09 Board of Commissioners V Dela Rosa
09 Board of Commissioners V Dela Rosa
09 Board of Commissioners V Dela Rosa
Issues:
W/N the marriages of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian celebrated in China are valid in accordance with
Philippine Law
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
On Marriage
Since admission as Filipino citizen, William continuously resided in the Philippines and married Ting Dee Hua with
whom he has 4 children.
The marriage contract shows that said resident is a Filipino, holding passports as a Filipino, a registered voter of
Valenzuela, engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973, the Director of International Polymer Corp and
Ropeman International Corp as a Filipino, and a taxpayer.
Companies respondent runs provides livelihood to 4000 employees and approximately 25k dependents.
Petitioners point out that William is an alien
1. Santiago’s marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China and marriage of Francisco to Ong Chiu Kiok in China were
not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there showing what the
laws of China were.
2. For said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by laws of China
where they were contracted.
3. There being none, petitioners conclude that marriages cannot be considered valid.
Hence Santiago’s children, including Francisco (father of William), followed citizenship of their mother.
4. Francisco’s marriage not having been demonstrated, Wlliam and Johnson followed citizenship of their mother,
a Chinese national.
In Miciano v Brimo, the Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular
subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is
the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on matter cannot be blamed on Santiago, much more on respondent William
who was then 12 y/o.
As records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by Citizenship Investigation board to prove laws of China relating
to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that marriage certificate was lsot or destroyed
during Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco’s testimony subjected to same scrutiny by BSI.
Testimonies of Santiago and Francisco before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible evidence as statements of
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. (Sec 34 Rule 130) this salutary rule of
evidence finds support in substantive law.
Art 267 CC provides that in the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving
but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere.
Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the CC provides that all marriages performed outside of
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country
Any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may
be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art 220 CC
o In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children,
the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
Bearing in mind the “processual presumption” enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared assailed marriages as Valid, William follows citizenship of father Francisco, a Filipino, as a
legitimate child of the latter.
Francisco in turn is a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago, a Filipino citizen whose citizenship was
recognized by Bureau of Immigration in 1960.
Finally, William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the
Constitution
o Citizens of the Philippines: those who are citizens of the PH at the time of adoption of this Constitution
OTHER MATTERS:
In Arocha and Vivo cases, the Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of
respondent’s who was not a party in the cases. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be
bound by a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that Board of Commissioners’ decision finding respondent’s claim to Philippine
citizenship not satisfactorily proved constitute res judicata.
1. Said decision did not make any categorical statement that William is a Chinese.
2. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship
In Lim v Comm of Immigration, the Court declared that everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as occasion may demand.
Exception was laid in Burca v Republic. In order that doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present;
1. Person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party
2. Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof and
3. Finding of citizenship is affirmed by this Court
On Citizenship
Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order which affirmed Board of Special Inquiry decision admitting
Gatchalian as Filipino Citizen and recalled warrant of arrest and revalidated their identification certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of
which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As
a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino.
On Prescription
Petitioners’ position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent’s arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the
alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation “shall not be
effected xxx unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises.”
It is clear that petitioners’ cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly
enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian.
The warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the identification certificate of respondent,
among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
The period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the
BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription.
It took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced
deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners’
cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6,
1962 be instituted after ten (10) years