Future of Bank Management
Future of Bank Management
Future of Bank Management
1.1. Basel II
In June 1999, in response to industry participants repeatedly voicing concerns about the
deficiencies of the regulations in place, the Basel Committee launched a consultation
process aimed at completely revising the existing capital adequacy framework (Basel I). Its
ultimate goal was the convergence of regulatory capital requirements and the definition of
up-to-date methods of identifying, evaluating and managing credit risks. The most striking
weaknesses of Basel I are:
The risk weights within the different risk classes are too uniform, which means that better
ratings are disadvantaged and weaker ratings are favoured.
There is no differentiation between distinct exposure classes (retail, specialised lending and
others).
Limited recognition of collateral for credit risk mitigation purposes.
(Credit) portfolio effects are ignored; therefore capital requirements are not aligned with the
respective credit risk of the loan portfolios of individual banks.
The same risk weights are assigned to loans with different maturities.
The Basel Committee cites greater flexibility and a more risk-oriented focus as the motives
for the new Capital Accord.
The main target of Basel II is to further strengthen the soundness and stability of the financial
system. Minimum capital requirements alone are not sufficient to guarantee the achievement
of this goal, therefore the new capital adequacy framework consists of three (equally
important) pillars:
The implementation of these three pillars also aims to maintain the current overall level of
capital in the system and boost competitive equality.
The minimum capital requirements outlined in pillar one constitute the largest part of the
Basel II regulations. The calculation of capital requirements (as the main point of minimum
capital requirements) was also the primary subject of discussion during the second round of
consultations.
One significant innovation with respect to minimum capital requirements is that operational
risk will feature directly in the assessment of capital adequacy for the first time, so that it has
to be quantified and translated into capital charges. Measurement approaches for operational
The main principle of capital adequacy remains unchanged, i.e. at 8% in relation to total
banking risks:
The Basel Committee has also retained the existing definition of eligible capital. The
recognition of tier 2 capital is still restricted to 100% of tier 1 capital. Thus, tier 1 capital has
to make up at least half of total eligible capital.
The calculation method for credit risk also remains unchanged. The regulatory credit risk of a
bank is equal to its risk-weighted assets (RWA). The most important innovation is the
assignment of different risk weights to credit risks (ratings) that serve as an input for the
calculation of capital required.
Your bank’s sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk equals EUR
1.2 bn. Calculate the minimum capital requirement (market and
operational risks are not considered in this example).
In line with Basel it’s aim of defining a more risk-oriented method for the calculation of capital
requirements, the existing method, i.e. the standardised approach, was retained and
developed further. Additionally, two internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches were also
developed.
Based on the current capital adequacy framework (Basel I), the standardised approach uses
ratings to determine risk weights, whereby only external ratings, i.e. ratings of internationally
recognised rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s, are accepted.
On the other hand, the internal ratings-based approach (IRB approach) offers banks the
opportunity to rely on their own internal ratings for calculating capital requirements. In taking
National supervisors are expected to review internal equity allocation. They are supposed to
intervene by imposing additional capital charges when the risk of a bank is greater than its
capital or risks are not adequately controlled. Supervisors should also seek to intervene at an
early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required.
Supervisory review not only includes the review of capital adequacy, but also ensures that
quantitative and qualitative standards for the calculation of capital requirements (for market,
credit and operational risk) are met.
In general, the legal responsibilities of supervisors and their competencies to exert control
over banks and intervene where necessary have been increased.
Guidelines under the third pillar require banks to disclose up-to-date, relevant information on
their financial situation and their risk exposure. The informative value of banks' balance
sheets will thus increase considerably and enable market players to judge the adequacy of a
bank’s equity capitalisation. This increased transparency due to disclosure is aimed at
strengthening the soundness and stability of the financial system.
Scope of application
Since the introduction of the capital adequacy framework in 1988, banking activities and
ownership structures have become more and more complex. Furthermore, national
regulations differ with respect to the consolidated level of a banking group to which capital
adequacy applies. Because of this, the Basel Committee has expanded the scope of
application of the new capital adequacy framework to ensure that the risks of the whole
banking group are taken into account.
