I.

Requirements before admission to the bar or practice of law

1. Citizen of the Philippines
2. Resident of the Philippines
3. At least 21 years of age
4. Good moral character
5. Successfully complied with the Academic requirements:
a. Had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college which requires for admission the
completion of a 4-year high school course
b. A bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences with Political Science,
or Logic, or English, or Spanish, or History, or economics as a
major field of concentration; and
c. A 4-year bachelor’s degree in law with completed courses in
civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor law and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
(RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Secs. 5&6)
6. Pass the bar examinations.
7. Production before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of:
a. Good moral character
b. That there are no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 2)
8. Sign the roll of attorneys and receive from the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court a certificate of license to practice.
9. Take the lawyer’s oath
Cases under 1st Topic
(1) In re: Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, [August 19, 2009],
613 PHIL 1-25
Facts: The case involves a query related to Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713, as amended. The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously
worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1,
2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition
mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private
practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before
RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe’s Contention: Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A.
No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public
employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so
long as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired,
resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is
prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the
office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the
date of her separation from government employment.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private
counsel before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon within the 1 year
prohibition
Held: No. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the
prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees.
Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice
of their profession during their incumbency. The Section 7 prohibitions
continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2),
which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition
period.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public
office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or
imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a
former government official or employee and his or her former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote
the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed
office hours to serve the public.
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's
admission that she immediately engaged in private practice of law
within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713. A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of
law immediately after her separation from the service and without any
period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of
R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice
her profession within one year before the office where he or she used
to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated
official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or
employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with
and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all,
save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law
and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis
again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises. By acting in a manner
that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. SC fined
Buffe and gave a stern warning.
(2) Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23,
2011], 677 PHIL 1-9
Facts: Noe-Lacsamana, counsel for plaintiff, alleged that Ulaso’s deed
of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was
annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case No. 9284
where Busmente appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa)
would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s
collaborating counsel. However, upon verification with the IBP, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Respondent’s Contention: Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law
graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente
alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela
Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with
the help of (Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente
alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that
his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana
was forged.
Issue: Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his
suspension from the practice of law
Held: Yes. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained.
The Court agreed with the findings of the IBP-CBD. Busmente alleged
that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela
Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As
pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb
resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent
Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s
practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
These facts clearly showed that Busmnete indeed assisted Dela Rosa
in her illegal practice of law that warranted his six-month suspension
to practice law.
(3) In re Medado, B.M. No. 2540, [September 24, 2013], 718 PHIL
286-294
Facts: Michael A. Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the degree of Bachelor in Laws in 1979 and passed
the same year’s bar examinations and took the Attorney’s Oath on 7
May 1980. He was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but he failed to do so, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he
went home to his province for a vacation. After a couple of years, while
rummaging through his old files he found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys and realized he had not signed the roll, instead it was only
an attendance sheet wherein he placed his signature.
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number. About seven years later, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
Petitioner’s Contention: He operated “under the mistaken belief that
since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer” and “the
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.” He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”
OBC’s Contention: The Court disagrees with Medado. While an honest
mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake
of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences. Petitioner exuded
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. It explained
that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing
in the Roll of Attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
Held: Yes. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that, “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.” Previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a
full-fledged lawyer, the Court cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, the Court see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year
after receipt of the Resolution and a fine of Php 32,000.
By not allowing Medado to sign would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for
the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted. For
one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character
when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
Note that it was not a third party who called the Court’s attention to
petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years.
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law, Finally, Medado appears to
have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions.

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged

member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand the rigors of the profession.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s

assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however,
is in the nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the
filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. In this case, while it
appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal
charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
(3) In re Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, [July 24, 2012], 691 PHIL 583-588
Facts: A petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of
the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines.
Petitioner’s Contention: The petitioner alleged that he became a
member of the IBP on March 21, 1966 and that he lost his privilege to
practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America
on August 28, 1981. On 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, DC., USA. And that
he also intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner be allowed to resume practice law
in the Philippines, considering the facts stated above.
Held: Yes. In a Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007,
Dacanay case, the Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination
of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine
Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice
of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court
for the practice of law, the OBC required, and incompliance thereof,
petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the
Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of
annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,
Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to
his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,

