STATCON CHAPTER III – case digests (all from the internet)

1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aids

CITY OF BAGUIO V MARCOS

FACTS:
On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of
the cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the land here involved was
amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to
the parcel of land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his name.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita
J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The petitioners questioned the cadastral court's
jurisdiction over the petition to reopen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40 year period preceding the approval of
Republic Act 931.

HELD:
Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision
was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted
that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain
claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however,
in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly
read than the act itself.” R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should receive blessings of liberal
construction. The court says that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be
permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Republic
Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared
public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was
rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.

EBARLE V SUCALDITO

FACTS:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local
elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings of his
criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office
of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies
on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," preliminary to their criminal recourses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not
criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not
even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it
intended to make itself applicable thereto. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing
rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. It
is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials
or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions,
it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not
necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.
b. Preamble

PEOPLE V PURISIMA

FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines charging the
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the
crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to constitute
the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.

HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by
P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the
facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in
order.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within
the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would
result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall
within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and
this can be found among others in the preamble or, “whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil,
and injurious consequences.

c. Context of Whole Text

ABOITIZ V CITY OF CEBU

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 207 was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and approved by
the City Mayor on the following August 27 where plaintiffs were made to pa wharfage charges under
protest since September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957. The plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to have the said void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and
ordinance declared other landing places belonging to the National Government were concerned, and all
the amounts thus far collected by defendants refunded to them. Appellee’s allege that the Municipal
Board's authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by them under section 17 (w) of the charter of the City
of Cebu, which grants them the legislative power “To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing
at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Cebu, under its charter, may provide by ordinance for the collection of
wharfage from vessels that dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the
National Government.

HELD:
No. The right to collect the wharfage belongs to the National Government. It is unreasonable to conclude
that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter
of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the
wharves involved. The National Government did not surrender such ownership to the city; and there is no
justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the
obligation of paying twice for the same purpose.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated
part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the
abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended
and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus an
apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with other provisions.
Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to
refund to appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from making such collection.

d. Punctuation Marks

FLORENTINO V PNB
FACTS:

The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to compel
it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the
sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953, which
is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6,
1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953.
Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the
respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section
2 of Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the
antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all
antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879.

HELD:
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be
noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from
the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to make the acceptance of the
backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government
entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897
unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private
creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much
lower than the current or even the legal one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the
amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay certificates as payment for
obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government. Another reason is that it is matter of general
knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the
Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used them for the payment of
the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act
No. 304.

Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was subsisting when
the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the
provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.

e. Capitalization of Letters, Headnotes on Epigraphs, Lingual Text

UNABIA V CITY MAYOR (NONE )

INRE ESTATE OF JOHNSON

Brief Fact Summary. Arnold H. Johnson created a will on a standard blank will form where certain
provisions were already in print writing and other parts were left blank. Johnson filled in the blank portions
with his own handwriting. The trial court held the form did not qualify as a holographic will because the
material provisions were not in Johnson’s own handwriting.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An instrument may not be probated as a holographic will if there are words
essential to the testamentary disposition that are not in the testator’s handwriting.

Facts. Johnson created a will using a standard blank will form. The only provisions in his own handwriting
that were, his name and addresses, the beneficiaries’ names and addresses, and the phrase “To John M.
Johnson 1/8 of my Estate.” The trial court held that the form did not qualify as a holographic will.

Issue. Whether an instrument constitutes a valid holographic will if the words essential to proving
testamentary intent are not in the testator’s own handwriting.
Held. No. The handwritten portions of the will without the printed words did not express testamentary
intent because the handwritten words alone did not require that a disposition be made at death. Though
the testator used the word, “estate”, the definition of that word refers to the extent of one’s interest in
land or property or it can also signify the assets and liabilities left by a person at death.

