Case No.

32 questioning the ownership and possession of

appellants.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. After trial, the then Court of First
AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, Instance of Batangas ruled in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988 Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land
Facts: Registration Court involving shore lands
Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto constitutes res judicata
Castillo applied for the registration of two Held:
parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in There is no question that one of the requisites of
Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, described in Plan res judicata is that the court rendering the final
Psu-119166, with a total area of 39,755 square judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951, the matter; that shores are properties of the public
said Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat, domain intended for public use (Article 420,
was declared the true and absolute owner of the Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus,
land with the improvements thereon, for which it has long been settled that portions of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was, foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches
issued to him by the Register of Deeds at cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a
Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952. certificate of title does not convert the same into
After the death of Modesto Castillo, on properties of private ownership or confer title
August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, upon the registrant.
et al., executed a deed of partition and
assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake,
Castillo, et al., as a result of which, Original like the lands in question must be differentiated
Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled, from foreshore land or that part of the land
and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered
title were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al., and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides.

The Republic of the Philippines filed Such distinction draws importance from the fact
Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the that accretions on the bank of a lake, like
annulment of the certificates of title issued to Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the
defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., estate to which they have been added while
as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the
the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots public domain, and is not available for private
1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged ownership until formally declared by the
that said lands had always formed part of the government to be no longer needed for public
Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters use.
thereof, and being of public ownership, it could
not be the subject of registration as private But said distinction will not help private
property. Appellants herein, defendants below, respondents because there is no accretion shown
alleged in their answer that the Government's to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it
action was already barred by the decision of the was established that the occupants of the lots
registration court; that the action has prescribed; who were engaged in duck raising filled up the
and that the government was estopped from area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
 NO. The Court held, it is an elementary
The defense of long possession is likewise not principle of law that said areas not being
available in this case because, as already ruled capable of registration, their inclusion in a
by this Court, mere possession of land does not certificate of title does not convert the same into
by itself automatically divest the land of its properties of private ownership or confer title on
public character. the registrant.
CASE 33
CASE 33
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT and
Republic vs Judge delos Angeles DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT,
Petitioners,
G.R No. L-30240, March 25, 1988
v.
FACTS:
Ayala and Zobel illegally absorbed COURT OF APPEALS and MINO HILARIO,
areas belonging to public domain by usurping Respondents.
the same and causing its subdivision, thereby
acquiring titles over said properties, and selling G.R. No. 81961. April 18, 1989
it over to third persons.
In a 1965 judgment, the Supreme Court
FACTS:
rendered this modus operandi, as quoted by
the OSG, as illegal and issued an order for the
restoration of subject areas to the Republic and - CA declared Mino Hilario as owner of
its lessees. a parcel of land declared as forest land
Respondents thwarted the decision thru - In the case of Republic v. Court of
technical maneuvers by asserting that petitioners Appeals, [154 SCRA 476 (1987), there can be
cannot recover all subdivided properties because no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not
the 1965 judgment specifically provided the yet classified as disposable or alienable.
nullity of a single title only. Furthermore, Declassification of forest land is an express and
petitioners may only recover via writ of positive act of Government. It cannot be
execution, which cannot be issued in full scope presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
because of the decisions limited deemed waived
pronouncement on which it is based. Lastly, a
res judicata of the issue bars another filing of an - Said parcel of land was obtained by
action, effectively restraining the execution of Hilario by purchase from his predecessor, who
the judgment. had been cultivating the land prior to World
War I
ISSUE:
- Defendant argues that although his
Whether or not respondents may validly claim belongs to forest land whose disposability
claim ownership over subject public properties depends on an express declaration of the
by registration of land titles and deeds. government, his claim would still boast merit by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 141, which
HELD:
provides:
 "(c) Members of the national "There is an erroneous
cultural minorities who by assumption implicit in the challenged
themselves or through their decision of the Court of Appeals which
predecessors-in-interest have the government oppositors also appear to
been in open, continuous, have overlooked. This is the reliance on
exclusive and notorious Proclamation No. 217 of Governor
possession and occupation of General Henry L. Stimson as the
lands of the public domain operative act which converted the lands
suitable to agriculture, whether covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
disposable or not, under a bona Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong.
fide claim of ownership for at The land was not non-forest or
least 30 years shall be entitled to agricultural land prior to the 1929
the rights granted in subsection proclamation. It did not earn a
(b) hereof. (as amended by R.A. classification from non-forest into forest
No. 3872, section 1, approved land because of the proclamation. The
June 18, 1964). proclamation merely declared a special
Respondent Hilario contends that the forest reserve out of already existing
phrase "whether disposable or not" should be forest lands. The land was already forest
construed to mean that a parcel of land situated or timber land even before the
in an inalienable land may be privately-owned proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915
by a member of the cultural minorities. of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of
15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares
claimed area has no legal significance. A
person cannot enter into forest land and
ISSUE:
by the simple act of cultivating a portion
WON Hilario may own forest land. of that land, earn credits towards an
eventual confirmation of imperfect title.
The Government must first declare the
forest land to be alienable and disposable
HELD: agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
No. possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title."
