De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro 545 SCRA 162, February 13, 2008

8/22/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 545
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
*
G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Filiation; The validity of a void

marriage may be collaterally attacked; Other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity.—The Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(2000), we held: However, other than for purposes of remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
Same; Same; Same; Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case.—In Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 351
SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the
main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we
held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015e079fffe03efd32db003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/13
case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or

documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
163
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 163
Same; Same; Same; Under the Family Code, the absence of

any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable.—Under the Family Code, the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when
they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than
five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
crossexamination, thus—ATTY. CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic)
the fact that you have not been living together as husband and
wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed
the Affidavit, is that correct? AYes, sir.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders the marriage void ab initio.—The falsity of the
affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for
a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no “scandalous
cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain

and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.—Anent the second issue, we find that the
child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled
to support. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
164
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of

birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Macario D. Carpio & Christine P. Carpio for
petitioner.
Richard Lee for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review of the Decision
2
of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, declaring that (1)
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts
in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for
a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to

the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an
affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 31-41.

2 Captioned Annabelle Assidao—De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B. De
Castro.
165
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 165

and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on
the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for
support against petitioner 3before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City (trial court). In her complaint, respondent
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter
has “reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
4
support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.”
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent,
claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he
was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and
possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant
state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from
his parents before he got married. He also averred that
they never lived together as husband and wife and that he
has never seen nor acknowledged the child.5
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court
ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage

license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural
father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner ele-
_______________
3 The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC,

presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
4 Records, p. 3, Complaint.
5 Rollo, pp. 92-94.
166

vated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the

lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on
the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and
could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by
the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until
a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In
addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s
refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and
filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the
last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying
that petitioner’s “forgetfulness should not be used as a
vehicle to relieve him of6 his obligation and reward him of
his being irresponsible.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an
action for support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
and void in the very same case. There was no participation
of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity,
and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before
the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of

petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of
the marriage apparently and
_______________
6 Id., at p. 37.
167
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 167

7
voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16

October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding
8
instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 9

but the
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court
properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as
shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the
marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He
stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a
marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the
truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be
allowed or admitted
10
as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license. Petitioner additionally argues that there
was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in
this case because it is only an ordinary action for support
and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the
trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of
their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for
_______________
7 Id., at p. 40.
8 Rollo, p. 41.
9 Id., at pp. 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003.
10 Id., at pp. 15-20.
168

11
support. Citing several authorities, petitioner claims that
a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack.
Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case
for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and
parties would be presented would entail enormous
expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the 12
parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.
Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his
marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the
child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court
required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General
13
(OSG) to file their respective
14
comments on the petition.
In her Comment, respondent claims that the instant
petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings
and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the
legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial
court, petitioner strongly objected to being 15
subjected to
DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.
_______________
11 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).

TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, 1990 Ed. and
SEMPIO-DIY,HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 1991 Ed.
12 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
13 Id., at p. 135.
14 Id., at pp. 119-126.
15 Id., at pp. 139-144.
169
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 169

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare
null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in
the action16
for support. Citing the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog, it states that courts may pass upon the validity
of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to
support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid
marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without
a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false.
Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the 17
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.
In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial
court that the child is an18illegitimate child of petitioner and
thus entitled to support.
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether
the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an
action for support and second, whether the child is the
daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The 19
validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, we held:
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial

action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
_______________
16 384 Phil. 661, 673; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000).

17 Rollo, pp. 174-182.
18 Id., at pp. 183-185.
19 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704; 312 SCRA 772,
781 (1999), citing TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, 1987

ed., p. 265.
170

other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of

heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final20
judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.”
21
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled
that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a
claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that
the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence 22of grounds
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the 23essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license
when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that
_______________
20 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000).
21 Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001).
22 Id., at p. 132.
23 FAMILY CODE, Art. 4.
171
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 171

24
they had been living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity
of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on
or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is
that correct?
25
A Yes, sir.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere

irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication
26
of every applicant’s name
for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
“scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all.
_______________
24 Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which

provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
25 TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.

26 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669; 328 SCRA 122, 129 (2000),
citing THEREPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.
172

The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent

executed so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were
not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same27 way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, or any other
28
means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
29
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner
as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
“1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE

CASTRO who was born on30 November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
Parañaque, Metro Manila;”
_______________

In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-
Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as examples of “other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws:” (a) the baptismal certificate of the child;
(b) a judicial admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the child is
entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e) admission by silence; (f)
testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
29 Records, p. 6.
30 Id., at p. 160.
173
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 173

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following

findings of the trial court:
“That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the

petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but
also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend.
While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the
latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid,
as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of
the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. “B,” “B-1,” to “B-3,” “C,” “C-1”
and “C-2,” “D,” “D-1” and “D-2,” “E,” “E-1” and “E-2,” “F,” “F-1”
and “F-2,” “G,” “G-1” and “G-2” and “H,” “H-1” to “H-3”). In one of
the pictures (Exhs. “D,” “D-1” and “D-2”), defendant is seen
putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another
picture (Exhs. “E,” “E-1” 31and “E-2”) respondent is seen in the act
of kissing the petitioner.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No.
4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Velasco, Jr. and

Nachura,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted in part, assailed decision and resolution

set aside. That of Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 70
reinstated.
_______________
31 Rollo, pp. 93-94.

** As replacement of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales who inhibited
herself per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
174

Quimpo, Sr. vs. Abad Vda. de Beltran
Note.—An illegitimate child born after the effectivity of

the Family Code has no right to use her father’s surname.
Rule applies even if petitioner’s father admits paternity.

(Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals, 410 SCRA 446 [20003])
——o0o——
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8/22/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 545

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs.

Civil Law; Marriages; Filiation; The validity of a void

case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 163

De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro

Same; Same; Same; Under the Family Code, the absence of

from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro

Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to

1 Rollo, pp. 31-41.

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 165

is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage

3 The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC,

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

vated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the

the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 167

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 9

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

11 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 169

“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial

16 384 Phil. 661, 673; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000).

PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, 1987

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 171

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere

24 Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which

25 TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent

“1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE

27 FAMILY CODE, Art. 175.

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 173

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following

“That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Velasco, Jr. and

Petition granted in part, assailed decision and resolution

31 Rollo, pp. 93-94.

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Note.—An illegitimate child born after the effectivity of

Rule applies even if petitioner’s father admits paternity.

© Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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