SUBJECT: ISPL

Project topic:
Interpretation of statutes affecting
jurisdiction of courts

Submitted By
Gunjan KUMAR
Roll no. 1212
4 Year, B.b.A.LL.B(Hons.)
TH

Submitted to
dr. ali mohammad
Faculty of ispl

Chanakya national Law University, Patna

April, 2017
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a project is one of the most significant academic challenges, I have ever faced.
Though this project has been presented by me but there are many people who remained in
veil, who gave their all support and helped me to complete this project.

First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher Dr. Ali Mohammad without the kind
support of whom and help the completion of the project was a herculean task for me. He
donated his valuable time from his busy schedule to help me to complete this project and
suggested me from where and how to collect data.

I am very thankful to the librarian who provided me several books on this topic which proved
beneficial in completing this project.

I acknowledge my friends who gave their valuable and meticulous advice which was very
useful and could not be ignored in writing the project. I want to convey most sincere thanks
to my friends, for helping me throughout the project.

Last but not the least, I am very much thankful to my parents and family, who always stand
aside me and helped me a lot in accessing all sorts of resources.

I thank all of them !

Gunjan Kumar

2
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sl No. Name of the Topic Page no.s

CHAPTER-1 INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTE....................05-06

CHAPTER-2 GENERAL PRINICIPLES OF INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTES AFFECTING JURISDICTION OF COURT...............07-10

CHAPTER-3 THE EXTENT OF EXCLUSION...............................11-12

CHAPTER -4 CASE LAWS. ...13-14

CHAPTER-5 CONCLUSION & SUGGESTION ....................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........16

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: -

In this project, the researcher has relied on the Doctrinal Method, which is primarily based
upon books, journals, news, articles etc.. A comprehensive study is made in order to arrive at
analytical & critical support of the arguments. The segments are structured and written
actively. The writing style is descriptive as well as analytical. This project has been done
after a thorough research based upon intrinsic and extrinsic aspect of the assigned topi

HYPOTHESIS:-
The hypothesis made by the researcher before doing the researcher work is that the
interpretation of statutes provides a methodology for the particular interpretation so that
uniformity in the judgements can be made. The mode of interpretation must change from
statute to statute. Here statute to statute means particular category of statute. So there must be
some general principles of interpretation of statutes affecting jurisdiction of the court

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:-

The research methodology on which the researcher has relied upon is the doctrinal mode of
research which includes books, articles and other materials available on the internet.

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY:-

The researcher has limitation that he cannot go for the non-doctrinal mode of research
methodology and also that there is a limited period of time available to complete the research
work which restricts the scope of research.

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 CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

To ensure that justice is made available to all, the judicial system has been evolved in all
nations. It is extremely important and infact necessary also that the Courts interpret the
law in such a manner that ensures access to justice to the maximum. For this purpose,
the concept of Canons of Interpretation has been expounded. The Canons are those
rules that have been evolved by the Judiciary to help Courts determine the meaning and
the intent of legislation. SALMOND has defined it as the process by which the Court
seeks to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative
forms in which it is expressed.1

As far as need for interpretation is concerned, in his The Law-Making Process, Michael
Zander gives three reasons why statutory interpretation is necessary:

1. Complexity of statutes in regards to the nature of the subject, numerous draftsmen and
the blend of legal and technical language can result in incoherence, vague and ambiguous
language.

2. Anticipation of future events leads to the use of indeterminate terms. The impossible
task of anticipating every possible scenario also leads to the use of indeterminate
language. Judges therefore have to interpret statutes because of the gaps in law. Examples
of inderterminate language include words such as reasonable. In this case the courts are
responsible for determining what constitutes the word reasonable.

3. The multifaceted nature of language. Language, words and phrases are an imprecise
form of communication. Words can have multiple definitions and meanings. Each party
in court will utilize the definition and meaning of the language most advantageous to
their particular need. It is up to the courts to decide the most correct use of the language
employed.

