5,700 50,000+ 1
Chlorofluorocarbon-12 10,600 100 4.4
Hydrofluorocarbon-23 12,000 260 0.55
Sulfur Hexafluoride 22,200 3,200 0.24
Source: IPCC (2001).
atmospheric concentrations originating from human (anthropogenic) sources.

The chemical properties of various greenhouse gas molecules result in dif-
fering capacities for absorbing heat in the atmosphere. The concept of global
warming potential (GWP) was developed to compare the ability of each green-
house gas to trap heat in the atmosphere relative to another gas, usually car-
bon dioxide. The definition of GWP for a particular greenhouse gas is the
ratio of heat trapped by one unit mass of the greenhouse gas to that of one
unit mass of carbon dioxide over a specified time period. There is an uncer-
tainty of approximately +/- 35 percent in the GWP values listed in Table
11.1. Greenhouse gases also differ in their atmospheric lifetimes, as shown
in Table 11.1. The case of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) is ironic because these
chlorine-free halocarbons were largely developed as alternatives to ozone-
depleting chlorinated fluorocarbons in refrigerant and other commercial and
industrial applications (see the discussion of the Montreal Protocol in chap-
ter 8 for details). Due to their roles as replacement gases under the Montreal
Protocol, global emissions of HFCs are rising.
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are a part of the larger, natu-
rally occurring global carbon cycle, which is illustrated in Figure 11.1. Note
that it is customary to keep track of emissions in terms of their carbon con-
tent rather than their total molecular mass, in order to facilitate comparisons
with other reservoirs and flows in the global carbon cycle in which the car-
bon may be in a variety of different chemical compounds. For example, the
carbon content of carbon dioxide is found by dividing the weight of carbon
dioxide by 3.67. It is also important to distinguish reservoirs (stocks) from
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 285
Figure 11.1 Simplified Global Carbon Cycle Circa 2000
Atmospheric carbon reservoir: +/760 Gt C

3.2 (+/0.1) Gt C added each year by human emissions
Anthropogenic Net land- Net ocean-

emissions of atmosphere atmosphere
carbon: flow: flow:
6.3 (+/0.4) 1.4 +/0.7 1.7 +/-0.5
Gt C/yr Gt C/yr Gt C/yr
Fossil fuels Terrestrial biosphere Oceanic

carbon reservoir: carbon reservoir: carbon reservoir:
+/ 5,000 10,000 Gt C +/ 2,500 Gt C 39,000 Gt C
Arrows represent carbon flows, while boxes represent carbon reservoirs. All numerical values are in
billions of metric tons (gigatons) of carbon (Gt C). Positive flow values indicate carbon transport to
the atmosphere, while negative flow values indicate carbon transport to the terrestrial biosphere and
the oceans. Actual values vary based on different estimates, and numerical values shown here only
serve as a simplified guide to the global carbon cycle. Note that more recent research by Sabine et
al. (2004) suggests that the net quantity of carbon that is drawn out of the atmosphere by the
terrestrial biosphere has been minimal until recent years, while the worlds oceans have accounted
for nearly all of the approximately 3.1 gigatons of human emissions removed from the atmosphere.
Sources: Pewclimate.org, IPCC (2001).
flows (also known as fluxes) in this cycle. A very large reservoir of carbon is
stored in the worlds oceans and seafloor sediments, with smaller quantities
stored in fossil fuels, the terrestrial biosphere, and the atmosphere. A very
large flow of carbon is exchanged in the worlds photosynthesis/respiration
processes, and between the atmosphere and the worlds oceans. Both of these
naturally occurring gas-exchange systems are in near-balance. Approximately
3.3 of the 6.3 billion metric tons (gigatons) of anthropogenic carbon fail to
be taken up by the terrestrial biosphere and oceans each year, and add to the
accumulated stock of carbon (and other greenhouse gases) in the atmosphere.
Dr. Robert Socolow, co-director of the Carbon Mitigation Initiative, has pro-
vided a useful mapping between carbon-equivalent emissions and increases
in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. In particular, every 2.1 gigatons
of carbon-equivalent emissions (net of what is taken up by the earths carbon
sinks) results in a 1 ppm (part per million) increase in atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations. Thus, the 3.3 gigatons of annual carbon-equivalent
286 POLICY
emissions that fail to be taken up by the earths carbon sinks results in an

annual average increase of about 1.57 ppm in the earths atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentration. It is this progressive rise in atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations, caused by anthropogenic emissions in excess of the earths
capacity for uptake and sequestration, that results in a climate forcinga
mechanism that alters the global energy balancethat is widely expected to
result in rising mean atmospheric temperatures and a complex of other changes
in global climate.
Anthropogenic climate change represents perhaps the most significant and
challenging global tragedy of the commons confronting the worlds policy-
makers. This chapter begins with a model that explains anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions as a function of a number of economic variables, followed
by a description of recent trends in global and U.S. emissions. Next, we turn
to a summary of scientific predictions regarding future anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions, and a review of the scientific evidence. We will then
consider the record of international action on the problem of preserving the
global climate commons. There have been a number of economic policy
studies that estimate costs and benefits associated with the control of green-
house gases, and after reviewing international action on global climate change,
we will examine several economic studies of greenhouse gas control. Key
elements of greenhouse gas control include the problem of industrialized
countries curbing their emissions of greenhouse gases and the problem of
developing countries leapfrogging from a less-industrialized status to so-
phisticated climate-friendly technologies. The chapter concludes with a dis-
cussion of climate-friendly technology transfer and the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which address the latter of these two prob-
lems.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Global Climate Change
Modeling Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Human activity has increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmos-

phere. There are several mathematical expressions that can be used to de-
scribe the primary factors driving anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions,
with emphasis on carbon dioxide. One of these is the IPAT identity:
Impact = Population Affluence Technology.
The IPAT identity relates a nation or other political units environmental

impact (e.g., carbon dioxide emissions) in a given time period to the math-
ematical product of population, affluence (which can be measured as gross

domestic product [GDP] per capita), and technology (which can be mea-
sured in emissions per unit of GDP). This relation can be expanded a bit
more to yield the Kaya identity (Kaya 1990):
Carbon Dioxide Emissions = Population (GDP/Population) (Energy/

GDP) (CO2 /Energy).
These equations are useful in understanding the complex factors influ-

encing changes in carbon dioxide emissions, though it is important to note
that the elements are not entirely independent of one another. The Kaya iden-
tity tells us that, all else equal, a country with a small population, or with low
per capita income (GDP/population) of energy, or with low energy intensity
(energy/GDP), or with low carbon intensity (CO2/energy), will have lower
carbon dioxide emissions. A useful property of a multiplicative identity such
as IPAT or Kaya is that the growth rate in energy-related emissions is equal
to the sum of the growth rates of each component. Thus, for the case of the
Kaya identity, we have:
%DCO2 = %DPopulation + %D(GDP/Population) + %D(Energy/GDP) +

%D(CO2/Energy).
Note that % refers to growth rate in percentage terms. According to

Watson, Zinyowera, and Moss (1996, hereinafter Watson et al.), worldwide
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have been growing at an average
annual rate of approximately 1.7 percent since the middle of the nineteenth
century. Using information from Nakicenovic et al. (1993) and Watson et al.,
this 1.7 percent rate of growth in annual emissions equals the sum of a 1
percent annual rate of growth in population, a 2 percent annual rate of growth
in per capita income, a 1 percent annual rate of decline in energy intensity,
and a 0.3 percent annual rate of decline in carbon intensity (sometimes termed
decarbonization). The declines in both energy and carbon intensity are due
to the fact that the intensities are mathematical quotients. So carbon intensity
can improve (i.e., in the context of global climate change, decline) if, for
example, a given quantity of electricity is generated from burning natural
gas instead of coal (decarbonization). Energy intensity will improve (i.e.,
decline) if, for example, a given level of GDP is generated from more en-
ergy-efficient capital equipment. Yet reducing the carbon intensity of energy
is not sufficient to assure a reduction in total carbon dioxide emissions. This
is because while carbon intensity may fall, population growth and per capita
GDP growth can swamp any improvement in carbon intensity. Projections
288 POLICY
for future carbon dioxide emissions usually assume continued decarboniza-

tion, though some experts believe that countries such as China, the United
States, and India may recarbonize by substituting abundant coal resources
for declining and more costly oil and gas resources.
Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Over hundreds of thousands of years of earths history gathered from ice-

core samples, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have naturally fluc-
tuated by 10 percent or more due to long-term orbital cycles that vary the
quantity of solar radiation reaching certain parts of the earth. Ruddiman (2005)
points out that these cycles in solar radiation in turn lead to the glacial and
interglacial cycle, and that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide
naturally peak just before the ice caps fully melt at 275 to 300 parts per
million. These carbon dioxide concentrations then naturally decline for per-
haps 15,000 years or so to an average of approximately 245 ppm. Ruddiman
argues that the earth should be in one of these long periods of declining
carbon dioxide concentrations. Instead, ice core data indicate that carbon
dioxide and methane concentrations have remained stable over the last 5,000
to 8,000 years, up to about 1780, a deviation from the natural trend that
Ruddiman hypothesizes is due to the advent of human agriculture. Key cul-
prits in this model are the clearing of forests and the irrigation and flooding
of land. If his hypothesis is true, then by the late 1700s the cumulative effects
of agriculture account for a 250 parts per billion (ppb) increase in methane, a
40 ppm increase in carbon dioxide, and an average warming of 0.8 degrees
Celsius. According to Ruddimans hypothesis, absent agriculture, average
temperatures would be steadily declining, and would have passed below the
glaciation threshold about 5,000 years ago. One interesting piece of support-
ing evidence is that during several historical periods of mass plagues that
reduced agricultural activity for several decades or more, carbon dioxide
concentrations actually declined by 5 or 10 ppm.
As of the mid-1700s, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide stood
at approximately 280 ppm. Starting in the late 1700sthe beginning of the
industrial revolution and the rapid rise in human populationatmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide began to increase, and as of 2005 had in-
creased to 380 ppm. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC 2001), the present carbon dioxide concentration in the atmo-
sphere has not been exceeded during the past 650,000 years, and likely not
during the past 20 million years. The current rate of increase is unprecedented
during at least the past 20,000 years. The IPCC (2001) also provides infor-
mation on emissions trends for other greenhouse gases. For example, they
report that the atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide has increased by

17 percent since 1750 and continues to increase. The present atmospheric
nitrous oxide concentration has not been exceeded during at least the past
thousand years. Moreover, the atmospheric concentration of methane has
increased by 151 percent since 1750, and continues to increase. The present
methane concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years.
About one-third of current nitrous oxide emissions and one-half of current
methane emissions are anthropogenic
Trend data over the last half-century from the Mauna Loa Observatory in
Hawaii indicate an acceleration in the rate of growth in the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. In particular, between 1990 and 1999, at-
mospheric carbon dioxide concentrations increased at an average annual rate
of 1.5 ppm. Carbon dioxide concentrations were only growing at a rate of 1.0
ppm a half-century ago, when observations were first made at Mauna Loa.
Estimates of greenhouse gas concentrations by the year 2100 depend on changes
in the energy-related emissions factors in the Kaya identity, as well as changes
in land use, rates of deforestation, and emissions of sulfate aerosols, among
other factors. Future change in these factors is difficult to predict. If the current
1.5-ppm growth rate were to continue for fifty years, for example, then by
2055 the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide would be a bit over 450
ppm, or approximately 1.6 times the preindustrial revolution concentration of
280 ppm. Moreover, if the current 1.5-ppm growth rate were to continue for
100 years, then by 2105 the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
would be 528 ppm. In fact, if action is not taken, annual increases in atmo-
spheric concentrations are likely to increase rather than stay the same.
The IPCC (1996) provides a business as usual (BAU) forecast for car-
bon dioxide concentrations. Under BAU, the worlds population is predicted
to reach 9 billion by 2050, global per capita income is predicted to be 3.3
times larger in 2050 than in 1990, and the energy intensity of economic ac-
tivity is likely to have improved by 2050 to 60 percent of its 1990 value.
Based on these projections, world energy consumption in 2050 would be
three times larger than in 1990. If the carbon intensity of world energy sup-
ply continues to fall at its BAU rate of about 0.2 percent per year, this sce-
nario would entail world carbon dioxide emissions from the energy sector
being 2.7 times bigger in 2050 than in 1990. Continuation of this BAU sce-
nario until 2050 would result in atmospheric concentrations of carbon diox-
ide reaching 550 ppm by 2050, and 715 ppm by 2100, or two and a half
times the pre-industrial level and still rising steeply.
According to the U.S. EPA (2004), total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in
2002 were 1.88 gigatons, measured in carbon equivalent GWP. Total U.S.
emissions have risen by 13 percent from 1990 to 2002. Emissions rose slightly
290 POLICY
from 2001 to 2002, increasing by 0.7 percent. Annual greenhouse gas emis-
sions by an average American are roughly equivalent to that of 18 Indians or
99 Bangladeshis. As the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,
carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion has accounted for a nearly con-
stant 80 percent of global warming potential (GWP) weighted emissions since
1990. Emissions from this source category grew by 17 percent from 1990 to
2002, and were responsible for most of the increase in national emissions
during this period. In 2001 Paul McCardle of the U.S. Energy Information
Administration reported that during the period between 1949 and 1999, over
99 percent of the variation in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions could be ex-
plained by energy consumption, and over 85 percent could be explained by
U.S. GDP. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administrations Inter-
national Energy Outlook 2004 (U.S. EIA 2004) reference case, world carbon
emissions are projected to rise to 7.55 gigatons by 2010 and 10.1 gigatons by
2025. Much of the projected increase in emissions is expected to occur in the
developing world, accompanying the increases in energy use projected for
the regions emerging economies. Developing countries account for 61 per-
cent of the projected increase in carbon dioxide emissions between 2001 and
2025.
Global Climate Change Predictions
It is more difficult and controversial to predict global climate change than it

is to predict future greenhouse gas emissions. Climate models are extremely
complex, and so as our understanding of the worlds climate improves, so
too will our ability to model and predict climate change caused by anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, in addition to relatively smooth
cause-and-effect relationships between greenhouse gas concentrations and
temperature, there is the potential for abrupt and dramatic changes. For ex-
ample, a report by Schwartz and Randall (2003), commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Defense, indicates that there is the potential for freshwater
runoff from melting glaciers to abruptly slow the North Atlantic Oceans
thermohaline conveyor (the Gulf Stream). This slowing could reduce aver-
age temperatures in Northern Europe by as much as six degrees Fahrenheit
over a ten-year period, and generate as much as a 30 percent decline in rain-
fall as well as significant declines in agricultural production. Similar disrup-
tions of thermohaline conveyors in other areas of the worlds oceans make
this a problem of potentially global concern. Schwartz and Randall note that
these disruptions could persist for as long as a century, as they did the last
time an ocean conveyor collapsed due to these effects 12,700 years ago, and
again 8,200 years ago.
Consider the evolution of IPCC greenhouse gas and climate predictions

during the 1990s. In 1990 the IPCC had estimated average increases in tem-
peratures at the earths surface ranging from 3 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit by
2050, with the most likely increase being nearly 5 degrees. The IPCC also
issued a mid-range estimate for global warming in the longer term (several
hundred years into the future) of 18 degrees Fahrenheit. In January 1996 the
IPCC lowered the projected rate of warming over the next century by about
30 percent compared to its 1990 assessment. This downward adjustment oc-
curred due to including more variables and interactive effects into the cli-
mate change model. For example, the new model included emissions of
traditional pollutants such as sulfates and carbonaceous aerosols, which cool
the atmosphere by reflecting incoming solar radiation and altering the re-
flective properties of clouds. These sulfates and aerosols may have masked
one-half of the heat-trapping impacts of increased concentrations of green-
house gases. The newer model also included increased carbon dioxide se-
questration by forests whose growth will be stimulated by a more carbon-rich
atmosphere. Another reason for the downward revision in the climate change
forecast was the decline in projected chlorofluorocarbon emissions due to
international control actions taken within the structure of the Montreal Pro-
tocol since 1990. The 1996 estimates for global warming, based on moderate
population growth and economic expansion, and a lack of international green-
house gas-control efforts, predicted a mean surface temperature rise of be-
tween 1 and 3.5 degrees Celsius by 2100.
Harris, Kattenberg, and Maskell (2000) provides climate change predic-
tions drawn from an improved understanding of the factors driving green-
house gas emissions and land use changes. This report describes scenarios
drawn from four very different storylines describing possible future de-
mographic, social, economic, technological, and environmental trends. While
these storylines predict widely different carbon dioxide concentrations in the
future, the midpoint of these predictions suggests atmospheric carbon diox-
ide concentrations of approximately 750 ppm by 2100, and a cumulative
transport of approximately 1,500 gigatons of carbon dioxide into the earths
atmosphere. The midpoint of these storyline predictions suggests an approxi-
mate doubling of annual atmospheric nitrous oxide and methane emissions
by 2100. Consequently, the globally averaged surface temperature is pro-
jected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius by 2100.
One direct implication of global warming and temperature rises in polar
areas is the potential for large-scale melting of ice caps, resulting in a rise in
sea levels (estimated in 1996 by the IPCC to be around 0.5 meter by 2100)
and widespread flooding in low-lying coastal areas. Hansen (2004) argues
that rising sea levels are the dominant issue in global warming, since a large
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share of the worlds population lives within a few meters of sea level, along
with trillions of dollars of infrastructure at risk. Levitus et al. (2000) reports
that the heat content of the worlds oceans has increased by about 10 watt-
years per square meter in the past fifty years, and that the rate of ocean heat
storage in the 1990s is consistent with Hansens estimate that the earth is
retaining between 0.5 and 1 watt per square meter. Hansen notes that the
amount of oceanic heat needed to melt enough ice to raise global sea levels
by approximately one meter is 12 watt-years. Given the current level of an-
nual climate forcing, that amount of oceanic heat could be accumulated in
twelve to twenty-four years. At the peak rate of ice melt during the time of
greatest warming in the Holocene interglacial period, a one-meter sea level
rise occurred in a twenty-year period.
If the predictions regarding global warming prove to be true, then the
damage from rising sea levels will disproportionately harm poorer countries
without the income to build dikes and other engineering works to counteract
rising seas, and may result in large-scale refugee displacements (hundreds of
millions or more people leaving Bangladesh, the Nile Delta, and coastal China,
among others). While current models predict a global average increase in
precipitation, this increase is not expected to be uniformly distributed. In
particular, higher latitudes are expected to experience an increase in precipi-
tation because of poleward transport of atmospheric moisture generated from
increased evaporation in lower latitudes. This increased spring evaporation
will tend to dry out many soils in lower latitudes, resulting in less moisture
being available for evaporation and rainfall during the summer, and leading
to sharper summer droughts (Karl, Nicholls, and Gregory 1997, hereinafter
Karl et al.). More generally, the pace of the greenhouse effect is predicted to
proceed more rapidly than the natural ability of many plant and animal spe-
cies to adjust, hastening the rate of extinctions.
Karl et al. (1997) observe that small increases in average daily tempera-
tures cause a disproportionate percentage increase in the frequency of ex-
tremely hot days and heat waves. Cold spells will still occur but will be less
likely. Using the Chicago area as an example, Karl et al. point out that with
just a three degree C increase in the average July temperature, the probabil-
ity that the heat index (a measure that includes humidity and measures over-
all discomfort) will exceed 49 degrees C (120 degrees F) sometime during
the month increases from one in 20 to one in four (p. 80). An interesting
effect of global warming appears to be that warming affects daily minimum
temperatures far more than daily maximums, thus lengthening the growing
season in many temperate areas around the world. Dai, Del Genio, and Fung
(1997) point out that this increase in daily minimum temperatures coincides
with (and thus might be explained by) a global increase in thick, precipitat-
ing clouds, as might be expected from the greenhouse effect, and these clouds
tend to reduce nighttime cooling. Moreover, while earlier analysis of global
warming suggested an increase in the frequency and intensity of tropical
cyclones and hurricanes, more recent work suggests that there will not nec-
essarily be a significant global increase in tropical storm activity.
Hayhoe et al. (2004) provides climate change predictions for California
using two different climate models (the Parallel Climate Model and the
Hadley Center Climate Model) and several different future emissions sce-
narios drawn from IPCC (2000). These scenarios include a low atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide concentration of 550 ppm by 2100 (scenario B1),
and a high atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration of 970 ppm by
2100 (scenario A1fi). Under the low carbon scenario, the two models
predict average annual statewide temperatures in California will rise by
2.33.3 degrees Celsius, the sea level will rise by 1927 centimeters, and
April 1 snowpack water equivalent will decline by 2972 percent. Under
the high carbon scenario, the two models predict average annual state-
wide temperatures will rise by 3.85.8 degrees Celsius, the sea level will
rise by 2941 centimeters, and April 1 snowpack water equivalent will de-
cline by 7389 percent. Earlier runoff may increase the potential for early-
season flooding, and when combined with increased evaporation, may lead
to a decline in late-season water availability.
The Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Research in the United King-
dom produced a number of predictions regarding global climate change and its
impacts in 1999. A summary of their predictions based on unmitigated anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gas emissions is provided below. The Hadley Center pre-
dicts that with unmitigated emissions, global average temperature will increase
by 3 C and mean sea level will rise by 40 centimeters by the 2080s com-
pared to the present (Hadley Center 1999). Land areas will warm twice as
fast as that of the oceans, and winter high-latitude temperatures will warm
more quickly than the global average, as will areas of northern South America,
India, and southern Africa. The 40-centimeter rise in mean sea level fore-
casted by the 2080s is estimated to increase the annual number of people
flooded from 13 million to 94 million. Sixty percent of this increase will
occur in southern Asia (along coasts from Pakistan, through India, Sri Lanka,
and Bangladesh to Burma), and 20 percent will occur in Southeast Asia (from
Thailand to Vietnam, including Indonesia and the Philippines). Large changes
in precipitation, both positive and negative, are anticipated in the tropics.
With unmitigated emissions, the Hadley Center predicts a substantial die-
back of tropical forests and tropical grasslands by the 2080s, especially in
northern South America and central southern Africa. Considerable growth of
forests is predicted to occur in North America, northern Asia, and China. The
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Hadley Center predicts that the absorption of carbon dioxide by vegetation

will increase during the twenty-first century, but this sink is lost in the 2070s,
with unmitigated emissions due to a dieback in tropical vegetation.
With unmitigated emissions, the Hadley Center model predicts that by the
2080s there will be large changes in the availability of water from rivers.
Substantial decreases are predicted for Australia, India, southern Africa, most
of South America and Europe, and the Middle East. Increases are seen across
North America, Asia (particularly central Asia), and central eastern Africa.
Climate change and carbon dioxide increases due to unmitigated emissions
are forecasted by the Hadley Center to increase grain harvests at high and
mid-latitudes, such as North America, China, Argentina, and much of Eu-
rope, by the 2080s. At the same time, grain harvests in Africa, the Middle
East, and, particularly, India are expected to decrease. In terms of human
health impacts, the Hadley Center forecasts that an estimated 290 million
additional people worldwide will be at risk of falciparum malaria (clinically
more dangerous than the more widespread vivax malaria) due to climate
change from unmitigated emissions by the 2080s. The greatest increases in
risk are projected for China and central Asia. Epstein (2000) reports that
predicted increases in temperature will broaden the range of mosquitoes car-
rying not only malaria, but also dengue fever, yellow fever, and several kinds
of encephalitis. Predicted increases in flooding events will not only create
ideal mosquito habitat, but will also increase the spread of cholera and other
water-borne diseases. The Hadley Center predicts that human-induced warm-
ing will reduce the risk of mortality in many large temperate-zone cities, as
the estimated reduction in winter-related mortality exceeds the increase in
heat-related summer mortality.
In 2000 the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP 2000) is-
sued a national assessment of predicted climate change impacts on the United
States, key elements of which are summarized below. The national assess-
ment predicts that the warming in the twenty-first century will be signifi-
cantly larger than in the twentieth century. Scenarios examined in the
assessment, which assume no major interventions to reduce continued growth
of world greenhouse gas emissions, indicate that temperatures in the United
States will rise by about 510F (36C) on average during the twenty-first
century, which is more than the projected global increase. This rise is very
likely to be associated with more extreme precipitation and faster evapora-
tion of water, leading to greater frequency of both very wet and very dry
conditions. The assessment reports that natural ecosystems (as opposed to
agricultural lands or timber plantations) are especially vulnerable to the harm-
ful effects of climate change since there is often little that can be done to help
them adapt to the projected speed and amount of change. Some ecosystems
that are already constrained by climate, such as alpine meadows in the Rocky
Mountains, are likely to face extreme stress, and may disappear entirely. It is
likely that other more widespread ecosystems will also be vulnerable to cli-
mate change. One of the climate scenarios used in the assessment suggests
the potential for the forests of the Southeast to break up into a mosaic of
forests, savannas, and grasslands. Several of the climate scenarios suggest
possible changes in the species composition of the Northeast forests, includ-
ing the loss of sugar maples. Major alterations to natural ecosystems due to
climate change could possibly have negative consequences for our economy,
which depends in part on the sustained bounty of our nations lands, waters,
and native plant and animal communities.
The USGCRP assessment also includes an examination of the potential
impacts of climate change on different regions of the United States. For
example, rising sea levels will very likely cause further loss of coastal wet-
lands (ecosystems that provide vital nurseries and habitats for many fish
species) and put coastal communities at greater risk of storm surges, espe-
cially in the southeastern region of the United States. Reductions in snow-
pack will very likely alter the timing and amount of water supplies,
potentially exacerbating water shortages and conflicts, particularly through-
out the western United States. The two models used in the assessment fore-
cast annual average temperature increases ranging from 3 to over 4 degrees
Fahrenheit by the 2030s and 811F (4.56C) by the 2090s. The two mod-
els project increased rainfall during winter, especially over California, where
runoff is projected to double by the 2090s. In these climate scenarios, some
areas of the Rocky Mountains are projected to get drier. Both models project
more extreme wet and dry years. The melting of glaciers in the high-elevation
West and in Alaska represents the loss or diminishment of unique national
treasures of the American landscape. Large increases in the heat index (which
combines temperature and humidity) and increases in the frequency of heat
waves are very likely. The assessment argues that these changes will, at
minimum, increase discomfort, particularly in cities. It is very probable
that continued thawing of permafrost and melting of sea ice in Alaska will
further damage forests, buildings, roads, and coastlines, and harm subsis-
tence livelihoods. In various parts of the nation, cold-weather recreation
such as skiing will very likely be reduced, and air conditioning usage will
very likely increase.
The USGCRP assessment also predicts some positive impacts from glo-
bal climate change in the twenty-first century. For example, crop and forest
productivity is likely to increase in some areas for the next few decades due
to increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and an extended growing sea-
son. The assessment states that some U.S. food exports could increase, de-
296 POLICY
pending on impacts in other food-growing regions around the world, and

that a rise in crop production in fertile areas could cause prices to fall, ben-
efiting consumers. Other benefits that are possible include extended seasons
for construction and warm-weather recreation, reduced heating requirements,
and reduced cold-weather mortality.
Finally, the USGCRP assessment points out that there are also very likely
to be unanticipated impacts of climate change during the next century. Such
surprises may stem from unforeseen changes in the physical climate system,
such as major alterations in ocean circulation, cloud formation, or storms,
and unpredicted biological consequences of these physical climate changes,
such as massive dislocations of species or pest outbreaks. In addition, unex-
pected social or economic change, including major shifts in wealth, technol-
ogy, or political priorities, could affect our ability to respond to climate change.
Policymakers are confronted with the challenge of devising greenhouse gas
policy in the context of uncertainty. Thus, we are conducting a natural ex-
periment on the planet, the outcome of which may range from moderate to
catastrophic, and which will last well beyond the human time scale of life-
times and generations.
The Evidence Regarding Global Climate Change
There is overwhelming consensus in the peer-reviewed scientific literature that

anthropogenic emissions are responsible for at least some of the observed warm-
ing trend on earth over the past fifty years. In particular, Oreskes (2004) re-
viewed the 928 peer-reviewed scientific articles on climate change that have
been published in scientific journals between 1993 and 2003. Oreskes found
that 75 percent of these articles endorsed anthropogenic climate change, while
25 percent addressed methodological issues and did not take a position on
anthropogenic climate change. Most importantly, not a single peer-reviewed
scientific article disputed anthropogenic climate change. As Oreskes notes,
[p]olicy-makers and the media, particularly in the United States, frequently
assert that climate science is highly uncertain. . . . This is not the case
(p. 1686). To illustrate Oreskess point, in June 2005, about six months after her
paper was published in Science, the Government Accountability Project and the
New York Times reported that Philip Cooney, the chief of staff of President Bushs
White House Council on Environmental Quality, modified a number of govern-
ment scientific reports to increase the emphasis on uncertainty regarding cli-
mate change. According to the New York Times (Revkin 2005), before being
appointed to the Council, Mr. Cooney, a lawyer rather than a scientist, worked
as a lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute, which, like the Bush admin-
istration, opposes mandatory curbs on greenhouse gas emissions.
Hansen (2004) notes that while there are both natural and anthropogenic
climate forcings affecting the earths energy balance, anthropogenic climate
forcings now dominate natural forcings. These climate forcings are mea-
sured in watts per square meter. Greenhouse gases and black carbon aerosols
(small particles of dark soot that absorb heat from sunlight) contribute to
radiative climate forcings, while reflective aerosols (e.g., sulfur dioxide from
burning coal, aerosols from volcanic eruptions), declines in solar irradiance,
and increases in the albedo effect from clouds reduce radiative climate
forcings. While events such as volcanic eruptions result in significant
interannual variation in climate forcings, and there is some question about
the role of changes in atmospheric water vapor and cloud cover, the evidence
suggests a discernable rising trend. According to the IPCC (2001), climate
forcings due to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases from 1750 to
2000 are estimated to total 2.43 watts per square meter. Of this total, carbon
dioxide accounts for 1.46 watts per square meter, methane accounts for 0.48
watts per square meter, various halocarbons account for 0.34 watts per square
meter, and nitrous oxide accounts for 0.15 watts per square meter. Hansen
(2004) argues that if recent greenhouse gas growth rates continued, the added
climate forcing in the next fifty years would be approximately 2 watts per
square meter, which is at the low end of the range of future scenarios given in
IPCC (2001).
The IPCC reported in January 1996 that over the last 100 years, global
mean surface temperatures have increased by between 0.3 and 0.6 degrees
Celsius, and mean sea level has risen by between 1 and 2.5 millimeters per
year. The IPCC concluded rather cautiously that it is unlikely that this rise in
global temperatures is entirely due to natural causes, noting, the balance of
evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate. In April
2000 the IPCC issued a stronger draft message in which it stated that that
there has been a discernible human influence on global climate. The Na-
tional Research Council (2000) reports that accelerated warming in the late
1990s has caused the IPCC (1996) to increase its warming estimate during
the twentieth century to between 0.4 and 0.8 degrees Celsius. The World
Bank (1999) reports that the twentieth century was the warmest in 600 years,
and fourteen of the warmest years since 1860 have occurred in the 1980s and
1990s. The World Bank also reports that winter seawater temperatures in
latitudes above 45 degrees north have risen by 0.5 degrees Celsius since the
1980s, and that in 1999 the International Ice Patrol did not report a single
iceberg south of 48 degrees north latitude. In its assessment of climate change
impacts on the United States, the USGCRP (2000) reports that the average
annual U.S. temperature has risen by almost one degree Fahrenheit (0.6C)
during the twentieth century, and precipitation has increased nationally by 5
298 POLICY
to 10 percent (mostly due to increases in heavy downpours). The assessment

reports that these trends have been most apparent over the past few decades.
The Hadley Center (1999) reports that the atmosphere at a height of 35 km
above sea level has clearly warmed over the past thirty-five years, although
not always in concert with the surface, and that the extent of Arctic Sea ice
has decreased over the last three decades. As pointed out earlier, analysis of
the observed rise in global temperatures indicates that the increase is due in
large part to increases in daily minimum temperatures. For example, Easterling
et al. (1997) find that while global daily maximum temperatures have been
rising at a rate of 0.88 degrees Celsius each century, daily minimum tem-
peratures have been rising at the rate of 1.86 degrees Celsius each century.
Increases in cloudiness are believed to have caused much of this effect.
Improved methods of reconstructing and then explaining the earths cli-
matic history are essential to understanding the extent to which the current
warming trend is anthropogenic. Methods of reconstructing the earths cli-
matic history include tree ring analysis, ice cores, corals and sediments, and
borehole temperatures. As Overpeck (2000) describes in his review of the re-
cent scientific literature on the worlds climatic history, natural factors such as
variation in solar output or volcanic eruptions that episodically reduce solar
heating at the surface account for many features of the pre-industrial portion of
the temperature record. Yet such natural mechanisms can explain only a frac-
tion of the total warming that took place in the twentieth century, leaving us
with the likelihood that human-induced warming is under way.
One source of controversy over the observed record of global climate change
has been the disparity between rising surface temperature readings and steady
satellite temperature readings for the lower and mid-troposphere (that portion
of the atmosphere that extends from the surface to about 8 kilometers above
the surface). Climate change models predict that the lower and mid-troposphere
should warm at least as much as the surface, and therefore the satellite data
appear to invalidate the models. The satellite data have been available only
since 1979, which makes it difficult to infer any meaningful trend in the data.
Nevertheless some have used this disparity to cast doubt on the reliability of
the surface temperature record and the claims made by the IPCC that there is a
discernable human influence on global climate. A special panel was assembled
by the National Research Council to assess this disparity. The National Re-
search Council (2000) reported that the warming trend in global mean surface
temperatures is undoubtedly real and is substantially greater than the aver-
age rate of warming during the twentieth century. They go on to report that the
disparity (which was reduced somewhat by corrections in the microwave sound-
ing units used to gauge tropospheric temperature) in no way invalidates the
conclusion that surface temperatures are rising. The panel stated that the lack
of warming in the troposphere in the twenty-year period might have been due
to natural causes such as volcanic eruptions, and human causes such as ozone
depletion in the stratosphere.
Global climate change skeptics have also pointed to the fact that observed
surface temperature warming has so far been very modest, less than some
have predicted, thus arguing that dire forecasts of future warming are over-
stated. Climate modelers have responded that a good deal of the warming
should be occurring in the worlds oceans, though the historical temperature
record was thought to be too spotty to get a definitive answer. Thus, the
United Nations sponsored the Global Oceanographic Data Archeology and
Rescue Project, which over the last seven years has resulted in an additional
two million ocean temperature profiles being added to the historical record.
Levitus et al. (2000) reported that these data show a marked warming in the
worlds oceans over the last half of the twentieth century. Kerr (2000) re-
ported that the increased heat content found by Levitus et al. is roughly what
climate models have predicted.
There is a variety of other regional sources of evidence for global climate
change. Myneni et al. (1997) report that since the early 1980s the active
growing season has increased by approximately twelve days in the Northern
Hemisphere between 45 and 70 degrees latitude. Much of the increase is
concentrated in the spring and appears to be associated with an earlier disap-
pearance of snow cover. The USGCRP (2000) reported that during the twen-
tieth century, temperatures in the western United States have risen by 2 to 5
degrees Fahrenheit (13C). The region has generally had increases in pre-
cipitation, with increases in some areas greater than 50 percent. However, a
few areas, such as Arizona, have become drier and experienced more droughts.
The length of the snow season decreased by sixteen days from 1951 to 1996
in California and Nevada, and extreme precipitation events have increased.
Epstein (2000) reports that the elevation at which temperatures are always
below freezing has ascended almost 500 feet in the tropics, and mosquitoes
carrying malaria and dengue fever now occur at higher elevations than be-
fore. For example, nineteenth-century European colonists in Africa avoided
malaria by settling in cooler mountain areas, but many of these havens are
now compromised. Epstein observes that insects and the diseases they carry
have been found at higher elevations in Central and South America, east and
central Africa, and Asia.
International Action on Global Climate Change
The political economy of global climate change exemplifies a global envi-

ronmental policy dilemma:
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The steps required to make a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas

emissions imply significant near-term transition costs that are concen-
trated on fossil fuelrelated industries and their consumers.
The estimated benefits of substantially reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions are diffuse across the globe, uncertain or unknown in terms of
probability and magnitude, and primarily fall far in the future.
Moreover, global warming has the characteristic of irreversibility from
the perspective of the next few human generations; Maier-Reimer and
Hasselman (1987) estimate that it will take approximately 1,000 years to
remove 85 percent of the excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
With transition costs concentrated and in the present, and with benefits
diffuse, uncertain, and cast in the future, the political economy of green-
house gas control is Olsonian in the sense that this term is used in
chapter 8. Thus, for example, current politicians may find it to be po-
litical suicide to deviate from a cheap energy policy and impose car-
bon taxes to limit emissions. Therefore coordinated international poli-
cies to slow or reverse global climate change will tend to be difficult to
achieve and unstable.
In order for global-warming policy to be effective, there must be inter-
national coordination and cooperation across countries that are highly
diverse in income, extent of industrialization, culture, population growth
rates and other demographic characteristics, educational attainment, and
extent of democratic empowerment.
The transnational characteristic of global climate change implies a con-
cern about free-riding behavior by countries choosing to avoid costly
greenhouse gas control efforts, which in turn creates a competitive ad-
vantage in terms of international trade.
The IPCC, which was formed in 1988, issued its First Assessment Report
in 1990 in which the organization highlighted the importance of forming an
international agreement on climate change. The Second World Climate Con-
ference, also held in 1990, linked many who were advocating for interna-
tional negotiations. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly opened
negotiations on a framework convention on climate change in 1990, and cre-
ated the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to conduct these nego-
tiations. Thus, as early as 1990 it was recognized that the worlds climate is
a global common-pool resource (CPR), and that international action is nec-
essary in order to avoid a potentially catastrophic tragedy of the commons.
As with managing the worlds marine fishery CPRs, lack of international
coordination and cooperation will likely result in many countries failing to
take adequate measures, thus free riding on the control efforts undertaken by
other countries. The question of what level of greenhouse gas control is in

the best interests of a particular country is very difficult to answer for a vari-
ety of reasons. Regional effects are known with much less certainty than
global effects, yet in all likelihood, some regions and countries will be much
more impacted than others. Moreover, northerly countries such as Canada,
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia may actually benefit from global warm-
ing. In addition, given the high degree of asymmetry between high- and low-
income countries, diversity also exists in the extent to which countries can
engineer around negative impacts of global warming. Countries also differ
in terms of the educational attainment and political empowerment of their
citizens. Thus, from an international relations perspective, countries are di-
verse and are unlikely to have national interests that are mutually consistent.
Nevertheless, most governments see a benefit in at least some control of
greenhouse gas emissions as a type of insurance against the risk of negative
future impacts.
While the world contends with the challenging political economy of cli-
mate change policy, human emissions continue. In the past, most public dis-
cussion about climate change was focused on how to prevent anthropogenic
changes from occurring, and as we will see below, international action has
focused on reducing future greenhouse gas emissions. But even if we were
to sharply reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases today, the stock of at-
mospheric greenhouse gases that has accumulated from anthropogenic emis-
sions will result in further warming and rising sea levels for decades, even
centuries to come. Consequently what is required is a two-tracked climate
change policy strategy of (i) preparation for the impacts of climate change
that are likely to come about due to past greenhouse gas emissions, and (ii)
stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. As the IPCC
(2001) notes, populations that inhabit small islands and/or low-lying coastal
areas are at particular risk of severe social and economic effects from sea-
level rise and storm surges. The impacts of climate change will fall dispro-
portionately upon developing countries and upon the poor persons within all
countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to
adequate food, clean water, and other resources. Consequently, the first track
will likely require an international fund to address the needs of climate
change refugees displaced by the impacts of climate change. The IPCC
(2001) estimates that the second trackstabilization of atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations at 450 to 650 ppmwould require global anthropo-
genic carbon dioxide emissions to drop below 1990 levels within a few de-
cades to about a century, and continue to decrease steadily thereafter.
Eventually, carbon dioxide emissions would need to decline to a very small
fraction of current emissions.
302 POLICY
The Earth Summit
The idea of sustainable economic development was made prominent follow-

ing the publication in 1987 of the World Commission on Economic Develop-
ment (Brundtland Commission) report Our Common Future. Concerns for
integrating biodiversity and climate change with sustainable development
strategies led to representatives of national governments meeting in May and
June of 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED), frequently referred to as the Earth Summit. The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee had adopted by consensus in May
of 1992 in New York, was opened for signature during the Rio de Janeiro
meetings of the Earth Summit. A total of 181governments and the European
Community are parties to the Convention. To become a party, a country must
ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the Convention. Parties meet regularly at
the annual Conference of the Parties to review the implementation of the
Convention and continue talks on how best to tackle climate change. The
Convention set an ultimate objective of stabilizing atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases at safe levels. Such levels, which the Convention
does not quantify, are to be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food produc-
tion is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner.
The Convention divides countries into Annex I Parties and unlisted non
Annex I countries. Annex I Parties are industrialized countries, made up of
wealthy Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries and economies in transition (EITs) such as the Russian Federation
and various central and eastern European countries that have historically
contributed the most to climate change. The per capita emissions from these
countries are higher than those of most developing countries, and they have
greater financial and institutional capacity to address the problem. The prin-
ciples of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities enshrined
in the Convention therefore require these parties to take the lead in modify-
ing longer-term trends in emissions. To this end, Annex I Parties committed
themselves to adopting national policies and measures with the nonlegally
binding aim of returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by
the year 2000. The OECD members of Annex I are also listed in Annex II of
the UNFCCC. Annex II countries have a special obligation to provide new
and additional financial resources to developing countries to help them tackle
climate change, as well as to facilitate the transfer of climate-friendly tech-
nologies to both developing countries and EITs. A Global Environment Fa-
cility (GEF) was set up to coordinate the transfer of support from Annex II
Parties to the nonAnnex I developing countries and EITs in Annex I. The
UNFCCC entered into force in 1994 after having been ratified by fifty coun-
tries. The UNFCCC also established a Conference of Parties, to which signa-
tory countries agreed to report their current emissions levels and provide
plans for reducing them. The Conference of Parties holds annual meetings.
The Kyoto Protocol
The implementation arm of the UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol, which was
developed in December 1997 at the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3)
in Kyoto, Japan. In order to enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol had to be
ratified by at least fifty-five parties to the Convention, including Annex I
Parties accounting for 55 percent of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions
from this group as a whole in 1990. Since the United States refused to ratify
the Protocol, and since the United States accounts for a large percentage of
total Annex I emissions (approximately 36 percent of emissions from Annex
I Parties), the problem had been that the 55 percent rule could not be satis-
fied unless Russia ratified the Protocol. When Russia ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol at the end of 2004, that requirement was satisfied, and the Protocol
entered into force on February 16, 2005.
From a political economy standpoint, Russias ratification is believed to
have been a condition imposed by key European countries in return for their
support for Russia being admitted to the World Trade Organization. As with
the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Kyoto
Protocol is a two-world approach whereby rich industrialized countries
are required to cut emissions, while lower-income countries can continue
business as usual. Proponents view this as politically essential to allowing
large industrializing countries such as India and China to catch up economi-
cally to richer industrialized countries before having to stabilize or cut emis-
sions. Opponents, particularly in the United States, see this as putting industry
in the richer regulated countries at a competitive disadvantage, and leading
to a shifting of industrial productionand emissionsto unregulated lower-
income countries.
The terms of the Kyoto Protocol call for Annex I countries (including
most of the worlds industrialized countries) to reduce their overall green-
house gas emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels over the 2008 to
2012 period. The Kyoto Protocol commits Annex I Parties to individual, le-
gally binding quantified emissions targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions. The individual targets for Annex I Parties are listed in the
Kyoto Protocols Annex B, and range from an 8 percent cut for the European
304 POLICY
Union (EU) and several other countries, to a 10 percent increase for Iceland.
Under the terms of the Protocol, the EU may redistribute its target among its
fifteen member states. It has already reached agreement on such a scheme,
known as a bubble, whereby the larger and richer EU countries must cut
emissions, while Spain, Portugal, and Greece could actually increase emis-
sions. Starting in 2005 the parties to the Protocol began discussions about
achieving greater reduction in a second five-year period after 2012 aimed at
bringing emissions down to levels that will not affect the climate, considered
to be at least a 60 percent global cut. Early discussions have focused on
creative ways of slowing the rate of emissions growth in China, India, and
other rapidly developing large countries around the world.
Despite its significant diplomatic importance, the first phase of the Kyoto
Protocol will have only a minimal impact on improving the climate. The re-
ductions called for under the Protocol by 2012 represent a modest first step for
the nations of the world, but meeting these target reductions would not result in
a reversal of anthropogenic climate change. Moreover, relatively few of the
Annex I countries are likely to meet their emissions reduction obligations un-
der the Kyoto Protocol. While industrialized countries cut their overall emis-
sions by about 3 percent from 1990 to 2000, this was largely because of a
significant decrease in the emissions of former Soviet-bloc countries caused
by the transition of their economies. This decline in eastern European emis-
sions masked an 8 percent increase in emissions among the other industrial-
ized countries of the world. Overall, the industrialized world is not on target to
meet the Kyoto emissions reduction goal, and is predicted to be about 10 per-
cent above 1990 levels by 2010. As of 2004, only four European Union coun-
tries were on track to comply with the national targets that all pre-2004 member
states had accepted in order to ensure that the EU as a whole fulfills its Kyoto
commitment. The four are France, Germany, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. The United States is prominent in its failure to meet the Earth Summit
target. In 1990 the United States produced 1.346 gigatons of carbon-equivalent
emissions due to the combustion of fossil fuel, and by 2003 that figure had
increased by 17.6 percent to 1.6 gigatons. Moreover, the United States also has
the worlds highest per capita emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol includes three incentive-based economic instruments
that are designed to help Annex B countries reduce the cost of meeting
their emissions targets. These instruments are joint implementation (de-
scribed in chapter 9), emissions trading, and the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM). These instruments allow Annex I countries to meet their
emissions target by either producing or acquiring emissions reductions in
other countries, most commonly lower-income developing countries. Joint
implementation projects allow an Annex I Party to receive emission credits
for projects that reduce emissions or enhance emissions-absorbing sinks in

other Annex I countries. It is specifically indicated in the Protocol that
trading and joint implementation are supplemental to rather than a substi-
tute for domestic actions. The worlds first mandatory multinational car-
bon marketthe EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)began in early
2005. As Michaelowa (2004) notes, the EU allocated generous quantities
of carbon credits to various polluting industries for the 20057 period to
help ease the transition. Moreover, in April 2004 the EU parliament passed
the linking directive, which allows participants in the emissions trading
system unlimited use of emission credits from the CDM. The linking direc-
tive is the worlds first large-scale incentive for companies to participate in
the CDM. Michaelowa goes on to report that the EU, especially Germany
and the Netherlands, is making significant funds available for CDM projects,
in order to generate credits that can be used to help the EU meet its Kyoto
obligations.
The CDM was envisioned to perform a three-fold function:
to assist nonAnnex I countries in achieving sustainable development;

to contribute to the ultimate goal of the convention, that is, stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere;
to help Annex I countries comply with their emission reduction
commitments.
The CDM assists developing countries in achieving sustainable develop-

ment by directing environmentally friendly investment into their econo-
mies from Annex I Parties and corporations. Two biomass examples included
a sugarcane wastefueled power plant constructed in Brazil, and a swine
waste/methanefueled power plant in Chile, both of which generated Certi-
fied Emissions Reductions (CERs) to the Annex I country funding the power
plants. Environmental groups have been concerned that some CDM projects,
such as large-scale hydroelectric facilities, fail to satisfy an environmen-
tally friendly criterion.
Policy Studies: The Economics of Controlling Greenhouse Gas

Emissions
The future costs associated with climate change manifest themselves in a

variety of ways. A large portion of those costs would fall on farmers who
would be displaced as formerly productive agricultural lands are taken out of
useful production by climate change. Other costs include increased cooling
costs for homes and offices, net of the decreased cost of heating, the costs
306 POLICY
associated with the displacement of people and infrastructure associated with

rising sea levels, and premature deaths due to increased heat and disease
epidemics. Much harder to quantify are the costs associated with loss of
species, unique ecosystems, and the threat of catastrophic change such as
that associated with displacement of the Gulf Stream. If action is taken to
reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, then some of these costs
can be avoided. These avoided future costs can be considered the benefits of
controlling greenhouse gas emissions today.
Since these harms are far into the future, applying a typical real discount
rate of 2 to 6 percent would result in a miniscule present value of harms. As
Cline (2004) notes, for example, discounting at even 3 percent annually causes
$100 two centuries in the future to be worth only 27 cents today. As a result,
spending more than 27 cents today could not be justified on benefit/cost
terms to generate $100 in climate change benefits two centuries from now.
Yet, as Cline points out, the essence of the global warming policy is taking
potentially costly actions in the present in exchange for a reduction of poten-
tial climate damages far in the future. Climate change harms from todays
emissions occur in the future due to lags induced by energy absorbed by the
oceans, and the relatively long atmospheric life of many greenhouse gases.
As a result, the use of typical discount rates can introduce a strong bias against
any preventive action. Consequently, any economic analysis of the benefits
and costs of greenhouse gas controls must confront the issue of selecting an
appropriately low discount rate. Cline (2004) uses a discount rate of 1.5 per-
cent (consistent with the social rate of time preference, which will be de-
scribed in detail in chapter 13) in his benefit/cost analysis of various actions
to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
According to Cline (2004), economically optimal abatement involves
an aggressive program that cuts global carbon emissions by an average of
about 45 percent from baseline during the twenty-first century, and 55 per-
cent from baseline in the next century. He notes that this would require
carbon taxes to rise from about roughly $130170 per ton through 2015 to
about $600 by 2100, and eventually $1,300 before declining again. Using
a 1.5 percent discount rate, this policy strategy would generate a present
value of global net economic benefits equal to $143 trillion (in constant
1990 dollars).
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) estimate damage costs associated with cli-
mate change, expressed as percentage of GDP, including the risk of cata-
strophic damages such as those associated with displacement of the Gulf
Stream. They find that damage costs as a percentage of GDP are initially
negative (i.e., beneficial) for mean global temperature rises of up to 1.25
degrees Celsius. Damage costs as a percentage of GDP increase with mean
global temperature beyond this point, however, and rise to 1.1 percent of
GDP for warming of 2.5 degrees Celsius, 1.6 percent of GDP for warming of
2.9 degrees Celsius, 5.1 percent of GDP for warming of 4.5 degrees Celsius,
and 10 percent of GDP for warming of 6 degrees Celsius. Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000) find that meeting the greenhouse gas reduction targets con-
tained in the Kyoto Protocol results in costs that exceed benefits, largely
because the reduction targets are so modest as to result in negligible im-
provements in the future global climate.
Economic analyses of action to slow anthropogenic climate change are
sensitive to the types of benefits and costs that are included. According to a
study by Burtraw and Toman (1998), for example, climate change policy
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases may also reap environmental ben-
efits by reducing emissions of other conventional pollutants. These ancil-
lary benefits occur immediately, and could be approximately 30 percent of
the incremental cost of greenhouse gas reduction. Along these same lines,
Boyd, Rutilla, and Viscusi (1995, hereinafter Boyd et al.) sought to deter-
mine the level of energy taxation, conservation, and carbon dioxide emis-
sions control that can be economically justified based on a net benefit
criterion. The analysis by Boyd et al. offers a range of different scenarios,
including low, medium, and high environmental benefits, and different as-
sumptions regarding the extent to which firms can respond to higher en-
ergy prices by conserving on the use of energy in production. It is also
important to point out that the Boyd et al. study utilizes a no-regret per-
spective in which the computed benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions are based on the current or secondary harms of fossil-fuel
burningparticulates, sulfur dioxide, ozone, nitrogen oxides, and carbon
monoxideand not on the possible future primary harms from carbon di-
oxide emissions. This method of computing the benefits of carbon taxation
is referred to as a no-regret measure because it is based on known cur-
rent impacts of fossil-fuel burning rather than more conjectural future glo-
bal-warming impacts. Thus, their study uses current benefits and costs
associated with reduced use of fossil fuels to justify reductions in carbon
dioxide emissions, which generate uncertain long-term benefits that are
secondary to the analysis.
One of the interesting findings from Boyd et al. is that under the assump-
tion that very little energy conservation is possible in production, reducing
carbon dioxide emissions by up to around 7 percent imposes insignificant
economic costs. Each additional 7 percent increase in carbon dioxide emis-
sions imposes progressively higher economic costs. These costs increase
strikingly for reductions beyond 35 percent. When substantial energy con-
servation is assumed possible, the economic costs of reducing carbon diox-
308 POLICY
ide are much lower, and the cost of a 50 percent reduction is only around 1.4
percent of real gross national product (GNP).
The principal findings of Boyd et al. are:
Energy prices are lower than socially optimal. Depending on the sce-
nario used, fossil-fuel energy tax rates of between 20 and 70 percent are
socially optimal. Even in the most conservative scenario, tax rates of 20
percent on coal, 10 percent on oil, and 5 percent on natural gas are
socially optimal.
Under the assumption that firms cannot easily reduce their use of en-
ergy in response to higher prices, the analysis finds that a 12 percent
reduction in carbon dioxide is socially optimal, and a reduction of up to
20 percent can be accomplished before social welfare is reduced rela-
tive to the no-control (base) case.
Under the assumption that firms can more easily reduce their use of
energy in response to higher energy prices, a 29 percent reduction in
carbon dioxide emissions is found to be socially optimal, and close to a
50 percent reduction could occur before social welfare is reduced be-
low the no-control case.
Carbon taxation is mildly regressive, taxing a larger proportion of the
incomes of the poor relative to the rich, as is the case with most sales
taxes, for example.
Thus, the Boyd et al. study indicates that relatively substantial reductions
in carbon dioxide emissions are consistent with a net monetary benefitbased
policy standard. Boyd et al. estimated that the total (excluding global warm-
ing) environmental harms caused by fossil-fuel burning in the United States
range from 0.2 to 4 percent of real GNP, with a midpoint value of around 2
percent. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) estimate these economic costs to be in
the range of 1 to 2 percent. As mentioned above, the Boyd et al. study com-
putes the benefits of carbon taxation based on the current or secondary ef-
fects of fossil-fuel burning, rather than on the possible future or primary
effects caused by carbon dioxide emissions. In a survey of this literature,
Ekins (1996) finds that these secondary benefits of reducing carbon dioxide
are of the same order of magnitude as the costs of medium to high levels of
carbon dioxide abatement. Moreover, these secondary benefits are generally
estimated to be higher than the primary benefit associated with less global
warming. Clearly, the existence of these secondary benefits greatly reinforces
the case made by environmental economists for current action on carbon
dioxide emissions.
Following the approach of Burtraw and Toman (1998) and Boyd et al.
(1995) in their benefit/cost analysis of Italy meeting its Kyoto obligations,