Sec. 48 (c) must be read in conjunction
with Sec. 48 (b), which expressly declares that LUNOD vs. MENESES
the land referred to are agricultural lands which
may either be alienable or not. To hold
otherwise would be unconstitutional. FACTS: 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod,
As to the lower courts ruling that et.al., alleging that they each owned and
"applicants predecessor Shawidi, had been possessed farm lands, situated in the places
occupying and working on the land at the known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake
outbreak of the First World War in 1914" long named Calalaran; that the defendant Higino
before Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Meneses, is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve was issued, of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said
the Court has already declared in Republic v. lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the
Court of Appeals, supra: other; that from time immemorial, and
consequently for more than twenty years before The defendant Meneses might have constructed
1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the the works necessary to make and maintain a fish
rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement pond within his own land, but he was always
permitting the flow of water over the said land under the strict and necessary obligation to
in Paraanan, which easement the plaintiffs respect the statutory easement of waters charged
enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that upon his property, and had no right to close the
the water collected upon their lands and in the passage and outlet of the waters flowing from
Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of
Taliptip River. From that year however, the Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not
defendant, without any right or reason, lawfully injure the owners of the dominant
converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip
and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, River of the waters flooding the upper lands
prevented the free passage of the water through belonging to the plaintiffs. (Art. 552, CC)
said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became Case No. 37
flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters,
NAPOCOR VS IBRAHIM
They therefore asked that judgment be entered
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2008
against the defendant, declaring that the said
tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory Facts:
easement permitting the flow of water from the
property of the plaintiffs. Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in
Lanao del Norte.
Meneses denied the allegations of the In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of
complaint, contending that no statutory the sub-terrain area of the land and
easement existed nor could exist in favor of the constructed underground tunnels on the
lands described in the complaint, permitting the said property.
waters to flow over the fish pond that he, The tunnels were apparently being used
together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of
Bambang, the area and boundaries of which Lake Lanao and in the operation of
were stated by him, and which he and his NAPOCORs Agus projects.
brothers had inherited from their deceased In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs
mother. of Ibrahim) requested Marawi City
ISSUE: Whether or not the tract of land in Water District for a permit to construct
Paraanan is subject to statutory easement or install a motorized deep well on the
parcel of land but it was rejected on the
HELD: YES. The lands of Paraanan, being grounds that the construction would
lower, are subject to the easement of receiving cause danger to lives and property by
and giving passage to the waters proceeding reason of the presence of the
from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; underground tunnels.
this easement was not constituted by agreement Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay
between the interested parties; it is of a statutory damages and to vacate the sub-terrain
nature, and the law had imposed it for the portion of the land.
common public utility in view of the difference
in the altitude of the lands in the barrio Issue:
Bambang. (Art. 530, CC)
 WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of possession is neither convenient nor feasible.
the sub-terrain area of the land. If yes, are they This is in accordance with the principle that
entitled to the payment of just compensation. persons shall not be deprived of their property
except by competent authority and for public
Held: use and always upon payment of just
compensation.
YES. The sub-terrain portion of the
property belongs to Ibrahim. CASE NO. 38
MODESTO PALALI VS. JULIET AWISAN
The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of
the Civil Code which provides that: The owner
FACTS:
of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
Respondent Awisan claims to be the
and of everything under it, and he can construct
owner of a parcel of land (6.6698 hectares) in
thereon any works or make any plantations and
SitioCamambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain
excavations which he may deem proper, without
Province covered by her tax declaration no. 147.
detriment to servitudes and subject to special
On March 7 1994 she filed an action for
laws and ordinances. xxx
quieting of title against Petitioner Palali alleging
Hence, the ownership of land extends to that the latter occupied and encroached on the
the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. northern portion (a total of 848 square meters)
Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property as well as of her property. Respondent assails that the land
the sub-terrain area of the land where the was originally owned by her father who testified
underground tunnels were constructed. that he was able to consolidate ownership over
the land by declaring them from public land as
On the issue of just compensation, the well as purchasing from adjoining land owners.
Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim should be He also claimed to have introduced
paid a just compensation. improvements on the subject land since the
1960s.
Ibrahim could have dug upon their
property and built motorized deep wells but was Petitioner denies encroachment and
prevented from doing so by the authorities asserts ownership over the subject land. He
because of the construction of the tunnels maintained that he and his ancestors have
underneath the surface of the land. openly and continuously possessed subject land
since time immemorial. His own home and
plantations has been standing on the property
Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the for the last 20 years without disturbance against
sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have his ownership and possession thereof.
excavated the same for the construction of the RTC ruled in favor of herein Petitioner
deep wells. It has been shown that the but such ruling was reversed by the Court of
underground tunnels have deprived the plaintiffs Appeals in favor of herein respondent under the
of the lawful use of the land and considerably misinterpretation that the land in question is the
reduced its value. whole 6.6698 hectares owned by Respondent
Awanis while in fact the subject land in question
It was held that: If the government takes is only the 848 square meters northern portion.
property without expropriation and devotes the Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
property to public use, after many years, the
property owner may demand payment of just ISSUE:
compensation in the event restoration of
 Who between the parties has the better FACTS:
right over the subject property? On 29 December
2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
HELD: represented by the Toll Regulatory Board
The court finds merit in the trial courts (TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated
ruling in favor of herein petitioner. From their Complaint for Expropriation against landowners
consistent testimonies, the court finds that the whose properties would be affected by the
petitioners ancestors occupied the land during construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the
the pre-war era. Their witnesses were longtime North Luzon Expressway. Respondent Holy
residents of SitioCamambaey. They lived on the Trinity Realty and Development Corporation
land, knew their neighbors and were familiar (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.