So, for the interpretation of statutes, there are some fixed principles which has to be
applied by the courts depending upon the facts of the case that to which interpretation is

1http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/interpretation-of-statutes-1152-1.html assessed on
09th October,2017 at 17:22 hrs

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 to be applied. Some of the few general rues of interpretation which are important are
Internal Aids to Interpretation, External Aids to Interpretation, Literal Rule, Golden Rule,
Mischief Rule, Subsidiary Rules, Harmonious Construction etc. Among these rules,
there are primary as well as secondary rule of interpretation. The primary rule of
interpretation includes Rule of Literal Interpretation, Rule of Reasonable Construction,
Rule of Harmonious Construction, Heydons Rule or Mischief Rule, Rule of Exceptional
Construction and Rule of Ejusdem Generis.2 The secondary rule of interpretation
includes Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissinia in lege and Noscitur a Sociis.

If the history of it has to be traced, statutory interpretation first became significant in

common law systems, of which England is the exemplar. In Roman and Civil law, a
statute (or code) guides the magistrate, but there is no judicial precedent. In England,
Parliament historically failed to enact a comprehensive code of legislation, which is why
it was left to the courts to develop the common law; and having decided a case and given
reasons for the decision, the decision would become binding on later courts.

Judges can interpret more than one meaning for the same word and that the meaning of
the word can change depending on the context. Statutory interpretation is important so
that they are unable to make their own judgment in cases. If they stumble upon any
problem they cannot change the law. In allows Parliament to be the law making body and
court will then apply the law.3 So there, statutory interpretation plays an essential role in
the process of access to justice and cannot be overlooked. It is easy to see that when
judges use statutory interpretation it may be considered a skill of language rather than a
law. The uses of traditional rules of interpretation are applied basis on the ambiguity of
the legislation and tend to somewhat cancel of each other.

Using rules of languages and, internal and external material helps interpret the law and
also how the system such work. Statutory interpretation is important to the access to
justice because it helps the judiciary system implement the law in an efficiency and
effective way and helps the Parliament to make the law.

2Class notes
3https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/the-interpretation-of-statute-
constitutional-law-essay.php assessed on 09th October, 2017 at 17:44 hrs

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 CHAPTER-2

GENERAL PRINICIPLES OF INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTES AFFECTING JURISDICTION OF COURT

As discussed earlier, the interpretation of different statutes governs on different principles.

So, as far as the interpretation of statutes affecting jurisdiction of court, it is also based upon
few general principles. General principles regarding statutes affecting jurisdiction of courts
will be discussed under three sub-headings:

(a) Exclusion must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied

(b) Three classes of cases

(c) Cases of breach of statutory duty

(d) Omission to exercise statutory power.

(a) Exclusion must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied

The provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and provisions conferring jurisdiction on
authorities other than civil courts are strictly construed. There is a strong presumption that
civil courts have jurisdiction to decide all questions of civil nature. Therefore, the exclusion
of jurisdiction of civil courts is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must either be
explicitly expresses or clearly implied. For a court which would otherwise have jurisdiction
in respect of the subject-matter concerned, ouster cannot be implied. Ouster must be express.4

The existence of jurisdiction in civil courts to decide questions of civil nature is the general
rule and exclusion is an exception of this rule. Therefore, the burden of proof to show that
jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party who raises such a contention.
The civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and people have a right, unless expressly or
impliedly barred, to insist for free access to the courts of general jurisdiction of the state. On
this basis only the rule is made that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts is not to be readily
inferred. Criminal courts are also courts of general jurisdiction and exclusion of jurisdiction
of ordinary criminal courts can be brought about by setting up courts of limited jurisdiction in
respect of the limited field, but only if the vesting and the exercise of that limited jurisdiction
is clear and operative and there is adequate machinery for the exercise of limited jurisdiction.

4 Bhatia International v. Bulk trading Air 2002 SC 1432

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It has been held that like other rules of construction the rule against exclusion of jurisdiction
of courts is attracted only where two or more reasonably possible construction are open on
the language of the statute and not where the legislative intent is plain and manifest to oust
the jurisdiction.5

Three classes of cases

The legislature being, however, competent to curtail the jurisdiction of civil courts, and to
confer the same on any other tribunal or authority, it is only a question of construction of a
particular statute whether the same by express words or by necessary implication excludes
the jurisdiction of civil courts. The nature of the rights and liabilities dealt with by the statute
and the remedies provided thereunder, may, in case of doubt, be taken into account for
determining as to how far the jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded. There are three classes
of cases in which a liability might be established, founded upon statute. One is where there
was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives
a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common
law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication
exclude the common law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the
statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely,
but provides no particular form of remedy; there, the party can only proceed by action at
common law but there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is
created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for
enforcing it- The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to
the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.