Gatto et al. (2002) included in their analysis the current or ancillary benefits
from reducing carbon dioxide. These current benefits include lower emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, mercury, and so
forth, based on estimates of average external cost per unit of pollutant. In
evaluating Italys current fuel mix versus the mix that meets the Kyoto tar-
get, they included benefits derived from avoided external costs to human
health, agriculture, material goods, and ecosystems. Damages to biodiversity
and ecosystem services were not accounted for in the cited literature, and
thus external costs in this study are likely an underestimation. Based on an
average global cost of 30 euros per ton of carbon dioxide, Gatto et al. found
that it would be economically advantageous for Italy to change its power
generation strategy to comply with Kyoto. This could be achieved with a fuel
mix using more gas, less coal, more renewable sources, and more co-genera-
tion (combining electric and formerly waste thermal energy).
Recent research on the costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions has
focused on emissions at power plants. According to Socolow (2005), station-
ary coal-burning power plants are the source of about one-quarter of the
worlds anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. It is anticipated that many
new coal-fired power plants will be built during the first half of the twenty-
first century. As a result, much attention is now being focused on capturing
carbon dioxide emissions from these power plants and injecting the gas deep
into geological formations for long-term storage. Socolow cites estimates of
approximately $25 per ton of carbon dioxide as the prevailing view of the
added cost of capturing the gas at a new coal gasification combined-cycle
plant and injecting it into geological formations. Costs would likely be much
higher at an existing coal-fired steam power plant. This cost translates into
an increase of approximately 2 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity. Pass-
ing this cost along to end consumers would raise the average retail electricity
price (currently at around 10 cents per kilowatt-hour) by about 20 percent. If
carbon dioxide injection became a mandate, then the extra 2 cents per kilo-
watt-hour cost would make wind power and perhaps other renewable sources
of electricity price-competitive.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) undertook an analysis
of the cost to the United States of meeting its obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol (U.S. EIA 1998b). The EIA considered a number of different sce-
narios based on the extent to which the reductions are achieved domestically
rather than through the acquisition of emission credits through trading, joint
implementation, or clean development. These ranged from the 1990+24 case,
in which U.S. carbon emissions are 24 percent above 1990 levels and ap-
proximately 80 percent of the Kyoto reduction is accomplished from the
310 POLICY
acquisition of emission credits, to the 19907 case, in which the Kyoto re-
duction is entirely accomplished through domestic emission reductions. In
its 1998 analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, EIA assumed that a carbon price
would be applied to each of the energy fuels at its point of consumption,
relative to its carbon content. The carbon price would not be applied directly
to electricity but would be applied to the fossil fuels used for electricity gen-
eration and reflected in the delivered price of electricity. The EIA estimated
that by 2010, the carbon price necessary to achieve the targets ranges from
$67 per metric ton (1996 dollars) in the 1990+24 case to $348 per metric ton
in the 19907 case. In the more restrictive cases such as 19907, the carbon
price escalates rapidly to achieve the more stringent reductions but then de-
clines over the next ten years of the forecast horizon.
Cumulative investments in more energy-efficient and lower-carbon equip-
ment, particularly for electricity generation, reduce the cost of compliance in
the later years. These carbon prices would in turn raise the price of energy
based on relative carbon content. For example, delivered coal prices would
rise by between 152 and nearly 800 percent, average electricity prices would
rise by between 20 and 86 percent, average delivered natural gas prices would
rise by between 25 and 148 percent, and average petroleum prices would rise
by between 12 and 62 percent. Clearly we can see that the trading of credits,
joint implementation, and clean technology options substantially reduce the
economic impacts of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
Over the long run these higher energy prices would in turn lead to in-
creased energy efficiency (as measured by reduced energy intensity, mea-
sured as energy per dollar of real GDP) and reduced reliance on
carbon-intensive energy sources such as coal. Higher fossil-fuel energy prices
also have implications for the macroeconomy. The EIA estimated the macro-
economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol using the Data Resources, Inc. (DRI)
Macroeconomic Model of the U.S. Economy. Using this model the EIA esti-
mated that the average annual cost to the U.S. economy (in constant 1992
dollars) from compliance with the Kyoto Protocol ranges from $128283
billion for the 19907 case to $77109 billion for the 1990+24 case. Based
on a projected real GDP of $9,425 billion for the 20082012 time period in
which the reductions are to occur, these annual costs to the economy are
estimated to range from a high of 3 percent to a low of 0.8 percent of GDP.
The more restrictive cases led to a larger reduction in projected economic
growth in the period between 2005 and 2010, though the economy was pro-
jected to quickly rebound so that impacts on economic growth during the
longer 200520 time period are estimated to be minimal.
Nordhaus and Yang (1996) also take a general equilibrium approach to ana-
lyze the economics of climate change policy, but their economic model distin-
guishes costs, impacts, and policies for different regions of the world. They find
the efficient global carbon tax to be around $6 per ton by 2000, rising to $27 per
ton by 2100. Under this scenario, China and Russia will be confronted with
much higher emissions controls than Japan and Europe, and Nordhaus and Yang
acknowledge that in the current policy environment, the efficient level of con-
trol is unlikely to obtain. Nordhaus and Yang also find the discounted net eco-
nomic gain from an international cooperative effort in climate change policy to
be about $300 billion relative to noncooperative efforts by various governments
and $344 billion relative to a no-abatement benchmark.
Azar and Sterner (1996) criticize the Nordhaus and Yang study and similar
studies on several counts, including the use of what they consider to be an
excessively high discount rate, and excessive pessimism regarding the rate of
technical change in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies. Other
criticisms focus on ignoring unequal distributions of income and the marginal
utility of money around the globe (implying unequal values attributed to statis-
tical lives lost due to global warming), and the assumption that climate change
will proceed as a smooth and predictable process without risk for sudden
catastrophic events (p. 170). Azar and Sterner recompute the Nordhaus Dy-
namic Integrated Climate Economic (DICE) model with adjustments for these
various shortcomings, with the exception that they could not model the possi-
bility of catastrophic scenarios. They also used a 300- to 1,000-year time hori-
zon. While Nordhaus (1993b) estimates the marginal cost of carbon dioxide
emissions to be $5 per ton, Azar and Sterner estimate the marginal cost of
carbon dioxide emissions to range from $260 to $590 per ton. The difference
is almost entirely due to a weighting of costs in poorer regions of the world and
a three percentage-point lower discount rate.
While these economic studies are helpful in understanding the trade-offs
involved in climate change policy, what practical steps are necessary to ex-
tend these policies into lower-income countries? Blackman (1999) has sur-
veyed the literature on the economics of technology diffusion and has related
it to the problem of promoting climate-change policy in developing coun-
tries. Blackman states that there are seven types of policy instruments avail-
able to speed the diffusion of climate-friendly technology in developing
countries: Information, factor prices, regulation, credit, human capital, infra-
structure, research and development, and intellectual property rights.
Blackman argues that the dissemination of information is critical in all eco-
nomic models of technology diffusion. Some examples of policies that may
enhance the flow of information about new technologies include demonstra-
tion projects, advertising campaigns, the testing and certification of new tech-
nologies, and subsidies to technological consulting services. Factor (or input)
prices can also be important in fostering the diffusion of climate-friendly
312 POLICY
technology in developing countries. In particular, there is considerable evi-

dence that investment in energy-efficient technology is spurred by higher
energy prices. Since many developing countries subsidize energy prices, the
removal of those subsidies is likely to trigger increased domestic demand for
energy-efficient technology. Presumably, the regressive nature of removing
energy price subsidies would need to be addressed elsewhere in the tax sys-
tem. Regulation such as energy taxes or pollution taxes provides the same
sort of economic incentives for investment in energy-efficient technology as
the removal of subsidies.
Access to credit has also been identified as a barrier to the adoption of cli-
mate-friendly technology. As will be discussed in much greater detail in chapter
13, large-scale projects funded externally by agencies such as the World Bank
have had mixed results at best. Perhaps a more effective approach would be to
help develop domestic sources of credit for smaller-scale and better-managed
initiatives. The diffusion of climate-friendly technology also requires investment
in human capital so that local people understand the new technology and can
make it function properly in their specific cultural context, and investment in
necessary infrastructure such as energy distribution networks. Research and de-
velopment (R&D) provides a direct impetus to technology diffusion, and there-
fore the promotion of climate-friendly R&D activities in developing countries
will have an obvious beneficial impact. Finally, intellectual property rights can
be a formidable barrier to technology transfer due to high licensing prices, and
therefore subsidized licensing arrangements may be a critical factor in the diffu-
sion of climate-friendly technology in developing countries.
Summary
There is widespread consensus that anthropogenic emissions of green-

house gases have altered the earths energy budget. These include both
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions that have imbalanced the earths
carbon cycle, as well as nitrous oxide, methane, various halocarbons,
nonmethane volatile organic compounds, ozone, sulfur hexafluoride,
and water vapor. These gases allow visible light to pass through but trap
some heat and prevent it from being radiated into space, thus operating
like a greenhouse. If there were no greenhouse effect on earth, the sur-
face of the planet would be approximately 33 degrees Celsius colder
than it is now, and most ecosystems would collapse.
Concentrations of carbon dioxide in the earths atmospherethe single
most important greenhouse gashave increased from 280 parts per
million (ppm) before the advent of industrialization to approximately
380 ppm in 2005. Business as usual forecasts (i.e., emissions growth
trends are unabated by attempts to limit emissions) suggest atmospheric

concentrations of carbon dioxide rising to approximately 700 ppm by
2100. The United States produces approximately 24 percent of all an-
thropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. The Persian Gulf states of Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had the highest per capita annual
emissions of carbon dioxide, at 16.9 and 11.5 metric tons, respectively.
The chapter presents a number of different climate change predictions.
These predictions call for varying amounts of global average tempera-
ture increases, sea level increases, and changes in the geographic distri-
bution of forests, grasslands, and deserts. There is also the potential for
significant discontinuities and abrupt climate change due to factors
such as displacement of important ocean currents.
Todays costs of making a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions are relatively large, concentrated on the current cohort of fossil-
fuel industries and their consumers, and are relatively well known.
The estimated benefits of substantially reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions are diffuse across the globe, primarily fall 100 or more years in
the future, and are therefore diffused across future generations. Thus,
from a political economy perspective, greenhouse gas control policy is
Olsonian (as the term was used in chapter 8)difficult to achieve and
relatively unstable to maintain.
Models of the global climate continue to be refined, and scientists are
getting better at predicting global climate, yet the mechanics of global
warming, particularly at the regional level, are tremendously complex.
As a consequence, the geographical distribution of benefits from con-
trolling greenhouse gas emissions are uncertain.
One important source of uncertainty is the possibility that large amounts
of methane now locked in Arctic tundra and permafrost could be rap-
idly released if some initial degree of atmospheric warming occurs (and
polar areas are predicted to experience the largest temperature changes).
Another source of uncertainty is the role of cloud cover and rainfall
patterns and whether they will reinforce or attenuate warming.
Global climate change necessitates international coordination and co-
operation across countries that are highly diverse in income, religion,
culture, population growth rates and other demographic characteristics,
educational attainment, and extent of democratic empowerment.
In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment resulted in 150 countries signing the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change, which pledges Annex I countries (rich industrial-
ized countries and economies in transition) to control emissions of green-
house gases. Unlike the European Union, the United States is currently
314 POLICY
behind schedule in reducing greenhouse gases relative to the 1990 bench-

mark, in part because cheap gasoline has increased the popularity of
less fuel-efficient automobiles.
The Kyoto Protocol commits Annex I Parties to individual, legally
binding targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, add-
ing up to a total cut of at least 5 percent from 1990 levels in the period
200812.
The Kyoto Protocol also establishes three incentive-based economic in-
struments that are designed to help Annex I countries reduce the cost of
meeting their emissions targets. These instruments are joint implemen-
tation (described in chapter 10), emissions trading, and the clean devel-
opment mechanism.
The United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and most action
to limit greenhouse gas emissions in this country is limited to state ac-
tions (e.g., renewable portfolio standards, described in chapter 10) or
voluntary controls.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated the macro-
economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol using the Data Resources,
Inc. (DRI) Macroeconomic Model of the U.S. Economy. Based on a
projected real GDP of $9,425 billion for the period between 2008
and 2012 in which the reductions are to occur, these estimated an-
nual costs to the economy range from a high of 3 percent to a low of
0.8 percent of GDP.
In a number of ambitious studies, environmental economists have found
that vigorous control of carbon dioxide emissions can be justified today
when the ancillary benefits of reductions in pollutants emitted with car-
bon dioxide that harm people today, such as sulfur dioxides, particu-
lates, nitrogen oxides, and ozone, are included in the benefit/cost analy-
sis. These studies make a very strong case for action on greenhouse gas
emissions based on a no-regrets policy.
1. Write a two-page essay in which you summarize what is known about

global climate change. Discuss how the complexity, the long-term nature of
the problem, the diffusion of the benefits, the uncertainty regarding global-
warming effects, and the international nature of any effective solution make
this one of the most important, controversial, and challenging environmental
policy problems we face today.
2. Review the concept of the prisoners dilemma in the Appendix to chap-
ter 5. Is it reasonable to model the international coordination problem for
control of greenhouse gases as a prisoners dilemma game? If so, explain the

payoff structure in a simple case of a two-country world.
3. What other environmental policy dilemmas have uncertainty, irrevers-
ibility, and potentially large long-term impacts similar to the global-warm-
ing issue? Carefully explain your reasoning. How might the policy and
political economy implications be similar to those of global warming?
4. Access the report Climate Change Impacts on the United States on the
Internet (www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessment/index.htm). Summarize the
forecasted environmental and social impacts of global climate change for a
region of the United States.
5. President George W. Bush argued against ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
because the Protocol fails to require India and China to make binding reduc-
tions in emissions of greenhouse gases, and because of concerns about costs
to the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, most other major industrialized countries
have ratified the Protocol and will be required to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions. Does this mean that the United States will be a free rider when it
comes to global action on greenhouse gas control? How will this decision by
the United States not to ratify affect the international competitiveness of our
manufacturing firms?
6. The European Union has a greenhouse gas allowance trading system in
place. Go to their website (http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/
emission_plans.htm) and write a brief summary that describes how this trad-
ing system works. To what extent will greenhouse gas allowance trading
reduce the economic cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol?
7. Visit the website of the Copenhagen Consensus (www.copenhagen
consensus.com), a group that attempts to prioritize action on various global
problems, including climate change. Review the article by Cline (2004) on
climate change, the articles refuting Clines work, and Clines rejoinder
(www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Default.asp?ID=165). Summarize the key
differences expressed by the authors regarding appropriate public action to
stem future climate change, and write a one-page position paper outlining
your position on this issue. Do you agree with the panel of experts ranking
of climate change in their prioritized list of global problems? Alternatively,
your class could use this material as background research for a debate on
appropriate action on climate change.
Internet Links
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States National Security (www.gbn.com/ArticleDisplayServlet.srv?aid
=26231): A report by the Global Business Network for the U.S. Department
of Defense.
316 POLICY
The Benefits of Reduced Air Pollutants in the U.S. from Greenhouse Gas
Mitigation Policies (www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-98-01-REV.pdf): A
study by Burtraw and Toman at Resources for the Future.
Climate Change 2001: IPCC Third Assessment Report (www.grida.no/

climate/ipcc_tar): A key authoritative source of information on the science
of greenhouse gases, atmospheric chemistry, trend emissions data, and the
science of global climate change.
Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report Summary for Policy Makers

(www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syreng/spm.pdf): This summary represents the formally
agreed statement of the IPCC concerning key findings and uncertainties con-
tained in the Working Group contributions to the Third Assessment Report.
Climate Change Impacts on the United States (www.gcrio.org/

NationalAssessment/index.htm): The U.S. Global Change Research Pro-
gram (USGCRP) established this national assessment in order to analyze
and evaluate what is known about the potential consequences of climate vari-
ability and change for the United States.
Energy Information Administration Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Cli-

mate Change Publications (www.eia.doe.gov/environment.html): Lots of
good information on current and projected future greenhouse gas emissions
in the United States and around the world.
EPAs Global Warming Internet Site (http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/

globalwarming.nsf/content/index.html): Comprehensive information on
greenhouse gases and global climate change.
European Union Greenhouse Gas Allowance Trading Scheme (http://

europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm): Learn
more about the European Unions greenhouse gas trading system.
Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Research (www.metoffice.

com/research/hadleycentre): The Hadley Center is jointly funded by the
United Kingdom Department of the Environment and the United Kingdom
Meteorological Office. The main objective of the Hadley Center is to pro-
vide an authoritative, up-to-date assessment of both natural and man-made
climate change.
The Heat Is On (www.heatisonline.org): Internet site based on Pulitzer

Prizewinning investigative reporter Ross Gelbspans book on greenhouse

gas emissions and global climate change.
Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic

Activity (www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/kyotorpt.html): Comprehensive 1998
economic analysis of the costs of complying with the Kyoto Protocol, spon-
sored by the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Interactive Atmospheric Data Visualization Website (www.cmdl

.noaa.gov/ccgg/iadv): Access the most current data from the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administrations Climate Monitoring and
Diagnostics Laboratory.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (www.ipcc.ch): Learn about

the latest consensus information on the status of greenhouse gas emissions,
global climate change, and international policy responses.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Emis-

sions Scenarios (www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission): Read the IPCCs
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios here.
Pew Center on Climate Change (www.pewclimate.org): Probably one of

the best websites for up-to-date science and policy studies.
Resources for the Futures Climate Change Economics and Policy Stud-
ies (www.rff.org/Climate.cfm): This nonpartisan environmental think-tank
is a good source of objective economic policy studies on climate change and
the environment.
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change (www.sciencemag.org/cgi/re-

print/306/5702/1686.pdf): December 2004 Science article by Naomi Oreskes.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(www.unfccc.de): Comprehensive information on the UNFCCC, the Kyoto
Protocol, and other aspects of coordinated international action on the control
of greenhouse gas emissions.
World Resources Institute Climate Change and Energy (http://

climate.wri.org/): World Resources Institute (WRI) is an environmental think
tank that goes beyond research to find practical ways to protect the earth and
improve peoples lives.
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Part III
Topics on the Economics of
Sustainability
12
Introduction to the
Concept of Sustainability
Introduction
There is a growing awareness of the increasingly sharp demands that human

societies place on their economies and their natural environment, and of the
corrosion of many social and political institutions. Many also recognize that
the imperatives of a healthy, functioning economy, community, and environ-
ment are interdependent. Sustainability represents a vision of the future whose
roots can be traced back to a variety of primary origins, including the Iroquois
Confederation, which developed a standard of judging decisions based on
the well-being of tribal people seven generations into the future. Many cul-
tures over the course of human history have recognized the need for har-
mony between their economy, community, and environment. What is new is
an articulation of these ideas in the context of the globalization of technol-
ogy, information, economics, and environmental crises. The sustainability
movement calls for a more sophisticated and inclusive view of development
and well-being that explicitly takes into account ecological health, natural
resource stocks, vibrant and just communities, and democratic processes.
Sustainability has come to mean different things to different people, and by
encompassing so many things there is the potential for its meaning to dissi-
pate or to become appropriated. We will develop a definition of sustainability
in this chapter that can be used as a standard for evaluating social, economic,
and environmental policies.
How is sustainability viewed within the discipline of economics? As we
will discuss in detail in chapter 14, traditional economic growth theorists see
323
324 TOPICS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABILITY
sustainability as an issue of intergenerational equity and as a constraint on

economic growth, and see human-made capital as substitutable for natural
capital. Somewhat more recently, but in the same vein, Arrow et al. (2004)
view sustainability as an economic modeling problem, and interpret
sustainability to mean that social welfare does not decline over time. Other
economists are much less traditional in their views. For example, Daly and
Cobb (1989) draw upon Aristotles distinction between chrematistics and
oikonomia to illustrate the difference between the mainstream of contem-
porary economic thought and the emerging sustainability economics.
Chrematistics can be thought of as the process of managing economic affairs
in such a way as to maximize the value of the decision makers financial
wealth, as measured in money. Oikonomia refers to household management,
which in Greek times included a broad array of activities, a relatively larger
number of people than we associate with modern households, and elements
of a multigenerational perspective. Accordingly, Daly and Cobb argue that
oikonomia differs from chrematistics in that (1) it takes a longer-term view,
(2) it focuses attention on the well-being of the household community as
opposed to a more individualistic perspective on financial wealth accumula-
tion, and (3) it places a larger emphasis on use value, while chrematistics is
more narrowly focused on money exchange values. Thus, oikonomia em-
phasizes the broader focus and longer time horizon that is more consistent
with the sustainability perspective than is the prevailing economic focus on
financial wealth, which is embodied in the concept of chrematistics.
Ecologists, environmental ethicists, and others argue that a sustainable
society is premised on the integrity of the ecosystems that provide the basis
for life on earth. As we shall see in chapter 13, ecologists are not particularly
sanguine with regard to the ability of human-made capital to substitute for
natural capital (for example, that the loss of natural wetlands can be miti-
gated by constructed wetlands). According to this view, the path to
sustainability requires restoration and preservation of the stocks of natural
capital embodied in the earths ecosystems. Economists and other social sci-
entists acknowledge the central role of ecosystem integrity but argue that
sustainability also requires democratic processes and empowerment, and a
vital economy to provide economic security and meaningful work opportu-
nities and to promote resource-efficient technologies. According to this ar-
gument, restoration and preservation of natural capital stocks is more likely
when economic systems are put into place that address the basic human needs
of the worlds poor. In addition, these sorts of economic systems in turn
require democratic processes and empowerment so that all people have ac-
cess to education, justice, a voice in governance, property ownership, and
meaningful work opportunities. Sustainability encompasses both an ethic
THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY 325
and a set of technical processes that relate ecological health and human well-
being to an interdependent array of economic, sociopolitical, and environ-
mental/ecological systems. In fact, as we will see below, sustainability occurs
at the intersection of ecological integrity, economic vitality, and democratic
systems and processes. The ethic of sustainability provides the common im-
perative and the shared values, and the technical processes provide the means
of acting in a manner consistent with the sustainability ethic.
Sustainable Development
To sustain something means to maintain, support, or uphold something, to

supply it with necessities. In the context of sustainability as the term is used
in this book, the something that is being sustained includes the essential
elements of a healthy, functioning economy, community, and environment
over a long-term time horizon. To develop something means to expand or
realize its potential, or to bring something to a fuller state. Economic devel-
opment, therefore, is not the same as economic growth, the latter referring to
inflation-adjusted increases in gross domestic product. Therefore, we can
think of sustainable development as providing the support necessary for the
functional elements of economy, community, and environment to achieve
their full potential. While it may or may not be possible to sustain endless
economic growth, it should be both possible and desirable to promote sus-
tainable development. In this section, we will consider the evolution of the
concept of sustainable development. In chapter 14, we will return to this
concept in detail.
Modern international discussion of sustainability goes back at least to a
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm
in 1972, where the notion of sustainable development was put forward as a
way of transforming conflicting objectives into complementary aspects of a
common goal. Arising from this conference was the Stockholm Declaration,
a set of principles that together represented the beginning of international
dialogue between rich and poor countries regarding the links between eco-
nomic growth, declines in global common-pool resource systems such as the
air, water, and oceans, and the well-being of people around the world.
The momentum for sustainable development that started with the
Stockholm Declaration increased due to the work of the World Commission
on Environment and Development that was headed by Gro Brundtland, who
served as prime minister of Norway in 1981 and again between 198689 and
199096. Between 1983 and 1987, what later became known as the
Brundtland Commission facilitated a series of public hearings throughout
the world, including many lower-income countries, to further develop the
concept of sustainability. In a unanimous report, the Brundtland Commis-

sion concluded that our common future depends on sustainable development.
In 1987, the Brundtland Commission published the book Our Common Fu-
ture (Brundtland, 1987), which defined sustainable development and called
upon nations of the world to adopt the objective of sustainable development
as the overriding goal and test of national policy and international coopera-
tion (Tokyo Declaration). The Brundtland Commission defined and framed
the imperatives of sustainable development, and focused on the interlock-
ing crises implied by the fundamental changes through which the planet is
passing. As pointed out in Our Common Future, more than 80 percent of
population growth is forecast to occur in the urban areas of the worlds poor-
est countries. As these people strive for the same standard of living enjoyed
by people in rich countries, will their industrialization path doom the pro-
ductive capacity of the worlds biosphere? The problem of making the
economy of an increasingly populous world environmentally sustainable is
one of the central challenges that motivate the sustainability movement.
There are many definitions of sustainability and sustainable development.
The World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Com-
mission) provided the following definition of sustainable development in 1987:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present

without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
While this is a very broad definition, the Brundtland Commission envi-

sioned two key concepts associated with sustainable development. The first
concept was that of needs, in particular the essential needs of the worlds
poor, which are seen as having overriding priority. The second concept is the
idea of limits on the ability of the environment to meet present and future
needs. The Brundtland Commission identified seven strategic imperatives
for sustainable development:
Reviving growth.
Changing the quality of growth.
Meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water, and sanitation.
Ensuring a sustainable level of population.
Conserving and enhancing the resource base.
Reorienting technology and managing risk.
Merging environment and economics in decision making.
The Brundtland Commission saw sustainable development as a process of

change rather than as a fixed state of harmony. Therefore, the exploitation of
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological devel-

opment, and institutional change are made in a manner that is consistent with
future as well as present needs. The Brundtland Commissions view of sustain-
able development was centered on promoting more appropriate and equitably
distributed economic growth, and the imperatives of ecological integrity and
democratic systems and processes did not play as prominent a role.
At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, representatives from gov-
ernments and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) developed the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Char-
ter. In its original form, the Earth Charter contained twenty-seven principles
covering a broad array of economic, social, and environmental issues. Ac-
cording to the 1992 Earth Charter, environmental protection constitutes an
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isola-
tion from it (principle 4), and countries must enact effective environmental
legislation (principle 11). Moreover, principle 7 states that countries shall
cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect, and restore
the health and integrity of the Earths ecosystem. The 1992 Earth Charter
recognizes the importance of economics in sustainable development. It af-
firms the right of development (principle 3), the essential need to alleviate
poverty (principle 5), the imperative of reducing and eliminating unsustain-
able patterns of production and consumption (principle 8), technology trans-
fer (principle 9), and the promotion of a supportive and open international
economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable devel-
opment in all countries (principle 12).
The 1992 Earth Charter also addresses empowerment and democratic prin-
ciples. For example, principle 10 states that environmental issues are best
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens. Moreover, individuals
are to have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that
is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials
and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in deci-
sion-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness
and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall
be provided. The 1992 Earth Charter recognizes the imperatives of empower-
ing women and indigenous peoples. Principle 20 states that women have a
vital role in environmental management and development, and that their full
participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable development. Like-
wise principle 22 states that countries should recognize and duly support the
identity, culture, and interests of indigenous peoples, and enable their effective
participation in the achievement of sustainable development.
Representatives from governments and NGOs were unsuccessful in se-

curing adoption of the Earth Charter during the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.
The Earth Charter Initiative was created by the Earth Council and Green
Cross International in 1994, and an Earth Charter Commission was formed
in 1997 to oversee the drafting of a revised Earth Charter. At the conclusion
of the Rio+5 Forum in Rio de Janeiro in 1997, the Earth Charter Commis-
sion issued the Benchmark Draft Earth Charter. After considerable feedback,
a second Benchmark Draft was issued in 1999, and a final version was is-
sued in 2000. The 2000 Earth Charter has sixteen main principles, various
supporting principles, and a conclusion. The principles are divided into four
parts: (1) respect and care for the community of life; (2) ecological integrity;
(3) social and economic justice; and (4) democracy, nonviolence, and peace.
The Earth Charter Initiative offers the following definition of sustainable
development on their Internet site (www.earthcharter.org/):
The goal of sustainable development is full human development and eco-

logical protection. The Earth Charter recognizes that humanitys environ-
mental, economic, social, cultural, ethical, and spiritual problems and as-
pirations are interconnected. It affirms the need for holistic thinking and
collaborative, integrated problem solving. Sustainable development requires
such an approach. It is about freedom, justice, participation, and peace as
well as environmental protection and economic well-being.
In 1995 the World Summit for Social Development produced a declara-

tion and program of action that is addressed to defining and articulating a
vision of sustainable development. The authors of the declaration and pro-
gram of action articulated a deep conviction that economic development,
social development, and environmental protection are interdependent and
mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development, which is the
framework for efforts to achieve a higher quality of life for all people. They
argued that equitable social development recognizes that empowering the
poor to utilize environmental resources sustainably is a necessary founda-
tion for sustainable development. Finally, the authors of the declaration and
program of action argued that broad-based and sustained economic growth
in the context of sustainable development is necessary to sustain social de-
velopment and social justice.
Conservation-based Development
Multilateral doctrines such as the Brundtland Commission Report and the

Earth Charter are useful because they encompass the values and political
interests of both high-income industrialized countries and lower-income coun-

tries. A more local and applied perspective on sustainability is provided by
what is known as conservation-based development, which refers to programs
and policies that help entrepreneurs succeed in developing viable businesses
that are environmentally sound and make a positive contribution to their lo-
cal community. For example, Johnson (1997) surveyed a number of local
conservation-based development efforts in the Pacific Northwest region of
the United States. By looking at both successful and unsuccessful conserva-
tion-based development projects, Johnson was able to develop some basic
themes that serve as practical design principles.
They engage residents at the local, community, or watershed level to

define and pursue a common vision of long-term community, economic,
and ecosystem health. In the process, they often help to reinvigorate
local civic processes and build upon local knowledge and culture.
They seek to maintain and restore healthy ecosystems upon which the
community and economy rely. Often this involves building a better
knowledge base by engaging citizens in developing and monitoring in-
dicators of community, ecological, and economic well-being.
They develop economic opportunities that provide for the needs of
local residents while ensuring the long-term sustainability of the eco-
system upon which the community relies. (p. 14)
Johnson argues that analysis of conservation-based development projects

identifies three key lessons. One lesson is the importance of trust and the
ability of people from widely diverse backgrounds and interests to collabo-
rate. Second is the importance of finding markets for niche value-added or
sustainably harvested products. Third is the importance of addressing pov-
erty and diversity, and expanding community-based development to include
people of more diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds.
A Working Definition of Sustainability
The definition of sustainability that will be used in this textbook draws upon
many of the sustainable development themes articulated in the Earth Char-
ter, and on conservation-based development themes identified by Johnson
(1997). The definition of sustainability was developed by Viederman (1996,
p. 46), and states:
Sustainability is a communitys control and prudent use of all forms of

capitalnatures capital, human capital, human-created capital, social capi-
tal, and cultural capitalto ensure, to the degree possible, that present and
future generations can attain a high degree of economic security and achieve
democracy while maintaining the integrity of the ecological systems upon
which all life and production depends.
Viedermans definition begins with a discussion of the five capitals of sus-

tainable development that shape, and are shaped by, human society. Note that
to economists, capital represents the stock of something that is capable of pro-
ducing a flow of valuable goods and services. In economics, capital refers to
the built environmentfactories, offices, roads, power lines, water systems
as well as equipment, tools, and inventory. In general, the larger the capital
stock, the larger the flow of goods and services that it can produce. As shown
in Figure 12.1, a bathtub serves as an analogy of the capital stock. Its water
level rises with investment that adds to the stock, and its level falls with depre-
ciation or the harvest of natural resources. Analogously, a fortunate retiree
may have a sizable stock of financial capital that she built up from careful
savings over the years. The size of this stock of financial capital determines the
sustainable flow of income that is available to support her retirement lifestyle.
For example, the retiree may have her financial capital retirement savings in
government bonds that pay interest income over time. If the retiree demands
too large of an income from this stock, she will be spending part of the stock
itself (e.g., selling bonds). As a result, the stock will decline, like the falling
level of water in a bathtub, thereby reducing the flow of income that the stock
can sustainably support in the future. As we will see below, this same process
is at play in other forms of capital as well, especially natural capital.
Natural capital generates the flow of natural resources (e.g., harvest of
fish from fisheries, harvest of trees from a forest, grazing of livestock on
rangeland) and ecosystem services (e.g., oxygen from forests, freshwater
filtration from watersheds, nutrient cycling in wetlands) upon which human
society depends. As Wackernagel and Rees (1997) observe, natural capital
is not just an inventory of resources; it includes all those components of the
ecosphere, and the structural relationships among them, whose organizational
integrity is essential for the continuous self-production of the system itself
(p. 4). Costanza et al. (1997) and Daily (1997) argue that the various forms
of ecosystem services such as climate regulation, soil formation, nutrient
cycling, habitat, erosion control, and recreation are the benefits that flow
from the stock of functional ecosystems that are an element of natural capi-
tal. Importantly, the emerging field of ecological economics focuses on de-
termining the economic value of the stocks and flows associated with natural
capital, and some of the pioneering work in this area indicates that natural
capital has considerable economic value.
Figure 12.1 The Bathtub Model of Capital Stocks and Flows
Inflow of investment: Examples include

watershed restoration (natural capital),
education (human capital), and construction
or repair (constructed capital)
Level of capital stock reflects a balance over

time of inflow (investment) and outflow
(goods, services, depreciation)
Outflow of valuable goods and services:

Examples include flow of natural resource
goods and ecosystem services (natural
capital), services of labor (human capital),
and the services of constructed capital
Human capital is another term for the knowledge, skills, and capabilities
of people that can be deployed to create a flow of useful work for their busi-
ness, employer, family, or community. Education represents investment in
human capital. By increasing the stock of human capital through education,
a larger and more valuable flow of labor and volunteer services is obtained.
Created capital (or constructed capital) is comprised of the technologies,
productive facilities (e.g., factories, offices, laboratories, roads and other in-
frastructure), and inventory of products that economists traditionally think
of as capital stock. Business firms and government both invest in created
capital, and this investment increases the stock of created capital, which in
turn provides a larger flow of useful services.
Social capital, as the concept is used by sociologist James Coleman and
political scientist Robert Putnam, refers to the stock of civic virtues and
networks of civic engagement, involvement, reciprocity norms, and trust es-
sential to democratic communities. In Italy, for example, Putnam (1993) ar-
gues that social capital was essential to the functioning of markets and
government in the comuni of medieval Pisa, Siena, Lucca, and Florence.
Social capital is sometimes measured through participation rates in volun-
tary service groups such as the PTA, unions, service clubs, and town hall
meetings. There is economic value in social capital. For example, Trivers

(1971) developed a theory of reciprocal altruism, contending that making a
sacrifice for another yields a payoff in the form of a future return of the favor.
As de Waal (2005) notes, researchers in the field of animal behavioral eco-
nomics have found that norms of reciprocity and cooperation naturally evolve
in nonhuman populations such as chimpanzees, and have documented many
cases where todays gift (e.g., of food) is linked to a future reciprocal gift
(e.g., of grooming services). In summarizing the findings of new agent-based
cultural algorithms (models that simulate social and cultural changes), Kohler,
Gumerman, and Reynolds (2005) note that kinship-based reciprocity norms
enhance the ability of households to survive downturns in their economic
circumstances, which indicates the economic value of social capital. Com-
munities with large stocks of social capital enjoy a flow of economic benefits
in the form of lower transaction costs, lower-cost dispute resolution, and
more timely adaptive and cooperative responses to adverse shocks of various
kinds (e.g., mill closures, natural disasters).
Cultural capital refers to the body of knowledge, stories, visions, myths,
and languages shared by people and providing the framework for how people
view the world and their proper role in it. Cultural capital can also include
culture-specific place-based knowledge, including of locations and uses of
medicinal plants and cycles of abundance for various resources. Of the five
capitals, cultural capital is probably the most difficult to grasp and quantify.
It should also be noted that Viedermans (1996) definition focuses atten-
tion on community rather than on the individual. Private property regimes
and market systems of allocation rest on an ethical foundation of individual-
ism, which states that all values, rights, and duties originate in individuals
and not in society as a whole. In contrast, the sustainability ethic holds the
interdependent health and well-being of human communities and earths ecol-
ogy over time as the basis of value. Viedermans definition ends by provid-
ing guidance for how society should deploy the various forms of capital at its
disposal. The three pillars of sustainability offered by Viederman (economy,
community, and environment) are widely accepted as the central elements of
a sustainable society, and these pillars illustrated in Figure 12.2. Note, how-
ever, that Viederman specifically refers to democracy when discussing the
community pillar of sustainability. There is some debate over whether de-
mocracy is essential to the concept of sustainability. In the absence of consti-
tutional protections, a tyrannical majority that preys upon minority interests
can potentially hijack democracy. This was the position taken in Platos Re-
public, which was partially a reaction against the injustice of the death of his
mentor, Socrates. More recently, Fareed Zakaria, in his book The Future of
Freedom, argues that under certain temporary circumstances a reformist au-
Figure 12.2 The Three Pillars of Sustainability
Community
Economy
Sustainability
Environment
tocracy may be preferable to a democracy that lacks basic constitutional pro-

tections for minority interests.
In an earlier work, Viederman (1993) has emphasized that sustainability
is an ethical standard as well as a technological, economic, and political
problem to resolve. Building on this notion, Proops et al. (1996) argue that
while sustainability is often seen as a scientific problem for which technical
solutions can be developed, more important is the development of an ethic
to formulate the goals, the social will to achieve these goals, and the matu-
rity of judgement to realize the goals (p. 133). Developing this ethic re-
quires a broad consensus in society regarding the basic values that underlie
the concept of sustainability. Proops et al. also argue that sustainability is not
a thing to be achieved but a constant process.
One of the challenges associated with learning about sustainability and
developing specific policies is the presence of rigid disciplinary boundaries,
which tend to promote rivalries and limit cooperation. The discipline of eco-
logical economics has recently organized itself around the integration of ecol-
ogy (natures household) with economics (humankinds household), an inte-

gration that is central to the concept of a sustainable society. The journal
Ecological Economics states in its aim and scope, for example, that this
integration is necessary because conceptual and professional isolation have
led to economic and environmental policies that are mutually destructive. It
is likely that these boundaries were a necessary part of developing a set of
best methods for isolating, analyzing, and ultimately understanding the
economic or the ecological or the sociological or the political elements of
the world. The argument from the sustainability movement is that these best
methods must be integrated now that we recognize the inherent interdepen-
dencies across these disciplines. There is a natural hesitancy on the part of
some economists, ecologists, sociologists, and other experts in various disci-
plines to overcome their differences in terminology, analytical methods, and
outlook. For example, Dasgupta and Maler (1996) point out that while it is
self-evident that poor countries depend on the integrity of their environmen-
tal and natural resourcessoil, forests, animals, and fisheriesfor fifty years
economic development models have largely ignored the health and integrity
of environmental and natural resources as an element of successful develop-
ment. Similarly, the discipline of environmental economics has largely ig-
nored issues concerning poverty and its links to environmental quality. As
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has stated,
the economics of a sustainable society occurs at the intersection, or balanc-
ing, of three global imperatives: environmental integrity, economic efficiency,
and the well-being of people [and community] (www.iisd.org).
Summary
Sustainability occurs at the intersection of three global imperatives

economy, community, and environmentover time.
Ecologists, environmental ethicists, and others argue that a sustainable
society is premised on the integrity of the ecosystem. Ecologists do not
see the potential for substitutability between important life-support ele-
ments of the ecosystem and human or human-made capital. From this
perspective, one can argue that sustaining the integrity of the remaining
stocks of natural capital embodied in the earths ecosystems is the path
to sustainability.
Social scientists and economists acknowledge the central role of eco-
system integrity but argue that sustainability also requires democratic
process and empowerment to allow people to make good decisions, and
a vital economy to provide economic security. Moreover, most econo-
mists to varying degrees argue that some forms of human-made capital
can substitute for declining stocks of natural capital and focus on main-
taining human well-being as the path to sustainability.
The international sustainable development movement provides insight
into the historical development of the concept of sustainability. Promi-
nent achievements of this movement include the Brundtland Commis-
sion Report and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
Conservation-based development represents a local and applied variant
of sustainable development.
Viederman (1996) has defined sustainability as being a communitys
control and prudent use of the five capitalsnatural, human, human-
made, social, and culturalto ensure, to the degree possible, that present
and future generations can attain a high degree of economic security and
achieve democracy while maintaining the integrity of the ecological sys-
tems upon which all life and production depends (the three pillars).
Sustainability is such an encompassing term that it easily loses its mean-
ing. It includes a process of development, an ethical and a policy stan-
dard, and a set of technical processes that relate ecological health and
human well-being to an interdependent array of economic, sociopolitical,
and environmental/ecological systems.
A central issue associated with sustainability has to do with the proper
way of guiding and measuring the performance of development. As we
shall see in chapter 14, there are competing theories for what sustain-
able development means and by implication what policies are consis-
tent with moving us closer to a sustainable society.
1. Go back to chapter 7 and review the concept of benefit/cost analysis

and the dynamic efficiency standard that is implied by such an analysis. Can
benefit/cost analysis and dynamic efficiency be made consistent with a
sustainability standard? If so, how might this affect the appropriate choice of
discount rate and the sort of screens that might be applied to various projects
that could eliminate projects or policies that generate current benefits at the
cost of future generations?
2. Contrast the focus of sustainability on community and intergenerational
equity with the individualistic focus of contemporary Western society. Ex-
plain why the greatest challenge of sustainability might involve human val-
ues and attitudes rather than the development of policies and technologies.
3. Access the Sustainable Development on Campus page of the Interna-
tional Institute for Sustainable Development website (www.iisd.org/educate)
and familiarize yourself with the issues. Once you have done so, go to their
Sustainable Campus Policy Bank page (www.iisd.org/educate/policybank.asp)

and review a number of the sustainable campus policies shown here. Next,
form a group of students and develop a proposal for a sustainable campus
policy at your college or university.
4. As international statements, the Brundtland Commission report and the
Earth Charter reflect the interests of both high-income industrialized coun-
tries and lower-income countries. Access the 1992 Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development (www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/)
and list what you think were the priorities of the high-income industrialized
countries, and what you think were the priorities of the lower-income coun-
tries. Identify possible conflicts between these lists of priorities that might
imperil sustainable development initiatives.
5. Read the paper The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public
Life by Robert Putnam at www.prospect.org/print/V4/13/putnam-r.html.
Write a half-page summary of what Putnam means by social capital, and
describe several real-world examples of how the stock of social capital gen-
erates an economically valuable flow of services to a community.
6. Read the paper The Value of the Worlds Ecosystem Services and Natu-
ral Capital by Robert Costanza and his colleagues at www.uvm.edu/giee/
publications/Nature_Paper.pdf. Write a half-page summary of what Costanza
et al. (1997) mean by natural capital, and describe several real-world ex-
amples of how the stock of natural capital generates an economically valu-
able flow of ecological goods and/or services to people.
7. Can we achieve sustainability, as that term is understood in this text-
book, in the absence of democracy? How does this relate to the role of Platos
philosopher-king, and to modern nation-states ruled by Islamic law? What
sort of protections would need to be in place to assure that a democracy is
consistent with sustainability principles?
Internet Links
Agenda 21 (www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21): Agenda 21, the

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Statement of Prin-
ciples for the Sustainable Management of Forests, were adopted by more than
178 governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992.
ConservationEconomy.net (www.conservationeconomy.net): A project

of Ecotrust, this website describes the elements of the conservation
economy and provides a number of case studies drawn from the Pacific
Northwest.
Earth Charter USA (www.earthcharterusa.org): A U.S. organization that

seeks to promote the Earth Charter and sustainability.
Earth Council (www.earthcouncil.com): The Earth Council is an inter-

national nongovernmental organization (NGO) that was created in Sep-
tember 1992 to promote and advance the implementation of the Earth
Summit agreements.
International Institute for Sustainable Development (www.iisd.org): Since

its incorporation in 1990, IISD has worked to help decision makers under-
stand the principles of sustainable development and how to put them into
practice. This site contains an enormous volume of useful information.
IISD Sustainable Development Timeline (www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/

sd_timeline2002.pdf): Nice PDF file that provides a detailed timeline on the
history of sustainable development.
SD Gateway (http://sdgateway.net): The SD Gateway integrates the on-

line information developed by members of the Sustainable Development
Communications Network. They offer more than 1,200 on-line documents
related to sustainable development, a calendar of events, a job bank, the
Sustainability Web Ring, a roster of mailing lists (listservs), and news sites
dealing with sustainable development.
Sustainable Development on Campus (www.iisd.org/educate): IISD

Internet site provides tools for making campuses more sustainable.
The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life

(www.prospect.org/print/V4/13/putnam-r.html): Learn more about the
value of social capital in this spring 1993 article by Robert Putnam published
in the American Prospect.
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (www.un.org/

esa/sustdev/csd/csd13/csd13.htm): The Division for Sustainable Develop-
ment provides leadership and is an authoritative source of expertise within
the United Nations system on sustainable development.
Worldwatch Institute (www.worldwatch.org): A leading source of infor-

mation on the interactions among key environmental, social, and economic
trends. Their work revolves around the transition to an environmentally sus-
tainable and socially just societyand how to achieve it.
Arrow, K., P. Dasgupta, L. Goulder, G. Daily, P. Ehrlich, G. Heal, S. Levin, K-G.

Maler, S. Schneider, D. Starrett, and B. Walker. 2004. Are We Consuming Too
Much? Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (3): 14772.
Berkes, F., and C. Folke. 1994. Investing in Cultural Capital for Sustainable Use of
Natural Capital. In Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Ap-
proach to Sustainability, ed. A. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza.
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Bruntland, G. (ed.). 1987. Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Costanza, R., and H. Daly. 1992. Natural Capital and Sustainable Development.
Conservation Biology 6 (March): 3746.
Costanza, R., R. dArge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B. Hannon, K. Limburg,
The Value of the Worlds Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital. Nature 387
(15 May): 25360.
Daily, G. 1997. Natures Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems.
Covelo, CA: Island Press.
Daly, H., and J. Cobb. 1989. For the Common Good. Boston: Beacon Press.
Dasgupta, P., and K-G. Maler. 1996. Environmental Economics in Poor Countries:
The Current State and a Program for Improvement. Environment and Develop-
ment Economics 1 (February): 37.
de Waal, F. 2005. How Animals Do Business. Scientific American 292 (April): 7379.
Johnson, K. 1997. Toward a Sustainable Region: Evolving Strategies for Reconciling
Community and the Environment. Seattle: Northwest Policy Center, University of
Washington.
Kohler, T., G. Gumerman, and R. Reynolds. 2005. Simulating Ancient Societies.
Scientific American 293 (July): 7784.
Meadows, D.H., D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. Behrens (Club of Rome). 1972.
The Limits to Growth. New York: Universe Books.
Proops, J., M. Faber, R. Mansetten, and F. Jost. 1996. Achieving a Sustainable World.
Ecological Economics 17 (June): 13335.
Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Trivers, R. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biol-
ogy 46: 3557.
Viederman, S. 1993. A Dream of Sustainability. Ecological Economics 8: 17779.
. 1996. Sustainabilitys Five Capitals and Three Pillars. In Building Sustain-
able Societies: A Blueprint for a Post-Industrial World, ed. D. Pirages. Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Wackernagel, M., and W. Rees. 1997. Perceptual and Structural Barriers to Investing
in Natural Capital: Economics from an Ecological Footprint Perspective. Eco-
logical Economics 20 (1): 324.
Zakaria, F. 2003. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.
New York: W.W. Norton.
13
Recognizing
Interdependencies and
Thinking Long Term
Introduction
Moving toward a more sustainable society requires an understanding of

the interactions between the elements of the three pillarseconomy, com-
munity, and environmentover a long-term time horizon. This chapter will
highlight a number of the more prominent factors and describe their rela-
tionship to the three pillars of sustainability. In the second part of this chapter,
we will discuss the challenge of developing long-term policies for
sustainability in political and economic contexts that tend to favor shorter-
term approaches.
Recognizing Interdependencies
There is a tendency to approach fields of study such as economics, sociol-

ogy, and environmental science in isolation from one another. This is the
traditional way in which colleges and universities construct their major cur-
ricula. This approach tends to create isolated fields of expertise with rela-
tively limited interdisciplinary skills. To some extent, this is necessary in
order to build depth and core competencies. Nevertheless, sustainability stud-
ies demand an interdisciplinary approach. Moreover, economic, social, and
environmental processes do not operate in isolation, which suggests that these
discipline-centered boundaries are to some extent artificial and dysfunctional.
339
This section of the chapter describes a few of the better-known interdiscipli-

nary topics that relate to the three pillars of sustainability.
The Industrial Revolution and the Agrarian Transition
The theory of path dependence suggests that where we are today, and where
we are going to be in the future, can be explained in part by the particular
series of events that make up our history. From this perspective, the human
world is where it is today in large part because of our common experience
with the industrialization process that transformed the way people live and
relate to the world around them.
Prior to the industrial revolution, traditional agriculture was small in
scale and labor-intensive. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Thomas Jefferson
saw small-scale, traditional agriculture as being at the center of healthy
and thriving local communities. As economies industrialize and make greater
and greater use of capital equipment, the scale economies that are inherent
to capital lead to unit production costs that are lower for large farms than
for small farms. Farmworkers displaced by this process frequently move to
urban centers looking for work. This process leads to a small number of
large-scale, highly capitalized farms. These large farms specialize rather
than having both livestock and crops, so chemical fertilizer, which is cheaper
to apply, replaces the old system of spreading manure from the livestock
onto the cropped fields. Food becomes relatively cheaper, and a large labor
force is available for large-scale, low-wage manufacturing. In the United
States, it took many years for workers to fully share in the gains created by
the industrial revolution.
The agrarian transition can be accelerated by international trade agree-
ments such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
focuses on reducing barriers to trade, thereby more fully realizing the aggre-
gate material gains from trade (more on this topic later in the chapter). In the
case of NAFTA, Mexico was required to reduce barriers to U.S. and Cana-
dian agricultural commodities. Since the time of Mexicos colonization, an
elite class, descending from the Spanish colonists, owned most of the pro-
ductive land in Mexico, thereby controlling most of the countrys power and
wealth, while the majority of the population worked in poverty. A key out-
come of the Mexican revolution was land reform, which broke up the haci-
endas and ranchos and created the ejido, or farm cooperative program, that
redistributed much of the countrys land from the wealthy landholders to the
peasants. The ejidos are still in place today and comprise nearly half of all
the farmland in Mexico. With the advent of capital-intensive and highly sub-
sidized agriculture in the United States, large U.S. farms are able to produce
INTERDEPENDENCIES AND THINKING LONG TERM 341
agricultural commodities in many cases much cheaper than on the under-

capitalized ejidos in Mexico. As a result, removal of Mexican trade barriers
has increased the flow of U.S. agricultural commodities into Mexico (from
$2.9 billion in 1993, before NAFTA was implemented, to $4.2 billion in
2001), thereby displacing Mexican farmworkers and accelerating the pro-
cess of migration into the urban centers of Mexico and into the United States.
Many undocumented immigrants in the United States come from Mexican
states that have been affected most negatively by the agriculture sections of
NAFTA, including Guererro, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Morelos, Puebla,
Quertaro, and Michoacn.
The process of assimilating displaced farmworkers in increasingly indus-
trialized urban societies is a significant challenge confronting low-income
countries as well as the richer countries to which many of these people mi-
grate for work. The results are seen in the squalor of growing shantytowns on
the outskirts of many cities around the world, and both legal and undocu-
mented immigration into more industrialized countries. The jobs available to
undocumented immigrants are usually less safe, and in agricultural settings
may involve exposure to harmful pesticides and other agricultural chemi-
cals. Substantial steps are needed to improve the economic, social, and envi-
ronmental conditions of these recent migrants.
Many recent migrants working in richer countries remit a portion of their
income to their families back home. These remittances help sustain rural com-
munities that have been impacted by the agrarian transition, and represent a
significant portion of the economies of many lower-income countries. For ex-
ample, in 2004 the Banco de Mxico (Mexicos central bank) estimated that
Mexicans living abroad remitted $17 billion to Mexico, larger than the rev-
enues derived from either Mexicos oil exports or from foreign tourism into
Mexico, and supporting an estimated one out of every ten families in Mexico.
The Inter-American Development Bank forecasted that an estimated $30 bil-
lion in remittances was sent to Latin America in 2004 from the United States.
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean basin have contributed about
one-half of the U.S. foreign-born population and receive almost one-third of
the worlds remittances. According to Inter-American Development Bank esti-
mates, three-quarters of remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean origi-
nate in the United States. The World Bank (2004a) estimated that total world
remittance flows to lower-income countries totaled $93 billion in 2003, dwarf-
ing the $58 billion in official aid flows to lower-income countries. As of 2001,
remittances to Haiti, Jordan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Jamaica represented
more than 10 percent of their GDP.
Due to factors such as the agrarian transition, cities in lower-income coun-
tries are where the great majority of the worlds population growth is fore-
cast to occur in the twenty-first century. In particular, at the UN-sponsored

Habitat II Summit in Istanbul in 1996, it was reported that 40 to 50 percent of
the worlds population lives in urban slums, and that people of the develop-
ing world continue to pour into these cities hoping to find a chance for a
better life. By 2015, only one of the globes ten largest cities (predicted to
range in population from 19 million to 27.4 million people) will be in a rich
country of the developed world. The process of providing energy, shelter,
and transportation to these rapidly growing urban centers will strain the re-
sources of low-income countries. Lack of access to cleaner technologies may
result in an industrialization path that, like that of the rich countries before
them, involves a period of intense pollution, which makes sustainable devel-
opment in the cities of developing countries a global problem.
Income, Poverty, and Economic Growth
From the material perspective of income and consumption, poverty occurs

when people lack access to economic resources sufficient for them to meet
their basic material needs, and are therefore physiologically deprived. How-
ever, poverty also includes social deprivation, in which people are denied
opportunities for improving their situation, and thus are robbed of dignity,
confidence, and self-respect. The circumstances of those in poverty are often
such that they have no choice but to live and work in the most polluted and
degraded of environments. Moreover, those in poverty lack access to resources
to meet their basic material needs, let alone to restore and conserve their
natural environment. Poor communities are oftentimes politically disenfran-
chised and therefore are exposed to environmentally unjust policies.
In order to have a common reference point for estimating poverty world-
wide, the World Bank uses reference lines set at $1 and $2 per day (ad-
justed for inflation), with the former serving as a threshold for extreme
poverty. Based on these benchmark income thresholds, the World Bank
estimated that in 2003 there were 1.2 billion people out of the developing
worlds 4.8 billion people living on $1 per day, while another 2.8 billion
were living on less than $2 per day. The World Bank (www.worldbank.org)
also reports that the proportion of people living in extreme poverty on less
than $1 a day dropped by almost half between 1981 and 2001, from 40
percent to 21 percent of the global population. In terms of population num-
bers, these percentages imply that the number people living in extreme
poverty fell from 1.5 billion in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001. The World Bank
also provides information on poverty from a regional standpoint, elements
of which are summarized below.
Among the regions of the developing world, East Asia is making the most
rapid progress in poverty reduction. Dramatic economic growth in the region

has pulled more than 500 million people out of poverty, and GDP per capita
tripled. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in East Asia fell
from 58 to 16 percent. Huge regional disparities remain, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, where the number of poor people has increased significantly
during the same time period and is projected to continue rising. In 1980 one
out of every ten poor people in the world lived in sub-Saharan Africa. In
2000 the figure rose to one out of every three. Future projections predict that
one out of every two poor people will live in sub-Saharan Africa. Between
1981 and 2001, the number of poor in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 164
million to 314 million, and real per capita GDP declined there by 14 percent.
In Latin America the proportion of poor in the population has been almost
unchanged since 1981, with about 10 percent living on $1 a day, while an-
other 25 percent live on $2 a day. Finally, the percentage of poor in the over-
all population has also decreased in South Asia, although the numbers have
not fallen by very much due a rapid population growth in the region. The
number of people living on less than $1 a day dropped by just 34 million
since 1990, to 428 million in 2001.
The United Nations Human Development Report (United Nations 2000)
finds that about one-third of the worlds countries experienced a drop in per
capita GDP during the 1990s, including nearly one-half of those in sub-Sa-
haran Africa and the majority of those in Eastern Europe. Thus chapter 4 of
Agenda 21 from the Earth Summit concludes that high levels of consump-
tion by the wealthy few results in excessive demands and unsustainable life-
styles among the richer segments, which place immense stress on the
environment. The poorer segments, meanwhile, are unable to meet food, health
care, shelter, and educational needs. Yet as the Human Development Report
also observes, there is no automatic link between economic growth and
progress in human development. Some countries have had fast growth and
little improvement in human development, while others have had low growth
and yet more rapid improvements in human development. The Human De-
velopment Report argues that in order for economic growth to improve the
well-being of all people, it must prevent those who failed to gain from growth
from falling into abject poverty, create jobs, ensure wide participation, pro-
tect the environment for future generations, and protect cultural traditions.
Economic growth has complex links to the sustainability of production
and consumption. This is particularly evident in the case of energy and eco-
nomic growth. On the production side, energy intensitya measure of the
quantity of energy required on average to produce the equivalent of a dollar
of GDPhas declined in most countries around the world. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the worlds energy intensity
declined an average of 1.3 percent per year between 1980 and 2001 (U.S.
EIA website). In the case of China, the largest energy consumer among de-
veloping countries in Asia, the reduction in energy intensity has been attrib-
uted to improving technical efficiency associated with new capital. Economies
with more rapid economic growth, such as Chinas, tend to have more rapid
upgrading of production capital, which tends to be associated with improve-
ments in energy efficiency. On the consumption side, however, economic
growth tends to be associated with increases in energy consumption. For
example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that world-
wide electricity consumption is expected to nearly double between 2001 and
2025 (U.S. EIA website). The strongest electricity-consumption growth rates
are projected for the countries of the developing world, where net electricity
consumption is forecasted to rise by 3.5 percent per year, compared with a
projected average increase of 2.3 percent per year worldwide. The EIA ar-
gues that robust economic growth in many of the worlds developing nations
is expected to boost demand for electricity to run newly purchased home
appliances for air conditioning, cooking, space and water heating, and refrig-
eration. There is a similar pattern for oil consumption and economic growth.
There have been moderately successful efforts at decoupling energy consump-
tion and economic growth, particularly in Western Europe. For example, in the
United Kingdom over the last thirty-one years, GDP has increased by 106
percent, while total energy consumption in that same period rose by only 12
percent, and carbon dioxide emissions fell by around 20 percent.
Among the worlds poorest countries, increased income is needed for those
basic requirements that people in industrialized countries often take for
grantedsanitation and water treatment, food storage, remediation of gross
pollution problems, and fuel for heating and cooking. With water, for ex-
ample, the basic need is to separate and properly treat drinking/cleaning water
and wastewater. According to the World Bank (2004b), about one-fifth of the
people living in the developing world were without access to safe water in
2000, while one-half lived without adequate sanitation, and 90 percent lived
without their wastewater treated in any way. The World Bank reports that
while there have been gains, some of which were associated with the United
Nations Decade for Water and Sanitation program, access to water and sani-
tation lags far behind the milestones set in the 1980s.
According to the World Bank, 5 to 6 million people die each year in de-
veloping countries due to waterborne diseases and air pollution. They esti-
mate that the economic costs of environmental degradation have been
estimated at 4 to 8 percent of GDP per year in many developing countries.
The World Bank (1993) measured the present value of future years of dis-
ability-free life lost due to premature death or to disability from air or water
pollution in a given year. Disability-free life expectancy is a key human capi-

tal indicator of sustainability. The World Bank study found that people in
very low-income regions suffer much higher rates of illness and disabilities
caused by bad air and water. The rate per 1,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa
was 120, approximately 70 for India, more than 60 for the Middle East, ap-
proximately 15 for China, and approximately 7 for established market econo-
mies. In countries with more than 20 percent of their population subsisting
on $1 per day or less, at least 40 percent of children are affected by stunted
growth, and people subsist on about half the amount of fresh water per capita
as in richer countries (World Bank 1994). Half of the worlds poor live in
ecologically fragile rural areas and rely almost entirely on natural resources
for day-to-day survival. Under these conditions, food insecurity leads to the
development of agriculture on unsuitable terrain such as steep, erosion-prone
slopes or nutrient-poor rain forest floors (Barrett 1996).
People who have inadequate food, water, and shelter for themselves and
their children, and people, especially children, suffering from waterborne
diseases and malnutrition, are under tremendous pressure to deal with todays
crisis and may have to choose between protecting natural resources for the
future and keeping themselves and their children fed today. Very poor re-
gions and countries are the least resilient to stresses and shocks such as
droughts, population booms, and political instabilities. When poor people
live in ecologically fragile areas, the response to shocks may be to intensify
deforestation, rangeland degradation, or displacement of wildlife habitat. In
a very stark sense, the high cost of energy-efficient and cleaner technologies,
and the opportunity cost of protecting biodiversity and wildlife habitat, may
make important elements of protection and conservation a luxury good that
only the rich countries can afford.
Population growth in lower-income countries has increased the scarcity
of resources such as firewood for heating and cooking food, clean water for
drinking and cleaning, fertile ground for raising food, and habitat for fishery
resources. Industrialized countries have developed substitutes and energy-
efficient technologies for overcoming the scarcity of these resources, yet
these substitutes are costly. For example, pipeline infrastructure can be used
to deliver natural gas and water to households, thereby reducing pressure on
forests, freeing up labor for more productive activities, and improving sani-
tation. Similarly, relatively simple alternative energy technology, such as solar
ovens, allows an even more complete move toward sustainability. The prob-
lem is that people in low-income countries may be priced out of the market
for more sustainable production technologies.
There have been a number of economic studies that find evidence for an
inverted-U-shaped relationship between levels of environmental harms (e.g.,
Figure 13.1 The Environmental Kuznets Curve
Environmental
harm
Turning
point
Increasing Decreasing
environmental environmental
harm harm
Per capita
income
atmospheric concentrations of certain pollutants) and per capita income as