Discussion. A document may not be admitted to probate as a holographic will if the handwritten portions
alone do not express intent to have property distributed at death. The fact that the printed words may
express testamentary intent is not enough to probate a holographic will.
PEOPLE V ABILONG (NONE PERO THIS IS IN CRIM NA! BAKA MAY NAKABASA NA SA ATIN )

TRADERS INSURANCE AND SURETY CO V GOLANGCO

FACTS:

Tomas Lianco and the Archbishop entered into a contract of lease on a parcel of landowned by church
As lessee, Lianco erected a building on the leased portion of the church’s land.
Lianco transferred ownership of this building to Kaw Eng Si,who later transferred the same to Golangco.
Transfers were made without the consent of the Archbishop
The Archbishop filed an ejectment case against Lianco, who appears to be occupants of the premises
building with others paying rent to Golangco.
The right of Golangco to receive rent on the building was judicially recognized in a case decided between
Lianco and others occupying the premises pursuant to a compromise agreement.
The Archbishop did not exercise his option to question Golangco’s rights as lessee
April 7,1949: Golangco applied for fire insurance with Trader’s Insurance and Surety Co.
fire insurance policy states: "that all insurancecovered under said policy, includes the 'rent or
othersubject matter of insurance in respect of or inconnection with any building or any property
contained in any building"
June 5, 1949: the building premises was burned so Golangco requested
Trader’s Insurance to pay the insurance amount of 10,000 including the amount of rent P1,100 monthly.
Trader’s insurance refused to pay the insurance for the rent averring that Golangco has no insurable
interest
ISSUE: W/N Golangco has insurable interest on the rent of the building premises which may
lawfully/validly be subject of insurance?

HELD: YES.
Sec. 13 of the Insurance Code
Every interest in the property, whether real or personal, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect
thereof of such nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured, is an insurable
interest.
Both at the time of the issuance of the policy and at the time of the fire,
Golangco was in legal possession of the premises, collecting rentals from its occupant.
The argument of Trader’s Insurance that a policy of insurance must specify the interest of the insured in
the property insured, if he is not the absolute owner thereof, is not meritorious because it was
the Trader’s, not Golangco, who prepared that policy, and it cannot take advantage of its own acts to
plaintiff's detriment; and, in any case, this provisionwas substantially complied with by Golangco when he
made a full and clear statement of his interests to Trader's manager.
The contract between Lianco and the Archbishop only forbade Lianco from transferring 'his rights as
LESSEE but the contracts Lianco made in favor of Kaw Eng Siand plaintiff Golangco did not transfer such
rights; hence no written consent thereto was necessary. At worst, the contract would be voidable, but not
a void contract, at the option of the Archbishop and it does not appear that it was ever exercised

f. Intent or Spirit of Law

MANILA LODGE V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion
of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of theLuneta extension. The act provided that the
reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of
the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a
portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of
Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of
the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been
strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources,
which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled
at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the
statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

Policy of the Law

Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919.
He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by
Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo
with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged
that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters,
Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting claims to the
estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the
Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion,
with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the
Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the
son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of
the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the
marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the
laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters
Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these
conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between
the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and recognizable in the Philippines.
Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is valid.
Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that “All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted,
are valid in these Islands.” To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact,
and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy
concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.
Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.”
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right
to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid
marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will mot
effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong
and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was
void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred
fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. We then have it within our power
either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions
bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block
or to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage.
We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed according
to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
g. Purpose of Law or Mischief to Suppress
PHIL SUGAR CENTRAL AGENCY V COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (NONE)

h. Dictionaries

ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails the RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder),as amended by RA 7659 on the grounds that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
HELD:
No. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conducts and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law
affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The court discerns nothing in the
law that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime
are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. As regards the assailed statutory definition
of the terms ”combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in the law, the court ruled that a statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.

A facial challenge does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. Legislative History
a. History of Statistics

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V ZAMORA

• Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora, Manila, filed his income tax returns
the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the
capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not
allowable. The collector required him to pay the sums of P43,758.50 and P7,625.00, as deficiency income
tax for the years 1951 and 1952.

• On appeal by Zamora, the Court of Tax Appeals modified the decision appealed from and ordered him
to pay the reduced total sum of P30,258.00 (P22,980.00 and P7,278.00, as deficiency income tax for the
years 1951 and 1952.

• Having failed to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, Mariano Zamora appealed alleging that the
Court of Tax Appeals erred (amongst other things, this being the only relevant to the topic) in disallowing
P10,478.50, as promotion expenses incurred by his wife for the promotion of the Bay View Hotel and
Farmacia Zamora (which is ½ of P20,957.00, supposed business expenses).