With respect to second of the three classes of cases mentioned by Justice Willes, there is
normally no difficulty. A statute falling in this category prescribes no special remedy and
whether it creates new rights and liabilities or regulates the already existing ones, the normal
remedy through the medium of civil courts, which are courts of general jurisdiction remains
always open.

With respect to first and third of the classes of cases mentioned by Justice Wiles ,it has to be
ascertained whether the statute in question deals with and regulates an already existing right
or liability, or whether it creates a new right or liability which has no existence apart from the

5 Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu, AIR 1993 SC 412

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statute. If the statute is of the former category, the special remedy provided therein, subject to
any provision for the exclusion of ordinary remedy, will only be construed as an alternative
one; whereas if the statute is of the latter category, the remedy will be construed as exclusive
even though the statute makes no express provision for exclusion of ordinary remedy. The
mere fact, therefore, that a statute provides for certain remedies, does not by itself necessarily
exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts, but where a new right or liability is created by as
statute which gives a special remedy enforcing it, the ordinary remedy of approaching the
civil courts is impliedly excluded. It is not, however, correct to say that the legislature takes
away civil courts jurisdiction only when a new right is created by statute, and a tribunal is set
up for determination of that right, for by use of appropriate words jurisdiction may be
excluded in other cases also6.

Cases of breach of statutory duty

Whether a statutory duty gives rise to a private law cause of action is a question of
construction of the relevant statute. There is no universal rule by reference to which the
question of maintainability of a civil action can infallibly be answered. A number of
indicators to solve the question can, however, be deduced from the decided cases. Let us see
some of them. In Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges7,Lord Tenterden said that when an
act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be
a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. If an obligation is
created but no mode of enforcing its performance is ordained, the common law may, in
general find a mode suited to the particular nature of the case. It was even approved in the
case of Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council8. Even the provision of a penalty,
for breach of a statutory duty, of fine or imprisonment contained in a statute creating the duty,
may be regarded as the only manner of enforcing the duty. In Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium
Ltd.9 where house of lords held that the statutory duty is enforceable only by recourse to the
criminal proceeding provided under the act and not be a civil action. So, the house of lords
again accepted the principle of lord Tenterdens dictum in Doe d. Rochesters case. Also,
there are many other case laws which has been provided to improve the clarity on the
concept.

6 Akbar Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 70

7 109 ER 1001, p. 1006
8 All ER Rep 191 (HL)
9 1949 AC 398 (HL.)

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Omission to exercise statutory power

It has been seen that whether a statutory duty gives rise to a private law cause of action is a
question of construction of the relevant statute. Similarly, the question whether omission to
exercise a statutory power gives rise to a private law cause of action is also one of
construction of the statute concerned as it requires discerning the policy of the statute whether
it confers a right to compensation on persons who suffer loss as a result of non-exercise of
the power. Subject to exceptional cases, the normal rule is that an omission by a public
authority to exercise a statutory power conferred for the benefit of public does not give rise to
breach of duty sounding in damage. The House of Lords gave preconditions in the case of
Stovin v. wise10 for basing a duty of care upon the existence of statutory power in respect of
an omission to exercise the power, if it could be done at all. Those preconditions are :-

i. that in the circumstances it would have been irrational for the authority not to have
exercised the power, so that in effect there was a public duty to act and

ii. that there were exceptional grounds to hold that the policy of the statute conferred a right
to compensation on persons who suffered loss if the power was not exercised.

