REPRIMAND

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Re: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT DATED FEBRUARY 18, 2005 OF ACOURT

PERSONNEL AGAINST JUDGE FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955 May 25, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS
On February 24, 2005, the Office of the Chief Justice received an anonymous

letter dated February 18, 2005 from a court personnel denouncing Judge Francisco C.

Gedorio, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ormoc City, as a disgrace

to the bench for behaving unprofessionally. The letter states that Judge Gedorio:
1. shouts at and reprimands lawyers, personnel, witnesses, and litigants in open

court;
2. does not know the basic rules of procedure and the law;
3. is corrupt, and favors two or three lawyers because kusog mohatag niya,

meaning they give him too often;

4. issued many controversial orders, such as granting bail to a Muslim drug

lord although the case was assigned to another sala presided by a new judge;

and directing that an order of arrest against the Vice Mayor of Palompon be

quashed even if no case was filed against the latter in his (judges) sala;
5. assigning Atty. Clinton Nuevo, then RTC clerk of court, to write his orders

and decisions; and

6. reprimanded in open court Atty. Ruben Capahi, a private practitioner, and

Atty. Pamela Oliver of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).

Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. referred the anonymous letter to Deputy Court

Administrator (DCA) Zenaida Elepao for discreet investigation. The Investigating

Team from the Office of the Court Administrator conducted a discreet investigation

and submitted a report. Judge Gedorio denied all the accusations against him.
In a Memorandum dated May 4, 2006 for then Chief Justice Artemio V.

Panganiban, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that

respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a

judge and be severely ADMONISHED to conduct himself in a way consistent with

the dignity of his judicial office by refraining from using intemperate language.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find Judge Francisco C.

Gedorio, Jr. administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge.

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 On August 24, 2006, respondent Judge filed a manifestation that he is

submitting the instant case for resolution based on the pleadings and records filed.

ISSUES
(1) whether or not that the letter-complaint should not be given due course

because it is only anonymous. (2) whether or not Judge Gredorio is

administratively liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.

HELD
On the first issue, we clear the objection of Judge Gedorio that the letter-

complaint should not be given due course because it is only anonymous. Section 1,

Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the disciplinary proceedings

against judges and justices may be instituted under either of three ways: (1) by the

Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint; or (3)upon an

anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The

instant complaint was instituted through the last mode.

On the second issue, the Court finds the Evaluation Report of the OCA well-

founded. The Investigating Team personally heard respondent judge shouting

punyeta at his staff and saying, Sino si Clinton? Bakla yon. when asked by a lady looking

for the latter. Likewise, he insulted Jotham Lopez, court interpreter, by shouting at

him, Animal ka, bakla ka.

The team had the occasion to talk to Atty. Francisco H. Escao, a former judge.

He confided to them that he can no longer take his (respondent judge) abuses,

arrogance, and corruption. However, according to Court Administrator Lock, there

is no evidence to sustain the charge of corruption.

On the charge of granting bail to a Muslim whose case was not assigned to

Judge Gredorio’s sala, suffice it to state that he was authorized by this Court in its

Resolution dated April 6, 2005 to preside over Branch 35 where the case was raffled.
On the charge of quashing an order of arrest against Palompon Vice-Mayor

Constantino Tupa, the records show that this matter is the subject of an

administrative complaint, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2244-RTJ, still pending

evaluation by the OCA.

We are convinced that Judge Gedorio’s actuations in the premises constitute

conduct unbecoming a judge. The use of intemperate language is included in the

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proscription provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,

thus: Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the

activities of a judge.
The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes

a number of restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and

occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. Irresponsible or

improper conduct on their part erodes public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, it is

their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and

integrity of the judiciary.

Thus, the court finds respondent judge Gredorio guilty of conduct

unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the

Revised Rules of Court. Under Section 11(c) of the same Rule, the penalty imposable

is any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding

P10,000.00; and/or (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; (4) Admonition with warning.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio, Jr. is declared GUILTY

of conduct unbecoming a judge. He is FINED in the sum of P5,000.00 and is

REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same act will warrant a

more severe penalty.

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CYNTHIA ADVINCULA VS ATTY. ERNESTO MACABATA
AC 7204, March 7, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS
Complainant Advincula sought the legal advice of respondent Macabata,

regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. The two met in a

restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing a complaint against

Queensway because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After dinner,

respondent took complainant home and as she was about to step out of the car, the

respondent held her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her tightly.
After almost a month, they met again in Starbucks, this time, to finalize the

draft of the complaint. After the meeting, the respondent offered her a ride, which he

usually did every time they met. Complainant was feeling groggy while inside the

car which made her wonder, considering that she had a restful sleep the night

before. When she was almost restless, respondent stopped the car along Roosevelt

Avenue and kissed her while he groped her. Complainant immediate stepped out of

the car even if she was still in a state of shock.

That same afternoon, complainant sent a text message to the respondent

informing him that she decided to refer the case to another lawyer and needed to get

the case folder from him. Their conversation was recorded on the phone. The

respondent replied with amorous pleas.

Respondent alleged that complainant, in both instances, welcomed his

amorous advances. Further, Roosevelt Avenue was a busy street and as such, it

would be impossible for him to impose said acts on her. By way of defense,

respondent alleged that the complainant was living with a man not her husband and

that complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent

who would always pay every time they would eat out. The IBP imposed a one

month suspension on the respondent.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which

constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or

suspension.

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HELD
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court perceives the act of

kissing (beso-beso) on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie

forms of greetings, casual and customary. The act of respondent in turning the head

of the complainant towards him, kissing her on the lips are distasteful but they

cannot be considered as grossly immoral. While respondent kissed her on the lips,

that was not motivated by malice. The Court comes to the conclusion because right

after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed, through a cellular

text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant.

Likewise, if respondent wanted to impose himself on the complainant, he would

have chosen a more secluded place where he could make his sexual advances. All

told, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant

disbarment or suspension.
The complaint is hereby dismissed. However, Macabata is REPRIMANDED

to be more prudent and cautious with his actions when dealing with his clients.

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ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES vs. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
A.C. No. 6691 April 27, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS
Atty. George Briones claims that Atty. Jacinto Jimenez and the Heirs engaged

again in forum shopping when Atty. Jimenez, as counsel for the Heirs, filed a

criminal complaint and executed an affidavit against Atty. Briones for resisting and

seriously disobeying the RTC Order dated April 3, 2002 which directed Atty. Briones

to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares,

punishable under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES
1) Whether or not Atty. Jimenez is guilty of forum shopping.
2) Whether or not Atty. Jimenez violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

HELD
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED

for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

1) The Court agrees with the OBC that Atty. Jimenez is not guilty of forum

shopping. Records show that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late

Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349

assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba,

Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

71488 assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment

of commission to complainant. It is evident that there is identity of

parties but different causes of action and reliefs sought. Hence, Atty.

Jimenez is not guilty of forum shopping. The Court likewise finds no fault on

the part of respondent in executing an affidavit in support of the criminal

complaint as held in the Santiago case.

2) However, there is sufficient ground in support of Atty. Briones’ complain

that Atty. Jimenez violated the Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and was reprimanded for violation of the Rule. Records

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reveal that before respondent assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal

complaint against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter to

comply with the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the residue of the estate to

the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson. Considering that Atty. Briones did not

reply to the demand letters, Atty. Jimenez opted to file said criminal

complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the

court.

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ALEX B. CUETO v ATTY. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, JR.
A.C. No. 5798 January 20, 2005
CORONA, J:

FACTS
Engr. Alex B. Cueto filed an administrative case against Atty. Jimenez for

having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Professional

Ethics when he filed a criminal case against him for the collection of the P20,000.00

balance pending his notarial fee.

