PEOPLE VS ROSIALDA

This is an appeal from the February 17, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 02968, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated April 27, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 164 in Pasig City, finding accused-appellant Rogelio Rosialda guilty of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002. The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to life imprisonment and imposed upon him a fine
of PhP 500,000, with the accessory penalties provided under Sec. 35 of RA 9165.

The Facts

On March 27, 2003, the Mayors Special Action Team, City Hall Detachment, Pasig City
Police, received information from Brgy. Councilor Antonio Santos of Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City,
that one, alias Bong, was selling shabu (methylamphetamine hydrochloride) in the
vicinity. Santos gathered his information from an informant. The police then constituted a team in
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to conduct a buy-bust operation
against alias Bong. Police Officer 1 (PO1) Roland A. Panis was designated poseur-buyer, who was
supplied with a one hundred peso (PhP 100) bill as buy-bust money, with which he marked his
initials RAP.

Accompanied by Santos informant, the police went to Sampaguita Street, Jabson Site,
Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City to conduct the buy-bust operation. Upon reaching the place, the
informant led PO1 Panis to Bong, while the other police officers stood back waiting for the
designated signal from the poseur-buyer. After the introductions, Bong asked PO1 Panis and the
informant what they wanted, and the two said they wanted to score, a code that meant to
purchase shabu. Upon being asked, PO1 Panis replied he wanted PhP 100 worth of shabu while
handing Bong the marked PhP 100 bill. When handed a plastic sachet of white crystalline powder,
PO1 Panis then signaled the other policemen that the buy-bust had been carried out, and they
converged on PO1 Panis, the informant, and Bong. PO1 Panis then held Bongs hand and
introduced himself as a police officer while informing him of his violation and apprising him of
his constitutional rights. Thereafter, PO1 Panis marked the plastic sachet as Exh A RAP 3/27/03.

At the police station, Bong was identified as accused-appellant Rogelio Rosialda. There,
too, PO1 Panis then turned over the plastic sachet to Police Senior Inspector Rodrigo Villaruel,
who prepared a laboratory examination request, addressed to the Eastern Police District Crime
Laboratory Office. A certain PO1 Mariano brought the plastic sachet with the examination request
to the crime laboratory where it was received by a certain PO1 Chuidian. The contents of the plastic
sachet were then examined by Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza Gural, who prepared the
corresponding Chemistry Report No. D-548-03E, with the following findings:

FINDINGS

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave

POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs (Exh. C)[3]

Thus, the following Information[4] dated March 28, 2003 was filed against Rosialda for violation
of Sec. 5, Article II of RA 9165:

On or about March 27, 2003 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1
Roland A. Panis, a police poseur buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet, containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found
positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in
violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.

The case before the RTC was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12267-D entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rogelio Rosialda y Jamot @ Bong.

At his arraignment, Rosialda pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial ensued where, notably, the parties
stipulated on the following facts:

(1) on the existence of the specimen (white crystalline substance contained

in the plastic sachet marked as Exh A RAP 3/27/03);

(2) that a request for the examination of the specimen was made;

(3) that P/Insp. Gural examined the same and, as a result, issued Chemistry
Report No. D-548-03E;

(4) that P/Insp. Gural had no personal knowledge from whom the specimen
was taken; and,
 (5) that the examination led to the identification of the specimen as
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

During the trial proper, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO1 Panis, and three other police
officers to corroborate his testimony: PO1 Janet Sabo, PO3 Arturo San Andres, and Senior Police
Officer 1 Amilassan Salisa, all from the Pasig City Police Station, City Hall Detachment. P/Insp.
Gural was not presented as a witness during the hearing.

The defense, on the other hand, presented as witnesses accused-appellant Rosialda, Frances Diana
Rosialda, and Silflor C. Velasco.

Rosialda testified that on March 24, 2003 at about 2:00 p.m., he was smoking beside their house
when several people ran past the area. After a while, two (2) armed men followed, approached
him, and asked whether he knew the persons who were running in front of them. He answered in
the negative, whereupon, he was restrained and frisked at gun point. Nothing illegal was recovered
from his person. Continuing, Rosialda related that he was then taken to
the Rizal Medical Center where he was made to sign a document. Then he was brought to the
police station at the Pasig City Hall and there was detained. He was informed that he would be
charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He was then told by PO1 Panis to just settle
the case.

The defenses second witness, Frances Rosialda, Rosialdas daughter, corroborated her fathers
testimony regarding his apprehension, except as to the date. She testified that her father was taken
on March 27, 2003, not March 24, 2003.
The third witness, Velasco, also corroborated the testimony of the Rosialda on his being
arrested. But the witness testified also that the incident happened on March 27 and not March 24,
2003.

Subsequently, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Rosialda y Jamot @ Bong GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) Pesos, with the accessory penalties provided
for under Section 35 of the said law.
 The plastic sachet containing shabu (Exhs D and D-1) is hereby ordered confiscated
in favor of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for destruction.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

From the above decision, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[5] dated April 30, 2007.

The appeal was docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CR No. 02968. Eventually, the CA rendered
the assailed decision affirming Rosialdas conviction, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The

challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

In its Decision, the CA found that the elements of the crime were present in the case. Moreover, it
found that Rosialdas defense of frame-up was not proved, holding that for the defense of frame-
up to prosper, clear evidence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers must be shown on
why they would impute false charges against the accused. The CA found that the self-serving
allegations of Rosialda were insufficient. In addition, the appellate court cited the doctrine that the
defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been generally viewed by the Court with disfavor as it is easily
concocted.

Anent Rosialdas claim of inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the CA
found them to be minor ones which did not affect the veracity of the testimonies.

Rosialda also questioned the admissibility of the Chemistry Report, arguing that since issuing
officer P/Insp. Gural was not presented as a witness, said report is inadmissible. The CA dismissed
such argument ruling that there was no need to present P/Insp. Gural, given the stipulations entered
into by the parties at the pre-trial of the case. Moreover, the CA enunciated that the findings in the
report are entries in official records made in the course of official duty, and as such, they are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated in the report.

The issue of the police officers non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165 was also raised
by Rosialda before the CA. However, relying on People v. Pringas,[6] the CA ruled that the failure
to comply with Sec. 21 does not render the arrest of the accused illegal nor the items
seized/confiscated inadmissible, for as long as there is a justifiable ground for such failure, and the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer.

Finally, as to the chain of custody of the seized item, the CA found that the facts and evidence
presented show that such chain was unbroken from the time the sale was consummated, the
marking of the specimen, and until it was delivered to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office for examination to the surrender of the specimen to the trial prosecutor who offered it to
the RTC as evidence.
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issues

Unconvinced, Rosialda raises in his Supplemental Brief the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether there was ill-motive on the part of the arresting

officer to give credence to the accuseds allegation that he was framed; and,

2. Whether the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was

indeed unbroken.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The first paragraph of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 penalizes the selling of dangerous drugs, thus:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.

In People v. Darisan,[7] the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs:
 In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2)
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
One with the RTC and the CA, we find the above elements present and proved beyond
reasonable doubt in the instant case through the evidence and testimonies presented by the
prosecution.

The first element was proved by the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation. For clarity, we quote the testimony of poseur-buyer PO1 Panis:

Affirmed by the appellate court, the RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of PO1 Panis and
the other police officers. Such finding of the trial court must be given great respect and shall
generally not be disturbed by this Court. This principle was revisited in Sumbillo v. People of the
Philippines,[9] where this Court reiterated that:
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
undertaken by the trial court due to its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. x x x The findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, which is not
true in the present case.

Rosialda, however, continues to question the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

asserting that the incident as narrated by them did not happen. He claims that he was framed. This
defense, however, is unsupported by the evidence.

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, for the defense of frame-up to prosper, the accused must
present clear and convincing evidence of such fact. It must be noted at this juncture that a prima
facie case against Rosialda had already been established. The burden of evidence now lies with
him to prove his defense of frame-up. Correlatively, the Court ruled in People v. Rodrigo:[10]

Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving

the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defensewhich shall
then test the strength of the prosecutions case either by showing that no crime was
in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not commit
the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 Thus, in People v. Hernandez,[11] the Court dismissed the defense of frame-up relied upon
by the accused for failing to present clear and convincing evidence to prove his allegations. The
Court said:

The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to
prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and
convincing evidence. In the case before us, appellants miserably failed to present
any evidence in support of their claims. Aside from their self-serving assertions, no
plausible proof was presented to bolster their allegations. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court held succinctly in People v. Agulay:[12]

Apart from his defense that he is a victim of a frame-up and extortion by

the police officers, accused-appellant could not present any other viable
defense. Again, while the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption
of innocence, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to
present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of regularity.

Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a violation of Sec. 21, Art.
II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the alleged dangerous drugs seized by the
apprehending officers be photographed in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel. Rosialda argues
that such failure to comply with the provision of the law is fatal to his conviction.

This contention is untenable.

The Court made the following enlightening disquisition on this matter in People v.
Rivera:[13]

The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized

dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 which stipulates:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
 person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted
the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated
pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render
accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso
added that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. The same provision clearly states as well,
that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.

This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if
any, since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may,
this Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine
qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is
vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement
performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
 seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence are removed.