The above preconditions, laid down for holding a public authority liable in private law for
omission to exercise a statutory power were accepted by the supreme court in the case of
Union of India v. United India Insurance co. Ltd.11

10 1996 AC 923
11 AIR 1998 SC 640

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 CHAPTER-3

THE EXTENT OF EXCLUSION

For the exclusion, there are factors which enable it, without which the exclusion wont be
possible. First of all, there must be construction of exclusionary clauses. The absence of a
provision to enable an authority or tribunal for holding an inquiry on a particular question is
indicative that jurisdiction of civil courts on that question is not excluded. It has been held
that the very provision setting up hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of a
question is sufficient in most cases for inferring that the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try
the same matter is barred.12 It has been held in a case that when jurisdiction of civil courts on
a particular matter is excluded by transferring that jurisdiction from civil courts to tribunals or
authorities, it is presumed that such tribunals or authorities can draw upon that principles of
procedure in civil procedure code, though not expressly made applicable, to ensure fair
procedure and just decision unless such principles are inconsistent with the provisions of the
act constituting them In cases where jurisdiction is excluded by use of prima facie
comprehensive language, it is open to civil courts which are courts of general jurisdiction to
decide whether a court, or tribunal or authority having limited jurisdiction has acted in excess
of its courts is excluded, neither consent of the parties nor an order of the special tribunal
which has jurisdiction to decide those matters, can confer jurisdiction on the civil courts.
Then come the cases of Nullity. A question is often asked that when can order passed by a
tribunal or authority of limited jurisdiction be held to be nullity? The answer is supplied by
the original or pure theory of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a tribunal is determinable at the
commencement of a proceeding and if jurisdiction is properly assumed any order pssed
thereafter will be within jurisdiction and conclusive though it may be erroneous in fact or
law. The pure theory of jurisdiction gave place to modern theory of jurisdiction according to
which defects of jurisdiction can arise even during or at the conclusion of a proceeding. The
courts make a distinction between jurisdictional questions of fact or law and questions of fact
or law which are not jurisdictional. If a question of fact or law is jurisdictional, the tribunal
though competent to inquire into that question cannot decide it conclusively, and a wrong
determination of such a question results in making the final decision in excess of jurisdiction.
But if a question of fact or law is non-jurisdictional, the tribunal/s decision is final and

12 Desika Charyulu v. State of APAIR 1964 SC 806

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conclusive. In other words, it can be said that a tribunal cannot by a wrong determination of a
jurisdictional question of fact or law exercise a power which the legislature did not confer
upon it. However, in this theory the demarcation between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
questions of fact or law is not clear which has been made by the juridicxary thorugh it
pronouncements in case laws. Then come, the rule of conclusive evidence. By enacting rules
of conclusive evidence or conclusive proof, the legislature may make certain matters non-
justiciable. For example, if by legislative command proof of A is made conclusive evidence
or conclusive proof of B, the moment existence of A is established the court is bound to
regard the existence of B as conclusively established and evidence cannot be let in to show
the non-existence of B. In effect the existence or non-existence of B after proof of A ceases to
be justiciable.13

The Supreme Court has laid down the test for determining whether a rule of irrebutable
presumption is a rule of evidence or a rule of substance law in the case Izhar Ahmed v. Union
of India14. Justice Gajendragadkar, was the judge in this case. It was said that the effect of a
conclusive evidence clause is subject at least to two qualifications:

I) A conclusive evidence clause may be held to be invalid as an unreasonable restriction of

fundamental rights.

II) The insertion of such clauses in statutes conferring power may fail to shut out basic defect
of jurisdiction in exercise of the power. It may also be ineffective to bar an attack on the
ground of fraud or colourable exercise of power.

13 Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State AIR 1957 SC 521

14 AIR 1962 SC 1052

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 CHAPTER-4

CASE LAWS

Izhar Ahmed v. Union of India15

Here, the question was whether r 3 of the Citizenship Rules 1956 framed by the central
government under section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 was valid or not. Section 9(2) of
the Act authorises the Central Government to prescribe rules of evidence and Rule 3 framed
thereunder reads: The fact that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from
the government of any other country shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily
acquired citizenship of the country before that date. This rule was held to be rule of evidence
and, therefore, valid. Gajendragadkar, J, observed:
In deciding the question as to whether a rule about irrebutable presumption is a rule of
evidence or not, it seems to us that the proper approach to adopt would be to consider
whether fact A from the proof of which a presumption is required to be drawn about the
existence of fact B is inherently relevant in the matter of proving fact B and has inherently
any probative or persuasive value in that behalf or not. If fact A is inherently relevant in
proving the existence of fact B and to any rational mind it would bear probative or persuasive
value in the matter of proving the existence of fact B then a rule prescribing eithera rebuttable
or irrebutable presumption in that behalf would be rule of evidence. On the other hand, if fact
A is inherently not relevant in proving the existence of fact B or has no probative value in
that behalf and yet a rule is made prescribing for a rebuttable or an irrebuttable presumption
in that connection that rule would be a rule of substantive law and not a rule of evidence. The
effect of a conclusive evidence clause is subject at least to two qualifications:

