CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 115

Title G.R. No. 217508 

LUMANLAW VS. HON. PERALTA
Date: April 18, 2016

Ponente: PARDO, J.:

JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO —petitioner Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as Acting Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch 13), Manila —respondents

Nature of the case: Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the dismissal of the Information filed against Petitioner John
Joseph Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his release from the Manila City Jail.
FACTS
1. Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District near San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26,
2002, for illegal possession of a dangerous drug. He was charged in an Information filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.
2. A Commitment Order was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis J. Arranz directing the detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and
setting the latter’s arraignment on January 8, 2003.
3. On even date, petitioner’s counsel manifested his intention to file a motion for preliminary investigation. Because of the Manifestation, the
arraignment was deferred to February 21, 2003.
4. The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranz’s retirement from public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled for February 21,
2003, had to be postponed. The newly designated acting presiding judge issued an Order setting the arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003.
On the latter date, the arraignment was reset to June 25, 2003, due to the public prosecutor’s absence.
5. On June 25, 2003, petitioner’s counsel received the lower court’s Order granting Lumanlaw’s Petition to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for
Preliminary Investigation for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. In the same Order, the trial court set petitioner’s arraignment on
August 6, 2003.
6. The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of petitioner’s counsel. According to him, he requested the court to proceed
with the arraignment, with the public defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied the request on the ground that petitioner
was already represented by a counsel de parte. The trial court then re-scheduled the arraignment on September 24, 2003.
7. September 24 arraignment was likewise postponed in view of the scheduled meeting of presiding judges with accredited newspaper publishers and
was thus reset to October 1, 2003.
8. On the latter date, the Judge issued an order stating that the arraignment and pre-trial conference are hereby reset on December 10, 2003 at 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon, on the date amenable to Atty. Ernesto Delfin, as well as the defendant.Again, the arraignment did not occur on December
10, 2003, because petitioner had not been brought to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial court’s Order, here was
no proof of service on the Manila City Jail. The arraignment was thus reset to March 1, 2004.
9. Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained uninformed of the charges against him, while
continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout that period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs, petitioner’s counsel
manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on account of the violation of his client’s right to a speedy trial but was promptly denied by the
trial court. The arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004
10. The arraignment did not take place, however, because the accused was not produced in court by the jail wardens concerned. It turned out that the
trial court had not issued a "produce order" to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for April 16, 2004.
11. Petitioner filed a Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss on March 22, 2004. Relying on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mandating that arraignment should be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused, petitioner argued
that the protracted delay of his arraignment violated his constitutional right to speedy trial.
12. Meanwhile, without prejudice to the resolution of the pending motion, the arraignment and pre-trial conference of John Joseph Lumanlaw are
hereby tentatively scheduled on May 26, 2004 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.”
13. On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted, again because of the Manila City Jail’s failure to bring petitioner to the court despite
notice. On the same day, his counsel received the Order, denying his Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The arraignment was reset to June 16,
2004. On this date, it was respondent judge’s absence that caused the postponement of the arraignment, which was reset to July 21, 2004. But on
that date, no hearing was conducted in Branch 13 because of the ongoing semestral inventory of cases in respondent judge’s regular sala, Branch
17.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
By respondent’s failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that
resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic
Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998"), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the
court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
There were no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the
participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and his counsel’s absence
from one of the scheduled hearings
ISSUE/S

Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct the arraignment of the petitioner despite the delay of one (1) year, nine (9) months and four (4)
days constitute undue and unjustifiable delay in violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial? - YES
RATIO

As to Speedy Trial Construed

The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How. It was held in that case that the period was not
absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that
those exclusions should "reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a ‘relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.’”
Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:
"x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive
a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.”

As to Reasonable postponements
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the retirement of Judge Arranz and the manifestation of petitioner
that the latter would be filing a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. The delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be deemed a normal part of the
ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Verily, petitioner’s request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in
view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right. Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation
may hold back the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that the defendant’s right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.

As to unjustified delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen
postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as
soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and
upholding petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost
two years elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment
takes, at most, ten minutes of the court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the
charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can
conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
Postponement Due to Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. The latter
sought to proceed with the arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the
flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find no legal basis for the trial court’s action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte is not prohibited, not even by the Constitution, especially
when the accused themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused have
no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.

As to Responsibility of Judge in Minimizing delay

The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court
settings, spanning seven months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was caused, in different instances, by
the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge
was justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented, the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the
Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision,
who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt
their personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative supervision of court
personnel must be avoided.
RULING

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 02-208425-26 pending before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED.
Petitioner is hereby ordered RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently detained, unless he is being held for any other lawful cause.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Notes
2-S 2016-17 (SUMANQUI)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/feb2006/gr_164953_2006.html