The new scope of application therefore includes, on a fully consolidated basis, any holding
company that is the parent entity within a banking group. This is to ensure the capture of all
relevant banking and other financial activities, and thus the risk of the whole banking group.
Supervisors not only have to test the top consolidated level of a banking group, but also have
to ensure that individual banks are adequately capitalised on a stand-alone basis. Other-wise
there would be no guarantee that capital recognised in capital adequacy measures is readily
available for the protection of depositors.
The Basel Committee therefore stipulates that the Basel II regulations also apply to each
sub-consolidated level for all internationally active banks. Among other things, this is to pre-
vent the double counting of equity within the banking group.
With respect to interest rate risk in the banking book, the legislators neither seek to impose
interest adjustment profiles nor to disregard the national specifics of retail products. The
legislators have thus acknowledged the needs of continental European banks.
A directive (the Capital Adequacy Directive) has been in place since 1995 that addresses
capital requirements for the trading book. Basel II will not entail standardised capital
requirements for interest rate risk in the banking book. However, a strict obligation to control
and disclose banking book positions has been adopted.
The following effects, broken down according to risk category, are currently expected:
Credit Risk Few changes regarding use of the standardised approach for
domestic banks, but increased expenditures for analysis
(pillars 2 + 3)
Potentials of IRB approaches must be assessed (costs vs.
benefit)
Collection of data must begin immediately
Internal rating systems have to be consistent with Basel II
standards
Collaterals have to be evaluated and applied more efficiently
Credit pricing has to be adapted
Operational Risk According to the Basel II Committee, additional equity
requirements are expected to be set off by savings in capital
requirements for credit risk thanks to the IRB approach
Unchanged to increased total capital requirements are expected
The development of new methods to measure risks is
accelerated
Interest Rate Risk Increased importance, disclosure of measurements
Mark-to-market risk estimate will be required
Risk Reporting Tremendous stepping-up of demands in terms of transparency
and underlying procedures
Table 3: Expected Consequences for Banks
Accounting practices in Europe have undergone some drastic changes in the past years,
which led to the introduction of the "International Financial Reporting Standards“ (IFRS). The
so-called IAS regulation basically commits all capital market-oriented companies with
registered offices in the European Union (EU) to apply the IFRS in their consolidated
accounts effective from 2005 or 2007 at the latest.
IAS 39, the standard for recognition and measurement of financial instruments, is of
particular importance for the banks.
IAS 39 divides financial assets into four main categories, which in turn are subdivided into
two subcategories.
Financial assets
loans and receivables
held-to-maturity investments
financial assets at fair value through profit or loss
− held for trading purposes
− financial assets at fair value through profit or loss
available-for-sale financial assets
Financial liabilities
financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss
− held for trading purposes
− financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss
other financial liabilities
Financial assets and liabilities have to be stated at acquisition costs when being valued for
the first time.
The follow-up valuation depends directly on the classification into one of the above-
mentioned categories.
The handling of derivative instruments, which are applied for hedging purposes, is of major
importance. The method used is called hedge accounting.
IAS 39.142 defines the specifications which have to be met in their entirety
The company’s hedging strategy and risk management approach must be formally
recorded
There must be a sufficient correlation between development of the hedging instruments
and the hedged asset(s)
IAS 39.146 describes the method for judging the efficiency of a hedging transaction.
Normally, a hedging transaction is considered to be highly effective if the company
assumes that the value or cash flow correlation between hedged underlying transaction
and the hedging instruments lies within a fluctuation margin of 80 and 125 percent upon
conclusion of the transaction and during the whole transaction period.
With cash flow hedges there must be an actual risk in the valuation of the future cash
flows
The efficiency of the hedges must be measurable
The hedge must be effective in the period under scrutiny
Hedge accounting for interest rate risk is not possible if financial instruments dedicated to the
held-to-maturity portfolio serve as hedged positions. According to IAS 39.127, a "held-to-
maturity“ asset cannot act as an underlying for a transaction to hedge interest rate risk. How-
ever, a hedge against fx and/or credit risk is allowed.
Cashflow hedges
A Cashflow hedge is a transaction (normally a swap) for hedging cash flows against interest
rate changes, normally with variable interest rates. The risk of potential fluctuations of future
cashflows (which affect the result) is hedged (e.g. future interest payments from issued or
held debt issues on a floating-rate basis).