After notarizing the document for Jose Jimenez III, the son of Atty. Jimenez

and owner of the building, the latter demanded a P50,000 fee for such service.

Surprised but not knowing much on the cost of notarial services, Cueto informed

respondent that he only had P30,000 in cash but was able to issue a check worth

P20,000 for the remaining balance, as advised by Atty. Jimenez. The Far East Bank

check was post-dated on December 28, 1999. The cash and the check for the balance

were accepted nonetheless. Prior to the check’s maturity date, Cueto requested that

the check not be deposited due to insufficient funds. He also reminded Atty. Jimenez

about the latter’s unpaid bill for Cueto’s services as general contractor. Despite the

advice, Atty. Jimenez still deposited the check, which was consequently dishonored

for lack of sufficient funds. Meanwhile, the P2,500,000 check issued by the lawyer’s

son to Cueto as initial payment pursuant to the Construction Agreement was also

dishonored for having been drawn from a closed account. Thereafter, Atty. Jimenez

filed a criminal case against Engr. Cueto in violation of BP 22 (Anti-Bouncing Checks

Law). It was in the pendency of which that Cueto filed the administrative complaint

against Atty. Jimenez. The IBP, after receiving no response from the lawyer despite a

notice to explain, resolved to sanction such act in violation of Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that Atty. Jose B.

Jimenez, Jr. be reprimanded. Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Jimenez is guilty of having violated Canon 20, Rule 20.4

of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD

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WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for

violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that

"[a] lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and

shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud."

Likewise, in Canon 14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it states that,

"[c]ontroversies with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the

lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive

reasonable recompense for his service; and lawsuits with the clients should be

resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."

There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in this case to

justify the legal action taken by respondent. As borne out by the records,

complainant Cueto had already paid more than half of respondent’s fee. To resort to

a suit to recover the balance reveals a certain kind of shameful conduct and

inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines the tenet embodied in Canon 15 that

"[A] lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and

transactions with his client." And what can we say about the failure of respondent’s

son Jose III to pay his own obligation to complainant Cueto? It in all probability

explains why Cueto ran short of funds.

Respondent therefore should have been more tolerant of the delay incurred

by complainant Cueto.

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Atty ORLANDO DIZON vs. Atty MARICHU LAMBINO
A.C.No. 6968 AUGUST 9, 2006
CARPIO-MORALES, J:

FACTS
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the

Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP

College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP

Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI). Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the

NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of

the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.

As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo

Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take

them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who

repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon's move, however,

he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. Chancellor Posadas and Vice

Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the

colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty.

Dizon, despite the latter's claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to

make warrantless arrests.

The suspects' lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of

Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon

and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with

Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning.

The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.

Hence, arises the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1

to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino,

together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain,

before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for

anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses. Atty.

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Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6,

Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01.

ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected

students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional

Responsibility
(2) Whether or not the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects

constitutes violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD
On the first issue, Report and Recommendation submitted to the

Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating

Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the

complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she acted within

her official duties as she safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance

with the school's substitute parental authority and within the bounds of the

law as the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest.

Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turnover

of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless

arrest. Atty. Dizon's administrative complaint against her must then be dismissed.
On the second issue, respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court,

also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that for the failure of the NBI agents to comply

with the constitutional and procedural requirements, their attempt to arrest the two

student-suspects without a warrant was illegal.

With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner

recommended to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional

Responsibility in recklessly trying to arrest the suspects without warrant.

In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI

Charter) which empowers the NBI 'to undertake investigations of crimes and other

offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public

interest may require and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said

section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI

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Charter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be 'in accordance with existing

laws and rules.

Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be

peace officers, and as such have the following power: To make arrests, searches and

seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules.

By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a

warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides: “Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,

obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”
“Rule 1.02.A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law

or at lessening confidence in the legal system.”

WHEREFORE, the case against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is

DISMISSED. And Atty. Orlando V. Dizon was found guilty of violation of

Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is

REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar

infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

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Rosa Yap Paras v Justo Paras

A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007

Garcia, J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Rosa Yap Paras filed a Motion for Contempt/Disbarment against

Respondent Atty. Justo Paras for Justo’s alleged violation of a suspension order

earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges that Justo has continued

his practice of after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of

his motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupts the running of the period to

appeal.

On 9 Sept 1998, Rosa filed a verified petition praying for disbarment of her

husband Justo alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly

immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer.

On 14 Feb 2005, Court issued a resolution finding Justo guilty of committing

falsehood in violation of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus,

he was suspended from the practice of law for one year, with warning that

commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition

of a more severe penalty. Justo filed for reconsideration. Pending reconsideration,

Rosa filed with the Court an Instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment that

Justo violated his suspension order. Court thereafter denied Justo’s motion for

reconsideration. In the same resolution, the Court required Justo to comment on

Rosa’s motion which he failed to do for more than one year, even after completely

and faithfully serving his suspension. The Court issued another Resolution dated

Nov 27, 2006 requiring Justo to show cause why he should not be held in contempt

of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within 10 days from

receipt.

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ISSUE

Whether or not Justo Paras should be disbarred

HELD

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED.

However, Atty. Justo Paras is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to

observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Court's

resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon

him for a repetition of the same act.

The court finds no sufficient basis to support Rosa’s allegation that Atty.

Paras violated the Court's suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras

himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one- year suspension

from law practice.

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the

purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a

means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from

members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed

and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for

contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders

by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration

of justice.

Justo admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of

his obligation to follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable

Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to his

deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary angiogram

and bypass graft. He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrow

amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order.

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Ligaya V. Santos, et al vs Judge Rolando G. How

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946 January 26, 2007

Austria-Marinez, J.:

FACTS
Complainant Ligaya Santos is the Chairwoman of Barangay 659-A,

Arroceros, Manila, while the other complainants are Barangay Councilors and

Barangay Policemen. They are presently detained without bail in Parañaque City Jail

as accused in criminal cases involving the successive “ambush” incidents during the

second quarter of 2001 againsts two sons of Manila Assistant Prosecutor Domingo I.

Orda, Jr. On the second “ambush” incident, the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office

found probable cause against the complainants but the Department of Justice, upon

review, recommended the dismissal of the complainants in a Joint resolution dated

June 13, 2002.

On June 21, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City, acting on th DOJ

Joint Resolution, moved for the withdrawal of the Information against complainants.

It was granted by the trial court in an Order dated July 5, 2001. the Court of Appeals

acting on bthe Petition filed by Prosecutor Orda in CA GR SP 72962, nullified the

order of withdrawal. As a consequence, the accused were arrested on the basis of the

previous warrant issued by the trial court. Upon receipt of the Supreme Court

Resolution, the trial court directed the resumption of proceedings on the subject

criminal cases. However, Prosecutor Orda filed a motion to inhibit Presiding Judge

Raul E. de Leon for partiality in the issuance of the previous order granting the

withdrawal of the Information. Judge de Leon inhibited himself, and the cases were

re-raffled and assigned to respondent Judge.

On December 14, 2004, the prosecution presented its first witness who re-

affirmed his affidavit and positively identified all the alleged malefactors, including

complainants. On December 16, 2004, the second witness presented by the

prosecution who is an alleged co-conspirator directly implicated Ligaya Santos as

the mastermind who instructed him to look for gun-for-hire, which he provided in

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the person of “Dagul” who was eventually hired for a price of PhP 100,000 to kill

Prosecutor Orda.
Respondent Judge held that he would resolve the petition for bail on the basis

of the evidence presented by the prosecution. When the complainants manifested

that they would present one witness to identify the documents on record,

respondent branded the request as “misplaced”. He even rejected outright the

request of the defense counsel to make a tender of proof and instead declared the

petition deemed submitted for resolution, subject to the filing of memorandum by

the parties within five (5) days.