particularly with the MCLE.
The petition was thus granted, subject to the condition that he shall re-
take the Lawyer’s Oath and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
II. Law Student Rule
General Rule: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear
and handle cases in court.
One of the recognized exceptions: Law Student Rule (A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular 4-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s
clinical legal education program approved by the SC – may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the Legal Clinic of the school. [RULES OF COURT,
Sec. 1, Rule 138-A] The student shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the IBP duly accredited by the law school.
[RULES OF COURT, Sec. 2, Rule 138-A])
Note: Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student
practice may be ground for disciplinary action. (RULES OF COURT,
Sec. 4, Rule 138-A)
Cases under 2nd Topic
(1) In Re: Need that Law student practicing under Rule 138-A be
actually supervised during trial (BAR MATTER NO. 730)
(2) Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-51813-14, [November 29,
1983], 211 PHIL 373-380
Facts: On April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate
criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo
Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court
of Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were
senior law students of the U.P. College of Law where, as part of the
curriculum of the university they were required to render legal
assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in
August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate
appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C, Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order
dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private
prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner Malana and Lucila claims that
despite being senior law students, they can represent their friend
Cantimbuhan in the court.
Defendant’s Contention: They claim that pursuant to Sections 4 and
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to
determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by
respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Malana and Lucila can represent Cantimbuhan

in court

Held: Yes. A non-member of the Philippine Bar—a party to an action

is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the
inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not
impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the
case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation,
whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other
hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private
prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case
under his supervision and control Further, We may add that if a non-
lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a
case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be
allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and
control of the trial fiscal.
III. Solicitation of Legal Services
“A lawyer shall not solicit legal business”
a. The law prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers, and makes
the act malpractice. (RULES OF COURT, Sec. 27, Rule 138)
b. Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on
what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

“A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed to primarily

solicit legal business.”
a. Among those that fall under the prohibition:
1. A lawyer who recommends employment of himself, his partner,
associate, or member of his legal staff to a non-lawyer who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
2. A lawyer who compensates and gives anything of value to a person
or organization to recommend or secure his employment of a client.
3. A lawyer who gives a reward for having made a recommendation
resulting in his employment by a client.
Proper or permissible advertising or solicitation
Not all advertising or solicitation are prohibited.
What makes solicitation improper is:
1. The employment of such methods as are incompatible with the
traditional dignity of a lawyer and maintenance of correct professional
standards or
2. The use of artificial means to augment the publicity that normally
results from what a lawyer does.
Best advertising for a lawyer: A well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust.
Other permissible forms include: (a) publication in reputable law list
with brief biographical and other informative data which may include
name, associates, address, phone numbers, branches of law
practised, birthday, day admitted to the bar, schools and dates
attended, degrees and distinctions, authorships, teaching positions,
associations, legal fraternities and societies, references and regularly
represented clients must be published for that purpose; (b) an ordinary,
simple professional card; (c) publication of simple announcement of
opening of law firm, change of firm; (d) telephone directory (but not
under designation of special branch of law); and (e) if acting as an
associate (specialising in a branch of law), may publish a brief and
dignified announcement to lawyers (law list, law journal);