Fair-value hedge
The hedged position and the hedging instrument are stated at market value. Profits and
losses on the hedging instruments are to be entered in the profit and loss account on an
accrual basis.
The conventional instruments of credit risk management take little account of the interests of
credit risk management and sales.
The meeting of these needs is left to newer instruments of credit risk management, such as
e.g. securitisation and credit derivatives.
1.3.1. Securitisation
The opportunity to bundle single risks so that they become attractive to investors represents
a simple but also quite a modern instrument of risk management in banks. Accordingly, since
the early eighties there has been a strong trend towards substituting the issue of securities,
i.e. the securitisation of a bank’s debt claims, for traditional loan financing. This substitution
of traditional loan financing may be carried out in two ways:
the borrower may directly issue an obligation as a security
obligations may be issued as securities via special-purpose vehicles, the obligations
being secured by financial assets of the (original) borrower (e.g. asset-backed
securities)
Securitisation thus offers a possibility to remove loan business from the balance sheet. As a
result, the bank is no longer a risk-taker but a service provider (rating, securitisation, etc.).
This allows the bank as the selling institution to restructure or reduce the credit risk inherent
in the debt claims sold and thus reduce its regulatory capital requirements. Additionally, the
bank generates the liquidity that is locked up in these debt claims, thus improving its
balance-sheet structure and its financing structure.
In this way debt claims become legally independent, which is a prerequisite for refinancing
through the issue of securities. In principle, all debt claims are suitable for inclusion in an
ABS transaction as long as they meet the following requirements:
steady stream of payments delivered (interest or redemption payments) (or
marketability);
no restrictions on the assignment of debt claims;
minimum credit quality.
Subsequently, the pool of loans is securitised and the SPV sells the securities in either a
public or a private placement. The reason why this instrument is called an ‘asset-backed
security’ is that the debt claims assigned to the SPV represent an SPV’s main assets. The
SPV finances the purchase of its debt claims from revenues generated from the issue of
asset-backed securities. Interest and redemption payments from debt claims are then directly
transferred to investors.
ABS are usually tranched, providing the investor with a specific risk profile. The junior
tranche, also called the first-to-default tranche, absorbs defaults until this tranche is full.
Additional defaults lead to losses on the second tranche, and so on. The junior will pay the
highest coupon, since it has the highest credit risk. Sometimes the SPV is required to keep
the junior tranche, or to sell it to the parent institution if no investors are found that are willing
to take on its risk.
With the start of the transaction, the bank receives the revenues from the sale in its function
as the seller of the debt claims. Since borrowers whose debts are sold in such a transaction
usually continue to make interest and redemption payments, the bank additionally transfers
these payments to the ABS entity. The bank also charges administration fees for the
continued provision of services such as credit surveillance, collateral surveillance and
collateral realisation.
Pool of External
Credit Exposures Provider of CRM
Figure 2 shows the most important and most commonly used basic types of asset-backed
structures.
The number and total volume of credit derivatives transactions has seen a phenomenal
growth in the last few years and there is nothing to indicate that this development will slow
down.
The introduction of both indices (e.g. Quarterly Bankruptcy Index – QBI, Trac-x and Ibox,
recently merged into iTraxx) and Internet-based electronic platforms (e.g. Creditex, Credit-
Trade) for trading and obtaining information on credit derivatives additionally contributed to
the liquidity of the market.
In 2003, credit derivatives comprised close to 1% of the total derivatives market. Credit
default swaps (CDS) are by far the most traded credit derivative, with total rate of return
swaps (TRORs) and credit spread options (CSOs) only comprising a few percent of the
credit derivatives market. TRORs had roughly the same trading volume as credit default
swaps in 1998, but then lost ground when the ISDA provided standardised legal
documentation for CDS in 1999. TRORs might regain their previous market standing once
standardised legal documentation is provided for them too.
North America and Europe comprise around 85% of the credit derivatives market in equal
shares. Banks, insurers, hedge funds and other asset managers are the main buyers and
sellers of credit derivatives.
Synthetic structures are not really a product in themselves, but bonds and loans with
embedded credit derivatives.