To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony,

the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came
into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the instant case, we find that the prosecution has adequately showed the continuous and
unbroken possession and subsequent transfers of the plastic sachet containing dangerous drugs
from the time accused-appellant Rosialda handed it to PO1 Panis to consummate the sale of illicit
drugs until it was offered in court. The fact that the plastic sachet containing shabu was
immediately marked by PO1 Panis with such marking remaining until the plastic sachet was
presented in court persuasively proves not only the identity of the shabu as seized from Rosialda,
but more importantly that it is the same item seized from the buy-bust operation. Its integrity and
evidentiary value were, thus, duly preserved. Consequently, the CA correctly appreciated that the
chain of custody of the seized drug remains unbroken. Accordingly, the conviction of accused-
appellant Rosialda must be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 17, 2009 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 02968 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

ALEJANDRO VS BERNAS
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated May 23, 2007 and
Resolution[2] dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94229.

The facts of the case follow.

Petitioner Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro (Alejandro) is the lessee-purchaser of

condominium unit No. 2402 (the Unit), 4th Floor, Discovery Center Condominium in Pasig City
under the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase[3] with the lessor-seller Oakridge Properties,
Inc. (OPI). On October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi
I.Y. Abbas (Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma.
Elena) to be used as a law office.[4] However, a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted
petitioners to suspend payments until the problem is fixed by the management.[5] Instead of
addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City,[6] against Alejandro for the latters failure to pay rentals. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9209. Alejandro, for his part, interposed the defense of justified
suspension of payments.[7]

In the meantime, the Discovery Center Condominium Corporation (DCCC) was organized
to administer the Discovery Center Condominium independent of OPI. Respondent Fernando
Amor (Amor) was appointed as the Property Manager of DCCC.

During the pendency of the ejectment case or on June 10, 2004, OPI, allegedly through
respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas), ordered that the Unit be padlocked. In
an Order[8] dated June 11, 2004 the MeTC directed OPI to remove the padlock of the Unit and
discontinue the inventory of the properties. The order was reiterated when the MeTC issued a
Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Alejandro. However, on August 11, 2004, at 8:00 in the
evening, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. The
padlocking was allegedly executed by Amor, as Property Manager and respondent Eduardo
Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with security officers John Doe and Peter
Doe. Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities on August 16,
2004.[9]

On August 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision[10] in the ejectment case in favor of
Alejandro and against OPI. The court found Alejandros suspension of payment justified. The
decision was, however, reversed and set aside by the Regional Trial Court[11] whose decision was
in turn affirmed[12] by the CA.
On October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint[13] for grave coercion against
respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe and John Doe with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig. The case was docketed as I.S. No. PSG 04-10-13650. In their
Joint Affidavit-Complaint,[14] petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal,
felonious and unlawful which prevented them from entering the premises.[15] Petitioners also
alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities had unduly prejudiced them and thus
constituted grave coercion.[16]

In their Counter-Affidavit[17], Bernas and Sia-Bernas averred that the elements of grave
coercion were not alleged and proven by petitioners. They also claimed that nowhere in petitioners
complaint was it alleged that respondents employed violence which is an essential element of grave
coercion.

In addition to the above defenses, Amor and Aguilar maintained that petitioners did not
allege that the former actually prevented the latter to enter the Unit. They added that petitioners in
fact gained access to the Unit by forcibly destroying the padlock.[18]
On March 22, 2005, the OCP issued a Resolution,[19] the pertinent portion of which reads:

Wherefore, respondents Fernando Amor and Eduardo Aguilar are charged

with unjust vexation and the attached information be filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City. Bail is not necessary unless required by the Court.

The charges against respondents Jose Bernas and Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas
is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[20]

The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as no violence was
employed by the latter. In padlocking the leased premises and cutting off of facilities, respondents
Amor and Aguilar were found to be probably guilty of the crime of unjust vexation.[21]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) but
the appeal was dismissed[22] for their failure to comply with Section 12, paragraph (b) of
Department Circular No. 70. The DOJ Secretary, acting through Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda,
explained that petitioners failed to submit a legible true copy of the joint counter-affidavit of some
of the respondents. Petitioners motion for reconsideration[23] was likewise denied in a
Resolution[24] dated April 3, 2006. He denied the motion after a careful re-evaluation of the record
of the case vis--vis the issues and arguments raised by petitioners.

Undaunted, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA that rendered the assailed
decision[25] on May 23, 2007. The appellate court recognized the DOJs authority to dismiss the
petition on technicality pursuant to its rules of procedure. The CA explained that while the DOJ
dismissed the petition on mere technicality, it re-evaluated the merits of the case when petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration. On whether or not there was probable cause for the crime
of grave coercion, the CA answered in the negative. It held that the mere presence of the security
guards was insufficient to cause intimidation.[26] The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on August 8, 2007.[27]

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

 WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING IN THE CASE OF SY VS. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE (G.R. NO. 166315, DECEMBER 14, 2006), WHEREIN THE
HIGHEST COURT OF THE LAND DEVIATED FROM THE NON-
INTERFERENCE POLICY WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL ARM OF THE
GOVERNMENT BY HOLDING THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IF THE RECORDS CLEARLY SHOW PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED, IS APPLICABLE TO INSTANT
CASE,

1. given that there is more than ample evidence of the

padlocking;
2. the padlocking has been admitted in no uncertain terms by
Respondents;
3. the padlock was ordered removed by the court

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

TANTAMOUNT [TO] LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE
COURT OF APPEALS DENIED THE PETITION DESPITE SHOWING OF
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF GRAVE COERCION.

WHETHER OR NOT SUBJECT RESOLUTION OF THE DOJ IS ANOMALOUS

BECAUSE THE GROUND OF DISMISSAL WAS FABRICATED WHICH
NECESSITATES A JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SAID RESOLUTION.

WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE COERCION CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH

INTIMIDATION ALONE WITHOUT VIOLENCE.[28]

Petitioners claim that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove the fact of padlocking
and cutting off of facilities thereat.[29] They insist that the allegations and evidence presented in
the Joint Affidavit-Complaint are sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause for grave
coercion irrespective of any defense that may be put up by respondents.[30] Finally, petitioners
maintain that although violence was not present during the commission of the acts complained of,
there was sufficient intimidation by the mere presence of the security guards.[31]

In their Comment,[32] respondents aver that petitioners raise issues of grave abuse of
discretion which are improper in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. They also argue
that the CA aptly held that petitioners failed to establish probable cause to hold them liable for
grave coercion. They do not agree with petitioners that the mere presence of security guards
constituted intimidation amounting to grave coercion. Finally, they insist that there is no legal
impediment to cause the padlocking and repossession of the Unit as a valid exercise of proprietary
right under the contract of lease.

In their Reply,[33] petitioners assail the propriety of the dismissal of their appeal before the
DOJ Secretary on technicality.

The petition must fail.

The propriety of the dismissal of petitioners appeal before the DOJ Secretary has been
thoroughly explained by the CA. We quote with approval the CA ratiocination in this wise:

It was also incorrect for petitioners to claim that the dismissal was on mere
technicality, and that the Department of Justice no longer studied the appeal on the
merits. The motion for reconsideration shows that the records were carefully re-
evaluated. However, the same conclusion was reached, which was the dismissal of
the appeal. The first resolution was a dismissal on technicality but the motion for
reconsideration delved on the merits of the case, albeit no lengthy explanation of
the DOJs dismissal of the appeal was inked on the resolution. It was already a
demonstration of the DOJs finding that no probable cause exists x x x[34]

Besides, petitioners failure to attach the required documents in accordance with the DOJ
rules renders the appeal insufficient in form and can thus be dismissed outright.[35] Moreover, when
the case was elevated to the CA, the latter ruled not only on the procedural aspect of the case but
also on the merit of the determination of probable cause.

The next question then is whether the CA correctly sustained the DOJs conclusion that
there was no probable cause to indict respondents of grave coercion. We answer in the affirmative.
It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the
prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of
the findings of public prosecutors.[36] To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor
and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutors
determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review
the prosecutors findings in such investigations.[37] The courts duty in an appropriate case is
confined to the determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction.[38]
 Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[39] As held in Sy v. Secretary of
Justice,[40] citing Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice:[41]

[Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead
a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual or positive cause; nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based in opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[42]

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:

1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by

law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do
so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.[43]

Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone
facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for
which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office. At the time of the padlocking and cutting
off of facilities, there was already a case for the determination of the rights and obligations of both
Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending before the MeTC. There was in fact an order for
the respondents to remove the padlock. Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor and
Aguilar had no right to do so.

The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of petitioners Joint Affidavit-
Complaint shows that petitioners merely alleged the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities
to prevent the petitioners from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of these acts is
sufficient to indict respondents of grave coercion. It was never alleged that the acts were effected
by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners belatedly alleged that they were intimidated by the
presence of security guards during the questioned incident.
 We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation
to the petitioners.

There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. [44] Material violence is not
indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which
restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.[45]

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities
in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security
guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the
degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.[46] Here,
the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know
their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant
because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the
mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was
intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
The case of Sy v. Secretary of Justice,[47] cited by petitioners is not applicable in the present
case. In Sy, the respondents therein, together with several men armed with hammers, ropes, axes,
crowbars and other tools arrived at the complainants residence and ordered them to vacate the
building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition
team, complainants were prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were compelled
to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition while
complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court thus found that there
was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated and that there was probable cause for
the crime of grave coercion.

On the contrary, the case of Barbasa v. Tuquero[48] applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together
with the head of security and several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls
occupied by the complainants-lessees because of the latters failure to pay the back rentals. The
Court held that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon
the lessees employees when the cutting off of electricity was effected. On the contrary, the Court
found that it was done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to
prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessors right under the
contract. We reach the same conclusion in this case.