with the terrain. They were witnesses to the
introduction of improvements made by On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent
petitioner and his predecessors. Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession, manifesting that it deposited a
On the other hand, respondent relied sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100%
merely on her tax declaration but failed to prove of the zonal value of the affected properties, in
actual possession. Respondent and her father the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the
allegedly introduced improvements upon the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor
subject property however such improvements Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized
were not seen during the ocular inspection by government depository. TRB maintained that
the RTC. Tax declarations by themselves are not since it had already complied with the
conclusive evidence of ownership of real provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
property. In absence of actual, public and 8974 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the
adverse possession, declaration of land for tax Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of
purposes does not prove ownership. possession becomes ministerial on the part of
Preponderance of evidence is clearly in favor of the RTC.
the petitioner. As the actual possessor under
claim of ownership, petitioner enjoys the On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with
presumption of ownership. Settled is the the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying
principle that a party seeking recovery of real that the respondent or its duly authorized
property must rely on the strength of her case representative be allowed to withdraw the
rather than on the weakness of the defense. amount of P22,968,000.00, out of
TRBs advance deposit of P28,406,700.00
Petition is granted. The CA ruling is reversed with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest
and set aside. which accrued thereon. Acting on said motion,
the RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003,
directing the manager of LBP-South Harbor to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, release in favor of HTRDC the amount
REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already
REGULATORY BOARD (TRB) vs. HOLY proved its absolute ownership over the subject
TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT properties and paid the taxes due thereon to the
CORP. government. According to the RTC, the issue
G.R. No. 172410 (April 14, 2008) however on the interest earned by the amount
deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still
NOTE: FIRST ISSUE additional information, be threshed out.
JUST GET THE 2nd ISSUE
 of Republic Act No. 8974 and
On 9 October 2003, TRB instead Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of
submitted a Manifestation to which was Court?
attached a letter dated 19 August 2003 by Atty.
Osoteo stating that the DPWH Expropriation 2. Whether or not the interest earned by the
Account was an interest bearing current deposited amount in the expropriation
account. account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue
of accession?
On 11 March 2004, the RTC issued an
Order resolving the issue of ownership of the
interest that had accrued on the amount HELD:
deposited by DPWH in its expropriation current 1. No. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of
account with LBP-South Harbor in favour of the Rules of Court speak of different
HTRDC, that the interest earnings from the procedures, with the former specifically
deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting one governing expropriation proceedings for
hundred (100%) percent of the zonal value of national government infrastructure
the affected properties in this expropriation projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, The
proceedings under the principle of accession are Court held:
considered as fruits and should properly pertain
to the herein defendant/property owner There are at least two crucial
[HTRDC]. differences between the respective
procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
The Republic, represented by the TRB, Rule 67. Under the statute, the
insisted that HTRDC is entitled only to an Government is required to make
amount equivalent to the zonal value of the immediate payment to the property
expropriated property, nothing more and owner upon the filing of the complaint
nothing less. According to the TRB, the owner to be entitled to a writ of possession,
of the subject properties is entitled to an exact whereas in Rule 67, the Government is
amount as clearly defined in both Section 4 of required only to make an initial
Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 2, Rule 67 deposit with an authorized
of the Rules of Court. government depositary. Moreover,
Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit
The TRB further points out that the be equivalent to the assessed value of the
expropriation account with LBP- property for purposes of taxation, unlike
South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as
of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account the relevant standard for initial
includes the compensation for the other compensation, the market value of the
landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. property as stated in the tax declaration
869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to or the current relevant zonal valuation of
respondent. the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the
ISSUE: improvements and/or structures using
1. Whether or not HTRDC is entitled the replacement cost method.
ONLY to an amount equivalent to
the zonal value of the expropriated The proceedings in this case deal with
property as defined in both Section 4 the expropriation of properties intended for a
national government infrastructure petitioner] TRB, conversely, the
project. Therefore, Republic Act No. 8974 is interest yield, as accession, in a
correctly applied by requiring the deposit of the bank deposit should likewise
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of pertain to the owner of the
the properties sought to be expropriated before money deposited.
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the Republic. That the expropriation account was in the
name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of
2. YES. Under Article 440 of the Civil Code, no moment. Thus,
the right of accession is conferred by
ownership of the principal property: Notwithstanding that the
amount was deposited under the
Art. 440. The ownership DPWH account, ownership over
of property gives the right by the deposit transferred by
accession to everything which is operation of law to the [HTRDC]
produced thereby, or which is and whatever interest, considered
incorporated or attached as civil fruits, accruing to the
thereto, either naturally or amount of Php22,968,000.00
artificially. should properly pertain to
[HTRDC] as the lawful owner of
The principal property in the case at bar the principal amount deposited
is part of the deposited amount in the following the principle of
expropriation account of DPWH which pertains accession. Bank interest partake
particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, the nature of civil fruits under
determined to be P22,968,000.00 of Art. 442 of the New Civil
the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already Code. And since these are
ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or considered fruits, ownership
its authorized representative. The deposit of the thereof should be due to the
amount was already deemed a constructive owner of the
delivery thereof to HTRDC: principal. Undoubtedly, being an
attribute of ownership, the
When the [herein [HTRDCs] right over the fruits
petitioner] TRB deposited the (jus fruendi), that is the bank
money as advance payment for interests, must be respected.
the expropriated property with an
authorized government Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that
depositary bank for purposes of the effects of a conditional obligation to give,
obtaining a writ of possession, it once the condition has been fulfilled, shall
is deemed to be a constructive retroact to the day of the constitution of the
delivery of the amount obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with
corresponding to the 100% zonal the given conditions, as determined by the RTC
valuation of the expropriated in its Order, the effects of the constructive
property. Since [HTRDC] is delivery retroacted to the actual date of the
entitled thereto and undisputably deposit of the amount in the expropriation
the owner of the principal account of DPWH.
amount deposited by [herein
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, directing the manager of LBP-South Harbor to
REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL release in favor of HTRDC the amount
REGULATORY BOARD (TRB) vs. HOLY of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already
TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT proved its absolute ownership over the subject
CORP. properties and paid the taxes due thereon to the
G.R. No. 172410 (April 14, 2008) government. According to the RTC, the issue
however on the interest earned by the amount
NOTE: FIRST ISSUE additional information, deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still
JUST GET THE 2nd ISSUE be threshed out.