Cases for 3rd Topic

(1) Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (Resolution),
[September 4, 2009], 614 PHIL 327-337
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Petitioner’s Contention: Complaint alleged that respondent, with the
help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance
and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To
support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of
James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to
sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50, 000.00.
Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card.
Respondent’s Contention: Respondent, in his defense, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.
Issue: Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment
Held: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03
should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides
that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes
“ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to
gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial
evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing,
respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in
this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold
the nobility of the legal profession.
(2) Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, 157053, [August 19, 2003]
Facts: Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public
Information Office of the Supreme Court saw an advertisement
appeared in the newspaper Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
“ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist.” She then called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.
She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4 to 6 months. Later on, it was found
out that similar advertisements were published Manila Bulletin The
Philippine Star. Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., the Chief of the Public
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rules of Court. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) passed a
resolution finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for 1
year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.
Petitioner’s Contention: Improper advertising and solicitation of legal
services in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rules of Court.
Respondent’s Contention: Advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public
is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising
Issue: Whether or not the act of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo of advertising
his legal services is violative of CPR and Rules of Court
Held: Yes. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business:
(1) A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money;
(2) A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
(3) A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; and
(4) A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.
The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. If it were made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable.
(3) Yu v. Bondal, A.C. No. 5534, [January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 247-
257
Facts: On March 30, 2000, complainant Jayne Y. Yu engaged the
services of respondent as counsel in five cases. In the Retainer
Agreement, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of
P200, 000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an
Appearance Fee of P1, 500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that
damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as
success fee. Complainant later issued two checks in the amount of
P30, 000.00 and P21, 716.54, respectively. Despite receipt of above-
said amounts, respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and
Development Corp; due to respondent's negligence, the case for
estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was dismissed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City and was not timely appealed to the
Department of Justice; respondent negligently failed to inform
complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary
documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case
filed against Julie Teh before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City, which case was eventually dismissed by Resolution dated
August 14, 2000; and respondent compelled her to settle the two cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth
Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms. Complainant thus
demanded from respondent, for the return of all the records she had
entrusted him bearing on the subject cases. Respondent did return but
only the records bearing on the estafa case against Lourdes Fresnoza
Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan.
Complainant through counsel thus demanded, the return of the rest of
the files, particularly that dealing with Swire Realty and Development
Corporation and Julie Teh. As respondent failed and continues to
refuse to comply with complainant's valid demands in evident bad faith
and to her prejudice, she filed the present complaint charging him with
flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Office of the Bar Confidant, by Report
and Recommendation, recommends the dismissal of the complaint for
failure of complainant to substantiate it.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 and
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: No. The case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon in was
dismissed by the Makati Prosecutor's Office by Resolution due to lack
of probable cause and, in any event, the issues raised therein were in
the nature of intra-corporate disputes which are properly cognizable by
another forum, Notably, a similar complaint for the same offense, had
been previously filed by complainant against Ms. Boon which case was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. As thus observed by the Of􀁉ce
of the Bar Confidant, the filing of an appeal from the prosecutor's
resolution would have been inutile since the facts and issues raised in
the estafa case had already been twice passed upon by the Office of
the City Prosecutor, hence, it would likely be dismissed.
No fault or negligence can also be attributed to respondent in the
dismissal of the case against Julie Teh. By Resolution of the Makati
Prosecutor's Office, it is clear that it was dismissed, in the main, on the
ground that the offense charged did not actually exist and complainant
failed to appear and present the original checks. On the alleged failure
of respondent to appear during the hearing and his failure to present
the original of the checks subject thereof, they being then in the
possession of complainant who was abroad at that time: Such failure
to present the original of the checks cannot solely be attributed to
respondent, for she herself was guilty of neglect.
As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two complaints
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with the terms dictated by
the therein respondents Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong,
upon the promise of respondent that he would waive the 10% success
fee in the complaint to be filed against Swire Development:
Subsequent to the amicable settlement, it appears that complainant
never raised any objection to the terms of the compromise. As an
accepted rule, when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise
and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his
attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it.
As for complainant's claim that the amount of P51,716.54, which was
the only amount on record that complainant paid for respondent's legal
services, was intended for the filing fees in the complaint against Swire
Development Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact
the retainer agreement does not so confirm.
In sum, the Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of the Bar
Confidant that complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The charges against him
must thus be dismissed.
(4) Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, Adm. Case No. 1117,
[March 20, 1944], 74 PHIL 579-581
Facts: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps
people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays
and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal
consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential.
The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued
Bayot for Malpractice. Bayot initially denied having published the
advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the
court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
Respondent's contention - the said advertisement was published only
once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.
Petitioner's contention - Violation of the code of ethics
Issue: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice
Held: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be published is a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly unethical
for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of
Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not
earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely
reprimanded him.

(5) Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17,
1993]
Facts: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court "to order the
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A'
and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30
am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
 Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner avers that the advertisements above

reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements.
Respondent’s Contention: Respondent admits the fact of publication of
said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Held: Yes. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and such
practice is not allowed. Respondent is composed mainly of paralegals;
the services it offers include various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine
jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, o
peration ortransaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein.
IV. Attorney’s fees and compensation for legal services
A. A lawyer shall not divide fees with non-lawyers
Rule 9.02. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law.
Exceptions:
1. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate
that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement.
2. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished or legal business
of a deceased lawyer.
3. Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a
retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on profit-
sharing arrangement.
The first two exceptions to the rule represent compensation for legal
service rendered by the deceased lawyer during his lifetime, which is
paid to his estate or heirs. The third exception to the rule does not
involve, strictly speaking, a division of legal fees with non-lawyer
employees. The retirement benefits in the form of pension represent
additional deferred wages or compensation for past services of the
employees.
B. A lawyer shall not charge lower rates to attract business
Rule 2.04. A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
What the rule prohibits is the competition in the matter of charging
professional fees for the purpose of attracting clients in favor of a
lawyer with lower rates. The rule does not prohibit the charging of a
reduced fee or none at all, to an indigent or a person having difficulty
paying the usual fee.
C. Rule 14.04. A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable
to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Cases under the 4th Topic
(1) People v. Estebia, G.R. No. L-26868 (Resolution), [February 27,
1969], 136 PHIL 375-383
Facts: Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First
Instance of Samar, and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His
case came up before the Supreme Court on review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was
appointed by this Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of
his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare and file his brief
within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable him to
examine the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano
received this notice on December 20, 1966. Adriano sought for
extension six times until April 26, 1967 but no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within
ten days from notice thereof why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of
the time. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this
Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500
payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that
upon further non-compliance with the said resolution of September 25,
1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary
action will be taken against him." Still, counsel paid no heed.
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation
of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this Court, the
resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He
ignored the resolution.
Petitioner’s Contention: In his third motion for extension of time, he
manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way
through" and that "additional time is needed to review, effectuate the
necessary corrections, put in final form and print the said brief." In his
motion for fourth extension, he intimated that the preparation of the
brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft
and rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same
stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text." His
motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the excuse that he
"suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting and rehashing
some significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and
interrupted his work thereon for some time." Finally, in his "Special
Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five
days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and have the
same stencilled and mimeographed.
Respondent’s Contention: No excuse at all has been offered for non-
presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20,
1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and December 5,
1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more
than sufficient time was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief
de oficio. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967.
Issue: Whether or not Adriano acts exhibit willful disobedience and is
guilty of gross misconduct
Held: Yes. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer undertook to
"obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities."
Adriano as an official member of the bar and as appointed by the Court
as a counsel de officio is expected "to render the required service." A
lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons
of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best efforts"
in the indigent's behalf.
It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel, he has as high duty to
the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself, he must
exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care to render effective assistance. The accused
defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation.
There should be equal importance to a defended party whether he is
able to afford the services of a lawyer or not. It has been said that
courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty
of attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons charged with crime."
For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is
expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of
self-interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious
of his duties to the indigent he defends.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us,
reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to disregard his obligation
as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be
accorded this Court.
For the reasons given, Attorney Lope E. Adriano is suspended from
the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1)
year

