4. PASCUAL vs.

CIR

Topic: The distinction between co-ownership and an unregistered partnership or joint venture for
income tax purposes

Doctrine:

The sharing of returns does not in itself establish a partnership; Reasons.—“In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must
be: (a) An intent to form the same; (b) generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and such a community of interest, as far
as third persons are concerned as enables each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of the whole property.’ The
common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the owners, though they may use it for purpose of making
gains; and they may, without becoming partners, agree among themselves as to the management and use of such property and the
application of the proceeds therefrom.’ The sharing of returns does not in itself establish a partnership whether or not the persons
sharing therein have a joint or common right of interest in the property. There must be clear intent to form a partnership, the existence
of a juridical personality different from the individual partners, and the freedom of each party to transfer or assign the whole property.

Petitioners, not liable for corporate income tax since they cannot be considered to have formed an unregistered partnership but only a
coownership; Reasons.—In the present case, there is clear evidence of coownership between the petitioners. There is no adequate
basis to support the proposition that they thereby formed an unregistered partnership. The two isolated transactions whereby they
purchased properties and sold the same a few years thereafter did not thereby make them partners. They shared in the gross profits
as co-owners and paid their capital gains taxes on their net profits and availed of the tax amnesty thereby. Under the circumstances,
they cannot be considered to have formed an unregistered partnership which is thereby liable for corporate income tax, as the
respondent commissioner proposes.

As petitioners have availed of the benefits of tax amnesty as individual taxpayers in these transactions, they are thereby relieved of any
further tax liability arising therefrom.—And even assuming for the sake of argument that such unregistered partnership appears to
have been formed, since there is no such existing unregistered partnership with a distinct personality nor with assets that can be held
liable for said deficiency corporate income tax, then petitioners can be held individually liable as partners for this unpaid obligation of
the partnership. However, as petitioners have availed of the benefits of tax amnesty as individual taxpayers in these transactions, they
are thereby relieved of any further tax liability arising therefrom.

MARIANO P. PASCUAL and RENATO P. DRAGON, petitioners,

G.R. No. L-78133

Nature of the Case:

Brief:
The petitioners in this case bought parcels of lands on two occasions: (a) two parcels of land on 1965 and (b)
three parcels of land on 1966. Both were sold on 1968 and 1970 respectively. They realized gain from both
sales transactions and correspondingly paid the capital gains tax thereon and thereafter avail a tax amnesty.
But on 1979, the petitioners were assessed by BIR for corporate deficiency taxes for yr. 1968 and 1970 stating
that during that period, as co-owner of those parcels of land, they formed unregistered partnership which is
taxable as corporation under NIRC. The Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of the petitioners stating
that there is no adequate basis to support the proposition that unregistered partnership was formed. The two
isolated transactions of purchase and sale of subject properties did not thereby make them partners. They
shared in gross profits as co-owners, correspondingly paid their capital gains taxes on their net profits and
availed tax amnesty thereby.

Facts:
June 22-1965- Pascual et.al, bought two (2) parcels of land from Santiago Bernardino, et al.
May 28, 1966- they bought another three (3) parcels of land from Juan Roque.

1968- The first two parcels of land were sold by petitioners to Marenir Development Corporation, where
petitioners realized a profit in the amount of P165,224.70.

March 19,1970- the three parcels of land were sold by petitioners to Erlinda Reyes and Maria Samson, and
profit was also realized in the amount of P60,000.00.

The corresponding capital gains taxes were paid by petitioners in 1973 and 1974 by availing of the tax
amnesties granted in the said years.

However, in a letter dated March 31, 1979 of then Acting BIR Commissioner Efren I. Plana, petitioners were
assessed and required to pay a total amount of P107,101.70 as alleged deficiency corporate income taxes for
the years 1968 and 1970.

Petitioners protested the said assessment in a letter of June 26, 1979 asserting that they had availed of tax
amnesties way back in 1974.