On December 29, 2004, respondent issued an Order denying bail to the

accused. Complainants assail the order for being based on a one-sentence conclusion

that the evidence of guilt is strong, without any supporting evaluation or

consideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not the acts committed by respondent judge constitute gross

ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and serious misconduct.

HELD
Wherefore, Judge Rolando How is hereby found GUILTY of simple ignorance

of the law and is REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of

the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

The act of Judge in denying the complainants the right to present evidence

constitutes simple ignorance of the law; but in the absence of malice, corrupt motives

or improper considerations on the part of the respondent. Respondent failed to

observe and consider for his proper determination and evaluation the weight of

evidence presented by the prosecution. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain

professional competence. Nothing in the records suggests that respondent was

motivated by malice or corrupt motives to deny the application for bail.

Complainants failed to substantiate their other allegations with competent proof

besides their own bare allegations. Respondents did what he thought was right

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under the law and established principles. Hence, respondent could not be held liable

for manifest partiality and serious misconduct.

Moreover, for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of

should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent

disregard of well-known legal rules. The records are bereft of any evidence to this

effect to warrant disciplinary action against respondent.

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FLORENCIA SOMOSOT vs. ATTY. ELIAS PONTEVEDRA
A.C. No. 4285 May 2, 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS
Florencia Somosot availed of the services of Atty. Pontevedra for a civil case.

In 1991, the trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda

because the case had been pending for 23 years. Despite repeated reminders from

the trial court and from his client, Atty. Pontevedra failed to submit the

memorandum. Complainant, through her daughter, also sent a money order for

1,000 as payment for the preparation of the memorandum. Later on, Somosot

obtained a certification that her case had been submitted to decision without any

memoranda. Her requests for explanation regarding the certification and for the

return of the money having been ignored by Atty. Pontevedra, she filed this case

against the latter for neglect of duty and for professional misconduct for unlawfully

keeping money belonging to her.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pontevedra violated the Canons of Professional

Responsibility in failing to file the required memorandum and for keeping the

money order despite complainant’s request for its return.

HELD
Yes, Atty. Pontevedra is liable for breach of his professional duties.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers owe

fidelity to the cause of their clients and must therefore be always mindful of the trust

and confidence reposed in them. Under Canon 18, they are mandated to serve their

clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, they are not to neglect a legal

matter entrusted to them and their negligence in connection therewith shall render

them liable. They are required to keep their client informed of the status of his cases

and to respond within a reasonable time to requests for information.

In this case, Atty. Pontevedra failed to exercise that degree of diligence

required of him in the performance of his duties. While it was impossible for him to

prepare a memorandum because of the loss of the transcripts of stenographic notes

and while he was constrained to enter into an oral agreement with opposing counsel

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to submit the case for decision without memorandum, he should have informed the

trial court and his client of the said agreement.

Moreover, Canon 16 expressly states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and

properties of his client that may come into his possession and deliver such funds and

properties of his client when demanded. In this respect, he should have returned the

money order when it was demanded from him.

The Court held that in the absence of malice, bad faith or evil motive, the

penalty of REPRIMAND is deemed sufficient penalty.

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Emmanuel Velasco v Judge Adoracion Angeles
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908 August 15, 2007
Carpio, J.:

FACTS
This administrative case covers 10 complaints filed by Emmanuel Ymson

Velasco, State Prosecutor of the DOJ, against Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge

of the RTC-Caloocan City.

Complainant Velasco was the investigating prosecutor in a criminal

complaint for multiple counts of child abuse, or violation of R.A. 7610 filed in 1999

against Judge Angeles by her grandniece, Ma. Mercedes Vistan (Mecedes). Velasco

issued a Resolution recommending Angeles’s indictment. Angeles then filed a case

with the DOJ which was dismissed by DOJ Sec. Perez. Her motion for

reconsideration was also denied. Angeles then filed a Petition for Review before the

Office of the President. Six of the complaints in the present case are based on the

contents of the petitions and Angeles’s succeeding pleadings.

On Apr. 8,2003, the SC referred the matter to the CA Associate Justice Tijam

for investigation, report and recommendation.

The report and recommendation dated Dec. 1, 2004 of Justice Tijam outlines

the ff charges against the Judge:

1) Misquoting Velasco in bad faith and accusing him of falsifying a public

document;
2) Using intemperate language in pleadings filed before the Office of the

President and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court;
3) Committing acts of child abuse against her two housemaids, in violation of

R.A. 7610;
4) Visiting the Secretary of Justice while her case was pending before the DOJ;
5) Visiting the Secretary of Justice during office hours, without filing for official

leave of absence;
6) Maliciously stating in a pleading that complainant, in his capacity as public

prosecutor, deliberately suppressed evidence to weaken the governments

case;
7) Falsifying a public document and introducing the document as evidence in a

judicial proceeding;
8) Causing Mercedes to execute a false affidavit, and introducing the affidavit as

evidence in a judicial proceeding;

Page | 21
 9) Using intemperate language and assailing the dignity of a Supreme Court

Justice; and
10) Utilizing sheriffs of the RTC Caloocan to serve pleadings on her behalf.

ISSUE
Whether or not Angeles is guilty of the charges against him

HELD
WHEREFORE, we REPRIMAND respondent Adoracion G. Angeles,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, for her use

of intemperate language in her pleadings. Respondent is STERNLY WARNED that a

repetition of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction. We DISMISS

all the other charges against respondent.

All other charges against Judge Angeles, except for using intemperate

language in her pleadings have been rebutted and disproved through supported

facts and good reasoning. The court cited the instances when she used intemperate

language for her pleadings: high-fault tin thesis; insult to intelligence; [Velasco’s]

mind has been suddenly transformed into a cheap factory of bogus charges x x x; a

monument to hypocrisy; the instant complaint x x x can be compared to the last

grunting noises of a dying rat that became trapped in its own gullibility; [i]t is very

disgusting that [Velasco] is acting like a cry baby begging for attention x x x; and

[e]ven the greatest of crooks can easily make disguises. Even wolves can dress in

sheep’s clothing.
The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience and

courtesy both in conduct and language.

Justice Tijam also found Angeles guilty of intemperate language in her

statements against Justice Bellosillo in her pleadings before the Office of the

President and the SC. Angeles insinuated an improper relationship between Velasco

and Justice Bellosillo.

We agree that respondent should have been more circumspect in her

language.We have held in a long line of cases that the judge is the visible

representation of the law. Thus, a judge must behave at all times in such a manner

that his or her conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching

public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential

Page | 22
to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system. However, we do not

agree that Angeles’s action merits the finding of indirect contempt against her.

Angeles’s outburst was due to the fact that the subject letter of Justice Bellosillo was

addressed to then Chief Justice Davide, Jr., copy furnished all Associate Justices of

the SC. She had never seen the letter and she must have been surprised when

complainant quoted excerpts of the letter in his pleadings. It is expected of her to try

to find out how complainant got hold of a copy of the letter.

Page | 23
JULIO B. VERZOSA vs JUDGE MANUEL E. CONTRERAS

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636 March 12, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS
Complainant alleges that he is a forest ranger of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Protected Area Office. On April 14,

2004, while conducting surveillance on treasure hunting activities in Mt. Isarog

Natural Park, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an

open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of Republic Act No. 7586.

He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose Credo

and Basilio Sumalde. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting activities

and on the basis of the testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory for

robbery. On the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued

an order for complainant's arrest. Respondent Judge did not inhibit himself from

conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all of the

accused since he had prior knowledge of the crime committed, in apparent violation

of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and Responsibilities. The respondent

Judge stated that on the latter part of March 2004, he went on mountain hiking at Mt.

