Summary of the Report:

Back Testing of Investment Performance by Asset Class

This summary was prepared by a member of the

The report was sponsored by the

Society of Actuaries Pension Section and

Pension Section Research Committee

Summary: Many actuaries now practice in the investment world, and many of the contemporary
practices may be influenced by recent (2000 to the present) market performance. What would have
happened if an investment actuary could have traveled in a time machine to 1974 and employed
contemporary investment strategies in the past? To answer that question, the SOA Pension Section
hired a research team to conduct a back testing exercise of several investment strategies over several
past time periods (1974 -2010, 1974 -1994, 1980 -2000, 1985 -2005 and 1990 -2010). The researchers
looked at open and closed plans. They also investigated scenarios where the plan started at 100 percent
funding and perhaps more importantly for today, plans that were initially at 70 or 80 percent funding.
They looked at the impact of rebalancing. Finally to compare the investment performance, the
researchers present a number of summary statistics for the reader to make his or her own comparisons,
including portfolio return, standard deviation of the portfolio return, average, maximum and minimum
percent funding and the standard deviation of the funding levels. There is also a discussion about
efficiency. Efficiency is a measure of the degree of risk associated with the expected investment
return. The ideal investment strategy maximizes returns with a minimum of risk. If there are two
investment strategies, both with the same expected return, the investment strategy with the least risk is
the more efficient strategy. The Sharpe ratio, which is one measure of efficiency, was defined and
provided for each time period and investment period.

The paper has two audiences, the investment actuary, and the pension actuary. If you are an investment
actuary, I urge you to read the paper. You can read the executive summary yourself with the papers key
findings.

I myself am the only member of the Project Oversight Committee who is not a practicing investment
actuary. I think the paper is also valuable to traditional pension actuaries. While many actuaries work
with larger pension plans that also work with investment actuaries or other investment professionals to
manage risk, many smaller plans operate without the benefit of considering the risks inherent in their
strategy. Their investment allocations may be based on common rules of thumb, (e.g. 60 percent
equities, 40 percent bonds). They may even switch to a more aggressive investment strategy (increase
the equity allocation from 60 to 70 percent) to justify the continued use of the current discount rate
assumption without sufficiently considering the associated risk.

In such cases, if the pension actuary has some investment knowledge, he or she can recommend that
the trustee consult with an investment professional or at least make the parties he has contact with
aware of the possible impact of increased volatility on the Plan so that the Plan Sponsor should not
unduly focus on expected return without considering the impact of volatility as well.

So if a 70/30 percent asset allocation has a greater expected return than a 60/40 percent asset
allocation, why not go to the 70/30 allocation? First, the increased volatility needs to be considered, and
that increased volatility may impact the accounting expense or the cash contributions under the Plans
funding policy. Most Plan Sponsors like stable results. Second, pension investment returns are
asymmetric. What do I mean by that? While funding deficiencies cause headline risk and strain budgets,
funding surpluses cannot be readily accessed by plan sponsors.

Consider the following results of the paper comparing the 25 percent equity allocation to the 100
percent equity allocation from 1990 -2010.
Percent Equity Average Percent Std Dev of Funding Maximum Minimum Funding
Funded Levels Funding Percentage
Percentage
25 percent 100% 10% 127% 86%
100 percent 121% 38% 232% 71%
The 100 percent equity allocation appears to be better because the plan is on average 121 percent
funded while the 25 percent equity allocation is only on average 100 percent funded. While that is true,
the Plan Sponsor cant readily access the 21 percent surplus any way. Furthermore, the price of the
excess return was close to 4 times the volatility and in the worst year was only 71 percent funded,
compared to 86 percent funded for the worst year under the 25 percent equity allocation. So speaking
for myself only, I would prefer the 25 percent equity allocation over the 100 percent asset allocation.

I work with a number of public sector OPEB plans that werent pre-funded until a few years ago. Their
assets as a percent of the accrued liability can be expected to be small in the first few years and
gradually increase over time. In the first years, the asymmetric nature of investment returns should be
no concern. The Plan Sponsor may select an aggressive investment policy after being aware of the risks
at that time. However as the plan becomes better funded the old investment policy may no longer be
appropriate for the plan.

For example, lets say the plan has a choice of two investments. Under Investment A, over the next 3
years, there is a 50 year percent chance that the investment will increase 95 percent (25 percent per
year), and 50 percent chance that the investment will lose 15 percent (minus 5 percent per year). The
expected return is 10 percent per annum. Under Investment B, the plan will earn a guaranteed rate of 5
percent per year.

Lets say that the Plan is currently 30 percent funded, and lets leave aside the issue of accruals, future
plan contributions and other plan experience. Under Investment A if the investment pans out, then after
three years the Plan will be close to 60 percent funded, but if things do not work out the Plan will be
about 25 percent funded. Under Investment B, the Plan will be 35 percent funded after three years.
The Plan Sponsor could well decide that Investment A is a better Investment than Investment B.

Now lets look at the same choice for the same OPEB plan in the future when it is 85 percent funded.
Under Investment A, if the investment pans out, then after three years the Plan will be over 165 percent
funded, but if things do not work out the Plan will be about 73 percent funded. Under Investment B,
the Plan will be 98 percent funded after three years. Investment B would appear to be the better
option. Even if Investment A panned, out the extra overfunding may not be very useful to the Plan
Sponsor. Indeed there could be pressure to improve benefits, and if the Plan stayed with Investment A
and over the next three years the investment did not pan out, there could be future underfunding.
While the choices are exaggerated, this did happen to some pension plans that enjoyed stellar returns in
the 1990s, improved plan benefits and then experienced the poor returns of the 2000s.

The back-testing paper talks about an investment strategy where a Plan gradually invests more
conservatively as the Plan becomes better funded. This kind of investment thinking is very useful to an
OPEB Plan that is gradually becoming better funded, or perhaps a Pension Plan that is currently poorly
funded and hopes to be better funded in the future.

In summary, I think this paper is also important for pension actuaries as well as investment actuaries.