measured by real GDP (Selden and Song 1994; Grossman and Krueger 1993;
Hettige, Lucas, and Wheeler 1992; World Bank 1995). This inverted-U rela-
tionship follows a pattern similar to the hypothesis by Kuznets (1955) that
income inequality first rises, and then declines, with economic development.
Thus, the inverted-U relationship between pollution concentrations and per
capita real GDP is usually referred to as the environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC), such as the one illustrated in Figure 13.1. The idea is that as low-
income countries industrialize, increased production and consumption is ini-
tially fueled by burning coal and other relatively dirty fossil fuels. Thus, as
Kander (2002) found for the case of Sweden in the 1950s, carbon intensities
tend to be high in this stage of industrialization. As a result, the worlds worst
urban air pollution tends to occur in newly industrializing low-income coun-
tries where ambient concentrations of sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, lead,
particulate matter, and nitrogen oxides are high. As countries become richer,
they purchase a cleaner environment through more stringent environmental
regulations, change the fuels they use (i.e., replace coal with natural gas),
use newer and more efficient capital equipment, and move the dirtiest indus-
tries to less regulated countries. This pattern would explain the difference in
concentrations of atmospheric sulfur dioxide emissions between, say, a non-
industrialized country in comparison to China, and China in comparison to
Germany.
An unfortunate implication of much of this empirical research is that coun-
tries such as China, India, and many countries in Latin America and Africa
are on the left-hand curve of the EKC, meaning that incremental increases in
income will create more rather than less pollution in the near future. Not all
pollutants follow the EKC pattern. For example, there is a direct relationship
between per capita income and garbage, and this direct relationship does not
appear to decline at higher income levels. It has been found, for example,
that a 40 percent increase in the GDP of countries belonging to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 1980 has
been accompanied by the same percentage growth in municipal waste. A
similar pattern may also hold for carbon dioxide emissions. Moreover, not
all economists accept the EKC relationship as a general metaphor for the
relationship between income and sustainability. For example, in comment-
ing on the EKC relationship, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow and colleagues
(1996, p. 106) point out:
While they [advocates for the EKC] do indicate that economic growth may
be associated with improvements in some environmental indicators, they
imply neither that economic growth is sufficient to induce environmental
improvements in general, nor that the environmental effects of growth may
be ignored, nor, indeed, that the Earths resource base is capable of sup-
porting indefinite economic growth. In fact, if this base were to be irrevers-
ibly degraded, economic activity itself could be at risk.
Along these same lines, Copeland and Taylor (2004) note that while there
is evidence of an EKC in some cases, their skepticism remains about the
existence of a simple, predictable, and general relationship between pollu-
tion and per capita income.
Arrow et al. point out that the inverted-U relationship has not been shown
to hold for accumulated stocks of waste or pollutants involving long-term or
more dispersed costs (such as CO2), for resource stocks, or for systemwide
consequences (for example, reductions in one country pop up as increases
elsewhere). Finally, Arrow et al. argue that most reductions in pollutants are
attributable to local institutional reforms such as environmental regulations,

market-based incentives, and empowerment to reduce environmental impacts.
Another argument linking income growth to sustainability comes from a
World Bank (1995) report indicating that most rich countries have fossil-fuel
taxes, which discourage fossil-fuel use, while lower-income countries actu-
ally subsidize such energy use. We will discuss this point in detail below. Yet
another point in favor of the argument that economic growth is needed for
low-income countries to become environmentally sustainable is that rising
incomes tend to be associated with declining population growth rates, which
is also explained in greater detail below.
To summarize, then, economic growth produces income that raises many
(if not all) people out of poverty, and higher incomes are associated with
lower fertility rates, safer drinking water, and the prevalence of cleaner and
less resource-intensive production technologies. Nevertheless, there are
strong counterarguments to the idea that higher incomes move us closer to
a sustainable society. One could argue that it is the rich countries, after all,
that consume the great majority of the worlds resources and are respon-
sible for a disproportionate percentage of the worlds trash, toxic emis-
sions, ozone-depleting chemicals, and greenhouse gases. For example, with
5 percent of the worlds population, the United States generates 19 percent
of the worlds wastes and consumes 20 percent of the worlds metals, 24
percent of its energy, and 25 percent of its fossil fuels. International trade
between rich countries and less democratic low-income countries that fail
to honor land tenure and property rights can accelerate unsustainable re-
source harvest rates.
Can economic growth be sustainable? Free-market economists who focus
on the self-correcting properties of well-functioning competitive markets will
usually endorse this view. Others, particularly ecologists, take a more skep-
tical view (more on this in chapter 14). Ayres (1996) argues that it is quite
possible to have economic growthin the sense of providing better and more
valuable services to ultimate consumerswithout necessarily consuming
more physical resources (p. 118). The flow of natural resources (e.g., wood,
energy, plastic, metals, food) through extraction, the production and distri-
bution of goods, consumption, and disposal is sometimes known as the ma-
terial throughput of an economy. It can be argued that the problem of the
sustainability of a macroeconomy is less about economic growth per se, and
more about the nature of what is produced and how. A country with eco-
nomic growth and declining material throughput could actually be making
more progress toward sustainability than a society with no economic growth
but rising material throughput. Declining material throughput in the context
of growing real GDP could occur, for example, with a shift to production and
consumption of high-quality services associated with long-lived, durable,

and energy-efficient consumer goods that can easily be disassembled for
reuse or recycling at the end of their product life. Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins
(1999) refer to this as the service and flow economy, and describe straight-
forward wayssuch as leasing rather than owningto get there. Other ways
that throughput can be reduced include the purchase of locally produced
food and other products that embody less transportation energy, and a gen-
eral shift from quantity to quality.
Costanza and Daly (1992) argue that the term economic growth should be
used when throughput is increased, while the term development should be
used when economic growth occurs because of increased resource and orga-
nizational efficiency that does not increase throughput. Ayres (1996) observes
that increasingly resource-efficient technologies allow for a de-linking of
large elements of economic activity from energy and other material through-
puts, a process sometimes known as dematerialization, which has occurred
to some extent with computer and telecommunications technologies. By the
same token, policies that focus on economic growth, as measured by GDP,
will not necessarily improve the well-being of people or lead to a more sus-
tainable society. We will discuss the relationship between GDP and sustain-
able development in chapter 13.
Education, Empowerment, and Justice
Sustainability is not simply restricted to the relationship between econom-

ics and the environment. Just as important is a variety of social, cultural,
and political empowerment issues. Failures of empowerment lead to de-
pendency, exploitation, and a wide variety of other ills. Important areas for
empowerment include recognizing the rights of communities to manage
the local common-pool resources upon which they rely, and giving women
access to education, employment, land ownership, and influence over poli-
cies that affect them.
One indicator of empowerment is the adoption of democratic institutions
in government. The World Bank (1999) reports that the number of demo-
cratically governed countries has grown steadily. Yet in many parts of the
world, the empowerment of women remains largely unfulfilled. As of 1995,
more than 60 percent of the worlds poor were women, and growth in the
poverty rate has been higher for women than for men. Estimates that are
more recent reveal that approximately 64 percent of the worlds illiterate are
women and girls, up from 58 percent in 1960 (United Nations Development
Program 2002, hereinafter UNDP). According to the United Nations, in coun-
tries such as Yemen, Iraq, and Senegal, more than two-thirds of all women
are illiterate, and even in countries such as India more than half of all women
are illiterate. Significant gaps continue to exist in school enrollment between
boys and girls. According to the World Bank (1999), two-thirds of the chil-
dren without access to even a primary education in lower-income countries
are girls. The International Labor Organization reports that women are more
likely than men to find employment in the informal economy, which lacks
the same degree of legal and regulatory protections afforded by regular em-
ployment. Women own less than 1 percent of the worlds property. Accord-
ing to Human Rights Education Associates, women held only a small fraction
of the seats in the worlds national congresses and parliaments, accounting
for only about 14 percent of all legislative seats in 2002. As a final point,
women and children experience high levels of rape and other forms of vio-
lence during periods of war and conflict, and represent a majority of the
worlds refugees and displaced peoples (Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio 1992;
Erlich, Erlich, and Daily 1995; Mehra 1996).
A strong inverse relationship exists between various measures of womens
empowerment (educational access and attainment, access to jobs and em-
ployment, reproductive decision-making opportunities) and total fertility rates.
For example, the relationship between female literacy and fertility rates is
described in the following excerpt from a speech given by Federico Mayor,
the director general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO):
Education has . . . been central to Thailands dramatic success in reducing

population increase. In a country where 90 percent of women are literate,
the average number of children per woman fell from 6.1 in 196570 to
only 2.2 in 1987 and was matched by a sharp drop in infant mortality and
substantial economic progress. In Brazil, illiterate women produce an av-
erage of 6.5 children, while women with secondary education only 2.5.
Sub-Saharan Africa, where female literacy averages only 15 percent, sig-
nificantly has some of the highest rates of population growth. No one, of
course, would seek to deny the complexity of population issues or the many
factors involved in the reduction of fertilityincluding the socioeconomic
context, the availability of family planning services and, in some cases,
direct incentives to limit family size. However, it is clear from the World
Fertility Surveys and many other studies that education, particularly of
girls and women, is the key to reducing fertility, whatever the socioeco-
nomic or cultural context. (www.un.org/popin/confcon/poped/anx3wp.htm)
Likewise, Martin and Juarez (1995, p. 52) offer the following insights
into the relationship between female education and total fertility rates in Latin
America:
According to data from Demographic and Health Surveys for nine Latin
American countries, women with no education have large families of 67 chil-
dren, whereas better-educated women have family sizes of 23 children, analo-
gous to those of women in the developed world. Despite these wide differen-
tials in actual fertility, desired family size is surprisingly homogeneous through-
out the educational spectrum. While the least educated and the best-educated
women share the small family norm, the gap in contraceptive prevalence be-
tween the two groups ranges from 2050 percentage points. Better educated
women have broader knowledge, higher socioeconomic status and less fatalis-
tic attitudes toward reproduction than do less educated women.
As well as having fewer children, educated women are more likely to

have better fed, and therefore healthier, childrenwho will themselves be
better educated. An increase in educational attainment by women is also gen-
erally associated with increased labor-force participation rates among women
and decreased rates among children, with higher life expectancies, with in-
creased use of contraceptives, and with safer drinking water. It seems clear,
therefore, that the education and empowerment of women is closely tied to
sustainability.
Mehra (1996) reports that the majority of poor women in developing coun-
tries support their families through farming and the raising of livestock, and
thus are at the heart of where new and more sustainable practices must be
implemented. In many parts of Africa, women provide the majority of the
labor for food production, which in many cases results in nearly one-half the
cash-equivalent value of household income. Women play a central role in
collecting livestock feed and water and in providing labor for gathering
fuelwood. Yet in many of these same countries, women are blocked from
owning land and thus receive only a small fraction of development funds
going to agriculture. By working land they do not own, women lack the
incentive to make long-term investments that benefit the environment, such
as the planting of trees. In fact, in some parts of Africa, Mehra reports that
land tenure is linked to the planting of trees, and men prevent women from
planting trees as a way to keep them from gaining land ownership and power.
Moreover, women are frequently not given the same access to economic
development and conservation resources. External aid organizations have in
the past been unaware of the key role of women in agriculture and resource
management and so have developed site-specific plans with men, with the
result being misdesigned projects that omit those who are responsible for
carrying them out.
Looking beyond the issue of gender, another manifestation of empower-
ment is the provision of secure land tenure to farmers. A lack of secure, long-
term land tenure can reduce farmers incentives to make beneficial long-term
investments in the land that they work. For example, lack of secure land
tenure in China has led to a reluctance by farmers to sink money and labor
into land improvements such as terraces to limit erosion because farmers
fear that they may not be able to keep farming the land long enough to real-
ize a return on their investment (Prosterman, Hanstad, and Ping 1996). Se-
curing land tenure may involve recognizing, and returning to, locally devised
systems of private and common property.
Exploitation, which is obviously inconsistent with sustainability, is more
likely to obtain when there is a substantial asymmetry in local power and a
failure to recognize local property rights regimes and the right to local self-
governance. For example, local communities and tribespeople of Ogoniland
in Nigeria have little control over the massive oil development and collateral
environmental degradation from corporations such as Royal DutchShell in
partnership with the Nigerian government. Income from oil development
enriches the military regime of Nigeria, which has executed a number of
dissident Ogoni tribespeople who protested the environmental degradation,
including activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Similarly, native Papuans have suffered
because of the huge Freeport mine.
Multinational corporations might claim that if they did not do business
with governments accused of extensive human rights and environmental
abuses then others would, and those others would not have the same degree
of ethical control. Moreover, multinational corporations might also argue
that their presence generates income that will eventually raise local living
standards. Both points can be argued, just as one could argue that these cor-
porations could use their advantage to foster reforms and pressure the more
repressive governments with which they do business.
Income inequality is both a cause and a manifestation of asymmetries in
empowerment and educational access. As of 2003, the richest 20 percent of
the worlds population received 85 percent of total world income, or about
60 times the 1.4 percent of total world income received by the poorest 20
percent of the worlds population. By way of comparison, in 1960 the richest
20 percent had only 30 times the income of the bottom 20 percent. The Hu-
man Development Report 2003 (UNDP 2003) describes income inequality
using a Gini coefficient (derived from a Lorenz curve diagram), where a value
of 0 indicates perfect equality and a value of 1.0 total inequality. That report
found that incomes are distributed more unequally across the worlds people
(with a Gini coefficient of 0.66) than within the most unequal countries (Bra-
zil, for example, has a Gini coefficient of 0.61). The Human Development
Report 2003 also notes that the gap between the worlds richest and poorest
countries has been increasing, and that inequality had been increasing in
many of the worlds developing countries. That report goes on to note that
the richest 1 percent of the worlds population receives as much as the poor-
est 57 percent, and that the 25 million richest Americans have as much in-
come as almost 2 billion of the worlds poorest people.
Countries with the most unequal distributions of income also tend to be
relatively poor, an issue investigated by Simon Kuznets (1955). More re-
cently, Persson and Tabellini (1994) studied fifty-six countries and found a
strong negative relationship between income inequality and growth in per
capita income, which they attributed to government policies that failed to
protect individual rights and appropriated the returns on effort and other in-
vestments. Similarly, World Bank researchers report that unequal distribu-
tions of assets such as land form an even greater impediment to economic
growth (Deininger and Squire 1997). In many cases a political/economic
elite controls most of these countries income-generating resources and so
gets most of the income. For example, the Economist (5 August 2000) re-
ports that the Suharto family was alleged to have corruptly amassed a $45
billion fortune. Prior to his ouster in 1998, President Suhartos children were
reportedly involved in almost every aspect of the countrys economic life.
When asked how Indonesias economy is run, President Suharto reportedly
replied, my children are very good in business. Income inequality is not
just a problem in the poor countries, however. The OECD recently reported
that the United States has the most unequal distribution of income among the
rich countries. Obviously, one implication of income inequality is that infor-
mation on average per capita income is not very descriptive of the condi-
tions under which most people live.
Highly unequal distributions of income, and the mass poverty that goes
with them, are difficult to reconcile with a sustainable society. Economic
systems featuring highly unequal distributions of wealth and income fre-
quently result in the political disenfranchisement of the poor, which is in-
consistent with the requirement for democratic process in a sustainable
society. In addition, most revolutions around the world have been reactions
to extremely unequal distributions of wealth and political influence, and
blockaded access to wealth-generating resources. Countries with highly
unequal distributions of income must spend substantial resources on build-
ing walled communities, prisons, and other defensive investments against
crime and theft. Of course, no country has a perfectly equal distribution of
income, nor would any country necessarily want to. There are two some-
what conflicting notions of fairness at work. One notion of fairness is that
a persons income should match the value of the work he or she does, which
naturally leads to some inequality but provides desirable incentives. An-
other notion of fairness is that of fundamental human rights, from which
one might argue that it is morally wrong for one person to be a billionaire
while another starves in the street.
Government failure in providing education and opportunities to all people
has led to the emergence of NGOsnongovernmental organizationsto deal
with rural development, small-farmer rights, urban service provision, and
protection of natural resources. NGOs include international development
organizations (the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank),
human rights organizations (Amnesty International), environmental organi-
zations (Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund [WWF]), unions, and so forth.
A remarkably successful form of empowerment is the provision of
microscale loanable funds to help people living in poverty start small busi-
nesses. Traditional banks will not lend to people who do not own valuable
assets that can be pledged to secure repayment, and venture capitalists (those
who capitalize entrepreneurs with funds from sources such as pension funds,
university endowments, foundations, and wealthy individuals) rarely work
with small or microscale entrepreneurs. A positive development in the area
of womens empowerment and the alleviation of poverty is the creation of
Bangladeshs Grameen Bank and similar organizations that specialize in
microlending. In 1976 economist Muhammad Yunus went into the villages
of Bangladesh to try to find out how the poor of Bangladesh could be helped.
In one village, Yunus found forty-one people engaged in activities such as
making bamboo stools and earning wages of only 2 cents a day. What they
lacked was the equivalent of $26 to capitalize small businesses that would
make them entrepreneurs capable of earning substantially more money.
Yunus created the Grameen (village) Bank to provide microloans to the
most impoverished and oppressed villagers so they could set up their own
small businesses to produce goods such as baskets, fishnets, and food. As of
2005, 96 percent of Grameens 4 million borrowers (in nearly 48,000 vil-
lages) were women. Yunus found that women proved to be more disciplined
and resourceful borrowers, were more reliable in repaying their loans, and
could be counted on to share profits with their families (Counts 1996). These
microloans have played a surprisingly central role in alleviating poverty.
Approximately 99 percent of the loans have been repaid, a rate higher than
for traditional banks in the area that lend to wealthier people. A key reason
for this high repayment rate, and for the success of Grameen-style banking,
is that individual loans are made in the context of a peer group or solidarity
group. Each member of the solidarity group assumes responsibility for guar-
anteeing the repayment of loans extended to every other member (Stix 1997).
These solidarity groups serve as an alternative to collateral in guaranteeing
loan repayment.
The Grameen Bank has elevated an estimated 48 percent of its women bor-
rowers above the poverty line and 34 percent of the others very close to the
line. Among a control group of similar families that had not been capitalized
by Grameen, only 4 percent were above the poverty line. Both Bornstein (1996)
and Counts (1996) report that the Grameen Bank has been substantially more
successful in combating poverty than traditional foreign aid or other antipov-
erty programs. By providing very poor people, especially women, with access
to credit, microcredit programs provide these people with the means to trans-
form their own and their families lives, providing better nutrition, education,
housing, and health for themselves and their children. In impoverished parts of
the world, there are few opportunities for wage and salaried employment, and
the great majority of people are self-employed. In this context, a small loan of
$150 or less, provided at a reasonable interest rate, can allow people to support
themselves, thus breaking the cycle of poverty.
Grameen-style microcredit programs are rapidly growing, and there are
microlending organizations in most countries around the world. A few of the
many microcredit organizations include Trickle Up, Opportunity International,
and SHARE. The United Nations made 2005 the International Year of
Microcredit, and microcredit is now widely acknowledged as one of the most
effective ways of elevating people out of poverty. Yet it is clear that Grameen-
style microlending cannot function in a social and political vacuumthere
must be substantial social capital within the solidarity group as well as suffi-
cient business training and accountability among both borrowers and lend-
ers. Moreover, microlending is not a panacea and should not be seen as a
substitute for education and public health programs, among others. Perfor-
mance up to now does suggest, however, that microlending is an important
tool of more sustainable economic development.
International Trade
Free or liberalized international trade and its relationship with sustainability

is another contentious subject. Free or liberalized trade means that there are
no barriers to trade. Barriers to trade usually take the form of special taxes
charged on imports (called tariffs), limits on the quantity of imports (called
quotas), or technical restrictions (e.g., restrictions on the characteristics of
products or how they are produced). The classical argument in favor of free
and unimpeded international trade, which goes back to Adam Smith and
David Ricardo, is that free trade allows for regions and countries to special-
ize in those activities that they do best. Specialization and trade create mate-
rial wealth, and increased international competition promotes innovation and
reduces consumer prices. Free trade and investment can heighten social and
environmental exploitation, however, when governments engaged in trade,
or the trade agreements they create, lack adequate democratic institutions

and processes to protect the environment and exhaustible natural resources.
For example, trade between wealthy and low-income countries can lead to a
process whereby low-income countries with lax environmental laws, poor
enforcement, or corrupt administration specialize in producing goods that
are pollution-intensive or resource-intensive, and specialize in providing waste
disposal services by accepting toxins and trash generated in wealthy coun-
tries. Trade agreements can also undermine local sovereignty and take away
tools that can be used to assure compliance with labor and environmental
standards when environmental or labor regulations are narrowly interpreted
as trade barriers. In addition, multinational corporations working in partner-
ship with corrupt government authorities can construct environmentally dam-
aging projects that displace local communities and create benefits that are
narrowly focused on the political elite. We will discuss these and other issues
below. In chapter 14 we will look at the mixed record of success with inter-
national development lending.
The Argument for Free International Trade
The modern argument for free international trade derives from a model of
trade developed by David Ricardo, which advanced even earlier work by
Adam Smith. The assumption is that potential trading partners have fixed
differences in natural resources or capital such that each can specialize in the
production of a particular good (or set of goods) that they can produce at a
lower opportunity cost than the others. Assuming that property rights are
fully articulated and respected by trading parties, and that there are no large
barriers or costs associated with trade, then specialization and trade will re-
sult in an increase in aggregate material prosperity. To see this, consider the
following simple example. Suppose that an island has a coastal zone with a
highly productive fishery, but with unproductive agricultural land. For ex-
ample, suppose that on average a person working all day could catch 20
pounds of fish per day, or produce 10 pounds of agricultural products, as
shown in Table 13.1. Consequently, resources such as labor and capital that
are applied to agricultural production on the coast come at a high opportu-
nity cost in terms of forgone fish production, since these resources can be
more productively applied to fishing. In this example, a day spent in agricul-
tural work generates an opportunity cost of 20 pounds of fish.
Suppose that the island also has an interior that has highly productive
agricultural land. Therefore, resources such as labor and capital that are
applied to fish production in the interior come at a high opportunity cost,
since they can be more productively applied to agriculture. For example,
Table 13.1
An Illustrative Example of Bilateral Trade
Country Fish production per Agricultural production per

person per day (lbs) person per day (lbs)
Coast 20 10
Interior 5 30
suppose that on average a person working all day in the interior could catch
5 pounds of fish per day, or produce 30 pounds of agricultural products, as
shown in Table 13.1. Consequently, resources such as labor and capital
that are applied to catching fish in the interior come at a high opportunity
cost in terms of foregone agricultural production, since these resources can
be more productively applied to agriculture. In this example, a day spent
fishing generates an opportunity cost of 30 pounds of agricultural prod-
ucts. Suppose further that each zone is a separate country. In the absence of
international trade, agricultural products will be very expensive in the coastal
country due to their relative scarcity and high opportunity cost. Similarly,
fish will be very expensive in the interior country due to the high opportu-
nity cost of its production.
In the absence of trade, if people divided their time in half between fish-
ing and agriculture in each country, then on average in a day a person on the
coast would produce 10 pounds of fish and 5 pounds of agricultural prod-
ucts. In contrast, a person in the interior on average would produce 2.5 pounds
of fish and 15 pounds of agricultural products. In total, these two people
produce 12.5 pounds of fish and 20 pounds of agricultural products per day.
Thus on the coast the relative price of a pound of agricultural products would
be 2 pounds of fish, whereas in the interior the relative price of a pound of
agricultural products would be only 0.17 pounds of fish. Since agricultural
product prices are considerably higher on the coast than in the interior, entre-
preneurs will recognize that an arbitrage opportunity exists and will have an
incentive to export agricultural products from the interior to the coast where
they are more valuable. Note that an arbitrage opportunity exists when there
is a difference in prices in different markets that cannot be entirely accounted
for due to differences in shipping and transaction costs, and which therefore
promotes trade. We can also derive the relative prices of fish. On the coast,
the relative price of a pound of fish will be half a pound of agricultural prod-
ucts, while in the interior the relative price of a pound of fish will be 6 pounds
of agricultural products. Since fish prices are considerably higher in the inte-
rior than on the coast, an arbitrage opportunity exists and entrepreneurs will
have an incentive to export fish to the interior where it is more valuable.
Bargaining and trade between the coast and the interior will cause the price
of fish and agricultural products to equilibrate across the two countries.
Trade involves specialization, and in economics the Law of Comparative
Advantage states that total material wealth can be increased when goods and
services are produced by the country with the lowest opportunity cost. We
have seen that a person in the coastal country can produce a pound of fish at
an opportunity cost of only half a pound of agricultural products, whereas in
the interior the opportunity cost of producing a pound of fish is 6 pounds of
agricultural products. Since the coastal country produces fish at a low oppor-
tunity cost relative to the inland country, the coastal country should special-
ize in fish production. Their low opportunity cost gives them a comparative
advantage in producing fish relative to the inland country. Likewise, we have
seen that a person in the inland country can produce a pound of agricultural
products at an opportunity cost of only 0.17 pounds of fish, while for a per-
son on the coast the opportunity cost is 2 pounds of fish. Thus, the inland
country should specialize in agriculture, where their low opportunity cost
gives them a comparative advantage. With complete specialization and trade,
a person on the coast can produce 20 pounds of fish a day, and a person in the
interior can produce 30 pounds of agricultural products per day. Consequently,
specialization and trade results in an extra 7.5 pounds of fish and 10 pounds
of agricultural products each day relative to the scenario of no trade, where
people divided their time between the two productive activities. This illus-
trates how trade increases material wealth.
Free international trade may move us closer to a sustainable society for
several reasons listed below:
By increasing material wealth, free trade can raise incomes, improve

human health, move people out of poverty, and free up time for arts and
culture.
As wealth increases, poorer countries increasingly can afford costly but
cleaner energy technologies.
Trade exposes people to different cultures and can foster increased un-
derstanding and tolerance of diversity.
Of course, concerns regarding self-sufficiency, the cost of transporting

goods, and cultural and religious incompatibilities can reduce the gains from
free trade. Moreover, in the example given above, free trade generated cheaper
imports that displaced those coastal people engaged in relatively high-priced
agriculture, and those people from the interior who specialized in relatively
high-priced fishing. There is also no guarantee that the gains from free trade
will be distributed equitably within either country. Nevertheless, most hu-
man cultures over thousands of years have engaged in some degree of trade,
driven by the basic incentive to exploit arbitrage opportunities and improve
material standards of living. Attempts at heavily regulating or eliminating
trade will usually result in the development of black markets. As economist
Paul Krugman has stated, [i]f there were an Economists Creed it would
surely contain the affirmations, I believe in the Principle of Comparative
Advantage, and I believe in free trade (1987, p. 131).
The Argument Against Free International Trade
When the idealized conditions identified by Ricardo and later trade theo-
rists do not exist, the material gains from free trade may be overstated.
Moreover, aggregate analysis of the gains from trade often ignores the dis-
tributional consequences of trade within a society, where some people lose
their livelihoods due to cheaper imports. In addition, globalization has sub-
stantially increased the mobility of capital relative to Ricardos day. To see
this, suppose that country A has developed an automobile industry, while
country B has developed a textile industry. Once these industries are in
place, we would naturally expect that comparative advantage, specializa-
tion, and international trade in cars and clothes would proceed along the
same lines as in the island example given above. Nevertheless, what if capital
is highly mobile and labor or regulatory costs are substantially lower in
country A? Ricardos law of comparative advantage is premised on immo-
bility of the factor of production that produces the comparative advantage,
and does not hold if that assumption fails. While capital mobility improves
profit and reduces consumer prices, it also can lead to considerable labor
displacement, harm smaller communities that lose their factory, and force
countries to reduce health, safety, environmental, and organized labor regu-
lations in order to prevent their industry from going offshore. This latter
effect is sometimes termed a race to the bottom. Education and training
that enhances worker productivity is essential to maintaining high wages
under free trade and capital mobility.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, free trade and investment can heighten
exploitation when governments engaged in trade lack adequate democratic
institutions and processes. Chichilnisky (1994), for example, models North
South trade between a high-income country with well-defined and enforced
property rights to environmental resources and a low-income country with
poorly defined and enforced property rights. The difference in the level of
property rights enforcement is sufficient by itself to motivate bilateral trade,
because the environmental resource is underpriced in the low-income country
relative to the high-income country due to the exhaustion of Hotelling rents
(discussed in chapter 5). She shows that the tragedy of the commons effect
in the low-income country is worsened by trade and transmitted to the entire
world economy. Overproduction of the environmental resource in the low-
income country is matched by overconsumption of the resource in the high-
income country. Thus, it is not necessarily efficient for countries in the South
to specialize in dirty, resource-extractive production.
Along these same lines, the United Nations Environment Program (1999,
p. 1) notes:
Recently . . . there has been an increasing concern over the potential nega-
tive impacts of trade liberalization, particularly on the environmental and
natural resources of developing countries and countries with economies in
transition where trade has grown most rapidly. These countries have found
that economic activities supporting, or supported by, rapidly expanded trade
can result in serious environmental degradation when complementary en-
vironmental policies are not in place. Unless appropriate action is taken,
such degradation can spark a progressive cycle of decline for national de-
velopment. Pollution of air, water and soil, and unrestrained natural re-
source exploitation, grow to levels that jeopardize the viability of the eco-
nomic activities they support. Trade thereby becomes unsustainable as the
potential for future trade is significantly reduced.
UNEP goes on to argue that emphasis should be placed on enhancing the

institutional and human capacities of developing countries for integrating
environment, trade, and development policiesin other words, sustainable
development. This issue is addressed in detail in chapter 14.
Copeland and Taylor (2004) use the phrase pollution haven effect to
refer to the argument that an increase in environmental regulations will, at
the margin, have an effect on plant location decisions and trade flows. This
argument is strongly supported by economic theory and by recent empirical
research. Thus, there is the potential for some countries to weaken their envi-
ronmental regulations as a way to out-compete other countries for new pro-
duction plants and to enhance their international competitiveness. In contrast,
Copeland and Taylor offer a more stringent pollution haven hypothesis
that a reduction in trade barriers (e.g., reduced tariffs or quotas) will lead to
a shifting of pollution-intensive industry from countries with stringent regu-
lations to countries with weaker regulations. They note that the theoretical
support for this hypothesis is quite weak because, as they observe, trade
theory suggests that there are many factors other than pollution regulation
that affect trade flows. Moreover, the empirical literature suggests that these
other factors are in fact more important in determining trade patterns. Thus,
there appears to be less concern that trade liberalization will result in a race
to the bottom in terms of environmental standards.
A related problem is that of rich countries exporting hazardous wastes
and garbage. Increasingly tight regulation for the handling and disposal of
hazardous waste has increased the cost of safe disposal in rich countries. In
contrast, extreme poverty and corruption in very low-income countries often
results in very low-cost disposal opportunities, thereby creating an unfortu-
nate comparative advantage in hazardous waste disposal services grounded
in poverty and failures of effective democratic governance. The 1989 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal addressed this environmental injustice. Amendments to
the Basel Convention effectively banned all forms of hazardous waste ex-
ports from the rich industrialized countries to all lower-income countries.
The ban amendment will come into force after sixty-two parties to the treaty
ratify it, and only applies to those parties that ratify it. As of 2004, forty-four
parties had ratified the amendment, with the notable exception of the United
States. Yet illegal waste dumping has increased as regulations governing the
safe and proper disposal of hazardous waste tighten.
For example, Somalias coastline has been used as a dumping ground for
tens of millions of metric tons of rich countries hazardous wastes since the
late 1980s, though the pace of dumping accelerated with the start of the civil
war that followed the 1991 overthrow of the late dictator Mohamed Siad
Barre. Local warlords, many of them former ministers in Siad Barres gov-
ernment, were paid large sums of money by European firms in return for
providing dumpsites for their hazardous waste, which included lead, radio-
active uranium, mercury, cadmium, and various industrial, hospital, chemi-
cal, and other toxic wastes. Payments to warlords of approximately $8 per
metric ton have been documented, which contrasts sharply with the cost of
safe disposal in rich industrialized countries, which can exceed $1,000 per
metric ton. The United Nations Environment Program announced that the
massive December 26, 2004, tsunami waves washed up and broke open rusted
barrels of hazardous waste. People living in northeastern coastal towns on
Somalias Indian Ocean coast were reported by the UN to be suffering from
radiation sickness and higher than normal numbers of respiratory infections,
mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal bleeding, and unusual skin infections.
Within the United States, the Supreme Court has ruled a number of times
that garbage disposal services represent an article of commerce protected
by the commerce clause of the Constitution from state-level restrictions on
interstate commerce. As a result, wealthy communities export their trash by
truck, barge, and rail to some of the poorest counties and American Indian
reservations in the United States.
Yet another problem with international trade liberalization derives from

the way we have structured international trade agreements. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), forged in concert with the IMF and the
World Bank at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1947, and renegotiated in
Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986, may threaten the integrity of local, na-
tional, and international environmental improvement efforts. GATT requires
signatory countries to follow the principles of multilaterialism (trade is gov-
erned by international rules) and nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination re-
quires that foreign firms be treated the same as domestic firms (national
treatment), and that firms from different countries be treated the same (most
favored nation status). Thus if an exporter in country A cannot sell its exist-
ing product in country B because country B has environmental laws that
constrain how the product is made or packaged, the exporter (or country A)
can file a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) that country
B has a nontariff trade barrier that restricts free trade. It is then possible
that the WTO will impose reciprocal trade and other sanctions on country B.
The WTO was formed in 1994 as a successor to GATT, and its primary
activities are in resolving international trade disputes. WTO decisions are
binding on the 125 member countries. Article XX of GATT states that GATT
shall not be construed as preventing the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures (1) necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health, or (2) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production. Article XX has been the subject of a number
of test cases having to do with disputes over environmental regulations as
nontariff trade barriers. In most all cases, the GATT or the WTO has found
against the environmental regulations. For example, Mexico filed a trade
complaint against the United States under GATT in 1991 over provisions of
the Marine Mammal Protection Act that required the United States to ban
imports of tuna from countries that could not prove adequate dolphin protec-
tion measures were utilized. Two important issues emerged from this case.
One issue was whether one country could tell another what its environmental
regulations should be, and the other issue was whether trade rules allow bans
or tariffs based on the method used to produce goods, rather than the quality
of the goods themselves. The GATT panel said no to both questions. Based
on this finding, domestic U.S. tuna fishers would be placed at a disadvantage
over foreign fishers, and the United States would no longer have the sover-
eignty to limit imports produced in an unsustainable manner.
Another such case had to do with a complaint filed by Venezuela and Brazil
against the United States. The charge was that U.S. regulations for evaluating a
gasoline refiners compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1990 discrimi-
nated against foreign refiners. In particular, the EPAs gasoline rule allows a
domestic refiner to use an individual baseline to evaluate toxic and other
pollution emissions characteristics of its currently refined gasoline. In other
words, if the refiner was producing gasoline prior to the CAA, then the refiner
could evaluate its gasoline using an internal or individual baseline. The gaso-
line rule did not allow foreign refiners to use a similar individual baseline, but
instead required them to use a statutory baseline. After final appeals were heard,
in April 1996 the WTO found in favor of Venezuela and Brazil. The WTO
stated that since imported gasoline was effectively prevented from benefiting
from as favorable sales conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline by an
individual baseline tied to the producer of the product, imported gasoline was
treated less favorably than domestic gasoline (WTO 1996). Importantly, the
WTO panel agreed that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource and so is
covered under Article XX.
In another important case, in October 1996 a complaint was filed by In-
dia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand [WT/DS58], challeng-
ing a U.S. ban on imports of shrimp caught without using turtle-excluding
nets. Again, the WTO found against the United States, arguing that the ban
was unilateral and thus violated the doctrine of multilateralism embodied by
the WTO. Moreover, the WTO argued that the ban was not applied uniformly
on all shrimp exporters. The WTO argued that the United States did not fully
exhaust the potential for fostering an international agreement on turtle con-
servation methods. The emerging view at the WTO is that international agree-
ments rather than unilateral import bans or tariffs are the preferred method of
addressing international environmental issues. To date, the WTO has invali-
dated no international environmental agreements. In addition, following the
Mexican tuna decision, the WTO has taken the position that trade restric-
tions (bans, tariffs, etc.) cannot be imposed on a product purely because of
the way it has been produced. Thus, seemingly in conflict with the nondis-
crimination doctrine of the WTO, domestic firms whose production methods
are regulated to protect the environment, labor, and human health are placed
at a disadvantage over foreign importers. Moreover, one country cannot use
trade restrictions to reach out beyond its own territory to impose its stan-
dards on another country. Therefore, in the absence of an international envi-
ronmental treaty, U.S. markets are forced to be open to foreign products that
damage the environment in ways that domestic firms cannot. Taken together,
it is clear that the WTO position has restricted the tools available for assuring
environmental protection, and places downward pressure on domestic envi-
ronmental regulations.
Starting in the 1990s, questions began to be raised about the legality of
ecolabels under WTO rules. An ecolabel is usually awarded by independent
third party certifying agencies, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (cer-
tified sustainable forest products), the USDA (organic food), or the Nordic
Council of Ministers (Nordic Swan product life-cycle standards) to products
that meet or exceed certain environmental criteria. These market-oriented
environmental programs provide information to consumers and allow con-
sumers to use their dollar votes in the marketplace to reward environmen-
tally friendly products. Ecolabeling programs can be considered a type of
technical barrier to trade (TBT), and WTO rules state that members cannot
use technical regulations or standards to restrict market access or discrimi-
nate against imported goods unless there is an internationally accepted stan-
dard, or if the rules are necessary under Article XX. Currently, there is no
single ecolabel standard worldwide. If an ecolabel applies to the characteris-
tic of a product (e.g., made from recycled products) and countries apply the
label equally across domestic and imported goods, it will not be a violation
of WTO rules. Where things get difficult, however, is with regard to ecolabels
that relate to processing and production methods (PPMs) that are not related
to the products characteristics (i.e., non-product-related PPMs). Under WTO
rules, such ecolabels can be contested. For example, if a country adopts an
ecolabel program lumber that is based on tree harvesting methods that are
unrelated to the characteristics of the lumber, then this non-product-related
PPM ecolabel could be contested in the WTO. As of 2005, the European
Union and Canada support PPM ecolabels, while various developing coun-
tries (with different dominant values toward resource harvest) and the United
States (concerned about discrimination against genetically modified agricul-
tural and food exports) oppose them.
Finally, expanded international trade has put great pressure on certain en-
dangered wildlife populations. The allure to some of rhino horns, pet reptiles,
leopard skins, shark fins, bear gallbladders, or rare orchids has imperiled many
threatened or endangered species of animals and plants. The United States is
the worlds largest market for wildlife and wildlife products. Because the trade
in wild animals and plants crosses borders between countries, the effort to
regulate this trade requires international cooperation to safeguard certain spe-
cies from overexploitation. CITES (the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) is a multilateral international
environmental agreement designed to address this problem. As of 2005, CITES
accords protection to thousands of species of animals and plants, whether they
are traded as live specimens or after they have been rendered into products.
Nevertheless, a large illegal trade in wild fauna and flora still exists, and in
some isolated cases, such as with African elephant ivory, parties to CITES vote
to partially legalize trade. Some argue that CITES is excessively rigid and
lacks accountability. For example, harvesting a few seed pods from a rare or-
chid can allow commercial growers to produce thousands of these plants and
take pressure off of wild stocks, but CITES does not distinguish this form of
harvest from large-scale black market trade.
To summarize, then, the argument against international trade from a
sustainability perspective includes the following:
When capital is highly mobile, this mobility strengthens firms bargain-

ing positions when negotiating with unions, local governments, and
environmental agencies, eroding livable wages, undermining the fiscal
base for local government, and putting downward pressure on health,
safety, environmental, and organized labor regulations.
Free international trade between rich and poor countries facilitates a
pattern of trade in which rich countries export their trash, toxic waste,
and the production of goods that generate especially high levels of pol-
lution. While some argue that this pattern is simply a reflection of dif-
ferences in the marginal utility of money and a manifestation of com-
parative advantage, others view it as unethical and a potential source of
environmental injustice. By separating the consumption of goods from
the pollution associated with these goods, the incentive to reduce this
pollution is itself diluted. Moreover, if property rights and democratic
systems are not in place in the low-income country, then free trade will
hasten the destruction of the environment.
The WTO has taken a series of positions that limit the tools that are avail-
able for protecting the environment, and that place domestic firms in coun-
tries with high standards at a disadvantage over firms in countries with
lower standards, with the potential for promoting a race to the bottom.
While there are important questions regarding the extent to which coun-
tries should engage in international trade, the nature of the goods that should
be traded, and the extent to which trade agreements should allow for trade
restrictions based on production methods, it is neither practical nor desirable
to eliminate trade completely. Trade has occurred between diverse human
societies for thousands of years, fostering mutual understanding, the diffu-
sion of ideas, and interdependence.
Population
Concerns regarding overpopulation and resource scarcity have been articu-

lated at least as far back as ancient Babylon and Rome. These concerns may
have been justified; there are indications that civilizations may have col-
lapsed because resource degradation led to desertification and climate change
in northern Mesopotamia, the Aegean, Egypt, Palestine, and the Indus (Weiss
et al. 1993). It is estimated that about 50 million people lived on earth in
1000 B.C. Todays population is more than 100 times larger, and each year
population rises by nearly twice the total number of humans who were alive
in 1000 B.C. As Cohen (1995) reports, global population growth rates never
exceeded 0.5 percent per year until approximately 1750, and never exceeded
a 1 percent annual rate until about 1930. Since 1950, they have never fallen
below their present level of roughly 1.33 percent per year. What are the causal
factors that explain changes in population growth rates?
The Demographic Transition Model
In 1798 economist Thomas Malthus argued that rapid population growth

would depress wages and result in higher mortality rates due to famine, dis-
ease, and war, and he referred to this as a positive control on population.
He also argued that lower wages would cause people to delay marriage and
promote vice that would ultimately limit fertility rates, which he referred to
as the preventative check on population growth. Malthus believed that
improvements in material standards of living were only temporary, since
population would soon grow until once again misery and vice provided posi-
tive and preventative population checks. Thus, Malthus opposed providing
economic support for poverty alleviation. Lee (2003) argues that evidence
from preindustrial Europe generally supports Malthuss theory, in that real
wage increases tended to be associated with reductions in mortality-related
labor force reductions. Sen (1999) notes, however, that in the modern era
there is significant evidence of declining fertility rates that is linked to social
and economic development.
Since the work of Frank Notestein in 1945, demographers have recog-
nized an empirical regularity in the data on the relationship between the stages
of industrial economic development and population growth rates over the
last several hundred years. The evidence generally supports what is known
as the theory of demographic transition, which underlies the argument used
by many economists that economic development is the key to overcoming
the rapid population growth rates that we observe in many developing coun-
tries. This theory suggests that industrializing countries go through four dis-
tinct stages of population growth:
Stage I: Prior to the industrialization process, both birth and death rates
are high, with only modest population growth. In these traditional agrar-
ian societies, children provide a valuable source of labor and are a form
of social security in countries that lack adequate retirement programs.
There may also be powerful cultural or religious values favoring large

family sizes and restricting the use of birth control methods.
Stage II (mortality transition): At the start of industrialization, death
rates fall (largely from improvements in medical technology that re-
duces contagious and infectious diseases, the rise of public health mea-
sures, and improvements in personal hygiene and nutrition that reduces
child mortality rates), while birthrates remain stable or fall only slightly
(perhaps because technology changes faster than cultural, religious, and
social institutions). Stage II is marked by accelerated population growth.
Stage III (fertility transition): This more mature stage of industrializa-
tion is marked by people shifting to raising substantially fewer children
(due to economic factors such as female participation in the labor force,
the rise of social security, the need for greater educational investment to
assure a childs future economic success, delayed parenthood, and laws
limiting child labor, as well as social issues related to the education and
empowerment of women), resulting in the first sustained instance of the
society experiencing declining birthrates. At the same time, death rates
may continue to decline, or stabilize at a relatively low rate.
Stage IV (stabilization): In this postindustrial stage of development,
both birth and death rates are low. Net population growth rates once
again are low.
These four stages of the demographic transition are illustrated in Figure

13.2. It has been argued that the stabilization characterized in stage IV may
be incorrect. Many high-income countries have experienced what some de-
mographers refer to as the second fertility transition, in which fertility rates
fall far below the steady-state replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman.
Lee (2003) reports that Western Europes demographic transition from stage
I to stage IIcharacterized by falling death rates and acceleration in popula-
tion growth ratesbegan in approximately 1800. In contrast, in many low-
income countries this same transition began in the early twentieth century
and accelerated in the years following World War II. Declines in death rates
have stagnated in some low-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa, that are struggling with increased mortality due to AIDS. The transi-
tion from stage II to stage IIIcharacterized by falling fertility ratesbegan
in Western Europe between 1890 and 1920. Some lower-income countries
started this transition to stage III in the 1960s and 1970s, with dramatic re-
ductions in fertility rates in East Asia, and much slower reductions in south
Asia and Latin America. As of 2005, the average fertility rate worldwide is
2.65 children per woman, and there are sixty countries with 43 percent of the
worlds population that have total fertility rates at or below the replacement
Figure 13.2 The Demographic Transition
Birth and death

rates
Birth rate:
Death rate:
Stage I:
Preindustrial Stage II: Stage III: Stage IV:
Industrializing Mature industrial Postindustrial
Stages of
development
rate. In developed countries as a whole, fertility is currently only 1.56 chil-

dren per woman, well below replacement. Lee reports that 17 of these 60
countries at or below replacement fertility rates are less developed coun-
tries, including countries such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan.
There is some debate over the relative importance of economic and fe-
male empowerment factors in explaining the fertility transition in stage III.
Economic factors include labor force opportunities for women raising the
opportunity cost of their time in child-rearing (which overlaps with female
empowerment), pension and social security systems replacing ones children
as providers for the elderly, the need for greater educational investment in
ones children in an industrialized society, and rising per capita incomes.
While few argue against most of these economic factors, there is question
about the role of higher incomes. Erlich, Erlich, and Daily (1995) report that
the evidence for a simple relationship between per capita income growth and
declines in fertility is mixed; Mexico and Brazil, for example, have under-
gone periods of income growth with little or no reduction in birthrates. Erlich
et al. go on to argue that fertility declines may be even more strongly related
to the empowerment of women, access to maternity health programs and
family-planning programs, and tax policies that encourage small families.
Likewise, Sen (1999) reports on empirical studies comparing various regions

within India that differ in terms of both income and the level of female em-
powerment (including education, employment opportunities, social status,
and property rights). Sen found that the level of real per capita income had
almost no impact on fertility rates compared with the sharp difference made
by the empowerment of women. Sen notes (p. 226):
The view of development as freedom gets reinforced by these empirical

connections, sinceit turns outthe solution of the problem of popula-
tion growth (like the solution of many other social and economic prob-
lems) can lie in expanding the freedom of the people whose interests are
most directly affected by overfrequent childbearing and child rearing, viz.,
young women.
One of the key sustainability challenges associated with the observed trends
in the demographic transition is that rapid reductions in total fertility rates
result in a younger age cohort that is much smaller than the older age cohort.
This imbalance is exacerbated by the rising life expectancy in these same
countries. Many countries, including the United States, have pay as you go
social security systems in which the current working age cohort is taxed to
fund old-age pensions for the older cohort of retirees. The fiscal health of
these systems is cast into doubt when the number of working-age people
supporting each retired person shrinks, as has been occurring in most high-
income countries. Solutions involve a combination of reducing benefits, in-
creasing the retirement age, raising taxes, or promoting immigration by
working-age people.
Population Forecasts
Thomas Malthus, the eighteenth-century economist, argued that human

population growth rates would exceeded the rate of growth in agricultural
production. As we have mentioned before, Malthuss model featured fam-
ine as a positive control on population. So far the evidence has not sup-
ported the Malthusian prediction. Two reasons present themselves. First,
Malthus did not anticipate the demographic transition relating population
growth rates to the stages of the industrialization process. Second, Malthus
apparently did not anticipate the rate of technological advance. For ex-
ample, what has been known as the green revolution in the 1970s was a
period of rapid improvements in crop yields and methods of industrial ag-
riculture. While a growing number of agricultural scientists questions the
sustainability of the methods that grew out of the green revolution (pardon
the pun), they are an example of the technological change that has so far
allowed the human world to dodge the bullet of Malthusian decline despite
enormous growth in human population.
Boserup (1965) offers an alternative to the Malthusian view. The Boserup
hypothesis regarding population density and agricultural productivity states
that increased population density, together with a greater reliance on market
systems of allocation, will lead to improvements in the management of the
land resource. There is evidence that Boserup effects result in an increase in
the utilization of organic fertilizer and integrated croplivestock systems that
enhance soil fertility. A number of studies (Ruthenberg 1980; Pingali, Bigot,
and Binswanger 1987; Tiffen, Mortimore, and Gichuki1994) have supported
the Boserup hypothesis. Heath and Binswanger (1996) argue that the evi-
dence from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Colombia suggests, however, that the fac-
tors given in the Boserup hypothesis are not sufficient and that sustainable
agricultural systems are more dependent upon social and economic policies
that present farmers and others with the proper incentives. For example, some
developing countries have instituted policies that promote large-scale, ex-
port-oriented cattle ranches over small, labor-intensive farms, pointing to the
importance of factors other than population density and market capitalism.
While the predictions of Malthus and his followers have so far failed to
manifest themselves, population growth can be difficult to reconcile with
sustainability. Deep ecologists, for example, question the ethics of burgeon-
ing human populations displacing a rapidly growing list of species and more
generally appropriating what has been estimated to be approximately 40 per-
cent of terrestrial biomass. Population growth contributes to the exhaustion
of CPR systems. Examples include the decline of common grazing lands,
deforestation in areas where too many people are trying to harvest fuelwood,
declines in desirable species of fish in marine and freshwater fisheries, and
excessive pumping from groundwater CPRs. The interdependence of agrar-
ian and demographic transitions leads to congestion and squalor in the cities
of many developing countries. As Pearce and Warford (1993) argue, the ex-
tent of overcrowding can be gauged in part by comparing population densi-
ties per square kilometer across industrialized and developing countries. While
U.S. cities such as Chicago (2,500 people per square km) and Philadelphia
(3,000) have relatively low population densities, cities such as Buenos Aires
(15,000), Cairo (24,000), Lima (29,000), Mexico City (43,000), and Calcutta
(88,000) in the developing countries have profound human congestion.
What will the global human population grow to in the future? According to
the United Nations Population Division, world population is currently grow-
ing at the rate of approximately 1.22 percent per year and reached the 6 billion
mark in 1999. From 1804, when the world passed the 1 billion mark, it took
123 years to reach 2 billion people in 1927, 33 years to attain 3 billion in 1960,
14 years to reach 4 billion in 1974, 13 years to attain 5 billion in 1987, and 12
years to reach 6 billion in 1999. The medium variant forecast of the United
Nations (2005) projects world population at 9 billion by 2050. According to
the assumptions in the medium variant scenario, by 2050 the population of the
more developed countries as a whole would be declining slowly by about 1
million persons a year, while that of the developing world would be adding 35
million annually, 22 million of whom would be absorbed by the least devel-
oped countries. The medium variant population forecast is based on the as-
sumption that average fertility rates decline from 2.6 children per woman in
2004 to slightly over 2 children per woman (i.e., replacement) in 2050. By
way of comparison, if average fertility rates declined only slightly to 2.5 chil-
dren per woman by 2050, world population would reach 10.6 billion, while if
average fertility rates declined to 1.5, world population would reach 7.6 billion
by 2050.
Undoubtedly, there will be unanticipated impacts that will affect popula-
tion. As Cohen (1995) points out, even elaborate systems dynamics models
have failed to predict population accurately ten or more years into the future.
Predictions regarding upper limits on supportable human populations vary
from the view that there is no limit to the view that the current population has
exceeded the earths carrying capacity. For example, from Kates et al. (1988)
and Millman et al. (1991), we find that the 1989 primary food supply could
feed up to 5.9 billion people. Millman et al. recognized, however, that fur-
ther population growth will create price and other economic incentives for
increasing the quantity of food supplied.
Taxes and Incentives
Taxes have been around since the early civilizations in Babylon, India, Rome,
Greece, China, and pre-Columbian Central and South America. As Webber
and Wildavsky (1986) report, early taxes were placed on food production
and labor in the form of tithing and conscription. With the advent of more
developed civil societies such as in Rome, taxes were placed on wealth and
traded commodities. Thus for millennia human civilizations have taxed pro-
ductive activities to raise funds for government services and operations.
Roodman (1996) reports that in contemporary rich countries, such as the United
States, Japan, and Germany, tax revenues primarily come from (1) profit and
income taxes (roughly 30 to 40 percent of the total); (2) employment and
wage taxes (roughly 30 to 40 percent); (3) sales, import/export, and value-
added taxes (roughly 15 to 25 percent); and (4) property taxes (roughly 2 to
10 percent). Lower-income countries receive a larger share of their tax rev-
enues from sales, import/export, and value-added taxes. Global taxes total
approximately $7.5 trillion, or about one-third of the value of measured glo-
bal economic output, and are a major factor in the worlds economies.
In the absence of externalities to internalize, taxes and subsidies distort
the incentives naturally produced by the market system. In addition to be-
ing the basis for public finance, taxes also have the effect of raising the
cost of the taxed activity and thus to a greater or lesser degree creating a
disincentive to engaging in the taxed activity. Thus, higher employment
taxes dilute the incentive to create jobs; higher income taxes dilute the
incentive to work hard or invest in costly specialized education; higher
sales taxes mean that some low-income people will go without; higher prop-
erty taxes reduce the affordability of homes for low-income people and
can contribute to homelessness. As we learned in chapter 4, and discussed
again in chapter 10, appropriately devised environmental taxes can dis-
courage pollution and internalize negative externalities. Unfortunately, as
noted in the preceding paragraph, most taxes are charged on productive
activities, which leads to perverse incentives.
At the same time that societies find themselves using taxes to discourage
productive activities, it ends up that they frequently encourage destructive
activities such as resource depletion and pollution through a variety of dif-
ferent subsidies. For example, the International Center for Technology As-
sessment (1998) categorized and then estimated the subsidies and external
costs (costs that are passed along to others through taxes, environmental harms,
health expenditures, and prices in other sectors) associated with gasoline and
diesel-powered motor vehicles in the United States. Categories for which
estimates were generated included (1) annual federal and state tax breaks
that support gasoline production and use ($9.1 to $17.8 billion); (2) govern-
ment program subsidies supporting the extraction, production, and use of
petroleum and petroleum fuel products ($38 to $114.6 billion each year); (3)
military and other protection costs associated with oil transport and motor
vehicle services ($88.5 to $140.8 billion); (4) negative externalities to the
environment, human health, and other areas of society ($231.7 to $942.9
billion); and (5) other costs ($191.4 to $474.1 billion). Their analysis gener-
ated an estimated sum of subsidies and external costs totaling $558.7 billion
to $1.69 trillion per year, which adds up to $4.60 to $14.14 per gallon of
gasoline more than the price at the pump. A 2005 update of total annual U.S.
military and protection cost estimates for oil ranged from $78.2 to $158.4
billion. Of this total, $39$98.5 billion annually represents spending by the
U.S. military to secure the production and transportation of foreign oil, not
including the cost of the Iraq war. By way of comparison, the National De-
fense Council Foundation estimated in 2004 that the United States spends
$49 billion per year for the defense of oil production and transportation,
which when summed with other costs associated with oil imports would add
over $3 to the existing price of a gallon of gasoline. Such subsidies under-
mine the demand for alternative energy, the flow of private financial capital
into alternative energy technologies and processes, and the incentives for
consumers to conserve on petroleum consumption.
The basic argument of ecological tax reform (also known as environmen-
tal tax reform) is to shift some taxes from productive to destructive activities,
and to shift subsidies from harmful activities to beneficial alternatives, thus
more fruitfully employing the incentive effects of tax system. As Roodman
(1998) observes, pollution taxes are the most direct way for governments to
enforce the polluter-pays principle. By removing harmful subsidies and
raising taxes on pollution and resource depletion, and reducing taxes on neu-
tral or beneficial things such as wage income society receives many divi-
dends. Ecological tax reform creates a disincentive to pollute, improves the
economic basis for cleaner energy forms, and increases after-tax income for
working people, while maintaining revenue neutrality. Taxes on resource
depletion, such as for oil, gas, and coal, allow society to share in the Hotelling
rents associated with their increasing scarcity (see chapter 5 for a description
of Hotelling rents). Some of the first experiments with ecological tax reform
have occurred in Northern Europe. The barriers to implementation of eco-
logical tax reform include adjustment costs for people and industry, though
perhaps the largest impediment is political pressure exerted by those indus-
tries and consumers whose tax burden would increase as a consequence of
the change. Gradual change and a well-informed and empowered citizenry
are likely to be key elements of successful transition. This topic will be ad-
dressed in greater detail in chapter 15.
Thinking Long Term: Discounting and Policy Making
Sustainability makes explicit a long-term time horizon. A central challenge

is in bringing future impacts into present policy making. There are several
problems with promoting the longer-term planning horizon required by
sustainability. One of these is associated with government. In representative
democracies, those running for office are most likely to succeed if they ap-
peal to their current constituents interests, even if it is not sustainable. For
example, in the United States it is nearly impossible in 2005 to imagine a
presidential candidate advocating for ecological tax reform in energy policy.
Removing fossil-fuel subsidies and imposing pollution taxes would end the
cheap energy policy that benefits current constituents at the cost of future
generations, and most assuredly would end that candidates prospects for
being elected. In fact, whenever there is a public policy issue that requires a
substantial up-front investment that generates future benefits, it will be diffi-
cult for politicians to support such a policy, as it imposes short-term costs on
current voters. Possible solutions to this structural problem with representa-
tive democracy include educating the public about sustainability issues, in-
culcating an ethic of sustainability, and building support through successful
pilot programs.
Aside from political feasibility, there is also the problem of economic
feasibility that is related to benefit/cost analysis when there are flows of
benefits and costs over time. As we saw in chapters 5 and 7, discounting
is used to bring future flows of benefits and costs into a present-value
context. Analysis of the present value of benefits and costs is used in
public policy contexts to evaluate whether policy proposals make eco-
nomic sense. Moreover, the worlds financial markets use discounting
methods to allocate financial capital to fund capital investments. In order
for sustainability-related projects to attract funding, they must pass mus-
ter in a benefit/cost analysis for public funds, or on a rate-of-return basis
for private funds. One of the questions addressed below is whether dis-
counting is consistent with sustainability. If discounting can indeed be
made consistent with sustainability, then the next question that arises is
whether the discount rates associated with competitive financial markets
are consistent with those required for sustainability. Since financial mar-
kets are central to contemporary market capitalism, this discussion of
discounting brings us to the larger question of whether market capitalism
is consonant with sustainability.
As we first learned in chapter 5, individuals discount future benefits and
costs for a variety of reasons that are similar to why we must pay interest when
we borrow money. Like many people, you are likely to have borrowed money
for school, or to buy a car or a home. Likewise, governments borrow money
when they issues bonds, and the people who buy those bonds are the lenders.
When a lender allows you to use her money today, the lender is forgoing using
that money now so that you can use it. What opportunities might a lender have
passed up in order to lend the money to someone? Some options include:
the ability to buy more goods and services now than in the future due to
rising prices (inflation);
the increased utility from consuming goods and services today rather
than having to wait;
the interest income that could be earned if those funds were loaned to
someone else;
the net income from a capital asset (i.e., skills gained from an educa-
tion, or all or part of a profitable business enterprise) purchased with

those funds.
Thus the opportunity cost of lending someone money is either the for-
gone utility of current consumption, forgone purchasing power due to in-
flation, or the forgone income that could have been earned by loaning the
money to someone else or by purchasing a capital asset. In the worlds
financial markets, the interest rate paid on borrowed money must be larger
than the lenders (risk-adjusted) opportunity cost in order to generate a
supply of loanable funds. For example, suppose that the lowest interest
rate that a lender is willing to accept in order to make a one-year loan of
$1,000 is 10 percent. This information tells us that the lender is indifferent
between having $1,000 today (the present value) and being repaid $1,100
in one year (the future value). The future value of todays $1,000 will in-
crease with the interest rate and with the length of time of the loan. Theres
another way of looking at this relationship. Suppose someone was going to
receive $1,100 exactly one year in the future, but they needed money in the
present. What is the smallest amount of money that that person would take
right now in return for giving up the inheritance next year? The answer to
this question is that persons present value of the future $1,100 inheritance.
As we learned in chapter 5, economists use the more general term discount
rate to refer to the rate of time preference (such as an interest rate) that
equates present value and future value.
Recall from chapter 5 that if we know that an environmental policy today
will generate a benefit equal to $B that will occur exactly T years from the
present, and if policymakers use a discount rate equal to r (assume for sim-
plicity that it is constant over time), then the present value (PV) of that future
benefit today is given by:
PVB = $B/(1 + r) T.
The hypothetical example below illustrates how discounting affects the dy-
namic efficiency of environmentally friendly investments.
The Effect of Discount Rates on Environmentally Friendly

Investments and Sustainability: An Illustrative Example
Suppose that Samantha has just bought an older, uninsulated house.

