Flores v. Drilon

ADMIN LAW LOCAL OFFICIALS - PROHIBITION AGAINST APPOINTMENT
Title: Flores v. Drilon G.R. No. 104732

Date: June 22, 1993
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and
PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and
RICHARD J. GORDON,
MANUEL P. REYES,
respondents
petitioners
FACTS
 Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of
R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) reads:
o (d) Chairman administrator - The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic
Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts. YES
2. Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance. NO
3. Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-
B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post. NO
4. Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. YES
5. Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have
received pursuant to his appointment. YES
RATIO
 It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to
another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94
of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail
over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor
is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice
otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.
 In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his office, ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of
the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government
posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and
planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who
may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
 Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: “No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.” The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City,
to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks
to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
 Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without
need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
 Sec. 8, Art. IX-B does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example,
an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet
position under Sec. 3, Art. VII if specifically authorized by law.
 Although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with
the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an
abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may
however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
 As incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA;
hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with
jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant
thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his
authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
(SANTOS, 2B 2017-2018)

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ADMIN LAW LOCAL OFFICIALS - PROHIBITION AGAINST APPOINTMENT

Title: Flores v. Drilon G.R. No. 104732

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