Gina Endaya vs. Ernesto v. Villaos
Gina Endaya vs. Ernesto v. Villaos
Gina Endaya vs. Ernesto v. Villaos
SECOND DIVISION
Present:
CARPIO, Chairperson,
-versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
:MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ.
DECISION
Factual Antecedents
1
Rollo, pp. 34-57.
2
Id. at 58-66; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concmred in by Associate Justices
Rosmari D. Carandang and Danton Q. Bueser.
3
Id. at 68-85; penned by Judge Mario P. Legazpi.
4
Id. at 86-91.
5
Id. at67.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 202426
The complaint in the main said that the purported sale of the affected
lots, from Atilano to respondent, was spurious.
Denying that Atilano, during his lifetime, had executed deeds of sale
involving the subject lots in favor of respondent, petitioner stated that during the
alleged execution of said deeds, Atilano was no longer ambulatory and could no
longer talk and give assent to the deeds of sale. She added that Atilano, an
educated and successful businessman, could have affixed his [signature] to the
documents and not merely put his thumbmark on it. She claims that the deeds of
sale were forged and could not have been executed with Atilanos consent.
Petitioner further contended that the deeds of sale could not have been
properly notarized because the same were notarized in Palawan at a time when
Atilano was purportedly confined at a hospital in Quezon City. Finally,
petitioner questioned the propriety of the ejectment case since according to her,
they already have filed Civil Case No. 4162 precisely to nullify the deeds of sale.
In its decision,9 the MTCC held that an action questioning the ownership
of a property does not bar the filing of an ejectment case since the only issue for
resolution in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material possession of
the property independent of any claim of ownership. Such being the case, the
MTCC had jurisdiction to decide as to who is entitled to the possession of the
residential house. It ruled that respondent had the right to the possession of the
6
Or WSH.
7
MTCC records, pp. 1-5.
8
Located in Puerto Princesa City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 8940, 8941, 8942, 8943,
8944, 10774, 19319, and 17932.
9
MTCC records, pp. 423-447; Decision dated August 6, 2007 in Civil Case No. 1940, penned by Judge
Lydia Abiog-Pe.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 202426
residential house subject of the instant case and ordered the petitioners to vacate
the same and pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
However, the RTC deleted the award for attorney's fees, saying that there
was no factual and legal basis to justify the same.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the RTC should
pass judgment on the legality of the deeds for the purpose of deciding who
between the parties has a better right to possession even if the same issue is
pending before another court.
The RTC denied the motion in its Resolution11 dated 29 May 2009 x x x.
xxxx
In the end, it can even be added that when appellants decided to lodge
10
Rollo, pp. 68-85.
11
Id. at 86-91.
12
Herein petitioner and the Atilano heirs.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 202426
civil case no. 4162, even while the ejectment case was pending with the court a
quo, they have empowered Branch 52 of this Court, to which the former case
was assigned, to decide squarely and bindingly the issue of the validity or
invalidity of the deeds of sale. Consequently, they must have known and
understood the legal and practical impacts of this decision of theirs on the
capacity of the court a quo, and of this Court eventually, to make a similar
determination even for a limited, and especially for a limited, purpose only.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review14 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 110427. Petitioner later filed an Amended Petition for Review, with
Supplement.15 She claimed that the RTC erred in affirming the MTCC; that the
MTCC and RTC erred in not passing upon the issue of validity of the deeds of sale
executed by Atilano in favor of respondent and declaring that said issue should be
resolved in Civil Case No. 4162 for declaration of nullity of said deeds of sale,
recovery of titles, and accounting before the Palawan RTC Branch 52; that it was
necessary to pass upon the validity of the deeds of sale even if the same is the
main point of contention in Civil Case No. 4162, because the question of
possession in the ejectment case cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership;16 that while respondent claimed that the subject lots were sold to him,
title to the same remains in the name of Atilano even up to this day; and that the
MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the only issue for resolution in an
ejectment case is the question of who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property in dispute which is independent of any claim of
ownership raised by any of the parties. If the question of ownership is linked to
the issue of possession, then the MTCC may pass on the question of ownership
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such determination
is not final and does not affect the ownership of the property. This is clearly set
forth in Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provides:
13
Id. at 89-90.
14
CA rollo, pp. 3-23.
15
Id. at 287-305.
16
Citing Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 97637 & 98700-01, April 10, 1992,
208 SCRA 108.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 202426
In this case, the MTCC was correct in refusing to dismiss the ejectment
case despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 which is an action for
declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale in another court. The case then pending
before the MTCC was concerned only with the issue of possession, or to be
exact, who between petitioner and respondent had the better right to possess the
properties in question.
Respondent has in his favour the deeds of sale which are notarized
documents and hence, enjoy the presumption of regularity. Based on the said
deeds of sale, the MTCC correctly awarded the possession of the properties in
question to respondent. In effect, the MTCC provisionally ruled on the
ownership of the subject properties, contrary to petitioners insistence that said
court completely avoided the issue.