In a (credit) default swap, the protection buyer makes a periodic or upfront payment (also
referred to as the ‘default swap spread’) to the protection seller (= seller of the default swap).
In return, the protection seller agrees to make a payment in the event of default of the
reference obligation. ‘Going long on the default swap’ means selling the reference obligation
and buying protection.
Libor Nominale
Refinancing
Figure 3: Credit Default Swap
A default swap might also be viewed as a put option on the reference obligation. It allows the
buyer to sell the reference obligation at a predetermined price in the event of default. If the
CDS is marked to market the protection buyer will also profit from the default swap in the
event of a mere deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying. In such a case, the put
option gains in value and the protection buyer may sell it at a higher market premium with a
profit.
The premium can be an upfront payment or a periodic payment. In the latter case it is
common for the periodic premium to terminate in the event of default, one more payment
being made for the time between the last regular periodic payment and the time of default.
The premium is usually quoted on an annual basis (ACT / 360) and it is paid quarterly.
The reference obligation can be a single bond, a loan issued by a corporate or a sovereign,
or a basket of bonds or loans. In most default swap contracts, the default event applies to
several bonds or loans with similar characteristics. This protects the default insurance buyer
in the event that many obligations have defaulted but – whether by coincidence or
deliberately - not his/her obligation.
The six possible default events that the ISDA master agreement specifies are:
bankruptcy
failure to pay
obligation acceleration
obligation default
repudiation / moratorium
restructuring
The ISDA does not include the event of a downgrade. Most default swaps include a
materiality clause, which ensures that no default payment has to be made if the credit event
is not significant, i.e. the credit event must result in a certain amount of actual credit loss. An
event that constitutes a default under the terms specified in the CDS contract but not in the
bond/loan market (i.e. the event doesn’t cause losses to the bond/loan holder) is termed a
technical default.
In the case of physical settlement, the default swap buyer delivers the defaulted bond and
receives the reference price of the bond.
The increasing importance of active credit portfolio management is rooted in a changing view
of the management of banking risks. Increasingly risk/return-oriented approaches make
active credit portfolio management necessary. Moreover, the banking environment in general
is also undergoing changes.
Only the opportunities to buy and sell individual loans on the secondary market via
securitisation and to change the risk profile of a bank’s loan portfolio via credit derivatives
seem to be a suitable and established method of risk management.
At first sight, the main advantage for the bank as the selling party lies in the elimination of
credit risks and the ensuing reduction of equity costs and liquidity costs. Often, however, the
seller has to bear the so-called ‘first loss’ in order to increase the marketability of the ABS,
which means that from an economic capital point of view apparent cost advantages are at
least partially cancelled out. The ‘first loss piece’ represents that part of the securitisation that
first bears possible losses due to credit defaults.
Credit risk
By means of an ABS transaction, it is possible to transfer the risk of interest and redemption
payments being lost due to default to an investor. In addition, it is also possible to reduce the
concentration risks inherent in a bank’s portfolio.
Interest rate risk arises if assets are not refinanced at matching maturities. The removal of
assets from the balance sheet (which happens in the case of ABS transactions) and the
resulting balance-sheet concentration, i.e. the reduction on both sides of the balance sheet,
frees up liquidity which can be used to improve the match of maturities. In addition, banks
may use ABS to get rid of interest rate-sensitive debt claims.
Refinancing risk
The positive effects will only be achieved if the volume of claims sold corresponds to the
average quality of the assets. If only high-quality assets are transferred, e.g. to achieve a
high rating for the transaction, the remaining credit portfolio will most probably include high
credit risk. This will fail to produce the desired effect of risk reduction.
As the traditionally used accrual method no longer seems sufficient for measuring interest
rate risk in the banking book, different approaches are being discussed. First of all we will
recall the difference between banking and trading book positions:
The banking book contains all customer business and assets held to maturity, as well as
other assets and liabilities. Determining actual market values and the possible changes
in value is a lot more complex than for the trading book positions. Even the future date
of a possible realisation (holding period) is only a fictitious assumption in many cases.
For the majority of customer business products there are no fixed agreements on
maturity and interest adjustment terms. As a consequence, benchmarks have to be
defined for the mapping of these positions. Risk measurement results will always
contain an element of uncertainty as to whether the defined benchmarks are correct.