In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party is an
essential ingredient.[49]

Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would
justify conviction.[50] While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a
need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State
from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising
from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.[51] It is, therefore, imperative upon the prosecutor to
relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.[52]

A preliminary investigation is conducted for the purpose of securing the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.[53]

Notwithstanding the DOJs conclusion that respondents cannot be charged with grave
coercion, it ordered the filing of information for unjust vexation against Amor, the Property
Manager of DCCC and Aguilar as head of the security division. We find the same to be in order.

Petitioners Joint Affidavit-Complaint adequately alleged the elements of unjust vexation.

The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and provides for
the penalty of unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent
person.[54] Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners charges but such matters may
only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements
of the crime may be thoroughly passed upon.[55]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Resolution dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94229, are AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.

ONG VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 169440 November 23, 2011

GEMMA ONG A.K.A. Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan,

Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
FACTS:
On September 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Gemma Ong forInfringement under Sec. 155
in relation to Sec. 170 of Republic Act. No. 8293 or the IntellectualProperty Code. This decision was assailed
based on facts established that Gemma Ong wasengaged in the distribution, sale and offering for sale of counterfeit
Marlboro cigarettes whichcaused confusion and deception to public and without permit or authority from the
TelengtanBrothers and Sons Inc., the exclusive manufacturer of Malboro cigarette in the Philippines andfrom the
Philip Morris Products, Inc. (PMPI) which is the registered owner and proprietor of theMARLBORO
trademark.The decision of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and hence thisappeal by
certiorari by Gemma Ong praying that the decision of RTC and CA to be set aside andreverse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gemma Ong, setting aside the issue of alleged mistaken identity, is guiltybeyond reasonable doubt
of Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code.
RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of Court of Appeals.I
n McDonalds Corporation and McGeorge Food Industries, Inc. v. L.C. Big Mak Burger,
Inc., Supreme Court held:To establish trademark infringement, the following elements must be shown:
(1) the validity of plaintiffs mark;
(2) the
plaintiffs ownership of the mark; and
(3) the use of the mark or its colorable imitation by the alleged infringer results in "likelihood of confusion." Of
these, it is the element of likelihood of confusion that is the gravamen of trademark infringement. A mark
is valid if it is distinctive and not barred from registration. Once registered, not only the
marks validity, but also the registrants ownership of the mark is prima facie presumed.
Anent the element of confusion, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals have correctly held that
the counterfeit cigarettes seized from Gemmas possession were intended to confuse and
deceive the public as to the origin of the cigarettes intended to be sold, as they not only bore
PMPIs mark, but they were also packaged almost exactly as PMPIs products.
The prosecution was able to establish that the trademark "Marlboro" was not only valid forbeing neither generic
nor descriptive, it was also exclusively owned by PMPI, as evidenced bythe certificates of registration issued by
the Intellectual Property Office of the Department of Trade and Industry.

PEOPLE VS JACINTO

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victims positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper,
the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to
have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2

Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final
and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence
on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic
Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and
Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this
Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction.4

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening more or less,
at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim

being only five years old.7

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted
the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was
born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical
certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.

Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective
versions of the story.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be
summarized in the following manner:

FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house is along the road. That
of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has
to pass by FFFs house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and]
every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge
against appellant prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time
playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his
way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident.14

At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter
CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned
without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her
aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15

Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At
the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of
short pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita
to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of
the "lower area or place."20

AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he
held her hand while on the road near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the
house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on
harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from
waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her
vagina and made a push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant
left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He
found her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her
head.33 He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning
black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina.35 AAA
told him that appellant brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of
the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed
her breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39

True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he
did to AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed
him.42 FFF went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked
again,44 and boxed him.45

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the
house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her,
embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped
her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you
really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51Appellants
aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded,
"Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees."52 Julito did found
the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident
blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center.55 Dr.
Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate56 dated 29
January 2003. It reads:

Injuries seen are as follows:

1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.

2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.

3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area

4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line

5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area

6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material

7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding

8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position

Impression

MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

HYMENAL LACERATIONS

Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of
the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January
2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:

P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is
no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59

Evidence for the Defense

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate
his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm
that he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went
further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition,
Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellants aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior
of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back
of FFFs house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access
the road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF,66 and
whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.67

At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle
Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellants uncle
sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the
house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a
watch .68

Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of
Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She
also observed that appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69

At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having
a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at
the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she
saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAAs face was
covered and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a
game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3)
minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of
Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house,
Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82

Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified
that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the
appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This
time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.83

On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was watching the
television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing
only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what
happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonias advice, Julito released her and went out of the
house.84

Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at
him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8
oclock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA]
P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87

The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that
appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old
when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence
and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is
amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty
impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in
view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to
indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants Notice of
Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.94

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of
moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction."96

Our Ruling

We sustain the judgment of conviction.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three
well-entrenched principles:

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.97

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to
convict the accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of
the examining physician.99

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime,100except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even
in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.102

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating
in the insertion of appellants organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical
findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased
in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all she had
been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to
show that rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of
truth and honesty.105

Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal
lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an
object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the
object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ.107

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration

conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108

II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the
commission of the crime are now in dispute.

The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.109

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good
look at him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life.
Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs
criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand
and led her all the way to the rice field.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she
called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was
wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive.
The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito Apiki, but the child, on
rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and
not Julito, who is older, who molested her.112

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court
of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the
opportunity to observe the witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs
and the scant or full realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114

Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to
someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainants positive identification
of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus
corroborating the latters testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from
the child."115

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his
denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring
inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of
the appellants very testimony.

Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy
Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before
he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape
incident because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their
house for the second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after
the appellants errand to the store.119

Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary
to Glorias statement that her husband was at work.

Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho.
Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvillas claim that Julito
wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as
testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in
saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvillas recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-
shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.

Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas house three (3)
minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA
arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial courts appreciation in order.
Thus:

xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father
that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among
strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the
child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only
later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a
look at her just as Julito Apiki said.120

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having
been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses
cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other."121

Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts,
still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.

We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.122

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so
far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of
the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by
foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this
Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep
when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely
presumed that the accused slept all throughout.126

In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the
appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise
disregarded by this Court in the following manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellants sister-
in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellants physical presence in the fishpond at
the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellants house where
the rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the
appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It
was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she
testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes
being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond,
could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not
farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the
victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if
he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their
sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience.
Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house
of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the
store next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of
Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncles house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his
corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the
scene of the crime.130

Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at
the time and place of the commission of the crime.

All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the
crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still
under review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with
discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.134

We determine discernment in this wise:

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.136

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minors cunning and shrewdness.138

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken
her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action.139

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that
she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law
prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old141 applies.

The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the
imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;142 and (2) the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing
the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code.143

Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of
penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one
degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146

We differ.

In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-
de Castro, clarified:

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Civil Liability

We have consistently ruled that:

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.150 The
respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of 75,000.00 each are,
therefore, proper.151

Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals in the amount of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity and 75,000.00 as moral damages. And,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be
increased from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00.

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the
Period of Suspension of Sentence

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of
conviction is pronounced. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of
Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the
aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning
the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in
conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.157

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this
Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos]
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict
with the Law,which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no
longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with
the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and
Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five
(25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age
limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become
a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time
of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to
effect appellants confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

YAMBOT VS TUGUERO
FACTS:

An article from the Philippine Daily inquirer headlined a report written by Contreras, herein
referred to as the petitioner regarding the mauling incident that happened between RTC Judge
Cruz and Mendoza, an administrative officer assigned at Makati RTC. Such article was referred
to by Judge Cruz as false and malicious so the latter filed a libel case against the writer,
particularly the line that states that the said judge still has a pending sexual harassment case filed
at the SC. It appeared that the sexual harassment being referred to by the Petitioner was based
from a Court Petition for cancellation of contempt order by one Paredes- Garcia. She appended
an affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the proclivity of Judge Cruz for
seducing women who became objects of his fancy, stating that she also suffered the same
infirmities. The SC later on granted the petition for cancellation of contempt order but the
administrative case against the Judge was not passed upon.

Subsequently, the RTC of Makati approved a resolution finding probable cause against the PDI
employees hence an information was filed them. The petitioners appealed to the DOJ and the CA
who dismissed the same hence the said Petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Prosecutor erred in finding probable cause to charge the PDI
employees with libel

HELD: Yes.

Criminal Law: Libel

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. The elements of libel are (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
The glaring absence of maliciousness in the news article negates the existence of probable cause
that the PDI staff has committed libel. The article in question merely reported the statement of
Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz, the
said article did not report the existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact.
Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement.The
questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is
insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases.The Court held that malice connotes
ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when
it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. The pointed the absence of
malice on the part of the PDI employees.

TAGUINOD VS PEOPLE
For this Court's consideration is the petition for review[1] dated February 5, 2009 of petitioner
Robert Taguinod seeking to reverse the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September
8, 2008 and its Resolution[3] dated December 19, 2008 affirming the Decisions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (RTC)[4] and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City
(MeTC)[5] dated September 6, 2007 and November 8, 2006, respectively.

The following are the antecedent facts:

This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the parking area of the Rockwell
Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the
3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara)
from the 2nd basement parking. When they were about to queue at the corner to pay the parking
fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the
Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side view
mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was
pushed forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan and
Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner appeared
to be hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the
CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved backward
as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Private
complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was
at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and pushed the
CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.

As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the front
bumper, the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered the said
amount, but the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation. On the other hand, the
Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.