Isarog with the Tinablanan River as his destination. While at Mt. Isarog, he received

an information that Candelaria, known confidant of the personnel of the DENR and

by the CARE Philippines, was looting by dismantling the tower antennae of the

Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company (PLDT) used as a relay station

but already inoperational. The respondent claims that prior knowledge of the

commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for a first level court judge to

recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation. It was just incidental that

he caused the apprehension of the truck loaded with stolen trusses and bars of the

PLDT Tower.
ISSUE

Page | 24
 Whether or not Judge Manuel E. Contreras, be admonished for violation of

Rule 3.12(a) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

HELD
The court ruled that the respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial

Conduct 3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:

Rule 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,

proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.
Records reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and

dismantling at the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and he was instrumental

in the apprehension of the robbers. Respondent should have been aware of the

impropriety of conducting the preliminary investigation considering that Rule

3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge from taking part in

proceedings where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Respondent ignored said rule, warranting disciplinary sanction from this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo,

Camarines Sur guilty of violation of Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct and is REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of the same or

similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Page | 25
David and Marisa Williams v Atty. Rudy Enriquez

A.C. No. 6353 February 27, 2006

Callejo, SR., J.:

FACTS
Respondent Atty. Enriquez is the counsel of record of complainant-spouses

David and Marisa Williams in a civil case pending before the RTC in Dumaguete

where the spouses are the defendants. According to the complainant-spouses,

Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A Transfer Certificate of

Title was then issued in her favor, stating that she is "Filipino, married to David W.

Williams, an American citizen." On January 8, 2004, Atty. Enriquez charged Marisa

Williams with falsification of public documents before the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Dumaguete alleging that Marisa Bacatan-Williams automatically lost

her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to

own land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed

she executed to buy property in Negros Oriental. However, in her counter-affidavit,

Marisa cites Article IV, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she

would not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she renounced

it in a specific act. In reply, Atty. Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that

her "act of marrying" her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He

also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his position, not

Marisa’s.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation and then ruled that

respondent Atty. Enriquez be "reprimanded, with a warning and advice to study

each and every opinion he may give to his clients."

ISSUE
Whether or not these facts construe that Atty. Enriquez can be charged with

"unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts” in violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics.

HELD

Page | 26
 Wherefore, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is

REPRIMANDED and advised to carefully study the opinions he may give to his

clients. He is sternly warned that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more

severely.
Atty. Enriquez is administratively liable for his actuations for there is no

evidence shown by him that complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced

her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that

she has automatically acquired her husband’s citizenship upon her marriage to him.

The cases cited by Atty. Enriquez are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they

refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines. As pointed out by the Investigating

Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a

lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence. Indeed, when the law is so

elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross

ignorance of the law. As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his

duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues

and legal problems confronting a client. In this case, the law he apparently

misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, the most basic law of the land.

Page | 27
WARNING

Page | 28
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO vs HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR et al

G.R. No. 145213 March 28, 2006

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS
This is an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

International Exchange Bank filed a Complaint before the RTC of Makati for

Collection of a Sum of Money against Alberto T. Looyuko on where the complaint

alleged that the Bank opened a credit line in favor of Looyuko to which Jimmy Go

a.k.a Jaime Gaisano executed a Surety Agreement binding himself solidarily for all

debts incurred under the credit line. On various occasions, they availed of the credit

line to the total amount of P98, 000,000 which has evidenced of eight promissory

notes co-signed by Looyuko and Gaisano. When the debts became due they failed to

pay, prompting the Bank to institute the case against them.

Gaisano, at the start of proceeding until the case was submitted for decision,

was represented by counsel, Atty. Ronald E. Javier in which RTC rendered a

decision, finding him and Looyuko jointly and severally liable to the Bank for the

said amount plus interests and cost. The decision was received by Atty. Javier.

However prior to the receipt, Atty. Javier wrote to Gaisano, informing the latter that

he was withdrawing his services as counsel dated September 30, 1999 but Gaisano

released Atty. Javier only on October 29, 1999 through a Notice of Termination to the

Entry of Appearance, filed with the RTC on November 5, 1999 by Gaisano's new

counsel Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda Jr. On the same date, Gaisano now represented by

Atty. Caneda Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 7, 1999 decision,

but it was denied by the RTC. Through his new lawyer they filed a Notice of Appeal

but RTC issued an order denying the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the

reglementary period had already expired on November 4, 1999, or one day before

Gaisano filed his Notice of Appeal, considering that his previous legal counsel Atty.

Javier received a copy of the decision on October 20, 1999. The decision having

become final and executory upon motion by the Bank, the RTC ordered the issuance

Page | 29
of a Writ of Execution against petitioner. Gaisano is now before this Court on a

Petition for Review by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the

denial of his Petition for Certiorari by the Court of Appeals. Gaisano argues that he

should be given a new trial as his former counsel, Atty. Javier was grossly negligent

in the handing of his case and that he has a meritorious defense.

ISSUE
Whether or not his Notice of Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) should be given due course despite having been filed late

HELD
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The Court finds the petition without merit.

It should be noted that the assailed decision was decided by the Court of Appeals

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To be granted relief under a special civil action,

it must be convincingly proven that the court a quo committed grave abuse of

discretion, or an act constituting a patent and gross evasion of a duty, or a virtual

refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, or that the

trial court exercised its powers in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of

passion and personal hostility. Bearing this standard in mind, the Court finds no

error in the denial of the petition by the Court of Appeals as there was no showing

that the RTC had gravely abused its discretion or whimsically exercised its

judgment. The Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the decision

was properly mailed to Atty. Javier as he was still counsel of record. His receipt of

the decision on October 20, 1999 is, therefore, the starting point from which to count

the 15-day reglementary period. The RTC, therefore, correctly dismissed the Notice

of Appeal that was filed late.

Under Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may

withdraw his representation by written consent of his client filed in court.

Otherwise, notice and hearing on the withdrawal are necessary. Therefore, even if

Atty. Javier had already written a letter to petitioner withdrawing his services as

counsel, it did not become effective until after the submission by petitioner of the

letter officially terminating Atty. Javier's services on October 29, 1999. In fact,

Page | 30
petitioner even stated in the letter that his termination of Atty. Javier's services was

effective only beginning October 29, 1999. This constitutes an admission by

petitioner that when Atty. Javier received the decision, he was still considered by

petitioner as his counsel.

The Court is also dismayed that such baseless attacks were assisted by

counsel, who is an officer of the court. Under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN RESPECT DUE TO

THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS. In particular, he shall not attribute to

a judge motives not supported by the records or by evidence. A lawyer should

submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only. Atty. Caneda, Jr.

should have known better than to permit the irresponsible and unsupported claim

against Judge Abrogar to be included in the pleadings. Allowing such statements to

be made is against a lawyer's oath of office and goes against the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Petitioner Jimmy Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda, Jr. are

STRICTLY WARNED not to make disrespectful statements against a Judge without

basis in the records or the evidence.

Page | 31
FINE

Page | 32
ROSARIO ADRIANO VS JUDGE FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA
A.M. NO. MTJ-99- 1232 DECEMBER 8, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS
An administrative case was filed against Judge Francisco D. Villanueva for

immorality. This stemmed from a letter of complaint filed by Rosario T. Adriano

charging him with gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust

judgment, grave abuse of discretion and conduct of unbecoming a trial judge.