For large parts of the customer business, implied options (e.g. prepayment) are agreed
upon. These options can only be translated into regular options if additional assumptions
are made, as their exercise by customers will not necessarily be market driven.
To sum up, it is also possible to determine a ‘super cash flow’ in the banking book, and risk
measurement methods can then be applied to this. The uncertainties of the results, however,
are higher than for a book with effectively tradable instruments.
In the following we would like to present a short description of the different approaches,
elaborate their pros and cons and describe their possible areas of application:
Accrual interest risk management
"Classical“ VaR approaches
Basel II proposal
CAD maturity band method
The preconditions for all the presented methods are similar. Interest adjustment frequencies
have to be determined for all positions in the banking book, and the positions have to be
mapped into time bands.
As most of the banking book positions are actually taken into account with their accrual in the
profit and loss statement, the first and obvious approach is to measure the impact of interest
changes on the P&L result. With this approach, the maturing positions (overnight, 3- month,
6-month, etc.) lead to a change in interest income/expense, depending on the assumed
future market rate. The resulting change in net interest income (or better: interest gap
contribution) can then be interpreted as risk.
Concepts such as historical volatility can be applied fairly easily for the interest moves
assumed, in which case the change in net interest income results from a worst-case
scenario. In a so-called ‘earnings at risk’ approach, even Monte Carlo simulations can be
applied for this method of risk measurement.
Can the risk measurement be reduced to the P&L result of the current year?
For longer time intervals the resulting interest changes from extrapolated volatility will be
too large, and other methods of predicting those changes have to be applied.
Do maturing positions stay in the overnight time band or are they replaced by their
original term?
Should future reactions be taken into account, or would they distort risk results?
− Easy to understand
− Comparable with net interest earnings in the P&L statement
Summary
The advantage of this method is the possibility of comparison with the profit and loss result.
However, the disadvantages of not being comparable to other risks and the limited time
All VaR models which have made their breakthrough in the past 10 -15 years in the risk
measurement of trading book positions are based on the following assumptions:
Historical moves in the market prices are used to evaluate possible future changes
Historical correlations are taken into account to deal with portfolio effects
All positions are marked to market
A definite holding period is assumed, usually 1-10 days
The risk is measured for a given statistical confidence level (usually 99%)
The choice of method (variance / covariance, historical simulation or Monte Carlo simulation)
depends on the willingness to invest in risk measurement systems and on the importance of
option positions. The option risks can be properly evaluated mainly by using historical or
Monte Carlo simulations.
Summary
VaR models in the banking book are attractive for institutions that have already installed a
VaR model for their trading book and use complex strategies in their banking book. Some
adjustment is necessary, at least for the longer holding period in the banking book.
The risk is measured under the assumption of a so-called ‘interest rate shock’ shifting the
whole interest yield curve by 200 BP. For the specified time bands, the present value change
on the basis of 200 BP is predetermined by risk weighting, or may be calculated individually
based on the actual yield curve. The risks within the different time bands are added, whereas
opposite time band positions are netted. Hence a parallel shift of 200 BP is assumed for the
total risk result.
− Easy to calculate
Summary
The Basle II proposal for the measurement of interest risk in the banking book is a necessary
step which enables banks to deal systematically with the interest risk on the total bank level.
However, the approach is of very limited scope for the internal management and limitation of
potential interest risk in the banking book.
In a sense, the maturity band method proposed in the CAD is a ”standard“ VaR model. The
parameters used in a classical VaR model are standardised, pre-defined and do not have to
be updated. These comprise volatilities, correlations between the time bands and term
zones, and a standardised approach for the measurement of basis risks. For the calibration
of the risk weighting an interest move of 70-100 BP was assumed.
− Easy to implement
− Yield curve risk is taken into account
− Basis risks are roughly covered
− Can easily be calibrated for longer holding periods in the banking book
Summary
The CAD maturity band method is an easily implemented, pragmatic and relatively consistent
approach to measuring and limiting the interest risk in the banking book, particularly for
banks that are ready to take and manage risks in their banking book but have a limited
volume of foreign currency interest positions and interest options.
Conclusions
Basle II will be a “must” for all OECD countries in 3-4 years’ time. In order to comply with this
regulation, the first step for the banks will be a systematic mapping of their interest positions.