Thereafter, an Information[6] was filed in the MeTC of Makati City against petitioner for the crime
of Malicious Mischief as defined in and penalized under Article 327[7] of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of May, 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent to cause damage, and motivated by hate and revenge and
other evil motives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bump
the rear portion of a Honda CRV car bearing Plate No. APS-222 driven by Pedro
N. Ang, thus, causing damage thereon in the amount of P200.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded Not Guilty during the arraignment on March 10, 2003. Consequently, the trial
on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the testimony of private complainant. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, the wife of
petitioner, Jojet N. San Miguel, Jason H. Lazo and Engr. Jules Ronquillo.

Afterwards, the MeTC, in its Decision dated November 8, 2006, found petitioner guilty of the
crime charged in the Information, the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused ROBERT TAGUINOD y AYSON GUILTY of Malicious Mischief
penalized under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing accused to
FOUR (4) MONTHS imprisonment.

Accused Robert Taguinod y Ayson is likewise ordered to pay complainant Pedro

Ang the amount of P18,191.66, representing complainant's participation in the
insurance liability on the Honda CRV, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the amount of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The case was appealed to the RTC of Makati City, which rendered its Decision dated September
6, 2007, affirming the decision of the MeTC, disposing the appealed case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 8 November 2006 is
AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, praying for the reversal of the
decision of the RTC. The CA partly granted the petition in its Decision dated September 8, 2008,
ruling that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review filed in
this case is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September
6, 2007 of Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City in Criminal Case
No. 07-657 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. The petitioner is penalized to suffer the penalty of 30 days imprisonment;

2. The award of moral damages is reduced to P20,000.00; and
3. The award of attorney's fee is reduced to P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari dated February 5,
2009. On March 16, 2009, this Court denied[11] the said petition. However, after petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration[12]dated May 14, 2009, this Court reinstated[13] the present petition and
required the Office of the Solicitor General to file its Comment.[14]

The grounds relied upon are the following:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UPHOLDING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.[15]

This Court finds the petition partly meritorious.

The first argument of the petitioner centers on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence presented. Petitioner insists that between the witness presented by the
prosecution and the witnesses presented by the defense, the latter should have been appreciated,
because the lone testimony of the witness for the prosecution was self-serving. He also puts into
query the admissibility and authenticity of some of the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution.

Obviously, the first issue raised by petitioner is purely factual in nature. It is well entrenched in
this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case.[16] This doctrine is premised
on the undisputed fact that, since the trial court had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses while on the stand, it was in a position to discern whether or not they were telling
the truth.[17] Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety
and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.[18]

It is apparent in this present case that both the RTC and the CA accorded respect to the findings of
the MeTC; hence, this Court finds no reason to oppose the other two courts in the absence of any
clear and valid circumstance that would merit a review of the MeTC's assessment as to the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Petitioner harps on his contention that the MeTC
was wrong in not finding the testimony of his own witness, Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, to be
credible enough. However, this Court finds the inconsistencies of said petitioner's witness to be
more than minor or trivial; thus, it does not, in any way, cast reasonable doubt. As correctly pointed
out by the MeTC:

Defense witness Mary Susan Lim Taguinod is wanting in credibility. Her

recollection of the past events is hazy as shown by her testimony on cross-
examination. While she stated in her affidavit that the Honda CRV's left side view
mirror hit our right side view mirror, causing our side view mirror to fold (par. 4,
Exhibit 3), she testified on cross-examination that the right side view mirror of the
Vitara did not fold and there was only a slight dent or scratch. She initially testified
that she does not recall having submitted her written version of the incident but
ultimately admitted having executed an affidavit. Also, while the Affidavit stated
that Mary Susan Lim Taguinod personally appeared before the Notary Public, on
cross-examination, she admitted that she did not, and what she only did was to sign
the Affidavit in Quezon City and give it to her husband. Thus, her inaccurate
recollection of the past incident, as shown by her testimony on cross-examination,
is in direct contrast with her Affidavit which appears to be precise in its narration
of the incident and its details. Such Affidavit, therefore, deserves scant
consideration as it was apparently prepared and narrated by another.

Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven its case against the accused
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[19]

What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article
327 of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of

another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving
destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake
of damaging it.[20]

In finding that all the above elements are present, the MeTC rightly ruled that:

The following were not disputed: that there was a collision between the side view
mirrors of the two (2) vehicles; that immediately thereafter, the wife and the
daughter of the complainant alighted from the CRV and confronted the accused;
and, the complainant, in view of the hostile attitude of the accused, summoned his
wife and daughter to enter the CRV and while they were in the process of doing
so, the accused moved and accelerated his Vitara backward as if to hit them.
 The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof
enough to establish the existence of the element of hate, revenge and other evil
motive. Here, the accused entertained hate, revenge and other evil motive
because to his mind, he was wronged by the complainant when the CRV
overtook his Vitara while proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking
fee, as a consequence of which, their side view mirrors collided.On the same
occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by the
complainant's wife and daughter when they alighted from the CRV to confront him
for the collision of the side view mirrors. These circumstances motivated the
accused to push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until it reached the steel
railing of the exit ramp. The pushing of the CRV by the Vitara is corroborated by
the Incident Report dated May 26, 2002prepared by SO Robert Cambre, Shift-In-
Charge of the Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police Report. x x x[21]

The CA also accurately observed that the elements of the crime of malicious mischief are not
wanting in this case, thus:

Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had
proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First,
the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly
deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private
complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV
until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's
version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and
deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the
P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and
his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his
direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second,
the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or
other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV,
the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated
encounter between him and the private complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had
proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malicious mischief. This adjudication is but an affirmation of the finding of guilt
of the petitioner by both the lower courts, the MeTC and the RTC.[22]

Petitioner likewise raises the issue that the CA was wrong in awarding moral damages and
attorney's fees to the private complainant claiming that during the trial, the latter's entitlement to
the said monetary reliefs was not substantiated. This Court finds petitioner's claim, with regard to
the award of moral damages, unmeritorious.
In Manuel v. People,[23] this Court tackled in substance the concept of the award of moral damages,
thus:

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission. An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be
culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[24]

It is true that the private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages under Article
2220[25] of the New Civil Code because the injury contemplated by the law which merits the said
award was clearly established. Private complainant testified that he felt bad[26] and lost
sleep.[27] The said testimony is substantial to prove the moral injury suffered by the private
complainant for it is only him who can personally approximate the emotional suffering he
experienced. For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury,
competent and substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it.[28] The same
also applies with private complainant's claim that his wife felt dizzy after the incident and had to
be taken to the hospital.[29]

However, anent the award of attorney's fees, the same was not established. In German Marine
Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[30] this Court held that there must always be a factual basis for the award
of attorneys fees. This present case does not contain any valid and factual reason for such award.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review dated February 5, 2009 of petitioner Robert Taguinod
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 8, 2008 and its Resolution
dated December 19, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the attorneys
fees are OMITTED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS REBUCAN
 Assailed before this Court is the Decision[1] dated August 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282, which modified the Decision[2] dated November 3, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4232. In the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin was adjudged
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) separate counts of murder and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double murder
in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of

Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound FELIPE
LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old,
with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for
the purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds upon
Ranil Tagpis:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which
wounds caused the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera,
immediately thereafter.[3]

When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
[4]
charge. Trial, thereafter, ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health
Officer of Carigara, Leyte; (2) Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim Felipe
Lagera and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.;[5] (3) Adoracion Lagera, the wife of Felipe Lagera;
and (4) Alma Tagpis, the daughter of Felipe Lagera and mother of Ranil Tagpis, Jr.

Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the
victim Felipe Lagera on November 6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds,
the first of which was located at his right arm and was about 23x2x4 centimeters. The said wound
was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp instrument such as a bolo. The second wound
was located at Felipes nose maxillary area,[6] measuring 13 centimeters, with an inverted C
shape. The second wound was not fatal and could have been caused by a sharp-edged instrument
like a bolo. The third wound was located at Felipes left arm and was measured as 9x1x1.5
centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have likewise been caused by a sharp-edged
instrument. Dr. Profetana concluded that the causes of death of Felipe were hypovolemic shock,
massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds. She also conducted a post-mortem examination
on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. on the aforementioned date. The results revealed that Ranil
sustained a hacking wound at the fronto-temporal area[7] with a skull fracture. In the case of Ranil,
the cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary to [the]
hacking wound to the head.[8]The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a
bolo.[9]

Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in question. She pointed to the
accused-appellant as the Bata Endong[10] (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and
brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while Felipe was hit on the face, the left
shoulder and the right shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the accused-appellant, the former was
still able to walk outside of his house, to the direction of the coconut tree and thereafter fell to the
ground. Carmela said that she saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil. She
related that Felipe also owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he was attacked. She
was then inside the house with Felipe and her two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She
was sitting about four meters away when the hacking incident occurred indoors.[11]

On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the incident, she was playing with
a toy camera inside the house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was
also there near the bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right arm. When asked whether the
accused-appellant came inside the house in a sudden manner, Carmela answered in the
affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was indeed carried by Felipe when the accused-appellant
entered the house. She said that no fight or altercation occurred between Felipe and the accused-
appellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately ran outside of the house. Carmela
and Jericho then ran to the back of the house.[12]

Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was at the house of
a certain Justiniano Rance. After arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who told her to go
home because Felipe had been hacked. She ran towards the direction of her house. When she got
there, she saw the lifeless body of Felipe sprawled on the ground. She then went inside the house
and found her daughter, Alma Tagpis, cuddling the body of Ranil whose head was wounded. She
told Alma to look for a motor vehicle to bring the child to the hospital. She also found out that the
other two children, Carmela and Jericho, hid when they saw Felipe being hacked. When she asked
them who went to their house, Carmela told her that it was the accused-appellant who entered their
house and hacked the victims.[13]

Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was in Brgy.
Sogod, having their palay (unhusked rice grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went home and
proceeded to the house of her father, Felipe, where she left her children. She then met a person
looking for her mother who was about to tell the latter that Felipe was hacked. When she rushed
to Felipes house, she saw him lying in the grassy place, wounded and motionless. She asked Felipe
who hacked him, but he was not able to answer anymore. She went inside the house and saw blood
on the floor and the feet of her son Ranil. Thinking that the killer was still inside, she went to the
back of the house and pulled a slot of board on the wall so she could get inside. Upon seeing the
body of Ranil, she took him and ran towards the road. She was able to bring Ranil to the hospital,
but the doctor already pronounced him dead. Her other two children, Carmela and Jericho, soon
arrived at the hospital with the police. When she asked them who killed Felipe, Carmela answered
that it was the accused-appellant.[14]

Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following documentary evidence, to wit:
(1) Exhibit A the Post-mortem Examination Report on Felipe;[15] (2) Exhibit B the sketch of the
human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by Felipe;[16] (3) Exhibit C the Certificate of
Death of Felipe;[17] (4) Exhibit D the Post-mortem Examination Report on Ranil;[18] (5) Exhibit E
the sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by Ranil;[19] and (6) Exhibit F
the Certificate of Death of Ranil.[20]

The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond
Rance, the stepson of the accused-appellant; (2) Renerio Arminal,[21] the barangay chairperson of
Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; (3) Arnulfo Alberca, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed at Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y
Lamsin.