On her letter-complaint, Adriano stated that the acquittal of accused Fe Floro

Valino of charges of misrepresenting and recording her name in the death certificate

as the wife of the deceased husband of herein complainant, countenanced the

criminal acts subject of the case; that respondents leniency towards the accused who

was the mistress of her deceased husband, may have been brought about by his own

practice of cohabiting with a woman who is not his legal wife, which constitutes

conduct unbecoming a judge.

Complainant however did not specify the name of the name of the woman

who allegedly is the mistress of Judge Villanueva but specified the address as No. 1

Hanna Street, Fil-Invest, Batasan, Quezon City.

Judge Villanueva was required to answer the letter-complaint by the Court

administrator. On his answer, he contended that the complaint that he does not live

with his legal with his legal wife is unfounded and has no basis. He also attached an

affidavit by his wife stating that her husband has no mistress and is not living with

any mistress elsewhere.

On a memorandum, dated September 9, 1999, the Court Administrator

recommended that the matter of whether respondent Judge is cohabiting with

another woman not his wife subject matter of complaint Rosario D. Adriano’s sworn

complaint, be re-docketed as an administrative matter separate from this case, be

investigated and, if found true, he should be dealt with accordingly.

Lastly, with regard to the charge of conduct of unbecoming a trial judge, it

was found out that complainant’s evidence is purely circumstantial. It was also

found out that respondent Judge had been previously accused of the same and was

penalized by paying P40,000.00 pesos and since Judge Villanueva is already retired,

Page | 33
he can no longer be dismissed or suspended. Although under Rule 140 of the Rules

of Court, immorality is considered a serious charge with an imposable penalty of

either dismissal or suspension from the service; respondent’s retirement renders the

penalty of either dismissal or suspension moot and academic. Therefore

recommending the dismissal of herein administrative matter for having been moot

and academic in view of the decision rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-99-1207 entitled,

NBI vs. Judge Villanueva.

As to the Judge Villanueva’s letter requesting the release of his retirement

benefits and the retention of a considerable amount there from pending resolution of

the administrative case filed against him, the Court, affirming the recommendation

of the Deputy Court Administrator, resolve that: (a) DENY the request of Judge

Francisco D. Villanueva and WITHHOLD his compulsory retirement benefits, except

his accrued leave credits, pending the final resolution of AM Nos. MTJ-99-1232 and

MTJ-99-1233; and (b) DIRECT the IMMEDIATE RELEASE of Judge Villanuevas

retirement benefits in the event that he is exonerated from the charges in the said

administrative complaints.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion and

immorality or conduct of unbecoming a trial judge

HELD
The Court ruled that respondent Judge guilty of simple misconduct, undue

delay in delay in deciding a case and gross ignorance of the law, and imposing upon

him a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits which have been

withheld in view of the second administrative case filed against him wherein he was

found guilty and fined.

As to the present complaint, charging the respondent immorality or conduct

of unbecoming a trial judge, since complainant did not specify the name of the

mistress but provided the address which turns out to be the same address where

respondent and his lover named as Marian Herrera have been found to be

cohabiting, as held in the NBI case, the Court reasonably concluded that the mistress

Page | 34
alluded to by complainant in this case must be the same mistress subject of the NBI

case because of the similarity of the given addresses; and if this were so, the present

charges of immorality against respondent had already been fully threshed out in

that NBI case where the same respondent was found guilty thereof and meted out a

FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000).

Page | 35
Re: Report on the Financial Audit of the Books of Accounts of Atty. Raquel Kho
A.M. No. P-06-2177 June 27, 2006

Corona, J.:

FACTS
An audit has been conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

of the books of accounts of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samarfor the period March 1985 to October 31,

2005.
The OCA had the following findings: (1) there was a shortage of P545.00 in

remittances to the General Fund; (2) a cash shortage ofP24.00 in the Sheriff’s General

Fund; and (3) Atty. Kho did not deposit on time in the authorized depository bank

the collections for the Fiduciary Fund (P60,000) and Special Allowance for the

Judiciary Fund (P5,000). It also noted that Atty. Kho had already restituted

the P545.00 and P24.00 cash shortages.

On the delayed remittance of the amount of P60,000 representing the amount

of a confiscated cash bond, Kho explained that the Land Bank of the Philippines had

no branch in their locality so it was his practice to keep his collections in the court’s

safety vault.
The OCA found Kho liable for violating OCA Circular No. 8A-93 dated April

21, 1993 when he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. He was

supposed to deposit all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other

fiduciary collections with the Land Bank upon receipt thereof.

The OCA recommended that (1) the audit report be docketed as a regular

administrative complaint against Kho and (2) a fine in the amount of P10,000 be

imposed on him.

ISSUE
Whether or not Kho’s failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross

dishonesty and gross misconduct.

HELD
Wherefore, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of gross

misconduct for his failure to make timely remittance of judiciary funds in his

Page | 36
custody. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000 within ten (10) days from receipt of

this resolution.
The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and

gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty,

being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from

the service even if committed for the first time. However, Kho showed remorse by

immediately restituting the cash shortages and complying with the directives of the

audit team. And considering that this is his first offense, we find that the penalty

of P10,000 fine is sufficient.

Kho’s failure to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him was

inexcusable because he could have purchased postal money orders from the local

post office payable to the chief accountant, Accounting Division, FMO-OCA. The

money could have earned interest had he not kept them in the vault for over a year
Moreover, even though Kho had already transferred to the Department of

Justice, it neither renders this matter moot nor frees him from liability. His

misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His malfeasance prima

facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.

Kho is further ordered to SHOW CAUSE within the same period why he should not

be disciplined for such misconduct as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.

Page | 37
Carmen Edaño v. Judge Fatima Asdala

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2007 December 6, 2010

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2368-RTJ)

BRION, J.:

FACTS
This case is an administrative complaint filed by herein complainant Carmen

Edano against respondent Judge Asdala, for allegedly deciding on Civil Case No. Q-

97-30576 on March 22, 2005, when in fact herein respondent judge actually ruled on

several motions related to the aforementioned case even after March 22, 2005. In

addition to this, complainant Edano alleges that respondent Judge erred in denying

her notice of appeal. Furthermore, herein complainant caused delay by going

beyond the 90-day reglamentary period for rendering decisions.

In the response of Judge Asdala, she stated that the orders she issued after

March 22, 2005 did not touch on the case, but were actually related to herein

complainant’s receiving support pendent lite. In addition to this, she denied the

complainant’s notice of appeal because Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of

Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action

without prejudice. The Office of the Court Administrator in its decision ruled that

Judge Asdala should be fines Php10,000 for undue delay in rendering judgment,

with a warning that future similar acts will be dealt with more severly.

ISSUE
Whether or not herein respondent judge is guilty in undue delay in rendering

her decision

HELD
In the ruling of the Supreme Court, it agreed with the decision of the Office of

the Court Administrator finding the respondent judge of undue delay in rendering a

decision. The Supreme Court, citing previous jurisprudence ruled that the 90-day

period for rendering a decision is mandatory, and can only be excused for valid

reasons. As stated in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes:

Page | 38
 The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured not only by the fairness

and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with

which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties

with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved.

There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions.

The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law

and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties.

As such Judge Asdala is found guilty of undue delay in rendering a court

decision, and is FINED the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000).

Page | 39
Miguel E. Colorado v Judge Ricardo M. Agapito
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J:

FACTS
Miguel E. Colorado filed a sworn-letter complaint dated 31 January 2001

charging Judge Ricardo M. Agapito with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave

Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G entitled

“People vs. Miguel Colorado,” with Grave Slander and Grave Threats.
Complainant Colorado alleged the following: that the cases were directly

filed with the court without attaching the requisite certifications to file action from

the Barangay; that on the date the two cases were filed, Judge Agapito immediately

issued two warrants for his arrest, wherein he was arrested on a Friday, which

resulted in his stay in the municipal jail for two days and two nights until he posted

bail; that his Motion to Inhibit the respondent from hearing the case was not acted

upon; and that he received an envelope from the court with nothing inside and

found out later that the same was supposed to be a notice of hearing, thus he was

ordered arrested for his non-appearance in court.

Judge Agapito compulsorily retired from the judiciary on 22 February 2001.

On a First Endorsement dated 8 June 2001, he was directed to file his comment on

the complaint, but he failed to do so. A First Tracer dated 17 October 2001 was sent,

giving him a non-extendible period of five days to file his comment. However, said

tracer was returned unserved due to his retirement from the judiciary. Another

Tracer dated 30 July 2002 was sent to respondent’s residence. Just the same, he filed

nothing.
A court Resolution dated 24 March 2003 required respondent to manifest

whether he was willing to submit the administrative matter against him for

resolution without his comment. Again, he failed to comply with it. In the

Resolution of 26 January 2005, the Court ordered him to show cause why he should

not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to manifest and

comply with the first court resolution. Still, he failed to comply with the second

resolution. In the Resolution of 24 August 2005, the Court imposed upon Judge

Page | 40
Agapito a fine of P1,000 and deemed to have waived the filing of his Comment on

the complaint.
On 12 October 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the

respondent judge guilty as charged and recommended a fine of P20,000.00 to be

deducted from his retirement benefits.

It was only on 8 November 2005 when Judge Agapito paid the P1,000.00 fine

imposed upon him in the first Resolution and submitted his Comment on the

complaint. In his Comment dated 31 October 2005, he averred the following: that

the crimes committed by the accused are not within the Katarungan Pambarangay

Law because the imposable penalty exceeds one year; that finding a probable cause

against Mr. Colorado, the court issued a warrant of arrest and there is no law or

circular which prohibits the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday; that the

motion for inhibition must be set on several hearings but complainant Colorado

failed to appear and that he was neither arrested nor detained; and that complainant

Colorado should have immediately informed the court regarding its failure in the

mailing of notices.
On 21 November 2005, Respondent Judge requested the Court that his

retirement benefits be released subject to the withholding of P20,000.00 pending

resolution of the present complaint. This has been approved by the Court in its

Resolution dated 28 June 2006.

In the Resolution dated 29 March 2006, the Court referred back the

administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. On

30 August 2006, the OCA submitted its evaluation as follows: that the offense

charged against the accused which has an imposable penalty of more than one year

does not need a certification to file action from the Barangay; that there was no grave

abuse of discretion in the issuance of warrant of arrest on a Friday; that there was

merit in the neglect of respondent judge to resolve the pending issue of the motion

for inhibition which was not acted upon to the time of his compulsory retirement;

and that complainant Colorado should have immediately informed the court about

the envelope without any contents so that proper action could have been done. The

Page | 41
OCA recommended that Judge Agapito be found guilty of gross neglect for failure

to act on the motion for prohibition filed by accused-complainant Colorado and for

his failure to promptly comply with the lawful order of Court and not offering a

valid excuse thereof and should be fined P20,000.00, and that the withheld amount

of P20,000.00 from his retirement benefits shall be considered the payment of the

fine. The Court agreed in toto with the said findings and recommendations of the

OCA.

ISSUES

1) Whether or not the OCA correctly proceeded with the administrative case

against respondent judge based on the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC,

a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the Judiciary from

Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints.

2) Whether or not respondent judge committed Gross Ignorance of the law for

his failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the absence of the

requisite certificate to file action issued by the barangay as a mandatory

requirement of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government

Code.
3) Whether or not respondent judge committed Grave abuse of authority for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainant’s

incarceration for two days.

4) Whether or not respondent judge committed Grave abuse of authority and

bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for failure to act on the motion

for inhibition.
5) Whether or not there was an intention on the part of respondent judge to

prevent complainant’s appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a

supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.

HELD
Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.

01-8-10-SC, classifies gross neglect or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less

serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without

Page | 42
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of

more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of the

OCA that respondent should be imposed a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito guilty of

gross neglect and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from respondent’s retirement

benefits is considered as payment of the fine.

1. Yes, the OCA correctly proceeded with the administrative case against

respondent judge based on the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a

Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the Judiciary from

Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints. The resolution

provides:

“If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a

Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before

such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it

must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the

Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10)

days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and

recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The

Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of

the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date

without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the

Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action

alleged in the complaint.”

In the case before us, the first two requisites for dismissal are present.

First, the sworn letter-complaint was received by the OCA only on 31 January

2001, which was about three weeks before the compulsorily retirement of the

respondent judge from his service on February 22, 2001. Second, the ground

for disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent

Page | 43
judge occurred only five months before his separation from the service. As to

the third requirement, the complaint that respondent judge failed to act on

the motion for inhibition and that he intentionally prevented complainant

Colorado from appearing in a scheduled hearing by sending an empty

envelope was not prima facie shown to be without merit. The filing of the

present complaint did not show to be intended merely to harass the

respondent.

2. No. Complainant Colorado is charged with grave slander. Under

Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum penalty for it is 2 years

and 4 months. Thus, respondent has jurisdiction over said criminal case since

prior recourse to barangay conciliation is not required for offenses with

imposable penalty of more than one year as exemplified in Administrative

Circular 14-93 based on the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160.
3. No. As provided by Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure, an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the

day or night. The respondent judge is correct that there is no law or circular

issued by the Honorable Court which states that a warrant of arrest issued on

a Friday is prohibited. Provided that complainant was arrested on a Friday,

he could have posted bail for his temporary liberty the next day. The

Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96 dated December 5, 1996 provided for a

skeletal force on Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on

petitions for bail and other urgent matters. Also, any judge may act on

bailable offenses on Saturday afternoons, Sundays and non-working

holidays.
4. Yes, the Court found the respondent judge liable for failure to act

upon complainant’s motion for inhibition. The records showed that

complainant filed his motion for respondent's inhibition in September 2000

but the same has been unacted upon until the time of respondent’s

compulsory retirement from the judiciary on February 22, 2001. The undue

Page | 44
delay committed by respondent for five months in resolving the pending

incident is tantamount to gross inefficiency. Respondent judge ought to

know that he may act motu proprio on the motion for inhibition without

requiring the attendance of complainant if the latter repeatedly failed to

appear despite several settings to hear the motion. A judge, in the exercise of

his sound discretion, may disqualify himself from sitting on a case for just or

valid reasons.

Judges are mandated to perform all judicial duties, including the

delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable

promptness under Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

for the Philippine Judiciary. Also, they are directed to observe

unscrupulously the periods prescribed by the Constitution in the

adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted to their court

under the Supreme Court Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987.

In the case of Visbal v. Buban, the Court held that: “failure to decide

cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross

inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against

the erring magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending

before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the

Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.

Further, such delay constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code

of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should dispose of the

court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. As a

trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and should at all

times act with efficiency and with probity. Undue delay in the disposition of

cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the

judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature.”

Page | 45
5. There was absence of evidence to show that the sending of an empty

envelope to complainant Colorado was malicious on the part of the

respondent judge.