• Note: He contends that the whole amount of P20,957.00 as promotion expenses in his 1951 income tax
returns, should be allowed and not merely one-half of it or P10,478.50, on the ground that, while not all
the itemized expenses are supported by receipts, the absence of some supporting receipts has been
sufficiently and satisfactorily established. For, as alleged, the said amount of P20,957.00 was spent by
Mrs. Esperanza A. Zamora (wife of Mariano), during her travel to Japan and the United States to purchase
machinery for a new Tiki-Tiki plant, and to observe hotel management in modern hotels. The CTA,
however, found that for said trip Mrs. Zamora obtained only the sum of P5,000.00 from the Central Bank
and that in her application for dollar allocation, she stated that she was going abroad on a combined
medical and business trip, which facts were not denied by Mariano Zamora. No evidence had been
submitted as to where Mariano had obtained the amount in excess of P5,000.00 given to his wife which
she spent abroad. No explanation had been made either that the statement contained in Mrs. Zamora's
application for dollar allocation that she was going abroad on a combined medical and business trip, was
not correct. The alleged expenses were not supported by receipts. Mrs. Zamora could not even remember
how much money she had when she left abroad in 1951, and how the alleged amount of P20,957.00 was
spent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA erred in disallowing P10,478.50 as promotion expenses incurred by his wife for
the promotion of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora in the absence of receipts proving the same.

HELD: NO

• Section 30, of the Tax Code, provides that in computing net income, there shall be allowed as deductions
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year, in carrying on any trade
or business. Since promotion expenses constitute one of the deductions in conducting a business, same
must testify these requirements. Claim for the deduction of promotion expenses or entertainment
expenses must also be substantiated or supported by record showing in detail the amount and nature of
the expenses incurred (N.H. Van Socklan, Jr. v. Comm. of Int. Rev.; 33 BTA 544). Considering, as heretofore
stated, that the application of Mrs. Zamora for dollar allocation shows that she went abroad on a
combined medical and business trip, not all of her expenses came under the category of ordinary and
necessary expenses; part thereof constituted her personal expenses. There having been no means by
which to ascertain which expense was incurred by her in connection with the business of Mariano Zamora
and which was incurred for her personal benefit, the Collector and the CTA in their decisions, considered
50% of the said amount of P20,957.00 as business expenses and the other 50%, as her personal expenses.
We hold that said allocation is very fair to Mariano Zamora, there having been no receipt whatsoever,
submitted to explain the alleged business expenses, or proof of the connection which said expenses had
to the business or the reasonableness of the said amount of P20,957.00. While in situations like the
present, absolute certainty is usually not possible, the CTA should make as close an approximation as it
can, bearing heavily, if it chooses, upon the taxpayer whose inexactness is of his own making.

• In the case of Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. v. Collector of Int. Rev, it was declared that representation
expenses fall under the category of business expenses which are allowable deductions from gross income,
if they meet the conditions prescribed by law, particularly section 30 (a) [1], of the Tax Code; that to be
deductible, said business expenses must be ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying
on any trade or business; that those expenses must also meet the further test of reasonableness in
amount; that when some of the representation expenses claimed by the taxpayer were evidenced by
vouchers or chits, but others were without vouchers or chits, documents or supporting papers; that there
is no more than oral proof to the effect that payments have been made for representation expenses
allegedly made by the taxpayer and about the general nature of such alleged expenses; that accordingly,
it is not possible to determine the actual amount covered by supporting papers and the amount without
supporting papers, the court should determine from all available data, the amount properly deductible as
representation expenses.
b. President’s Message
c. Legislative Debates, Views and Deliberations

CASCO PHIL CHEMICAL CO V GIMENES

Facts of the Case:

Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber
and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea
and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid
P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner
sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board
of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde
is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve
the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision
of section 2 of RA 2609.