FACTS:
On 29 December On 9 October 2003, TRB instead
2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, submitted a Manifestation to which was
represented by the Toll Regulatory Board attached a letter dated 19 August 2003 by Atty.
(TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Osoteo stating that the DPWH Expropriation
Complaint for Expropriation against landowners Account was an interest bearing current
whose properties would be affected by the account.
construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the
North Luzon Expressway. Respondent Holy On 11 March 2004, the RTC issued an
Trinity Realty and Development Corporation Order resolving the issue of ownership of the
(HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners. interest that had accrued on the amount
deposited by DPWH in its expropriation current
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent account with LBP-South Harbor in favour of
Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of HTRDC, that the interest earnings from the
Possession, manifesting that it deposited a deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting one
sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% hundred (100%) percent of the zonal value of
of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the affected properties in this expropriation
the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the proceedings under the principle of accession are
Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor considered as fruits and should properly pertain
Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized to the herein defendant/property owner
government depository. TRB maintained that [HTRDC].
since it had already complied with the
provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. The Republic, represented by the TRB,
8974 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the insisted that HTRDC is entitled only to an
Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
possession becomes ministerial on the part of expropriated property, nothing more and
the RTC. nothing less. According to the TRB, the owner
of the subject properties is entitled to an exact
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with amount as clearly defined in both Section 4 of
the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 2, Rule 67
that the respondent or its duly authorized of the Rules of Court.
representative be allowed to withdraw the
amount of P22,968,000.00, out of The TRB further points out that the
TRBs advance deposit of P28,406,700.00 expropriation account with LBP-
with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but
which accrued thereon. Acting on said motion, of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account
the RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003, includes the compensation for the other
landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. property as stated in the tax declaration
869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to or the current relevant zonal valuation of
respondent. the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the
ISSUE: improvements and/or structures using
3. Whether or not HTRDC is entitled the replacement cost method.
ONLY to an amount equivalent to
the zonal value of the expropriated The proceedings in this case deal with
property as defined in both Section 4 the expropriation of properties intended for a
of Republic Act No. 8974 and national government infrastructure
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of project. Therefore, Republic Act No. 8974 is
Court? correctly applied by requiring the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of
4. Whether or not the interest earned by the the properties sought to be expropriated before
deposited amount in the expropriation the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue the Republic.
of accession?
4. YES. Under Article 440 of the Civil Code,
the right of accession is conferred by
HELD: ownership of the principal property:
3. No. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court speak of different Art. 440. The ownership
procedures, with the former specifically of property gives the right by
governing expropriation proceedings for accession to everything which is
national government infrastructure produced thereby, or which is
projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, The incorporated or attached
Court held: thereto, either naturally or
artificially.
There are at least two crucial
differences between the respective The principal property in the case at bar
procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and is part of the deposited amount in the
Rule 67. Under the statute, the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains
Government is required to make particularly to HTRDC. Such amount,
immediate payment to the property determined to be P22,968,000.00 of
owner upon the filing of the complaint the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already
to be entitled to a writ of possession, ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or
whereas in Rule 67, the Government is its authorized representative. The deposit of the
required only to make an initial amount was already deemed a constructive
deposit with an authorized delivery thereof to HTRDC:
government depositary. Moreover,
Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit When the [herein
be equivalent to the assessed value of the petitioner] TRB deposited the
property for purposes of taxation, unlike money as advance payment for
Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the expropriated property with an
the relevant standard for initial authorized government
compensation, the market value of the depositary bank for purposes of
 obtaining a writ of possession, it once the condition has been fulfilled, shall
is deemed to be a constructive retroact to the day of the constitution of the
delivery of the amount obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with
corresponding to the 100% zonal the given conditions, as determined by the RTC
valuation of the expropriated in its Order, the effects of the constructive
property. Since [HTRDC] is delivery retroacted to the actual date of the
entitled thereto and undisputably deposit of the amount in the expropriation
the owner of the principal account of DPWH.
amount deposited by [herein
petitioner] TRB, conversely, the 41.) FLORENTINO v SUPERVALUE
interest yield, as accession, in a
bank deposit should likewise G.R. No. 172384, 12 September 2007
pertain to the owner of the
money deposited.