(2) Rustia v. Judge of First Instance of Batangas, G.R. No. 19695,

[November 17, 1922], 44 PHIL 62-66
Facts: Respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself and on behalf of his wife,
the respondent Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a written contract,
retained the petitioner to represent them as their lawyer in case No.
1435 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and in
which Rosa H. de Porcuna was the plaintiff and one Eulalia
Magsombol was the defendant. The contract fixed the petitioner's fee
at P200 in advance with an additional contingent fee of P1, 300. It was
also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not
compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without
express consent of his lawyer, the herein petitioner.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the
respondents. The defendant on the case, Eulalia Magsombol, gave a
notice of appeal and presented a bill of exceptions which was
approved. However, before the transmission of such bill of exceptions
to the court, the plaintiffs presented a motion to the court, without any
intervention of their attorney, stating that the case has already been
settled and requesting that the case be dismissed. The defendant,
through here attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having signified her assent
to the motion, the Court of First Instance on the same day, March 2,
dismissed the action without notice to counsel for the plaintiffs.
Petitioner’s Contention: The petitioner alleges that he did not discover
the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922. After an unsuccessful
effort to obtain a reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial
court, he filed the present petition for a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a notice of dismissal
to the action presented before the court.
Held: Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of
Civil Procedure a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any
stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from
appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code
of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to
compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.
The clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By
appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed
their lawyer. The petitioner's contingent interest in the judgment
rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as
an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.
As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the
case after the bill of exceptions had been approved, it is very true upon
such approval the lower court loses its jurisdiction over all contentious
matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing to
prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of
exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the
jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was done in this case. A valid
agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in
everything covered by the agreement. The petitioner might have
protected his interests by entering an attorney's lien under section 37
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3) Rilloraza v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
104600, [July 2, 1999], 369 PHIL 1-13
Facts: Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by
the law firm SAGA, filed with the Regional Trial court a complaint for
the recovery or revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner
of the firm, appeared for ETPI. After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA
the billed amount. The latter was dissolved and the junior partners
formed RADA, which took over as counsel in the casefor ETPI. ETPI
signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was stated that in
cases of collection or judicial action, “our attorney’s fees shall be 15%
of the amounts collected or the value of the property acquired or
liability saved.” The retainer agreement was terminated in 1988. the
next day, RADA filed a notice of attorney’s lien. In its notice, RADA
informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise
between ETPI and PLDT. In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable
settlement and the same was entered as a judgment. The petitioner
(RADA) filed a motion for the enforcement of attorney’s lien.
Issue: Whether or not RADA entitled to the awards of attorney’s fees
they are claiming
Held: RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of
the amount of attorney’s fees to which the petitioner is entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI terminated
the law firm’s services in 1988. Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s
fees hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally
handled the case when he was working for SAGA, and second, the
retainer agreement. Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts
shall fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for
their professional services.” “A lawyer has
the right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client
, which compensation must be reasonable.” A lawyer would be entitled
to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the
amount must be determined on a quantum merit basis.”
(4) Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120592, [March 14, 1997],
336 PHIL 705-725
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz
entered into a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself
to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of
the undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract.
During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to
private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and
year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
A complaint was filed by petitioner. NLRC favored the employees,
awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and
year-end bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC
before the SC. The SC deleted the award of mid-year and year-end
bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential.
After private respondent received the decision of the SC he notified the
petitioner union, the TRB and the NLRC of his right to exercise and
enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of holiday pay differential, he
filed a motion before LA for the determination of his attorney’s fees,
praying that 10% of the total award for holiday pay differential
computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be
declared as his attorney’s fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to
pay and remit said amount to him.
Petitioner opposed said motion. LA favored private respondent.
Petitioner appealed to NLRC but NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. Hence
the petition at bar.
Petitioner’s Contention: First, the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of P17, 574.43, or ten percent (10%) of
the P175, 794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its members, in
violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution
of the NLRC is null and void. Second, although petitioner union
concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorney's
fees, it contends that the award for attorney's fees should have been
incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had
already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC. Since
the claim for attorney's fees by private respondent was neither taken
up nor approved by the Supreme Court, no attorney's fees should have
been allowed by the NLRC.
Respondent’s Contention: First, his motion to determine attorney's
fees was just an incident of the main case where petitioner was
awarded its money claims. The grant of attorney's fees was the
consequence of his exercise of his attorney's lien. Such lien resulted
from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein
the favorable judgment was obtained. To include the award of the
attorney's fees in the main case presupposes that the fees will be paid
by TRB to the adverse party. All that the non-inclusion of attorney's
fees in the award means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB
to pay the opposing party attorney's fees in the concept of damages.
He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion to have his own
professional fees adjudicated. Second, he contended that a retainer
fee is not the attorney's fees contemplated for and commensurate to
the services he rendered to petitioner. He asserts that although there
was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees for services
rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the
Labor Code supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten
percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent entitled to Atty.’s fees
aside from his retainer fee
Held: Yes. There are 2 commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s
fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept,
an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis
of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s
fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the
losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided
by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the
lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorney’s fees which private respondent demanded
before the labor arbiter. A claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted
either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been
rendered or in a separate action. While a claim for attorney’s fees may
be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the
propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for
attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the
determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course,
a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor
of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
Private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim
and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential,
instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution.
The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent
does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the LA
and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in their retainer’s
agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for
the law firm’s commitment to render the services. There are two kinds
of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general
retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer. A general retainer,
or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services
as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the
routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The
future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the
retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee.
The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer.
The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the
opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or
other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities. A
special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service
rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases
demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a
separate and independent contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is
considered a special retainer. The P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in
the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a
general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the
law firm’s commitment to render the legal services enumerated in said
agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional
services. However, the value of private respondent’s legal services
should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code
alone.
The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as
against his client should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum
meruit which means “as much as he deserves,” which is used in the
absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. Where a
lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon,
the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. But instead of
adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter erroneously set the
amount of attorney’s fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code.
He completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the
amount of attorney’s fees.
Article 111 of the Labor Code may not be used as the lone standard in
fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal
services he rendered. While it limits the maximum allowable amount of
attorney’s fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic
award of attorney’s fees in such maximum limit. The criteria found in
the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, in
assessing the proper amount. These are: (a) the time spent and the
extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the
skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges
for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which
the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or
certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment,
whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of
the lawyer.
(5) Navarro v. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, [January 28, 2014], 725
PHIL 358-371
Facts: On April 2006, Complainant Navarro sought for the services of
Respondent Atty. Solidum for the sale and registration of their various
land situated in different locations. On 25 May 2006, respondent
obtained a loan of P1, 000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan
of P1, 000,000 from Navarro. They also agreed that respondent shall
issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as
well as the interest thereon. At the same time, respondent obtained a
loan of P1, 000,000 from Presbitero. Respondent sent Presbitero
postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod
City Branch. Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months.
He was able to pay complainants a total of P900, 000. Thereafter, he
failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In
September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants
could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which
they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called
respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest
to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the
other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as
counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of
the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent
countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and
illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Petitioner’s Contention: They claim that Atty. Solidum should be liable
for violating the CPR when the respondent did not act in good faith in
obtaining the loans.
Respondent’s Contention: Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo
who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to December
2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that
complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current
account and they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son
issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started
with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before it
could be completed.
Issue: Whether or not Solidum violated the CPR
Held: The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and
Presbitero regarding the issuance of the postdated checks. The IBP-
CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in liquidating
the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR.
He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of
Yulo’s property which was financed by Navarro.The IBP-CBD found
that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they
were from his own account;
 (2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to
her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-
meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although
he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were
dishonored as the accounts were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to
properly account for the various funds he received from
complainants. In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is
fully protected or the client is given independent advice. Clearly,
respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money
he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return
the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.

