EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003.]

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO

CASTILLO, respondent.

Ariel M. Los Banos for complainant.

SYNOPSIS
At bar is an administrative case for disbarment filed against respondent
on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent allegedly had an illicit
relationship with a woman other than his wife and sired a child with her. The
respondent did not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant, but
argued that what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and
desire. He claimed that he did not use any deception to win her affection.
The Supreme Court held that siring a child with a woman other than his
wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every
lawyer. Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not
his wife and now refused to recognize and support a child whom he
previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly, he violated the
standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be
disciplined accordingly. The fact that complainant entered into a relationship
with him knowing full well his marital status did not absolve respondent of
gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this was respondent's
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It was not dependent whether
or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
The Court held that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Accordingly, it found the respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and
imposed upon him the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.

SYLLABUS
1.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; GROSS IMMORALITY; IMMORAL CONDUCT;
DEFINED. Immoral conduct has been defined as: ". . . that conduct which is
so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency."

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SIRING A CHILD WITH A WOMAN OTHER THAN HIS WIFE IS A
CONDUCT WAY BELOW THE STANDARDS OF MORALITY REQUIRED OF EVERY
LAWYER. In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in
castigating a judge stated that: ". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has
to conform to the strict standard of conduct demanded of members of the
profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife
fails to meet these standards." Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is
a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYERS MUST NOT ONLY IN FACT BE OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER BUT MUST ALSO BE SEEN TO BE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER;
CASE AT BAR. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his
notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by
Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification. This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer
of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." While
respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he
seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are
polygamous," and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual
lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the
reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYER'S FITNESS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION NOT DEPENDENT ON WHETHER THE OTHER PARTY KNOWINGLY
ENGAGED IN AN IMMORAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MARRIED LAWYER.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection.
Grantingarguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing
full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for
what is in question in a case like this is respondent's fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party
knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.

5.ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS; DEFENSE OF IN PART DELICTO

IMMATERIAL THEREIN. We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari
delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras: "In a disbarment
proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is
not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law
profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts."

6.ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS; AN APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP

IN THE BAR MUST SHOW THAT HE POSSESSES GOOD MORAL CHARACTER.
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing
to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him
that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is
possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. DHSACT

7.ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IS A CONTINUING

REQUIREMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession; it is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore admission to the bar
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This
is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption
that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.

8.ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR IS A PRIVILEGE BURDENED WITH

CONDITIONS. The Court held: "The practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during
good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard."
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya: "The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law."

9.ID.; ID.; ID.; STANDARDS OF MORALITY; VIOLATED WHERE A LAWYER

REPEATEDLY ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONGRESS WITH A WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE
AND REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT THEIR CHILD. Respondent
repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now
refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and
promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of
morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

10.ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; NOT TO BE METED OUT IF A LESSER PUNISHMENT

COULD BE GIVEN; INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IMPOSED UPON RESPONDENT IN
CASE AT BAR. As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be
meted out if a lesser punishment could be given. Records show that from the
time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now
lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not
perceive this fact as an indication of respondent's effort to mend his ways or that
he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that
indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall
last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the
Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral
integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.

11.ID.; ID.; A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY

MISCONDUCT EVEN IF IT PERTAINS TO HIS PRIVATE ACTIVITIES. The rule is
settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if
it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre

against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became
officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 1 Respondent courted
complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be
single. 2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996
and lasted until 1997. 3 During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar
examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member
of the Philippine Bar. 4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife
went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with
respondent. 5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and
recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. 6 On December 09, 1997,
complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. 7 By this time however,
respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form
of support. 8

Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired

between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented
himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and
with children; 9 complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew
beforehand that he is already married; 10 the child borne by complainant it not
his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having
an affair. 11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he
did not know at the time that complainant was seeing other men. 12

After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo
Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct."

xxx xxx xxx

 "CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."

xxx xxx xxx

"Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession."

Immoral conduct has been defined as:

". . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show

indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the common sense of decency." 13

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary
public, he declared explicitly:

"1.That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;

"2.That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with

my child;

"3.That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her
womb to be my own;

"4.That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including

his/her personal and medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing
and other necessities for living, which I will give through his/her mother,
Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and capable to
live on his/her own;

"5.That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof

that he/she is my child; however, my failure to sign does not negate the
recognition and acknowledgement already done herein;

"6.That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and

being a lawyer, I have full knowledge of the consequence of such
acknowledgment and recognition."14
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in
part:

"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g.,
Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your
daughter.

"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I

cannot promise fix amount for monthly support of your daughter.
However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than P1,000." 15

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a
judge stated that:

". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict

standard of conduct demanded of members of the profession. Certainly,
fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet
these standards." 16

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer. 17

Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement

recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a
certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a
member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. 18

This Court has repeatedly held:

"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards." 19

While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant
he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are
polygamous," 20 and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual
lust and desire." 21 The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the
reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection.
Granting arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him
knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondent's fitness to be
a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other
party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.

We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The
Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:

"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in

pari delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members,
to protect the public and the courts." 22

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing
to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him
that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is
possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. 23 This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession; 24 it is
a continuing requirement to the practice of law 25 and therefore admission to the
bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into
any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer.
This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.

The Court held:

"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We
must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity
to be heard." 26

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence

to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
 degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law." 27

Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife
and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized
and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of
morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser
punishment could be given. 28 Records show that from the time he took his oath
in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and
children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an
indication of respondent's effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the
impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court
deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension
should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time
that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has
instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and
uprightness required of every member of the profession.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 29

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of

Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from
the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 11.

2.Id., p. 2.

3.Id., p. 12.

4.Annex "A", Rollo, p. 5.

5.Rollo, p. 2.

6.Id., p. 7.

7.Annex "B", Rollo, p. 6.

8.Rollo, p. 2.

9.Id., at p. 11.

10.Id., at p. 13.

11.Id., at p. 12.

12.Id., at p. 13.

13.Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, 464 (1998).

14.Annex "C", Rollo, p. 7.

15.Id., at p. 39.

16.A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519, August 8, 2002.

17.Paras vs. Paras, 343 SCRA 414, 426 (2000).

18.Marcayda vs. Naz, 125 SCRA 466, 469 (1983).

19.Narag vs. Narag, supra, footnote 13.

20.Rollo, p. 14.

21.Id., at p. 11.

22.100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956).

23.Cordova vs. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680, 683 (1989); Vda. de Mijares vs. Villaluz, 274
SCRA 1, 8 (1997).

24.Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93, 100 (1998); Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA 416
(1996); Villanueva vs. Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 (1995); People vs. Tunada, 18
SCRA 692 (1990);Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662 (1989).

25.Nakpil vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, 774 (1998).

26.Sebastian vs. Calis, 344 SCRA 1, 8 (1999).

27.334 SCRA 513, 521 (2000).

28.Saburnido vs. Madrono, A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001.

29.Nakpil vs. Valdes, supra.