In a reply of August 22, 1979, respondent Commissioner informed petitioners that in the years 1968 and 1970,
petitioners as co-owners in the real estate transactions formed an unregistered partnership or joint venture
taxable as a corporation under Section 20(b) and its income was subject to the taxes prescribed under Section
24, both of the National Internal Revenue Code that the “unregistered partnership was subject to corporate
income tax as distinguished from profits derived from the partnership by them which is subject to individual
income tax”; and that the availment of tax amnesty under P.D. No. 23, as amended, by petitioners relieved
petitioners of their individual income tax liabilities but did not relieve them from the tax liability of the
unregistered partnership. Hence, the petitioners were required to pay the deficiency income tax assessed.

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the respondent Court of Tax Appeals. In due course, the respondent
court by a majority decision affirmed the decision and action taken by respondent commissioner.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioners invoke as basis thereof the following alleged errors of the respondent
court:
A. IN HOLDING AS PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT THE DETERMINATION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSIONER, TO THE EFFECT THAT
PETITIONERS FORMED AN UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP SUBJECT TO CORPORATE INCOME TAX, AND THAT THE BURDEN OF OFFERING
EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION THERETO RESTS UPON THE PETITIONERS.

B. IN MAKING A FINDING, SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF ISOLATED SALE TRANSACTIONS, THAT AN UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP EXISTED
THUS IGNORING THE REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN BY LAW THAT WOULD WARRANT THE PRESUMPTION/CONCLUSION THAT A PARTNERSHIP
EXISTS.

C. IN FINDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS SIMILAR TO THE EVANGELISTA CASE AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE DECIDED ALONGSIDE THE
EVANGELISTA CASE.

Evangelista Case:

Petitioners borrowed a sum of money from their father which together with their own personal funds
they used in buying several real properties. They appointed their brother to manage their properties
with full power to lease, collect, rent, issue receipts, etc. They had the real properties rented or leased
to various tenants for several years and they gained net profits from the rental income. Thus, the
Collector of Internal Revenue demanded the payment of income tax on a corporation, among others,
from them.

D. IN RULING THAT THE TAX AMNESTY DID NOT RELIEVE THE PETITIONERS FROM PAYMENT OF OTHER TAXES FOR THE PERIOD COVERED
BY SUCH AMNESTY.
Actions of the Court:
CTA – affirmed the decision of CIR. It ruled that on the basis of the principle enunciated in Evangelista case,
an unregistered partnership was in fact formed by petitioners which like a corporation was subject to
corporate income tax distinct from that imposed on the partners.

In a separate dissenting opinion, Associate Judge Constante Roaquin stated that considering the
circumstances of this case, although there might in fact be a co-ownership between the petitioners, there was
no adequate basis for the conclusion that they thereby formed an unregistered partnership which made "hem
liable for corporate income tax under the Tax Code.

SC – ruled in favor of petitioners

Issue/s:
Whether petitioners are subject to the tax on corporations provided for in section 24 NIRC, as well as to the
residence tax for corporations and the real estate dealers’ fixed tax.

Note: With respect to the tax on corporations, the issue hinges on the meaning of the terms corporation and partnership as used in sections 24
and 84 of said Code, the pertinent parts of which read:

Sec. 24. Rate of the tax on corporations.—There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the
preceding taxable year from all sources by every corporation organized in, or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created
or organized but not including duly registered general co-partnerships (companies collectives), a tax upon such income equal to the sum of the
following: ...

Sec. 84(b). The term "corporation" includes partnerships, no matter how created or organized, joint-stock companies, joint accounts (cuentas en
participation), associations or insurance companies, but does not include duly registered general co-partnerships (companies colectivas).

Rationale:

No. Petitioners are not subject to tax on corporation, and other tax related thereon because there is no
partnership that was formed in this case.

Article 1767 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry
to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.

Pursuant to this article, the essential elements of a partnership are two, namely: (a) an agreement to
contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the
contracting parties.

In the present case, there is no evidence that petitioners entered into an agreement to contribute money,
property or industry to a common fund, and that they intended to divide the profits among themselves.
Respondent commissioner and/ or his representative just assumed these conditions to be present on the basis
of the fact that petitioners purchased certain parcels of land and became co-owners thereof.

The SC also mentioned the differences between Evangelista Case and the case at bar, as follows:

In Evangelista case, there was a series of transactions where petitioners purchased twenty-four (24) lots
showing that the purpose was not limited to the conservation or preservation of the common fund or even
 the properties acquired by them. The character of habituality peculiar to business transactions engaged in
for the purpose of gain was present.

