Cabador v. People
Cabador v. People
Cabador v. People
*SECOND DIVISION.
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ABAD,J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision of August 4, 20081 and
Resolution of October 28, 20082 in CA-G.R. SP 100431 that
afrmed the August 31, 2006 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City.
The facts are not disputed.
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner
Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case
Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N.
Valerio.4 On February 13, 2006, after presenting only ve witnesses
over ve years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the
prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the prosecution
to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within
15 days from notice.5 But the public prosecutor asked for three
extensions of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006.
Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador led a motion to dismiss
the case,6 complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since
his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy
trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court
could not consider any evidence against him that had not been
formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution
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witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime
charged.
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on
July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the RTC for another extension
of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on
August 1, 2006, the day Cabador led his motion to dismiss.7
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner
Cabadors August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he led his motion without leave of court, the
RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his
defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision
insofar as he was concerned. Cabador led a motion for
reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on February 19,
2007.8 Cabador questioned the RTCs actions before the CA but on
August 4, 2008 the latter denied his petition and afrmed the lower
courts actions.9 With the CAs denial of his motion for
reconsideration, on October 28, 2008 petitioner came to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari.
The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner Cabadors
motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to
evidence led without leave of court, with the result that he
effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and
submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned.
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: rst,
the prosecutions presentation of evidence against the accused and,
second, the accuseds presentation of evidence in his defense. If,
after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears
insufcient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own
initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage
and dismiss the criminal action.10 There is no point for the
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trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since
the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to
delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat.
When the accused les a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case
shall be considered submitted for judgment.11 On occasions, this
presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the
accused les a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the
appearance of a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not
one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections12 that,
to determine whether the pleading led is a demurer to evidence or a
motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it
made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is
led; and (3) the primary objective of the party ling it.
Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner Cabadors motion to
dismiss read as follows:
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dismiss the action on the ground of insufciency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence led by
the accused with or without leave of court.
If the Court denies the demurrer to evidence led with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is led without leave of court,
the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution.
x x x x
11Id., par. 2; see Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007,
515 SCRA 502, 512.
12347 Phil. 510; 283 SCRA 229 (1997).
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dated November 21, 2001 where he had been detained during the course of
this case.
3.The accused was arraigned on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon
after.
4.UP-OLA entered its appearance as counsel for the accused on
January 20, 2005.
5. On February 10, 2006, the Honorable Court terminated the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution considering that the case has
been going on for 5 years already and during that period the prosecution has
only presented 5 witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had been numerous
postponements due to failure of the prosecution to ensure the presence of its
witnesses.
6.In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable court required the
public prosecutor to submit its formal offer of evidence within fteen (15)
days from receipt of such order.
7.On April 17, 2006, the public prosecutor was again absent so the
presentation of evidence for the accused was reset to June 6, 2006.
8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again granted an
additional fteen (15) days within which to le their formal offer of
evidence.
9.On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and to
le their formal offer of evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again
extended to the prosecution an additional fteen (15) days from receipt of
the order within which to le their formal offer of evidence.
10. On June 28, 2006, the Honorable Court issued an order granting
the prosecution a thirty-day extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which
to le their formal offer of evidence since the public prosecutor was on
leave.
11.Upon the expiration of the extension granted by the Honorable
Court, the prosecution failed to le their formal offer of evidence.
10.(Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to le
formal offer of evidence.
11.(Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. A
formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their ndings of
fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by
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the parties at the trial (Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any
formal offer of evidence, this Honorable Court has no evidence to consider.
12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The
witnesses that had been presented by the prosecution testied mainly on the
occurrences on the night of the incident and had no knowledge of any
connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident.
13. The hearings of the case have been delayed since 2001 through no
fault of the defense to the prejudice of the rights of the accused to a speedy
trial, mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16 of the Constitution.
14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the case had
been reset for twelve (12) times, most of which are due to the fault or
absence of the prosecution. For the ve year duration of the case, the
prosecution still has not presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly
stripped of this liberty for more than ve (5) years upon an unsubstantiated
charge.
15.The accused was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest
which resulted in the amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely
hampered and his living conditions are less adequate. To subject him to
further delays when there is no substance to the charge against him would
tantamount to injustice.13
It can be seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains
to point out in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 10 (sic), 13,
14, and 15 above how trial in the case had painfully dragged on for
years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often
postponed because of the prosecutors absence. This was further
compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions
for extension of time to le its formal offer and its failure to le it
within such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his
right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore
these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion
as a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in
paragraphs 11 (sic) and 12 regarding the inadequacy of the
evidence against him.
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14People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688,
700-701, 708.
15Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 496, 507; 257 SCRA 703, 713 (1996).
16Rollo, pp. 24 and 30.
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on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard
or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence led by the accused with or without
leave of court. (Emphasis supplied)
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17Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.,
G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117, 135.