Raymond Rance testified that his mothers name is Marites Rance. The accused-appellant is not his
biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated that on the
night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their house. Felipe placed himself on top of
Raymonds mother, who was lying down. Raymond and his younger sister, Enda, were then
sleeping beside their mother and they were awakened. His mother kept pushing Felipe away and
she eventually succeeded in driving him out. In the evening of July 20, 2002, at about 11:00 p.m.,
Raymond recounted that he saw Felipes son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy
was able to go upstairs and kept trying to place himself on top of Raymonds mother. The latter got
mad and pushed Timboy away. She even pushed him down the stairs. The accused-appellant was
working in Manila when the aforesaid incidents happened. Raymond said that his mother
thereafter left for Manila. Subsequently, he saw the accused-appellant at the house of a certain
Bernie, several days after the accused-appellant arrived in Leyte. He told the accused-appellant
about the incidents involving Felipe and Timboy. On November 6, 2002, Raymond and the
accused were already living in the same house. On the said date, the accused-appellant left their
house after they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was going to call the latters
mother. Raymond testified that the accused-appellant is a good man and was supportive of his
family. He also stated that the accused-appellant seldom drank liquor and even if he did get drunk,
he did not cause any trouble.[22]

Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant surrendered to

him. The latter came to him alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant) fought with Felipe
Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human rights action officer, Ricky Irlandez, and the chief tanod,
Pedro Oledan, to bring the accused-appellant to the police station. Afterwards, the police officers
came to his place and he accompanied them to the house of Felipe.[23]

Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness stand to prove that the voluntary surrender
of the accused-appellant was entered into the records of the police blotter. He was asked to read in
open court the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002, which recorded the fact of
voluntary surrender of the accused-appellant. His testimony was no longer presented, however,
since the prosecution already admitted the contents of the blotter.[24]

The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila on August 15,
2002. He went to the house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children. There, he learned
that his wife went to Manila and his brother was taking care of his two children and his stepson,
Raymond. On November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his friend, Bernie Donaldo. He
asked Raymond why the latters mother went to Manila and he was told that, while he was still
in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went to their house and tried to place themselves on top of
his wife. He then said that he harbored ill feelings towards the said men but he was able to control
the same for the sake of his children. On November 6, 2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the
house of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a call to his wife who was in Manila. He was
carrying a bolo at that time since he was using the same to cut cassava stems in his farm. When he
talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter,
as the accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so he first sought shelter at the
place of his friend, Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After staying
there and drinking for half an hour, the accused-appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he
remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera.[25]

The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached the house of Felipe, the latter was
feeding chickens. When Felipe asked him what was his business in going there, he confronted
Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-
appellant had a bad purpose for being there and that the latter wanted to start a fight. Accused-
appellant denied the accusation and responded that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he
(Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and his wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled
the cover of a chicken cage at him, but he was able to parry it with his hand.The accused-appellant
then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen, as the latter was already
turning and about to run to the house. He also went inside the house since Felipe might get hold
of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a second hacking blow,
Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered
suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. When
he saw that he hit the child, he got angry and delivered a third hacking blow on Felipe, which
landed on the right side of the latters neck.Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He followed Felipe and
hacked him again, which blow hit the victims upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on
the yard of his house and was about to run towards the road.He then left and surrendered to
the barangay chairperson.[26]
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when he proceeded
to Felipes house, but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after the first hacking
blow, the accused-appellant stated that he had no intention to back out because he was thinking
that the victim might get a gun and use the same against him. The accused-appellant also asserted
that when he was about to deliver the second hacking blow, Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who
was sitting on a sack and used him to shield the blow. There was a long bolo nearby but Felipe
was not able to take hold of the same because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted
that he had a plan to kill Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the latters house on the day of
the attack, he had no intention to kill him.[27]

The defense also presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 the Police Blotter
Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002;[28] and (2) Exhibit 2 the Civil Marriage Contract of
Rosendo Rebucan and Marites Rance.[29]

On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused-appellant of

the crime of double murder. The trial court elucidated thus:

[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the accused] was
sexually abused by the father and son Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to
avenge his wifes sexual molestation. Days had passed, but this decision to kill
Felipe did not wither, instead it became stronger, that on the 6th of November 2002,
he armed himself with a sharp long bolo known as sundang and went to Brgy.
Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte where the victim live[d]. Fueled by hatred and the
spirit of London gin after consuming one bottle with his compadre Enok, he decided
to execute his evil deeds by going to the house of Felipe Lagera, in the guise of
buying kerosene and once inside the house hacked and wounded the victim, Felipe
Lagera who was then holding in his arm his grandson, one and half years 1 old,
Ramil Tagpis, Jr.

The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victim, Felipe
Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was a premeditated decision and executed with
treachery.

xxxx

There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness Carmela

Tagpis that the victim, Felipe was holding in his arms her younger brother,
Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his house, when the accused entered, and without any
warning or provocation coming from the victim, the accused immediately
delivered several hacking blows on the victim giving no regard to the innocent
child in the arms of Lagera. With this precarious situation, the victim who was
unarmed has no opportunity to put up his defense against the unlawful
aggression of the accused, moreso, to retaliate. Moreover, what defense could an
innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up against the armed and superior
strength of the accused, but to leave his fate to God.
 The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected and the
victims, unarmed, were caught totally unprepared to defend themselves qualifies
the crime committed as murder. x x x.

After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan immediately went to the
house of Brgy. Chairman, Renerio Arcenal at sitio Palali, Brgy. Canlampay,
Carigara, Leyte, to surrender, because he killed Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis,
Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky
Irlandez and his Chief Tanod, Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police
Authorities of Carigara, Leyte. This fact of voluntary surrender was corroborated
by Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who presented to Court the police blotter, under
entry No. 5885, dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP, Carigara, Leyte.

Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the authorities showed his
intent to submit himself unconditionally to them, to save the authorities from
trouble and expenses that they would incur for his capture. For this reason, he has
complied with the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance[.]
x x x.

From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating circumstances of

admission and voluntary surrender credited to the accused are not sufficient to
offset the aggravating circumstances of: a) evident premeditation; b) treachery
(alevosia); c) dwelling the crime was committed at the house of the victim;
d) intoxication the accused fueled himself with the spirit of London gin prior to the
commission of the crime; e) abuse of superior strength; and f) minority, in so far
as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is concerned, pursuant to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. x x x.

xxxx

In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially established the
quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[30]

The RTC, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6, Art. 248 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended and further amended by R.A. 7659 (The Death
Penalty Law), the Court found accused ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER charged
under the information and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH,
and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos for each victim and moral
damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos to each; and
 Pay the Cost.[31] (Emphases ours.)

The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review and the same was
docketed as G.R. No. 161706.[32] The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal
briefs.[33] In our Resolution[34] dated July 19, 2005, we ordered the transfer of the case to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate disposition, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[35] Before the
appellate court, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282.

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on August 21, 2007, modifying
the judgment of the RTC. The appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the accused-appellant resulted in two separate
crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex
crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the
killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. With respect to the ensuant mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited
the circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused-appellant, but rejected the
appreciation of intoxication, immediate vindication of a grave offense and voluntary confession.As
for the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that the same was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, the Court
of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision

appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant is hereby
adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder for the
deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr., and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder he has committed.

The award of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim; the
award of moral damages is likewise reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim. Further,
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of each
victim.[36]

The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[37] of the above decision. In

a Resolution[38] dated February 6, 2008, the Court of Appeals ordered that the records of the case
be forwarded to this Court.

On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice.[39] Thereafter, both
parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals and
will no longer file their respective supplemental briefs.[40]

The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of errors:

 I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME
OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
GRAVE OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE

INTOXICATION AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING, ABUSE
[41]
OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND MINORITY.

The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but denies that the crime was
committed with treachery and evident premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as to the
presence of treachery given that there was no eyewitness who categorically stated that the accused-
appellant attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving them of the means to defend
themselves. He brushed aside the testimony of Carmela Tagpis, insisting that she was not in a
position to say that there was no altercation between him and Felipe, which could have put the
latter on guard. The prosecution allegedly failed to prove that the accused-appellant intentionally
waited for the time when Felipe would be defenseless before initiating the attack. The fact that he
voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chairperson and the police and admitted the killings
supposedly showed that it was not intentional and he did not consciously adopt the method of
attack upon the two victims. The accused-appellant similarly rejects the finding of the RTC that
there was evident premeditation on his part since the prosecution failed to prove that he
deliberately planned the killing of Felipe.