Samantha commissions an energy audit and finds that an adequate insu-
lation job would cost approximately $3,000. Samanthas career usually
requires her to move every five years or so, and realtors have told her not
Table 13.2
Hypothetical Example: Costs With and Without Home Insulation
Year Year Year Year Year Year

Option 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Insulation
added 3,000 1,000 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,100 8,250
No insulation
added 0 1,800 1,800 1,890 1,980 1,980 9,450
Cost savings
from insulation 3,000 8,00 800 840 880 880 1,200
to count on recovering the cost of the insulation job in the resale price.
Thus Samantha will conduct a benefit/cost analysis of the insulation job
using a five-year time horizon. The $3,000 cost of insulating her home is
paid at the start of the five-year time horizon (period 0), while the ben-
efits are represented by the present value of the five-year annual flow of
energy cost savings. Based on the energy audit and estimated energy
prices, Table 13.2 indicates the costs associated with the options of insu-
lating or not insulating.
Samanthas decision regarding whether or not to add the insulation to her
home is based on whether the net present value (NPV) is positive over the
five-year time horizon. The NPV of insulation (subscript I below) is given
in the following equation:
NPVI = $3,000/(1 + r)0 + $800/(1 + r)1 + $800/(1 + r)2 + $840/(1 + r)3

+ $880/(1 + r)4 + $880/(1 + r)5.
We can compare net cost savings from insulation based on a number

of different discount rates, as shown in Table 13.3. Note that Samanthas
dynamically efficient choice depends on the discount rate that she uses.
As the rate at which Samantha discounts a future payment over a current
payment increases, the financial advantages of home insulation decline.
Somewhere between the 10 and the 15 percent discount rate, Samantha
finds that the home insulation project fails to pay for itself. This example
illustrates how discounting affects the net present value of environmen-
tally friendly investments. In addition, two related issues are raised by
this illustrative example. The first has to do with determining whether we
can identify a discount rate that is consistent with sustainability, and the
second has to do with relating this sustainable discount rate (if it exists)
to the discount rates generated in financial markets. These issues will be
addressed below.
Table 13.3
Hypothetical Example: Cost Savings from Home Insulation for Different

Discount Rates
Discount Rate Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total

0 Percent 3,000 800 800 840 880 880 1200
(0.0)
5 Percent 3,000 761.91 725.62 725.64 723.89 689.49 626.64
(0.05)
10 Percent 3,000 727.27 661.16 631.10 601.50 546.82 167.85
(0.1)
15 Percent 3,000 695.65 604.92 552.32 503.14 437.51 -206.47
(0.15)
The Opportunity Cost of Capital and the Social Rate

of Time Preference
The Opportunity Cost of Capital
As was alluded to above, the opportunity cost of lending money in financial

markets is primarily generated by the income that can be earned by investing
the money in some other income-generating asset. In economics, the term
capital traditionally refers to the tools, equipment, factories, inventories, of-
fices, and other human-made instrumentalities that generate income through
their employment as factors of production. A profit-maximizing firm that is
considering investment in capital (say, for example, to expand a factory or to
add new equipment to a production process) evaluates this investment by
comparing the anticipated flow of income generated by the particular capital
investment under consideration to the various other investment opportunities
open to the firm. In other words, each dollar invested in capital generates
income known as the rate of return on capital, and a profit-maximizing firm
seeks the highest rate of return on each dollar of invested capital. Of course,
investment returns are not guaranteed. It is possible that invested capital will
be lost if markets change or if firms fail. Thus, riskier investments tend to
offer a risk premium in the form of a higher rate of return on invested capital.
The opportunity cost of capital to a firm is the next best (risk-adjusted) rate
of return that was forgone when a particular investment decision was made.
When someone buys a share of stock, he or she owns a portion of a publicly
traded firm and so owns a right to the net income generated by the firm. This
investor can sell this share of stock if a better (risk-adjusted) rate of return
can be found in some other form of investment, such as the interest gener-
ated on a U.S. Treasury Bond. Thus, the opportunity cost of capital generally
refers to the prevailing risk-adjusted rates of return available in financial

markets. A typical benchmark is an 8 percent rate of return, which is ap-
proximately the average rate of return on publicly traded shares of stock in
the United States in recent history.
The Social Rate of Time Preference
While the opportunity cost of capital forms the basis for discounting by op-
timizing entities in financial markets, the social rate of time preference forms
the basis for discounting in policies designed to enhance the well-being of
society over time. The social rate of time preference has two elementsthe
rate at which a societys wealth-generating capital stocks grow and the pure
rate of time preference. Lets first consider growth discounting. Consider a
society with a stable population and no inflation that is committed to a
sustainability standard. Suppose that this society accepts some degree of sub-
stitutability between the various forms of capital (as defined in chapter 11).
Suppose a proposal is made to invest money in enhancing future natural
capital by reducing emissions below the level at which they accumulate and
thus pollute the air, water, or soil in the future. Suppose further that natural
increases in productivity (e.g., from technological innovation) result in a 2
percent per capita annual growth rate for human and human-made capital.
The implication is that diverting a dollar of investment in human or human-
made capital today means that we must forgo a 2 percent social rate of re-
turn. Given the assumption that we can substitute human and human-made
capital for natural capital, then the opportunity cost of social investment in
natural capital is a 2 percent real rate of return on human or human-made
capital. If various forms of capital are perfect substitutes, then the future
benefits of an up-front investment in natural capital should be discounted at
a 2 percent annual rate to make it comparable to the natural growth rate in the
productivity of human and human-made capital.
Even if we allow for only one type of capital, if that capital stock is grow-
ing relative to population, then people in the future will have greater income
than people will in the present. It is generally accepted that the marginal
utility of income (broadly defined as the flow of benefits deriving from vari-
ous forms of capital) declines as income grows. If a society has steady-state
population and growing capital stocks, then its income is growing over time.
Yet if income is higher in the future, then the marginal utility deriving from
this income is becoming smaller (and so total utility is growing at a slower
rate than income). Based on this argument, consumption of a given unit of
income next year will generate a smaller level of utility than if consumption
of the income had occurred today. This difference in utility can also be seen
as the basis for growth discountingin an increasingly wealthy society, fu-

ture income is discounted because it will generate greater utility today than
next year. Note that if population growth is occurring faster than capital stocks,
then it is possible to have negative growth discounting.
Lets now consider the pure rate of time preference. The pure rate of time
preference is based on factors such as impatiencepeople would rather con-
sume now than in the futureand fundamental uncertainty regarding whether
a person will be alive to consume in some future period. The pure rate of
time preference forms the basis for consumers in markets applying positive
discount rates in their consumption and savings decisions. If the correct growth
discount rate is zero or negative, then the only basis for a positive social rate
of time preference is the pure rate of time preference. Yet while it makes
sense for individuals to have a positive pure rate of time preference, given
the probability that an individual will die before future consumption can
occur, this argument does not hold as well for an entire society. By the same
token, it is not clear that impatience is a good reason to include a positive
pure rate of time preference when constructing a discount rate for sustainability
policy purposes. As Azar and Sterner (1996) argue, the choice of pure rate of
time preference is a question of value judgments, and at the societal level,
there is no good ethical argument for using a pure rate of time preference
other than zero.
Thus it can be argued that sustainability policies can be made dynami-
cally efficient through the use of the social rate of time preference, and the
soundest element of the social rate of time preference is growth discounting.
Yet if we relax the assumption that human and human-made capital can sub-
stitute for natural capital, then even the use of growth discounting can break
down. Sustainability cannot generally be made compatible with dynamic ef-
ficiency under the low-substitutability scenario, which limits the applicabil-
ity of benefit/cost analysis. Such a situation calls for alternative policy models
such as the application of safe minimum standards to irreplaceable elements
of natural capital such as biodiversity, wilderness habitat, and certain waste-
assimilating functions of the earths biosphere.
Are the Discount Rates Associated with Competitive Financial

Markets Consistent with Those Required for Sustainability?
In contemporary financial markets in the United States, firms apply dis-

count rates based on a risk-adjusted opportunity cost of capital that is sev-
eral times higher than the social rate of time preference. This would seem
to suggest that the investment decisions generated by financial markets
will be biased toward projects and management plans that generate current
rather than future benefits, and thus may not be consistent with sustainability.
As the example below illustrates, financial markets treat natural and hu-
man-made capital as perfect substitutes when it comes to rates of return,
implying that the opportunity cost of capital drives management decisions
for commercial natural resources.
Recent developments with Maxxam/Pacific Lumber Company illustrate
the difficulties associated with publicly traded firms managing their assets
based on discount rates lower than those applied to similar assets in finan-
cial markets. The Pacific Lumber Company was founded in 1869 and owned
approximately 190,000 acres of highly productive redwood forestlands in
Humboldt County, California, south and east of Arcata. Albert Murphy, the
grandson of the founder, at least implicitly recognized the need for sustain-
able forestry and set up a harvest plan in which the company would never
run out of old-growth trees 150 or more years old. This form of conser-
vative forestry management is consistent with a relatively low discount
rate, since old-growth trees grow very slowly and thus add little additional
commercial value over time. As a consequence of these conservative forest
management practices, by the mid-1980s Pacific Lumber owned approxi-
mately 70 percent of the old-growth redwood in private hands, creating a
virtual monopoly on the supply of extremely durable and valuable lumber
from the heart of these old trees (Harris 1995). Apparently, the discount
rate implied by Pacific Lumbers management plan was substantially lower
than the prevailing discount rates for similar forestland assets. This made
Pacific Lumber an acquisition target, because its management plan was
inconsistent with maximizing the discounted present value of profits at a
higher discount rate; Pacific Lumber was undervalued based on its con-
servative management practices.
Thus with financing arranged by Michael Milken, an expert in junk bond
financing, Charles Hurwitzs Maxxam Corporation managed to acquire a
controlling interest in Pacific Lumber. Management practices were changed
to increase the logging cycle substantially and to cut the remaining inventory
of old-growth trees, a process that ultimately led to one of the largest forest-
related protests in U.S. history in September 1996. Soon after the protests, a
deal was struck, and federal officials agreed to acquire 7,470 acres of the
remaining old-growth groves at a cost of $380 million. The Pacific Lumber
case illustrates the dilemma of environmentally friendly corporate man-
agement practices in the context of competitive financial markets; the firms
that manage their assets based on below-market discount rates become take-
over targets, creating a form of market discipline that undercuts more so-
cially or environmentally sustainable practices. In this sense, our contemporary
form of market capitalism may not be consistent with sustainability.
Rice, Gullison, and Reid (1997) offer a very similar account of the eco-
nomics of tropical forestry practices in Bolivia. Dollar-denominated accounts
in Bolivia offer real (inflation-adjusted) annual interest rates averaging 17
percenta decent measure of the after-inflation opportunity cost of capital.
Moreover, mature mahogany trees (and mahogany prices) grow slowly, and
so delaying harvest for a year increases the value of the tree by only around
4 or 5 percent, much less than the 17 percent (inflation-adjusted) opportunity
cost of capital. Finally, delaying harvest places the timber company at risk of
policy reversal. Thus, Rice and his colleagues find that the financially opti-
mal strategy is for loggers to harvest mahogany trees as quickly as possible
and invest the proceeds in financial markets to yield high returns; unrestricted
mahogany harvest is two to five times as profitable as forestry practices de-
signed to sustain the mahogany resource.
If it is not always feasible for publicly traded firms to select environmen-
tally friendly management practices that imply below-market discount rates,
then might this same argument also hold for policymakers? Horowitz (1996)
has identified a form of time inconsistency associated with just such a case.
While a policymaker today may want to commit future policy makers to a
sustainable policy path, when that future becomes the present, new policy-
makers feeling the pressure to generate current returns may have an incen-
tive to deviate from the sustainable path and instead select policies that are
dynamically efficient based on prevailing discount rates. This means that the
original commitment was time-inconsistent. One way around this time in-
consistency is to make a large capital investment in pollution control that
cannot easily be reversed. Another is for policymakers to use a market dis-
count rate but to assign a very high value on future environmental amenities.
As Horowitz (1996) points out, [a] high value of future environmental ameni-
ties, discounted at the market rate, will on paper look much the same as a low
environmental discount rate. Yet this price approach avoids the inconsistency
problem and, at the same time, ensures that future generations interests are
adequately represented in policy analysis (p. 74).
Summary
Technological advances that led to the industrial revolution and the agrar-
ian transition have also contributed to dramatic changes in rural and
urban populations. Countries undergoing these changes experience an
accelerated recruitment of less technically trained former agricultural
workers into the industrial labor force, which has an adverse impact on
wages and presents difficulties in terms of providing adequate sanita-
tion and other urban infrastructure to growing urban communities in
lower-income countries. The agrarian transition can be accelerated by

freer international trade, and can help explain patterns of both legal and
undocumented migration into richer industrialized countries. Remit-
tances from these foreign workers provide a large and important source
of income for lower-income countries.
Income and economic growth may have both pro- and antisustainability
properties in the contemporary human world. Growth in per capita in-
comes raises people out of squalor and poverty, makes cleaner tech-
nologies available, and contributes to lower population growth rates.
On the other hand, economic growth is associated with high levels of
consumption and disproportionate emissions of greenhouse gases, ozone-
depleting chemicals, trash, and toxic wastes. In a world of rich and poor,
the rich can export dirty and destructive production practices to poorer
countries that are more desperate for sources of income.
The benefits of education and empowerment are much less ambiguous.
There is clear evidence that education raises incomes in general, and
increased social, reproductive, and economic empowerment for women
results in higher family incomes, reduced child mortality, and substan-
tially reduced fertility rates.
Like economic growth, international trade has both pro- and antisustain-
ability properties. Specialization and international trade along the lines
suggested by comparative advantage has occurred for thousands of years
of human history, and the resulting trade creates wealth that increases
aggregate material standards of living. Ricardos theory of comparative
advantage assumes fixed capital endowments for different countries,
which casts increasing doubt on the properties of this model of trade in
the context of economic globalization and increasing capital mobility.
Moreover, capital mobility creates a lowest-common-denominator
effect in which communities with strong labor and environmental pro-
tections export their businesses and production facilities to those with
weaker protections. When rich countries trade with lower-income coun-
tries for natural resource commodities over which property rights are
poorly defined and enforced, free trade can accelerate the rate of unsus-
tainable resource harvest. Others question the ethics of trade in the ser-
vices of garbage and toxic materials disposal that are provided by lower-
income regions and countries.
Many environmental and social activists question the sustainability
properties of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While the WTO
allows for exceptions to its rules against trade barriers in the case of
protecting exhaustible natural resources, actual dispute settlements
regarding protections such as turtle-excluding devises for catching
shrimp have sided against the protections. Moreover, the growing

movement for ecolabels may conflict with WTO rules, particularly in
the case of process and production method (PPM)-based ecolabels
such as certified sustainable forest products and shade-grown coffee.
WTO rules generally do not allow a country to restrict imports based
on how those products were made.
The demographic transition model provides a useful framework for un-
derstanding the economic, social, cultural, and technological factors
influencing population trends. This model finds that high mortality rates
transition downward before high fertility rates, resulting in a period of
high population growth. This is thought to be because the public health,
nutritional, and sanitary improvements associated with early industrial-
izing countries proceeds at a faster pace than the social, economic, and
cultural factors influencing fertility rates. Amartya Sen has argued that
the fertility transition is most heavily influenced by the education and
empowerment of women. For example, when women have access to an
education and to the workforce, their opportunity cost of child-rearing
increases.
Taxes not only are the source of funds for public financing of govern-
ment, but they also affect economic incentives. Traditionally most gov-
ernments tax productive activities such as work and income, and subsi-
dize politically powerful and entrenched interests such as fossil-fuel
industries. These patterns create perverse economic incentives. Econo-
mists who study sustainability argue for ecological (also known as en-
vironmental) tax reform, shifting some taxes onto harmful activities,
and shifting subsidies from harmful activities and to beneficial activi-
ties. A growing number of European countries are implementing eco-
logical tax reform.
Sustainability also requires that we think long term. A challenge to ef-
fective sustainability policy is that of market myopia, namely, that the
plethora of profit opportunities in contemporary financial markets leads
to discount and interest rates that are inconsistent with sustainability.
Another challenge to thinking long term is that elected politicians tend
to have a short-term time horizon focused on satisfying their constitu-
ents most immediate concerns and leaving future problems to future
elected leaders to deal with.
Arguments for the root causes of environmental degradation and fail-
ures of sustainability include rural poor living in ecologically fragile
environments; government failures in selecting and enforcing appropri-
ate property rights regimes; the concentration of power and lack of ac-
countability associated with large multinational corporations and their
relations with corrupt local governments, particularly in developing

countries; relatively unconstrained international trade in garbage and
toxics, and trade agreements that treat legitimate environmental protec-
tion measures as trade barriers; failures of democratic process and local
empowerment caused by discrimination against women and minorities,
as well as concentrations of political power and political access; gov-
ernment or corporate control of major news media that limits news critical
of corporate or government practices; the short-term orientation of mar-
kets and governments; perverse incentives created by taxing productive
activities and subsidizing polluting and resource-depleting activities;
and finally, the lack of leadership in fostering an ethic and a vision of
sustainability.
1. Develop an international trade policy that allows trade yet also protects
those who live in countries with relatively strict labor and environmental
standards. How would your trade policy be different from that of the WTO?
How would the leaders of exporting countries in the developing world feel
about your policy?
2. Explain the relationship between income and the quality of environ-
mental and natural resources in a given country. In particular, explain why
one might expect an inverted-U-shaped relationship (an environmental
Kuznets curve) between levels of per capita income and environmental deg-
radation. Can you think of any situations in which this relationship might not
always exist? What does the evidence suggest? You can find additional infor-
mation at www.perc.org/publications/research/kuznets2.php.
3. Explain why empowerment, education, and opportunities for women
and other disadvantaged groups are positively related to a more sustainable
society. Your explanation should go beyond the issue of democratic process
to include impacts on economic vitality and environmental integrity. Which
countries have made the most progress in this area? Which have made the
least? You can find information on this by looking at the Human Develop-
ment Index at www.undp.org/hdro.
4. The bioregionalist movement argues for most goods to be produced in
the same bioregion in which they are consumed, limiting the role of trade
and the scale of production. Discuss the merits of this proposal, with atten-
tion to its benefits and its costs.
5. Access the United Nations Population Divisions Internet site
(www.popin.org) and find some examples of countries that have success-
fully reduced high rates of population growth. What policies or economic
Table 13.4
Hypothetical Example: Cost Savings from Purchasing a More Fuel-

Efficient Furnace (in US dollars)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Total

Option 0 1 2 3 4 5
80% efficient 1,000 1,200 1,200 1,300 1,300 1,400 7,400
furnace
90% efficient 1,500 1,080 1,080 1,170 1,170 1,260 7,260
furnace
Cost savings
from more
efficient furnace -500 120 120 130 130 140 140
trends do you think were responsible for reducing the growth trend?
6. Suppose that Clara just bought an older home. She expects that her
employer will ask her to accept a new assignment and move in five years.
Claras house needs a new natural gas furnace. Clara is considering two op-
tions: an 80 percent efficient furnace and a 90 percent efficient furnace. The
90 percent efficient furnace costs $500 more than the 80 percent efficient
furnace, but of course, the more efficient furnace will save Clara money over
time because it is more fuel-efficient. Suppose that, after considering ex-
pected inflation, Clara projects the time-zero installation costs and operating
costs over a five-year horizon to be as shown in Table 13.4.
a. Determine which of the two furnaces has the smaller present value of
total installation and operating cost when Clara discounts the future
at (1) 5 percent, (2) 10 percent, and (3) 15 percent.
b. Briefly discuss the relationship between discount rates and (1) the
market viability of environmentally friendly products, and (2) the
likelihood of sustainability policies being implemented.
7. Use the Internet to research and describe an ecological tax reform policy
or policy proposal. A good place to start is the Redefining Progress Internet
site (www.redefiningprogress.org/programs/sustainableeconomy/other.htm).
8. Use the Internet to research and describe the extent to which interna-
tional development programs are addressing the education and empower-
ment of women, and the protection of the environment. A good place to start
is the World Banks World Development Report Internet site (http://
econ.worldbank.org/wdr) and the United Nations Development Program
Internet site (www.undp.org/).
9. Use the Internet to learn about population pyramids, a way to present
information on the age profile of different countries populations that is re-

lated to the demographic transition. Find two countries with regular pyra-
mid-shaped populations, and two countries with square or even inverted
pyramid populations, and use demographic transition theory to explain the
causes and consequences of these age profiles. You can find these easily at
the following U.S. Census Bureau Internet site: www.census.gov/ipc/www/
idbpyr.html.
10. Access the Earth Track Internet site (http://earthtrack.net) and select a
category of dysfunctional subsidy for environmentally harmful activity. Write
a one-page paper that describes the environmentally harmful activity and
summarizes the estimated dollar value of the subsidy. Be sure to fully cite
the source(s) used in your paper.
Internet Links
Earth Track (http://earthtrack.net): Informative website that contains links

to primary research studies that estimate subsidies provided to various sec-
tors of the economy, including fossil-fuel energy subsidies.
Ecological Tax Reform (www.redefiningprogress.org/programs/

sustainableeconomy/other.htm): Redefining Progress site with lots of use-
ful material and links to on-line resources.
Environmental Kuznets Curves: A Review of Findings, Methods, and

Policy Implications (www.perc.org/publications/research/kuznets2.php):
A review of the literature from the Political Economy Research Center.
Grameen Bank (www.grameen-info.org): The Grameen Bank was started

in Bangladesh in 1976 as an experiment on how a small amount of credit
could affect the lives of the rural poor.
Human Development Report (www.undp.org/hdro): You can supplement

and update the material in this chapter by accessing the United Nations De-
velopment Programs current Human Development Report on the Internet.
United Nations Development Program (www.undp.org): Learn more about

the UNs view on sustainable development.
United Nations Population Division (www.popin.org): Access informa-

tion such as the world population estimates and projections, as well as com-
missions on women and sustainable development.
World Development Report (http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/): You can

supplement and update the material in this chapter by accessing the World
Banks current World Development Report on the Internet.
World Resources Institute (www.wri.org): Nongovernmental organization

whose mission is to move human society to live in ways that protect earths
environment for current and future generations. Publishes the World Resources
report on-line.
World Trade Organization (www.wto.org): You can read the actual text of
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14
Sustainable Economic
Development
Introduction
The goal of economic development has been to improve the material well-
being or welfare of society. Nevertheless, the focus on jobs and income that
characterized economic development in the postwar period often failed to
screen out projects and policies that harmed the environment, failed to ad-
dress poverty and empowerment, and failed to sustain local communities
and indigenous peoples. International development lending projects formed
with corrupt host-country government leaders often left developing coun-
tries saddled with such large debt service requirements that essential invest-
ments in human capital such as domestic health and education programs had
to be reduced or curtailed. These failings of traditional economic develop-
ment served as the impetus for the sustainable development movement. The
Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as satisfying present
needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
The concept of sustainable development is broad and has come to mean dif-
ferent things to different people. For example, Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier
(1989) document over sixty definitions of sustainable development. As Jae-
ger (1995) points out, the conventional economic and ecological approaches
need to be integrated if we are to progress in conceptualizing sustainable
economic development as a necessary precursor to operational policy.
In this chapter we will first consider the history and performance of con-
ventional economic development and how some of the perceived failures of
391
these conventional methods have provided the motivating force for work on
more sustainable economic development concepts and strategies. We will
then consider several competing theories of sustainable development and
how particular indicators of sustainable development have been derived from
these theories. We will conclude with several brief case studies that measure
progress relative to various sustainable development standards.
Conventional Economic Development Strategies
The primary goal of conventional economic development has been to im-

prove real per capita income, where income is measured from GDP. Increases
in real per capita income have been a prized objective of development policy-
makers because rising incomes can lift people out of poverty and provide
them with access to medicines, safe drinking water, and cleaner production
technologies. Moreover, income can be relatively objectively measured, and
so analysts can gauge the success of development policies and programs
with objective performance data. As we shall see below, in the postWorld
War II period, international development assistance programs were modeled
on the reconstruction of developed European countries and focused on large
project-based lending designed to increase per capita incomes. Unintended
consequences of these economic development programs have led to the move-
ment for sustainable economic development.
Conventional Economic Development Assistance Programs
International economic development policies take the form of technical as-

sistance, financial assistance, and development loans. Development loans
have frequently been facilitated by either the World Bank or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) pooling funds from donor countries such as
Germany, Japan, and the United States and then lending these funds out to
developing countries. In the 1970s, however, it was large commercial banks
from the United States and elsewhere that originated many of these develop-
ment loans. In past decades, these loans tended to be focused on large-scale
infrastructure projects such as the building of hydroelectric and other power
plants, mines, irrigation networks, road systems, and port facilities.
Unfortunately, many of these debt-financed projects were economically,
socially, and environmentally misguided. For example, loans have been used
to fund large-scale resettlement of urban poor in rain forests in Brazil and
Indonesia, with the result being displacement of indigenous people and mas-
sive deforestation. Loans have been used to fund large coal-fired power plants
and open-pit coal mines in India, leading to massive sulfur dioxide and heavy
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 393
metals pollution problems and the uncompensated displacement of thousands

of local people. Loans have been used to fund large dam projects in Thai-
land, displacing numerous small, locally self-governed irrigation common-
pool resource (CPR) systems in which local people sustainably managed the
community forests that served as watersheds for the community rice paddy
irrigation systems. As Ostrom (1990) remarks, the failure . . . to develop an
effective set of rules for organizing their irrigation system is not unusual for
large-scale, donor-funded irrigation systems in Third World settings (p. 166).
Thus as Rich (1994) and others have pointed out, the record of large-scale
international project lending has featured substantial environmental and lo-
cal community destruction and dislocation.
World Bank and related lending programs have also failed from a finan-
cial perspective, as revealed by the World Banks own Wapenhans Re-
port in 1992 (World Bank Portfolio Management Task Force, 1992). The
report found that the performance of the World Banks $140 billion loan
portfolio was deteriorating at an alarming rate, as measured by appraised
rate of return on investment and on compliance with loan conditions. The
rate of financially unsatisfactory projects increased from 15 percent in
1981 to 30.5 percent in 1989 to 37.5 percent in 1991. The report also found
that World Bank staff used project appraisals as marketing devices to advo-
cate loan approval rather than as unbiased assessments of project viability.
It found that developing countries that borrowed from the World Bank saw
the negotiation stage of a project as being a largely coercive exercise in
which the World Bank imposed its philosophy on the borrower. Confiden-
tial surveys of World Bank staff indicated that substantial pressure was
being exerted on staffers to meet lending targets and that this pressure over-
whelmed all other considerations; the report stated that only 17 percent of
the staff in the survey believed that their project analysis was compatible
with achieving project quality.
Other problems encountered included a lack of democratic political insti-
tutions in some borrowing countries, which led to leaders who opportunisti-
cally appropriated development funds or project revenues for their own use,
and an ignorance of local environmental, political, and social systems. Those
projects that were successful in producing export commodities contributed
to rapid growth in world commodity supplies that outpaced demand, result-
ing in a downward trajectory in commodity prices and repayment capability,
as described below. Thus, the overall performance of large-scale interna-
tional economic development lending was poor and led to a crisis in which
developing countries were faced with staggering external debt and inadequate
income for repayment.
Because about one-half of the development loans were held by large com-
mercial banks, there was fear of a collapse of the international financial sys-
tem. The World Bank and the IMF responded to this debt crisis by offering
debtor countries an opportunity to restructure their debt through structural
adjustment loan (SAL) programs, using concepts of economic development
that later became known as the Washington Consensus. Accepting a SAL
also implied that the debtor country accepted structural adjustment plans
(SAPs) crafted by the World Bank or the IMF. These plans instituted funda-
mental change in a debtor countrys political and economic institutions. Eco-
nomic restructuring included market-oriented reforms such as liberalization
of foreign trade and finance (reduction of import/export tariffs and restric-
tions on foreign direct investment), reduced spending on government pro-
grams, and the reorganization of the domestic economy. Domestic economic
reorganization was focused on privatization of state-owned enterprises, de-
regulation of industry, strengthening of private property rights, and a focus
on export-oriented production capable of generating income from trade with
rich countries for debt repayment.
The emphasis on export-oriented industry occurred in part because the
exchange value of many debtor nations currencies was in decline, and so
exportation of goods to rich countries generated a source of foreign exchange,
meaning acquiring the currency of countries such as the United States, Ja-
pan, and Germany, whose value was far more stable. This foreign exchange
could then be used to repay old external development loans. The decline in
the value of debtor nations currencies occurred for a number of reasons.
One reason is that wages and sales transactions in many low-income coun-
tries are underground and hence difficult to tax, creating a challenge to
financing government. As a substitute for taxation, governments could se-
cretly print money and make purchases before merchants and others learned
that there was more currency chasing the same number of goods and ser-
vices, and thus before knowledge of money printing led to higher prices.
Eventually people catch on to this scheme, and the result is accelerated infla-
tion. Another reason for declining currency values is that low-income coun-
tries imported many of the finished goods and services they consumed and
had little other than raw commodities to export, leading to trade deficits and
currency devaluations.
The rise of external development debt and the export-oriented policies
mandated by structural adjustment programs were common across many low-
income countries around the world and led to a substantial increase in raw
commodity exports to high-income countries. According to the World Banks
Commodity Trade and Price Trends report (1986), natural resourcebased
export earnings in the early 1980s were 59 percent or more of the overall
economy in countries such as Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Indonesia,
Nepal, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Paraguay. The increased supply of raw com-
modity exports resulted in a substantial decline in the price of these com-
modities, as would be suggested by simple supply-and-demand analysis. This
is revealed in the barter terms of trade, or the ratio of export prices to import
prices for low-income countries. According to the World Bank (1991), the
barter terms of trade for low-income countries declined by 50 percent during
the period between 1965 and 1988. The decline in the value of commodity
exports relative to finished goods imports reduced the income that develop-
ing countries gained from commodity exports. In the case of Africa, for ex-
ample, where a majority of export earnings came from basic commodities
such as cocoa, coffee, palm oil, and minerals, Godfrey and Rose (1985) ob-
served that prices [fell] so rapidly with increased production and supply
that increases in export volume actually result[ed] in a decrease in earnings
(p. 178). If these countries had substantial amounts of human or human-
made capital, they could shift away from reliance on commodity exports, but
expensive educational and capital investment schemes are beyond the reach
of the very poorest of countries trying to cope with rapidly growing popula-
tions, urbanization, and hunger. In order to maintain adequate incomes to
support both the national economy and SAL repayment schemes, more raw
commodities would have to be harvested and exported.
The Brundtland Commission argued that the promotion of commodity
exports in the manner described above has led to unsustainable overuse of
the natural resource base for commodities such as forestry, beef ranching,
ocean fishing, and some cash crops (World Commission on Environment
and Development 1987, pp. 8081). Thus the hypothesis is that as the bar-
ter terms of trade for commodity-exporting countries decline, these coun-
tries must increase such exports in order to maintain steady export income.
This puts pressure on environmentally sustainable forestry, pasturage, and
cropping systems in these countries. There is some evidence supporting
this hypothesis. For example, Malawi has had ten SALs since 1979, and
the Overseas Development Institute found negative outcomes resulting from
those SALs. Similarly Ghanas SAP called for export-oriented cocoa pro-
duction, which failed as an income-generating strategy following the col-
lapse of world cocoa prices. In the Philippines, the World Resources Institute
found that SALs encouraged overexploitation of natural resources, increased
pollution, and urban decay. Moreover, analysis of tropical deforestation
data by Bawa and Dayanandan (1997) uncovers a statistically significant
and relatively large positive correlation between per capita external debt
levels and annual tropical deforestation rates. In particular, Bawa and
Dayanandan used World Resources Institute data for seventy tropical coun-
tries and looked at fourteen socioeconomic factors thought to be related to
deforestation. Their multiple regression analysis of the relative magnitude

of direct effects indicates that per capita external debt is the single most
important factor explaining deforestation rates in Latin America and Asia,
while in Africa the debt measure is ranked behind population density in
importance. Interestingly, per capita gross national product (GNP) was not
found to be a significant factor in explaining deforestation.
Looking back, structural adjustment programs can also be attacked on
humanitarian grounds. Severely indebted low-income countries, having a
present value of debt repayment obligations that are at least 80 percent of the
annual gross national income or 220 percent of total export revenue, are
effectively unable to repay their debt while at the same time providing for
the needs of their citizens. For example, the World Bank (1992) indicated
that interest payments on external debt in Latin America consumed up to 40
percent of these countries national export earnings, leaving little money avail-
able for necessary imports, let alone health care, low-income assistance, job-
creation programs, education, or the promotion of more pollution-efficient
technologies. Oxfam International estimated that Uganda spends $17 per
person on debt repayment annually but only $3 on health care. The U.N.
Commission on Africa reported that expenditures on health in IMF/World
Bankprogrammed countries in Africa declined by 50 percent while these
countries were under SAL programs in the 1980s, and education expendi-
tures declined by 25 percent. To create income for repayment, SAL pro-
grams require reduced spending on imports, and one way that is accomplished
is by allowing inflation-adjusted wage floors to decline, an explicit IMF/
World Bank policy. As a consequence, income inequality and poverty have
increased, even in countries such as Mexico and Chile, which are considered
SAL successes. While SALs have been damaging to most countries operat-
ing under them, they have generated substantial benefits to the donor banks
and countries. Not only did the SALs force loan repayments, but by increas-
ing the supply of commodity exports, they contributed to lower prices for
key commodities such as cocoa and coffee, which are disproportionately
consumed in rich countries.
Case Studies
Brazils experience with conventional international development lending

assistance provides an instructive case study in the failure of such pro-
grams to address sustainability issues. In the 1970s international develop-
ment lenders were providing project finance to build roads, dams,
agricultural extensions, and to promote colonization of the Amazon rain
forest. One of these projects was the Itaipu hydroelectric dam, which be-
gan in the early 1970s and was funded by the World Bank. The project was
anticipated to cost $3.4 billion, but skim-offs by the military rulers of
Paraguay and Brazil and their colleagues contributed to the costs skyrock-
eting to around $20 billion (Select Committee on International Develop-
ment 2001). Another project financed by the World Bank was the $5 billion
Carajs project, which was designed to promote agricultural and mineral
exports by creating road, rail, and port infrastructure.
According to the Select Committee on International Development (2001)
of the United Kingdom, the Itaipu dam displaced 42,000 people, and the
World Bank acknowledged negative effects including prolonged idleness,
incidents of intracommunal violence, alcohol abuse, family disintegration,
and low morale (Danaher and Shellenberger 1995). Danaher and Shellenberger
go on to note that the Itaipu dam flooded unique rain forest ecosystems and
accelerated the spread of bilharzia, a water-borne disease. Along these same
lines, the road network created by the Carajs project encouraged illegal
settlements that depleted forests, degraded soils, polluted water, and resulted
in land conflicts. Furthermore, road building in the Amazon enabled develop-
ers to gain access to dense rain forests and caused an influx in deforestation
from logging, farming, mining, and other exploitative industries, which con-
tributed to the permanent loss of unique functioning ecosystems. During the
high-growth 1970s, a significant portion of foreign borrowing had been done
by Brazilian state enterprises to fund various development projects. In 1991
the World Bank admitted in the Wapenhans Report that 44 percent of its projects
in Brazil were failures because the World Bank ignored local inputs, adopted a
negotiating rather than consultative role, and was more responsive to pressures
to lend than a desire for successful project implementation.
The second oil price shock in 197980 contributed to a global accelera-
tion in inflation rates, which in turn led to record-high interest rates on vari-
able-rate development loans that ratcheted up debt service requirements
among all debtor nations in the developing world, including Brazil. This oil
price shock doubled the price of oil imports into Brazil, which substantially
reduced the amount of funds available for Brazil to service its external debt.
The IMF intervened in late 1979 with a structural adjustment program that
imposed various austerity measures along with a restructuring of Brazils
external debt. At around the same time, Mexico was also entering into a
problem servicing its external debt. In August 1982 the U.S. government
provided Mexico with a $4.55 billion rescue package to give the Mexican
government additional time to negotiate work-out plans with its creditors,
most of which were private commercial banks, and to set up a restructuring
plan with the IMF. Mexicos threat of default on its external debt contributed
to an international debt crisis that substantially reduced the flow of private
development finance to lower-income countries, including Brazil. As a re-

sult, after 1982 there was an increased dependence on IMF/World Bank/
governmentguaranteed loans. Danaher and Shellenberger (1995) note that
in spite of a focused effort on external debt repayment, during this time Brazils
foreign debt grew from $64 billion in 1980 to $115 billion by 1989.
One somewhat more successful example of structural adjustment is of-
fered by the case of Costa Rica, which was given an SAL following earlier
development loan defaults. The Costa Rican economy had been primarily
driven by coffee exports, and in 1982 Costa Rica experienced a crisis caused
by the collapse of world coffee prices. SALs offered by the IMF and the
Inter-American Development Bank, together with $2.7 billion in U.S. aid,
resulted in substantial economic and social progress. Per capita income is
$5,800, 93 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water, the
rate of adult literacy is 94 percent, infant mortality rates have declined from
110 to 12 per thousand births, and fertility rates have declined from 7 to 3
births per woman. Moreover, Costa Rica has diversified its exports, and in
1995 nontraditional exports generated $1.4 billion in income and represented
57 percent of total exports. At the same time, Costa Rica has managed to
preserve large tracts of rain forest.
Envisioning Sustainable Development: The Brundtland

Commission Report, the Earth Summit, the Millennium
Development Goals, and Beyond
A growing perception that conventional methods of economic development

were failing contributed to an international movement to promote more sus-
tainable methods of economic development. The Brundtland Commission is
where the term sustainable development first began receiving widespread at-
tention as an alternative to the widely publicized failures of traditional large-
project international lending programs. These sustainability concepts were
further discussed and refined in a June 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This
meeting, more commonly known as the Earth Summit, produced an interna-
tional charter known as Agenda 21, a program of action for sustainable devel-
opment worldwide. The Earth Summit also produced the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Charter. From the
perspective of this chapter, one of the most important products of the Earth
Charter is the list of guiding principles for sustainable development.
The sustainable development principles contained in the Earth Charter
represent an integration of conventional income-enhancement policies with
a broad array of value statements that address social justice, poverty allevia-
tion, and environmental preservation and restoration. These principles in-

clude international cooperation to help countries enhance their carrying ca-
pacity; policies to promote a more informed and empowered citizenry; a
recognition of the needs of future generations; environmental laws that com-
pensate pollution victims, limit the relocation of polluting activities or sub-
stances from rich to poor communities, and cause firms to internalize pollution
costs; international agreements by which rich countries would assist poor
countries in accessing clean production technologies; empowerment of local
and indigenous communities to manage the resources upon which they rely;
providing people with information and a voice in decision making; the pro-
motion of peace. Thus, from the perspective of the Earth Charter, sustainable
development policies differ from conventional economic development by
acknowledging the interdependencies between economy, environment, and
community, and thus more completely addressing the well-being of people.
A variety of different policies have been identified that are considered
to be broadly consistent with the sustainable development principles ar-
ticulated in the Earth Charter. Examples include policies to increase lit-
eracy rates; the provision of microloans, entrepreneurial skills, and
marketing assistance to low-income people; the imposition of pollution
taxes and liability on polluters, as well as information reporting such as the
Toxics Release Inventory; the fostering of appropriate legal, political, and
property rights reforms needed to protect local communities that have
sustainably governed their local common-pool resources; the promotion of
local small businesses to produce goods to replace imports that drain in-
come from the community; family-planning programs; social and political
reforms that empower women; the promotion of ecotourism, which gener-
ates income and employment from protection of nature preserves and
biodiversity, and transforms poachers into guides and guards; and finally,
direct monetary assistance and technology transfers from rich countries to
promote environmentally friendlier production in low-income countries.
In September 2000, the United Nations sponsored the Millennium Sum-
mit. The result of this summit was the Millennium Declaration, which was
ratified by 189 countries. The declaration includes eight broad development
goals that are to be met by 2015, along with 18 specific targets, which are
listed in Table 14.1. The declaration also includes forty-eight indicators of
progress, which can be accessed on the Internet at http://millenniumindicators
.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp. The goals and targets are based on the ideas
of promoting sustainable economic growth and focusing development
resources on the poor, with human rights at the center of the development
process. Environmental elements are more limited. The seventh goal ad-
dresses environmental sustainability, but only the first target in this goal
Table 14.1
Millennium Development Goals and Targets
Goals Targets
1. Eradicate extreme Reduce by half the proportion of people living on
poverty and hunger less than a dollar a day
Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer
from hunger
2. Achieve universal Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course
primary education of primary schooling
3. Promote gender equality Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary
and empower women education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015
4. Reduce child mortality Reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among
children under five
5. Improve maternal health Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
malaria, and other Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria
diseases and other major diseases
7. Ensure environmental Integrate the principles of sustainable development
sustainability into country policies and programs; reverse loss of
environmental resources
Reduce by half the proportion of people without
sustainable access to safe drinking water
Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least
100 million slum dwellers, by 2020
8. Develop a global Develop further an open trading and financial
partnership for system that is rule-based, predictable and
development nondiscriminatory. Includes a commitment to good
governance, development, and poverty reduction
nationally and internationally
Address the least developed countries special
needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free access
for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily
indebted poor countries; cancellation of official
bilateral debt; and more generous official
development assistance for countries committed to
poverty reduction
Address the special needs of landlocked and small-
island developing states
Deal comprehensively with developing countries
debt problems through national and international
measures to make debt sustainable in the long term
In cooperation with the developing countries,
develop decent and productive work for youth
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies,
provide access to affordable essential drugs in
developing countries
In cooperation with the private sector, make
available the benefits of new technologies
especially information and communications
technologies
addresses the environment as a value somewhat independent of human health.

The overall objective of the declaration is to promote a comprehensive ap-
proach and a coordinated strategy to address improvements in the well-being
of people, tackling many problems simultaneously across a broad front. Low-
income countries that have suffered the most from the effects of poverty
have been taking the lead in advocating for the declaration, especially the
first seven goals that call for improvements in human well-being. The eighth
goal includes steps that developed countries need to take in order to provide
support to the efforts of lower-income countries.
Nevertheless, as Barraclough (2001) observes, while sustainable develop-
ment is a term that is widely used, it conveys different and sometimes contra-
dictory meanings for the different groups that promote it. He argues that part
of the reason for the popularity of the concept stems from its ambiguous mean-
ing. Even when applied with sincerity, sustainable development has been a
term used to promote both reformist modifications of conventional economic
development and technological modernization on the one hand, and more radical
revisions that focus on social justice and the environment on the other.
Barraclough offers the following explanation for why sustainable development
was considered by some to be the best term to describe an integrated approach
to combating environmental degradation and promoting social justice:
Most important, [the term sustainable development] could help to open

new space in international organizations for those convinced that environ-
mental degradation and social polarization were not only closely linked,
but were also symptoms of deep systemic malfunctioning. This would en-
able them to promote more effectively radical people-centered institutional
and policy reforms at international, national, and local levels. Of course,
vested interests would use this same space to try to maintain their privi-
leges and power, but vigorous popularly based social forces could use it to
improve their opportunities to counter them. (Barraclough 2001, p. 6)
The Millennium Development Goals represent a recent and significant

example of some sustainability principles being promoted in the context of
international economic development. Fully and conclusively satisfying sus-
tainable development principles involves analysis of trade-offs that will be
hampered by practical limits to the quantification and commensurability of
the dissimilar factors under consideration, uncertainties relating to cause/
effect relationships, and the unknown preferences of unborn future genera-
tions. Given these practical policy challenges, it may be more productive to
view sustainable development as a continuing process of education, advo-
cacy, incremental change, and assessment. In order to use the concept of
sustainability as a policy guide, it is important that we go beyond the defini-
tions provided in chapter 12 and develop theories of sustainability from which

we can extract policy implications. We turn to that subject below.
Theories of Sustainability
So far in this chapter we have seen that social, economic, and environmental
failures of international development lending programs resulted in a call for
more sustainable economic development, as articulated in prominent decla-
rations such as the Brundtland Commission report and the Millennium De-
velopment Goals. Theorists in various disciplines have also made efforts to
understand the concept of sustainability. These different approaches can be
placed into two broad categories. One of these categories focuses on the
primacy of ecological integrity, diversity, and carrying capacity, and identi-
fying the quantity and quality of natural capital stocks that are necessary for
sustaining the entire system. Performance indicators in this category trans-
form human activities and impacts into physical measures of consumption or
drawdown that can be compared to available flows of biophysical resources
from the earths stock of natural capital. The other category of sustainability
theory focuses on the aggregate value of natural, human, constructed, social,
and cultural capital stocks, and thus allows for trade-offs of one form of
capital over another. Performance indicators in this category can be difficult
to compare across types of capital. Attempts to produce single-number indi-
cators in this category usually convert the flows of services from these capi-
tal stocks, as well as any harmful or beneficial human impacts on these stocks,
into monetary values.
As Turner and Pearce (1993) point out, following the Brundtland Com-
mission report, there was an evolution of the economics and ecology de-
bate into two competing theories of sustainability, which we will refer to
here as weak and strong sustainability (Pearce and Atkinson 1993; Pearce,
Hamilton, and Atkinson 1996). While each of these two categories of
sustainability theory tends to draw its own loyal advocates, perhaps a more
useful way to think about them would be to consider the circumstances in
which the assumptions that underlie them are true. For example, what are
the essential elements of natural capital that lack any practical substitutes?
The need to understand the functional characteristics and human impacts
on these elements of natural capital makes the issues of carrying capacity
and resilience in the first category of sustainability theory relevant. As we
learned in chapter 12, sustainability must also include the economic and
social needs of people that go beyond simply being represented as impacts
on environmental integrity. The need to understand the flow of goods and
services from all valuable forms of capital, and the practical trade-offs in-
volved with meeting basic human needs, makes the second category of
sustainability theory relevant.
Weak Sustainability
Weak sustainability theory has developed from economic models of growth

and technological change in the context of limited resources. A central ele-
ment of weak sustainability theory is the assumption that human-made capi-
tal can effectively substitute for natural capital and the services provided by
ecological systems. The weak sustainability concept has developed from ear-
lier work by Solow (1974) and his colleagues in understanding the condi-
tions required for continued economic growth in a world with limited natural
resources. Solow (1992) argued that a sustainable path for the national
economy is one that allows every future generation the opportunity to be as
well off as its predecessors. Likewise, Repetto (1986) states that the core of
the idea of sustainability, then, is the concept that current decisions should
not impair the prospects for maintaining or improving future living stan-
dards (pp. 1516). The concern was that if natural resources are limited,
and there is little substitution between different types of natural and human-
made capital stocks, then per capita consumption may not be sustainable in a
world with a growing population. Dasgupta and Heal (1979) found that if
unlimited substitution of human-made capital for natural capital is possible,
then exhaustible natural resources do not pose a limit to population and eco-
nomic growth, even in the absence of technological advance. Hartwick (1977)
developed a savings/investment perspective that, as Gutes (1996) points out,
helps link economic growth theory with the concept of weak sustainability.
Under the Hartwick rule, in order to sustain constant levels of per capita
consumption, the gains that society today enjoys from utilizing an exhaust-
ible natural resource must be reinvested in natural or human-made capital
over time. Following the benefit/cost rule, such a substitution of human-made
capital for exhausted natural capital is justified so long as the increase in the
productive capacity of human-made capital more than offsets the loss in pro-
ductive capacity from natural capital. As a result, a nondeclining aggregate
flow of beneficial goods and services from all capital stocks is maintained
over time. As Pearce (1994) alludes, a Hartwick-style savings rule underlies
the Pearce-Atkinson concept of weak sustainability.
An implication of weak sustainability is that it allows for the mitigation of
lost natural capital. For example, land conversion that eliminates an acre of
wetland may be mitigated with a number of acres of constructed wetlands.
Likewise, according to weak sustainability, the loss of natural runs of salmon
may be mitigated through the development of fish hatcheries or aquaculture.
Strong Sustainability
Running down the stocks of natural capital and replacing these stocks with
constructed substitutes is not universally seen as being consistent with the
requirements of sustainable development, however. As Victor (1991) has ar-
gued, the easier it is to substitute manufactured capital for depleting re-
sources or a degraded environment, the less concern there needs to be about
the capacity of the environment to sustain development (p. 194). Strong
sustainability theory has developed from ecological science. It emphasizes
the ecological imperatives of carrying capacity, biodiversity, and biotic resil-
ience. From this perspective, human-made capital cannot effectively substi-
tute for the vital services provided by ecological systems. Arguments
supporting strong sustainability theory include (following Pearce, Barbier,
and Markandya 1990):
Uncertainty: The consequences of depleting natural capital in terms of

the functional characteristics and productivity of ecological systems are
unpredictable, which suggests caution. Because of this uncertainty, we
cannot determine the proper level of offsetting investment in human or
human-made capital that is required by weak sustainability.
Irreversibility: So many of our actions, such as species extinctions, large-
scale ecosystem disruptions, and global climate change, cannot be un-
done. Unlike human-made capital, which can be rebuilt, destruction of
certain forms of natural capital, such as biodiversity, is irreversible. While
it is possible in theory to compensate future generations for permanently
diminished natural capital, from a practical standpoint we cannot know
their preferences regarding the trade-off between natural and human-
made capital. As a result, as a practical matter we have no way of satis-
fying the weak sustainability standard.
Scale and Discontinuities: Instead of the smooth and continuous cause-
and-effect relationships assumed in models drawn from weak sustain-
ability theory, natural systems often feature discontinuities and
threshold effects. One of the best known of these is the potential for
melting terrestrial ice sheets to disrupt the Northern Atlantic thermo-
haline circulation system. The temperate climate of Western Europe is
dependent upon the transport of warm ocean waters northward, and
evidence suggests that acute freshwater runoff events due to climate
warming in the past have disrupted this flow, resulting in dramatic cool-
ing and loss of agricultural production in Western Europe. Similarly,
with uneven topography, each additional one-foot rise in sea level will
generally imply highly uneven land inundation rates. As a final example,
loss of one species may have a small ecosystem impact, while loss of
another may cause the same ecosystem to collapse.
To summarize, strong sustainability theory is distinguished by the view

that there is very little substitutability between human-made capital and natural
capital in terms of the flow of goods and services that they are capable of
providing over time. Strong sustainability theory is therefore focused on the
critical and irreplaceable life-support systems associated with natural capi-
tal. From a more technical perspective, another distinction is that weak
sustainability theory is built on economic conceptions of smooth and con-
tinuous cause-and-effect relationships, while strong sustainability theory is
premised upon an ecological systems approach that features discontinuities,
discreteness, and thresholds in cause-and-effect relationships. Thus in strong
sustainability the ecological systems approach provides the basis for guiding
(or constraining) sustainable development, while in weak sustainability eco-
nomic methods of analysis provide the context for evaluating sustainable
development. While weak sustainability calls for the maintenance of the sum
of human, human-made, and natural capital, strong sustainability calls for
maintaining human, human-made, and natural capital separately (Costanza
and Daly 1992).
There has been relatively little research that has attempted to evaluate the
hypothesis of substitutability between human-made and natural capital on a
comprehensive basis. Presumably, substitutability is possible in some cases
and not possible in others, which would imply that the choice of weak or
strong sustainability is situational and complex. Pearce (1994) points out
that the waste-transforming capacity of the natural environment and the de-
gree of biodiversity, for example, have no real substitutes (though the pro-
ductivity of natural sink functions has been improved by technology, as
illustrated by innovative new methods of using wetlands to transform vari-
ous human wastes). Empirical evidence supporting high degrees of substi-
tutability has largely been limited to the study of energy and mineral resources
(see, for example, Brown and Field 1979).
Practical Policy Implications
Policies consistent with weak sustainability theory are those that view natu-
ral capital, human capital, and human-made capital as substitutes. Degrada-
tion of natural capital is acceptable if, and only if, it is accompanied by a
mitigating increase in human and human-made capital. This view is reflected
in various World Bank positions, as expressed in the World Development
Report, 1992, and by Pearce and Warford (1993). Therefore, for example, it
may be consistent with weak sustainability to build a hydroelectric dam that

destroys elements of natural capital if the constructed capital that constitutes
the dam generates an offsetting flow of benefits. A central concern that crit-
ics have for weak sustainability theory is that it does not necessarily provide
for limits to the built environment, or for minimal preservation of wildlands
and other attributes of natural capital.
In contrast, policies consistent with strong sustainability theory call for
the application of a safe minimum standard that ensures the continued exist-
ence and at least minimal functional integrity of the various renewable re-
source stocks and ecosystem functions of natural capital from which flow
the food, fiber, energy, and ecosystem services essential for a sustainable
society. Consistent with the notion of minimal substitutability between natu-
ral and human or human-made capital, economic growth premised on devel-
opment of human and human-made capital would be constrained when
pollution and other waste by-products persist in the environment and signifi-
cantly degrade natural capital. As Opschoor (1996) argues, strong sustain-
ability requires preserving unique and vital natural capital stocks (ecological
infrastructure) and thus keeping human activity consistent with the earths
carrying capacity and the available environmental utilization space.
Stepping back a bit, it should be noted that one need not make an either-
or choice of weak or strong sustainability as a guide to public policy. In
most any complex society, we can readily observe policies consistent with
both strong and weak sustainability theory. For example, most societies have
sacrificed some natural capital in the process of developing human-made
capital such as transportation infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing fa-
cilities, hospitals, and schools. These same societies may at the same time
have designated wilderness areas and wildlife refuges, regulatory systems to
protect wildlife and ecosystem services generated from privately owned land,
and programs to conserve agricultural lands and soil resources.
Sustainability Indicators
We will begin by discussing measures of weak sustainability and then ad-