It cannot also be said that the RTC likewise refused to rule on the issue of
ownership, or on the validity of the deeds of sale. The RTC was one with the
MTCC in ruling that the deeds of sale are presumed to be valid because these
were notarized. While it categorically refused to rule on the validity of the deeds
of sale, it may be considered to have ruled on the ownership of the properties on
the basis of the presumption of regularity that attaches to the notarized deeds.
xxxx
To reiterate, the only duty imposed upon the RTC in resolving questions
of possession where the issue of ownership is raised is to touch on said subject
matter provisionally. When it ruled on the issue of possession on the basis of the
aforesaid presumption, it cannot be said to have been remiss in its duty.
Records will show that petitioner never raised the said issue in the court
below. In fact, it was raised only for the first time on appeal before this Court.
Hence, petitioner cannot now impugn for the first time MTCCs lack of
jurisdiction based on the rule that issues not raised or ventilated in the court a quo
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To do so would offend the basic
rules of fair play and justice.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its assailed June 11, 2012 Resolution,
the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the issue of jurisdiction,
or lack of it, of the MTCC over the complaint for ejectment filed by the
Respondent cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.18
Petitioners Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and set aside and that
the ejectment case Civil Case No. 1940 be dismissed, petitioner essentially
insists in her Petition and Reply19 that the MTCC and RTC should have resolved
the issues of ownership and validity of the deeds of sale despite the pendency of
Civil Case No. 4162 because these issues will settle the question of who between
the parties has the better right of possession over the subject properties; that it was
error for the MTCC and RTC to declare that respondent had the better right of
possession based on the supposed deeds of sale in disregard of the successional
rights of the Atilano heirs; that the CA erred in declaring that the MTCC possessed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1940; that the issues raised in her Petition involve
questions of law which thus merit consideration by this Court and the exercise of
its discretionary power of review; and that the ejectment case should be dismissed
while Civil Case No. 4162 is pending since a determination of the issue of
ownership therein will likewise settle the question of possession.
Respondents Arguments
Our Ruling
In resolving the Petition for Review, the CA lost sight of the legal principle
that in resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner
of the property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of sale.
In Co v. Militar,21 this Court held that
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is
the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely
showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The
Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the
name of petitioner.
The same principle was reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel,23 which held thus
In any case, we sustain the appellate courts finding that the respondents
have the better right to possess the subject property. As opposed to the
unregistered deeds of sale, the certificate of title certainly deserves more
probative value. Indeed, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of indefeasible title of
property in favor of the person in whose name appears [sic] therein; such holder
is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve more
credence because they are valid contracts that legally transferred ownership of
21
466 Phil. 217 (2004).
22
Id. at 224-225.
23
554 Phil. 351 (2007).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 202426
the property to Melu-Jean. They argue that (a) the 1975 Deed, being a public
document, is presumed to be valid and there was no evidence sufficient to
overturn such presumption or show that it was simulated; (b) the fact that the
person who notarized the said deed of sale is not commissioned as a notary
public has no bearing on its validity; (c) registration of the deed of sale was not
necessary to transfer ownership; (d) Melu-Jean is not guilty of laches in asserting
her ownership over the property since she is actually in possession of the
property through the petitioners; and (e) the filing of the annulment case is an
admission that the two deeds of sale are merely voidable, or valid until annulled.
Even if we sustain the petitioners arguments and rule that the deeds of
sale are valid contracts, it would still not bolster the petitioners case. In a number
of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners superior right to possess the
property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of
which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should be
given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to
possess. There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered deeds
of sale of the respondents. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens System
was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
Torrens title over the entire Lot 83. Respondents have only their notarized but
unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their claim of ownership. Thus,
even if respondents proof of ownership has in its favor a juris tantum
presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over
petitioners Torrens title. This has been our consistent ruling which we recently
reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel, viz[.]:
26
Id. at 142-143.
27
G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 486.
28
Id. at 504.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 202426
While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of
land, these deeds were not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner
and seller Atilano. When he died, title passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate
child. This relationship does not appear to be contested by respondent in these
proceedings, at least. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, [t]he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Thus,
applying the principle enunciated in the above-cited cases, petitioner and her co-
heirs should have been favored on the question of possession, being heirs who
succeeded the registered owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the MTCC,
RTC, and CA erred in ruling in favor of respondent.
Besides, if there are strong reasons of equity, such as when the execution of
the judgment in the unlawful detainer case would result in the demolition of the
premises such that the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable, then the unlawful detainer case should at least be suspended,
if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final judgment in the more substantive
case involving legal possession or ownership.29 The facts indicate that petitioner
and her co-heirs have established residence on the subject premises; the fact that
they were given a long period of six months within which to vacate the same
shows how deep they have established roots therein. If they vacate the premises,
serious irreversible consequences such as demolition of their respective
residences might ensue. It is thus more prudent to await the outcome of Civil
Case No. 4162.
29
Go v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 214, 226 (1998); Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 16; Salinas v. Hon. Navarro, 211 Phil. 351, 356 (1983); Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendao, 169
Phil. 138, 146 (1977).
Decision 11 G.R. No. 202426
With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds no need to tackle the
other issues raised by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
$~~?
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(. fWl)J/;J .
ARTUROD.B~
Associate Justice
JOSECA~NDOZA
Ass~J~hce
Associate Justice
3
Fernando v. Lim, 585 Phil. 141, 159 (2008).
Decision 12 G.R. No. 202426
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
QC/~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, ArticJe VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
~A