Page | 46
Juan dela Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v Judge Ruben Carretas
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043 September 5, 2007
Corona, J:

FACTS
An administrative case was filed against the respondent thru an anonymous

letter accusing said respondent of bad behavior during hearings conducted by him

by using harsh words against the counsels and their witnesses, such letter also

claimed that the respondent was stepping beyond his duties by cross exmining the

witnesses himself. Such unacceptable behavior tarnished the good reputation of the

justice system.
On the other hand, the respondent claimed that he was not guilty of such

behaviors and that the only reason why such complaints came about was because he

was doing his job as a judge imposing good conduct upon the counsels and

witnesses, he also claimed that some of the lawyers were exercising unacceptable

behaviors during hearings such as “a lawyer insisting on further examining a witness he

had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor proceeding with the presentation

of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a lawyer appearing for an absent

counsel de parte and manifesting that he was appearing "in corroboration" with the latter;

lawyers appearing without observing the proper dress code; a lawyer offering the testimony

of his witness "to collaborate" the testimony of another witness; a lawyer manifesting that he

was ready for trial but turning out to be unprepared with his documentary evidence,

prompting the court to call a recess;etc.”. The respondent admitted the fact that he may

on the occasion of such misbehaviors used harsh words but it was done only to

correct the counsels wrong.

An investigation was conducted headed by Judgre Romeo Danas, executive

judge of the RTC of Legazpi City. Upon his investigation, counsels were interviewed

stating that the respondent was using harsh words and was constantly engage in

embarrassing counsels and witnesses. They also accused respodent of being

boastful.
A meeting was held by the members of the provincial Prosecution office for

the said matter, their recommendation was to advice the respondent to observe

Page | 47
proper judicial decorum and to observe the mandates of New Code of Judicial

Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of improper behavior as

dictated by the Canons of Judicial Ethics?

HELD
The court ruled that respondent’s conduct was unbecoming of a magistrate.

The canons of law provided the judicial body of the proper etiquette a judicial

representative must have in performing their duties.

It was provided for by such canon that a judicial representative must not use

harsh words or embarrass counsels, litigants and witnesses. He must be able to use

courteous words and be patient in dealing with them. It was foud out that the

respondent was not able to meet such requirements expected of a judge. The court

sited Canon 2, Integrity sec.1 and 2, Canon 4 on Propriety, sec 1 and 6. It is required

of a judge to “He should be learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and

virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that

hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.”

With regard to respondent’s behavior of stepping beyond his role by

questioning by himself the witnesses, it was ruled that although judges and lawyers

have a shared responsibility to uphold justice, they have to cooperate and have

mutual respect with each other. As a general rule, judge must only limit his

questions with clarificatory ones. He must exercise impartiality and neutrality

It was ruled that the respondent was guilty in violation of the Code of

Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1

and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 8 and Rule 8.01. He is

mandated to pay fines and was sternly warned.

Page | 48
P/SINSP. OMEGA JIREH D. FIDEL v JUDGE FELIX A. CARAOS
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1224 December 12, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS
Respondent Judge Felix, at 10:45 in the evening was heavily drunk, attempted

to forcibly release one Natividad Braza from detention without any preliminary

investigation or written order for the latter’s release in the Municipal Police Station

of Candelaria.
While at the police station Respondent Judge shouted “PUTANG INA

NINYONG MGA PULIS KAYO, NASAAN SI HEPE? HOY, ILABAS NINYO ITO

NGAYON DIN, PUTANG INA NINYONG MGA PULIS. SINONG MASUSUNOD

DITO, MAYOR, PULIS, O JUDGE?"

Respondent Judge Commented that at 5:30 in the afternoon, while he was

watching his friends play lawn tennis at Tiaong, Quezon, a group of seven market

vendors approached him. The market vendors pleaded with him to order the

temporary release of a certain Natividad Braza, also a market vendor.

Respondent judge averred that after reading the complaint against Braza and

finding that the case was covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. He tried to

get in touch with the Chief of Police of Candelaria, Quezon by telephone but to no

avail. He then tried to contact the Candelaria Public Market Police Detachment and

was able to talk to a certain Police Officer Limbo. Respondent judge asked Officer

Limbo to convey his message to the municipal jail warden for the temporary release

of Braza pending the preliminary examination of the latter’s case scheduled the

following day.
At around 10:00 that evening, his wife woke him up and told him that there

were two men outside their house. Seeing that they were among the vendors who

approached him earlier at the tennis court, he let them in. The two men complained

that Braza was not allowed to be released and that the jailer told them, "walang

puedeng magpalabas nito kundi si Mayor."

He then decided to proceed to the police station in Candelaria, Quezon that

same evening. When he arrived there, he noticed that a telephone was located beside

the policemen who were then busy watching television and who did not even pay

Page | 49
attention to him. Respondent judge admitted that this irritated him, considering that

earlier the policemen failed to answer his telephone call, so he uttered the words:

"Bakit hindi ninyo sinasagot and telepono? Putangina! Kailangan pa ba nating dagdagan

yan? O alisin na dahil walang silbi, putangina! Paano na kung may emergency? O sunog?

Nasaan na si Hepe?" When he was told that the Chief of Police was out, he again asked:

"Bakit ayaw ninyong palabasin si Braza? At bakit wala daw puwedeng magpalabas sa

kanya?" Eventually, respondent judge was able to facilitate the release of detention

prisoner Braza.
After due investigation, Judge Rosales found no evidence to support

complainant’s claim that respondent judge was intoxicated when he arrived at the

Candelaria Police Station.

ISSUE
Whether or Not Judge Felix A. Caraos action was justified

HELD
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Felix A. Caraos of

the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, Quezon, is found GUILTY of Conduct

Unbecoming a Judge, and is ordered to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos

(P5,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts

will be dealt with more severely.

A judge, as an advocate of justice and visible representation of the law, must

not only apply the law but must imbibe it in his everyday living. Having accepted

the exalted position of a judge, both his personal and public life have been set apart

from the average citizen by losing his cool and uttering intemperate language at the

policemen on duty regarding the release of detention prisoner Braza, respondent

judge has overstepped the norm demanded of a member of the bench.

Page | 50
Leticia Gonzales v Atty Marcelino Cabucana
A.C. No. 6836 January 23, 2006
Austria-Martinez, J.:

FACTS
Petitioner Leticia Gonzalez is praying that Respondent Atty. Marcelino

Cabucana be disbarred for representing conflicting interests. She filed on January 8,

2004, a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as she was the

complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the Municipal

Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, where she was represented by the law

firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE,

with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an

associate/partner. A decision was rendered on that case ordering the losing party to

pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in

connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against

the said sheriff with this Court, after which Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the

house of Gonzales. They harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of

desistance regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed

against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral

defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation.

However, notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where

respondent's law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent

represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses.

Gonzalez now alleges that Cabucana should be disbarred from the practice of law

since his acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client

relationship between complainant and respondent's law firm and renders

respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the

IBP WARNED and REPRIMANDED Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. and advised to

be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of

interests.

Page | 51
ISSUES

1.) Whether or not Atty. Marcelino Cabucana represented conflicting interests

when he represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the

said spouses.
2.) Whether or not there is merit on the contention of Cabucana that there is no

conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm

where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales

against the Gatcheco spouses are not related.

HELD
Wherefore, the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is approved

with modification that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the

amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) with a stern warning that a commission

of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

1.) Cabucana is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent

conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a

full disclosure of the facts.

Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as

the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the

highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s

confidence,but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing

for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their

lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a

new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of

undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of

unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. In this case,

respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative

case filed by Gonzales against them. As Cabucana himself narrated in his

Page | 52
 Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed

by Gonzales against them.

2.) There is no merit in the contention of Cabucana that it was his brother who

represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no

conflict of interests. As Cabucana admitted, it was their law firm which

represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against

representing conflicting interests applies.

Page | 53
Marissa Mondala vs Judge Rebecca Mariano
AM RTJ-06-2010 January 25, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS
Marissa Mondala, a Legal Researcher of RTC Makati, Branch 136, charged

respondent Judge, Judge Mariano, with misrepresenting her “Report of Pending

Cases for January 2005” that she had already decided entitled “Amanet Inc vs

Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc., “ when, in fact, the case was still with

Mondala for research and drafting of the decision.