V. Confidentiality and “Privileged communications” between

lawyers and clients
A. A lawyer shall preserve the secrets of a prospective client
Rule 15.02. A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective
client.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by
the rule on privileged communications even if the prospective client
does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the lawyer declines the
employment. (Reason: To make the prospective client discuss freely
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he discloses
will not be divulged nor used against him and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from such prospective client.)
B. RRC RULE 130 SECTION 24
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. —
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined
as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he
may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person
making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or
any advice given by him in his professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence,
when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.
C. Nature of Relations
Historically, the nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of location conduction operarum (contract of
lease of services) and mandato (contract of agency). In modern day,
an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by
his client.
The relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly
confidential.
D. CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE
AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his
client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his
employees or associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client,
give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such
information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to
partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required
to prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or
using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a
client's affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about
a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
E. RRC, RULE 138. Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval
F. CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
G. REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 209
Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation
of secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative action, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging
from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-
at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach
of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall
prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by
him in his professional capacity.chanrobles virtual law library
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a
client or having received confidential information from said client in a
case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same
case, without the consent of his first client.
H. PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
RULES OF COURT, SECTION 24(d), Rule 130
SEC.24(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the
person making the confession, be examined as to any confession
made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or
priest belongs;

Cases under the 5th Topic

(1) Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 108113,
[September 20, 1996], 330 PHIL 678-755
Facts: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA
Law Firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33,
entitled - Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit
Third Amended Complaint which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.
Respondent’s Contention: In their answer to the Expanded Amended
Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to
them the same conditions availed of by Roco but they have refused to
disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
for certiorari, invoking that the honorable Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion:
In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict
application of the law of agency; In not considering petitioners
ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and,
therefore, deserving of equal treatment; In not holding that, under
the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits
petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and other information requested by PCGG; In not
requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG
must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due
consideration to equal protection of the law.
Issue: Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring
companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and
disclosure of such is unethical
Held: The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As
a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at
bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under the first
and third exception.
The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court
provides the disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of
maintaining client confidence. Furthermore, this duty is explicitly
mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a
lawyer's fidelity to client.
The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled
and set aside.

(2) Hadluja v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, [July 3, 2007], 553 PHIL
221-228
Facts: Complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula alleged that she and respondent
Atty. Roceles F. Madianda used to be friends as they both worked at
the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief
Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse. Hadjula claimed that she
approached Atty. Madianda for some legal advice. In the course of
their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she
disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be
informed later by Atty. Madianda that she would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend. Hence, the filing of complaint before the IBP. Atty.
Madianda then retaliated by filing a counter complaint before the
Ombudsman charging Hadjula of falsification of public documents and
immorality based on the disclosures Hadjula made to her. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a resolution stating that
the information related by complainant to the respondent is “protected
under the attorney-client privilege communication.” Respondent then
the violated legal ethics when she revealed information given to her
during a legal consultation, and recommended that respondent be
reprimanded.
Petitioner’s Contention: It was malicious for respondent Atty. Madianda
to refuse to handle her case only after she had already heard her
secrets.
Respondent’s Contention: Atty. Madianda dismissed the existence of
attorney-client relationship and contends that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact
matters of common knowledge in the BFP.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent breached the duty of preserving
the confidence of a client
Held: Yes. The moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship
evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession.
Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information
acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at
the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any
difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship.
Essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client
privilege communication:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents
shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in
the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in
the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the
complainant. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to
protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a
consultation with a lawyer.