FACTS:
That the expropriation account was in the
name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of Florentino is a lessee of Supervalue (SM).
no moment. Thus, Florentino is the owner of Empanada Royale, a
food cart business entered into a contract of
Notwithstanding that the lease with SM. The contract was good for 4
amount was deposited under the months and after the end of the contract, both
DPWH account, ownership over parties had the option to either renew or
the deposit transferred by terminate the contract. Florentino and SM was
operation of law to the [HTRDC] able to renew the contract several times that it
and whatever interest, considered even lasted for a year. However, SM terminated
as civil fruits, accruing to the the contract with Florentino for the following
amount of Php22,968,000.00 violations: failure to open on two separate
should properly pertain to occasions; closing before mall closing time
[HTRDC] as the lawful owner of ;introducing a new variety of empanada without
the principal amount deposited the approval of SM. The store management then
following the principle of ordered the foreclosure of the space and along
accession. Bank interest partake with it were the personal belongings of the
the nature of civil fruits under petitioner. Florentino demanded for the return of
Art. 442 of the New Civil her personal belongings and of the security
Code. And since these are deposit that she has given SM.
considered fruits, ownership
thereof should be due to the
owner of the ISSUE:
principal. Undoubtedly, being an
attribute of ownership, the 1. Whether or not Florentino can claim for
[HTRDCs] right over the fruits reimbursement on the improvements that
(jus fruendi), that is the bank she has made?
interests, must be respected. 2. Whether or not Florentino is entitled to
claim for the security bond that she has
Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that posted?
the effects of a conditional obligation to give,
HELD: such terms and conditions.The courts may
equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the
(1)Florentino is no longer entitled for contracts in two instances:
reimbursment on the improvements that she has
done on her stall. 1. if the principal obligation has been
partly or ireegularly complied with;
Article 1678: If the lessee makes in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable to the 2. If there has been no compliance if the
use for which the lease is intended, without penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in
altering the form or substance of the property accordance with Article 1229:
leased,the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the of the Article 1229: The judge shall equitably reduce
improvements at that time. Should the lessor the penalty when the principal obligation has
refused to reimburse said amount the lessee may been partly or irregularly complied with by the
remove the improvements, even though the debtor. Even if there has been no performance,
principal thing may suffer damages thereby. He the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if
shall not, however, cause any more impairment it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
upon the property leased than is necessary." Damian Ignacio vs Elias Hilario
As stated in Geminianovs CA: "Being mere 76 Phil 605 Civil Law Property Accession
lessees, the private respondents knew that their Industrial Builder in Good Faith; Owner in
occupation of the premises would continue only Good Faith
for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be
considered as possessors nor builders in good Sometime during the 1940s in Pangasinan, a
faith" civil suit arose between Damian Ignacio and
Elias Hilario. Hilario was the owner of a parcel
of land. He later discovered that Ignacio built
some buildings therein (a granary and a house).
(2)Florentino is entitled to half of the security
After trial, Judge Antonio Felix of the Court of
deposits made with SM because it would
First Instance of Pangasinan ruled that both
unconscionable for the former to be imposed
were in good faith (Hilario was the owner in
such penalty.
good faith while Ignacio was the builder in good
Obligations with Penal clause: faith).

Article 1226: In obligations with penal clause, Judge Felix then spelled out the rights of the
the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for parties to wit:
damages and the payment of interests in case of
a.) Ignacio can retain possession over the
noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the
buildings he erected until after he is paid by
contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if
Hilario for the value of the buildings he erected;
the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty
of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation. b.) Hilario can choose to buy the said buildings
or he can choose to sell Ignacio his land since
The penalty may be enforced only when it is
the value of his land was only P45.00 while the
demandable in accordance with the provisions
value of the buildings erected was P2,000.00.
of this code.
However, Hilario refused to avail of his options.
As a rule the courts are not in the liberty to
Instead, he filed a motion in court to have
ignore the freedoms of the parties to agree on
Ignacio be ejected and have them destroy the The Petitioners alleged that the said property
buildings he erected. Judge Felipe Natividad (he became a subject of a cadastral survey due to
replaced Judge Felix), granted Hilarios motion. conflicts and overlapping of boundaries. In that
survey, Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to
ISSUE: Whether or not Hilario, the owner in petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and
good faith, may eject a builder in good faith that of IsidariaTrillo, their predecessor in
without choosing either to appropriate the interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that
building for himself after payment of its value Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138)
or to sell his land to the builder in good faith. covers 295 square meters of land, while the
sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of
HELD: No. The owner in good faith has to
Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only 230
make a choice. He cannot dispense the options
square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the
under the law and then eject the builder in good
latter area properly belongs to respondents and
faith. This is because both are in good faith.
that the land in question is part of the adjoining
But when can the owner in good faith land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their
compel the builder in good faith to remove the predecessor in interest.
building he erected?
Issue:
This is only available if after the owner in good
faith chose to sell his land to the builder in good Whether or not the first survey was erroneous or
faith and the latter fails to pay the value of the that it included part of the contiguous land of
land within the agree period. Only then can the petitioners' predecessor in interest?
owner in good faith compel the builder in good
faith to remove the building he erected. Held:
CASE 43 Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was
LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA presented to show that the first survey was
VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA erroneous or that it included part of the
BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in
interest as part of the lot now covered by
GR L-12486 31 AUG 1960 Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138).