The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the incident, he was still unable to
control his anger as he just recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by Felipe and
the latters son, Timboy. He also avers that he was a bit intoxicated when the crime took place so
that he was not in total control of himself. He claims that he is not a habitual drinker and that he
merely consumed the alcohol prior to the incident in order to appease his friend. He likewise argues
that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should not have been appreciated inasmuch as the
same was not alleged in the information. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength cannot be appreciated since he did not deliberately harm or attack Ranil Tagpis,
Jr. and the death of the latter was accidental. The accused-appellant prays that he should only be
found guilty of the crime of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender,
immediate vindication of a grave offense and intoxication.

The appeal lacks merit.

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution
must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.[42] Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof against the accused must
survive the test of reason for it is only when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the
crime is the person on trial should there be a judgment of conviction.[43] A finding of guilt must
rest on the strength of the prosecutions own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of
evidence for the defense.[44]

In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of
Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.

According to Article 248[45] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall
kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance
of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article
246.[46] There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.[47] The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is
frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend
themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.[48]

In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in
establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out
the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we reiterate the established doctrine
articulated in People v. De Guzman[49] that:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial
court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity
to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin
line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
 accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. x x x.[50]

Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of
the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.[51]
As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly and categorically pointed to
the accused-appellant as the person who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated that the
attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between the accused-appellant and
Felipe. Without any provocation, the accused-appellant suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to
Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of
any opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the
child unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil,
the trial court likewise correctly appreciated the existence of treachery. The said circumstance may
be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner
put up defense against the attack or become aware of it.[53] Furthermore, the killing of a child is
characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the weakness of the
victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.[54]

Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture on the matter, i.e., that the
attack was preceded by a fight between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be persuaded
by the accused-appellants version of the events in question. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the
testimony of children of sound mind is more correct and truthful than that of older persons and
that children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within
their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of
older persons.[55] In the instant case, Carmela was cross-examined by the defense counsel but she
remained steadfast and consistent in her statements. Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to
distrust the testimony of Carmela.

Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only contradicts that of Carmela,
but some portions thereof do not also conform to the documentary evidence admitted by the trial
court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch of the human anatomy of Felipe, which was
marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution, stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds that
were found on his right arm, at his nose maxillary area[56] and on his left arm. On the other hand,
the accused-appellant testified that he delivered four hacking blows on Felipe, the three of which
landed on the left side of the victims abdomen, the right side of his neck and on his upper left
arm. When confronted on the said apparently conflicting statements, the accused-appellant did not
offer any explanation.[57]
 Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of Felipe
and Ranil to murder.

The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial courts and the Court of Appeals appreciation
of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate
a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and
execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[58] It is not enough that
evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious
outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be evident
premeditation.[59] In the case at bar, the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish any of the
elements of evident premeditation since the testimonies they presented pertained to the period of
the actual commission of the crime and the events that occurred thereafter. The prosecution failed
to adduce any evidence that tended to establish the exact moment when the accused-appellant
devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry out the plan and that
a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his plan.

Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.[60] On the other hand,
dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the
instant case considering that the same were not alleged and/or specified in the information that was
filed on January 23, 2003. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, a generic aggravating circumstance will not be appreciated by the Court unless
alleged in the information. This requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to wit:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall

state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
 With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals vis--vis the
nature of crimes committed, we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant should
be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [w]hen a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is
known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.[61]

The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls under
any of the two classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly and
indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from
the accused-appellant. The eyewitness testimony of Carmela did not contain any detail as to this
material fact. To a greater degree, it was neither proven that the murder of Felipe was committed
as a necessary means for committing and/or facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa. As the
factual milieu of the case at bar excludes the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the accused-appellant should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of murder. In the
past, when two crimes have been improperly designated as a complex crime, this Court has
affirmed the conviction of the accused for the component crimes separately instead of the complex
crime.[62]

In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant, we uphold the

trial courts ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must
concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a
person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[63] To be sufficient,
the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save
the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
capturing them.[64] The accused-appellant has duly established in this case that, after the attack on
Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on
his own volition and before he was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this
circumstance of voluntary surrender during trial.

We reject, however, the accused-appellants contention that the trial court erred in failing
to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave
offense.

The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the intoxication
of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the
plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.The Court finds that the accused-appellant is not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication since his own testimony failed to
substantiate his claim of drunkenness during the incident in question. During his cross-
examination, the accused-appellant himself positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not
drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe.[65] He cannot, therefore, be allowed to make a
contrary assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the crimes he committed on the basis
thereof.

As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the

same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code requires that the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to
the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. The established rule is
that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time
to recover his equanimity.[66] In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt
of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought
immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on
November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out
the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was
sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have regained his composure
and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-
appellant.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of any other aggravating circumstance in
both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the presence of the lone mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly established in both instances, Article 63,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code[67] mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[68]

The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages for each set of heirs. The Court of Appeals, on
the other hand, reduced the aforesaid amounts to P50,000.00 and further awarded the amount
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim.
 Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime.[69] Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the court
for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the latters death. The purpose
for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries
to their feelings.[70] The award of exemplary damages, on the other hand, is provided under Articles
2229-2230 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party.

In People v. Dalisay,[71] the Court clarified that [b]eing corrective in nature, exemplary
damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
award.[72]

Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity

and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is, however, increased
to P30,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. As held in People v.
Combate,[73] when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, the proper amounts that should be awarded are P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award
of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. The award
of P25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of
burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven.[74]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision

dated August 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. The accused-
appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for the
deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count. The accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the
respective heirs of the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00
as temperate damages for each victim, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6%
from the date of the finality of this decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-
appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, plus the costs of suit.

On June 21, 2002, an Information[3] was filed against Villacorta charging him with the
crime of murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby
inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.[4]

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr.
Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located
at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendejas
store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruzs
body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs
body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to
catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the
broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.[5] Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical
Center.[6]

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz
sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where
he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February
14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not
personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and
diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.[7] Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruzs death in the following manner:

The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of
opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of
death is hypoxic encephalopathy neuro transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding x x
x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.[8]

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz
at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias
testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres testimony on Cruz
dying of tetanus.

For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta
recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of January
21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did
not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruzs death upon his arrest on July
31, 2002.[9]

On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito
Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo
Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the
costs of suit.[10]

Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of
appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.[11] The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to file
Villacortas brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief[12] on May 30, 2007; while the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief[13] on October 2, 2007.

On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
 Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was adopting
the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.[14] The OSG, likewise, manifested that
it was no longer filing a supplemental brief. [15]

In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME,

HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.[16]

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It was
Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning
of January 23, 2002.Villacorta asserts that Mendejas account of the stabbing incident is replete
with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1)
instead of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted
to run after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendejas own account, there were other people
who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only Mendeja did;
(3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been
physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who immediately
ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite
directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left
at her store, although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruzs
body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor
inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.

We are not persuaded.

To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility
of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from
its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude
under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.[17]

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected Villacortas attempts to
impugn Mendejas testimony, thus:

Appellants reason for concluding that witness Mendejas testimony is incredible

because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails
to impress the Court because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.

x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people

react differently and there is no standard form of behavior when one
is confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons could
have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness
Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the
appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 oclock in the
morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their house, not roaming
the streets.

His [Villacortas] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered
impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper
in view of his admission that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23,
2002 at 2:00 oclock in the morning and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.

Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support
appellants argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja,
both being her friends and regular customers. There was light in front of the
store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and meters enables the person inside to
see persons outside, particularly those buying articles from the store. The victim
was in front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further, immediately after the
stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity
to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.[18]

Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to
fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have
ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and
accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can
be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her version of the story deserves
much weight.[19]
 The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on
matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta
stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendejas store.

In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber, Villacorta

could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is
inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[20]

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to
have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.[21]

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January
23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February
14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection,
where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of
the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab
wound, or Cruzs activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[22] the Court was confronted with a case of very
similar factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano
hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javiers hand. Javier was treated by Dr.
Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and
convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that Javiers serious condition was caused
by tetanus infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed
against Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court
found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence
of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that Javiers own negligence
was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javiers
wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs
when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court
granted Urbanos appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between

injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges
from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of
injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,

irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw,
abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle
involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only
local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the
vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first

symptoms, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case
of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction
of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
 may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at

least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is
usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are
brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered
the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following
day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms
of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time.
The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.[23]

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking
incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court
that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained
in Urbano that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
 Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an

action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p.
125)[24]

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction
of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and
the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have
appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later.As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has
a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days
from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce
that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus
might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his
death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form
part of those constituting the offense of murder.[25]

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly
observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick,
hitting him on the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument
used is not as lethal as those made of metallic material. The part of the body hit is
not delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab
wound. The assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether
appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the
appellant. x x x.[26]

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as
to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-
appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent
is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.[27]

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical
treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz
was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no other evidence to
establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than
nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.[28]

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged

in the Information and proved during trial.

The Information specified that accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent
to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x
x.

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out
what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment
of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that
the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.[29]Likewise, even when the
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate.[30]

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case,
and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two oclock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying
bread at Mendejas store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for
an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened
bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then swiftly
ran away. Villacortas treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend
himself or retaliate.