dress measures of strong sustainability. Weak sustainability indicators usu-
ally start with quantitative measures of human, human-made, natural, and
perhaps social capital that are made commensurate in monetary terms so that
they can be reduced to a single aggregated indicator that is roughly compa-
rable to GDP. The Human Development Index (HDI) takes a somewhat simi-
lar approach of aggregating indicators of human capital and human-made
capital, though the HDI number is not monetized. Moreover, the Millennium
Development Indicators provide separate measures of human, human-made,
and natural capital, though no attempt is made to aggregate them into a single
indicator. Thus, before we consider some of the more prominent weak
sustainability indicators, we should briefly consider the conventional means
by which macroeconomic performance is measured.
Macroeconomics is the subdiscipline of economics that analyzes the ag-
gregate performance of an economy, with particular attention given to the
business cycle of expansion and contraction that leads to changes in infla-
tion, unemployment, and income. The data that are used to measure macro-
economic performance are organized into national income and product
accounts, which were first developed by Simon Kuznets and other
macroeconomists for the U.S. Department of Commerce in the Great De-
pression. Before that time, policymakers lacked timely and reliable macro-
economic data and therefore were unable to take appropriate policy actions
in response to current trends in the economy. Kuznets received a Nobel Prize
in economics for his work with the national income and product accounts. A
central element of national income accounting is gross domestic product
(GDP). GDP measures the market value of all the goods and services bought
by consumers, firms, or government agencies, those invested in to enhance
production by firms and other enterprises, and those involved in net exports
(export minus import expenditures) each year in a particular domestic
economy. When people refer to the status of the economy, they usually mean
GDP. GDP can grow over time due to a general increase in prices (inflation)
or due to an increase in the productive capacity of labor and capital in the
economy, or a combination of both. When one removes the component of
GDP increase that is due to inflation, one is left with real GDP growth or
GDP growth due only to increases in the quantity and quality of goods and
services produced. Growth in real GDP is called economic growth. Finally,
real GDP divided by population is per capita real GDP, or the average persons
share of real GDP in the economy. To central government policy makers, the
key macroeconomic policy goal is to promote the highest growth rate for
real per capita GDP that is consistent with low inflation.
Consider the problem of adjusting GDP to take into account unmeasured
(or incorrectly measured) changes in the quality of the social and natural
environment. Many important qualities associated with a healthy natural en-
vironment or the safety and quality of our community, for that matter, are
not bought or sold, and so are more difficult to quantify and have been ig-
nored in conventional macroeconomic analysis. Macroeconomics simply tal-
lies up the value of market transactions, and yet macroeconomic performance
defines the issues that policymakers work to address. As degradation of sen-
sitive environmental and natural resource systems accelerates, it becomes
increasingly important to find a way to adjust GDP and our system of na-
tional income accounts so that they provide a more accurate picture of the
well-being of people over timemacroeconomic sustainability.
Limitations of conventional GDP accounting include the following:
Money spent deterring and remediating crime and other problems asso-
ciated with the deterioration of communities is counted as economic
gain and increases GDP, as is money spent after a natural disaster.
Money spent remediating pollution problems is added to the income
generated by the industrial process that originally created the pollution
problem, thus creating the illusion that the industrial activity creates a
double benefit to society.
GDP is not affected by the degree of inequality in the distribution of
income in a national economy, and per capita real GDP does not indi-
cate the extent of inequality in an economy. Thus poverty can increase
when real per capita GDP increases.
GDP does not take into account moral, spiritual, or aesthetic values
associated with biodiversity, wilderness, Native American religious sites,
or unique aspects of the natural environment.
GDP does not distinguish a dollar generated by sustainable harvest of a
resource from a dollar generated in the process of exhausting a natural
resource. From a business perspective, we can say that depreciation of
the productive capacity of the natural capital stock is not taken into
account in GDP.
Therefore, we can see that simple GDP accounting treats every transaction
as positive, as long as money changes hands, and therefore real per capita GDP
is inadequate as an indicator of progress toward a sustainable society. Lets
now look beyond GDP to find indicators of weak and strong sustainability.
Indicators of Weak Sustainability
Recall that weak sustainability theory calls for the maintenance of a constant
(per capita) level of capital stock, largely independent of whether it is hu-
man-made, social, human, or natural. A number of measures have been de-
veloped that attempt to take indicators of human-made, human, natural, and
social capital and reduce them to a single aggregated indicator of weak
sustainability. From the standpoint of weak sustainability, ideally the na-
tional income and product accounts would be extended beyond the market-
mediated flows underlying GDP measurement to include all stocks of capital
and both market-mediated and nonmarket flows of valuable goods and ser-
vices. Moreover, ideally markets would accurately capture both negative and
positive externalities in the sense described in chapter 4. Under these condi-

tions, net national product (the sum of aggregate consumption spending and
net capital formation) is equivalent to the maximum sustainable amount of
consumption spending that an economy with zero population growth can
indefinitely maintain (National Research Council 1999). Net capital forma-
tion refers to capital investment in excess of depreciation (or deterioration).
Consumption spending and net capital formation would include traditional
market-based consumption and investment as well as nonmarket consump-
tion and investment not currently captured in the national income and prod-
uct accounts. Nonmarket consumption would include the flows from resource
stocks such as forests, rangelands, fisheries, and aquifers, as well as flows of
ecosystem services such as oxygen exchange, temperature regulation, the
hydrological cycle, and waste absorption. Accordingly, net capital formation
would include investments in natural capital.
Presumably, one would also have to include consumption of the flow of
services from social capital in this measure, as well as net investment in
social capital. From the perspective of the National Research Council (1999),
however, there is no satisfactory metric for measuring social capital, and no
established methodology for valuing it in monetary terms, and therefore econo-
mists have not included social capital in some measures of augmented GDP.
Recall that social capital is made up of factors such as trust, norms of reci-
procity, volunteerism, and networks of support. Quantitative social capital
indicators include trust in government, voter participation rates, member-
ships in civic organizations, and hours spent volunteering. Despite the con-
cerns of the National Research Council, there have been some attempts at
valuing volunteerism and other aspects of social capital, but before address-
ing them, we will first consider several relatively simple indicators of weak
sustainability.
One method of GDP augmentation that applies some of these concepts
uses the Hartwick rule to derive a measure of environmentally adjusted or
green GDP. Green GDP is derived as follows:
Green GDP = GDP Hotelling rent for nonrenewables total expenditures

on pollution control other direct costs due to environmental degradation.
Recall that Hotelling rent reflects the excess of (price - marginal cost)
from resource extraction and reflects the opportunity cost of current resource
consumption. Scarce resources consumed today are not available in the fu-
ture, and so Hotelling rent reflects forgone future consumption value. Hartwick
and other growth theorists have shown that steady-state consumption can be
maintained if Hotelling rent from consumption of nonrenewable resources is
reinvested in some form of capital stock (natural, social, human, or con-

structed) to provide for future consumption. Thus, as nonrenewable resources
are exhausted, the Hotelling rents generated by dynamically efficient con-
sumption of these resources create a revenue source that can be invested to
develop substitutes for the time when the resource is exhausted.
Along these lines, Arrow et al. (2004) proposed genuine investment as an
indicator of weak sustainability, which they interpret as assuring that a
nondecreasing level of social welfare is being maintained over time. Genu-
ine investment refers to the sum of the values of investments or disinvestments
in each of societys capital assets (i.e., human, human-made, social, natural,
and cultural). Since under weak sustainability theory we can view the sum of
these stocks of capital assets as societys genuine wealth, we can also view
genuine investment as the rate of change in genuine wealth. While this is a
helpful concept in understanding weak sustainability theory, it poses chal-
lenges from a measurement standpoint. For example, weak sustainability
theory requires that declines in nonrenewable resource stocks over time must
be offset with genuine investment in one or more of the five categories of
capital stock. In order to maintain nondecreasing social welfare, however,
society must assign values to the flows from each of these stocks, and direct
genuine investment in a manner consistent with maintaining nondecreasing
social welfare. Arrow et al. noted that the potential for substitution of one
form of capital for another would likely vary depending on differing degrees
of scarcity and characteristics of social utility.
A closely related and computationally identical indicator for weak
sustainability, developed by Hamilton (1994), is genuine savings (also see
Pearce, Hamilton, and Atkinson 1996). Hamilton and Clemens (1999) pro-
vided estimates of genuine domestic saving for nearly all the countries of the
world in 1998. Their formula for estimating genuine domestic saving is given
as follows:
Genuine domestic saving = investment + education CO2 damage oil

depletion mineral depletion net forest depletion.
Note that investment in the equation above refers to aggregate spending

on human-made capital of various kinds, net of depreciation, while educa-
tion refers to aggregate investment in human capital. Hamilton and Clemens
(1999) measure CO2 damage at US$20 per ton. The last three terms refer to
depletion of oil resources, mineral resources, and depletion (net of regen-
eration) of forest resources. Hamilton and Clemens found that genuine do-
mestic savings (or in Arrow et al. [2004] terms, genuine investment) was
positive in all the rich industrialized countries of the world, as well as in
most middle- and even lower-income countries, but was negative in thirty-
three of the worlds poorest or most oil-export-dependent countries. In par-
ticular, the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa regions featured
negative genuine domestic savings because the increases due to investment
in human-made capital and in education were more than offset by depletion
of oil and other natural resource stocks. Thus the large positive values for
genuine domestic saving in rich industrialized countries is at least partially
based on exporting their resource depletion to these oil-exporting countries.
Arrow et al. (2004) modify the genuine domestic saving calculation from
Hamilton and Clemens (1999) to take into account the additional impacts of
population growth and technologically based improvements in the produc-
tivity of human-made capital. Even with these adjustments, Arrow et al. still
find negative genuine investment rates for sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa,
and the Middle East, due to depletion of oil and other natural resource stocks.
Moreover, countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, which had rela-
tively large positive rates of total genuine investment, were found to have
near-zero rates of per capita genuine investment due to their high population
growth rates. Arrow et al. conclude that for sub-Saharan Africas -2.6 per-
cent rate of genuine investment implies that this regions genuine wealth is
declining by a factor of two about every twenty-five years.
While there are some challenges associated with adequately measuring
genuine savings, it can be argued that it is the most widely accepted and best
attempt at measuring weak sustainability so far, with considerable scope for
future development and improvement (Dietz and Neumayer 2004). There
are a number of other more ambitious measures of weak sustainability that
include a wider variety of indicators, including some for social capital. Two
of the better known of these socioeconomic measures of weak sustainability
are the index of sustainable economic welfare (ISEW), developed by Daly
and Cobb (1989), and the genuine progress indicator (GPI), developed by
Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe (1995, hereinafter Cobb et al.) and maintained on
the Internet at www.rprogress.org/newprograms/sustIndi/gpi/index.shtml.
Computation of the ISEW begins with per capita real consumption spending
(a major element of GDP), followed by the introduction of various adjust-
ments to take into account a variety of socioeconomic and environmental
factors. The following are examples of the large number of adjustment fac-
tors that Daly and Cobb (1989) include in their index:
deduction of an estimate of the amount that society would need to set

aside in a perpetual income stream to compensate future generations
for the loss of services from nonrenewable energy resources such as oil
and natural gas;
deduction for estimates of pollution and other environmental damages,

including noise pollution, and what they admit to be a rather specula-
tive estimate of damage from global warming;
deduction for income inequality;
addition of the nonmarketed value of household production;
addition of the value of government expenditures for education, health,
roads, and highways;
deduction for the higher cost of urbanized living.
The GPI is very similar to the ISEW. To compute the GPI, one starts with
real personal consumption spending, adjusts for income distribution, and
then adds or subtracts a number of different elements that reflect ecological
and social benefits or costs. Adjustment factors added to traditional con-
sumption spending to arrive at the GPI include:
the value of household work and parenting, based on the cost of hir-
ing out these services, based on the work of economist Robert Eisner;
the value of volunteer work, using Census Bureau data and taking the
opportunity cost of time at $8 per hour;
services of consumer durables net of their costs (from making do with
old things);
services of government capital such as highways, streets, and other infra-
structure, as a percentage of the total value of the stock of these assets.
Factors subtracted from traditional consumption spending to arrive at GPI

include:
cost of crime;
cost of family breakdown, based on added expenditures;
loss of leisure time;
cost of underemployment, measured at opportunity cost;
cost of consumer durables;
cost of commuting (a defensive expenditure);
cost of household pollution abatement;
cost of automobile accidents;
cost of water, air, and noise pollution;
loss of wetlands;
loss of farmlands;
depletion of nonrenewable energy resources;
other long-term environmental damage;
cost of ozone depletion;
loss of old-growth forests.
As you might expect, green GDP, genuine savings, ISEW, GPI, and
similar weak sustainability measures are controversial, particularly among
economists. Many economists are uncomfortable with them because they
are not as concrete and objective as traditional GDP accounting. For ex-
ample, the dollar values assigned to GPI elements such as family break-
down and loss of old-growth forests are to some degree subjective and
open to debate, while the conventional national income accounting meth-
ods underlying GDP are widely accepted. In its description of augmented
accounts for tracking economic sustainability the National Research Council
(1999) excludes elements such as income inequality and the success and
happiness of families. While both of these are included in the ISEW and
the GPI, and in fact, inequality is a major factor explaining their trend, the
National Research Council argued that such things are important but not
amenable to economic measurement. Finally, despite the complexity of
measures such as the ISEW and the GPI, they still exclude important fac-
tors such as risk and uncertainty. Should the path to sustainability be risk-
free, or is society willing to accept policies or technologies that offer a
good chance of a major improvement, but at the cost of a small chance of a
loss in sustainability?
While the weak sustainability measures are clearly controversial and
somewhat subjective, it is also clear that current GDP accounting offers a
highly incomplete view of economic well-being and sustainability. There
is a growing recognition of the need for augmenting the traditional na-
tional income and product accounts. For example, the National Research
Council (1999) observes that augmented national income accounts would
. . . be valuable as indicators of whether economic activity is sustainable. .
. . It is clear that the national productivity depends on many non-market
elements, including not only the environment, but also such things as school-
ing, health care, and social capital in volunteer and civic organizations. It
may not be possible to capture all these important facets of modern society
in nations accounts, but an attempt should surely be made . . . (pp. 15
16). With time, a set of best methods may develop that will lend more
precision and acceptance to measures of weak sustainability.
Indicators of Strong Sustainability
Indicators consistent with strong sustainability theory include measures of

ecological resilience such as biological diversity and yield variability in ag-
riculture, measures of carrying capacity, and ecological impact analysis. As
Pearce, Hamilton, and Atkinson (1996) point out, under strong sustainability
theory, sustainable development occurs by conserving key elements of the
natural capital stock that preserve ecological integrity. Wackernagel, White,

and Moran (2004) argue that strong sustainability has specific, definable re-
quirements, including the need to avoid ecological overshoot, meaning the
level of human resource demand that exceeds ecological carrying capacity.
Two indicators of strong sustainability are carrying capacity based on net
primary product (NPP), and ecological footprint (EF), each of which focuses
on measuring the natural capital requirements of human society. NPP can be
derived from the amount of vegetation produced annually over the land area
of the country for which NPP is being calculated. Following Vitousek, Ehrlich,
and Matson (1986), one can then divide NPP by the average amount of veg-
etable matter required to support a human per year to arrive at a measure of
the human carrying capacity of the land area under analysis.
The EF is a more comprehensive measure of appropriated human carry-
ing capacity, or the natural capital stock utilized by human society. The EF
is approximated by the area of ecologically productive land and water per
capita that is necessary to support existing human consumption and to ab-
sorb many human-generated wastes (see Rees and Wackernagel 1994). Some
impacts are not quantified in EF analysis. For example, toxic pollutants
and species extinction are not incorporated into the EF model. Wackernagel
and Rees divide land into categories: arable land, pasture, forest, sea space,
built-up land, and fossil energy land. Fossil energy land refers to land set
aside to sequester carbon dioxide created from burning fossil fuels.
Wackernagel and Rees report that only about 0.25 hectares per capita of
arable land exists worldwide, and that nearly all is already under cultiva-
tion. According to analysis by Wackernagel and Rees, the world has only 2
hectares per capita of productive surface area, including sea space. They
then subtract 12 percent of ecological capacity for biodiversity to arrive at
their net figure of 1.7 hectares per capita of ecologically productive land.
Since the world average per capita EF is 2.3 hectares, the implication is
that humanitys consumption exceeds what nature can generate on a con-
tinuous basis by about 35 percent. As a result, the work of Wackernagel
and Rees suggests a sustainability gap, or overshoot, in which industrial-
ized countries are drawing down natural capital stocks (or importing them
from lower-income countries) rather than living on sustainable flows. The
EF can be reduced by various combinations of more resource-efficient tech-
nologies, reduced population, reduced consumption, and increased eco-
logical productivity.
Venetoulis, Chazan, and Gaudet (2004) show that while the global aggre-
gate EF has been rising, average worldwide per capita EF has been slowly and
steadily declining since 1980. Moreover, while there is a correlation between a
countrys per capita income and EF, there is not a direct linear relationship,
indicating that some rich countries are able to foster far more sustainable soci-
eties than others. For example, Venetoulis and colleagues report that the per
capita EF in the Netherlands was only 3.81 in 2000, while Italys was only
3.26. In contrast, per capita EF in the United States is nearly 10 hectares, the
highest in the world, and those of New Zealand, Canada, and Norway ex-
ceeded 8 hectares. In contrast, countries such as Haiti and Bangladesh have
per capita EF values below 1.0. Wackernagel and Rees find that some coun-
tries are in an EF deficit, implying that they must import carrying capacity
from another country (or from future generations), while others still have a
surplus. Canada is one of the better examples of a country with surplus carry-
ing capacity. Japan, on the other hand, has a significant deficit.
Case Studies in Measuring Sustainable Economic Development
Scotland
Moffatt, Hanley, and Gill (1994, hereinafter Moffatt et al.) used both weak
and strong sustainability measurement techniques to answer the question of
whether Scotland is on a sustainable development path. Some of their key
findings are summarized below:
Approximate environmentally adjusted national product, 198892: Ac-

cording to this measure, which is a measure of green GDP, Scotland is
on a sustainable development path, as this measure has risen without
break, with a start-to-finish rise of approximately 30 percent.
Index of sustainable economic welfare (Daly and Cobb 1989), 1984
90: According to this measure, Scotland is unlikely to be on a sustain-
able development path, as this measure has declined in all years except
1989, with a start-to-finish decline of over 10 percent. Moffatt et al.
classify this as a marginal case.
Carrying capacity: This ecological measure indicates that Scotland is
very close to its human carrying capacity, and so Moffatt et al. classify
this outcome as being marginal.
Ecological footprint (appropriated carrying capacity): Analysis of
Scotlands ecological footprint indicates that its present patterns of en-
ergy and food consumption are unsustainable.
The results from Moffatt and colleagues are quite mixed, and they do
consider theirs only a pilot study. Nevertheless, as one might expect, the
weak sustainability measures are to some extent more likely to indicate a
sustainable development path than measures of strong sustainability.
United States
Daly and Cobb (1989) offer an ambitious study of the sustainability of the
United Statess development path using the ISEW. Based on this analysis,
Daly and Cobb find that the ISEW generally increased from 1950 (per capita
ISEW value = 2,488) to 1979 (per capita ISEW = 3,776.4). Annual increases
averaged 0.84 percent in the 1950s and 2.01 percent in the 1960s. Daly and
Cobb argue that a major factor explaining the dramatic rise in the per capita
ISEW during the 1960s was the increased equality of income that occurred
during that period. There were also appreciable increases in net capital. Be-
tween 1979 and the end of their study in 1986, per capita ISEW declined by
approximately 10 percent (1986 per capita ISEW value = 3,402.8). The de-
cline during the 1980s averaged 1.26 percent annually. This decline occurs
even when one removes the more controversial elements from their index,
such as assumed impacts of global warming. This decline is driven by wors-
ening income inequality, further heavily impacted natural resources, and in-
adequate investment in socially beneficial forms of capital.
As mentioned above, Cobb et al. (1995) have developed a genuine progress
indicator (GPI) that includes a very broad range of environmental, social,
political, and economic adjustment factors. Cobb et al. have computed GPI
for the United States from 1950 to 1994. GPI is an adjusted dollar measure
of per capita income. Their methodology is similar to that of Daly and Cobb,
and their findings are somewhat similar. Cobb and his colleagues find that
GPI was relatively constant during the period from 1950 to 1961, ranging
between 5,658 and 6,346. From 1961 to 1969 the GPI rose from a value of
5,872 to 7,400, approximately a 25 percent increase. The GPI declined, with
a few small upward blips, through the 1970s and by 1980 was at 6,369, a
level comparable to that of the 1950s. By 1990 the GPI declined to a value of
5,304, a 17 percent drop. The 1994 figure for GPI is 4,068, showing a 23
percent decline in four years. As with the analysis by Daly and Cobb, much
of this decline can be attributed to the increase in income inequality that has
occurred in the United States since the 1960s. For example, while GPI de-
clined by 45 percent from 1973 to 1994, if income distribution had remained
the same, GPI would have declined by only 10 percent.
Venetoulis and Cobb (2004) provide an update on the GPI for the United
States for the period 200003. They note that in the period between January
2000 and January 2003, real GDP increased by 2.64 percent, or $180 per
American. Based on the GPI, however, the value of economic activity grew
by less than 1 percent (0.12 percent) during the same period. On a per
capita basis, from 2000 to 2003 there was a $212 decline in GPI, with the
biggest reductions coming from the degradation of natural resources and a
rise in the national debt. There was also an increase on the positive side of
the GPI. In particular, the GPI increased by $600 billion due to the increased
value of housework and volunteer work between 2000 and 2003, which is
not counted in GDP. In terms of ecological footprint analysis, Venetoulis,
Chazan, and Gaudet (2004) report that in 2000, the most recent year for
which data are available, the United States became the country with the larg-
est per capita ecological footprint of any country on the planet9.57 hect-
ares (23.6 acres) per person.
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean
The World Bank (1995) computed genuine savings for a variety of different
developing regions of the world. While the World Bank acknowledged that
this computation should also include investments in education (human capi-
tal) and health, its analysis did not include them. The World Banks results
indicate that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced negative genuine savings
since 1977. Latin America and the Caribbean as a single region experienced
periods of negative genuine savings from 1980 to 1984 and again in the
period since 1989. Most developed countries experienced a genuine savings
rate of between 1 and 10 percent annually. More recent measurements of
genuine savings by Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and Arrow et al. (2004)
indicate that while Latin America and the Caribbean have improved, sub-
Saharan Africa continues to experience negative genuine savings.
Summary
Sustainable development is about broadening the traditional mandate

of economic development policies, which focused on increasing real
per capita incomes in developing countries, to include social and envi-
ronmental factors. The sustainable development movement is driven in
part by the perception that conventional methods of sustainable devel-
opment may result in serious environmental, resource, and community
degradation, as well as fostering a dependency on resource-depleting
commodity exports as a means of repaying past development debt.
While conventional economic development policies have focused on
fostering income growth, sustainable economic development policies
also include improved education and literacy; family planning; the pro-
vision of information and democratic empowerment; the tailoring of
economic development to local conditions, environments, and cultures;
the promotion of ecotourism; and the fostering of environmental regu-
lations, among others.
Two broad categories of sustainability theory have become prominent.

One of these, weak sustainability, derives from economic models of
sustainable economic growth and is based on the assumption that tech-
nological innovation will allow for the substitution of human-made capi-
tal for depleted natural capital. The other of these, strong sustainability,
derives from ecological models of carrying capacity and is based on the
assumption that natural capital is usually unique and thus cannot be
replaced by human-made capital.
Traditional macroeconomic accounting techniques for measuring eco-
nomic performance are inadequate for evaluating the sustainability of a
national economy. A number of recent attempts have been made at ad-
justing GDP to take into account the environmental and community
requirements and impacts related to the economy. These adjustments
are very difficult because of the problem of quantifying social and envi-
ronmental qualities that are not directly traded in markets.
Indicators of weak sustainability include green GDP, genuine savings,
the index of sustainable economic welfare, and the genuine progress
indicator. These measures begin with conventional elements of GDP
and make adjustments based on the monetary value of changes in the
environment, natural resource systems, and a variety of social and po-
litical factors related to sustainability. While these measures are contro-
versial both for the factors that are included and for the values assigned
to them, conventional GDP accounting offers only a very incomplete
picture of the well-being of people.
Indicators of strong sustainability include carrying capacity, biodiversity,
and ecological footprint. These indicators provide information on the
ability of terrestrial ecosystems to support human life over time. They
do not allow for improved technology or for the substitution of human-
made capital for natural capital.
Case studies indicate a substantial disparity between the trend in con-
ventional GDP, weak sustainability measures, and strong sustainability
measures. For example, while real per capita GDP has generally been
rising in the United States at a slow but steady pace (with the exception
of recessionary periods), both the ISEW and the GPI indicate a decline
in sustainable economic welfare over the last twenty or more years.
1. Research the effects of traditional development lending and SALs in a

country of your own choice and write a two-page essay describing your find-
ings. Discuss the impacts of development debt on the domestic economy of
the country, poverty and income distribution, food security, social spending,
and the integrity of environmental and natural resources.
2. Describe the conceptual differences between strong and weak sustain-
able development. What is the basis for disagreement over which of the two
offers the better guide to sustainable development policy?
3. Make a list and describe some examples of situations in which there
appears to have been a sustainable substitution of human-made capital for
natural capital. Now make another list and describe some elements of natu-
ral capital that cannot be replaced by human-made capital. How might we
combine elements of strong and weak sustainability theory into a unified
theory of sustainable development that is consistent with the two lists you
have drawn up?
4. Access the Compendium of Sustainable Development Indicators on the
Internet (www.iisd.org/measure/compendium). Select an indicator of
sustainability that has not been discussed in the textbook and critically evaluate
how well it measures progress toward sustainability.
5. Access the Millennium Development Indicators website (http://
millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi.asp), select a country, and produce
a summary report of the trends in that countrys Millennium Development
Indicators.
6. Go to www.myfootprint.org and assess your own ecological footprint
based on where you live and on your various life-style choices. Then con-
sider several life-style changes and see how those would affect your ecologi-
cal footprint.
Internet Links
Compendium of Sustainable Development Indicators (www.iisd.org/mea-

sure/compendium): Provides an overview of initiatives on sustainable de-
velopment indicators being carried out at the international, national, and
provincial/territorial/state levels. It has been prepared by the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, Environment Canada, Redefining
Progress, the World Bank, and the United Nations Division for Sustainable
Development.
Dashboard of Sustainability (www.iisd.org/cgsdi/dashboard.asp): A free,

noncommercial software package that illustrates the complex relationships
among economic, social, and environmental issues. The visual format is suit-
able for decision makers and others interested in sustainable development.
Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (www.worldbank.org/

hipc): Read about the World Banks program for providing debt relief to
heavily indebted poor countries.
Ecological Footprint (www.rprogress.org/newprojects/ecolFoot.shtml):

Information and computation procedures for estimating ecological footprint,
from the group Redefining Progress.
Friends of the Earths Trade, Environment, and Sustainability Program

(www.foei.org/trade/index.html): An advocacy group that is critical of cor-
porate globalization, and that promotes fair and sustainable economies based
on democracy, diversity, reduced consumption, cooperation, and caution.
Genuine Progress Indicator (www.rprogress.org/newprograms/sustIndi/

gpi/index.shtml): Information and updates on the GPI from the group Rede-
fining Progress.
Greening the GDP: Is It Desirable? Is It Feasible? (www.rff.org/Docu-

ments/RFF-Resources-139-greengdp.pdf): Article by Joe Darmstadter in
the Spring 2000 issue of Resources addressing the National Research Councils
study of the merits of measuring green GDP, published by the group Re-
sources for the Future.
Human Development Reports (http://hdr.undp.org/reports): A good site

to read global reports such as the annual Human Development Report, as
well as regional and national reports, and to read the latest Human Develop-
ment Index. Produced by the United Nations Development Program.
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (www.foe.co.uk/campaigns/

sustainable_development/progress): Information and computational pro-
cedures for estimating the ISEW, from the group Friends of the Earth.
International Institute for Sustainable Development (http://iisd.ca): One

of the best and most comprehensive sources of information on sustainable
development.
Millennium Development Goals (www.un.org/millenniumgoals): A frame-

work of eight goals that relate to sustainable development. Maintained by
the United Nations Development Program.
Millennium Development Indicators (http://millenniumindicators.un.org/

unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp): A set of forty-eight indicators that can be used to
gauge progress toward the millennium development goals. Maintained by

the United Nations Development Program.
Multinational Monitor (http://multinationalmonitor.org/monitor.html):

Published monthly, the Multinational Monitor tracks corporate activity, es-
pecially in the Third World, focusing on the export of hazardous substances,
worker health and safety, labor union issues, and the environment.
Social Capital for Development (www.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/

scapital/index.htm): This World Bank Internet site is a good resource for
those studying social capital.
SD Gateway (http://sdgateway.net): Information gathered from the Sus-

tainable Development Communications Network, including over 1,200 docu-
ments available in SD Topics, including a calendar of events, a job bank, the
Sustainability Web Ring, a roster of mailing lists (listservs), and news sites
dealing with sustainable development.
United Nations Division for Sustainable Development (www.un.org/esa/

sustdev): Internet site for the Division for Sustainable Development, De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (www.uneca.org): Lots

of good information on development in Africa, including the African Statis-
tical Yearbook.
World Bank Environmental Initiatives (www.worldbank.org/environ-

ment): Read about what the World Bank is doing to promote environmen-
tally friendly development.
World Development Report (econ.worldbank.org/wdr/): An annual World

Bank publication with articles and extensive indicators relating to develop-
ment worldwide.
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15
Issues in Sustainable
Production and Consumption
Introduction
The role of production and consumption in sustainable development was a

major issue discussed during the UN Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (more commonly known as the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992. Two important documents emerged from the Earth Summit. One of
these, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (more commonly
known as the Earth Charter) represents a statement of twenty-seven principles
of sustainable development. Principle 8 of the Earth Charter addresses sustain-
able production and consumption: To achieve sustainable development and a
higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsus-
tainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate de-
mographic policies. Agenda 21 is the other document that came out of the
Earth Summit, and is a forty-chapter action blueprint on specific issues relat-
ing to sustainable development. Chapter 4 of Agenda 21 is addressed to the
subject of sustainable production and consumption. For example, section 4.3
of Agenda 21 states that the major cause of the continued deterioration of the
global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and produc-
tion, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave con-
cern, aggravating poverty and imbalances. Accordingly, chapter 4 of Agenda
21 states that action is needed to meet the following broad objectives:
to promote patterns of consumption and production that reduce envi-

ronmental stress and will meet the basic needs of humanity;
426
SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 427
to develop a better understanding of the role of consumption and how to

bring about more sustainable consumption patterns.
Agenda 21 calls on industrialized countries to take the lead in developing

sustainable production technologies and consumption policies, and to help
in disseminating them among lower-income countries. These technologies
and policies must be demonstrated to be resource-efficient, less polluting,
affordable, feasible, and attractive. Moreover, these technologies and poli-
cies should not hinder the development efforts of lower-income countries.
There are several challenges associated with sustainable production and
consumption. One challenge is that the capital costs of implementing cleaner
production technologies often put these methods beyond the reach of low-
income countries. The lack of social and political empowerment, the exist-
ence of fossil-energy subsidies, and pressures to export resources abroad
in order to repay development loans have all reinforced problems of unsus-
tainable production in the developing world. Another challenge in the in-
dustrialized world is the disconnect between product design and packaging
on the one hand, which is driven by consumer preferences for convenience
and styling, and the imperatives from sustainability to reduce waste, pro-
mote reuse, and reduce the cost of materials recycling on the other. High-
income countries consume a disproportionate amount of the worlds
resources and are responsible for emitting a disproportionate share of the
worlds air pollution, toxic wastes, and trash. Market systems that are largely
responsible for generating the wealth and cleaner production technologies
enjoyed by high-income countries also reinforce the consumer culture and
the problems associated with unsustainable consumption in the industrial-
ized world. Our ways of production and consumption are embedded in our
culture, which means that moving onto a path of more sustainable produc-
tion and consumption requires a cultural change. Moreover, the value of
most of our capital assets and infrastructurehomes, factories, roads and
highways, layout of towns and cities, facilities for generating electric power,
and modes of transportare themselves dependent upon current ways of
production and consumption.
Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute has popularized the notion
that there is a strong path-dependence aspect to investments in homes, facto-
ries, roads and highways, the layout of towns and cities, facilities for generat-
ing electric power, and modes of transport. Once started on a particular path, it
becomes difficult to change. This commitment occurs for a number of reasons:
1. Once made, infrastructure investment (highways, water/sewer/power

lines) is sunk into place, representing a substantial financial com-
mitment to the existing way of doing things, and making jobs and
the economy itself dependent on existing methods.
2. Private R&D investment is more likely to be directed toward the se-
curity of existing systems than toward speculative alternatives, which
reduces the cost of existing systems and makes them more difficult
to dislodge.
3. As a technology diffuses through the economy, it becomes possible
to produce at larger and larger scale. Scale economies (the drop in
unit costs as scale or size of operation grows) develop in the chosen
technology that put alternatives at a cost disadvantage.
4. The existing system becomes a standard upon which people come to
rely when they make complementary investments. For example, the
primacy of automobiles and extensive road networks as the trans-
portation standard results in suburban sprawl. Those with invest-
ments contingent on a particular path (e.g., owners of suburban hous-
ing) have a strong economic stake in status quo policies such as
subsidies for roads and petroleum.
Hart (2005) provides a useful analysis of automobile-centered transporta-

tion planning. She notes that while the population of the United States in-
creased by about 17 percent between 1982 and 1997, the amount of land
converted for urban development in that period increased by 47 percent. Public
subsidies for gasoline (see chapter 13) and publicly funded road infrastruc-
ture encourage the use of private automobiles over public transit, and results
in demand for low-density suburban and exurban automobile-dependent de-
velopment. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA
2001) reported that between 1980 and 1997, vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
in the United States increased by 63 percent, a growth rate almost three times
more rapid than population growth during the same period. A 1990 National
Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS) cited in that EPA study found that
64 percent of the observed increase in VMT was attributable to increases in
the number and average distance of automobile trips. Moreover, the 1995
NPTS found that from 1983 to 1995, the average length of work trips in-
creased by 36 percent (from 8.5 to 11.6 miles), reflecting the fact that jobs
and housing have become increasingly segregated from one another in re-
cent years. From an economic standpoint, investment in highway capacity
induces additional demand for automobile travel by temporarily reducing
travel time and costs. Urban design that emphasizes the automobile, such as
large surface parking lots, wide streets, and a lack of safe pedestrian or bi-
cycle routes, makes automobile use more comfortable and safer than walk-
ing or bicycling, even for short trips.
Thus, we can see that there is also a problem with the political and so-
cial feasibility of new and more sustainable approaches that is linked to the
problem of path dependence. People who have made financial investments
and life-style commitments to the existing pattern of the built environment
are likely to join with automobile manufacturers and petroleum companies
in supporting status quo policy in the United States. To be politically fea-
sible, sustainable production technology must create profit opportunities
for firms in order to create a supportive economic interest group. More
sustainable products must provide approximately similar service quality as
existing goods and not be too much more expensive, in order to gain con-
sumer support. This is why there is so much interest in developing fuel-cell
automobiles. Perhaps most important to the success of more sustainable
production and consumption is for people to become convinced that exist-
ing systems are destructive, that a change is warranted, and that they act on
those convictions. Once this change begins, growth in markets for more
sustainable technologies and products will allow for cost-reducing econo-
mies of scale in production and also provide an incentive for cost-reducing
research and development.
The discussion below will address some renewable energy resources and
technologies. As the price of oil, natural gas, and other fossil-fuel energy
resources increases, so too does the economic viability of the renewable,
solar-based resources and technologies described below. Recall from chap-
ter 4 that the imposition of Pigouvian taxes on fossil-fuel energy resources,
or the provision of subsidies for renewables, also helps promote these alter-
natives. Many Western European countries lead the way in the deployment
of renewable energy resources and technologies due to their use of carbon
taxes and various renewable energy subsidies.
More Sustainable Energy Resources, Technologies,

and Processes
Solar Energy
Daly and Cobb (1989) have argued that low-entropy matterenergy (energy
that is available for useful work) is the ultimate resource for human enterprise.
Further, they state, the feature of the industrial revolution whose implications
are insufficiently appreciated is the shift to fossil-fuel energy and mineral ma-
terials. This is a shift from harvesting the surface of the earth to mining the
subsurface (p. 11). Solar energy drives the earths hydrological cycle, climate
system, and photosynthetic process, which people have harvested in the form
of water power, wind power, and wood/biomass fuel. Georgescu-Roegen (1971)
referred to this transformation as a shift from dependence on energy currently

coming from the sun to stored energy on the earth. Daly and Cobb point out
that while solar energy is unlimited in stock, the flow that arrives on earth is
strictly limited. In contrast, fossil fuels are strictly limited in stock but are rela-
tively unlimited in available flow. Thus, the industrial revolution shifted the
emphasis from low-intensity but abundant solar energy to high-intensity but
more scarce terrestrially based fossil fuels.
Movement to a sustainable society will likely require a shift back to a
greater reliance on solar energy in our economy. As Hoagland (1995) has
pointed out, every year the earths surface receives about ten times as much
energy from the sun as is available from the total stock of the known reserves
of natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium combined. This flow of solar energy is
15,000 times greater than current levels of energy consumption by humans.
The first patent for a solar-powered motor was granted to Augustin Mouchot
in 1861, but cheap and readily available fossil fuels stunted the development
of solar energy technologies until a brief period in the late 1970s following
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis. Yet by
2025, worldwide demand for electricity is forecast to rise by 265 percent.
Hoagland estimates that solar energy could provide 60 percent of this elec-
tricity. A few of these renewable, solar-based electric energy resources, or
the technologies developed to harness them, are listed below.
Biomass: According to the World Energy Council (www.worldenergy.org),
biomass resources are potentially the worlds largest and most sustainable en-
ergy source, though these resources are also relatively poorly documented.
Sources include trees and other woody matter, agricultural products and by-
products, and municipal solid waste. The World Energy Council reported in
2005 that there are millions of acres of dedicated energy plantations in coun-
tries such as in Brazil, China, Sweden, and the United States, where eucalyp-
tus, willow, and other species are combusted for the generation of heat and
power. Biomass is both a modern and a traditional fuel. In rural areas of lower-
income countries, annual biomass consumption is estimated to be approxi-
mately 1 metric ton per person, with about one-half this level of consumption
occurring in more urban settings. Sustainable energy-crop resource manage-
ment and deployment of technology to limit air pollution are key policy issues.
Agricultural and forestry wastes are currently the main sources of biomass
energy. The United Nations estimated in 1992 that biomass could supply 55
percent of the worlds energy needs, but the water-intensive nature of photo-
synthetic processes will limit the production of biomass in arid environments.
Biomass fuels can be used in conjunction with intermittent sources (wind, pho-
tovoltaic) to maintain minimum steady energy (baseload) supply.
Hydroelectric: The World Energy Council reports that hydropower ac-
counts for 19 percent of the worlds electricity supply, and estimates that
about one-third of its economically exploitable potential has been developed.
Hydroelectric power is created by channeling water through turbines. Large-
scale hydroelectric development usually involves creating proportionately
large dams and reservoirs that displace human and natural communities, and
impact water quality and natural sediment transport in ways that can result in
further displacements downstream. Hydroelectric facilities can be used to
meet both peak-load demand and to offset more intermittent electricity
sources, thus improving system reliability.
Hydrogen Fuel Cells: Hydrogen can be used to store solar energy for use in
various energy applications including powering vehicles, and running turbines
or fuel cells to produce electricity. For example, an intermittent wind turbine or
solar photovoltaic system can be used to generate electricity necessary to re-
move hydrogen from water through electrolysis. The hydrogen can then be
stored for later use in a fuel cell. Other ready sources of hydrogen include
gaseous hydrocarbons such as methane or natural gas. A fuel cell directly con-
verts chemical energy into electricity by combining the stored hydrogen with
oxygen from the air. A common form of fuel cell consists of an electrolyte and
two catalyst-coated electrodes (a porous anode and cathode) separated by a
proton-exchange membrane (PEM). The PEM is derived from a thin, fluoro-
carbon-based (or hydrocarbon-based) polymer that serves as both the electro-
lyte and as a barrier to keep the hydrogen and oxygen separate. Each electrode
is coated on one side with a catalyst such as platinum. Electricity is produced
when the anode catalyst splits the incoming hydrogen into electrons and pro-
tons. The electrons flow through an external circuit to provide power to a drive
motor. The hydrogen protons pass through the membrane to the cathode, where
the catalyst causes them to combine with oxygen from the air and returning
electrons to form water and heat, the only waste products from the process.
Despite tens of billions of dollars in research and development since the 1990s,
as of 2005 fuel cells are not commercially viable except in a few highly spe-
cialized applications. After considerable technical advance, most major auto-
mobile manufacturers have developed prototype fuel-cell vehicles. Nevertheless,
commercial viability will require higher gasoline prices, the development of a
hydrogen production and distribution system, and additional advances in
onboard hydrogen storage, fuel-cell durability, and reductions in fuel-cell costs.
In his survey of the state of the fuel-cell technology, Ashley (2005) cites vari-
ous sources as indicating that commercial viability is unlikely to occur before
2015 at the earliest.
Methane: Methane is generated from animal and human wastes, biomass,
and from municipal solid waste. Dairy and swine operations can produce
large quantities of fecal matter that must be stored in lined ponds in order to
protect surface and groundwater supplies from contamination. Animal feces

and other biological waste sources contain volatile solids that are transformed
by anaerobic bacteria into biogas that consists of methane (5080 percent),
carbon dioxide (2050 percent), and trace levels of other gases such as hy-
drogen, carbon monoxide, nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen sulfide. The rela-
tive percentage of these gases in biogas depends on the feed material and
management of the process. Some form of scrubbing is necessary in internal
combustion applications to remove highly corrosive hydrogen sulfide, and
commercialization of biogas may require scrubbing out carbon dioxide.
Anaerobic digester systems include a pre-mixing area or tank, one or more
digester vessels, a system for gathering the biogas, and a system for distrib-
uting or spreading the effluent (the remaining digested material), which can
be a valuable fertilizer. Anaerobic bacteria thrive best at temperatures be-
tween 98 and 130 degrees Fahrenheit, and so some form of temperature con-
trol may be needed to maintain digester productivity. From an economic
standpoint, the U.S. Department of Energy reports that when costs are high
for sewage, agricultural, or animal waste disposal, and when the digester
effluent has economic value, anaerobic digestion and biogas production can
be profitable, as well as limit emissions of methane, a potent greenhouse gas
(see chapter 11).
Ocean Tides, Waves, and Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion: According
to the California Energy Commission, the three most promising ocean-re-
lated energy technologies are tidal power, wave power, and ocean thermal
energy conversion. Wave energy is a potentially enormous resource in many
areas around the world. Wave energy conversion technology is not currently
commercially viable, though the prospects are promising. Extracting com-
mercially valuable energy from ocean tides requires large tidal differences.
For example, the Bay of Fundy in eastern Canada has a very large tidal dif-
ference, and this ocean energy resource is being harnessed at the Annapolis
Tidal Generating Station, which feeds power directly into the Nova Scotia
Power Corporations utility system. Ocean thermal energy conversion makes
use of the difference in temperature between warm surface water of the ocean
and the cold water in depths below 2,000 feet to generate electricity. As long
as a sufficient temperature difference (about 40 degrees Fahrenheit) exists
between the warm upper layer of water and the cold deep water, net power
can be generated. Ocean thermal energy conversion has been done in Ha-
waii, though as of 2005 the cost of producing electricity from this system
exceeded that from conventional fossil-fuel sources.
Solar Dish-Engine Systems: Research at locations such as the Sandia Na-
tional Laboratory in New Mexico is being directed at designing systems to
convert solar energy into electricity by way of dish collectors and Stirling heat
engines. The dish is used to collect and concentrate solar energy, which is
converted into thermal energy and fed into the Stirling heat engine. The Stirling
engine uses heat to move pistons and create mechanical power in a manner
similar to that of internal combustion engines. This mechanical power is then
used to generate electricity. According to information produced by Sandia Lab,
solar dish-engine systems are being developed for use in emerging global mar-
kets for distributed generation, to produce certified green power for states
with renewable portfolio standards (see chapter 10), to generate power in re-
mote locations, and for grid-connected applications. Due to their high effi-
ciency and conventional construction, the cost of dish-engine systems is
expected to become price competitive with other energy systems.
Solar Ovens: Advocates of solar ovens see this simple technology as a
remedy for deforestation that is induced by household demand for fuelwood.
According to the World Energy Council, most of the worlds fuelwood con-
sumption occurs in Africa and Asia, and in those regions, most of that fuelwood
consumption is for cooking and related household uses. For example, they
report that more than 86 percent of total fuelwood consumption in Africa in
1994 was attributed to the household sector. Moreover, they estimate that 90
to 98 percent of all household energy needs are met with fuelwood in sub-
Saharan Africa. According to the World Resources Institute (1994), about 2
billion of the worlds poorest people rely solely on fuelwood as their energy
source for heating and cooking. Various sources (e.g., Nandwani 1996; World
Resources Institute 1994) indicate that the rate of fuelwood consumption in
many areas exceeds the rate of reforestation and regeneration. In many areas
of western and sub-Saharan Africa, for example, fuelwood consumption is
running 30 to 200 percent ahead of the average increase in the stock of trees.
High rates of sunshine in these same areas make solar oven technology a
possible substitute for fuelwood. Various relatively inexpensive solar oven
designs have been developed, some as simple as cardboard and aluminum
foil. In order for solar ovens to be accepted by households in low-income
regions of the world that are dependent on fuelwood, substantial training and
continuing promotion and social support are necessary. While even the mod-
est cost of a solar oven may be quite high for people living on the equivalent
of $1 or less per day, the increasing scarcity of fuelwood is driving up the
price that rural people must pay. Fuelwood expenditures account for perhaps
as much as 25 percent of average household budgets in places such as rural
China and Zimbabwe. Thus as Grupp (1996) argues, the availability of
microloans for families to buy solar ovens may be critical, since the fuelwood
savings can be used to repay the loans. Key limitations of solar ovens in-
clude the less than full reliability of the technology, due to the inability to
store energy for cloudy days, and the longer cooking times required. Despite
these limitations, Nandwani reports that about 525,000 solar ovens are in use
around the world. Solar ovens are well suited as supplemental cooking de-
vices and gaining acceptability in places such as Central America, India,
Cuba, and parts of Africa.
Solar Photovoltaics: These systems directly convert sunlight into elec-
tricity with semiconducting materials such as crystalline silicon. The bal-
ance-of-system components include everything in a photovoltaic system other
than the photovoltaic modules, such as mounting structures, tracking de-
vices, off-grid storage batteries, power electronics (including an inverter, a
charge controller, and a grid interconnection), and other devices. According
to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by the end of 2003 a cumulative
total of 1,809 megawatts (MW) of solar photovoltaic capacity had been in-
stalled worldwide. The top three countries accounting for about 85 percent
of the worlds installed solar photovoltaic capacity are Japan (859.6 MW),
Germany (410.3 MW), and the United States (275.2 MW). Most new capac-
ity in countries with subsidy programs is grid-interconnected, while in
unsubsidized areas most new capacity is off-grid. As of 2005, photovoltaic
systems are not price-competitive with most conventional grid-based elec-
tricity sources. In some off-the-grid locations a quarter-mile or more from
power lines, stand-alone photovoltaic systems can be more cost-effective
than extending power lines. Solar photovoltaic systems are also used in re-
mote, environmentally sensitive areas such as national parks. Some state and
national governments provide subsidies and tax rebate incentives in order to
bridge the gap between the cost of photovoltaic technology and the cost of
conventional grid-sourced electricity. Like wind, photovoltaic electricity is
intermittent, and storage is costly, implying that photovoltaic electricity must
be augmented with electricity from other sources in order to support baseload
requirements.
Wind: About 0.25 percent of the suns energy is transformed into lower-
atmosphere wind, and areas that have average winds of more than 7.5 meters
per second can generate electricity from wind farms for about 4.5 to 5 cents
per kilowatt-hour (kWh). The implication is that in areas with sufficient wind
resource, wind-generated electricity is at or near being price-competitive with
fossil fuel and other conventional generation sources. The IEA reported that
as of 2001, 86 percent of the worlds installed wind capacity was located in
just four countriesDenmark, Germany, Spain, and the United States. Ac-
cording to the Global Wind Energy Council (www.gwec.net), new wind power
capacity installed in 2004 totaled 7,976 MW, a 20 percent increase over
2003. Total worldwide wind power capacity in 2005 was 47,317 MW. The
top five countries with the largest total installed wind power capacity in
2005 were Germany (16,629 MW), Spain (8,263 MW), the United States
(6,740 MW), Denmark (3,117 MW), and India (3,000 MW). Installed ca-
pacity growth in the United States has been lagging in recent years due to
uncertainty about the federal governments commitment to the production
tax credit. Newer turbine design and better site selection have helped reduce
bird and bat mortality associated with wind power. Offshore sites have also
helped reduce visual impacts. Wind energy is intermittent, however, and stor-
age is costly, implying that from a practical standpoint wind power must be
augmented with electricity from other sources in order to support baseload
requirements.
Industrial Ecology
While referring to something (or someone) as being linear is a popular

disparaging remark, a central facet of industrial ecology is transforming lin-
ear production processes to ones that more closely mimic the circular pro-
cesses in natural ecosystems. Hawken (1994) has used the phrase waste
equals food to refer to the cyclicity of natural systems, where nothing, or
almost nothing, that is produced by one organism as waste is not a source of
food or useful material for another. In contrast, traditional production meth-
ods are linear in the sense that they produce waste materials that cannot readily
be assimilated as inputs in some other productive process. The environmen-
tal and energy complementarities across production facilities that serve as
the foundation of industrial ecology can be realized by way of a collabora-
tive planning, site design, and business management approach referred to as
eco-industrial parks. As the Smart Communities Network (www.sustainable
.doe.gov/business/ecoparks.shtml) notes, eco-industrial parks use of ecologi-
cal design to foster collaboration among firms in managing environmental
and energy issues. In an eco-industrial park, each firms production require-
ments and processes are coordinated so that production residuals from one
firm become valuable inputs for another, following the cyclical waste =
food principle of natural systems. From a managerial standpoint, eco-in-
dustrial parks enhance opportunities for collaboration on innovation and tech-
nological development, access to new markets, strategic planning, and
financing. As with conventional industrial parks, site design allows firms to
exploit cost-savings through the sharing of park infrastructure and a more
streamlined permit process.
A good example of a renewable energy project that incorporates indus-
trial ecology and eco-industrial park elements is provided by the winning
project in the 2005 National Hydrogen Association Student Design Compe-
tition. Humboldt State University students designed the Evolution Energy
Systems hydrogen power park to be located in the city of Eureka on the
northwestern coast of California. The power park will be capable of provid-

ing about 442 kilowatts (kW) of electric power and 132 kW of thermal power
as hot water to new businesses along the Eureka waterfront. In addition, the
power park will be capable of producing 10.5 kg/hr of gaseous hydrogen for
use as vehicle fuel. The industrial ecology element of the design involves the
use of methane emitted from decomposition of municipal solid waste from a
local landfill as feedstock to produce the energy and hydrogen at the power
park. Landfill gas is considered an eligible renewable energy source in the
Renewable Portfolio Standard of twelve states, including California (see chap-
ter 10). The plan calls for the landfill gas to be scrubbed and then transmitted
through the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) natural gas pipeline system to
the power park. One barrier that would have to be overcome is that PG&E
does not allow third parties to inject gas into their pipelines. The team hopes
to change that policy if this project moves forward. The gas will be internally
reformed into hydrogen and carbon dioxide within two 250 kW fuel cells.
The overall net efficiency of the power park will be an estimated 65.5 per-
cent, which compares favorably to the approximately 33 percent average
efficiency of electric powergenerating facilities operating in the United States.
The price of the electricity produced by the power park is $0.075/kwh, the price
of heat produced by the power park is $0.60/therm, and the price of vehicle-
grade hydrogen fuel produced by the power park is estimated to be $2.50/kg.
Evolution Energy Systems Eureka Power Park will reduce CO2/kWh emis-
sions by an estimated 40 percent relative to California grid electricity gen-
eration, not counting the emissions avoided through cogenerated heat and
the use of hydrogen-fueled vehicles.
One well-known example of a large-scale implementation of industrial
ecology is in Kalundborg, Denmark, where an oil refinery, an aquaculture
facility, a greenhouse, and residential homes employ waste heat from a power
plant. Both a chemical company and a wallboard producer utilize the sulfur
waste from the petroleum-refining process. The wallboard producer uses the
sulfur waste as a substitute for gypsum. Considine (2001) argues, however,
that profitable waste exchange possibilities can remain unexploited for years
due to high transaction costs from technical, regulatory, legal, and organiza-
tional constraints. Another source of inefficiency is information asymme-
tries. As an example of an information asymmetry that forms a barrier to the
application of industrial ecology, Considine reports that firms typically do
not know the quantity and quality of waste streams of other companies, or
even of other divisions within a large corporation. Engineers and managers
can overcome these information asymmetries and find ways to reduce trans-
action costs if they have the proper incentives. As an example of the impor-
tance of incentives, Considine reports that International Business Machines
(IBM) achieved substantial reductions in the concentrations of heavy metals

in their water effluents from their disk plants when they included environ-
mental performance measures in their annual performance reviews of pro-
duction line engineers.
There is a growing interest in product life cycle analysis (LCA), which
allows firms, consumers, activists, and policymakers to evaluate the environ-
mental impacts of different products. In the first stage of LCA, a researcher
creates an inventory of the energy and various material inputs involved with
production, distribution, use, and subsequent reuse, recycling, or disposal.
Typically, LCA inventories ignore second generation impacts, such as the
energy required to fire the bricks used to build the kilns used to manufacture
the raw material. The second stage of LCA is life cycle assessment. This
stage is more difficult, since it requires the analyst to interpret data and evaluate
trade-offs. For example, is it better to use a product that uses less energy, or
that uses less water? Is it better to use plastic products that are derived from
environmentally harmful and nonrenewable oil, or to use renewable wood
products that may come from timber harvesting that creates other environ-
mental harms? LCA might be conducted by a firm or an industry group to
enable it to identify areas where cost-saving improvements can be made, or
to provide an objective foundation to claims that their product is environ-
mentally superior to competing products. Alternatively, the LCA may be in-
tended to provide objective environmental information for environmental
advocates, for the general public, or for government.
One interesting example of life cycle analysis was conducted by the Dutch
Environment Ministry regarding the environmental friendliness of reusable
porcelain coffee cups, disposable paper cups, and disposable Styrofoam cups.
The life cycle analysis included extraction and processing of raw materials,
production of the cups, and final disposal. The analysis took into account
energy use at each stage as well as consumption of natural resources, hazard-
ous materials by-products, and volume of waste. The biggest problem with
reusable coffee cups is the water and energy required to clean them. The
report indicated that washing a porcelain cup and saucer once, in an average
dishwasher, has a greater impact on water resources than either a paper cup
or a Styrofoam cup. In contrast, porcelain cups have less impact on air, en-
ergy consumption, and volume of trash. If a reusable coffee cup is used twice
before being washed, then it becomes energy-efficient relative to Styrofoam
cups after 114 uses, and takes less than 100 uses to be energy-efficient rela-
tive to paper. Even fewer reuses are required for the reusable mug to be more
air pollution efficient and landfill volume efficient. An interesting finding of
the study is that more attention needs to be given to energy requirements of
dishwashers and to the environmental impacts of detergents (1992, p. 58).
Policies Promoting Sustainable Production and Consumption
Market forces will eventually provide very powerful incentives for cleaner
and less resource-intensive methods of production and consumption as price
responds to growing resource scarcity and mounting environmental degra-
dation. The problem is that this sort of sudden and reactive change in the way
people live could come too late, involve sudden transitions that are costly
and painful, and lead to an irreversibly damaged environment. Interventions
in the form of regulations, taxes, subsidies, and direct funding of clean tech-
nology research and development are necessary in order to prevent poten-
tially even greater problems in the future caused by our inaction.
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)
Traditionally, manufacturers are only responsible for their immediate pollu-

tion and waste emissions, while end-users and municipal governments are
responsible for reuse, recycling, and disposal of wastes. Extended producer
responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool in which producers are required to be
financially or physically responsible for their products after their useful life.
Because the product design, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and re-
tail sales functions are economically separated from downstream reuse, re-
cycling, and disposal costs, product and packaging design does not usually
reflect downstream recycling and disposal costs. EPR is a policy strategy
that is designed to shift the downstream costs of disassembly, recycling, or
disposal onto the upstream producer. While costs are shifted, which makes
EPR policy difficult to implement, more importantly costs can be reduced
when profit-maximizing firms redesign their products and packaging to en-
hance profitability by reducing costs. This incentive to design for the envi-
ronment is a key environmental economic benefit of EPR.
As Hanisch (2000) observes, EPR programs are rapidly growing in popu-
larity among European and some Asian countries. Peter Lindhqvist devel-
oped the EPR concept at the Swedish Ministry of the Environment in 1990.
According to Environment Canada, the core objectives of EPR are to (i)
internalize downstream costs into the price of the product, (ii) reduce or di-
vert waste and focus on increased reuse or recycling, and (iii) design for the
environment. EPR requires that producers either take back waste products
and packaging and manage them through reuse, recycling, or remanufacturing,
or contract for this responsibility with a third party, known as a producer
responsibility organization (PRO). EPR policies have been implemented by
a variety of governments around the world, including Canada, some states in
the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. In 2001 the state of New
South Wales in Australia created legislation allowing for EPR to be imple-

mented. Product stewardship is a concept that is closely related to EPR, and
tends to be voluntary in nature. Examples of product stewardship projects in
the United States include batteries, carpeting, computers, and other electron-
ics. Examples of EPR policies include the following:
Green Dot: Germany initiated an ambitious take-back program in 1991
with the German Packaging Ordinance. As Hanisch (2000) reports, under
the German Packaging Ordinance, producers of all kinds of packaged prod-
ucts are required to either individually take back their packaging or join the
Duales System Deutschland (DSD), an industry organization for packaging
waste. DSD charges a fee to license its Green Dot label to firms, and the
licensing agreement allows firms to print the green dot on their packaging.
Consumers can then dispose of green dot wastes in the DSD disposal sys-
tem. Moore and Miller (1994) report that by 1993, 400 randomly surveyed
German companies had completely abandoned the use of polyvinyl pack-
aging, plastic foams, and 117 other types of packaging (p. 36). Between
1991 and 1998, the per capita consumption of packaging in Germany was
reduced from 94.7 kg to 82 kg, a reduction of 13.4 percent. As of 1999, the
ordinance requires that 60 percent of plastic packaging must be recycled. In
1998 the cost per ton for waste management in Germany was $360.80. The
costs for the Green Dot program have been significantly reduced over recent
years. In comparison to 1998, the license fee that companies from the indus-
trial and commercial sectors paid for using the Green Dot on their packaging
had fallen by an average of 23 percent. According to a study performed by
the Gesellschaft fr Konsumforschung (GfK) in May 1998, 94 percent of all
Germans separate their waste. In their opinion, recycling is by far the best
way of handling waste. In a GfK survey carried out in March 1999, more
than three-quarters of the people questioned (77 percent) were in favor of
collecting and recycling waste. In contrast, very low acceptance figures were
recorded for waste incineration (17 percent) and landfilling (4 percent). Sys-
tems based on the German Dual System model have also been set up in
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.
Work is currently ongoing to develop an environment-oriented product policy
within the European Union (EU).
Ecocycle Society: Sweden has committed to the creation of an ecocycle
society in which producers are responsible for life-cycle wastes associ-
ated with the goods that they make and for maximizing energy and mate-
rials efficiencies. According to the United Nations Commission on
Sustainable Development, the Ecocycle Bill was passed in 1993 to re-
duce the environmental impacts of goods, particularly by reducing waste
and promoting the recycling and reuse of goods at the manufacturing

stage. Swedens Ecocycle Commission has responsibility for defining new
energy or environmental wastes that firms are responsible to reduce. The
Public Cleansing Act (1979), administered by the Swedish Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, implements the legislative framework for a num-
ber of ordinances targeted at industry to reduce, reuse, and recycle waste
material such as packaging, paper, and tires. The Ordinance on Producer
Responsibility for Waste Paper was passed in 1994, and had a collection
target of 75 percent for waste paper by the end of the year 2000. Accord-
ing to the Swedish EPA, the waste paper target was attained in 1997, and
has increased since then to about 80 percent. The total weight of packag-
ing consumed in Sweden declined by 20 percent during the period be-
tween 1991 and 1998 (Hanisch 2000).
Automobile Recycling Nederland: The Dutch created Automobile Re-
cycling Nederland (ARN), which charges a waste disposal fee (45 euros
as of 2005) and sets targets for recycling automobiles at end of life. As of
2005, 89 percent of all scrapped automobiles in the Netherlands were
recycled, and industry set a goal of recycling 95 percent of all scrapped
automobiles by weight by 2007. According to the ARN website
(www.arn.nl), the number of different types of materials that car disman-
tling companies have been required by ARN to dismantle has increased
every year. Nevertheless, ARN only requires that materials be dismantled
from scrap automobiles if high-quality recycling processes are available
for the material in question. Moreover, ARN reports that it conducts re-
search on a continuous basis into what materials are present in scrap cars
and whether those materials can be processed now or in the future. When
it becomes feasible for new materials to be recycled, the dismantling com-
panies are required to gather those materials.
Ecolabels
Ecolabel programs are designed to promote more sustainable production and

consumption by providing an environmental standard for consumer goods.
Typically, ecolabel programs set environmental standards (and sometimes
labor standards) that exceed those set by law, and are administered by a gov-
ernment agency or a trusted auditing or certifying organization. Third party
certification (the term third party refers to an entity other than the buyer or
the seller) has developed as the most credible method for assuring compli-
ance with meaningful standards because many people do not trust unverifi-
able claims made by corporations. Firms bear the cost of third party
certification and in return can label their product as complying with the
ecolabel standard. Ecolabeled goods are perceived by some consumers as

being of higher quality than nonlabeled goods. Therefore, firms may find
that participation in an ecolabel program increases the demand for their prod-
uct and differentiates it from nonlabeled rivals.
According to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Develop-
ment (UNCSD), as of 1996 there were thirty ecolabel programs operating
worldwide (UNCSD website). One of the more prominent examples of
ecolabel programs is offered by Germanys Blue Angel program. This pro-
gram has registered 4,000 products and is the oldest ecolabeling program.
According to a study by Papastefanou (1996), the number of ecolabeled prod-
ucts in Germany increased from fewer than 100 in 1979 to over 4,000 in
1994. The number of ecolabeled goods dropped to approximately 3,400 in
1995, approximately the number for 1990. Papastefanou reports that people
most open to ecolabeled goods in Germany tend to be middle-aged (3842),
employed part-time or in the home, living in small cities rather than rural or
large metro areas, moderately or highly educated, middle or upper class,
female, and with children under age six. Other countries are experimenting
with ecolabel programs, including Taiwans, whose Green Leaf program has
registered 200 products, as well as Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Finland,
with its Nordic Swan program. In Sweden, the market share of ecolabeled
detergents increased from 12 percent in 1992 to 80 percent in 1995. The U.S.
EPA manages a number of ecolabel programs, one example of which is the
Energy Star program for energy-efficient appliances and office equipment.
Common ecolabels in the United States include Energy Star (electronic ap-
pliances), Forest Stewardship Councilcertified lumber, USDA-certified or-
ganic food, and Fair Trade coffee. Recall that the issue of ecolabel programs
(particularly those programs that establish standards for processing and pro-
duction methods in the exporting country) in the context of World Trade
Organization rules was discussed in chapter 13.
Factors Relating to the Success of Ecolabel Programs
Both environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and indus-

try members play a role in the development of ecolabel standards and
support the standards.
Ecolabel certification is done by third party agencies or organizations
that consumers can trust and that are subject to periodic audits.
A substantial number of people are educated about the impacts of their
consumer choices on the environment, and perceive ecolabeled goods
as being of higher quality than nonlabeled goods.
Firms can make a profit by producing ecolabeled goods.
Three Examples of Ecolabeled Goods
Certified Sustainable Wood Products: The most credible of these programs

utilize third party certification procedures. Third party certification involves
an organization such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which estab-
lishes guidelines and standards, and accredits other organizations (such as the
SmartWood program of the Rainforest Alliance) that certify professional for-
esters, forestlands, and lumber mills. In order for wood products originating
from certified sources to carry the FSC logo, the wood products must be tracked
from logging operation to log transport, milling, lumber transport, and the lum-
beryard in a process known as chain of custody. Chain of custody assures
consumers that the ecolabeled lumber they buy was harvested in a manner
consistent with FSC standards. Certified sustainable forestry has spread through-
out the world. According to the FSC (www.fsc.org), 50 million hectares in
more than sixty countries were certified in accordance with FSC standards
between 1995 and 2005. Between 2003 and 2005, the number of FSC chain of
custody certificates increased at an annual rate of 25 percent, while the hect-
ares of forest certified to FSC standards doubled. In addition, as of 2005 sev-
eral thousand products are produced using FSC-certified wood and carrying
the FSC trademark, and the size of the global market in FSC-certified products
is estimated to be in excess of US$5 billion. FSC operates through its network
of National Initiatives in more than thirty-four countries.
Certified Coffee: There are a number of different organizations that are
certifying coffee based on environmental and social criteria. For example,
the American Birding Association has collaborated with the Thanksgiving
Coffee Company to produce Song Bird Coffee, which is certified to come
from coffee plants grown in the shade of rain forests that provide habitat to a
large number of migratory birds. The advocacy group Global Exchange has
developed a Fair Trade certification for a variety of products, including
coffee. According to their Internet site, to become Fair Trade certified, an
importer must meet international criteria, including paying a minimum price
per pound of $1.26, providing credit to farmers, and providing technical as-
sistance such as help transitioning to organic farming. Starbucks has recently
agreed to provide financial support for shade-grown coffee projects, and to
market both shade-grown and Fair Trade coffees.
Organic Foods: According to Scheel (2004), the organic industry (food
and nonfood) reached $10.8 billion in consumer sales in 2003. Organic foods,
the largest segment of the organic industry, grew 20 percent in 2003, reach-
ing $10.4 billion. Scheel goes on to note that sales of organics increased at
an annual rate of between 17 and 21 percent each year since 1997. In con-
trast, total U.S. food sales increased at a 2 to 4 percent average annual rate.
As the Rodale Institutes New Farm Program (www.newfarm.org) notes, while

the concept of organic farming is not new, a common legal definition of
organic in the United States became effective in 2002 through the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Organic Standard (NOS). These
standards define how crops and livestock are grown, processed, and handled
in the marketplace in order to be sold in the United States as organic. The
NOS is considered the organic rule that individual inspectors use to deter-
mine compliance by each entity in the organic value chain. While the USDA
has responsibility for overseeing the NOS, it is up to inspectors representing
third party certifying agents to decide which farms, processors, and handlers
meet the USDAs current organic standards. Organic food certification ex-
cludes the use of most synthetic pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers, as
well as human sludge and irradiation. Land must have been clear of prohib-
ited substances for at least three years. Organic meats come from animals
that have not been given hormones or antibiotics, have been fed organic feeds,
and have had access to the outdoors. As of 2000, there were approximately
10,000 U.S. farms that claimed to be organic, 6,600 of which had been ap-
proved by one of the 88 different state or private certifying entities. Sales of
organic foods in the United States have increased at a rate of approximately
20 percent per year, and sales in 1999 were estimated to be $6.46 billion.
Taxes, Subsidies, and Ecological Tax Reform
Most countries tax productive activities such as work (payroll and income
taxes), but implicitly subsidize destructive activities such as pollution and
the exhaustion of critical natural resource systems. As was discussed in chapter
13, the notion underlying ecological tax reform is that countries should shift
their taxation from productive activities such as work and income genera-
tion, and onto pollution and resource exhaustion. This scheme can be rev-
enue-neutral, meaning that total tax revenues to government remain the same.
Most important, taxing pollution and resource exhaustion raises the cost of
these destructive activities, thereby discouraging them. By reducing taxes on
productive things, such a scheme encourages employment and income gen-
eration. Sweden and Norway have established tax-shift commissions in their
ministries of finance to analyze the problems and implications of shifting to
more ecological taxation, according to the UNCSD.
Government Research and Development Funding
Direct, government-financed research and development (R&D) is critical to

moving renewable energy technologies toward market viability. In the United
States, substantial increases in alternative energy and energy efficiency R&D

occurred in the years following the OPEC- and Iranian-induced oil price shocks
in the 1970s. For example, the U.S. Department of Energys R&D spending on
renewable energy R&D, including energy efficiency, was $1.4 billion in 1980.
A combination of factors, including the collapse of oil prices and a change in
priorities when President Reagan took office in the early 1980s, led to a sharp
decline in renewable energy R&D. According to the Energy Information Ad-
ministration (www.eia.doe.gov), total federal R&D spending on renewable
energy in the United States was $327.2 million in 1999.
A study by the European Commission (2004) surveyed both government
and private R&D spending on renewable energy in the EU. Total annual EU
government spending on renewable energy R&D was estimated in 2001 to
be 349.3 million euros, with private and other sectors contributing an addi-
tional 340 million euros. More than one-third of the estimated annual 689.3
million euros of total EU R&D investment, and the great majority of busi-
ness and university R&D spending in the EU, occurred in Germany (where
half of the EUs total research personnel are working on renewable energy
R&D). Denmark and the Netherlands have the highest ratio of research spend-
ing on renewable energy R&D in comparison to their GDP.
International Environmental Certification
There are an increasing number of international voluntary environmental

certification programs. One of these has been developed by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), a worldwide federation of national
standards bodies that has been providing voluntary technical, safety, and other
standards for manufacturing and other production processes around the world.
ISO standards are constructed through a consensus process and are highly
regarded internationally. Following the formation of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in 1986, which established the principle of regulatory harmoni-
zation, a need was recognized for developing international environmental
standards. ISO 14000 represents a series of international standards on envi-
ronmental management. It provides a framework for the development of an
environmental management system and the supporting audit program within
firms. According to the ISO (www.iso.org), ISO 14001 is the cornerstone
standard of the ISO 14000 series. It specifies a framework of control for an
environmental management system against which an organization can be
certified by a third party. Other standards in the series are merely guidelines
designed to help firms achieve registration to ISO 14001. According to the
ISO 14000 website, these other guidelines include the following:
ISO 14004: provides guidance on the development and implementation

of environmental management systems;
ISO 14010: provides general principles of environmental auditing (now
superseded by ISO 19011);
ISO 14011: provides specific guidance on audit of an environmental
management system (now superseded by ISO 19011);
ISO 14012: provides guidance on qualification criteria for environmen-
tal auditors and lead auditors (now superseded by ISO 19011);
ISO 14013/5: provides audit program review and assessment material;
ISO 14020+: labeling issues;
ISO 14030+: provides guidance on performance targets and monitoring
within an environmental management system;
ISO 14040+: covers product life cycle issues.
According to the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants

website (www.aicpa.org), environmental management systems help compa-
nies satisfy the expectations of a broad range of stakeholders. By way of ISO
14001, environmental management systems can help emphasize the strate-
gic importance of global management, integrate environmental considerations
into the decision processes of senior management, and provide an account-
ing mechanism to relate environmental improvements to increases in share-
holder value. In addition, environmental management systems can increase
a firms revenue, reduce its costs, and improve the quality of both products
and processes. Importantly, implementation of the ISO 14001 standard can
produce environmental performance information that can reduce shareholder
exposure to regulatory risk due to noncompliance.
Another emerging voluntary certification systemleadership in energy
and environmental design (LEED)sets performance standards for green
buildings, and was developed in 2000 by the U.S. Green Building Council.
While LEED certification started in the United States, it is spreading to other
countries around the world, and there are currently LEED-certified and reg-
istered buildings in Australia, Canada, China, Guatemala, India, Japan,
Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Sri Lanka. According to the U.S. Green Building
Council (www.usgbc.org), LEED certification was created with the follow-
ing goals in mind:
to define green building by establishing a common standard of mea-

surement;
to promote integrated, whole-building design practices;
to recognize environmental leadership in the building industry;
to stimulate green competition;
to raise consumer awareness of green building benefits;

to transform the building market.
The LEED certification system provides performance-based standards for

the entire building design (or renovation) process based on five categories:
sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and re-
sources, and indoor environmental quality. Standards range from LEED cer-
tified (level 1) to silver (level 2), gold (level 3), and platinum (level 4). While
in most cases LEED certification is voluntary, in Portland (Oregon), San
Francisco, and Seattle, municipal governments have adopted LEED stan-
dards for city buildings. The state of Californias Sustainable Building Task
Force commissioned a report (Kats 2003) to estimate the benefits and costs
of constructing LEED-certified green buildings in California. This study took
into account the construction costs of thirty-three LEED-certified buildings
in the United States and adjusted these based on the cost of energy, water,
and waste disposal in California. Kats found that LEED-certified construc-
tion standards increased construction costs over and above those of conven-
tional construction methods. This green construction cost premium
generally increases with higher levels of LEED certification: 0.66 percent
for certified, approximately 2 percent for silver and gold, and 6.5 percent for
platinum. The average cost premium for the thirty-three LEED-certified build-
ings was approximately 2 percent. In contrast, the quantifiable economic
benefits of LEED certificationin the form of life-cycle cost savings tied to
energy and water efficiency and reduced worker absenteeism and higher pro-
ductivitywas estimated to be approximately ten times as large as the green
construction cost premium. The human health and productivity benefits rep-
resent the great majority of the quantified total benefits of green buildings,
according to the study, but are the most difficult to quantify. These health
and productivity benefits were drawn from other studies on the effect of
features such as natural lighting and local temperature controls on students
and office workers. California recently mandated that all new building con-
struction or renovation projects undertaken with state funds must achieve at
least the silver level of LEED certification.
Consumer Preferences and Sustainable Consumption
According to the Worldwatch Institute (2004), while the United States,

Canada, and Western Europe account for about 11.6 percent of the worlds
population, in 2000 they accounted for about 60.2 percent of the worlds
consumption expenditures. As we learned in chapters 13, consumer prefer-
ences are a primary component of demand, and thus of what is produced, in
market economies. A key characteristic of rich industrialized market econo-

mies is the vast array of choices available to consumers. Free-market advo-
cates argue that these choices should not be limited through government
regulation, and that if consumers want more socially and environmentally
friendly products or services, then by exercising those preferences in the
marketplace, firms will respond by providing more of those products and
services. Advocates of sustainability argue that certain consumer preferences
are better than others. For example, that the cause of sustainability will be
furthered if people in rich industrialized market economies adopt preferences
that result in the consumption of goods and services featuring low material
throughput, minimal environmental impact and resource depletion, and sup-
porting living wages and humane working conditions. Effective ecolabeling
programs can provide the information required to make those choices. Nev-
ertheless, ecolabeling programs will not work if consumers lack the prefer-
ence for more sustainable life-styles.
The origin of values and preferences is complex. We live in a social con-
text where individuals are influenced by cultural trends, including messages
from various media, as well as interactions in social networks involving rela-
tionships with family, friends, and organizations such as employers, govern-
ment bodies, affinity groups, and religious institutions. Sophisticated
psychological principles are increasingly being used in designing products
and marketing strategies that respond to (or shape) broader cultural trends in
order to promote consumption. In fact, we are surrounded by marketing mes-
sages promoting an attachment to material goods. Advocates of more sus-
tainable consumption have developed various affinity groups for mutual
support, and one of these is voluntary simplicity, or simple living. Voluntary
simplicity is difficult to define, and can be approached in different ways, but
the idea is that a high quality of life is more likely to be attained with less of
a materialistic drive to acquire consumer goods, and a greater focus on ful-
filling relationships with friends, family, community, and the natural world.
A common view among voluntary simplicity advocates is that there is a vi-
cious cycle in which the materialistic drive to acquire consumer goods forces
people to work long hours and sacrifice personal relationships. Moreover,
this sacrificing of personal and other relationships for income creates a void
that people attempt to fill, paradoxically, by acquiring more consumer goods.
This vicious cycle was termed affluenza by de Graaf, Wann, and Naylor
(2002) and in several Public Broadcasting System programs co-produced by
de Graaf. Key advocates for voluntary simplicity, such as Pierce (2000), ar-
gue that to live more simply involves working less, wanting less, and spend-
ing less. This life-style is easier to maintain when it is reinforced through
social interaction with like-minded people.
Another sustainable consumption movement is focused on food choices.

The Worldwatch Institute (2004) notes that humanity devotes about 25 per-
cent of the planets surface to food production, a scale of ecological change
that makes it impossible to separate the way food is produced from the
health of rivers, wetlands, forests, and our living environment. For example,
about 40 percent of todays world grain production is used to feed meat-
producing livestock. Converting these grains into meat and other animal
products involves significant loss of energy. It takes about 5 pounds of
grain to produce 1 pound of beef, and advocates for a vegetarian diet argue
that the environmental impacts of farming could be reduced if people ate
less meat. It is argued that these dietary changes could also help alleviate
world hunger by making more grains available to the worlds poorest people.
We have already discussed how organic food certification has made impor-
tant strides in promoting earth-friendly farming methods, but other aspects
of the food system are seen by some as remaining less sustainable. In par-
ticular, food activists are interested in promoting diets based on locally
produced food. The Worldwatch Institute (2004) reported that in the United
States in 2004, the average food item travels 2,5004,000 kilometers, about
25 percent farther than in 1980. While consumers benefit from unparal-
leled choices of foods from around the world, these food-miles imply
that a great deal of fossil fuel used for processing and transportation is
embodied in the foods we eat. The local food movement is focused on
making food more sustainable by reducing food-miles and promoting the
local economy by purchasing food produced by small farms in the local
foodshed. In chapter 16 we will show how to quantify the way in which
buying local can enhance local economies.
Summary
The traditional view is that sustainable production is the problem of

low-income countries that cannot afford cleaner production technolo-
gies, and that sustainable consumption is the problem of high-income,
developed countries with the money to consume a vastly disproportion-
ate share of the worlds resources. For example, it is estimated that on
average each person in the United States consumes the same amount of
energy as ten people in developing countries. Practically speaking, how-
ever, all countries are confronted with the challenges of sustainable pro-
duction and consumption.
More sustainable production and consumption requires that the worlds
economies shift toward renewable energy resources and technologies.
Most of these ultimately derive their energy from the sun, rather than
from fossil fuels. Of these renewable energy sources, wind energy is

experiencing rapid growth in installed capacity.
Policies such as extended producer responsibility, ecolabels, renewable
energy subsidies, fuel efficiency standards, and direct funding of re-
newable energy R&D are consistent with more sustainable production
and consumption.
Japan, the European Union, and the United States are all actively en-
gaged in R&D for renewable energy resources and technologies.
ISO 14000 provides a voluntary set of standards for implementing en-
vironmental management systems in corporations. LEED certification
provides standards for green buildings in the United States and around
the world.
The voluntary simplicity movement advocates for more sustainable con-
sumption. Its philosophy that a high quality of life is more likely to be
attained with less of a materialistic drive to acquire consumer goods
and a greater focus on fulfilling relationships with friends, family, com-
munity, and the natural world. The local food movement focuses on
more sustainable diets featuring foods produced in local foodsheds,
which thus reduces the embodied energy associated with long-distance
transportation of food.
1. Select a particular clean technology and find out where the technology
was developed, where the products are produced (or if they are being pro-
duced), and where they are sold. What factors, if any, limit sales of this tech-
nology relative to traditional technologies?
2. In the absence of some sort of government policy promoting clean tech-
nology, what types of environmentally friendly technologies will the market
process produce and sell, and why? In the case of recycling, why is it impor-
tant that both government policies and markets be coordinated?
3. Go to your local grocery store or coffee shop and compare the price of
standard and ecolabeled coffees. Is there a price premium for the ecolabeled
coffees over and above what is charged for the standard coffee? Ask the
manager if they perceive the ecolabeled product as being successful. You
might also compare certified organic fresh produce with standard produce at
your local grocery store. Write up your findings in a one-page essay.
4. Suppose that a hybrid automobile costs $3,000 more than a similar
conventional automobile, but gets an extra 30 miles per gallon of fuel
economy. Assuming that a car is driven 12,000 miles per year, the dis-
count rate is 5 percent, and gasoline costs $2 per gallon, determine whether
or not the energy cost savings from the hybrid pays for the higher up-
front cost over a five-year time horizon. In how many years would the
hybrids energy cost savings pay for the higher up-front cost if gasoline
cost $3 per gallon?
5. Go to the 2003 study by Kats titled The Costs and Financial Benefits
of Green Buildings: A Report to Californias Sustainable Building Task
Force on the Internet at www.ciwmb.ca.gov/greenbuilding/Design/
CostBenefit/Report.pdf and write a summary essay on the life cycle cost
analysis done on LEED-certified green buildings. If possible, trace back
the research on human health and productivity benefits and critically evalu-
ate the key findings.
Internet Links
Fair Trade Coffee (www.globalexchange.org/economy/coffee): Learn more

about the Fair Trade coffee campaign from the advocacy group Global Ex-
change.
Forest Stewardship Council (www.fsc.org): Read more about certified sus-

tainable forestry.
Green Building Council (www.usgbc.org): Learn more about LEED certi-

fication standards for green buildings.
Is Extended Producer Responsibility Effective? (http://pubs.acs.org/

hotartcl/est/00/apr/hanis.html): Article by Carola Hanisch in the April 1,
2000, issue of Environmental Science and Technology.
ISO 14000 (www.is014000.com): Learn more about this international sys-

tem of environmental management standards for business.
National Organic Program (www.ams.usda.gov/nop): This USDA Internet

site describes the revised national organic standards.
OECD Environment Website (www.oecd.org/env): Although OECD coun-

tries make up only 19 percent of the global population, they are the major
consumers of the worlds natural resources. Read about OECD member coun-
try initiatives, indicators, and sectoral studies related to sustainable consump-
tion. Material is also provided on sustainable production topics such as
increasing resource efficiency and sustainable transportation. Site maintained
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Online Fuel Cell Information Center (www.fuelcells.org): Learn more

about fuel cells and zero-emission power sources.
Solar Cooking Archive (http://solarcooking.org): Find out more about this

environmentally friendly technology. The country reports are especially useful.
Sustainable Markets (www.iied.org/smg/index.html): Internet site provided

by the International Institute for Environment and Developments Sustain-
able Markets Group, the goal of which is to influence the behavior of key
market actors and institutions to support dynamic enterprise, local liveli-
hoods, environmental regeneration, and accountable decision making by the
private sector, particularly in the global South.
The Earth Council (www.ecouncil.ac.cr): The Earth Council is an interna-

tional nongovernmental organization (NGO) that was created in September
1992 to promote and advance the implementation of the Earth Summit agree-
ments. You can read the text of the Earth Charter and Agenda 21 on this site,
and learn about efforts at implementing the proposals generated at the Earth
Summit.
UN Division for Sustainable DevelopmentPublications on Sustainable

Consumption and Production (www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/con-
sumption/conprod.htm): Lots of good information on this site.
Worldwatch Institute (www.worldwatch.org): Lots of information provided

on sustainable production and consumption.
Ashley, S. 2005. On the Road to Fuel-Cell Cars. Scientific American 292 (3):
6269.
Considine, T. 2001. Industrial Ecology: Challenges and Opportunities for Econom-
ics. In International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics: 2001/
2002, ed. T. Tietenberg and H. Folmer. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Daly, H., and J. Cobb. 1989. For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy to-
ward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Beacon
Press.
de Graaf, J., D. Wann, and T. Naylor. 2002. Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epidemic.
San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
European Commission. 2004. European Research Spending for Renewable Energy Sources.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Froesch, R. 1994. Industrial Ecology: Minimizing the Impact of Industrial Waste.
Physics Today 47 (November): 6368.
. 1995. The Industrial Ecology of the 21st Century. Scientific American 273
(September): 17881.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Grupp, M. 1996. Solar CookersTheyre Better Than Their Reputation! Gate Online
(February).
Hanisch, C. 2000. Is Extended Producer Responsibility Effective? Environmental
Science and Technology 34: 170A175A.
Hart, K. 2005. Energy Conservation and Community Planning. Planning Commis-
sioners Journal 57 (Winter): 3038.
Hawken, P. 1994. The Ecology of Commerce. New York: HarperBusiness.
Hoagland, W. 1995. Solar Energy. Scientific American 273 (September): 17073.
Kats, Greg. 2003. The Costs and Financial Benefits of Green Buildings: A Report to
Californias Sustainable Building Task Force. Sacramento: California Integrated
Waste Management Board. Available at www.ciwmb.ca.gov/greenbuilding/Design/
CostBenefit/Report.pdf.
Lovins, Amory. 1977. Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace. Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger.
Myers, F. 1992. Japan Bids for Global Leadership in Clean Industry. Science 256
(May): 114445.
Nandwani, S. 1996. Solar CookersCheap Technology with High Ecological Ben-
efits. Ecological Economics 17 (May): 7381.
. A New Chance for Solar Energy. 1995. Scientific American 273 (Septem-
ber): 173.
Papastefanou, G. 1996. Social Basis of Paying Attention to Eco-Labels in Purchase
Decisions in West Germany. Working paper, ZUMA, Mannheim, Germany.
Pierce, L. 2000. Choosing Simplicity: Real People Finding Peace and Fulfillment in a
Complex World. Carmel, CA: Gallagher Press.
Rhodes, S. 1995. International Environmental Standards to Emerge as the ISO 14000
Series: Guidelines Will Influence the Way Companies Do Business in the 21st
Century. Tappi Journal 78 (September): 6566.
Scheel, J. 2004. New Product Trends: Driving Organic Growth. Prepared Foods
August. Available at www.preparedfoods.com.
Schneider, D. 1995. Putting Greens: Clean, Hydrogen-Powered Golf Carts Hit the
Streets. Scientific American 273 (December) (reprint).
Sperling, D. 1996. The Case for Electric Vehicles. Scientific American 275 (No-
vember): 5459.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2001. Our Built and Natural Environments:
A Technical Review of the Interactions Between Land Use, Transportation, and
Environmental Quality. EPA 231-R-01002. Washington, DC: U.S. EPA.
World Resources Institute. 1994. World Resources Report, 199495. New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
Worldwatch Institute. 2004. State of the World 2004 Special Focus: The Consumer
Society. Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute.
16
Issues in the Economics of
Sustainable Local
Communities
Introduction
There has been growing interest in the sustainability of national econo-

mies and in promoting sustainable economic development at the macro-
economic level. But there has also been a growing recognition that the
principles governing a sustainable society may be most effectively ap-
plied to smaller local communities, which is the focus of the present chap-
ter. For one thing, it is at the local community level that the scale of
decision making is most consistent with democratic process and the em-
powerment of people. As Ostrom (1990) has found in her research, sus-
tainable common-pool resource (CPR) systems appear to be linked to
effective local self-governance, which connects community with its natural
resource life-support system. Yet local communities cannot wall them-
selves off from national and international trends, migrations, and trade.
Sustainable local communities must not only find equitable methods of
governing themselves and their local commons but also develop strate-
gies for relating with the forces of the larger national and international
economy and with the dynamics of in- and out-migration. In this chapter,
we will contrast sustainable local institutions for governing CPR sys-
tems, many of which evolved in pre-industrial societies, with the dilemma
of sustainable local economic development in modern industrialized
economies.
453
Sustainable Local Self-Governance of CPR Systems
For hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years, local communities have had rule
systems for jointly managing and using those common lands and other resources
that typically lay between deep wilderness and the farmstead and that were not
suitable for cultivation (Snyder 1990). Common lands were typically used for
grazing livestock, the gathering of fuelwood and building materials, and varying
degrees of hunting and gathering of wild animals and plants. Local tribes or
village communities governed the use of these lands (or fishing grounds). Typi-
cally, their rule systems limited access to people from outside the community
and related the intensity and frequency of use by those in the community to the
resources carrying capacity. For example, as we learned in chapter 5, some tribes
such as the Yurok in northwestern California utilized variants of both private
property and common property systems depending on the nature of the resource
in question. In a very important sense, the commons constitutes both the re-
source and the community institutions of self-governance that connect that re-
source to the people who depend upon it. As Gary Snyder (1990) has stated, the
commons is the contract a people make with their local natural system. There is,
unfortunately, a long history of centralized government authorities failing to
recognize locally devised traditional common property regimes. The result has
often been the loss of local community rights and controls. One prominent ex-
ample is the enclosure movement in England and parts of Europe, which re-
sulted in many village commons being transformed into private estates.
As was shown in chapter 5, the salutary effects of Adam Smiths invisible
handthat self-interested behavior is transformed into the common good by
way of decentralized marketsdo not extend to common-pool resource sys-
tems. The central problem is that there is rivalry surrounding the consumption
of the natural resource in question. For example, when someone adds more
cattle to the communal grazing land, there is a disparity between the flows of
benefits and costs. The benefits flow to the person who added more cattle to
the communal grazing land and may take the form of greater income from
selling more calves or dairy products. All who use the grazing commons, how-
ever, share the costs. These costs take the form of less feed and degraded range
conditions. Thus, a self-interested maximizer sees an opportunity to increase
his or her herd without limit, receive 100 percent of the income, and share only
a fraction of the cost. This is the mechanics of what Garrett Hardin called the
tragedy of the commons. In economic terms, we can describe the tragedy of the
commons as the outcome of self-interested users of the CPR imposing appro-
priation externalities on all the other CPR users.
What is interesting from the perspective of this chapter is that there are sus-
tainable, long-enduring local communities that have not succumbed to the trag-
ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE LOCAL COMMUNITIES 455
edy of the commons. Ostrom (1990) provides some of the most comprehensive
analysis of the nature of these long-enduring and sustainable local communities
and their relationship to the local natural resource systems on which they de-
pend. The enduring role of common property resources such as grazing land and
forestland in these communities is perhaps surprising to resource economists,
who see private property as the solution to resource degradation. What one ob-
serves instead is a lasting, parallel existence of both private and communal prop-
erty in communities where people exercise control over institutions of governance
and property. Drawing upon her field research, Ostrom (p. 61) observes,
Generations of Swiss and Japanese villagers have learned the relative ben-
efits and costs of private property and communal-property institutions re-
lated to various types of land and uses of land. The villagers in both set-
tings have chosen to retain the institution of communal property as the
foundation for land use and similar important aspects of village econo-
mies. The economic survival of these villagers has been dependent on the
skill with which they have used their limited resources. One cannot view
communal property in these settings as the primordial remains of earlier
institutions evolved in a land of plenty.
The tragedy of the commons is a characteristic of open-access property

regimes and of other property regimes where rule systems have failed.
Examples of Sustainable Local Communities and the Systems

They Use for Governing CPRs
Trbel, Switzerland
As described by Netting (1981), for centuries the people of Trbel have relied on
a combination of private and communal property. Privately owned plots are used
to grow grains, vegetables, fruit, and hay. Five different types of common prop-
erty have been acknowledged in written legal documents that date back to 1224:
alpine grazing meadows

forests
wastelands
irrigation systems
paths and roads connecting private and communal property
In 1483 the villagers agreed to a system of self-governance to manage the use

of communal property. A central element of this rule system limits access to the
villages communal property. For example, regulations written in 1517 state that
no citizen could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the win-
ter (Netting 1976, p. 139). Ostrom reports that many other Swiss villages use
the wintering rule as a means for allocating grazing rights. Moreover, those with
rights to use the village communal property are given the power to decide whether
additional people should be admitted to community membership. The bound-
aries of the communal property are well defined. A local official is authorized to
impose fines on those who put an excessive number of cows on the communal
alp and to keep half the fine. Each family receives a share of the villages cheese
in proportion to the number of cows it grazes relative to the total. Villagers with
voting rights have created an alp association to hire staff, impose fines, and ar-
range for manure spreading and other necessary maintenance of the commons.
Those who use the grazing commons provide labor in proportion to the number
of cows they graze. Trees needed for fuel and construction are selected by the
village and assigned by lot to households. Before the rapid rise in population in
the nineteenth century, Netting reports that severe population pressure was held
in check by measures such as late marriages, high celibacy rates, long birth spac-
ing, and a great deal of emigration.
As Ostrom reports, Nettings major findings are consistent with experi-
ence in many other Swiss communities. Throughout the alpine region of
Switzerland, private property exists for more intensive cropping, while com-
mon property is used for summer meadows and forests. In fact, 80 percent of
the Swiss alpine area engages in some form of common property. Ostrom
cites an unpublished work by Hartmut Picht that reports that all local regula-
tions limit the level of appropriation from these commons. Overuse of alpine
meadows is rarely reported.
Japanese Village Commons
McKean (1986) estimates that approximately 12 million hectares of Japanese

forests and mountain meadows were managed as communal property between
1600 and 1867, and that about 3 million hectares are so managed today. As in
Switzerland, villagers in the Japanese villages studied by McKean use private
property for valuable land that is more intensively cropped for rice and veg-
etables and use common property for larger areas of less valuable forestland
and grazing land.
Spanish Irrigation Commons
Irrigated agriculture has been critical in Spain, where limited and highly sea-
sonal rainfall would otherwise severely restrict agricultural productivity.
Ostrom (1990) reports that Spanish towns and villages have had self-gov-
erned irrigation systems for at least 550 years, and probably for close to
1,000 years. These systems require farmers to construct and maintain canal
and ditch systems, and to agree on how to allocate scarce water supplies. The
irrigation areas that surround or are near the villages that govern them are
referred to as huertas. Interestingly, farmers lost control over their irrigation
systems during the Spanish Civil War and did not regain this power until
1950. Moreover, the freedom of farmers to self-organize was peculiar to the
traditional region of Aragn in eastern Spain. As Ostrom (p. 81) points out:
By the time the centralized monarchy based on the Castilian model came
to dominate Spain and Latin America, the autonomy of the huertas was
well established. The continuing willingness of the irrigators in these re-
gions to stand up for their rights attests that they had greater autonomy
than did those in other parts of Spain. One can only wonder if the course of
history in Latin America might have differed substantially if the Spanish
monarchy established by Ferdinand and Isabella had been modeled on
Aragn and not on Castile.
Ostrom finds that similar communities with longstanding communal irri-

gation systems exist in the Philippines, referred to as zanjeras. As with the
huerta system, village communities have retained substantial autonomy to
determine their own rule systems, including durable methods for assigning
water, monitoring rule conformance, and providing labor for canal and ditch
maintenance.
Localized Self-Governance of Fisheries
Schlager (1993) evaluated the varying degrees of success experienced by

thirty locally self-governed coastal fishing grounds around the world. Three
problems that develop in these settings are appropriation externalities (trag-
edy of the commons), technological externalities (gear entanglement and
other forms of physical interference from fishing boats working adjacent to
one another), and assignment problems (boats locating themselves ineffi-
ciently on the fishery, such as when too many are clustered in one place).
Schlager points out that fishers organize themselves as a way to coordinate
their harvesting activities. She finds that this coordination has successfully
reduced assignment problems and technological externalities relative to cases
in which self-governance did not occur. She also argues that it is extremely
difficult for fishers to resolve appropriation externalities because of the prob-
lem of determining whether a decline in catch is due to overfishing of that
species, overfishing of species that are lower on the food chain, environmen-
tal circumstances, or even how many fish are landed by other fishers. Ac-
cordingly, Schlager finds no instance among the sample of coastal fishing
grounds she studied in which fishers utilized a quota scheme. Thus, fishers
try to regulate the use of the space of their fishing grounds rather than the
overall catch.
Sanctions of various kinds have been found to be associated with success-
ful local self-governance of fisheries. For example, Acheson (1988) studied
Maine lobster gangs, which are groups of fishers who make informal (but
very real) territorial claims for harvesting lobsters. Sustainable harvest rates
in these territories have been achieved in part by use of sanctions such as
destruction of the equipment of outsiders who repeatedly enter the territory
claimed by the gang. In their study of local fishery self-governance in the
state of Bahia in northern Brazil, Cordell and McKean (1992) find an elabo-
rate system of social norms and rules for ethical conduct on the CPR. These
rules are devised to prevent exhaustion of the fishery and to distribute access
rights equitably. Violation of these norms-based rules of conduct can result
in sanctions such as ostracism and sabotage of fishing gear and equipment.
Thus, mutual monitoring and sanctioning appear to have been important to
sustaining local fisheries and the communities that depend upon them.
Fodder and Fuelwood Use in Panchayat Community Forests
The panchayat community forests occur in the mid-Himalayan Mountains

in the Almora District of Uttar Pradesh, India. Agrawal (1993) studied 6 of
the nearly 4,000 villages with panchayat forests. Local van panchayats
councils made up of five elected people who set rules for forest useman-
age these forests. For example, Agrawal finds that most villages have
allocation rules that limit the time in which villagers can harvest fodder,
usually two to twelve weeks. When tree leaves are cut for fodder, at least
two-thirds of the leaf cover must be left on the tree. While in some villages
people are given equal allocations of fuel and fodder, in others the rights
are proportionate to the contributions made by each person in maintenance
(tree planting) and monitoring (directly, or indirectly by paying the salary
of a guard). Agrawal finds a very strong link between the level of village
investment in monitoring and dispute resolution systems, the degree of vil-
lage commitment to sanctioning violators appropriately, and the resource
conditions in the panchayat forests. In the less successful villages studied
by Agrawal, panchayat officials did not emphasize monitoring. Moreover,
two of the three less successful villages used rule systems that discrimi-
nated against lower-caste people, and monitoring was primarily used to
punish these lower-caste people. In contrast, successful villages linked a

guards pay to performance, and panchayat officials monitored the guards.
In one of these villages, violators were required to confess in front of the
entire village, creating a strong deterrent to violating the shared social norm
of sustainable use. The failure of these three villages to construct adequate
rule structures for governing panchayat forests explains the subsequent re-
source degradation in these forests.
After extensive field research, Ostrom developed a set of design prin-
ciples that she found to be consistently associated with enduring, sustainable
CPR governance systems. These principles are also supported by the later
studies of Schlager and Agrawal, as described above, and by Pye-Smith and
Feyerabend (1994) in their case study analyses of successes in local commu-
nity environmental management.
Ostroms Design Principles Associated with Sustainable Local

Self-Governance of Common-Pool Resources
1. Clearly defined boundaries: Boundaries regarding who has the right to

appropriate from the commons, and regarding the CPR itself, tend to be clearly
defined.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules, and local con-
ditions: The rules that govern withdrawal of resource units from the CPR are
tailored to local conditions. Local conditions include culture, the biomechanics
of the CPR, and differences between resource users, among others. Rules
that govern the provision of human-made CPRs similarly match local condi-
tions. This principle argues against the one rule system fits all approach to
self-governance.
3. Collective-choice arrangements: All stakeholders (people who use or
are impacted by the CPR) are included in the formation of appropriation/
provision rules and in rule adaptation over time.
4. Monitoring: Those who actively audit CPR use and conditions are ac-
countable to the appropriator group or may be the appropriators themselves.
5. Graduated sanctions: Sanctions or punishments imposed for violation
of rules reflect the extent of the harm imposed and the context of the offense,
and are established by the appropriator group itself.
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have
rapid access to low-cost arenas in which to resolve conflicts among appro-
priators or their appointed officials.
7. Minimal recognition of the rights to organize: External government
authorities do not block or hinder local self-governance.
8. Nesting of small-scale governance systems within larger governance sys-
tems when localized CPRs are part of larger systems: Layering of governance
structures matches the interdependence and complexity of CPR systems.
Research by Ostrom, Agrawal, and others supports the idea that success-
ful CPR governance must include clearly defined boundaries between the
CPR and either private property or other CPR systems. For example, Agrawal
(2002) notes that the design principle of clearly defined boundaries can be
expected to influence both the level of certainty that individuals within an
appropriation group will receive benefits from the CPR, and the costs that
they can expect to face when considering new rules for resolving a commons
dilemma. Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom (2005) note that the principle of
clearly defined boundaries should reduce uncertainty as to who will benefit
and who will pay the costs, while poorly defined boundaries should increase
uncertainty and thus retard efforts to find or sustain a collective solution.
Rule congruence linking appropriation with local conditions and with
provision of maintenance or monitoring effort is also linked to successful
self-governed systems. In principle 3, Ostrom points out that successful
CPR self-governance is linked to inclusive, democratic process, one of the
key elements of a sustainable community. Principles 4 and 5 indicate the
importance of enforcement efforts in promoting compliance with appro-
priation and (effort) provision rulesgroups must provide for effective
monitoring and must have credible sanctions that are appropriate to the
extent of the transgression. Monitoring and enforcement systems may be
based on formal rule systems (de jure), or based on informal customs (de
facto). Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom (2005) evaluated the empirical im-
portance of monitoring and enforcement on successful community-level
governance of CPRs. They used data from 178 community-forest gover-
nance systems that were collected by the International Forestry Resources
and Institutions (IFRI) research program in Africa, Asia, and the Western
Hemisphere. Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom evaluated two hypotheses: (1)
If rule enforcement is sporadiceven if a user group has high levels of
social capitalforest conditions are more likely to be poor. (2) If rule en-
forcement is regulareven if a user group has low levels of social capi-
talforest conditions are more likely to be good. Their results show that
rule enforcement and forest condition are correlated, regardless of the level
of social capital. They also show that it is highly unlikely for forest condi-
tions to be good if there is only sporadic rule enforcement, and that this
relationship exists whether social capital is high or low.
Principle 6 illustrates the importance of mediation, arbitration, and other
alternative dispute resolution methods to sustainable local communities. Dietz,
Ostrom, and Stern (2003) note that sharp differences in power and in values
across interested parties make conflict inherent in environmental choices.

They argue that the benefits of conflict resolution in and of itself may be as
important a motivation for designing community-based CPR governance
systems as is concern with the resources themselves. While the varying per-
spectives, interests, and values that people bring to problems of CPR gover-
nance can escalate to the point of dysfunction, they can also spark learning
and change. The failure of centralized governments to recognize the rights of
local groups to self-organize to manage their localized commons (principle
7) has been a problem for inshore fishers in the United States, Canada, and
elsewhere. Finally, principle 8 provides a hint for how these very small-scale
success stories can be replicated on a larger scale. The idea is for larger and
more complex systems to have a number of small, highly localized self-
governing groups nested within them. Then the larger, more complex, and
interdependent system can be self-governed by representatives from the vari-
ous small-scale self-governing groups. Ostrom also makes the point that suc-
cess in small-scale self-governance creates social capital and organizing skills
that can then be used for larger and more difficult CPR problems.
Retrospective on CPRs and Local Self-Governance
Ostrom has argued that there are important similarities shared by various long-
enduring communities and their systems of CPR governance. The natural en-
vironments in which villages are located feature important uncertainties such
as unpredictable rainfall and snowfall, and so successful rule systems are adapt-
able to changing natural conditions. In these situations, community members
share a common understanding of the merits of continuing the status quo rela-
tive to various feasible changes in rules and norms of acceptable behavior.
Importantly, populations in these villages have remained stable over long peri-
ods. Well-defined social norms prescribe a rather narrow band of acceptable
behavior that facilitates interdependence with minimal conflict. As one would
expect, the costs of being ostracized are quite high and, together with mutual
monitoring of behavior, lead to powerful reputational incentives, which pro-
mote conformance to shared social norms of sustainable use. Community mem-
bers tend to be very similar in terms of wealth, education, ethnicity, and race,
and this homogeneity also limits conflicts. People who live in these communi-
ties share a common history and can reasonably expect to have a common
future together. Because the rule systems can accommodate generational trans-
fers of rights and land tenure, people can expect that they are making decisions
that will determine the quality of life of their children and grandchildren. As
Ostrom points out, this promotes very low discount rates and thus leads to
policies that are consistent with community sustainability.
The case study research described above points to the central importance
of social capital, and the evolution of behavioral norms of restraint and co-
operation, to sustaining local common-pool resources. Sethi and Somanathan
(1996) have developed a theory that explains why norms of behavior that
restrain the use of CPRs can persist in social settings that might otherwise
favor self-interested behavior. They use the mathematics of evolutionary pro-
cesses and apply them to social and economic institutions such as the rules
that communities use to govern CPRs. Their theoretical analysis is consis-
tent with the extensive case study literature, namely, that social norms that
restrain overuse of the CPR and provide sanctions for those who violate these
norms can remain stable over time even when there is occasional intrusion
by self-interested people. They also show, however, that factors such as a rise
in the market price of the resource in question, or diminution of the impact of
available sanctions, can produce a fatal instability in sustainable local self-
governance from which it is extremely difficult to recover.
Successful local self-governance appears to be associated with only modest
asymmetries in the distribution of local power and influence, a factor that is also
linked to the quality of local democratic process. For example, the villages stud-
ied by Agrawal that featured rather rigid caste structures and discriminated against
lower-caste people were less successful in sustainable self-governance. Simi-
larly, proposals for local environmental dispute resolution through collaborative,
stakeholder-based self-governance cannot be expected to succeed in local set-
tings where certain stakeholders have disproportionate power and influence. Thus,
community economic development centered on attracting disproportionately large
business or government operations may undermine the quality of democratic
local self-governance and so ultimately may not be consistent with community
sustainability. As we shall see in the discussion below, protecting the quality of
local self-governance forms one of the arguments for community economic de-
velopment strategies that instead focus on assisting local small businesses that
produce for local consumption and substitute for goods that would have to be
imported into the community.
Integrating Sustainability into Local Economic Development
This section focuses on the sustainable development dilemma confronting rela-

tively small local communities in rich industrialized countries. These industri-
alized countries feature large and highly specialized industrial enterprises, an
extensive reliance on inter-regional and international trade, and free migration
of people from one community to another. As the term suggests, industrialized
societies generate much of their wealth from industrial production and from
services, and thus local governance of CPRs may be of only minor economic
importance. Moreover, unlike traditional subsistence or agrarian communities,

local communities in rich industrialized societies rely on extensive outside
trade with other regions for most of the goods and many of the services that
local people consume. Unlike traditional societies around the world, most rich
industrialized countries are open societies in which residents are free to mi-
grate from one community to the next based on economic, quality of life, or a
myriad of other factors. In this context many of the design principles devel-
oped by Ostrom for successful local governance of CPRs are difficult to imple-
ment, and the property rights to community quality-of-life factors may be
essentially open-access in nature. The challenge of sustainable economic de-
velopment in rich industrialized societies involves a balance of economic, com-
munity, and environmental goals in a technologically and demographically
changing landscape that features stakeholders with sharply different goals.
We will start out by considering a simplified model of a local economy,
which emphasizes the inflows and outflows of income that are driven by the
relationships between the local economy and the broader regional, state, na-
tional, and international economies. We will then explore how the proportion
of local purchases relative to the purchase of imports affects the ultimate
local economic impact of a given amount of income injected into the local
economy. Once we have this basic understanding of the local economy we
will consider different views of local economic development.
A Model of the Local Economy
Consider a local or regional economy in the context of a modern industrial-

ized country. These local economies are usually centered on distinct towns
or cities where people shop, work, and conduct business, and that serve as
centers of production and distribution. These local economies interact in vari-
ous ways with other economies and government entities that range from the
local to the international. The various sources of income that flow into a
local economy from outside are called income injections, and these injec-
tions occur due to trade with or transfers from entities outside of the local
economy. The sectors of the local economy that in various ways generate
income injections are collectively referred to as the economic base of the
local economy. Elements of the economic base may be business or govern-
ment entities, or even categories of people such as retirees. Examples of
economic base activities include the export of local manufactured goods,
agricultural commodities, or services by local firms, as well as income in-
jected by tourist visitation, local state and federal employee salaries, and
federal benefits for local retirees. Offsetting these income injections are in-
come leakages that occur when local residents purchase goods and services
Figure 16.1 Simplified Model of a Local Economy

Income injections: Generated by activities such as
the export sale of locally produced goods and
services, by taxes or transfers paid to local entities,
or by tourist visits to the local area.
Level of local income reflects the balance of

income injections and income leakages over
time.
Income leakages: Generated by activities such

as the import purchase of externally produced
goods and services, by taxes or transfers paid to
outsiders, or by locals traveling outside the local
area.
produced outside the community, pay state or federal taxes, send money to
family or friends in other places, or travel out of the area. Thus, we can see
that many of these injections and leakages are the monetary flows linked to
specialization and trade. In fact, many human settlements originated from
some local comparative advantage, such as access to valuable resources or to
advantageous ports and trade routes, which resulted in the formation of a
base industry, export trade, and the rise of a town or city. Since the purchase
of imports leaks income out of the local economy, then unless a local economy
completely divorces itself from trade with the outside world, ultimately there
must be some base industry in a local economy to inject income to fund the
purchase of these imports and maintain a satisfactory level of local income.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 16.1.
A given dollar of income that is injected by the local base industry is
usually spent more than once before it leaks out. Specifically, the income
injected by the economic base of a local economy, net of the income that
leaks out, flows to local businesses that support the base industry by provid-
ing various inputs or services, and to the households of those employed by
the base industry. These businesses and households in turn respend a portion
of this money locally at grocery stores, clothing and shoe stores, health care
providers, restaurants, and for the services of those skilled in various trades,
crafts, and professions. Thus, a dollar of net income injected into the local
economy by export sales from the economic base is multiplied as it flows
through the supporting businesses and through the spending of employee
households. The size of this multiplier effect is determined by the extent to
which the local economy imports rather than produces the goods and ser-
vices that local people consume. In particular, the smaller the leakage rate,
the larger the multiplier. Note that while we are speaking as if there is a
single multiplier for the local economy, in reality each business, and each
economic sector, will have a different multiplier. You can think of the multi-
plier, described below, as an average for the entire local economy, and repre-
senting the typical number of times a given dollar injected into the local
economy is recycled as income for various members of the community.
To see how the multiplier effect works, consider the following simpli-
fied example. Suppose that a new lumber mill is opened in a community
that generates $5 million in export sales. Before we proceed to the multi-
plier analysis, however, we need to subtract from this export income any
initial leakage in the form of payments for imported factors of production
used to generate the export sales, such as raw logs, energy payments, trans-
portation services, equipment rentals or loan payments, stumpage taxes, or
income paid to out-of-area workers or owners. Suppose that of this $5 mil-
lion, $2 million flows out of the community right away as payments for
imported production inputs and to owners from outside the community.
Thus $3 million represents the (net) initial injection into the local commu-
nity in the form of payments for locally sourced inputs, such as parts and
hardware, wages, salaries, profits, and locally sourced equipment rentals
and payments. The term capture rate is sometimes used to refer to the
portion of gross export income that is initially injected into the local
economy (in this example the capture rate is three-fifths or 60 percent).
This initial injection is then spent by the people who received it as income,
including workers at the mill, the owner of the hardware store, the equip-
ment dealer, and any local owners of the mill. Some of this spendingsay
50 percentleaks out of the community on purchases of imported goods.
For example, the hardware store owner spends some of this income on
inventory orders from outside the community, and workers spend some of
their income on car payments to dealerships in neighboring communities.
Thus, the initial $3 million injection generates an additional $1.5 million

in local spending. This $1.5 million in second-round spending then spurs
additional rounds of spending. For example, the workers and the hardware
store owner spend money at the local grocery store, and the local grocery
store spends some of that income on wages and locally sourced food, and
some of it on food imported from outside. Thus, the third-round of spend-
ing is $750,000. Spending continues until leakages exhaust the process.
The total increase in income is the sum of the initial injection and the addi-
tional income generated through each round of spending. The following
formulas can be used to calculate this total increase in local income:
Initial injection = (gross export sales revenue) (payments for imported

factors of production)
Leakage rate = (total local expenditures on imports)/(total local expenditures)
Multiplier = 1/(leakage rate)
Total increase in income (economic impact) = (initial injection) multiplier.
The initial injection of $3 million from the economic base can be thought of
as the primary effect of the economic base activity. The multiplier is used as a
simplified tool to measure the secondary effects of this initial injection. Sec-
ondary effects can in turn be divided into indirect effects (increases in income
to the sectors of the local economy that support the base industry, such as
locally sourced equipment rentals) and induced effects (increases in income to
the entire local economy that occur due to increased spending by households
that received income from the base industry or one of its support sectors). The
total increase in income, or economic impact, generated by the initial injection
of $3 million into the local economy is $6 million. This process is illustrated in
Figure 16.2. The total economic impact represents the sum of the primary
effect (the initial $3 million injection) and the secondary effects (the $3 million
in indirect and induced effects) estimated by the multiplier. This formula is a
simplified version of the more general case developed by Sirkin (1959) and
assumes that savings by community members that leak out of the community
in the form of loans (for example, money market mutual fund investments or
savings in large national banks) are just offset by loan funds in the community
that come from savings outside the community. There are other assumptions,
such as the availability of excess production capacity and the relative sensitiv-
ity of imports and exports to income that go beyond the scope of the current
presentation. Note too that while simple multiplier analysis is relatively crude,
Figure 16.2 Economic Impact of Export Income on the Local Economy
Gross export
income
Initial
Local base
leakage
industry
Initial injection
Multiplier effect: Additional

leakage
Initial injection
X
(1/Leakage rate)
Economic
impact
much more sophisticated input/output software programs can be used to much

more comprehensively estimate economic impact.
Different Approaches to Economic Development
With this simplified view of the local economy and the economic impact of
base industry sales in mind, lets look at economic development. A primary
goal for conventional economic development has been to spur local eco-
nomic growth in order to create jobs, enhance the vitality of commercial
centers, and increase incomes for businesses and workers. An excessively
narrow focus on job and income growth can lead to pathological results that
undermine a communitys sustainability. Perhaps one of the more notorious

economic development strategies is termed smokestack chasing, or more
recently microchip chasing. In this strategy, local or state governments
compete with one another in order to attract large base-industry firms into
their jurisdiction. The inducements used by these jurisdictions to attract these
firms are property tax abatements, and free or subsidized land and site im-
provements. Unfortunately, winning the jurisdictional competition to attract
a base industry can be very costly in terms of public resources expended,
thus reducing funds available for schools, public safety, and other public
services. These public resource inducements can be measured in terms of
dollars per job. In one well-publicized example, in 1993 the state of Alabama
paid the equivalent of $200,000 per job in order to attract a Mercedes-Benz
assembly plant. According to the Rocky Mountain Institute (1997), during
each year of the 1990s, the economic development agencies of approximately
25,000 U.S. jurisdictions bid for about 500 major base-industry plants. Note
that there is no guarantee that the jobs promised will be forthcoming, or that
the firm will not shift jobs and production elsewhere in the future. Mean-
while, pressure is often placed on local jurisdictions to offer proportionate
inducements to existing firms, further eroding the foundation of public fi-
nance for infrastructure and public services in local communities.
More innovative local economic development strategies avoid the winners
curse of jurisdictional competition for footloose base-industry firms, and
instead promote business development within their own jurisdiction. Some
examples of these strategies include the following:
streamlined one-stop development and business permitting processes;

specific plan areas that have already undergone public hearing pro-
cesses and have been zoned, pre-permitted, and designed for certain
types of commercial or industrial uses;
strategic infrastructure improvements such as broadband or telecom-
munications access in targeted commercial or industrial districts;
marketing assistance, cooperative regional marketing programs, and
creation of regional marketing images to assist export sales of locally
made products and to promote tourism;
training and business plan assistance for local entrepreneurs, as well as
promotion of entrepreneurship in high schools and community colleges;
microenterprise lending programs for new and poorly collateralized firms;
organization of local base industry clusters that include base industry
firms and associated suppliers and distributors; identification of local
bottlenecks limiting further cluster development;
formation of public redevelopment districts in blighted areas, or private
business improvement districts, that receive the increase (increment)

in property taxes resulting from successful economic development, with
these funds going toward additional economic development efforts, in-
frastructure improvements, or marketing efforts;
small-business incubators, which are facilities that provide space at be-
low-market rates plus office management and marketing assistance; in-
cubators usually require some form of subsidy;
Internet-based information on permitting processes, local business con-
ditions, and on-line databases of undeveloped commercially or indus-
trially zoned parcels.
When economic development efforts cause local or regional economies

to grow relative to those of neighboring areas, the growth in jobs and income
attracts workers and other businesses, which in turn requires housing, office
space, schools, and other infrastructure and public services. As a result, eco-
nomic development cannot be done in isolation, but needs to be fully inte-
grated with local and regional community planning. One way this can be
done is to include an economic development element to the general plans
of local and county jurisdictions. State and local tax policies, as well as the
political influence of developers, can have a big impact on the incentives of
local government policymakers regarding economic development and regional
planning. For example, local governments in California can keep some of
the sales tax revenue generated within their boundaries, but receive only a
small fraction of the property tax revenue generated within their boundaries.
Many local governments find that the property tax revenues they do receive
from new housing development are inadequate to pay for roads, schools,
public safety, and other public services that must be provided in support of
new residential areas. As a result, while local governments in California com-
pete for retail sales taxgenerating businesses, they have less incentive to
provide housing for new residents. So-called big box retailers understand
this jurisdictional incentive to capture sales tax revenue from neighboring
communities. While workers at some big-box firms receive such low pay
and benefits that they depend on publicly provided health care and other
subsidies, nevertheless these firms are able to succeed by offering consum-
ers inexpensive goods produced elsewhere, and allowing small towns a chance
to capture substantial sales tax revenue from neighboring jurisdictions.
The traditional laissez-faire approach to development by many local gov-
ernments often results in a pattern of low-density suburban sprawl that is
driven by the incentives and political influence of landowners, developers,
and local business boosters, as well as the various subsidies for gasoline and
personal automobile usage that influence preferred household locations (see
chapter 13 for a discussion of these subsidies). Fodor (1999) refers to this

setting as the urban growth machine, and argues that the cost per housing
unit of providing public services is inversely related to housing density. At
the extreme, the result can be sprawled, automobile-dependent communities
like San Jose, Denver, and Los Angeles. Low-density housing in areas with a
strong economy but limited land available for development can lead to esca-
lating housing prices and an affordability crisis, which in turn pushes people
into cheaper housing in more remote areas, resulting in further sprawl, long
automobile commutes, highway congestion, and loss of community identity.
Increasingly, health care professionals see a linkage between automobile
dependence and the growing proportion of people who are obese.
As a result, more recently some innovative communities are integrating
land use planning and economic development in order to anticipate the hous-
ing needs of new workers in a way that preserves open space, reduces depen-
dency on automobiles, and allows new development to pay its own way in
terms of public services. One example is to provide development incentives
and planning in support of transportation oriented development (TOD).
The TOD community design concept features moderate and high-density
housing combined with complementary retail, public facilities, and services.
This mixed-use development is concentrated at various locations along re-
gional public transit networks. TOD creates a pedestrian-oriented environ-
ment and reinforces the use of public transportation. Another example of
innovative development planning is to integrate apartment or condominium
housing units upstairs from retail or commercial operations in the center of
cities and towns, and to design narrower streets with broader sidewalks that
emphasize pedestrian uses. Other examples include open space requirements
and urban growth boundaries. Many of these elements are drawn from suc-
cessful Western European urban models. TOD projects are underway in a
growing number of cities, including Atlanta, Boston, Charlotte, Los Ange-
les, Portland (Oregon), San Diego, the San Francisco Bay area, Seattle, and
the Washington, DC, area.
An alternative approach to economic development is to focus on increas-
ing the multiplier effect rather than on increasing the initial injection from
the economic base (though there is nothing preventing a community from
doing both). The multiplier effect is increased by reducing the income leak-
ages associated with the purchase of goods and services imported from out-
side the local community. This type of economic development has been termed
import substitution and was a dominant form of economic development in
newly independent former colonies in Africa, Asia, and South America in the
1950s and 1960s. Many economists see import substitution as a less desir-
able form of economic development at the national level because it requires
policies such as import tariffs and quotas that raise domestic consumer prices.
Moreover, by limiting competition from foreign imports, import substitution
policies are seen by some as government-sponsored protection for domestic
firms, reducing their long-term competitiveness. At the local level, however,
jurisdictions (at least in the United States) cannot levy import tariffs or quo-
tas on goods and services produced outside the local economy, and so the
economic distortions associated with import substitution policy are much
smaller at the local level.
Thus, for the most part, economic development strategies based on local
import substitution are less formal in nature, and usually amount to buy
local campaigns and marketing assistance for locally made products or ser-
vices. Another example is the development of a local currency, one of the
most famous of which is the Ithaca Hours project (www.ithacahours.org).
U.S. law allows local currencies or scrip as long as all appropriate taxes are
paid on economic transactions mediated by local currency, and that U.S.
money is not being counterfeited. If mostly locally owned businesses accept
local currency, then use of the currency reinforces a buy local value sys-
tem that increases the multiplier effect. Perhaps the most important benefit
created by local currencies is the awareness that interactions linked to a local
currency promote investment in social capital. Some jurisdictions have de-
signed restrictions on pattern restaurantsrestaurants that use a standard-
ized menu and design at multiple locationsas a method of restricting large
corporate chains and instead promoting local alternatives. In terms of
sustainability, democratic and community values are enhanced by promot-
ing local small business over larger corporate enterprises since the former
are more likely to be politically responsive to the local community. Eco-
nomically speaking, economic diversificationhaving many small businesses
across many sectors of the economyhas the advantage of reducing a
communitys risk of economic dislocation due to one large employer going
out of business. In some cases, large firms in small communities have used
the threat of closing down to extract concessions from the community; this
threat is less effective when employed by a small business.
One of the fundamental challenges associated with import substitution in
small local communities is that of economies of scale in production. Mass-
produced imports tend to be cheaper than local goods produced on a smaller
scale. Those who support local small businesses often must be willing to pay
a price premium. Those locals who are willing to pay a price premium for
local goods and services may recognize the mutual benefits of buying lo-
cally, and a vibrant sector of locally owned businesses may serve as an indi-
cation of a communitys social and cultural capital. The social and cultural
aspect of buying locally is also manifested in the rise of farmers markets and
community-supported agriculture. Communities that are more isolated may

find more success with the import-substitution development strategy, since
relatively high shipping costs help work against the cost advantage of im-
ports. In general, sustainable local economic development involves invest-
ment in the local stocks of natural, human, social, and human-made capital
as a way of producing adequate flows of jobs, income, and quality of life to
residents over time. As Power (1996) has argued, protection of the local natural
environment and investment in the public commons and the arts provides a
concrete way of enhancing local quality of life that also moves us toward
what may be a more appropriate balance between the commercial and non-
commercial aspects of life in local communities. Moreover, businesses make
location decisions in large part based on these local qualities, and so an alter-
native to tax giveaways and erosion of community services is to enhance
community services and protect local quality of life.
Case Studies
A number of strategies for more sustainable economic development have

been discussed in Part III of this book and are summarized in Table 16.1. The
case studies that follow help illustrate how these concepts can be applied in
actual community settings.
Arcata
Some 275 miles from San Francisco and over 400 miles from Portland, the
small city of Arcata, California, is located at one of the most remote sec-
tions of the U.S. Pacific Coast south of Alaska. Declines in the local forest
products and fisheries industries have contributed to local unemployment
rates substantially higher than in either California or the United States.
Moreover, Arcatas remoteness makes it quite costly to export products
and generate income injections into the community. In 2004, the City of
Arcata created an Economic Development Strategic Plan that operates in
the context of the citys General Plan 2020, a comprehensive planning tem-
plate. The Economic Development Strategic Plan identified the economic
development potential of the various districts in the city, and also articu-
lated citywide strategies. The city has implemented many of the innovative
economic development strategies described in the bulleted list in the previ-
ous subsection of this chapter. In addition to those measures given in the
bulleted list, other citywide strategies include a focus on infill develop-
ment for vacant, underutilized, and contaminated former industrial sites,
gateway investment and signage for visitors at key entrances to the city,
Table 16.1
Selected Economic Instruments for More Sustainable Local

Community Development
Instruments and Strategies Description

Microlending Very small-scale lending directed at low-
income people lacking collateral. To receive a
loan one must usually be part of a solidarity
group of other borrowers who provide mutual
support and help assure repayment.
Microlending reduces dependency, promotes
empowerment and entrepreneurship, and
builds social capital among members of the
solidarity group.
Promotion of local small business Smaller communities need not compete away
and entrepreneurship their tax base to attract large, export-oriented
industry. An alternative strategy is to promote
home-grown small businesses and
entrepreneurs, some of which will be a part of
the economic base that injects income into
the community, while others will produce
goods and services that substitute for imports
from outside and thus stem leakages. Such
development promotes a more stable and
diversified local economy, and is more
responsive to local democratic process. For
example, farmers markets and community-
supported agriculture strengthen urban/rural
ties and establish a connection between
environmental quality and local economic
vitality.
Ecotourism Engaging local people as guides, guards, and
hosts to tourists visiting adjacent ecologically
important areas. Ecotourism provides a direct
financial incentive for local communities to
protect their natural areas and an economic
alternative to poaching or extractive resource
harvest.
Recognizing and enforcing land Securing land tenure and property rights, and
tenure rights and effective local recognizing effective local systems of CPR
systems of CPR self-governance self-governance, helps avert tragedy of the
commons outcomes and promotes a longer-
term perspective to resource management.
cultural and environmentally based tourism, entrepreneurship, and techno-

logical spinoff collaborations with Humboldt State University faculty and
students, complementary affordable housing measures, and a program for
sustainability. The sustainability program includes implementation mea-
sures focused on promoting local organic agriculture and farmers mar-
kets, energy conservation and the development of local renewable energy

sources, revitalization of pedestrian-oriented neighborhood commercial
centers, and preservation of key historical districts.
The City of Arcata has also promoted ecological tourism and related events
such as the Godwit Days bird festival and the Arcata Bay Oyster Festival.
These festivals both improve the quality of life of local residents and help
make the areas ecological assets an integrated element of economic devel-
opment. The Humboldt/Arcata Bay complex represents the largest embayment
between San Francisco and the mouth of the Columbia River, is one of the
most pristine bays in California, and thus is ecologically very important for
bird migration. Thus, in addition to producing approximately 70 percent of
all the oysters sold in California, it should be noted as well that mariculture
creates a market-based incentive to protect water quality in estuaries such as
Arcata Bay. Finally, the City of Arcata operates an industrial park that pro-
vides infrastructure for local manufacturing firms, many of which produce
locally based food products and outdoor recreational equipment. Because of
these efforts, Arcatas economy has become more diversified, and support of
local entrepreneurs has increased economic vitality, created a higher degree
of self-reliance, partially stemmed income leakages caused by reliance on
imports, and created employment opportunities within the community.
The Cogtong Bay Mangrove Management Project
In August 1992 the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International Cen-
ter for Research on Women (ICRW) studied mangrove management in
Cogtong Bay, which is on the island of Bohol in the Philippines. Mehta (1996)
reports the results of this study, and elements of that report are summarized
below. Mangrove systems act as nurseries and spawning areas for many ani-
mals, as erosion control, and as vital sources of food and fuelwood for people.
Coastal mangrove forests have been cut down in many areas of the tropics to
make way for fish ponds for aquaculture operations. Villagers in the Cogtong
Bay area observed this same trend in their region, with newcomers from out
of the area building fish ponds and unsustainably harvesting wild fish in
Cogtong Bay. In 1990 the Philippine government empowered sustainable
local community management of nonwilderness mangrove systems, one of
which was Cogtong Bay. In Cogtong Bay 1,300 of the original 2,000 hect-
ares of mangrove swamp remain, with the rest converted to fish farms. Ap-
proximately 52,000 people live in the Cogtong Bay area; per capita income
is $228, less than one-half that of the Philippines as a whole; and wild fish
yields were falling as mangroves were being cut down. Mehta reports that
wealthy and politically well-connected entrepreneurs were conducting a dis-
proportionate large proportion of the (largely illegal) mangrove logging, which

was undermining the sustainability of local communities in the area.
The goal of the management project was to help the local people better
control and protect their coastal mangrove resource, to promote sustainable
resource use, and to improve the economic well-being of local people. Mehta
reports that the plan was to (1) organize eight Cogtong Bay communities
into resource self-governance organizations; (2) rehabilitate 400 hectares of
mangrove forest; (3) install artificial coral reefs to replace those that had
been destroyed; (4) begin a locally operated oyster and mussel mariculture
operation to boost local incomes; (5) limit illegal fishing and more sustainably
manage the fishery resource; and (6) award twenty-five-year individual stew-
ardship leases to mangrove plots conditional on individuals keeping the
plots under mangrove cover. While only a fraction of the target number of
reefs was developed, other project targets were generally reached or exceeded.
The project is considered a prototype, and the Philippine government report-
edly intends to place 150,000 hectares of mangroves under sustainable com-
munity management.
Sustainable Local Economic Development in South Africa
In 1994 a largely peaceful process of democratization and empowerment in

South Africa resulted in the end of apartheid and the beginning of the presi-
dency of Nelson Mandela. South Africas parks have for many years been
viewed as being among the best in the world. These parks have become among
the largest remaining refuges for elephants, white and black rhinos, Cape
buffalo, lions, and leopards, among others. South Africa has 17 parks, an
additional 5 in the process of formation, as well as many provincial parks
and private game reserves. Yet as Chadwick (1996) has pointed out, the South
African government must also provide for the basic needs of the very poor,
mostly black, people of South Africa, including medical care, water and sani-
tation, housing, and schools. Unemployment is estimated to be 40 percent,
and South Africas population is growing rapidly. How can park protection
be made consistent with the pressures for economic development?
Part of the solution may lie in ecotourism and in finding ways of bringing
the economic benefits of ecotourism to the rural communities adjacent to
these parks. Piet du Plessis, South Africas chief of tourism, pointed out that
730,000 people visit Kruger National Park annually, and that 77,000 of them
are from overseas, compared to 56,000 when the international boycotts were
still in effect prior to the transition to majority rule. Nationwide, the number
of overseas visitors increased 52 percent from 1994 to 1995. The substantial
income generated by Kruger National Park subsidizes other less well known
parks that nevertheless harbor substantial biodiversity. Kruger and many other
parks are fencedwhat Chadwick refers to as a form of ecological apart-
heidkeeping local people from poaching and protecting local people from
predators and their livestock from communicable diseases.
Perhaps most important is the work that is being done in linking the
ecotourism income generated by the parks to the welfare of local communi-
ties. Chadwick (1996) quotes park employee Chris Marais as saying: [T]he
old idea of how to run a park was: Put up a BIG fence, get BIG guns, and
keep the neighbors and their cattle OUT. . . . The new idea is to build support
by making sure those neighbors benefit as much as possible from being next
door (p. 16). First, since independence, local chiefs are now empowered to
meet with park staff to discuss common concerns. People displaced since
1913 can seek restitution. Most of Kruger Parks 2,700 employees are from
the local communities. As Chadwick points out, [T]he staff has established
medical clinics, assisted with irrigation projects, and arranged to purchase
local crafts and produce to sell in park stores. Neighbors pay only a nominal
entrance fee now, and drivers of local bush taxis have been trained as tour
guides (p. 23). A portion of income from KwaZuluNatal parks is shared
with local villages and communities. Chadwick reports that local villagers
are considering establishing private wildlife reserves. Many local people re-
tain traditional rights to gather building materials and some food, and some
villages are developing camping facilities and guided tour programs. Since
1979, private reserves and game farms have increased from less than 2 mil-
lion acres to more than 16 million. Most big South African parks are consid-
ered by their managers to be at carrying capacity, and many surplus animals
go to private hunting reserves, where a rhino, for example, can generate
$15,000 to over $40,000 in income. Other private reserves are primarily fo-
cused on attracting ecotourists.
The South African government recently passed up the opportunity to de-
velop an estimated $3 billion in titanium, rutile, and zircon from the coastal
dunes of St. Lucia Wetland Park, opting instead for preservation and
ecotourism. This provides a strong indication of the commitment that South
Africa appears to have to its parks and sustainable development principles.
Moving Toward Sustainable Urban Planning in Curitiba, Brazil
The capital of the state of Paran in Brazil, Curitiba has grown from a popula-
tion of 300,000 in 1950 to over 2 million in 1990. During that time Curitibas
economy has shifted from an agricultural base to one of industry and com-
merce. Yet the usual results of such rapid change in developing countries
high unemployment, squatter settlements, congestion, and environmental
degradationhave occurred to a much smaller extent than in similar cities in

Brazil. Herbst and Allor (1992) argue that Curitiba is a living laboratory for
extensive public transportation, flood-plain parklands, citizen participation, and
investment in appropriate technologies such as bicycle and pedestrian access.
Mayor Jaime Lerner initiated this experiment in the late 1960s. During rapid
growth in the 1970s, a public transportation system was already in place, and
so growth occurred along a rationalized five-spoke public transportation net-
work rather than the sprawl associated with private automobile transportation.
According to Herbst and Allor (1992), three-quarters of all commuters are
reported to use public transportation, so per capita fuel consumption is 25
percent lower than in comparable Brazilian cities, and the city has one of the
lowest rates of ambient air pollution. City officials purchased land for conve-
niently located low-income housing prior to industrial and transportation con-
struction when land was still relatively inexpensive. People wishing to build
beyond the normal height limit pay a fee that goes into a low-income housing
subsidy fund. Curitiba has a Free University for the Environment providing
practical short courses for families, builders, shopkeepers, and others. These
courses are a prerequisite for certain jobs, yet many take the courses voluntar-
ily. Some 70 percent of households sort recyclable materials for collection,
and employment opportunities are created for low-income people through la-
bor-intensive reuse/recycling programs. To limit illegal dumping, low-income
people can exchange garbage for free bus tokens or surplus food. Reportedly,
Cape Town, South Africa, is following the Curitiba model.
Summary
This chapter focuses on two different views of the economics of more

sustainable local communities. One of these is based on institutions for
local governance of common-pool resources (CPRs), many of which
evolved in pre-industrial societies, and the other is based on a model of
the local economy in the context of modern industrialized societies.
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues argue that carefully designed insti-
tutional structures are central determinants of sustainable and long-
enduring community-based CPRs. These systems are based on inclu-
sive, democratic policy processes, common visions of equitable ways
of allocating work inputs and resource units harvested from the com-
mons, effective monitoring and enforcement schemes, and adaptabil-
ity to changing conditions.
Ostrom has developed a set of design principles for local governance
institutions for CPRs that are associated with sustaining both the re-
source system and the community that relies upon it.
In industrialized countries, local communities must contend with free

migration and extensive regional, national, and international trade. A
local economy can be characterized by inflows and outflows of in-
come. Income is injected into the local economy by the economic
base, which sells goods and services to those outside the local com-
munity, or in other various ways injects income into the local economy.
The purchase of imported goods and services, as well as other activi-
ties such as paying state or federal taxes or traveling out of the area,
results in income leaking out of the local economy. The level of mate-
rial prosperity in a local community is a reflection of the balance of
these injections and leakages.
Injections of income by the economic base, net of imported factors of
production used to produce those exports, flows through local input sup-
pliers and employee households to grocery stores, restaurants, and other
elements of the local economy. Thus, an initial injection from the eco-
nomic base generates a larger overall economic impact that can be esti-
mated using multiplier analysis. A simplified multiplier can be derived
from the inverse of the leakage rate. The leakage rate is the percentage of
overall local spending that goes to imported goods and services.
The economic impact of additional sales by the base industry of a local
economy is equal to the product of the initial injection and the multiplier.
Economic development strategies have traditionally focused on increas-
ing jobs and income. One notorious economic development strategy is
smokestack chasing (also known as microchip chasing) where ju-
risdictions offer tax abatement and other giveaways in competition to
attract a large base-industry firm. Winning local governments may end
up spending hundreds of thousands of dollars per job.
More innovative economic development strategies focus on improving
local infrastructure, simplifying and streamlining the permitting pro-
cess, and assisting local entrepreneurs in starting and growing local
businesses.
Alternative ideas for economic development focus on increasing the
multiplier effect by sponsoring buy-local campaigns, promoting com-
munity currencies, and assisting local firms that produce local goods
and services that substitute for imports.
Economic development has substantial impacts on other aspects of com-
munity planning, including housing and transportation infrastructure.
In order to prevent sprawl, economic development needs to be fully
integrated with local planning.
Local economic development can also focus on growing the natural,
human, and human-made capital stocks in the community, thus increas-
ing the flow of benefits to the community. Examples include education

and training programs to improve the income-generating potential of
local people, improved telecommunications infrastructure to promote
decentralized cyber-commuting, promotion of farmers markets (and
thus local organic agriculture), and improving the noncommercial as-
pects of local communities such as parks, open spaces, and the arts.
1. Identify a local common-pool resource in the area where you live. It

may be natural, like a lake or a fishery, or constructed, like a community
pool. Research the property rights structure (who owns the resource) and the
rules that govern usage, as well as who monitors and enforces these rules.
Assess the success of these rules in sustaining the resource, and compare
your results to Ostroms design principles. Suggest any recommendations
that might improve the condition of the common-pool resource.
2. Go to the E.F. Schumacher Societys Local Currency website (www
.smallisbeautiful.org/local_currencies/currency_groups.html) and research
one or more of the local currency projects described there. What was the
purpose of the local currency project? How widely accepted is the currency,
and how effective has it been in promoting locally owned small business and
fostering the creation of social capital?
3. Suppose that a firm proposes locating a production facility in your com-
munity that would generate $25 million in annual export sales revenue. Sup-
pose that $10 million of that revenue initially leaks out of the local economy
as payment for factors of production from out of the local area. Assume that
on average, 60 cents of every dollar of local expenditure goes to the purchase
of imported goods and services, or otherwise leaks out of the local economy.
What is your estimate of the annual local economic impact of this facility?
4. Interview someone in your local jurisdictions planning or economic de-
velopment department. Find out what strategies they employ for promoting
the jurisdictions economic development. To what extent is economic develop-
ment integrated into community planning (e.g., zoning, housing, transporta-
tion)? Ask for one or two concrete examples of recent successful projects, and
critically evaluate whether, in your judgment, these projects enhanced or un-
dermined the sustainability of your local community. Justify your argument.
5. Devise a sustainable economic development plan for the jurisdiction
that you live in or grew up in. Explain how your plan is consistent with
sustainability and with improving the economic well-being of people in the
community. What sorts of economic activities are most appropriate for your
community and why?
Internet Links
Arcata Economic Development Strategic Plan (http://arcatacityhall.org/

econ_dev_strat_plan/final_plan/table_of_contents.htm): This site contains
the entire economic development strategic plan for the city of Arcata, Cali-
fornia.
Communities by Choice (www.communitiesbychoice.org): A national net-

work of communities, organizations, and individuals committed to learning
and practicing sustainable development. They define sustainable develop-
ment as the process of making choices that consider the long-term economy,
ecology, and equity of all communities.
E.F. Schumacher Society Local Currency Website (www.

smallisbeautiful.org/local_currencies.html): Directory of local currency
projects and other descriptive material.

(www.iascp.org): A nonprofit association devoted to understanding and im-
proving institutions for the management of environmental resources that are
(or could be) held or used collectively by communities in developing or de-
veloped countries.
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (www.lincolninst.edu): A nonpartisan

forum for discussion of the multidisciplinary forces that influence public
policy regarding land and tax policy.
National Congress for Community Economic Development

(www.ncced.org): Promotes, supports, and advocates for community devel-
opment corporations and the community economic development industry,
whose work creates wealth, builds healthy and sustainable communities, and
achieves lasting economic viability.
New Urbanism (www.newurbanism.org): Promotes the creation and res-

toration of diverse, walkable, compact, vibrant, mixed-use communities.
Sierra Business Council (www.sbcouncil.org): A nonprofit association of

more than five hundred businesses, agencies, and individuals working to se-
cure the social, environmental, and financial health of the Sierra Nevada re-
gion for this and future generations. The council explicitly rejects the notion
that Sierra communities must choose between economic and environmental
health, and views environmental quality and resource conservation as key to

the Sierra Nevadas economic prosperity.
Smart Communities Network (www.sustainable.org): The SCN website

connects citizens with the resources they need to implement innovative pro-
cesses and programs to restore the economic, environmental, and social health
and vitality of their communities.
Sonoran Institute (www.sonoran.org): The Sonoran Institute works with

communities to conserve and restore important natural landscapes in west-
ern North America, including the wildlife and cultural values of these lands.
The Institutes efforts focus on creating lasting benefits, including healthy
landscapes and vibrant livable communities that embrace conservation as an
integral element of their economies and quality of life.
Sustainability Toolkits for Communities (www.iisd.org/comm/

default.htm): A directory of sustainability tool kits for communities that
provides a listing of publications dealing with community sustainable devel-
opment initiatives and how to guides. Provided by the International Insti-
tute for Sustainable Development.
Acheson, J. 1988. The Lobster Gangs of Maine. Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England.
Agrawal, A. 1993. Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit
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Resources, ed. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
______. 2002. Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability. Chapter 2 of
The Drama of the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global
Change, ed. E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. Stern, S. Stovich, and E. Weber.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Ascher, W. 1995. Communities and Sustainable Forestry in Developing Countries.
San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
Bartik, T. 1991. Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute.
Bromley, D., ed. 1992. Making the Commons Work. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Chadwick, D. 1996. A Place for Parks. National Geographic 190 (July): 241.
Cordell, J., and M. McKean. 1992. Sea Tenure in Bahia, Brazil. In Making the
Commons Work, ed. D. Bromley. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Daly, H., and J. Cobb. 1989. For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy
Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Bea-
con Press.
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. Stern. 2003. The Struggle to Govern the Commons.
Science 302: 19071912.
Fodor, E. 1999. Better Not Bigger: How to Take Control of Urban Growth and Im-
prove Your Community. Stony Creek, CT: New Society.
Gibson, C., J. Williams, and E. Ostrom. 2005. Local Enforcement and Better For-
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Herbst, K., and D. Allor. 1992. Brazils Model City: Curitiba. Planning 58 (Sep-
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Lammers, P. 1997. 1997 Humboldt County Economic & Demographic Almanac. Eu-
reka, CA: North Coast Almanacs.
McKean, M. 1986. Management of Traditional Common Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management,
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Maughan, J. 1995. Beyond the Spotted Owl. The Ford Foundation Report 26 (win-
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Mehta, R. 1996. Involving Women in Sustainable Development: Livelihoods and
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Glossary
Absolute Resource Scarcity (chapter 5). Exists for those natural resources
(or elements of an ecosystem) that have no substitutes and whose productiv-
ity cannot be enhanced by way of technology. An element of traditional
Malthusian models of resource scarcity.
Acid Rain (chapter 10). Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions react
with water droplets, oxygen, and various oxidants in the atmosphere, usually
in cloud layers, to form solutions of sulfuric and nitric acid. Rainwater, snow,
fog, and other forms of precipitation bring these acidic solutions into soil,
streams, lakes, and rivers, lowering the pH of these soils and water bodies
and damaging terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.
Anthropogenic (chapter 11). An event, such as the emission of greenhouse
gases, that is caused by human activity rather than natural nonhuman causes.
Appropriation Externality (chapters 5 and 16). Occurs when the act of
harvesting (appropriating) resource units from a common-pool resource
by an appropriator subtracts from what is available to others, or results in
damage to the current and/or future productive capacity of the resource. There-
fore, appropriation from a common-pool resource imposes negative exter-
nalities on other appropriators, which is at the core of the tragedy of the
commons. Also see the entry for rule of capture externality.
Arbitrage Opportunity (chapter 13). A difference in prices in different
markets that cannot be entirely accounted for due to differences in shipping
and transaction costs, and which therefore promotes trade. Entrepreneurs
have incentive to export products from low-price to high-price markets. There-
fore trade tends to equilibrate prices across markets. For example, if apparel
is cheap in China relative to the United States, then entrepreneurs will have
483
484 GLOSSARY
an incentive to export apparel from China to the United States. Likewise, if

alcohol taxes are considerably higher in one state than in another, then alco-
hol will tend to be smuggled from the low-tax state to the high-tax state.
Average Effort Cost (chapter 5). Total cost divided by total effort applied to
resource harvest.
Average Revenue Product (chapter 5). Total revenue divided by total effort
applied to resource harvest.
Base Industry (chapter 16). See entry for economic base.
Benefit/Cost Analysis (chapter 7). An analytical technique that guides policy-
makers by computing the present value of benefits and costs for each of a set
of different policy alternatives. An application of utilitarianism.
Biodiversity (chapters 13 and 14). Refers to the number of different species
interacting in a particular ecological system. Related concepts include bio-
logical complexity and ecological resilience.
Buyers (chapter 3). Those market participants who exhibit a willingness to
pay for a certain number of units of a good or service offered through some
form of market process. This willingness to pay reflects a combination of a
preference for the good and an ability to pay.
Cap-and-Trade System (chapter 10). A regulatory system in which overall
pollution emissions are capped, and tradable quota shares are assigned to
polluters. The EPAs Acid Rain Program features a cap-and-trade system for
sulfur dioxide allowances.
Capture Fishery (chapter 6). Marine or freshwater fisheries in which the
stocks are wild rather than farmed by way of aquaculture or mariculture.
Capture Rate (chapter 16). In the context of economic impact analysis, the
capture rate is the percentage of gross export income generated by a local
economys economic base, net of payments for imported inputs, that is ini-
tially injected into the local economy. Also see entries for economic im-
pact and economic base.
Capture Theory of Regulation (chapter 8). Based on the work of George
Stigler and Sam Peltzman, the argument is that firms are able to form a
more effective interest group than consumers or other more diffuse inter-
ests because each firm has a lot at stake, and small numbers make firms
easy to organize. Therefore the interest group representing firms captures
the regulatory process. This demand-side theory does not address the sup-
ply of regulation.
GLOSSARY 485
Carbon Intensity (chapter 11). Carbon dioxide emissions per British ther-
mal unit (BTU) of energy.
Cartel (chapter 3). A group of colluding sellers who attempt to coordinate
their behavior so as to collectively act like a monopolist.
Categorical Imperative (chapter 2). Presents an action as being of itself
objectively necessary, or intrinsically right, without regard to any other end
that may or may not result from the action. For example, it can be argued that
the idea of equal protection under the law is a categorical imperative.
Climate Forcing (chapter 11). Mechanisms such as human greenhouse gas
emissions or natural fluctuations in the earths orbit that alter the global en-
ergy balance.
Coase Theorem (chapter 7). Named after economist Ronald Coase, the Coase
theorem starts from the premise that a complete set of private property rights
can be assigned to aspects of the environment, that polluters and those harmed
by pollution can negotiate to resolve pollution problems at very low cost, and
that free-rider effects among multiple parties on either side of the negotia-
tion are minimal. Under these conditions the central finding is that private
parties can negotiate a solution equally as efficient as that which would result
from more centralized regulatory processes using benefit/cost analysis.
Collusion (chapter 3). An agreement among market participants to limit com-
petition for mutual benefit. For example, a cartel of sellers colludes by coor-
dinating a reduction in each firms production output.
Command-and-Control Regulation (chapter 10). Specifies how pollution
is to be reduced through the application of uniform standards for firms. See
entries for technology-based (technology-forcing) standard and perfor-
mance-based standard.
Common Ownership (chapter 4). Also known as common property or com-
munal property. A system in which the property rights of access, with-
drawal, management, exclusion, and alienation are held in common by a
group of individuals. Examples include communal farms, cooperative pro-
cessors, wholesalers and retailers, and recreation facilities in a condominium
development.
Common-Pool Resources (chapters 5, 8, and 16). Those resources such as
groundwater basins, rivers, marine fisheries, and community forests for which
(1) it is difficult to exclude multiple people from appropriating from the re-
source, and (2) the resource units appropriated by one are no longer avail-
able to others. Contrast with private goods and pure public goods.
486 GLOSSARY
Comparative Advantage (chapter 13). In economics the Law of Compara-

tive Advantage states that people (and by extension firms, regions, or coun-
tries) should specialize in those activities for which their productivity
advantage is greatest, or their productivity disadvantage is least, relative to
potential trading partners. As a result, the trading party with the lowest op-
portunity cost of producing something is said to have a comparative advan-
tage in producing it. Comparative advantage answers the question of what
people, firms, regions, or countries should specialize in producing.
Consequentialism (chapter 2). The moral worth of actions or practices is
determined by the consequences of the actions or the practices.
Conservation-based Development (chapter 12). Refers to programs and
policies that help entrepreneurs succeed in developing viable businesses that
are environmentally sound and make a positive contribution to their local
community.
Conservation Easements (chapter 4). A landowner sells a portion of her
property right having to do with the right to develop or otherwise diminish
the conservation characteristics of her land. The landowner can still engage
in certain activities such as livestock grazing or selective timber harvest, but
the owner of the conservation easement the landowner can charge for en-
croachment on the easement if the landowner engages in an activity that
diminishes the conservation characteristics of her land. These easements are
permanent transfers of rights that run with the land.
Constructed Capital (chapters 12 and 14). See entry for human-made capital.
Consumer (chapter 3). A person who buys goods or services and uses them
personally instead of reselling them.
Consumer Surplus (chapter 3). The gain from trade that goes to consumers
when the maximum amount they are willing to pay for something exceeds
the price that they have to pay. Geometrically it is the area between the de-
mand curve and the price line in a supply/demand diagram. The experience
of finding a bargain at a garage sale is an example of consumer surplus.
Contingent Valuation Method (chapter 7). Involves the use of survey ques-
tionnaires to elicit hypothetical willingness-to-pay information regarding al-
ternative management practices or other contingencies, usually affecting
environmental or ecological resources that are not traded in markets and so
do not have a market price to provide an indication of value.
Cultural Capital (chapter 12). Refers to the stock and functional integrity
of the body of stories, visions, values, history, language, and myths shared
GLOSSARY 487
by people that provide the framework for how people come to view the world
and their proper role in it. A source of the shared values that determine the
nature of economic systems and the relationship individuals and communi-
ties have with the natural environment.
Deadweight Loss (chapter 4). A type of negative gain from trade that occurs
when either too much or too little of a good or a service is exchanged in a
market. Deadweight loss occurs in association with market failures, such as
when pollution accompanies market transactions, or when there is a mo-
nopoly or cartel, or when consumers are misinformed about product quality.
When there is deadweight loss, the total gains from trade in a market are not
maximized, and so the market features an inefficiency that may justify some
form of government regulatory intervention.
Decentralized Markets (chapter 3). When resource allocation occurs as a
consequence of a set of individual market transactions rather than central-
ized allocation decisions made by government. Decentralized markets are a
key element of capitalist systems.
Demand Curve (chapter 3). A graphical representation of the inverse rela-
tionship between price and quantity demanded. Points along a demand curve
represent buyer willingness-to-pay values. See also the buyers entry.
Dematerialization (chapter 13). Refers to a process of reducing the through-
put (see definition) of physical resources and energy required to produce a
given dollar of gross domestic product.
Demographic Transition (chapter 13). A theory that relates the stages of the
industrialization process to growth rates in population. Stage 1, prior to in-
dustrialization, features high birthrates and death rates, and thus low growth
rates. Stage 2, the initial stage of industrialization, features a sharp drop in
death rates but persistently high birthrates, perhaps because medical tech-
nology reduces child mortality but cultural values related to childbearing are
slower to adapt. Much higher population growth rates are experienced in
stage 2. Stage 3, the fully industrialized stage, features low birthrates and
death rates, and thus a return to low population growth rates.
Deontological Ethics (chapter 2). Theories of action based on duty or moral
obligation. Actions are judged by their intrinsic rightness and not by the
extent to which they further ones own goals or aspirations.
Derby (chapter 6). In the context of marine capture fisheries, a derby is the race
for fish that occurs when a total allowable catch (TAC) is set, and fishers compete
with one another to catch fish before the TAC is met and the fishing season ends.
488 GLOSSARY
Deterrence (chapter 9). In the context of promoting compliance with envi-

ronmental and resource management law, a risk-neutral firm will be deterred
from violating the law when the expected penalty exceeds the cost savings or
revenue gains from being out of compliance. The expected penalty is the
penalty or sanction (such as a fine) weighted by the probability of the viola-
tor being detected and penalized.
Direct Compliance Costs (chapter 7). The cost of environmental regulation
can be divided into direct and indirect costs. Direct compliance costs include
pollution abatement and expenditures by firms, consumers, and government,
as well as opportunity costs that can be attributed directly to regulation.
Discount Rate (chapters 5, 7, and 13). The rate of time preference that equates
present value and future value. For example, one might say that $100 to be
received twenty years from now has a present value of only $25. This is
equivalent to saying that $25 invested today in a (risk free) financial asset
paying an interest rate equal to the discount rate will grow to $100 in twenty
years. Discount rates are embodied in interest rates charged on borrowed
money and other investments in financial markets.
Dose/Response Relationship (chapter 7). In the case of risk assessment, the
dose-response relationship for a specific pollutant or human activity describes
the association between exposure and the observed response (health or eco-
logical effect).
Dynamic Efficiency (chapter 5). A criterion for evaluating projects or deci-
sions that generate a stream of benefits and/or costs into the future. When a
set of alternatives is being considered, the dynamically efficient alternative
generates the largest present value of net benefits, profit, or surplus.
Ecolabels (chapter 15). Programs designed to inform consumers of the so-
cial and environmental impacts of the goods and the services that they pur-
chase. Ecolabels are most effective when an independent third-party agency
establishes the standards and evaluates the extent to which products adhere
to those standards. An example is the SmartWood certification for sustainably
harvested wood products.
Ecological Tax Reform (chapters 13 and 15). The reform of public finance
in which taxes are shifted from productive activities such as income and
employment to destructive activities such as pollution emissions and the deple-
tion of natural resources. Since anything that is taxed is discouraged, eco-
logical tax reform can be a revenue-neutral way of promoting desirable
activities and discouraging polluting activities. Also known as environmen-
tal tax reform.
GLOSSARY 489
Econometrics (chapter 7). The application of statistical methods to economic

problems. Often involves use of regression analysis to estimate functional rela-
tionships between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables. Ex-
amples include estimation of demand, supply, production, and cost functions.
Economic Base (chapter 16). The sectors of a local economy that in various
ways generate income injections are collectively referred to as the economic
base of the local economy. Examples include the export of local manufac-
tured goods, agricultural commodities, services by local firms (e.g., consult-
ant services provided by locals to those outside the community), or the
injection of income associated with tourism in the local area, or salaries at a
local state university paid for by state taxes and out-of-area students.
Economic Development (chapter 14). The process of improving the well-

being of society.
Economic Growth (chapter 13). The rate of increase in real (inflation-ad-

justed) gross domestic product (GDP).
Economic Impact (chapter 16). The total increase in income in a local

economy that occurs as a result of an initial injection (see entry below) of
income into the local economy from the base industry (see entry for eco-
nomic base above).
Economic Rationality (chapter 1). Occurs when a choice is taken from among
competing options that yields anticipated benefits exceeding opportunity cost.
Economics (chapter 1). The study of how scarce resources, goods, and ser-
vices are allocated among competing uses.
Economies of Scale in Production (chapter 13). Occur when the average

cost of producing a unit of a good or a service declines as more and more is
produced at a given factory or office. For example, automobile and aircraft
production features economies of scale in production because of the exten-
sive amount of capital equipment required to produce cars and airplanes.
The average cost of producing a car or an airplane declines as more and more
are produced because the cost of the capital can be spread out over more and
more units.
Ecosystem Services (chapters 5, 12, and 14). As Robert Costanza and his
colleagues have observed, ecosystem services consist of flows of materials,
energy, and information from natural capital stocks, which combine with
manufactured and human capital services to produce human welfare.
490 GLOSSARY
Efficiency (chapters 3 and 7). Generally refers to the condition of producing

something of value with a minimum of waste. Efficient resource allocation
is realized under market exchange when all the available gains from trade
are realized, while efficient production occurs when goods or services are
produced at minimum cost. A proposed social policy is Pareto-efficient when
it makes some people better off and nobody worse off in comparison to the
status quo or some other policy option. In contrast, a proposed social policy
is potentially Pareto-efficient (or Kaldor-Hicks-efficient) when it generates
an increase in total net social benefits compared to the status quo and other
policy options, and thus the potential exists for those made better off to com-
pensate those made worse off.
Effluent Charges (chapter 10). Fees or taxes charged on the emission of a
pollutant. Pollution taxes are a type of effluent charge.
Embedding Effect (chapter 7). In the context of the contingent valuation
method, the embedding effect occurs when willingness-to-pay responses for a
particular good (protecting a mountain lake) are approximately equal to the
willingness-to-pay responses for a more inclusive good (protecting an entire
mountainous region that includes the lake among other features). When it oc-
curs, the embedding effect may indicate the nonexistence of individual prefer-
ences for the good in question, and the failure of respondents to consider the
effects of their budget constraints in hypothetical willingness-to-pay surveys.
Emissions-Trading Programs (chapter 10). Started in 1976, these are re-
gional, state-controlled programs designed and operated in cooperation with
the Environmental Protection Agency. To understand the concept, see the
marketable pollution allowance systems entry.
Energy Efficiency (chapter 11). In the context of a macroeconomy, British
thermal units (BTUs) of energy per dollar of gross domestic product (or other
relevant currency). In general, units of energy necessary to produce a given
unit of something valuable.
Equimarginal Principle (chapters 4, 7, 9, and 10). The equimarginal prin-
ciple simply states that an optimal allocation occurs when the marginal ben-
efit (e.g., marginal revenue) equals marginal cost. If there are multiple sources
of pollution emissions, each of which has a different marginal abatement
cost curve, then the equimarginal principle would suggest that each source
would have its own unique level of abatement where the marginal benefit
from abatement equals marginal cost.
Ethics (chapter 2). A branch of philosophy that is concerned with moral duty
and ideal human character.
GLOSSARY 491
Excess Demand (chapter 3). Occurs when price is below equilibrium in a

competitive market, and represents the amount by which quantity demanded
exceeds quantity supplied at that price. Also known as a shortage.
Excess Supply (chapter 3). Occurs when price is above equilibrium in a
competitive market, and represents the amount by which quantity supplied
exceeds quantity demanded at that price. Also known as a surplus.
Existence Value (chapter 7). See the entry for nonuse value.
Expected Value (chapter 9). Relevant in the context of a risky choice, or
gamble, where there are multiple possible outcomes, each with its own prob-
ability of occurring, the expected value of the choice is equal to the sum of
the products of each possible outcome and its probability of occurring. For
example, if you are offered a gamble where you receive a payment of $0
(heads) or $2,000 (tails) based on the outcome of the toss of a fair coin,
where the probability of a heads or a tails is 50 percent each, then the
expected value of this gamble equals $0*0.5 + $2000*0.5, or $1000.
Exposure Assessment (chapter 7). In the case of risk assessment, exposure as-
sessment involves an estimation of the quantity of a pollutant that people breathe,
drink, absorb through the skin, or are otherwise exposed to in a period of time.
Exposure assessment also includes an estimate of how many people are exposed.
Extended Producer Responsibility (chapter 15). Refers to regulatory pro-
grams that make producers rather than consumers and municipal govern-
ments responsible for reusing, recycling, or disposing of packaging and
worn-out products. Extended producer responsibility (EPR) programs give
producers an incentive to design products with less waste and for easier and
less costly reuse, disassembly, and recycling. Notable examples include the
packaging take-back and recycling legislation in Germany, the Netherlands,
Austria, Switzerland, and France, as well as end-of-life legislation and vol-
untary agreements concerning a number of complex products such as cars,
batteries, electronic and electrical appliances.
Externality (chapter 4). Positive externalities are external benefits gener-
ated from production and exchange and enjoyed without payment by mem-
bers of society. For example, when parents pay to vaccinate their children
against infectious disease, they create an external benefitthe reduced like-
lihood of epidemicthat is shared by many in society. Negative externali-
ties are external costs generated from production and exchange and borne
without compensation by members of society. For example, when firms can
avoid costly cleanup by polluting, they create an external costthe harms
created by their pollutionthat is shared by many in society.
492 GLOSSARY
Fertility Rate (chapter 13). The average number of children produced per
woman in a country. The fertility rate has been declining worldwide over the
last fifty years, and is below replacement in almost half.
Fishery (chapters 5 and 6). The interaction of human harvest activities, envi-
ronmental conditions, and the population dynamics associated with one or
more species of fish.
Fishing Effort (chapters 5 and 6). The deployment of fishing inputs (vessel,
gear, labor). May be measured as the dollar value of total inputs, or as the
aggregate amount of time that inputs are deployed, with adjustments made
for differences in the productivity of different vessel and gear types.
Fixed Costs (chapter 7). Those costs that do not vary with the quantity that a
firm produces in the short run. An example is the cost of leasing office space
or renting equipment. Even if a firm shuts down production, it must still pay
fixed costs in the short run.
Free Rider (chapters 3 and 7). One who enjoys the benefits of a public good
or common-pool resource without paying a share of the costs of providing
for or maintaining it. Voluntary contributions will fall short of providing the
socially optimal quantity of a public good or a common-pool resource when
there are many free riders.
Fugitive Resources (chapters 4 and 5). Those resources such as marine fish-
eries, groundwater basins, oil and gas fields, or stocks of fresh air having the
characteristic of being difficult or impossible to fence, brand, or partition.
Such resources tend to be state property, common property, or open-access
resources rather than private property.
Gain from Trade (chapters 3, 4, and 7). The positive net benefit to market
participants that occurs as a consequence of trade. The gain to consumers,
known as consumer surplus, is the difference between the maximum amount
that consumers are willing to pay (consumer valuation) and the market price
they actually have to pay. The gain to producers, known as producer surplus, is
the difference between the market price and the minimum amount that sellers
are willing to accept (producer valuation). Resources are said to be efficiently
allocated in a market when all possible gains from trade are realized.
Genuine Investment (chapter 14). Refers to the sum of the investments or
disinvestments in each of societys capital assets (i.e., human, human-made,
social, natural, and cultural). Since under weak sustainability theory we can
view the sum of these stocks of capital assets as societys genuine wealth, we
can also view genuine investment as the rate of change in genuine wealth.
GLOSSARY 493
Genuine Saving (Domestic) (chapter 14). A method for measuring genuine

investment that offsets positive investments in human-made capital and in
education with depletion of natural capital stocks.
Gini Coefficient (chapter 13). A measure of inequality, often applied to
national income distributions. The Gini coefficient is calculated as a ratio
of areas on a Lorenz curve diagram (see entry for Lorenz curve). If we
refer to the area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve
as X, and the area underneath the Lorenz curve as Y, then the Gini coeffi-
cient is X/(X + Y). A value of 0 indicates perfect equality, and a value of 1
total inequality
Globalization (chapter 13). A complex process associated with technologi-
cal, economic, and social changes that have lowered the barriers to interna-
tional connectivity and integration. This process has speeded up dramatically
as technological advances make it easier or cheaper for people to travel,
communicate, and do business internationally. Associated with increased in-
ternational trade and the mobility of capital and labor, and decreased cultural
differentiation. Results in downward pressure on wages and prices.
Government Failure (chapters 3 and 8). A circumstance in which policy
makers fail to craft regulatory interventions that enhance the efficiency of
market processes. For example, policy makers may attempt to craft regula-
tions such as Pigouvian taxes to resolve market failures, but political influ-
ence may distort the regulation to such an extent that the regulation creates
additional inefficiencies.
Greenhouse Effect (chapter 11). Certain gases such as carbon dioxide, ni-
trous oxide, methane, and chlorofluorocarbons allow visible light to pass
through the earths atmosphere but block much of the resulting heat that
would otherwise radiate from the warmed surface of the earth and out into
space. Thus these atmospheric gases act like the clear walls of a greenhouse,
creating a warmer environment than would otherwise exist. Human activity
has increased the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, a key green-
house gas, by about 36 percent in the last several hundred years, and this
process is forecast to accelerate.
Green GDP (chapter 14). An adjustment to gross domestic product (see the
gross domestic product entry below) that takes into account declines in
nonrenewable resources, expenditures on pollution control, and external costs
due to pollution. A method of integrating environmental impact into GDP.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (chapters 11 and 14). The value of the final
goods and services produced in a country in a given year.
494 GLOSSARY
Halocarbons (chapters 8 and 11). Synthetic compounds that combine car-

bon and halogen atoms such as fluorine, chlorine, and bromine. They may
also contain hydrogen. Examples include chlorofluorocarbons,
hydrochlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl
bromide, and perfluorocarbons. Some of these halocarbons are ozone-de-
pleting chemicals regulated under the Montreal Protocol, and others were
developed as substitutes under the Montreal Protocol. Most are also potent
greenhouse gases with global warming potential many times greater than
that of an equivalent mass of carbon dioxide. Many are long-lived in the
atmosphere.
Harvest Function (chapter 6). Relates harvest from a fishery to different
levels of fishing effort and to different levels of fish stocks.
Hazard Identification (chapter 7). In risk assessment, hazard identification
refers to identifying the health problems caused by a pollutant. In the case of
human health risk assessment, hazard identification uses both animal and
human studies to establish the likelihood that a pollutant will generate harm
to human health.
Hedonic Regression Method (chapter 7). A method used to determine the
value of aspects of the environment not traded in markets and thus lacking a
price to indicate value. This method uses regression analysis, a type of statis-
tical analysis, to infer the value of environmental qualities that are bundled
together with things that are traded in markets. For example, the price of
residential housing reflects not only the characteristics of the house, but also
the community and natural environmental qualities of the place where the
house was built. Hedonic regression analysis can be used to assign prices to
units of these environmental qualities such as lower crime rates, views, dis-
tance to a park or green space, open space, or clean air.
Hotelling Rent (chapter 5). See entry for rent.
Hotellings Rule (chapter 5). States that the dynamically efficient
intertemporal allocation of a resource occurs in an equilibrium state where
the marginal profit (P - MC) in the current period will equal the present value
of the marginal profit in future periods. Note that marginal profit in the
sentence above is actually a marginal rent. If the present value of marginal
profit was larger in the future than in the present, then it would be profitable
for producers of the resource to reduce sales today in order to have more to
sell in the future. When Hotellings rule is satisfied, the market is dynami-
cally efficient, meaning that the present value of the total gains from trade
summed over all the years of resource production is maximized.
GLOSSARY 495
Human Capital (chapters 12 and 14). The stock of knowledge, skills, and
capabilities of people that can be deployed to create a flow of useful work for
community and economy.
Human-Made Capital (chapters 12 and 14). Also known as constructed,
created, or manufactured capital. The stock of technologies, tools, equip-
ment, productive facilities, infrastructure (e.g., roads, waterworks, electric-
ity grids, telecommunications networks, and the like) and inventories of
products that economists traditionally think of as the capital stock.
Import-Substitution Model of Economic Development (chapter 16). An
alternative to the economic (export) base model (see the economic base
entry above). Instead of offering tax giveaways to attract big exporting firms,
which will then have disproportionate power over the local community, local
incomes and jobs can be enhanced by promoting local small businesses that
produce local substitutes for imported goods, which would otherwise drain
income from the community.
Incentive Regulation (chapter 10). Regulatory schemes that use prices, taxes,
subsidies, and other instruments to align individual incentives with the com-
mon good. This form of regulation controls pollution indirectly through in-
centives rather than by way of direct controls such as emissions caps and
technology-forcing rules.
Indirect Costs (chapter 7). Changes in production and production costs due
to environmental regulation can result in additional costs such as product
market distortions, changes in market concentration, and reduced rates of
economic growth.
Indirect Effect (chapter 16). In the context of economic impact analysis, the
indirect effect of an initial injection (see entry below) represents the increase
in income to the various sectors of the local economy that support the base
industry that generated the initial injection of income.
Individual Quotas (chapter 6). In the context of a fishery, individual
quotas (IQs) are shares of a total allowable catch (TAC) allocated to fish-
ers, vessel owners, communities, or processors. Initial quota allocations
are usually based on historical landings. Individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) can be traded, sometimes with restrictions. A competitive quota
market can be expected to allocate a quota to its highest-valued use. ITQs
are commonly used in fisheries that are overcapitalized and that have
experienced problems associated with a race for fish (derby). Market forces
resolve overcapitalization and promote efficiency by concentrating larger
quota shares on a relatively small number of vessels. Fishers need not
496 GLOSSARY
race for fish because they can fill their quota at any time during the sea-
son opening.
Induced Effect (chapter 16). In the context of economic impact analysis, the
induced effect of an initial injection (see entry below) represents the increase
in income to the entire local economy that occurs due to increased spending
by households that received income from the base industry or one of its
support sectors.
Inflation (chapter 13). The rate at which the overall price level rises over
time. Inflation may be measured in the overall economy, for consumer prices,
or for particular sectors such as health care or higher education.
Initial Injection (chapter 16). In the context of economic impact analysis,
the initial injection is the portion of gross income generated by a local base
industry net of any initial leakage in the form of payments for imported in-
puts used to produce the export. It is the initial injection, not gross export
income, that is multiplied to get total economic impact. Also see the entry for
base industry and capture rate.
Invisible Hand (chapters 3, 5, and 8). A term associated with economics
pioneer Adam Smith that refers to the efficient way that well-functioning
competitive markets coordinate the complex and interdependent allocation
of scarce resources in an economy without the guiding hand of economic
planners.
IPAT Identity (chapter 11). Human impact (I) = Population x Affluence x
Technology.
KaldorHicks Criterion (chapters 2 and 7). See the efficiency entry.
Kaya Identity (chapter 11). Carbon dioxide emissions = Population (GDP/
Population) (Energy/GDP) (CO /Energy).
2
Kyoto Protocol (chapter 11). International treaty to limit human emission of
greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change.
Land Tenure (chapters 4, 5, and 13). Also known as traditional or custom-
ary land tenure, often in contrast to Western property rights systems that
commodify land. Land tenure refers to the rights, responsibilities, and re-
straints that individuals and groups of individuals have with respect to the
use and occupancy of land. Customary land tenure is often linked to com-
mon property arrangements, and may include aspects of religious signifi-
cance and of a permanent home attached to land. Formal land tenure systems
are officially recognized and sanctioned, while informal land tenure systems
GLOSSARY 497
are not officially sanctioned or recognized by the courts or government, but

are practiced and accepted as an unspoken long-term customary practice.
Land tenure may be of an indefinite or long-term duration, and instead of the
right of alienation may have succession rules whereby when the tenure holder
dies, the tenure rights either go to the holders children or revert to a commu-
nal pool for reallocation by the customary authority. Many former European
colonies have dual property systems of imposed Western-style property sys-
tems and indigenous (precolonial) customary land tenure systems.
Law of Comparative Advantage (chapter 13). Originally developed by David
Ricardo, this law argues that countries specialize in those productive activi-
ties where their opportunity cost is lower than that of the other potential
trading partners.
Law of Demand (chapter 3). Demand curves are downward-sloping.
Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns (chapter 3). In the short run some
production inputs are fixed, typically capital (e.g., the lease on a production
or sales facility). In order to increase output in the short run, therefore, the
firm must add more and more variable inputs, such as labor. Eventually the
fixed input becomes congested with the variable input (e.g., too many cooks
in the kitchen, too much irrigation water or fertilizer in the field). When this
congestion occurs, the marginal productivity of a unit of the variable input
(e.g., labor) declines. For example, if a workplace is congested, then the next
worker hired will make a smaller contribution to output than one who pre-
ceded her.
Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility (chapter 3). Each successive unit of a
good that is consumed in a given time period generates less marginal utility
than did the previous unit.
Law of Increasing Opportunity Cost (chapter 1). Is manifested when a
societys resources (land, labor, capital, entrepreneurship) are at least some-
what specialized. As a result, successive increases in the production of a
particular type of good or service entails higher and higher opportunity cost.
Law of Supply (chapter 3). Supply curves are upward-sloping.
Long Run (chapter 3). Time period for production over which all inputs can
be varied, including land and capital.
Lorenz Curve (chapter 13). Illustrates income inequality in a population.
Constructed on a diagram where the X axis represents the percentage of
people in a population, arrayed from lowest to highest income, while the Y
axis represents the percentage of the groups total income received by each
498 GLOSSARY
percentile of the population arrayed on the X axis. If there were perfect in-
come equality in the population, then the Lorenz curve would be a 45 degree
straight line. With substantial inequality, the Lorenz curve takes the shape of
the portion of a parabola that occurs in the northeast quadrant (X, Y > 0) of
geometric space.
Marginal Analysis (chapter 3). Economic technique used to identify op-
tima. For example, the optimal output level for a profit-maximizing firm op-
erating in a competitive market can be identified by comparing marginal
revenue with marginal cost. Likewise in benefit/cost analysis, the optimal
level of pollution abatement can be identified by comparing marginal benefit
with marginal cost.
Marginal Benefit (chapter 7). The change in total benefit that occurs as a
consequence of a small (one-unit) change in production or consumption.
Marginal Cost (chapter 3). See the entry for marginal private cost below.
Marginal Effort Cost (chapter 5). The increase in total cost from applying
an additional unit of effort to resource harvest.
Marginal External Cost (chapter 4). The increase in total external cost (costs
borne by society in the form of pollution harms) that occurs as a conse-
quence of a small (one-unit) increase in output produced by a firm.
Marginal Net Benefit (chapter 7). Marginal benefit/marginal cost. When
marginal net benefit is positive, then a small incremental increase in pollu-
tion control or other policy activity contributes to a larger total net benefit.
Marginal Private Cost (chapter 4). The increase in total private cost (borne
by producers) that occurs as a consequence of a small (one-unit) increase in
output produced by a firm.
Marginal Product (chapter 3). The increase in output generated by a one-
unit increase in an input. For example, an additional pound of fertilizer input
applied to farmland will result in an increased crop yield output from that
land. The increase in crop yield is the marginal product of the additional
pound of fertilizer. Also see Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns.
Marginal Revenue Product (chapter 5). The change in total revenue from
applying an additional unit of effort to resource harvest.
Marginal Social Cost (chapter 4). The increase in total social cost (borne by
both producers and other members of society) that occurs as a consequence
of a small (one-unit) increase in output produced by a firm. Marginal social
cost equals the sum of marginal private cost and marginal external cost.
GLOSSARY 499
Marginal Utility of Money (chapter 7). The increase in a persons total util-
ity or satisfaction that occurs as a consequence of a $1 increase in income.
Economists generally assume that the marginal utility of money, like the
marginal utility of most other valuable things, is positive but tends to become
smaller as total income rises. Thus a billionaire would have a smaller mar-
ginal utility of money than someone living in poverty.
Market (chapter 3). An institution that coordinates trade between buyers

and sellers. Markets determine how buyers and sellers communicate, how
prices are set, and how money is exchanged for goods or services.
Market Capitalism (chapter 3). A socioeconomic system based on the use

of a complete set of decentralized markets to allocate scarce resources, goods,
and services. In this system, human-made capital is privately owned by indi-
viduals, and production and employment decisions are decentralized and thus
made by firms. Contrast with centrally planned allocation of scarce resources
and government (or community) ownership of human-made capital under
socialism or communism.
Market Equilibrium (chapter 3). Occurs at a price at which the quantity of

a good or service demanded by buyers is just matched by the quantity sup-
plied by sellers, meaning that neither a shortage nor a surplus occurs.
Market Failure (chapter 3). Occurs when one or more of the conditions re-
quired for a well-functioning competitive market is not met in a substantial way.
Examples include monopolization or cartelization of markets, the presence of
significant positive or negative externalities, or poorly informed buyers.
Market Power (chapter 3). Exists when buyers or sellers can affect market
price to their advantage by manipulating the quantity they purchase or sell.
For example, a monopolist has market power if it can maintain a lower quan-
tity of output than would otherwise be produced under competitive condi-
tions, and thereby benefit from a higher market price. Likewise a monopsonist
fish processor that buys all the fish in a local market has market power if it
can maintain low prices paid to fishermen.
Marketable Pollution Allowance Systems (chapter 10). These systems are