Note that the difference in area between the land
Facts: covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the
resurvey plan is 65 square meters while the area
The herein Petitioners were sued by Bongato of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And
and Sanchez for the recovery of 87 square what is more, the alleged sketch plan of the
meters of residential land which they have resurvey was not presented in evidence.
inherited as the children of the spouses Marcos
Bongato and Eusebia. The former were ordered Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the
by the to vacate and deliver it to said land in question is part of the lot covered by the
respondents and to pay a monthly rental of Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the
P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until name of respondents' predecessor in interest.
they actually vacate the same, plus attorney's Said title has not been contested up to the
fees and costs. present, and, therefore, has become
inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the
land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a
Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive Case No. 44
and indefeasible after the lapse of the period
within which it may be impugned (Reyes, et al. Felices vs Iriola
vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs. G.R No. L-11269, Feb. 28, 1958
Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13). FACTS
Although without any legal and valid claim over It appears that Felices was the grantee
the land in question, petitioners, however, were of a homestead, by virtue of which he was
found by the Court of Appeals to have issued OCT. A month after patent, he conveyed
constructed a portion of their house thereon in in conditional sale to Iriola a portion of his
good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil homestead with an express stipulation subject to
Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the Sec. 119 of Act 141 (PLA), that after the lapse
land on which anything has been built in good of 5 years or as soon as may be allowed by law,
faith shall have the right to appropriate as his the vendor or his successors would execute in
own faith shall have the right to appropriate as vendee's favor a deed of absolute sale over the
his own the building, after payment to the land in question. 2 years after sale, Felices tried
builder of necessary and useful expenses, and in to recover the land, but the latter refused unless
the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or he was paid P2,000 as the value of
mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the improvements. Felices deposited the received
price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the price in court and filed this action.
land, have therefore the choice of either
appropriating the portion of petitioners' house ISSUE
which is on their land upon payment of the
proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to Whether or not appellant may re- cover
petitioners that part of their land on which or be reimbursed the value of his improvements
stands the improvement. It may here be pointed on the land in question.
out that it would be impractical for respondents
to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., HELD
buy that portion of the house standing on their
land, for in that event the whole building might While recognizing Felices' right to
be rendered useless. The more workable "redeem", Iriola insisted that he must first be
solution, it would seem, is for respondents to reimbursed. But investigation found that
sell to petitioners that part of their land on improvements were made after the complaint
which was constructed a portion of the latter's had been filed; some of the improvements were
house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to even introduced after a commissioner had
buy, then they must vacate the land and must already been appointed. "He who builds, plants
pay rentals until they do so. Of course, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the what is built, planted, or sown without right to
land if its value is considerably more than that indemnity" (Art. 449, New Civil Code). The
of the aforementioned portion of the house. If sale in question was executed by the parties
such be the case, then petitioners must pay within the 5-year prohibitive period (Sec 118 of
reasonable rent. The parties must come to an PLA), the same is absolutely null and void and
agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and ineective from its inception. Consequently,
should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix Felices never lost his title or ownership over the
the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article land in question, and there was no need either
448 of the new). for him to repurchase the same.
CASE 45 build on the property, could reasonably be
expected to later on give them the LAND. In
Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 scra 122 regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of
the Code provides:

Facts:
ART. 448.
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the
latter's mother had told him the couple could
build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE whom Ernesto
did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the The owner of the land on which anything has
LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 been built, sown orplanted in good faith,shall
whoprobably assumed that the wife's mother have the rightto appropriate as his own the
was the owner of the LAND and that,it would works,sowing or planting, after payment of the
be transferred to the spouses. Subsequently indemnity provided for in articles 546and 548,
turned out that the LANDhad been titled in the or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, sold the price of the land,and the one who sowed, the
the sameto petitioner SARMIENTO. proper rent.However, the builder or planter
SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment suit against cannotbe obliged to buy the land if its value is
them. Inthe evidentiary hearings before the considerably more than that of thebuilding or
Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submittedthe trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which if the owner of theland does not choose to
showed the price to beP15,000.00. On the other appropriate the building or trees after
hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of properindemnity. The parties shall agree upon
theRESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from the terms of the lease and in case of
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.Sarmientorefuse to disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
pay and give option to buy the property. thereof.

Issue: 2. No. The owner of the building erected in

good faith on a land owned byanother, is
1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith. entitled to retain the possession of the land until
he is paid thevalue of his building, under article
2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both
453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land.
refusal to pay thespouses and give option to
upon, the other hand, has the option, under
purchase.
article 361 (now Article 448),either to pay for
the building or to sell his land to the owner of
the building.
Held:
But he cannot,
1. Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were
builders in good faith in view of the peculiar as respondents here did,
circumstances under which they had constructed
refuse both to pay for the buildingand to sell the
the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they
land
knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's
mother-in-law who, having stated they could
and compel the owner of the building to remove 1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to
it fromthe land where it is erected. He is entitled the case at bar?
to such remotion only when, afterhaving chosen
to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for 2. Whether or not the land owner can be
the same.We hold, therefore, that the order of compelled to accept rent payments by the court
Judge Natividad compellingdefendants- (with both LO and BPS being in good faith)?
petitioners to remove their buildings from the
HELD:
landbelonging to plaintiffs-respondents only
because the latter choseneither to pay for such In the first issue, res judicata would not apply
buildings nor to sell the land, is null andvoid, should the first case be one for ejectment and
for it amends substantially the judgment sought the other for quieting of title. Article 448 of the
to beexecuted and is, furthermore, offensive to Civil Code provides that the land owner has 2
articles 361 (nowArticle 448) and 453 (now options to buy the building or to sell/rent his
Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignaciovs. land. This is so because the rights of the owner
Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).Disposition: of the land is older, and by the principle of
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is accession, he also has a right to the accessories.
hereby ordereddismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs. The Court remanded the case to the RTC to
determine the fair price of the land, the expenses
DEPRA VS DUMLAO incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in
value of the land, and whether the value of the
FACTS:
land is considerably more than the value of the
Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give
Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Depra 15 days to exercise such option.