I) A conclusive evidence clause may be held to be invalid as an unreasonable restriction of

fundamental rights.

II) The insertion of such clauses in statutes conferring power may fail to shut out basic defect
of jurisdiction in exercise of the power. It may also be ineffective to bar an attack on the
ground of fraud or colourable exercise of power.

In Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges16,Lord Tenterden said that when an act creates an
obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule

15 Supra Note 14

13
that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. If an obligation is created but no
mode of enforcing its performance is ordained, the common law may, in general find a mode
suited to the particular nature of the case. It was even approved in the case of Pasmore v.
Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council17.

Black v. Fire Coal Co.Ltd.18

In this case, the coal mines regulation Act 1887 imposed on the mine owners the duty to
make due provision for safety of worker in the mines. Lord Kinnear here observed that there
is no reasonable ground for maintaining that a proceeding by way of penalty is the only
remedy by the statute. We are to consider the scope and purpose of the statute and in
particular for whose benefit it is intended. Now the object of present statute in plain. It was
intended to compel mine owners to make due provision for the safety of the men working in
their mines and the persons, for whose benefit all these rules are to be enforced, are the
persons exposed to danger. But when a duty of this kind is imposed for the benefit of
particular person, there arises at common law a correlative right in those persons who may be
injured by its contravention. Therefore, it is quite impossible to hold that penalty clause
detracts in any way from the prima facie right of persons for whose benefit the statutory
enactment has been passed to enforce the civil liability.

Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu19

In this case, it has been held that even a provision in the constitution conferring finality to the
decision of an authority is not construed as completely excluding judicial review inder
articles 136, 226 and 227 of the constitution but limiting it to jurisdictional errors viz,
infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with
rules of natural justice and perversity.

In Raj Krushna Bose v. Vinod kanungo20, it was held by the supreme court that if the
legislature states that the decision or order of a court or tribunal shall be final and conclusive,
the remedies available under the constitution remain unfeterred.

16 109 ER 1001, p. 1006

17 All ER Rep 191 (HL)
18 1912 AC 149 (HL)
19 AIR 1993 SC 412
20 AIR 1954 SC 202

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 CHAPTER-5

CONCLUSION & SUGGESTION

After doing the research work, the researcher would like to conclude that the hypothesis
made by the researcher stands in affirmative as for the interpretation of the statutes affecting
jurisdiction of the court, there are few principles for such interpretation which is different for
the interpretation required for some other forms. Like here the general principles are there
which are as discussed above are exclusion must be explicit either expressly or impliedly,
then there are three classes of cases, then in cases of breach of statutory duties and the
omission to exercise statutory power. The also, the extent of exclusion is there that tells that
up to what extent the jurisdiction of the courts will be excluded under which there are rules
also. It says that there must be construction of exclusionary clauses, then in the cases of
nullity what happens and the rule of conclusive evidence. So the hypothesis of the researcher
stands positive in this case.

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 BIOBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Singh Avtar, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, Lexis Nexis, 3rd Edition, 2009
Singh G.P., Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Lexis Nexis, 13th Edition, 2012
Bindra N.S., Interpretation of Statutes, Lexis Nexis, 12th Edition, 2017
Sarathi P. Vepa, Interpretation of Statutes, Eastern Book Company, 5th Edition, 2010

OFFICIAL WEBSITES

http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Interpretation-of-Statute-5430.asp
http://hanumant.com/index.php/academics/law-notes/14-interpretation-of-
statutes.html
https://www.lawteacher.net/lecture-notes/statutory-interpretation.php

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