Once this step has been taken, the Basle II calculation proposal will remain a supervisory
constraint, whereas banks will use additional models to manage and limit their interest risks
in the banking book.
As internationally active banks will integrate the banking book into the existing VaR models,
we would recommend the CAD maturity band method – with an adjustment for the longer
holding period – for smaller or regional banks.
This does not preclude a later change to more complex VaR models.
To summarise, the over-simplification deliberately taken into account in the Basle proposal
as compared to the CAD maturity band method is intended for use in the supervisory
The role of the treasury department will also change in the future.
Imagine the following experiment: We calculate our banks’ results without recognising the
treasury contribution. In a first step we deduct the interest gap contribution from net interest
income. The result is that banks lose 50 – 75 % of their profit, only big banks with strong
trading departments and – for the time being – the growth markets in CEE and SEE doing
better. The conclusion is that our banks need treasury to survive.
Fortunately, treasury does not only consist of asset and liability management. If interest rates
rise or the yield curve flattens or inverses it would be tremendously difficult to achieve an
interest rate gap contribution in this area. In addition to asset and liability management, the
most visible treasury function is FX. But this business is suffering from the reduction in the
number of currencies due to the single European currency. So at first sight it is not evident
where the future of treasury lies. It may seem paradoxical, but we see the legislator as the
main driving force helping the banks to produce more treasury income. Since the mid-90s the
legislator has been producing an increasingly complex legal framework concerning risk
management. Starting with the Capital Adequacy Directive and now continuing with Basel II,
the legislator is compelling more and more financial markets to increase their risk
management standards. And as soon as risk can be measured, it can also be traded. The
concept is identical in all cases:
As soon as risk can be bundled it is also clear that one single department has to be
responsible for its management. And who else if not treasury? Today, this is a foregone
conclusion for FX, interest and other market risks. But other risks too will increasingly be
managed in the treasury department.
The bundling of risks is also the source of all treasury revenue potentials. We see the
following five components as being crucial:
Flow trading
Is the most important source of revenue. The bank is market maker for its customers. With-
out customer business (commercial and private) a bank has hardly any flow, therefore it is
unable to maintain its treasury operation and loses the other sources of treasury income too.
Can be performed by the ALM or trading department. A crucial factor for success are
diversified trading strategies that reduce the volatility of this business to a level a bank can
bear.
Cheaper refinancing
Structuring of bank issues helps to reduce liquidity costs, as does the use of financial
collateral through repo trading and collateral management.
Additional revenue from selling of derivatives and structured products to corporate clients, as
well as from structuring of asset management products. Strong treasuries (in terms of skills,
systems and flows) are able to structure the entire value-added chain themselves. Other
banks concentrate on core components they can handle by themselves and buy additional
components in the market.
It is becoming increasingly clear that liquidity management is both a revenue business and a
risk business, where risk has to be measured and revenue shown in a transparent way.
In the future the biggest source of flows will be credit business. Again, by means of Basel II
the legislator is making sure that the flows will be bundled and that risk can be measured. As
a result of Basel II most parts of the loan business will be tradable within a few years' time,
thus opening up new sources of income.
Flow trading The bigger the portfolio, the bigger the potential for more
revenue. Keep these flows in your bank – if you don’t, you are
jeopardising the future of your treasury department.
Directional trading of Credit risk trading in ALM or trading book. Imagine a return on
market risks based on risk of 20–30 %, compared to 0 % to 10 % today.
portfolio effects
Cheaper refinancing Securitisation is the key word here. What is the bank able to
structure by itself? How can the bank sell its credit risks at the
highest possible prices? These are the questions that have to
be answered and the solutions put into action in the bank's
financing business.
Structuring of customer Interest, FX and equity risk are not the only means of creating
products attractive customer products. We estimate that products with
credit risk structures will be more attractive than equity
products in the long run, because they reflect the mentality of
investors and have a huge primary market.
Revenue from liquidity Financial collateral is the key to success. Any bank that is able
risk to utilise more collateral and convert traditional collateral into
financial collateral is not only able to reduce its financing costs;
it also becomes more competitive in the commercial business
by granting more financing.