(3) Genato v. Silapan, A.C. No. 4078, [July 14, 2003], 453 PHIL 910-
919
Facts: Complainant William Ong Genato alleged that in July 1992,
respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan, asked if he could rent a small office
space in complainant's building in Quezon City for his law practice.
Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin
Dacanay, complainant's retained lawyer, who accommodated
respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainant's
cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship between complainant
and respondent. Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200, 000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as down
payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to
complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176, 528.00 to
answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise
mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City, but did
not surrender its title, claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution
proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Respondent
failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent
demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash
respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank, but it was
dishonored as respondent's account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for
payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. In answering the foreclosure case,
respondent alleged that "complainant is a businessman who is
engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of
deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and
has many cases pending in court." Complainant griped that the
allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such
allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-
client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor.
Consequently, he filed the present complaint for disbarment, praying
also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for
his issuance of a bouncing check. The Board of Governors of the IBP
approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the
respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
Respondent’s Contention: When required by the Court to comment,
respondent explained that it was complainant who offered him an office
space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was
impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case filed against
complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his
imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his
revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in
relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these
statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and
discredit complainant's credibility by establishing his criminal
propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that
he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship
with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor
and reputation.
Issue: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and
confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in
connection with a pending case
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and recommendation
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that respondent's allegations
and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity
sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.
Respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
disclosures in his pleadings failed to satisfy the Court. The disclosures
were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent
to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it
against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the
subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case.
The Court stressed that a lawyer must conduct himself, especially in
his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith and fairness. The Court, however,
modified the recommended penalty and suspended respondent lawyer
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months considering that
this is his First administrative offense against him.
(4) U.S. v. Horn, 976 F2d 1314 (CA9 1992)
Facts: On May 15, 1990, a federal grand jury issued a subpoena duces
tecum to Horn naming fourteen individuals and two corporations. The
subpoena sought production of "[a]ny and all records, papers and/or
documents pertaining to financial transactions by, with, between or on
behalf of [the named individuals and corporations], and/or any and all
businesses associated with the above-named persons or entities, for
the period of January 1, 1984, through the present...." The subpoena
also specifically requested Horn to produce documents relating to fee
arrangements between himself and any of the named individuals or
corporations, and documents "relating to any funds or anything of value
held in any trust account(s)" for any of the named individuals or
corporations. The subpoena stated that it did not intend to request
privileged documents, and that if Horn thought that privileged
documents were called for he should describe those documents and
his reasons for believing they were privileged to the grand jury. Horn
moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena was
overbroad and unreasonable in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17, that compliance with the subpoena would violate the
attorney-client privilege, and that the subpoena violated his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court
denied the motion to quash and ordered Horn to produce for in camera
inspection any documents that he claimed were protected either by
attorney-client privilege or by his Fifth Amendment privilege. Horn
notified the government and the court of his refusal to comply with the
subpoena and requested that a contempt order issue. The government
stipulated that Horn was in contempt of the district court order to
produce the documents. The district court issued the requested
contempt order, but stayed its execution pending our final decision on
appeal. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, Horn does not raise
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination argument, but
only the overbreadth and attorney-client privilege arguments.
Respondent’s contention: Horn argues that compliance with the
request for production of all documents relating to fee arrangements
and trust accounts would violate the attorney-client privilege for two
reasons. First, he argues, it would require him to identify which of the
individuals named in the subpoena are his clients, thereby
incriminating those individuals. He admits without naming any names
that, in addition to Doe, five of the fourteen individuals listed in the
subpoena are his clients. Second, he contends that compliance with
the subpoena would result in the disclosure of confidential attorney-
client communication.
Issue: Whether or not the attorney-client privilege would be violated
Held: The general rule described in Osterhoudt and Sherman contains
an obvious exception, however. An attorney may invoke the privilege
to protect the identity of a client or information regarding a client's fee
arrangements if disclosure would "convey[ ] information which
ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged
communication between attorney and client." Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir.1960). Thus, for example, the identity of a client
is privileged information if revelation of that identity would constitute an
acknowledgement of guilt of the offense that led the client to seek legal
assistance.
The terms "confidential" and "incriminating" are not synonymous. In
order to qualify for the protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege, information regarding client identity or legal fees must be "in
substance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the
professional relationship between the client and the attorney."
Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 593. Neither the identities of Horn's five clients
nor the bare financial details of their fee arrangements with Horn satisfy
that standard.
The court declines to hold, however, that the government may interpret
the restriction on a subpoenaed witness's right to invoke the attorney-
client privilege as license to discount the privilege entirely when
formulating its request for information. The presumption of legitimacy
that is accorded to grand jury investigations does not relieve the
government of its obligation to attempt to prepare a proper subpoena-
-to make a reasonable effort to request only those documents that are
relevant and non-privileged, consistent with the extent of its knowledge
about the matter under investigation. The subpoena at issue here
seeks the widest possible range of privileged information--all
information relating to clients' financial transactions--by and between a
large number of entities over a lengthy period of time--over 6 1/2 years.
To compel Horn to present all of that material to the district court with
explanations as to each of the privileged portions, in the absence of
any good faith effort by the government to draw a narrow and lawful
subpoena, would constitute an unreasonable and undue burden upon
the subpoenaed witness.
The government argues, finally, that the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege may apply, but that it need not make the
showing required of it with respect to that exception until the district
court has determined which, if any, of the documents are privileged.
Whatever the merits of the government's argument, it does not
advance its cause here. Before Horn can be required to submit the
type of information requested here to the court, a proper subpoena
would have to be issued. The present subpoena is invalid and may not
be used for any purpose. Accordingly, Horn was not required to
produce the requested documents for in camera inspection by the
district court and his failure to do so does not defeat his appeal. The
judgment of contempt is REVERSED, and the matter REMANDED for
the entry of an order quashing the subpoena.
(5) U.S. v. Del Carpio-Cotrina, 733 FSupp 95 (DC SFla 1990)
Facts: Del Carpio-Cotrina was charged with conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine but
was released by posting several bonds. De Fabio, the substitute
counsel of De Carpio, attempted to contact the latter on several
occasions to inform him of developments in the case, but was
unsuccessful. Del Carpio's wife telephoned De Fabio and told him that
Del Carpio had left the residence with a suitcase and that she did not
know where he had gone. De Fabio did not advise the Court of these
events. Instead, three days before trial, at the calendar call, De Fabio
moved for a continuance of the trial date. The Court initially denied the
motion, but then reset the trial date. Farr, appearing for De Fabio,
informed the Court that De Fabio had been unable to reach Del Carpio
and did not expect him to appear for trial.
Atty. De Fabio’s Contention: He argued that he was never certain that
his client would fail to appear, and therefore, under the attorney-client
privilege and ethical rules governing attorneys, he had no duty to notify
the court of his client's disappearance.
Issue: Whether or not De Fabio had an obligation to disclose that Del
Carpio had jumped bond and did not intend to appear for trial?
Held: Yes. The law provides that if a lawyer learns in the course of
representation "that a client intends prospective conduct that is
criminal," the lawyer "shall reveal information in order to prevent such
consequences." In addition, the lawyer must disclose confidential
information when necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client.
The Court concludes that De Fabio was required to inform the Court
that he had a firm factual basis for believing that his client would not
appear for trial before moving for a continuance of the trial date.
Disclosure was necessary to "avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client," Florida Rule 4-3.3(a) (2) and "to prevent a client from
committing a crime," Florida Rule 4-1.6(b). The Court does not believe
that this holding creates a conflict for an attorney between his duties to
a client and to the court. "The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty
to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of the law.