In the instant case, petitioners bought two (2) parcels of land in 1965. They did not sell the same nor
make any improvements thereon. In 1966, they bought another three (3) parcels of land from one seller.
It was only 1968 when they sold the two (2) parcels of land after which they did not make any additional
or new purchase. The remaining three (3) parcels were sold by them in 1970. The transactions were
isolated. The character of habituality peculiar to business transactions for the purpose of gain was not
present.

In Evangelista, the properties were leased out to tenants for several years. The business was under the
management of one of the partners. Such condition existed for over fifteen (15) years. None of the
circumstances are present in the case at bar. The co-ownership started only in 1965 and ended in 1970.

Article 1769 of the new Civil Code lays down the rule for determining when a transaction should be deemed a
partnership or a co-ownership. Said article paragraphs 2 and 3, provides;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners or co-
possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons
sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived;

From the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a co- ownership share or do not share
any profits made by the use of the property held in common does not convert their venture into a partnership.
Or the sharing of the gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether or not the persons
sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in the property. This only means that, aside from the
circumstance of profit, the presence of other elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the clear
intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality different from that of the individual
partners, and the freedom to transfer or assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the
others.

It is evident that an isolated transaction whereby two or more persons contribute funds to buy certain real
estate for profit in the absence of other circumstances showing a contrary intention cannot be considered a
partnership.

Persons who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise and agree to share the gross returns of
that enterprise in proportion to their contribution, but who severally retain the title to their respective
contribution, are not thereby rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital, and no community of
interest as principal proprietors in the business itself which the proceeds derived.

SC also mentioned various ruling from different cases as follows:

 A joint purchase of land, by two, does not constitute a co-partnership in respect thereto; nor does an
agreement to share the profits and losses on the sale of land create a partnership; the parties are only
tenants in common. (Clark vs. Sideway, 142 U.S. 682,12 Ct. 327, 35 L. Ed., 1157.)

 Where plaintiff, his brother, and another agreed to become owners of a single tract of realty, holding
as tenants in common, and to divide the profits of disposing of it, the brother and the other not being
entitled to share in plaintiffs commission, no partnership existed as between the three parties,
whatever their relation may have been as to third parties. (Magee vs. Magee 123 N.E. 673, 233 Mass.
341.)

 In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) An intent to form the same; (b)
generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and such a community of interest, as far as third
 persons are concerned as enables each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of
the whole property.-Municipal Paving Co. vs. Herring 150 P. 1067, 50 III 470.)

 The common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the owners, though
they may use it for the purpose of making gains; and they may, without becoming partners, agree
among themselves as to the management, and use of such property and the application of the
proceeds therefrom. (Spurlock vs. Wilson, 142 S.W. 363,160 No. App. 14.)

 The sharing of returns does not in itself establish a partnership whether or not the persons sharing
therein have a joint or common right or interest in the property. There must be a clear intent to form a
partnership, the existence of a juridical personality different from the individual partners, and the
freedom of each party to transfer or assign the whole property.

In the present case, there is clear evidence of co-ownership between the petitioners. There is no adequate
basis to support the proposition that they thereby formed an unregistered partnership. The two isolated
transactions whereby they purchased properties and sold the same a few years thereafter did not thereby
make them partners. They shared in the gross profits as co- owners and paid their capital gains taxes on their
net profits and availed of the tax amnesty thereby. Under the circumstances, they cannot be considered to
have formed an unregistered partnership which is thereby liable for corporate income tax, as the respondent
commissioner proposes.

And even assuming for the sake of argument that such unregistered partnership appears to have been
formed, since there is no such existing unregistered partnership with a distinct personality nor with assets that
can be held liable for said deficiency corporate income tax, then petitioners can be held individually liable as
partners for this unpaid obligation of the partnership p. 7 However, as petitioners have availed of the benefits
of tax amnesty as individual taxpayers in these transactions, they are thereby relieved of any further tax
liability arising therefrom.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFROM, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of
March 30, 1987 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another decision is hereby rendered relieving
petitioners of the corporate income tax liability in this case, without pronouncement as to costs.