Issue of the Case:

Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product
which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the
view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

PEOPLE V MANANTAN

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However,
Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the
said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the
purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee
of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election
or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code
wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was
omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance
and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of
the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected
in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-
appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar,
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded
from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges".
Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are
now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts
because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".
d. Change in Phraseology by Amendments, Amendments by Deletion

GLORIA V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public schoolteachers. Some time in
September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason
they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules;
3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension.
Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The
three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during
the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).
ISSUE
Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are
subsequently exonerated.
HELD
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent
must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal
is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be
considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On
the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore
the period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension,
entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

e. Adopted Statues

REPUBLIC V MERALCO

Facts:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an
average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition
that should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess
amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly
credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB
ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision.
MRs were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State
and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise
thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases
to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as
use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and
excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power
to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the
public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one
that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and
one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates
involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.

f. Principles of Common Law, Conditions at the Tie of Enactment, History of the Times
3. Contemporary Construction
a. Three Types of Contemporary Construction
b. Weight Accorded to Contemporary Construction

PHIL SUGAR CENTRAL AGENCY V COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (NONE)

VERA V CUEVAS
Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc.
are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk
Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc.,
under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers
of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at
its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are
members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not
bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in
skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty
part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly
marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with
the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the
labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one
year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the
respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been
removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term
"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has
been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies
both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the
petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants
of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have
not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.
CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V OPLE

FACTS:On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association instituted a complaint with the
Department of Labor against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked
legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November
1, 1974. Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the
petitioners. On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the
petitioner's claim for lack of merit basing its decision on the provisions of Book III of the Integrated Rules
and Policy Instruction No. 9. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor acted contrary to law and abused his discretion
in denying the claim of petitioners HELD:While it is true that the respondent Minister has the authority in
the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the
Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or
clarified. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the
statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Any slight doubts must be resolved in favor of the
workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and affording
protection to labor..
c. Reenactment

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V AMERICAN EXPRESS

Facts:
Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit
of AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members
situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B
of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or
to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other
internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.”
In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed that,
as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted
inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx”
Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the
claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption.
CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA
affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines”
and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations
of BSP.
Issue:
W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund
Held:
Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate:
(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the
Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;
(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels
and other service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP
Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines),
when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zero-
rated. Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating.
As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of
the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are
zero-rated, while imports are taxed.
In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of
consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the
consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign
client the drafts and bulls it has gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services
also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT.
However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for
services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for
in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption,
and thus should be zero-rated:
(1) Service be performed in the Philippines
(2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code
(3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

d. Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere

ASSOCIATED SUGAR INC V COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of wharfage dues in the sum of P904,236.38 collected by the
Commissioner of Customs from the five petitioners in connection with their exportation of sugar which
was shipped from two private wharves.
There is no dispute as to the facts. On various dates between 1959 and 1966 the petitioners shipped
raw sugar to the United States on board ocean-going vessels. The shipments were loaded at the Sto.
Niño Wharf located in Bacolod City and the wharf of the Philippine Bulk Corporation at Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental. The wharves were of private ownership. No government port facilities were utilized.
The Collector of Customs for the Port of Iloilo levied and collected on the said shipments wharfage dues
in the sum of P904,236.38 pursuant to sections 2801 and 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The
petitioners paid the wharfage dues under protest. The Collector of Customs dismissed their protest.
The petitioners appealed. The Commissioner of Customs affirmed the Collector's decision. On February
16, 1967, the petitioners filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the
Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner answered the petition.
Later, he filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of cause of action. The Tax Court
in its order of December 28, 1968 dismissed the case. The petitioners appealed to this Court.[*]
The petitioners contend that the Tax Court erred in rendering summary judgment on a motion to
dismiss and in applying the ruling that wharfage dues are collectible on shipments of cargoes which are
loaded in a harbor for exportation without the use of any government facilities (Procter and Gamble
PMC vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-22819, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 883, 63 O.G. 10602; Luzon
Stevedoring Corp. vs. CTA, 124 Phil. 1013; Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Auditor General, 116 Phil. 1139).
The appellants assail the wharfage fees in question on the theory that wharfage is a charge or rent for
the use of a wharf or for the use of government facilities in a port. Since in exporting their sugar they
used private wharves and did not use any government facilities, they contend that they should not be
held liable for wharfage dues.
That theory is not tenable under sections 2801 and 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code, Republic Act
No. 1937, as amended. The ordinary connotation of wharfage is that it is a charge assessed for the use
of a wharf for freight handling or ship dockage. Thus, wharfage has been defined as money paid for
landing goods upon or loading them from a wharf (Old Dominion S.S. Co. vs. City of New York, D.C.N.Y.,
286 Fed. 155, 156).
But that is not the meaning of wharfage under the Tariff and Customs Code. Wharfage is used in a
different sense in that Code. It can be inferred from sections 2801 and 2802 of the Code, as amended,
that wharfage dues can be collected even if no wharf is used in the loading or unloading of exported of
imported cargoes, such as when the loading or unloading takes place offshore or in midstream by using
lighters (meaning at shipside).
In City of Sacramento vs. The New World, 4 Cal. 41, 44, cited in 45 Words and Phrases, Per. Ed., p. 51, it
was held that the definition of wharfage is not to be confined to the charge for landing at a wharf. The
term "wharfage" is generally applied to a charge for landing the goods, whether upon an artificial
erection or a natural landing.
The Tariff and Customs Code provides:
"SEC. 2801. Definition.- Wharfage due is the amount assessed against the cargo of a vessel engaged in
foreign or coastwise trade, based on the quantity, weight or measure received and/or discharged by
such vessel. The owner or consignee of the article, or agent of either, is the person liable for such
charge." (As amended by P.D. Nos. 34 and 441.)
"SEC. 2802.- Schedule of Dues.- There shall be levied, collected and paid as wharfage dues, on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, a charge of eight (P8.00) pesos per gross metric ton; on articles
exported from the Philippines, a charge of four (P4.00) pesos per gross metric ton and on domestic
articles transported at national ports, a charge of one (P1.00) peso per gross metric ton: x x x xx
x x x x.
"Provided, further, That in case the articles imported into or exported from or transported within the
Philippines are loaded or unloaded offshore, in midstream, or in private wharves where no loading or
unloading facilities are owned and maintained by the government, the wharfage fees shall be fifty (50%)
percent of the rates provided for herein. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 34 and 441.)
That same definition in section 2801 is found in section 3(p-1) of the Local Tax Code, Presidential Decree
No. 231, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 426, which provides that wharfage is a fee assessed
against the cargo of a vessel engaged in u based on the quantity, weight or measure received and/or
discharged by such vessel.
As thus defined, a wharfage fee may be collected even if no wharf is used. It is a charge against the
cargo and not for the use of a wharf. In that sense, the term "wharfage" is a misnomer. The appropriate
term would be cargo fees or charges.
The said definition is a repudiation or abandonment of the meaning of wharfage as "a charge or rent
for the temporary use of a wharf" (8 Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, p. 7435; Aboitiz Shipping
Corp. vs. City of Cebu, 121 Phil. 425, 428), or of the statement of Justice Johnson that wharfage is a
payment for services rendered by a wharf (51 Phil. 154).
The Tariff and Customs Code abrogated the provision in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1371 that
exempted from the wharfage fee all imported articles unloaded on private wharves (Com. of Customs
vs. Superior Gas and Equipment Co. and Court of Tax Appeals, 108 Phil. 225).
It is evident that the concept of wharfage dues in section 2801 was taken from the decision of this Court
in 1927 in Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, which is almost
identical to this case.
In that Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency case, the plaintiff shipped at the port of Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental centrifugal sugar consigned to the United States. As in this case, the sugar in that case was
loaded from the private wharf of the Ma-ao Sugar Central. The Collector of Customs assessed and
collected wharfage dues on the said sugar. The plaintiff paid the wharfage dues under protest.
It filed an action for the recovery of the wharfage dues. The law in force at that time was the Philippine
Tariff Act of 1909 which imposed on all articles exported through ports of entry of the Philippines, or
shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of
one thousand kilos as a charge for wharfage.
This Court upheld the legality of the wharfage dues even though the sugar was shipped from a private
wharf. It noted that since 1901 a charge for wharfage was collected on exports although there were no
piers or wharves and export cargoes were brought to the sides of the vessels by means of lighters.
That ruling was reiterated in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Auditor General, 116 Phil. 1139, a case decided
under section 3 of Republic Act No. 1371 and in two Procter and Gamble cases, infra, and also in
Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-23359, Caltex (Phil.), Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Customs, L-23679 and Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-
25400, all decided on October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 60.
So, that is a settled matter. We have to follow it because of the rule of stare decisis et non qudeta
movere.
Wharfage fees are collectible on export or import cargoes even if a private wharf is used or even if the
loading or unloading takes place at shipside because the "said cargoes should also share the cost of
providing and keeping a safe port". They partake of the nature of a tax which is collected by the
Government to support its operation of the customs service. (Procter and Gamble PMC vs.
Commissioner of Customs, L-22819, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 883.)
Wharfage dues are charged, not for the use of any wharf but for a special fund known as the Port Works
Fund, as provided in Act No. 3592, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 130 and Republic Acts Nos.
1216 and 2695 (Procter and Gamble PMC vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-24173, May 23, 1968, 23 SCRA
691, 698).
It is noteworthy that berthing fees are collectible even if the tugboats and barges are moored at
a privately owned pier in a port of entry because as long as they are moored inside the port they enjoy
the facilities thereof (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. CTA, 124 Phil. 1013).
Appellants' contention, that to collect wharfage charges from an exporter for the use of his own private
wharf amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law, is not correct. It is incorrect
because it is premised on the erroneous assumption that under the Tariff and Customs Code a wharfage
fee is a compensation for the use of a wharf.
As shown above, that common acceptation of wharfage is not used in this jurisdiction. Here, wharfage
is a charge against the cargo which is loaded or unloaded in the safety and security of the port. That
concept of wharfage has prevailed in this country since 1901 as shown by Justice Johns in the Philippine
Sugar Centrals Agency case.
The Tax Court erroneously categorized its dismissal resolution as a summary judgment. Actually, it was
a judgment on the pleadings. The Commissioner admitted the ultimate facts alleged in appellants'
petition for review. Only a purely legal issue was raised. And that issue had been set at rest in the cases
already cited.
We find no merit in petitioners' appeal. The Tax Court's dismissal resolution is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Guerrero, J., on leave.

TUNG CHIN HUI V RODRIGUEZ

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Provisions that were not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed repealed. Hence,
having been omitted from the 1997 Rules, deemed already repealed is Section 18, Rule 41 of the pre-
1997 Rules of Court, which had theretofore provided for a 48-hour reglementary period within which
to appeal habeas corpus cases. Accordingly, the period for perfecting appeals in said cases and ordinary
civil actions is now uniform -- 15 days from notice of the judgment or order.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 2, 1999
Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 26) in Special Proceedings No. 98-92014.
The challenged Order reads in full as follows:[2]

"For resolution is a Motion For Reconsideration filed by petitioner thru counsel with
comment/opposition thereto filed by respondents thru counsel.

"After careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by both parties, this Court finds for the
respondents. The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondents is actually fo[r] the Court Decision dated
January 7, 1999 and not for [the] Court Order dated January 29, 1999.
"In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

"Meanwhile, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to immediately transmit the record of the
instant case to the Honorable Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from today."
The Facts

From the records and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts appear undisputed.

After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a "Taiwanese

On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by several policemen, who subsequently turned him over to
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Thereafter, on November 25, 1998, the BID Board of
Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier canceled by
Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary deportation.

On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the
ground that his detention was illegal. After respondents filed a Return of Writ controverting his claim,
the trial court issued a Decision dated January 7, 1999, granting his Petition and ordering his release
from custody.

On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial
court in an Order dated January 29, 1999.

Respondents then filed a "[N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-
stated case, dated January 29, 1999, a copy of which was received by the Bureau on February 11, 1999
and was received by the undersigned counsel on February 15, 1999 x x x."[4] Dated February 15, 1999,
it was received by the RTC on February 16, 1999 at 9:45 a.m.

Petitioner filed an "Opposition," claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour
reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of
Court. Although respondents alleged that they had received the said Order on February 15, 1999,
petitioner contended that they had in fact received it on February 11, 1999, "as evidenced by the receipt
of the service thereof and by the Sheriff's Return."[5]

In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's contention and granted due course
to the Notice of Appeal.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing this time that the Notice should be rejected
because it had referred not to the RTC Decision but to the January 29, 1999 Order denying
reconsideration. In its assailed March 2, 1999 Order, the trial court denied his Motion.

Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of law.[6] In a Resolution dated March 22, 1999, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order "directing the respondents to cease and desist from deporting
the petitioner x x x until further orders."[7]

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:[8]

"(a) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] now 15 days from notice of judgment
as contended by [the] lower court?