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period.

The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.[31] The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its coverage cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year.[32] With the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in
the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon
Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has
been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we
order his immediate release.
 Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered
in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a
proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to
previous jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is
appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.[33]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that
Villacorta has been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas immediate release, unless Villacorta is
being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt
of this Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the
late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS DADULLA

A rapacious father who vented his lust on his own daughter without any qualms is allowed to suffer
the lesser penalty because of the failure of the criminal information to aver his relationship with
the victim. Even so, the Court condemns his most despicable crime.
The father is now before the Court to assail the decision promulgated on January 20, 2006
in C.A.-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01021, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) pronounced him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304, imposing reclusion
perpetua, and of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 98-2305, thereby modifying the
sentences handed down by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272 (RTC), in Marikina City.[1]

The Charges

On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and attempted rape through
separate informations, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK

 That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA,[2] against her will
and consent.[3]

Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to have carnal
knowledge of herein complainant one AAA, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution
that could have produced the crime of rape by reason of cause or causes other than
his own spontaneous desistance.[4]

Evidence of the Prosecution

In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping in the bedroom that she and her
five younger siblings shared with their father, was roused from sleep by someone undressing
her.[5] It was her father. AAA resisted, but the accused, wielding a bladed weapon,[6] threatened to
kill her if she shouted.[7] The accused then forcibly kissed her on the lips, mashed her breasts,
touched her private parts, and had carnal knowledge of her. After her ordeal, she put on her
garments and just cried.[8] She recalled that her father had first sexually abused her on February
14, 1992.[9]

On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father touching her body.
Noticing that her shorts were already unzipped and unbuttoned, she zipped and buttoned them up
and covered herself with a blanket. But her father pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip her
shorts. However, she was able to go under the wooden bed to evade him. She resisted his attempts
to pull her out from under the bed by firmly holding on to the bed. She told him that she would not
get out from under the bed because what he was doing to her was bad.[10] Upon hearing her, he
stopped and withdrew, telling her to leave the house. He then went to sleep.[11] In the meanwhile,
BBB, AAAs younger sister, was awakened by what she thought was an argument between her
father and AAA. She heard him tell AAA: Tumigil ka na nang kaiiyak, wala ka nang
pakinabang. AAA just cried under the bed and did not say anything. BBB soon fell asleep,[12] but
AAA could not sleep and remained under the bed until morning when the accused left to ply his
jeepney route.[13]

Upon waking up, BBB saw her father as he was about to leave the house. She heard him
telling AAA to leave the house.[14] As soon as he had left, BBB approached the crying AAA and
asked what had happened to her. AAA related her ordeal and pleaded with BBB to help
her.[15] Together, they went to their uncle, CCC, to report the incident. CCC queried AAA whether
she wanted her father to be thrown in jail, and she replied in the affirmative. Thus, CCC requested
his wife to accompany AAA to the barangay to file a complaint. Later, AAA and CCCs wife went
to Camp Crame for the physical and genital examinations, which established that AAA had a deep
healed hymenal laceration at 5:00 oclock position.[16]

Evidence of the Defense

The accused denied molesting AAA. He narrated that on January 15, 1998, AAA and BBB
left the house at around 6:30 p.m. to watch television elsewhere and returned only at around 11:00
p.m.; that on January 22, 1998, he scolded AAA for her failure to cook on time; that at around 4:00
a.m. of January 23, 1998, he struck AAAs face with his fist (dinunggol sa mukha) and told her to
leave the house because he was slighted by AAAs laughing instead of answering his query of
whether she had understood why he had scolded her the previous night; and that AAA was no
longer a virgin due to her having been raped by Joel Cloma in 1992, and by another man in 1993.[17]

The RTC Decision

On March 24, 1999, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 98-
2304-MK, and imposed the death penalty, ordering him to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages; and of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-
2305-MK, and imposed the indeterminate penalty of four years, nine months, and eleven days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to five years, four months, and twenty days, as maximum,
ordering him to pay to AAA P20,000.00 as moral damages.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2304 DESPITE THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT
PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
 AGAINST HIM WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
ATTEMPTED RAPE DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2305.

Nonetheless, the CA disposed in its decision promulgated on January 20, 2006:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATION:

In Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y

Capanas is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to
pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y

Capanas, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.

The CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK was reclusion
perpetua because the accused was liable only for simple rape by virtue of the information not
alleging any qualifying circumstances; and that in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused
was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper
and buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed constituted only acts
of lasciviousness.

Ruling of the Court

We sustain the conviction but correct the award of civil liability.

I
Criminal Liabilities

The CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both cases.

 To begin with, the finding and conclusion of the RTC that the totality of the evidence
presented by the State painted a convincing tale of AAAs harrowing experience at the hands of the
accused are well founded and supported by the records. Her unwavering testimonial account of the
bestiality of her own father towards her reflected her singular reliability. The CAs holding that a
woman would think twice before concocting a story of rape unless she was motivated by a desire
to seek justice for the wrong committed against her[18] was apt and valid. Indeed, her revelation of
being sexually assaulted by her own father several times could only proceed from innate sincerity,
and was entitled to credence in the absence of strong showing by the accused of grounds to
disbelieve her. Also, her immediate willingness to report to and face the police investigation and
to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial was a badge of trustworthiness.

Secondly, the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the

information in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against the
accused. Section 8,[19] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due to such requirement
being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged
with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000
revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).[20]

The term aggravating circumstance is strictly construed when the appreciation of the
modifying circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of
death.[21] Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of relationship, even if established during
trial, could not affect the criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in the
information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver offense of qualified rape, although
proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included in the
information.[22] Accordingly, the accused was properly convicted by the CA for simple rape and
justly punished with reclusion perpetua.

Thirdly, it is notable that the RTC outrightly concluded that the crime committed
on January 22, 1998 constituted attempted rape, after quoting the testimony of AAA and BBB. It
offered no analysis or discussion of why the accused was criminally liable for attempted rape. The
omission contravened Section 14,[23] Article VIII of the Constitution, as reiterated in Section
1,[24] Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which enjoined that decisions should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based.[25]

Nonetheless, the omission did not invalidate or render ineffectual the conviction, for the
CA in due course reformed the RTCs error. In its disquisition on why the accused should be held
liable for acts of lasciviousness, instead of attempted rape, the CA explained the true nature of the
crime of the accused thus:
We likewise agree with accused-appellant that the court a quo erred in
convicting him of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK. In connection
with the incident that transpired on January 22, 1998, Liza testified as follows:

Pros. Dela Pea:

Q: While you were sleeping in the evening on January 22, 1998, do you recall
of any instance (sic) or incident which awakened you?

Witness:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Again Miss Witness, tell us this incident that you are referring to?

A: While I was sleeping, I was awakened that my zipper was already opened
and my buttons were already loosened.

Q: And upon noticing that the zipper and the buttons of your short[s] are
already loosened or opened, what did you do?

A: I zipped it again and unbuttoned it.

Q: Was your father there on that night?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about your brother and sisters?

A: They were already asleep.

Q: Like on January 15, 1998, you slept, on January 22, 1998, you slept side
by side with your brothers and sisters and your father?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you notice the presence of your father when you said you were
awakened on that night?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was sitting and touching me, sir.

Q: How far was he from you?

A: He was near me.

Q: And upon seeing your father near you and the button and zipper of
your short[s] was open, what did you do?

A: I zipped and unbuttoned my short[s] and covered myself with blanket.

Q: Why did you cover yourself with blanket?

A: Because I do not want to see him beside me.

Q: Did you not ask your father to leave because you do not want to see
him?

A: I told him.

Q: Did your father leave?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why dont you like your father beside you?

A: Because of these things he was doing to me.

Q: And after covering yourself with blanket, what transpired next?

A: He removed the blanket from me, sir.

Q: And after that, what happened?

A: He was forcibly opening my short[s].

Q: What did you do when your father was forcibly opening your
short[s]?

A: I covered myself under the wooden bed.

Q: How wide is this wooden bed?

A: From that wall up to the rostrum.

Pros. Dela Pea:

 About a distance of two meters in width. Why did you hide yourself under
the wooden bed?

A: In order not to repeat what he was doing to me.

Q: After you hi[d] yourself under the wooden bed, what did your father
did [sic] to you?

A: He held me on my hands and tried to pull me out under the wooden

bed.

Q: And was your father able to pull you out under the wooden bed?

A: No sir.

The act of accused-appellant in opening the zipper and buttons of the

shorts of Liza, touching her and pulling her when she hid under the bed
showed that he employed force on Liza and was motivated by lewd
designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous.
It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or
that which is carried in a wanton manner. Thus, the crime committed by
accused-appellant is merely acts of lasciviousness, which is included in
rape. The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by using force
and intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that
the offended party is another person of either sex.[26]

According to People v. Collado,[27] the difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness lies in the intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his external acts. The intent
referred to is the intent to lie with a woman.[28] Attempted rape is committed when the touching of
the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of
lasciviousness.[29] Thus, the accuseds act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts,
touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed manifested lewd designs, not intent to lie
with her. The evidence to prove that a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the accused was
plainly wanting, therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 98-2305-MK.
 And, fourthly, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous for not being
in accord with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This impelled the CA to revise the indeterminate
penalty, rationalizing:

Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of
lasciviousness is prision correccional. We impose the penalty in its medium period,
there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance alleged and proved.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty imposable is from
six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum.[30]

We uphold the revision by the CA. The RTC fixed the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty from within prision correccional, when Section 1[31] of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law expressly required that the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower is arresto mayor.