Dumlao built his house on his own land, but the
ORTIZ vs. KAYANAN
kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depras
property. Upon finding this, Depras mom
FACTS: Plaintiff used to be the legal guardian
ordered Dumlao to move back from his
of Martin Dolorico II. When his ward died,
encroachment, then subsequently filed an action
plaintiff continued to cultivate and possess the
for unlawful detainer against Dumlao. latters property, which was formerly a subject
The lower court found that Dumlao was a of homestead application. In the said
builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay application, the wards uncle was named as his
rent (PhP5.00/month) forced lease between heir and successor in interest. Thus, the uncle
the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights
so Dumlao deposited this with the MTC. over the property in favor of Comintan and
Neither party appealed judgment so this became Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law and had
final and executory. the Director of Lands cancel the homestead
application. Ortiz protested, saying that he
1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint should be given preference to purchase the lot
for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this, inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has
stating that the suit is barred by res judicata. But been in continuous possession of the same, but
Depra averred that the lower court did not have was not given due course. Still, the lot in
jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real question was sold at a public auction wherein
property only the CFI has jurisdiction. defendant Comintan was the only bidder. On
appeal, respondent court rules that half of the
ISSUE: portion of land should be given to the defendant,
being the successful bidder. The other half It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits
should be awarded to Zamora without prejudice of the property, including the tolls collected by
to the right of Ortiz to participate in the public him from the passing vehicles, which according
bidding of the lot. If Ortiz is to be not declared to the trial court amounts to P25K, belongs to
the successful bidder, defendants should him and not to defendant/private respondent
reimburse jointly said plaintiff for the Quirino Comintan, in accordance with the
improvements introduced on the land, with him, decision itself, which decreed that the fruits of
having the right to retain the property until after the property shall be in lieu of interest on the
he has been paid for. It was later found out that amount to be paid to petitioner as
Ortiz collected tolls on a portion of the property reimbursement for improvements.
wherein he has not introduced any ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is still
improvement. The judgment became final and entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit
executory. Private respondents filed a motion all the fruits of the property, after the rendition
for its execution requesting that they file a bond by the trial court of its judgment confirming the
in lieu of the amount that should be paid to award of one- half of the property to Quirino
Ortiz, on the condition that after the accounting Comintan.
of the tolls collected by plaintiff, there is still
and amount due and payable to the said RULING: NO.
plaintiff, the bond shall be held answerable. 1. Possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received only before the possession is legally
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, interrupted, that is, from the moment defects in
contending that in issuing the Order and Writ of the title are made known to the possessor, by
Execution, respondent Court acted without or in extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action
excess of jurisdiction, moving astray from the in court by the true owner for the recovery of
terms of the judgment they purportedly seek to the property. Hence, all the fruits that the
enforce. He argued that since said judgment possessor may receive from the time he is
declared the petitioner a possessor in good faith, summoned in court, or when he answers the
he is entitled to the payment of the value of the complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to
improvements introduced by him on the whole the owner or lawful possessor.
property, with right to retain the land until he
has been fully paid such value. He likewise 2. However, even after his good faith ceases, the
averred that no payment for improvements has possessor can still retain the property (Art 546)
been made and, instead, a bond therefor had until he has been fully reimbursed for all the
been filed by defendants (private respondents), necessary and useful expenses made by him on
which, according to petitioner, is not the the property. Considering that the right of the
payment envisaged in the decision which would possessor to receive the fruits terminates when
entitle private respondents to the possession of his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order
the property. Furthermore, with respect to that this right to retain may be useful, to
portion "B", petitioner alleges that, under the concede to the creditor the right to secure
decision, he has the right to retain the same until reimbursement from the fruits of the property by
after he has participated and lost in the public utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the
bidding of the land to be conducted by the interest as well as the principal of the debt while
Bureau of Lands. It is claimed that it is only in he remains in possession.
the event that he loses in the bidding that he can
be legally dispossessed thereof. 3. Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own
exclusive benefit the tolls which he collected
from the property retained by him. It was his constructed a residential building. Tuatis
duty under the law, after deducting the asserted that she paid Visminda the remaining
necessary expenses for his administration, to balance of P3000 in the presence of one Erik
apply such amount collected to the payment of Selda and thereafter requested Visminda to sign
the interest, and the balance to the payment of the absolute deed of sale. Visminda refused
the obligation. contending that the purchase price has not been
fully paid. The RTC dismissed Tuatiss
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after complaint and also ruled that Tuatis constructed
deducting petitioner's expenses for the building in bad faith for she had knowledge
administration, belong to Quirino Comintan, of the fact that Visminda is still the absolute
owner of the land through which the toll road owner of the land and there was also bad faith
passed, further considering that the same was on on the part of Visminda since she allowed the
portions of the property on which petitioner had construction of the building without opposition
not introduced any improvement. The trial court on her part. The rights of the parties must,
itself clarified this matter when it placed the toll therefore, be determined as if they both had
road under receivership. The omission of any acted in bad faith. Their rights in such cases are
mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be governed by Article 448 of the Civil Code. The
attributed to the fact that the tolls appear to have Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal by Tuatis
been collected after the rendition of the which resulted to the finality of the appealed
judgment of the trial court. decision. Visminda filed a writ of execution.