"(b) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] still 48 hours from notice of judgment
as provided for in Section 18, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court? or

"(c) Is the provision of Sec. 1, sub-paragraph (a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure --
prohibiting appeal from an Order denying a motion for reconsideration - mandatory or merely
discretionary on the part of the lower courts?

"(d) Are petitions for writs of habeas corpus already brought down to the level of ordinary cases despite
the fact that in habeas corpus the liberty of persons illegally detained is involved?"
In the main, the Court will resolve whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed. In the process, it
will determine the applicable reglementary period for filing an appeal in habeas corpus cases.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:
Reglementary Period for Appealing
Habeas Corpus Cases

Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because respondents filed it only on February
16, 1999, five days after they had received the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on
February 11, 1999.[9] He argues that the reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as
prescribed in Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which reads as follows:

"SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be
perfected by filing with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom."
The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was omitted from and thereby
repealed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which completely replaced Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled
rule of statutory construction is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision
thereof covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded.[10] The omission shows the
intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this case,[11] "to abrogate those provisions
of the old laws that are not reproduced in the revised statute or code."[12]

Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that
in ordinary civil actions[13] and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which
provides:

"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.

"The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed."
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.

Stare Decisis

Petitioner insists, however, that the "application of Section 18, Rule 41 under the Revised Rules of Court
must be maintained under the doctrine of stare decisis."[14] , Thus he urges the Court to apply
precedents that held that the 48-hour period for perfecting an appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional.
He specifically cites Saulo v. Cruz,[15] Garcia v. Echiverri[16] and Elepante v. Madayag.[17]

The principle cited by petitioner is an abbreviated form of the maxim "Stare decisis, et non quieta
movere."[18] That is, "When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same."[19] This principle assures certainty and stability in our legal system.[20]

It should be stressed that stare decisis presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to
which it is applied are substantially the same. In this case, there is one crucial difference. All the
incidents of the present controversy occurred when the 1997 Revised Rules of Court was already in
effect. On the other hand, all the cited precedents had been resolved under the pre-1997 Rules.
Accordingly, stare decisis cannot compel this Court to apply to the present case the alleged precedents
decided during the regime of the pre-1997 Rules. The cited cases applied a specific provision of the
Rules in effect at the time. But because that provision had already been repealed when the facts under
present consideration occurred, the Court can no longer rely on those cases. Indeed, to rule otherwise
is to bar the effectivity of the 1997 amendments, which conflict with jurisprudence decided under an
old and repealed rule. Verily, petitioner's contention effectively precludes changes and freezes our
procedural rules.

Subject of the Notice of Appeal

As earlier observed, the Notice of Appeal referred to the "judgment of the Honorable Court in the
above-stated case, dated January 29, 1999." Petitioner now argues that the Notice was improper
because it referred to the Order denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, not the Decision
itself which was dated January 7, 1999. He cites Section 1 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides
that an order denying a motion for a new trial or a reconsideration may not be appealed.[21]
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that because the Notice of Appeal contained the word
"judgment," their clear intent was to appeal the Decision.

We agree with respondents. In referring to the trial court's "judgment," respondents were clearly
appealing the January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they would have referred to the
"Order." Indeed, "judgment" is normally synonymous with "decision."[22] Furthermore, the wrong
date of the appealed judgment may be attributed merely to inadvertence. Such error should not, by
itself, deprive respondents of their right to appeal. Time and time again, it has been held that courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this right.[23] They are encouraged to hear
the merits of appealed cases; hence, the dismissal of an appeal on grounds of technicality is generally
frowned upon.[24] Indeed, the postulates of justice and fairness demand that all litigants be afforded
the opportunity for a full disposition of their disputes, free as much as legally possible from the
constraints of technicalities.[25] To rule otherwise is to let technicality triumph over substantial justice.
Indeed, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality."[26]

Other Matters

Petitioner insists that the Order deporting him is invalid, as he was not given notice or hearing.[27] We
reject this argument because it properly pertains to the appeal before the CA, not in these proceedings
instituted merely to determine the timeliness of the Notice of Appeal.

Likewise, we reject the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that the promulgation of the
CA Decision resolving the appeal rendered the present case moot and academic.[28] It should be
stressed that the validity of the proceedings before the appellate court ultimately hinges on the issue
before us: whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.