designed to work in conjunction with overall emissions-control schemes,
with the objective being to reduce the cost of regulatory compliance. Pollut-
ers are issued quotas (usually a fraction of historical emissions levels), which
represent their total emissions allowance under the emissions-control scheme.
500 GLOSSARY
If some firms can further reduce their emissions, and if their cost of emis-
sions control is much lower than for others, then trade in allowances will
result in the firms with lower emissions-control costs selling allowances to
firms with higher emissions-control costs. Allowances trade shifts clean-up
to firms with lower clean-up costs, reducing the industrywide cost of com-
pliance with an overall emissions reduction target.
Maximum Sustained Yield (chapter 5). The maximum number or quantity
of resource units that can be harvested without damaging the productive ca-
pacity of the resource stock.
Minimum Efficient Scale (chapter 6). The level of output where the long-
run average cost curve stops declining. In other words, the level of output
where economies of scale end. In a large market under long-run perfectly
competitive conditions, minimum efficient scale will dictate the minimum
size of firms.
Monopoly (chapter 3). The condition that exists when there is a single seller
that dominates a market. When monopolies are protected from entry by rival
firms, the incentive for profit maximization results in the monopolist supply-
ing less to the market than would otherwise happen under competitive condi-
tions, which causes price to be higher than under competition.
Monopsony (chapter 6). The condition that exists where there is a single buyer
that dominates a market. When monopsonies are protected from entry by rival
firms, the incentive for profit maximization results in the monopsonist buying
less from sellers than would otherwise happen under competitive conditions,
which causes purchase price to be lower than under competition.
Montreal Protocol (chapter 8). International treaty to limit human emis-
sions of stratospheric ozone-depleting chemicals.
Multiplier Effect (chapter 16). In the context of economic impact analysis,
the multiplier effect is the additional income created when income originally
injected into the local economy by the economic base (see entry for eco-
nomic base) is respent and becomes additional income through the second-
ary effect (see entries for indirect effect and induced effect).
National Income and Product Accounts (chapter 14). Accounts that are
used to measure the total income and output of a national economy. Gross
domestic product (GDP) is derived from data from the national income and
product accounts.
Natural Capital (chapters 12 and 14). The stock of natural resources, together
with the components and the structural relationships in the earths ecosystems,
GLOSSARY 501
that taken together serve as the foundation for life on earth. From the stock of
natural capital flows the annual harvest of natural resources, ecosystem ser-
vices, sink functions, and other benefits from a healthy environment.
Negative Externality (chapters 3 and 4). See the externalities entry.
Network Externalities (chapter 5). Positive network externalities occur when
network use by one entity creates benefits for others. A classic example is
the benefit of having everyone on a common telephone network, as opposed
to having people on different telephone systems lacking interconnectivity.
Negative network externalities occur when network use by one entity creates
costs to others. For example, on electric transmission networks (grids), ex-
cessive withdrawals by one entity can create system problems such as black-
outs on others. Similarly, excessive withdrawals of natural gas from a pipeline
network can reduce system pressure and impair deliveries to other network
members.
New Political Economy (chapter 8). An area of study that borrows eco-
nomic approaches for modeling incentives as a way to understand the politi-
cal and economic forces that shape public policy.
Nonrenewable Resource (chapter 5). A class of resource having the charac-
teristic that the overall stock cannot replenish itself within the human
timeframe.
Nonuse Value (chapter 7). Also known as passive-use value or existence
value, reflects value that people assign to aspects of the natural environment
that they care about but do not use in a commercial, recreational, or other
manner. For example, someone might value the existence of grizzly bear
habitat in Alaska but have no interest in actually visiting such wildland habi-
tat. Existence values are controversial because they are difficult to measure.
Normative Economics (chapter 2). Identifies the economic elements of how
things should be, based on a particular set of norms or standards, as opposed
to objectively describing the current economic state of affairs.
Open Access (chapters 4, 5, and 6). A state of affairs that exists when there
are no property rights systems recognized that constrain access to a resource
or withdrawals of resource units, typically for a natural resource. Tragedy of
the commons is the anticipated outcome when self-interested appropriators
harvest resource units from an open-access common-pool resource.
Opportunity Cost (chapters 1 and 7). When a scarce resource, good, or
service is allocated to one use, the opportunity cost of that allocation repre-
sents the net value of the best alternative that was forgone.
502 GLOSSARY
Opportunity Cost of Capital (chapter 13). When a firm is considering a

capital investment, such as expanding production capacity, the investment is
anticipated to generate a flow of additional net income. The opportunity cost
of that capital investment is the net income that could be earned by investing
the money in some other income-generating asset, like stocks, bonds, or al-
ternative projects. For example, if the next best use of invested capital is to
buy U.S. Treasury Bonds paying a 7 percent annual return, then every dollar
invested in a particular capital project has an opportunity cost of generating
a 7 percent return each year.
Pareto Efficiency Criterion (chapters 2 and 7). See the efficiency entry.
Performance-based Standard (chapter 10). A type of command-and-con-
trol regulation that sets a uniform emissions control target for all regulated
firms. Unlike technology-based standards, however, firms are given some
choice over how the target is actually met.
Pigouvian Taxes (chapter 4). A tax (named after economist A.C. Pigou) placed
on firms that is equal to the marginal external costs resulting from their pollu-
tion emissions. For example, if each unit of a good or service produced by a
firm generates $20 in marginal external cost, then a Pigouvian tax of $20 per
unit of output would internalize the marginal external cost, thereby resolving
the market inefficiency caused by the presence of the negative externality.
Political Economy (chapter 8). In contemporary usage, political economy is
distinct from the discipline of economics in that it is more interdisciplinary
in nature, draws upon related fields such as law and political science, and
often has a broader scope. Within microeconomics, political economy is an
approach used to understand how political and legal institutions influence
the economic behavior of people, firms, and markets, as well as the econom-
ics of how interest groups influence the formation of laws and regulatory
policy.
Pollution (throughout the textbook). Harmful human-generated (anthropo-
genic) waste emissions that exceed the assimilative capacity (sink functions)
of earths ecosystems.
Pollution Abatement (throughout the textbook). Reducing, eliminating, or
properly disposing of unwanted human emissions or wastes that are harmful
to the natural environment.
Pollution Credits (chapter 10). See entry for tradable pollution credits.
Pollution Taxes (chapter 10). Taxes placed on firms based on their pollution
emissions. Unlike Pigouvian taxes, however, pollution taxes may not be de-
GLOSSARY 503
signed to fully internalize external costs. In other words, pollution taxes may
be greater than or less than the theoretically correct Pigouvian tax. Also see
the entry for effluent charges.
Positive Economics (chapter 2). A method of economic analysis based on
the Western scientific tradition of modeling the world and then subjecting
these models to empirical test. Positive analysis seeks to explain the observ-
able. Contrast with normative economics. (See the normative economics
entry.)
Positive Externality (chapters 3 and 4). See the externalities entry.
Precautionary Principle (chapters 11 and 14). Suggests that precaution-
ary measures should be taken when evidence suggests that an activity is
generating costly or irreversible harms, even if there is still some uncertainty
over the extent or the mechanics of the harms. An alternative to benefit/cost
analysis.
Present Value (chapters 5 and 7). The value at present of a future benefit or
cost. Because people (and thus firms as well) have positive discount rates
(see the discount rate entry), the present value of a future benefit or cost is
smaller than the dollar amount of the payment in the future. The higher the
discount rate, or the longer the time period before the benefit or the cost is
received, the smaller is the present value.
Primary Market (chapter 5). In the context of metals markets, for example,
the market for metal directly smelted from virgin ore, as opposed to second-
ary markets made up of metal derived from recycled material.
Private Ownership (chapter 4). Also known as private property. An arrange-
ment in which the property rights of access, withdrawal, management, ex-
clusion, and alienation are held by a private company, partnership, or
individual owner.
Producer Surplus (chapter 3). The sellers share of the gains from trade. The
area between price and a sellers minimum sales price (usually marginal cost).
Property Rights (chapter 4). In the context of natural resources and the
environment, one or more of the rights of accessing a resource, withdrawing
or harvesting resource units, managing a resource, excluding others from
accessing the resource, and selling to someone else.
Public Choice (chapter 8). A form of political economic analysis that treats
politicians as any other self-interested maximizer having an objective func-
tion that might include current and discounted future income, reelection,
504 GLOSSARY
ideology, or power and control. Thus the rational behavior of a politician is

predicted to be of a manner that is consistent with his or her objectives, which
may or may not be consistent with the public interest.
Pure Public Good (chapter 5). A good or service (1) that is used by multiple
people, and (2) for which use by one does not subtract from what is available
for others to use. The latter characteristic distinguishes pure public goods
from common-pool resources. An example of a pure public good is public
radio or public television broadcasts.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (chapter 7). Quantitative risk assessment in-
volves four steps: hazard identification, exposure assessment, dose response,
and risk characterization. Risk assessment for environmental issues often
addresses impacts on human health or on animals and plants in ecosystems.
Risk assessment data can then be monetized and used to indicate the value of
environmental conservation and restoration in benefit/cost analysis.
Rate of Return on Capital (chapter 13). Net income generated from capital
such as a factory or office equipment (also used for financial capital), ex-
pressed as a percentage of the total cost of the capital.
Rational Choice (chapters 1 and 8). From the perspective of economics, a
choice is rational if it is consistent with the objectives and preferences of
those making the decision, given the available information. An allocation
choice is economically rational if it is seen as yielding a benefit that exceeds
opportunity cost. What is economically rational for one person may not be
seen as reasonable by another.
Relative Price (chapter 13). The price of one thing (usually a good) in terms
of another in a barter transaction.
Renewable Resources (chapter 5). The class of resources that are capable of
replenishing themselves over time. Excessive harvest can deplete the repro-
ductive capacity of a renewable resource.
Rent (chapters 5, 6, and 14). A return or profit from a differential advantage
in production. Also known as economic rent, Hotelling rent, resource rent,
Ricardian rent, or scarcity rent. In the case of agricultural land, for example,
rent represents the excess of the return from a given piece of cultivated land
over that from land of equal area that has such limited productivity (or is so
remote) that it is at the margin of cultivation. Large rents may be evidence
of a lack of competition, such as government-created monopolies, or of suc-
cessful measures to limit harvest from a common-pool resource. In the case
of a natural resource, due to fixed supply, consumption of a resource unit
GLOSSARY 505
today has an opportunity cost equal to the present value of profit from selling
the resource unit in the future. This opportunity cost limits current supply,
which in turn elevates current price above marginal cost, creating the rent.
Under tragedy of the commons, rents are dissipated because individual re-
source appropriators cannot find a way to limit current harvest and preserve
the resource for future sale.
Rent Dissipation (chapter 5). Occurs when competition eliminates rents.
For example, when firms compete for a government monopoly by offering
kickbacks equal to the present value of the rents that would be derived from
the monopoly. Rent dissipation may also be bad, such as in the context of
common-pool natural resources, where dissipation of rents occurs when har-
vest rates exceed the dynamically efficient consumption rate. In the context
of common-pool resources, this outcome has been described by Garrett Hardin
as the tragedy of the commons. Also see the entry for rent.
Resilience (chapter 14). As used here, the magnitude of shocks (flood,
drought, fire) that an ecosystem can withstand before being pushed from one
locally stable equilibrium to another. Shifts from one equilibrium to another
can cause detrimental changes in ecosystems.
Risk Characterization (chapter 7). The final step of risk assessment, risk
characterization presents risk assessment results in various ways in order to
illustrate how individuals or populations in human or ecological communi-
ties may be affected by pollution or other harmful human activity.
Risk Preference (chapter 9). Ones risk preference regarding a particular
risky situation falls into one of three categories. To understand these, sup-
pose you are offered the following choice: (A) $1,000, or, (B) based on out-
come of the flip of a fair coin, either $0 (heads) or $2,000 (tails). Note that
the expected value of (B) equals 0.5*$0 + 0.5*$2,000 = $1,000, which equals
the guaranteed value of (A). A risk-averse person prefers (A) over (B), even
though they have the same expected value, since choice (A) avoids risk. A
risk-neutral person is indifferent between (A) and (B), as they have the same
expected value. A risk-loving person will prefer (B) over (A), even though
they have the same expected value, since choice (B) includes risk. A persons
risk preference usually varies across different types of choices. It is usually
assumed that large firms are risk-neutral.
Risk Premium (chapters 7 and 13). A payment provided in return for ac-
cepting higher risk, such as with riskier jobs or riskier investments. Lenders
add a risk premium onto interest rates for loans to those with a larger likeli-
hood of defaulting on loan repayment.
506 GLOSSARY
Rule of Capture (chapters 4 and 6). A part of our common law tradition, the
rule of capture operates on open-access and common-property resources such
as groundwater basins, oil and gas fields, and marine fisheries. The rule of
capture states that resource units harvested from an open-access or a com-
mon-property resource become private property owned by the appropriator
at the time the resource units are captured from the commons.
Rule of Capture Externality (chapter 6). A phrase used by some resource
economists to refer to appropriation externalities.
Scarcity (chapter 1). The condition of not having enough of something to
provide for all that is wanted. The condition of scarcity implies that not all
goals can be attained at the same time.
Scarcity Rent (chapter 5). See the entry for rent.
Secondary Market (chapter 5). In the context of recyclable resources such
as glass and metal, for example, the secondary market is the market for sal-
vaged or recycled resources, as opposed to the primary market for glass or
metal produced from virgin resources.
Shortage (chapter 3). See entry for excess demand.
Short Run (chapter 3). Time period of production in which at least one in-
put, such as land or capital, is fixed. For example, once a farmer has planted
a crop, land is fixed, and the short run is the growing season.
Sink Capacity (chapter 5). The capacity of the biosphere to absorb human
waste and render it harmless. Pollution occurs when human emissions ex-
ceed the earths sink capacity.
Social Capital (chapter 12). As the concept is used by sociologist James
Coleman and political scientist Robert Putnam, it refers to the stock of civic
virtues and networks of civic engagement, involvement, reciprocity norms,
trust, volunteerism, and sharing essential to democratic communities.
Social Rate of Time Preference (chapter 13). A discount rate that can be
made consistent with weak sustainability. A key element of the social rate of
time preference is the per capita growth rate in the productivity of human-
made capital. If the productivity of a unit of human-made capital naturally
grows at a 1 or 2 percent rate because of technological innovation, then so-
cial projects that divert money from such investments and into improving
future environmental quality (enhancing future natural capital) should use a
1 or 2 percent discount rate. Under weak sustainability the various forms of
capital are substitutable for one another, and so the opportunity cost of in-
GLOSSARY 507
vestment in natural capital is the return on human-made capital. The other

element of the social rate of time preference is individuals pure preference
for benefits received today rather than in the future.
Stable Systems of Regulation (chapter 8). In this Stiglerian situation regu-
latory controls for protecting the environment are relatively unlikely to be
overturned, perhaps because the regulation generates concentrated benefits
to a few firms, individuals, or organizations that accordingly have a strong
incentive to lobby to maintain the regulation. See the capture theory of regu-
lation entry.
State Ownership (chapter 4). Also known as government ownership. The
property rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alien-
ation are held by some subdivision of government. Examples include mili-
tary bases, national parks and forests, and public roads, bridges, and buildings.
Status Quo (chapter 2, 7). Latin phrase for the existing state of affairs or the
current way of doing things.
Strong Sustainability (chapter 14). Developed from ecological theories of
sustainability. Primarily focuses on protecting and enhancing natural capital.
A key assumption is that declines in natural capital cannot be made up with
increases in human or human-made capital.
Structural Adjustment (chapter 14). Developing countries that became
saddled with enormous debt burdens from earlier ill-advised development
loans were offered structural adjustment loans in return for economic and
political restructuring that involved privatization of government-owned in-
dustry, reduced social spending, increased openness to foreign investment,
and a focus on export-oriented production, typically of natural resource com-
modities. Falling commodity prices created pressure for unsustainable re-
source harvest, which led the Brundtland Commission of the UN to call for
sustainable development.
Sunk Costs (chapter 8). Costs that cannot be salvaged if an activity is ended.
For example, if a worker invests time and effort in learning a work routine
that is highly specific to a particular employer, then the costs associated with
developing workplace skills are sunk and cannot be salvaged if the worker
quits and moves elsewhere. Such a situation gives bargaining power to the
employer.
Supply Curve (chapter 3). A graphical representation of the relationship
between quantity supplied and price. The supply curve for individual com-
petitive firms is their short-run marginal private cost curve. The market
508 GLOSSARY
supply curve is found by horizontally summing each individual firms sup-

ply curve.
Surplus (chapter 3). See entry for excess supply. Note that the term sur-
plus usually refers to the amount by which quantity supplied exceeds quan-
tity demanded when price is above the equilibrium in a competitive market.
Be careful to distinguish this from consumer surplus and producer surplus,
which measure the welfare gains to consumers and producers, respectively,
due to trade.
Sustainability (chapter 12). A communitys control and prudent use of natu-
ral, human, human-made, social, and cultural capital to foster economic secu-
rity and vitality, social and political democracy, and ecological integrity for
present and future generations. Ecological sustainability more narrowly fo-
cuses on maintaining and enhancing ecological integrity and biodiversity, and
generally on protecting the life-support and waste-sink functions of the earth.
Sustainable Economic Development (chapter 14). The Brundtland Com-
mission defined sustainable economic development as the process of satisfy-
ing present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs. We can also interpret sustainable economic develop-
ment as a redirection of economic development toward enhancing economic
security and vitality, social and political democracy, and ecological integrity
for present and future generations. Sustainable economic development gen-
erates improvements in human well-being without large increases in energy
and materials throughput.
Technology-based Standard (chapter 10). Also known as technology-forc-
ing regulation, this type of command-and-control regulation specifies the
specific methods and equipment that firms must use in order to comply with
environmental regulation.
Teleological Ethics (chapter 2). A class of ethical theory in which the ethics
of actions are judged by the extent to which they advance valuable ends or
goals, and not by the intrinsic rightness of the actions themselves. A promi-
nent form of teleological ethics is utilitarianism.
Throughput (chapter 13). The flow of materials through an economy, start-
ing with raw materials inputs, followed by their conversion into products and
services, and ultimately their transformation into wastes of various kinds.
Total Net Benefit (chapter 7). Total benefit minus total cost.
Total Surplus (chapters 3 and 4). Also known as the total gains from trade.
The sum of consumer and producer surplus in a market.
GLOSSARY 509
Tradable Pollution Credits (chapter 10). Also known as tradable emission

credits, these are the product of regulatory programs that regulate emissions
at the level of the individual source rather than setting an overall cap on
emissions. Firms that reduce their emissions below their regulatory maxi-
mum are granted credits that can be traded. Tradable credit programs often
allow firms to bank credits for future use. Contrast with a cap-and-trade regu-
latory program that sets an aggregate emission cap and allows emission quota
shares to be traded among individual polluters.
Tragedy of the Commons (chapter 5). A term coined by Garrett Hardin
referring to excessive appropriation from a common-pool resource under an
open-access or dysfunctional common-property regime. Excessive appro-
priation occurs because (1) each user imposes appropriation externalities on
the others, and (2) governance structures that might limit appropriation to
sustainable levels are inadequate or lacking. The tragedy is that the rational
appropriator knows that the resource should be conserved, but nevertheless
depletes the resource because resource units conserved by one will simply
be appropriated by another. The tragedy of the commons leads to the dissipa-
tion of rents and damage or destruction of the common-pool resource. Also
see the entries for appropriation externality, rent, open access,and rent
dissipation.
Transaction Costs (chapters 3 and 7). The costs of making, measuring, and
enforcing agreements. Often times these are information costs. An example
would be the cost of hiring a mechanic to inspect a used car to determine
quality prior to purchase.
Travel Cost Method (chapter 7). In the context of measuring the value of
aspects of the environment not traded in markets, the travel cost method
assigns a dollar value to active recreational use based on observed travel
costs borne by those who come to use the resource.
Use Value (chapter 7). Use value represents the utility enjoyed by people
who directly use some aspect of the environment. For example, a bird sanc-
tuary yields use value to bird watchers and to those who use the area as an
open space (walking, jogging, observing the view). Likewise, a back-coun-
try area provides use value to hunters, hikers, backpackers, and equestrians,
and the ocean shore provides use value to surfers and fishers.
Usufructuary Rights (chapter 4). Certain use and withdrawal rights to prop-
erty that is owned by others. For example, treaties ceding Indian lands to the
federal government sometimes include clauses granting Indian tribes usu-
fructuary rights for hunting, fishing, and gathering on the ceded lands. Like-
510 GLOSSARY
wise water rights held by irrigators on navigable waterways are usufructu-

ary rights, with the waterway itself being owned by government in a public
trust capacity.
Utilitarian Ethics (chapter 2). A branch of ethics that considers a proposed
social rule to be utilitarian-ethical if, after adding up the utility and the disutility
that the proposed rule induces on people in society, a positive net social
utility is realized that exceeds that of any alternatives being considered. This
rule is sometimes (imprecisely) characterized as providing the greatest good
for the greatest number without regard to the intrinsic rightness of the spe-
cific acts required to achieve the desirable end.
Utility (chapter 2). The principle that judges actions according to their ten-
dency to increase or decrease an individuals happiness.
Weak Sustainability (chapter 14). A theory of sustainability that developed
from economic models of growth. A key assumption is that declines in natu-
ral capital can be offset by increases in human, social, or human-made capi-
tal. In other words, one form of capital can readily substitute for another.
While strong sustainability is concerned with the stock of each individual
form of capital, weak sustainability is only concerned with the sum of the
stocks of all forms of capital.
Willingness to Pay (chapter 3). The amount a consumer is willing and able
to pay for a particular quantity of a good or service.
Index
Abatement costs, 257, 25966 Allowances and allowance trading systems

Absolute resource scarcity, 115 and the EPAs emissions-trading programs
Acid rain, 267 (continued)
Acid Rain Program, 10, 26770 offsets, netting, bubbles, and banking of
Allowance Tracking System (ATS), 26869 ERCs, 27172
cost savings, 269 and the equimarginal principle, 264
price of allowances, 269 and the possibility of facilitating market
See also Clean Air Act Amendments of power, 266
1990 and the Regional Clean Air Incentive
Affluenza, 447 Market (RECLAIM), 273
Africa, 29394, 299, 343, 35051, 396, 411, cap-and-trade system, 25859, 26170
43334 greenhouse gas emissions trading, 30405
Agenda 21 principles of sustainable illustration of cost savings, 25966
development, 398, 42627 marginal abatement cost, 25965
See also United Nations Conference on marketable pollution allowances, 25870
Environment and Development other experiments, 27273
Agrarian transition, 34042 pollution credits, 258
Agriculture, 349 price of allowances, 269
Alabama, 468 uniformly mixed versus concentrated
Alaska, 139, 145, 148, 295 pollution and localized hot spots, 265
Alcoa, 10405 Aluminum market, 10405
Allowances and allowance trading systems, Amazon rain forest, 39697
25870 Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions,
advantages and disadvantages, 26667 28385
and the EPAs Acid Rain Program, 26770 Antitrust, 55
estimated cost savings from allowance Appropriation externality, 58, 107, 457
trading, 269 See also externalities
retirement of allowances by Appropriator, 107
environmental and other groups, Aquaculture, 14648
269 Arbitrage opportunity, 357
and the EPAs emissions-trading programs, Arcata (California), 39091
27172 Argentina, 276, 294
emissions reduction credits (ERCs), 271 Audits, 24041
511
512 INDEX
Australia, 143, 294, 43839 California

Automobiles, 42829, 440 Arcata, 47274
Average effort cost, 10809 collapse of the California sardine fishery,
Average revenue product, 10809 133
Assignment problems, 378 deposit-return system, 255
Dungeness crab fishery, 13940
Bangladesh, 293 energy crisis, 9192
Barter terms of trade, 395 enforcement/environmental law, 24748
Basel Convention on the Control of Eureka, 436
Transboundary Movements of green building standards and LEED
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, certification, 446
361 Independent System Operator (ISO), 91
Baseline emissions, 25968 Mono Lake, 175
Basic needs, 326, 342 organic standards, 443
Benefit/cost analysis, 4, 2930, 15392, 376 Regional Clean Air Incentive Market
and climate change policy, 307 (RECLAIM), 273
and commensurability, 155 South Coast Air Quality Management
and ecosystem complexity, 155 District (SCAQMD), 265, 273
and future generations, 156 Yurok system of property rights, 112, 454
and quantitative risk assessment, 16670 Canada, 13132, 139, 14445, 14748,
and the apples and oranges comparison, 16465, 218, 301, 340, 432, 438
154 Cap-and-trade system, 25859, 26170
and the benefit/cost ratio, 157 Capital, 33031, 402, 405
and the marginal utility of money, 156 constructed (also known as human-made or
and the value of a statistical life, 15556, created), 32931, 378, 402, 405
16870 cultural, 32930, 332, 402, 405
and U.S. environmental policy, 16364 expenditures (costs), 187, 427
illustrative example, 15860 human, 32931, 378, 402, 405
marginal benefits, 15859 natural, 4, 114, 32930, 378, 40206
marginal costs, 15859 social, 31, 113, 32932, 355, 402, 405,
measuring benefits, 16486 409, 471
measuring costs, 18692 stocks and flows, 330, 40203
direct compliance costs, 18688 substitutability of constructed and human
indirect costs, 18892 capital for natural capital, 378,
net present value, 376 40206
total net benefits, 15760 Capitalism, 4142
Benefits transfer, 185 Capture
Biodiversity, 1314, 116 See rule of capture and property rights
Bioeconomic equilibrium, 13439 Capture theory of regulation, 20607
Bioeconomic model of a fishery, 13439 Carbon dioxide
Biomass energy, 430 See greenhouse gases)
Brazil, 305, 350, 36263, 368, 39697, Carbon intensity of energy, 287
430 Carrying capacity, 115, 41315
Bretton Woods Conference, 362 Cartel, 55
British Columbia, 14445 Catch limits, 14041
Brundtland Commission (World Categorical imperative, 2324
Commission on Environment and See also ethics
Development), 32527, 395, 398 Central African Republic, 39495
Burma, 293 Central planning, 4142, 54
Business cycle, 407 Chile, 14748, 155, 276, 305
Buyers, 42
INDEX 513
China, 130, 147, 293, 29394, 345, 347, 368, Consumers and consumer choice theory,
430, 433 4346
Chlorofluorocarbons Consumption spending, 409
See halocarbons Contingent valuation method, 17178
Choice, 6, 447 and consumer surplus, 173
Chrematistics, 324 and existence values, 171
Citizen lawsuits, 250 and the embedding effect, 176
Civil society, 3334 and the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 17172
Clean Air Act of 1970, 10, 81, 164, 16768, and the NOAA panel of experts, 17273
18990, 36262 and the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-
and the World Trade Organization, 36264 accept gap, 17677
estimated net benefits, 81, 164, 16768, and the referendum-style format, 17172,
18990 177
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 242, and response effects, 177
245, 250 and strategic bias, 177
Acid Rain Program, 26770 controversy (the CVM debate), 17678
Clean Water Act, 242 examples, 17476
Climate change guidelines, 17273
See global climate change Convention on International Trade in
Climate forcing, 286 Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Club of Rome, 11 Flora (CITES), 364
Coasian contracting, 81, 162 Corruption, 361
Coase theorem, 16163 Cost effectiveness, 163
Coffee, 398, 442 Cost measurement, 18692
Cogtong Bay (Philippines), 47475 Costa Rica, 39495, 398
Colorado, 175 Criminal penalties, 24348
Columbia, 276, 370 Curitiba (Brazil), 47677
Command-and-control regulation, 257
See also regulation Deadweight social loss, 7879
Commodity exports, 39495 See also efficiency
Commodity prices, 34041 Decentralized markets, 41
Common good, 3031 Deep ecology, 2425
Common law, 73 Defensive behavior and investments, 18485,
Common-pool resources, 5, 5758, 89, 353
10613, 21216, 370, 393, 45362 Deforestation, 39597
See also natural resources Demand, 41, 4346
Common property, 72, 45462 and positive externalities, 6768
See also property rights curve, 4546
Communal living, 35 for regulation, 208
Community, 35, 32930, 332, 461, 471 individual consumer, 46
Competitive markets, 4143 market, 46
Compliance with environmental law, 24950 Dematerialization, 349
Compliance costs, 18688, 259 Demographic transition, 36669
See also benefit/cost analysis economic versus empowerment
Consequentialism, 25 explanations, 36869
See also ethics social security, 369
Conservation-based development, 32829 transition stages, 36667
Conservation easement, 68, 7172 Denmark, 218, 43536
Consumer preferences, choices, and Deontological ethics, 2325, 30
sustainable consumption, 44648 See also ethics
Consumer surplus, 52, 95 Department of Justice, 245
514 INDEX
Derby conditions in capture fisheries, 130, Economic diversification and local economic
13946 development, 471
Deregulation of energy markets, 9192 Economic gain from being out of
Deterrence, 23135 compliance, 232
Development as freedom, 369 Economic growth
Direct compliance costs, 18688 and dematerialization, 349
See also benefit/cost analysis and disproportionate consumption, 34349,
Discounting and discount rates, 93, 15758, 42627
37381 and energy consumption, 344
and benefit/cost analysis, 15758 and investment in cleaner, resource-
competitive financial markets, capitalism, efficient technology, 34344
and sustainability, 37981 and poverty alleviation, 34349
and climate change policy, 1306 and sustainable economic development,
and dynamic efficiency, 102 325, 392, 403, 407
and interest rates, 93, 375 relationship to economic development, 325
and the economics of tropical forestry Economic impact analysis, 46367
practices, 381 See also multiplier effect; sustainable
compatibility with sustainability, 102, economic development
37381 Economic rationality, 8, 233
effect of discounting on environmentally Economics, 5
friendly investments, 306, 37381 Economics of crime, 22931, 412
opportunity cost of capital (and of lending), Economics of deterrence, 23135
375, 37778 Economies of scale, 90, 340, 47172
and risk premia, 377 Ecosystem goods, 114
social rate of time preference, 37879 Ecosystem services, 3, 89, 11314, 16465,
growth discounting, 378 330
pure rate of time preference, 379 Education, 34951
time inconsistency of social policy, 381 and the empowerment of women, 34951
Distributive justice, 5859 and fertility rates, 350
See also ethics Efficiency, 52, 15657, 162
Dungeness crab fishery, 13940 and deadweight social loss, 78
DuPont, 21821 and markets, 52
Durable goods and negative externalities, 7579
extending the life of, 412 and resource allocation in markets, 5254
monopolist, 10405 dynamic, 4, 92102, 379
Dynamic efficiency, 92102, 379 Kaldor-Hicks, 2829, 157
See also discounting; efficiency; Pareto, 28, 52, 157
Hotellings rule Effluent taxes, 256
See also incentive regulation
Earth Charter, 32728, 426 Effort, 10710, 13739
See also United Nations Conference on See also fisheries management
Environment and Development Ehrlich/Simon wager, 117
Earth Summit, 327 Electronic waste (e-waste) recycling fee, 274
Eco-industrial park, 43536 Emergency Planning and Community Right-
Ecolabels, 364, 44043 to-Know Act of 1986, 10
Ecological economics, 4, 334 Emission trading and emissions reduction
Ecological footprint, 41415 credits, 27172
Ecological tax reform, 373, 443 See also allowance trading systems
See also incentive regulation Empowerment, 34952
Economic base industries, 46364 indigenous people, 352
Economic development, 325, 39198 land tenure, 35152
INDEX 515
Empowerment (continued) European Union, 275

microlending programs, 35455 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme,
multinational corporations, 352, 356 305
women, 34951 Excess demand, 52, 54
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 106 Excess supply, 51, 54
Endangered species protection, 30, 36465 Excludability, 107
Energy, 9092, 10102, 42935 Exhaustible natural resources, 362
See also natural resources Existence value, 17071
Energy intensity, 287 Expected penalty, 232
Enforcement, 230 Extended producer responsibility, 43840
California, 24748 See also incentive regulation
estimated compliance rates, 24950 External benefits, 67
incentive, 24142 See also externalities
federal, 24245 External costs, 69, 7375
role of citizen lawsuits, 250 See also externalities)
See also penalties and sanctions External debt, 39498
Environmental economics, 4 Externalities, 42, 5657, 6682, 37273,
Environmental justice, 15556, 265 45758
Environmental Kuznets curve, 34647 appropriation, 58, 10713, 454, 457
Environmental Leadership Program, 238 internalizing, 68, 75
Environmental management systems, 24041 negative (external costs), 56, 6970,
Environmental risk assessment 372
See quantitative risk assessment estimates of the external costs of
Environmental taxes and subsidies gasoline, 37273
domestic and worldwide, 27376, 443 network, 91
See also incentive regulation pecuniary, 69
EPA enforcement, 24245, 303 positive (external benefits), 56, 6669
Equilibrium, 54, 7678, 94, 9699 rule of capture, 141
Equilibrium price, 54, 7678, 9699 technological, 69, 45758
Equimarginal principle, 15960, 26365
Equity, 5859, 32324, 358 Fairness, 5859, 353
Ethics, 2230 Families, 351
categorical imperative, 2324 Fertility rates, 350, 36771
consequentialism, 25, 28 Finland, 301, 441
deep ecology, 2425 Fisheries, 10710, 12948, 45758
deontological, 2325, 30 See also natural resources
ecosophy, 24 Fishery management, 13946
hypothetical imperative, 2324 and economic efficiency, 138, 143
justice, 24, 39899 and fish processing industry structure and
land ethic, 24 performance, 14446
Rawlsian justice, 24 and open access, 10613
reciprocity norms, 332 community fishing quotas, 142, 45758
sustainability, 32425, 333 derby conditions, 130, 13946
teleological, 2526 effort quotas, 142, 146
tyranny of the majority, 26, 332 fishing capacity, 141
utilitarianism, 2629 fishing effort, 10710, 13739
net social utility, 2729 gear restrictions, 139
sum ranking, 2728 individual quotas, 14146
utility, 27, 4346 input controls, 139
welfarism, 27 local self-governance of inshore fishery
Ethiopia, 370, 39495 commons, 45758
516 INDEX
Fishery management (continued) Global climate change (continued)

Magnuson Fishery Management and carbon intensity of energy, 287
Conservation Act, 132 emissions trading, greenhouse gases,
New England Fishery Management 30405
Council, 132 energy intensity, 287
output controls, 139 evidence of anthropogenic climate change,
overcapitalization, 130, 14046 29699
Pacific Fishery Management Council, 132 global carbon cycle, 28486
seasonal restrictions, 139 global warming potential and atmospheric
technical measures, 139 lifetime, greenhouse gases, 284
total allowable catch, 13940 greenhouse gas emissions and global
trap certificates, 146 climate change, 28688
Five capitals of sustainability, 330 Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and
Fixed costs, 47, 19092, 219 Research, 29394
Flood Control Act of 1936, 154 international action regarding global
Florida, 146, 182 climate change, 299305
Food-shed and food-miles, 448 Earth Summit, 302
Food security, 345 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Foreign exchange, 394 Change (IPCC), 284, 28889, 291,
Forests and Forestry, 1213, 186, 442, 293
45859 Kyoto Protocol, 30305
Forest Stewardship Council, 442 United Nations Framework Convention
France, 304 on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
Free rider, 57, 162, 300 30203
Fuelwood, 45859 IPAT identity, 28687
joint implementation, 27273, 30405
Gains from trade, 53 Kaya identity, 287
and deadweight social loss, 78 policy and economic studies, 30512
gross gains from trade, 78 benefit/cost measurement and analysis,
true net gains from trade, 7879 307
Game theory, 12325 predictions regarding future global climate
dominant strategy, 124 change, 29096
Nash equilibrium, 12425 science, the greenhouse effect, 28384
payoff structure, 124 science, anthropogenic climate change,
prisoners dilemma and the common-pool 29096
resource dilemma, 12425 the developing world and global climate
strategic form game, 124 change, 303, 30405
ultimatum game, 32 Clean Development Mechanism,
Gasoline and external costs per gallon, 30405
37273 thermohaline conveyor, 290
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 362 trends and predictions, future greenhouse
See also international trade gas emissions, 28890
Genuine investment and genuine savings, 410 U.S. Global Climate Change Research
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), 41113 Program (USGCRP), 29495
Germany, 255, 30405, 371, 434, 439, 441 Globalization, 323, 359
Ghana, 395 Global warming
Gini coefficient, 352 See global climate change
Global climate change, 13, 283312 Gordon model of a common-pool resource,
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 10710
28385 See also natural resources
climate forcing, 286, 297 Government failure, 59, 204, 354
INDEX 517
Grameen bank, 35455 Incentive regulation

Green buildings, 44546 pollution taxes (continued)
Green GDP, 40910 pollution taxes distinguished from
Greenhouse effect, 28384 Pigouvian taxes, 81
Greenhouse gases, 13, 28384 product take-back programs, 255, 43840
constituent makeup of, 28384 property rights, 256
trends in emissions, 28890 See also allowance trading systems
Gross domestic product (GDP), 287, 407 Income inequality, 35253
shortcomings of GDP as a measure of Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare
well-being, 408 (ISEW), 41113
India, 293, 303, 345, 347, 43435
Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Indirect benefits, 18889
Research, 29394 Indirect costs, 18892
Harvest function (fisheries), 13639 See also benefit/cost analysis
Halocarbons, 163, 21721 Individual quotas, 130, 14146
Hawaii, 289 community fishing quota (CFQ), 142
Hazardous waste tax, 274 effort quota (EQ), 142, 146
Hedonic regression method, 18284 individual fishing quota (IFQ), 142
Homestead Act of 1862, 33 individual vessel quota (IVQ), 142
Hot spots (concentrated pollution), See also fishery management
26566 Indonesia, 293, 39495
Hotelling rent (also known as resource Industrial ecology, 43538
rent or scarcity rent), 5, 10713, 138, Industrial Revolution, 34042
14344, 359, 373, 40910 Inequality, 3334
Hotellings rule, 97101, 11516 Informal economy, 350
Housework value, 412 Infrastructure, 42728
Humboldt State University, 43536 Inputs, fixed and variable, 47
Hydroelectric power, 43031 Institutions, 31, 107, 20910, 349, 454
Hydrofluorocarbons, 284 Instrumental value, 25
Hydrogen fuel cells, 431 Interest groups, 20809, 211
Interest rates, 93
Iceland, 143, 145,, 441 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Imperfect information, 58 (IPCC), 284301
See also market failure International competitiveness, 360
Import substitution and buy local International Monetary Fund (IMF), 362,
campaigns, 471 39298
Incarceration, 23536 International Organization for
Incentive enforcement systems, 24142 Standardization (ISO), 44446
Incentive regulation, 25576 ISO 14001, 44445
compared to command-and-control International trade, 11, 35565
regulation, 25666 and environmental degradation, 360
deposit-return programs for cans and argument for free or liberalized trade, 35659
bottles, 255 argument against free or liberalized trade,
ecolabels, 44043 35965
environmental bonds, 256 capital mobility, 359, 365
environmental taxes and subsidies, 373, endangered species, 364
443 environmental regulation, 11
extended producer responsibility, 43840 gains from specialization and international
liability standards, 256 trade, 358
per-bag fees for garbage collection, 256 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
pollution taxes, 4, 81, 256 (GATT), 362
518 INDEX
International trade Leadership in Energy and Environmental

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Design (LEED) standards, 44546
(GATT) (continued) Liability standards, 256
Article XX, 362 See also incentive regulation
principle of multilateralism, 362 Liberal society, 33
principle of nondiscrimination, 362 Liberty, 35
Law of Comparative Advantage, 35859 Life cycle analysis, 43738
North-South, 359 Limits, 326,, 403
pollution havens, 1112, 192, 36061 Literacy, 34950
race to the bottom, 359 Locally self-governed common-property
self-sufficiency, 358 resources, 45462
toxic and hazardous materials, 361 Lorenz curve, 352
trade barriers and restrictions, 355,
36263 Macroeconomics, 407
World Trade Organization (WTO), 36265 Magnuson Fishery Management and
processing and production methods, 364 Conservation Act, 132
Intrinsic value, 2324, 30 Malthusian model, 115, 366, 36970
Invisible hand of the market, 41, 110, 216, Marginal abatement cost, 25965
454 Marginal analysis, 4748, 15960
Iowa, 275 Marginal benefit, 15859, 23031
IPAT identity, 28687 Marginal cost, 4749, 7475, 15859,
Ireland, 147 23031
Iroquois Confederation, 323 Marginal effort cost, 10810
Irreversibility, 404 Marginal external benefit, 6768
Irrigation, 45657 Marginal external cost, 7475
ISO14001 Marginal Hotelling rent, 101
See International Organization for Marginal net benefit, 15859
Standardization Marginal private cost, 7475
Marginal productivity, 4749
Japan, 148, 371, 434, 438, 45556 Marginal profit, 97101
Job loss and the environment, 12 Marginal revenue, 4749
Joint implementation, Kyoto Protocol, Marginal revenue product, 10810
27273, 30405 Marginal utility, 4344, 156
Marine capture fisheries, 12948
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion, 2829, See also natural resources
157 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 362
Kaya identity, 287 Market, 42
Kenya, 370 Market capitalism, 4142
Kyoto Protocol, 30305 Market demand
See also global climate change See demand
Market equilibrium, 5152, 54
Laissez faire, 59, 469 Market failure, 43, 5559
Land reform, 340 Market forces, 5152
Land tenure, 71, 35152 Market power, 42
Law of Demand, 45 Market supply
Law of Comparative Advantage, 35859 See supply
Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns, 47, Marketable pollution allowances, 25870
137 See also allowance trading systems;
Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, 43 incentive regulation
Law of Increasing Opportunity Cost, 9 Maximum sustainable yield (MSY), 89, 105,
Law of Supply, 497 10910, 130, 13339
INDEX 519
Maxxam, 380 Natural resources

Malaysia, 363 common-pool resources (continued)
Malawi, 395 history, 45262
Methane, 28384, 43132 Elinor Ostroms design principles for
Mexico, 276, 34041, 36263, 368, 39497 sustainable, locally self-governed
Michigan, 255 CPRs, 11113, 45962
Microcredit, 35455 political economy of CPR self-
See also empowerment governance, 21216
Millennium Development Goals, 401 tragedy of the commons, 58, 11013,
Millennium Summit and Declaration, 125, 45455
399401 fisheries, 10711, 12948, 45758
Mitigation, 403, 40506 aquaculture, 129, 14648
Monitoring, 23334, 243 bioeconomic model of a fishery, 13439
Monopoly, 55 marine capture fisheries, 10711,
Montreal Protocol on Substances That 12948
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 21621, 291, fossil-fuel energy resources, 90102, 115,
303 fugitive resources, 73, 10607
Morals, 23 future resource scarcity, 11416
See also ethics mineral resources, 90, 115, 117, 410
Most favored nation status, 362 nonrenewable resources, 4, 89106, 41012
Multinational corporations, 352, 355 recyclable resources, 10205
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, renewable resources, 4, 10513
105 solar power, 42930
Multiplier effect and economic impact Natural resource economics, 4, 88
analysis, 46567 Needs, 275
capture rate, 465 Negative externalities, 5657, 6970
economic base, 463 See also externalities
income injection, initial, 46365 Neoclassical economics, 41
indirect effects, 466 Nepal, 395
induced effects, 466 Net benefits, 15760, 162, 376
leakage and leakage rate, 464, 46667 Net primary product, 414
multiplier, 46667 Net social utility, 2729
primary effect, 466 Netherlands, 147, 305, 440
Nevada, 299
National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, New England, 132
106 New Mexico, 432
National Forest Management Act of 1976, New political economy, 203
106 and environmental regulation, 20412
Natural capital, 4, 114, 32930, 40206 and governance of common-pool resources,
Natural Gas Act of 1938, 90 21216
Natural resources and the political market for regulation,
common-pool resources, 4, 15, 5758, 89, 20710
10613, 45362 and the rational-choice framework, 205
and appropriation externalities and the requirements for a stable system of
See externalities regulation, 217
and the Gordon model, 10710 and the revolving-door for policymakers,
case studies of sustainable, locally self- 20607
governed CPRs, 45562 equilibrium quantity of effective support,
common property rights 20910
See property rights New Zealand, 143, 145
game-theoretic model, 12325 Nongovernmental organizations, 354
520 INDEX
Nonrenewable resources, 4, 89102, Penalties and sanctions, 112, 23136, 362

41012 California enforcement, 24748
See also natural resources compared to incarceration, 23536
Nontariff trade barrier, 362 compared to market-based reputational
Nonuse values, 17071 enforcement, 23638
Normative economics, 3536 compared to voluntary overcompliance
Norm, 36 programs, 23840
North Carolina, 181 summary of federally-sponsored
Northwest Forest Plan, 12, 29 voluntary overcompliance
Norway, 14748, 218, 301, 325, 441, 443 programs, 23840
conceptual theory, 23133
Ohio, 181 EPA/Department of Justice enforcement,
Oikonomia, 324 24247
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 172 role of citizen lawsuits, 250
Oil spill tax, 274 See also deterrence
Olsonian regulation, 216, 300 Peru, 133
Open access, 72, 455 Pesticide and fertilizer tax, 275
See also property rights Philippines, 293, 363, 395, 47475
Opportunity cost, 78, 21, 10001, 153, 180, Pigouvian taxes, 77, 7981
209, 230, 375, 37778 Policy stability, 259
Optimizing behavior, 8 Political economy, 20321
Option value, 171 See also new political economy
Oregon, 17576, 178, 181, 255 Political market for regulation, 20710
Organic Act of 1897, 105 Pollution abatement and control
Organic (or fair trade or shade-grown) coffee, expenditures, 187
442 See also benefit/cost analysis
Organic food, 44243 Polluter-pays principle, 373
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Pollution credits, 258
Development, 275 Pollution haven, 1112, 192, 36061
Organization of Petroleum Exporting effect, 1112, 360
Countries (OPEC), 88, 90, 101, 430 hypothesis, 1112, 360
Overcapitalization in capture fisheries, 130, Pollution taxes, 4, 81, 256
14046 See also environmental taxes; incentive
Ownership, 71 regulation; Pigouvian taxes
See also property rights Population and population growth, 36571
Ozone depletion, 21621 and the agrarian transition, 34142
appropriation of habitat and biomass,
Pacific Lumber Company, 380 370
Pakistan, 293, 363 Boserup hypothesis, 370
Panchayat community forests (India), declining fertility rates, 350
45859 Malthusian model, 366, 36970
Paraguay, 395, 397 demographic transition, 36669
Pareto efficiency, 28, 52, 157 population forecasts, 36971
See also efficiency urbanization, 34142
Partners for the Environment, 238 Porter hypothesis, 189
Passive-use value Positive economics, 36
See nonuse value Positive externalities, 56, 6669
Patent race, 211 See also externalities
Path dependence, 340, 427 Poverty, 34243, 361
Pattern of trade, 26162, 360 Present value (PV), 9394, 15758, 306,
Peak oil, 102 37577
INDEX 521
Price system, 54 Quantitative risk assessment (continued)

and information, 54, 94, 115 National Center for Environmental
Primary resources, 104 Assessment (NCEA), 166
Prisoners dilemma game, 12325 risk characterization, 166
Private benefits, 67 value of a statistical life, 16870
Private costs, 69, 7375 Quantity demanded, 4546, 5152
Private property, 3235, 72, 111, 394, 455 Quantity supplied, 4952
See also property rights Quotas, 258
Privatization, 111, 116 See also individual quotas; fishery
Probability of detection, 232 management
Processing industry structure and
performance, 14446 Rate of return on capital, 377
Producer surplus, 53, 95 Rationality
Product stewardship, 439 See economic rationality
Production possibilities frontier, 89 Recyclable Resources, 10205, 440
Productivity, 47, 378 See also natural resources
Profit, 64 Regional Clean Air Incentive Market, 273
Profit maximization, 4749, 6465 See also allowance trading systems
Property rights, 3235, 7073, 129, 16163, Regulation
356 capture theory, 206
access rights, 7071 command-and-control, 257
alienation rights, 71 costs, 18688
and international trade, 356, 35960 demand for, 20810
and land tenure, 71 design of, and cost of compliance, 18990
and public trust doctrine, 71 enforcement and compliance, 22950
and treaties with American Indian tribes, 71 impacts on market structure, 19091
claimants, 71 incentive, 25576
Coase theorem, 16163 Olsonian and Stiglerian regulation, 21617,
common property, 72, 129, 45462 300
exclusion rights, 71, 129 political economy, 20512
intellectual, 263 public utilities, 9091
management rights, 71, 129 requirements for a stable system of
open access, 72, 10613 regulation, 217
origins, 72 supply of, 20910
ownership, 71 Regulator incentives, 20506, 209
private property, 3235, 72, 111, 394, 455 Relative prices, 357
proprietors, 71 Religion, 31, 33
protection under the common law, 73 Remittances, 34142
state property, 72, 129 Renewable Energy Credits, 270
usufructuary rights, 71 Renewable Portfolio Standard, 27071, 436
water rights, 71 Renewable resources, 10513
withdrawal rights, 71 See also natural resources
Public choice theory, 20506 Rent dissipation, 10913, 13839
Public goods, 5758, 107 Replacement cost, 186
Public utilities, 9091 Reputations and reputational enforcement,
23637
Quantitative risk assessment, 16670 Research and development (R&D), 211, 312,
and the Clean Air Act, 16768 44344
dose-response relationship, 166 Resilience, 413
exposure assessment, 166 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 244
hazard identification, 166 Resource Planning Act of 1974, 106
522 INDEX
Resource rent Somalia, 361

See Hotelling rent South Africa, 47576
Resources land, labor, capital, 8, 35657 South Coast Air Quality Management
See also natural resources District, 265, 273
Risk aversion, 232 South Korea, 368, 438
Risk neutrality, 232 Spain, 43435
Risk preference, 232 Specialization and trade, 35557
Rivalry in consumption, 107 Sri Lanka, 293
Rocky Mountain Institute, 42728, 468 Standards
Rocky Mountains, 295 performance-based, 257, 260
Rule of capture, 141 technology-based, 257
Russia, 30103 Status quo, 2829
Stiglerian regulation, 217
Safe Drinking Water Act, 16364 Strong sustainability, 402, 40405
Sanctions, 112, 22950 Structural adjustment programs and loans,
Scale economies 39598
See economies of scale See also sustainable development
Scarcity, 5, 21, 11416 Subsidies, 68, 79, 217, 256, 312, 37273
Scarcity rent See also incentive regulation
See Hotelling rent Substitutes and substitutability, 117, 217,
Scotland, 147, 415 324, 345, 378, 40206
Secondary market, 10405 Subtractability, 107
Service and flow economy, 349 Supply, 41, 4751
Scrubbers, 259 and negative externalities, 7579
Self-interest, 22, 3032, 454 derived from marginal cost in competitive
Self-regulation, 212 markets, 4750
Sellers, 47 deriving market supply from the supply
Short run, 47 curves of individual firms, 50
Sink capacity, 89 of regulation, 20910
SmartWood, 442 private-cost supply, 7576
Smokestack chasing, 468 social-cost supply, 7576
Smuggling, 22021 Surplus, 51, 53, 94101
Social benefits, 6769 excess supply, 51
Social capital, 31, 113, 32932, 355, 402, total (gains from trade), 53, 94101
405, 409, 471 Sustainability, 32334
Social cost, 7375 political feasibility, 37374
Social deprivation, 342 Sustainable consumption, 44648
Social justice, 401 Sustainable local economic development,
Social order, 3031 46277
Social rate of time preference, 37879 case studies, 47277
See also discounting economic base industries, 46364
Social utility function, 27 model of a local economy, 46372
See also ethics smokestack (or microchip) chasing, 468
Socialism, 4142, 54 import-substitution theory of local
Solar power, 42930 economic development, 47071
dish-engine systems, 43233 selected economic instruments, 473
photovoltaics, 434 strategies for more sustainable local
solar ovens, 43334 economic development, 46872
See also biomass; hydroelectric power; transportation-oriented development, 470
hydrogen fuel cells; methane; wave Sustainable development, 16, 32528,
power; wind 398417
INDEX 523
Sustainable development (continued) Sustainable self-governance of local

Agenda 21 principles of sustainable common-pool resources, 111
development, 398, 42627 Sustainable society, 32325
Brundtland Commission report, 32526 Sweden, 218, 301, 304, 346, 430, 43841,
case studies, 41517 443
Scotland, 415 Switzerland, 112, 45556
United States, 41617
sub-Saharan Africa, 412, 417 Take-back programs, 255
compared to conventional economic See also incentive regulation
development, 325, 392402 Taxes, 37173, 443
compared to economic growth, 325, Technological change, 11516, 370
40713 Technology spillovers, 6869
competing theories, 40205 Technology transfer and diffusion, 31112,
strong sustainability theory, 402, 428
40405 Teleological ethics, 2526
weak sustainability theory, 40203 See also ethics
deforestation rates and structural Thailand, 165, 293, 350, 363
adjustment, 39597 Three fundamental economic questions, 36
ecological footprint, 41415 Three pillars of sustainability, 32933
envisioning sustainable development, 325, Threshold effects, 336
398402 Throughput, 34849
genuine investment, 410 Timber harvest regulatory costs, 186
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), 41113 Time inconsistency of social policy, 381
genuine savings, 410 Trbel (Switzerland), 45556
green GDP, 409 Total allowable catch (TAC), 13940
Hartwick rule, 403, 409 Total net benefit, 15860, 231
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare Total surplus, 53, 94101
(ISEW), 41113 Toxic Release Inventory, 10, 212
indicators and measurement methods, Tragedy of the commons, 58, 11013, 125,
40615 45455
strong sustainability measures, 41315 Transaction costs, 4243, 162, 266, 332, 357
weak sustainability measures, 40813 and the Coase theorem, 162
International Monetary Fund, 39298 and the trading of allowances or Emissions
Net primary product, 414 Reduction Credits, 266, 272
practical policy considerations, 40506 Transferable development rights (TDRs), 273
safe minimum standard, 406 Transportation-oriented development, 470
severely indebted low-income countries, Trap certificate programs, 146
396 Travel cost method, 17882
structural adjustment programs and loans, Trip cost, 180
39598 Tyranny of the majority, 26, 332
substitutability of constructed and human See also ethics
capital for natural capital, 324,
40206 Uncertainty, 404
Wapenhans Report (World Bank Portfolio Underground economy, 394
Management Task Force), 393 Uniformly mixed versus concentrated
World Bank, 312, 39298 pollution, and localized hot spots, 265
See also precautionary principle United Kingdom, 304
Sustainable energy resources, technologies, United Nations Commission on Sustainable
and processes, 42935 Development, 441
Sustainable forestry, 442 United Nations Conference on Environment
Sustainable production, 42627 and Development, 327, 426
524 INDEX
United Nations Conference on Environment Voluntary simplicity and simple living, 447
and Development (continued) Voting rules, 21213
Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (Earth Charter), 327, Wage premium, 16869
39899, 426 Wapenhans Report (World Bank Portfolio
United Nations Conference on the Human Management Task Force), 393
Environment, 325 War, 350, 361
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Washington (state), 17476, 181, 27374
Sea, 141 Washington Consensus, 394
United Nations Framework Convention on Waste equals food, 435
Climate Change (UNFCCC), 30203 Water rights
United States Department of Agriculture See property rights
Organic Standards, 443 Wave energy and ocean tides, 432
United States Forest Service, 10506 Weak sustainability, 40203
contribution to GDP by type of activity, Wealth, 358, 462
106 Welfare, 53
Urban migration, 34142 Well-functioning competitive market, 4143,
Use value, 170 75
Usufructuary rights, 71 Wilderness Act of 1964, 106
See also property rights Willingness to accept, 17677
Utilitarianism, 2629 Willingness to pay, 45, 52, 173, 17677
See also ethics Wind power, 43435
Utility, 27, 4345, 154, 378 Women, empowerment and sustainability
See also ethics empowerment, education, and literacy, 349
52
Value in exchange, 324 role in agriculture, 35152
Value in use, 324 World Bank, 312, 39298
Value of a statistical life, 16870 World Commission on Environment and
Value systems, 23 Development (Brundtland Commission),
Vegetarian diet and sustainable consumption, 32527, 395, 398
448 World Summit for Social Development, 328
Venezuela, 363 World Trade Organization, 36264
Vermont, 274 See also international trade
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 218 Yurok system of property rights, 112, 454
Vietnam, 293
Voluntary overcompliance, 23840 Zimbabwe, 433
About the Author
Steve Hackett is professor of economics at Humboldt State University in

Arcata, California. Before coming to Humboldt, Hackett was an assistant
professor and member of the graduate faculty at Indiana University in
Bloomington. He has published in a variety of different scholarly journals,
including Journal of Law and Economics; Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization;
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Economic Inquiry; Ma-
rine Resource Economics; Japan and the World Economy; Journal of Theo-
retical Politics; California Agriculture; and California Cooperative Oceanic
Fisheries Investigations Reports. His research has been supported by grants
from the National Science Foundation and the California Sea Grant College
Program.

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Environmental

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hackett, Steven C., 1960

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of

List of Tables and Figures xvii

Part I. Theory and Fundamentals 1

1. Introduction to Environmental and Natural

2. Value Systems and Economic Systems 21

Rousseau and the Civil Society 33

3. The Economics of Market Allocation 41

4. Externalities, Market Failures, and Policy Interventions 66

Pigouvian Taxes: The Theory of Policy Interventions for

5. The Economics of Natural Resource Systems

Part II. Policy 127

6. The Economics of Natural Resource Systems,

Review Questions and Problems 149

7. Measurement and Analysis of Benefits and Costs 153

8. The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and

Economic Models of Political Economy and the Regulatory

Marketable Pollution Allowances 258

11. Global Climate Change: Science, Policy, and Economics 283

Sustainable Development 325

13. Recognizing Interdependencies and Thinking Long Term 339

14. Sustainable Economic Development 391

Envisioning Sustainable Development: The Brundtland

15. Issues in Sustainable Production and Consumption 426

16. Issues in the Economics of Sustainable Local Communities 453

Examples of Sustainable Local Communities and the Systems

10.4 Hypothetical Industrywide Cost of Cutting Emissions by

1.1 Production Possibilities Frontier 9

6.2 Bioeconomic Equilibria with H = FMAX 136

This textbook provides an accessible yet rigorous treatment of environmental

have a prior background in economics. If this book is to be used in an upper-

of this textbook. My colleagues Dan Ihara, Michal Moore, Yo Nagai, and

Many people approach economics with a preconceived notion of what eco-

A candy bar offered to a classroom full of hungry students.

In each of the cases given above, there is a choice problem necessitated

Much of government policy making involves the ranking of alternatives.

Figure 1.1 Production Possibilities Frontier

Point A: Attainable but inefficient

the moral, ethical, and spiritual implications of a particular allocation prob-

Some Reasons for Optimism and Some Reasons for Concern

Reasons for Optimism

Many factors can influence the stability of forest-based communities. . . .

In contrast, the regions urban centers have experienced dramatic growth

Reasons for Concern

that are required for a well-functioning competitive market. This discussion

Environmental economics focuses attention on pollution problems and

have generated substantial improvements in air quality in the United

Review Questions and Problems

1. You are an investigative reporter covering the issue of a trade-off be-

a. a brief overview and description of the concept of a jobs versus

2. Price is a simple indicator of value for things traded in markets. Yet if

a. Think of some specific indicators of the monetary value of a wilder-

3. Classroom debate activity: Debate consists of reasoned arguments

a. The first affirmative panelist presents the affirmative case (6 minutes).

Economic Report of the President (http://w3.access.gpo.gov/eop/): Ex-

Environmental Protection Agencys National Center for Environmental