Sumilang vs. Ramagosa

VOL.
21, DECEMBER 26, 1967 1369

Sumilang vs. Ramagosa
No. L-23135. December 26, 1967.
TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION

RAMAGOSA.MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,
vs. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO
RAMAGOSA,ENRIQUE PABELLA,LICERIA FABELLA
and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.
Remedial law; Probate of wills.—In petitions for probate, the

Court’s area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the
will, as the testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry
into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions thereof or
the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
Same; Implied revocation does not warrant dismissal of
petition for probate.—An alleged disposal by testator prior to
1370
1370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
his death of the properties involved in his will is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first
decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution.
Same; Lack of interest bars opposition to probate.—In order
that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will,
or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, L-
17091, Sept. 30, 1963) and an interested party is on who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753,
March 26, 1965). Where oppositors do not take issue with the
probate court’s finding that they are totally strangers to the
deceased, or do not attempt to show that they have some interest
in the estate which must be protected, the order striking out their
opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto must be
affirmed.
Same; Appeals; Order striking out opposition to probate not
interlocutory.—An order striking out an opposition to the probate
of the will on the ground that the oppositors have no personality
to intervene in the case is final, and therefore appealable insofar
as they are concerned.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Quezon.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Gatchalian & Sison and J. A. Bardelosa, Jr. for
petitioner-appellee.
Jose L. Desvarro, Jr. for oppositors-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of

First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of
Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said
document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949,
institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator.
The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) sets of
oppositors—appellants herein—who questioned the due
execution of the document, claiming that it was made
under duress and was not really intended by the deceased
to be his last will and testament. Aside from merely
opposing the petition for probate, the first set of oppositors
1371
VOL. 21, DECEMBER 26, 1967 1371

—Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa—also claimed that

they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the
estate of the deceased. The other oppositors representing
themselves simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only
for the disallowance of the will.
At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his
evidence, and then rested his case on February 16, 1961.
Reception of oppositors’ evidence was set for July 14, 1961.
However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the
dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground
that “the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter
because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever
it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication
of law six years before his death.” Oppositors alleged that
after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner
Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of
land described therein, so that at the time of the testator’s
death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.
Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal
on July 17, 1961 supplemented it by another opposition on
August 14, 1961, and by a rejoinder on August 21, 1961.
Finally, on October 22, 1962 petitioner moved to strike out
the oppositors’ pleadings on two grounds, namely:
“1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and

they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate
of the last will and testament of the testator; and
“2. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in
the distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid
testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.”
On October 18, 1963 the court a quo issued the order now
subject of this appeal, which read as follows:
“Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July

31, 1961, the same is hereby denied for the allegations contained
therein goes (sic) to the very intrinsic value of the will and other
grounds stated on said motion to dismiss are without merit. With
respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other
pleadings of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it appears that
oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree
as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally
strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. This being
so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings
pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.”
1372
1372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the

court’s area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
thereof. The testator’s testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the
legality of any devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966).
“To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all,

the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by
law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings xxx for the probate of a will. The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more.” (Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, 3 Phil. 424).
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss the

petition for probate on the ground that the testator had
impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the
lands disposed of therein.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing;
the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The
first decides the execution of the document and the
testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution.
“The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of

conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant
to and separate from the question of whether the testament was
duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its
probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous:
in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to
revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-
appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from
subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the
will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.” (Fernandez,
et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23638 and Reyes, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-
23662, October 12, 1967,)
In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a

quo’s finding that they “have no relationship what-
1373
VOL. 21, DECEMBER 26, 1967 1373

soever within the fifth degree as provided by law and
therefore xxx are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased
whose will is under probate.” They do not attempt to show
that they have some interest in the estate which must be
protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of
certified true copies of the parties’ baptism and marriage
certificates, support the said court’s finding in this respect.
“It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be

allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo
The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30,
1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor,” (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R.
No. L-18753, March 26, 1965.)
“The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting
the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from
learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be
molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with
no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard
with relation thereto.” (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)
Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court

appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the order appealed from is interlocutory. We deferred
action on the motion until after the brief of both parties
had been filed. The motion, although now practically
academic in view of our resolution of the main issues
involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court
striking out appellants’ opposition to the probate of the will
on the ground that they have no personality to intervene in
the case, was final and therefore appealable order insofar
as they were concerned.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against oppositors-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed.
1374
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VOL.

21, DECEMBER 26, 1967 1369

No. L-23135. December 26, 1967.

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION

Remedial law; Probate of wills.—In petitions for probate, the

1370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sumilang vs. Ramagosa

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of

VOL. 21, DECEMBER 26, 1967 1371

—Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa—also claimed that

“1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and

“Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July

1372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the

“To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all,

Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss the

“The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of

In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a

VOL. 21, DECEMBER 26, 1967 1373

“It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be

Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

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