Buhat vs CA

265 SCRA 701

December 17,1996
Hermossisima;

Quick Facts: An information for Homicide was filed against Danny Buhat. After arraignment and plea of
not guilty, the Secreatary of Justice granted the appeal and ordered the hief prosecutor to amend the
information upgrading the offense to MURDER and implead additional accused.

Facts:

 On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against petitioner Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe".
 The information alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife,
unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held
his arms, "using superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which were x x x the direct x x x
cause of his death."
 Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the
arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for
the reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the
aforementioned information for homicide.
 Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion.
 Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded "not guilty", trial
ensued.
 On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yu's appeal
meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City "to amend the information by
upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein additional accused Herminia
Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat."
 Amendent information:

"The undersigned assistant City Prosecutor accuses DANNY BUHAT, of Capricho II,
Barangay V, Roxas City, Philippines. HERMINIA ALTAVAS AND OSMEÑA ALTAVAS both
resident' of Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Philippines, of the crime of Murder, committed as
follows:

That on or about the l6th day of October, 1992, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, the
above-named accused, Danny Buhat armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did and then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic]
without justifiable motive and with intent to kill, attack, stab and injure one RAMON
GEORGE YU, while the two other accused held the arms of the latter, thus using superior
strength, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Ramon
 George Yu in such amount as maybe [sic] awarded to them by the court under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

 The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.

 In an order,6 dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend information.
The denial was premised on (1) an invocation of the trial court's discretion in disregarding the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs. Mogul and (2) a conclusion
reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest prosecutor is more persuasive than
that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having actually conducted the preliminary
investigation "where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigated
 The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed a petition
for certiorari assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave to amend information.
 COURT OF APPEALS: -allowed the amendment of information from homicide to murder, and
the inclusion of Herminia Altavas and Osmeña Altavas as additional accused. (Finding the
proposed amendment as nonprejudicial to petitioner's rights, respondent court granted the
petition for certiorari in a decision, dated March 28, 1995.)

Issues:

1. WON the additional allegation o conspiracy is a substantial amendment. NO

2. WON the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder
is such a substantial amendment that it is disallowed if made after the accused had pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime of homicide.

Held/Ratio: NO

1. On the additional allegation of conspiracy

 The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioner's participation
as principal not having been affected by such amendment
 General rule: the allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents accused, which was
not previously included in the original information, is x x x a substantial amendment saddling the
respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial
court(people vs Montenegro)
 Exception: where an amendment after plea resulting in the inclusion of an allegation of
conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons in addition to the original accused,
constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment(people vs. Zulueta)
 The aforegoing principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely applies in the
present controversy
 Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu whom
petitioner is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's arms. The
addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another" does not change
the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in the killing.
 Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to defend
himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public protection the
punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior strength, a fellow citizen in
whose health and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no tenable basis
to decry the amendment in question.
 Furthermore, neither may the amendment in question be struck down on the ground that
Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat would be placed in double jeopardy by
virtue of said amendment. In the first place, no first jeopardy can be spoken of insofar as the
Altavases are concerned since the first information did not precisely include them as accused
therein. In the second place, the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of
Renato Buhat who was found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held
the arms of the victim while petitioner was stabbing him,18 is only a formal amendment and
one that does not prejudice any of the accused's rights.
 Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused involves merely a
matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to
present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the
revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it
introduce any new and material fact.19 In fact, it is to he expected that the information has to
be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor

2. On the amendment of the name of the crime to MURDER.

 "Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information charging
homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal
amendment permissible even after arraignment
 In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo,we ruled that the amendment of the information so as to
change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made "even if it may result in
altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused."
 At the outset, the main consideration should be whether or not the accused had already made
his plea under the original information, for this is the index of prejudice to, and the violation of,
the rights of the accused.
 The question as to whether the changing of the crime charged from homicide to the more
serious offense of murder is a substantial amendment proscribed after the accused had pleaded
"not guilty" to the crime of homicide was, it should be noted, categorically answered in the
affirmative by us in the case of Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy.
 The said case(Dacuycuy) however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein
sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
"x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat stabbing the
deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, 'the
Information already alleged superior strength'; and inflicting mortal wounds which led to the
death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
 Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength , and the additional allegation that
the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were being held by the two
other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe....
 If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then to repeat,
there is murder
 Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not allowing change of
designation from homicide to murder, but then the body of the Information in the Dacuycuy
ruling did not allege averments which qualifies [sic] the offense of murder. The case before us
instead is different in that the Information already alleges that Buhat attacked the deceased
while his two other companions held him by the aims, 'using superior strength.' x x x We would
even express the possibility that if supported by evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could still be
penalized for murder even without changing the designation from homicide to murder, precisely
because of aforementioned allegations. The proposed change of the word from homicide to
murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should be prohibited
 In the matter of amending a criminal information, what is primarily guarded against is the
impairment of the accused's right to intelligently know the nature of the charge against him.
This right has been guaranteed the accused under all Philippine Constitutions26 and
incorporated in Section 1 (b), Rule 115, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on
the merits x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged.
 The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific
name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the matter therein
set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of
substantive right how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the
body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal x x x. For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights.
 The real and important question to him is, 'Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?' not, 'Did you commit a crime named murder?' If he performed the acts alleged, in
the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penaly
 therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. If the
accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.
 The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but
from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the information.
 Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that having already pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to murder
is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the original information did
allege that petitioner stabbed his victim "using superior strength." And this particular
allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a killing is technically
designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor.

NOTE:

On another aspect, we find merit in the manifestation of the Solicitor General to the effect that the
respondent Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that petitioner and Renato Buhat are one and the
same person, hence the non-inclusion of Renato Buhat as additional accused in its order allowing the
amendment of the information.38 We also agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
amended information filed in this case still fails to embody the correct identity of all of the persons
found to be indictable in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Explained the Solicitor General:

"In its Decision under review, the Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that Danny Buhat and Renato
Buhat are one and the same person (CA Decision, 1st par.). This, however, is not correct because Danny
Buhat and Renato Buhat are, in fact, brothers. Moreover, it was not Osmeña Altavas and his wife
Herminia Altavas who held the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him.

Verily, the statement of facts in the Information or Amended Information must conform with the
findings of fact in the preliminary investigation (in this case, as reviewed by the Secretary of Justice) so
as to make it jibe with the evidence x x x to be presented at the trial x x x.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas City is
HEREBY ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information fully in accordance with the findings of fact
set forth in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, dated February 3, 1994, and in disregard of the
finding of the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated March 28, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 3 55 54 to the
effect that "Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are one and the same person."