Tuatis then moved that the RTC issue an order
4. As to the other lot, it appears that no public allowing her to buy the subject property and
sale has yet been conducted by the Bureau of maintained that she has the right to choose
Lands and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to between being indemnified for the value of her
remain in possession thereof. This is not building or buying from Visminda the parcel of
disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. After land. During the pendency of the motion, the
public sale is had and in the event that Ortiz is writ of execution was enforced. Tuatis filed with
not declared the successful bidder, then he the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
should be reimbursed by respondent Zamora in mandamus but the same was denied hence this
the corresponding amount for the improvements petition.
on Lot 5785-B
TUATIS VS. SPOUSES ELISEO AND ISSUE:
VISMINDA ESCOL Whether or not Tuatis is entitled to exercise the
G.R. No. 175399 October 27, 2009 options granted in Art. 448 of the Civil Code.

FACTS: RULING:
No, Tuatis is not entitled to exercise the options
Visminda Escol, the seller and Ophelia Tuatis, granted in Article 448 of the Civil Code.
the buyer entered into a Deed of Sale by
Installments, the subject matter of which is a Article 448 provides that the owner of the land
parcel of land in Sindangan. It provided that on which anything has been built, sown or
upon the failure of the buyer to pay the planted in good faith, shall have the right to
remaining balance within the time stipulated, he appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
shall return the land to the seller, and the seller planting, after payment of the indemnity
shall return all the amounts paid by the buyer. provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
Tuatis took possession of the land and oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the Still under the second option, if the present or
proper rent. However, the builder or planter current value of the land, the subject property
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is herein, turns out to be considerably more than
considerably more than that of the building or that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, be obliged to pay for the subject property, but
if the owner of the land does not choose to she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the
appropriate the building or trees after proper same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the terms.
the court shall fix the terms thereof The Court highlights that the options under
. Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the
According to the provision, the landowner can owner of the subject property. There is no basis
choose between appropriating the building by for Tuatis demand that, since the value of the
paying the proper indemnity for the same, as building she constructed is considerably higher
provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil than the subject property, she may choose
Code; or obliging the builder to pay the price of between buying the subject property from
the land, unless its value is considerably more Visminda and selling the building to Visminda
than that of the structures, in which case the for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And,
Under the first option, Visminda may depending on Vismindas choice, Tuatis rights
appropriate for herself the building on the as a builder under Article 448 are limited to the
subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for following: (a) under the first option, a right to
the necessary and useful expenses the latter retain the building and subject property until
incurred for said building, as provided in Article Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under
546 of the Civil Code. Until Visminda the second option, a right not to be obliged to
appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the pay for the price of the subject property, if it is
building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may considerably higher than the value of the
retain possession of the building and the subject building, in which case, she can only be obliged
property. to pay reasonable rent for the same.

Under the second option, Visminda may choose

not to appropriate the building and, instead, Case No. 49
oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC
value of the land.The P10,000.00 price of the
subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale G.R No. 68166, February 12, 1997
on Installment executed in November 1989,
shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be Facts:
obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in
the exercise of Vismindas rights under Article On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual
448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said filed an application for foreshore lease covering
Deed. Tuatis obligation will then be statutory, a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga,
and not contractual, arising only when Visminda Bataan, having an area of approximately
has chosen her option under Article 448 of the seventeen (17) hectares. This application was
Civil Code. denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion
for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased,
Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The
five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
application was denied, eventually however the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land petitioners' own tract of land on the northern
is an accretion to his property, The Talisay side. As such, the applicable law is not Article
River as well as the Bulacan River flow 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the
Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor public domain. As part of the public domain, the
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that herein disputed land is intended for public uses,
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to
possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the national domain and is reserved for public
the same being a portion of the public domain uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the any private person, except through express
Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the court a authorization granted in due form by a
quo rendered judgment finding the subject competent authority."Only the executive and
property to be foreshore land and, being a part possibly the legislative departments have the
of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of right and the power to make the declaration that
land registration proceedings. On appeal, the the lands so gained by action of the sea is no
respondent court reversed the findings of the longer necessary for purposes of public utility or
court a quo and granted the petition for for the cause of establishment of special
registration of the subject property but industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners
excluding certain areas. A motion for utterly fail to show that either the executive or
reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the legislative department has already declared the
same was denied. Anchoring their claim of disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the
ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the
petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed property of petitioners as owners of the estates
14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the adjacent thereto.
joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers
which run their course on the eastern and CASE NO. 50
western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CA
own tract of land. AND TANCINCO

Issue: FACTS:
Benjamin Tancinco et, al are registered
Whether or not the petitioners can owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-
rightfully claim the land under the principle of 89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
accretion Bulacan bordering the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
Held:
On 24 June 1973, Tancinco filed an
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The application for registration of 3 lots adjacent to
principle of accretion is only applicable to their fishpond property. On 26 June 1976, the
owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as lower court rendered decision granting the
application on the finding that the land in effect of the current of the rivers but as a result
question are accretions to the Tancinco fishpond of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
covered by TCT 89709. The Republic appealed encroaching upon it.
to the CA however the appellate court rendered
decision in favor of the lower court. Hence this
petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of
the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion can be
valid subject of registration.

HELD:
Supreme Court granted the petition,
reversed and set aside the decision appealed
from and orders private respondents to move
back the dikes of their fishpond to their original
location and return the disputed property to the
river which it belongs.
There is no accretion to speak of as the
transfer of dikes is man-made and artificial.
Private respondents merely transferred their
dikes further down the river bed and thus such
accretion is not the result of gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the
river. Article 457 of the New Civil Code states
that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters. Article 457 requires the
concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion is said to have taken place; 1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible. 2) that it
be made through the effects of the current of the
waters. 3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent ti the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should
be due to the effects of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Article 457
all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition of said
property was made gradually through the effects
of the currents of the river. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole