Speedy Trial
Speedy Trial
Speedy Trial
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. xxxxxxx A balancing test of
applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, Four (4) factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x. Closely related to the
length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights
should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. xxxx
(Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312-
313).
Relative thereto, the Supreme Court has clarified that in determining the right
of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55)
the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations
in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat,
resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and
powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to
assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In the case of Tan vs. People, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and
the petitioners failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled
the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing
to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary
hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to
have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto. For the reasons above-stated, there is
clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating
petitioners right to speedy trial (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, 3rd
Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).