In order to work on increasing the revenue potentials of loan business it is necessary to deal
with two crucial points:
A bank will need systems that are able to integrate the trading book and the banking
book. If not, how can we have a single online limit system? How can we evaluate all
collateral in a uniform way? How can we convert more and more illiquid business into
tradable business?
It is also crucial to openly address the loan specialists and make it clear that the
common goal is to generate revenue from the bank's credit risk potential.
Without a treasury department, a bank would have difficulties in defining itself as a bank.
Indeed, it would be more of a sales organisation for asset management and financing
Traditionally, classical bank management was merely return-oriented. But modern bank
management puts the question: what return can I realise at what risk? Therefore the bank
tries to generate optimum profit from the risk/return relation starting from the individual trans-
action right up to the total portfolio. The ratio which measures this efficiency is RORAC (re-
turn on risk-adjusted capital).
Besides RORAC there are other ratios which are used quite often. Below you will find a
differentiation of these ratios in relation to RORAC:
Profit (profit after tax) minus minimum interest on economic capital (versus economic
capital).
If we now take a closer look at RORAC, we see that the basic assumption is that equity is
exclusively needed to cover a bank’s risks. Risk measurement is performed for credit risk
(default and mark-to-market losses), market risks (primarily interest and currency risk),
liquidity risk and operational risk. Economic capital is measured using the value-at-risk
technique and can be interpreted in a simplified form. We can say that there will be only one
year in a century where the loss is higher than the economic capital and the bank is heavily
indebted as a result.
These considerations touch on the question of minimum equity requirements and the share-
holder’s willingness to take risks. For our interpretation it is important to know that for the
time being there is no standard for the correct probability level of economic capital. Finance
Trainer always uses a 99% confidence level because this is what regulatory authorities
usually require as standard.
Two big advantages and two drawbacks need to be considered when implementing RORAC:
Advantage 1
Benchmarks are available for each risk category (e.g. interest) and profit centre, which help
us to assess the attractiveness of a field of business in relation to our own performance. We
know that a professional treasury operation in a regional bank is capable of earning three to
six times the economic capital (99%/1 day), which means a return on equity of approx. 30%.
This also improves budgeting by not relying on the simplistic formula of “last year’s budget +
x%” and gives a clear indication why treasury activities are attractive.
Advantage 2
When using RORAC, it’s no longer necessary to use over-simplified return on equity goals
for all business units. In the past, many subscribed to the motto “If you achieve 15% ROE,
you're OK – if you’re below, you’re not OK”. With RORAC your benchmark will tell you that a
6% return in local corporate business is OK. Top management decides how much equity is
allocated to the bank’s corporate business, but they are satisfied if the bench-mark is
achieved. The average of the benchmarks of all the bank's profit centres gives the bank's
The “drawbacks” pertain especially to the completeness of the RORAC ratio and the
standards applied to it. On the one hand we have to decide what to do with free equity (the
ex-cess of economic capital). This is a problem of standards and not one of methodology. On
the other hand, and much more importantly, we have to decide how to integrate businesses
without bank-related risk (e.g. private banking). We have developed a methodology to
integrate non-risk-related business in order to arrive at a consistent total bank management
approach, but we cannot say that our methodology is standard on the market. Nevertheless,
the controlling departments of banks are increasingly addressing these drawbacks and we
are happy to assist in finding solutions through our decision-making training courses or
consultancy activities.
The goal of the RORAC concept is consistent total bank management, from strategy to
business units, from customer calculation to product calculation. The RORAC concept is able
to give a bank’s management and employees orientation and help them in their pursuit of the
bank’s goals.
An important competitive factor in the banking business will be the development of a bank’s
credit rating.
Credit rating is a core competence of banks, and is mainly regarded from the loan business
point of view - the bank judges the rating of its customers. But nowadays the bank’s own
rating is increasingly being judged. This is standard on the international capital markets. But
what about the "normal customers of a bank“ – private individuals, small and medium-sized
businesses? The customers have to pay the liquidity costs with their loan conditions. The
worse the bank’s rating, the higher the credit conditions will be. The better the bank’s credit
rating, the more competitive it is. Another main competitive factor are the costs of production
and the process efficiency: the bank that produces the same quality at lower costs will have a
competitive advantage.