II
Civil liability must be modified

Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,[32] the attendance of any aggravating circumstance
(generic, qualifying, or attendant) entitles the offended party to recover exemplary damages. Here,
relationship was the aggravating circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to
award P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts
of lasciviousness.

Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the

information (albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of
the accused, the established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or
nature

entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the
requirement of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not
his civil liability. The Court has well explained this in People v. Catubig:[33]

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim.
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation
 of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a
State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense
for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the dates of the commission of the crimes
charged did not matter. Like any other judicial interpretation of an existing law, the ruling
in People v. Catubig settled the circumstances when Article 2230 of the Civil Code applied,
thereby reflecting the meaning and state of that legal provision. The retroactivity of the ruling vis-
-vis the accused could not be challenged or be barred by virtue of its being civil, not penal, in
effect.

WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01021 is affirmed in all respects, subject to the modification that the civil liabilities
include P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the rape (Criminal Case No. 98-2034-MK),
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 98-2035-
MK).

SO ORDERED.

POSADAS VS SANDIGAN

The Facts and the Case

To recall the facts culled from the decision of the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of
the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman when on September 19, 1994 he formed a Task
Force on Science and Technology Assessment Management and Policy. The Task Force was to
prepare the needed curricula for masteral and doctoral programs in "technology management,
innovation studies, science and technology and related areas." On June 6, 1995, acting on the
Task Force's proposal, UP established the U Technology Management Center (UP TMC) the
members of which nominated Dr. Posadas for the post of Center Director. He declined the
nomination, however, resulting in the designation of Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP
TMC Director.
Shortly after, Dr. Posadas worked for the funding of the ten new graduate courses of UP TMC.
With the help of the Philippine Institute of Development Studies/Policy, Training and Technical
Assistance Facility and the National Economic Development Authority, there came into being
the Institutionalization of Management and Technology in the University of the Philippines in
Diliman (the TMC Project), funded at Dr. Posadas initiative by the Canadian International
Development Agency.

Meantime, on October 5, 1995 Malacanang granted Dr. Posadas and fifteen other UP Diliman
officials authority to attend the foundation day of the state university in Fujian, China, from
October 30 to November 6, 1995. Before he left, Dr. Posadas formally designated Dr. Dayco,
then UP Diliman Vice-Chancellor for Administration, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) in his absence.
On November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as
"Project Director of the TMC Project from September 18, 1995 to September 17, 1996." In an
undated letter, Dr. Dayco also appointed Dr. Posadas consultant to the project. The appointments
were to retroact to September 18, 1995 when the project began.

About a year later or on August 22, 1996 the Commission on Audit (COA) Resident Auditor
issued a Notice of Suspension of payments made to UP TMC personnel, including the second
payment to Dr. Posadas of 36,000.00 for his services as TMC Projects Local Consultant. On
August 23 the Resident Auditor further suspended payment of 30,000.00 honorarium per month
to Dr. Posadas as Project Director from September 18 to October 17, 1995.

On September 16, 1996, however, the UP Diliman Legal Office issued a Memorandum to the
COA Resident Auditor, pointing out that the amounts paid the TMC Project personnel "were
legal, being in the nature of consultancy fees." The legal office also "confirmed the authority of
Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as project director and
consultant of the TMC Project." Finding this explanation "acceptable," the COA Resident
Auditor lifted his previous notices of suspension.

Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP President Javier constituted an Administrative

Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and decide the administrative complaint that he himself filed
against Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. On August 18,
1998 the Tribunal recommended the dismissal of the two from the service. The UP Board of
Regents modified the penalty, however, to "forced resignation" with right to reapply after one
year provided they publicly apologize. Still, the UP General-Counsel filed with the
Sandiganbayan the present criminal cases.

On June 28, 2005 the Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty of violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 and imposed on them an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and one day as minimum and 12 years as maximum, with the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court also found them guilty of
violation of Section 7(b) of Republic Act 6713 and imposed on them the penalty of
imprisonment for 5 years with the same disqualification. They were further ordered to indemnify
the government in the sum of 336,000.00.1
In its decision of July 17, 2013, the Court affirmed the decisions of the Sandiganbayan in the two
cases.

Discussion

1. The appointments were in good faith

The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this Court, does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence. It imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and a
conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it partakes of the nature of fraud.2

Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken advantage of his brief designation as OIC
Chancellor to appoint the absent Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC
Project. But it cannot be said that Dr. Dayco made those appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted
them, fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC
Chancellor.

All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers, hence
unfamiliar with Civil Service rules and regulations. The world of the academe is usually
preoccupied with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those appointments appear to have been
taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any immediate protest from those who could have had
an interest in the positions. It was only after about a year that the COA Resident Auditor issued a
notice of suspension covering payments out of the Project to all UP personnel involved,
including Dr. Posadas.

Still, in response to this notice, the UP Diliman Legal Office itself rendered a legal opinion that
"confirmed the authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as
project director and consultant of the TMC Project." Not only this, the COA Resident Auditor,
who at first thought that the OIC Chancellor had no power to make the designations, later
accepted the Legal Offices opinion and withdrew the Notices of Suspension of payment that he
issued. All these indicate a need for the Court to reexamine its position that Dr. Dayco and Dr.
Posadas acted in bad faith in the matter of those appointments.

2. Dr. Dayco chose the most qualified for the project

The next question is whether Dr. Dayco, believing in good faith that he had the authority to make
the questioned designations, acted with "manifest partiality" in choosing Dr. Posadas among all
possible candidates as TMC Director and Consultant. The answer is no.

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another.3 Here, the prosecution presented no evidence
whatsoever that others, more qualified than Dr. Posadas, deserve the two related appointments.
The fact is that he was the best qualified for the work:

First, Dr. Posadas originated the idea for the project and so he had every reason to want it to
succeed.
Second, he worked hard to convince the relevant government offices to arrange funding for the
project, proof that he was familiar with the financial side of it as well.

Third, the members of the Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and
Policyhis own peersnominated Dr. Posadas as Director of the UP Technology Management
Center.

Fourth. The work fell within his area of expertisetechnical managementensuring

professionalism in the execution of the project.

In the world of the academe, that project was the equivalent of Dr. Posadas thesis. Thus, since
he was a natural choice to head the same, it beats the mind that such choice could be regarded as
one prompted by "manifest partiality."

3. The misstep was essentially of the administrative kind

The worst that could be said of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas is they showed no sensitivity to the
fact that, although Dr. Dayco may have honestly believed that he had the authority to make those
appointments, he was actually appointing his own superior, the person who made him OIC
Chancellor, however qualified he might be, to those enviable positions. But this should have
been treated as a mere administrative offense for:

First. No evidence was adduced to show that UP academic officials were prohibited from
receiving compensation for work they render outside the scope of their normal duties as
administrators or faculty professors.

Second. COA disallowances of benefits given to government personnel for extra services
rendered are normal occurrences in government offices. They can hardly be regarded as cause
for the filing of criminal charges of corruption against the authorities that granted them and those
who got paid.

Section 4 of the COA Revised Rules of Procedure merely provides for an order to return what
was improperly paid. And, only if the responsible parties refuse to do so, may the auditor then (a)
recommend to COA that they be cited for contempt; (b) refer the matter to the Solicitor General
for the filing of the appropriate civil action; and (c) refer it to the Ombudsman for the appropriate
administrative or criminal action.4 Here, Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were not given the chance,
before they were administratively charged, to restore what amounts were paid since the Resident
Director withdrew his notice of disallowance after considering the view of the UP Diliman Legal
Office.

If the Court does not grant petitioners motions for reconsideration, the common disallowances
of benefits paid to government personnel will heretofore be considered equivalent to criminal
giving of "unwarranted advantage to a private party," an element of graft and corruption. This is
too sweeping, unfair, and unwise, making the denial of most benefits that government employees
deserve the safer and better option.
Third. In other government offices, the case against Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas would have been
treated as purely of an administrative character. The problem in their case, however, is that other
factors have muddled it. The evidence shows that prior to the incident Dr. Posadas caused the
administrative investigation of UP Library Administrative Officer Ofelia del Mundo for grave
abuse of authority, neglect of duty, and other wrong-doings. This prompted Professor Tabbada,
the Acting UP TMC Director, to resign his post in protest. In turn, Ms. Del Mundo instigated the
UP President to go after Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco. Apparently, the Office of the Ombudsman
played into the intense mutual hatred and rivalry that enlarged what was a simple administrative
misstep.

Fourth. The fault of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas, who spent the best parts of their lives serving
UP, does not warrant their going to jail for nine to twelve years for what they did. They did not
act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith. Indeed, the UP Board of Regents, the highest
governing body of that institution and the most sensitive to any attack upon its revered portals,
did not believe that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas committed outright corruption. Indeed, it did not
dismiss them from the service; it merely ordered their forced resignation and the accessory
penalties that went with it.

The Board did not also believe that the two deserved to be permanently expelled from
UP.1wphi1 It meted out to them what in effect amounts to mere suspension for one year since
the Board practically invited them to come back and teach again after one year provided they
render a public apology for their actions. The Board of Regents did not regard their offense so
morally detestable as to totally take away from them the privilege of teaching the young.

4. The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr.
Posadas caused "undue injury" to the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits."

This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual
damage" must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence
or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork.5 The Court held in Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan6 that the element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed
wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime.

Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of 30 000.00 monthly as TMC
Project Director caused actual injury to the Government. The record shows, however, that the
247 500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor disallowed was deducted from his
terminal leave benefits.7

The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas "unwarranted advantage"
as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot be considered
"unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he did not discharge the additional responsibilities
that such appointments entailed.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners
and to vacate their conviction on the ground of failure of the State to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.