The judge denied the allegation, saying that at the time the monthly report

was being done, a decision had already been prepared and it was just an oversight

on her part , not misrepresentation, when she reported the status of the case as

decided. Just the same, Mariano signed “another” decision on the case. Mariano

attached documentary evidence to support her claim. Among her three “witnesses,”

were: Atty. Riel of Branch 136. He contended that the Amanet case was among those

decided in January and that Judge Mariano instructed him to include the said case in

the list of cases decided for the month and to submit a copy of the decision later on

since it was still to be printed in final form.”

Another witness was Tablate, the Clerk-in-Charge for Civil Cases, who

attested that when the monthly report was being prepared, the Amanet case had

already been drafted and was due for printing and that she was told by the judge to

already include it in the monthly report. However, after the submission of the

report, the computer bogged down and the draft could no longer be retrieved.
Belando, an employee of the local government of Makati City, detailed in

Branch 136, re-typed the final draft upon the instruction of the Judge.
Judge Mariano countered that Mondala should have called her attention

regarding the status of the subject case to enable her to address the situation; that

Mondala’s failure to inform her of the status showed her inefficiency and

untrustworthiness as a public servant. Mariano affirms that Mondela is a perennial

latecomer, a habitual absentee, and is negligent in the performance of her duty.

Mondala’s disrespectful attitude and unprofessional conduct prompted her to ask

Mondala’s detail to the office of the Clerk Court of the Makati RTC.

Page | 54
 The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the case be

converted into a regular administrative matter and that Judge Mariano be held liable

for misrepresenting the said case; that she explain in writing why she should not be

disciplined for her failure to decide some cases within the reglementary period.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Mariano is liable for misrepresentation when she

included in the monthly report the said case as among the decided cases; and WON

respondent Judge made inaccurate entries in the monthly reports and failed to

decide the other cases within the 90-day reglementary period.

HELD
Yes. Judge Mariano is liable for misrepresenting that she had decided the case

of Amanet, before it was drafted, printed and signed by her. Even if there is a

quarrel between the Judge and Mondala and that Mondala was motivated by a

desire for revenge, still, the Judge included an undecided case in the list of decided

cases.
A decision in a civil case is rendered only upon the signing by the judge who

penned the same and upon filing with the clerk of court. A judgment or final order

determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly

prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law of which

they are based, signed by him and filed by the Clerk of Court. What constitutes

rendition of judgment is not the mere pronouncement of the judgment in an open

court but the filing of the decision signed by the Judge with the Clerk of Court. A

draft decision does not operate as a judgment. Rendition of judgment is not effected

and completed until after the decision and judgment is signed by the judge.
What the monthly report requires is a list of cases decided and not a list of

cases with prepared drafts. The list of decided cases should pertain to those decided

during the month for which the report is being submitted, the basis of which is the

Seventh paragraph of the Administrative Circular No. 4-2004.

Thus, the Judge misrepresented herself regarding the promulgation of the

decision in the Amanet case. While the January 2005 monthly report of Branch 136

Page | 55
was submitted, the subject decision had not yet been printed. Amanet had

obviously been not decided yet.

Mariano is likewise guilty of administrative transgressions.
There were cases submitted for decision but which were not decided within

the reglementary period. Mariano also did not request for an extension for most

cases. In some instances when an extension was made and granted, still, the cases

remained undecided within the specified extension period. No less than the

Constitution mandates that all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within

24 months from date of submission to the Supreme Court , and unless reduced by

the High Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all

other lower courts.

A judge’s failure to expedite speedy justice constitutes administrative

sanction.
In this case, respondent was guilty of intentional misrepresentation resulting

in breach of trust and confidence, amounting to the serious charge of gross

misconduct due to violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

provisions of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular; as well as making

untruthful statements as provided in Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

The Judge is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000 directly to the Court , with a

stern warning that a commission of the same or a similar offense will be dealt more

severely.

Page | 56
National Bureau of Investigation vs. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1207. November 21, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS
Director Santiago Y. Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),

send a letter recommending the prosecution of Judge Francisco D. Villanueva

Branch 36, Metropolitan Court of Quezon City and three others for illegal

recruitment under Republic Act (RA) 8042 and white slave trade under the Revised

Penal Code in relation to RA 7610. The letter also charged respondent with

immorality, alleging that Marian Herrera was his live-in partner.

Judge Francisco D. Villanueva encourage three young women to apply for

jobs as GROs, he accompanied them to the Bodega Night Club one night in January

1999. He introduced them to the operator, Andres C. Torres-Yap, and informed the

latter that the women were looking for jobs. Respondent Francisco Villanueva also

accompanied them when they applied at the KTV night club, where they eventually

worked as GROs from January 26, 1999 to January 29, 1999. He clearly facilitated the

employment of the three young women as GROs. Our present society considers their

work as morally wrong. By facilitating the employment of the three in a night club

as such, he was placing the then impressionable minors directly on a path of moral

decay. He was exposing them to a seedy world where the practice of offering ones

flesh in exchange for money was thrust right in front of their faces.
Through his careless acts, respondent opened himself to the charges of white

slave trade and violation of RA 7610. Such acts are unacceptable, because no position

exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the

judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained,

without which the faith of the people in the judiciary so indispensable in an orderly

society cannot be preserved. In sum, his actions show conduct unbecoming his

office.
On Immorality, Judge Francisco D. Villanueva and Marian Herrera were

lovers because respondent was found sleeping inside the same bedroom occupied

by Herrera at No. 1 Hanna Street, Fil-Invest, Batasan, Quezon City. Second, they

Page | 57
were cohabiting in the same house in the aforementioned address. Respondent

Judge Villanueva never denied that he was the husband of Herrera when he was

introduced to complainant’s witnesses.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Francisco D. Villanueva is guilty of Immorality and

conduct unbecoming a judge

HELD
Wherefore, Judge Francisco D. Villanueva is found guilty of immorality and

conduct unbecoming a judge. He is hereby FINED in the amount of P40, 000.

In this case, the acts complained of are not connected with the performance of

respondent’s official duties; thus, they cannot be considered serious or gross

misconduct. However, such acts are violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,

specifically Canon 2 which states that judge should avoid impropriety and the

appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Page | 58
Johnny Ng v Atty. Benjamin Alar
Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS
Johnny Ng, one of the respondents in a labor case, filed a disbarment case

against Atty. Alar for misbehavior. Alar, in his motion for reconsideration, derided

and attacked the personalities of the Labor Arbiter and the Commissioners for

having come with a decision not in favor of them. Previously, Alar’s complaint

against Jonny Ng and company was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter, whose act was

also upheld by the NLRC commissioners. The motion for reconsideration contained

abusive language that attempted at castigating the personalities herein mentioned.

However, Alar argued in defence that the Rules of Court and the Code of

Professional Responsibility only have suppletory effect to the NLRC when its Rules

of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters against litigants and lawyers

appearing before it. In this case, Alar stressed that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of

Procedure already provides for appropriate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers

and litigants. He also contended that the Rules of Court and/or the Code of

Professional Responsibility have no application and effect to lawyers practicing at

the NLRC, the latter not being a court. Moreover, he argued that Labor Arbiters and

Commissioners are not judges nor justices and hence, the Code of Judicial Conduct

do not apply to them likewise as they do not form part of the judiciary.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Code of Professional Conduct applies to Atty. Alar’s misbehavior

before the NLRC

HELD
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of

violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

imposed a FINE of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same

or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely:

1.) The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its

moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality,

Page | 59
 impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive

language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification. The Code of

Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and

candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics

against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language

which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the

courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by

the record or have no materiality to the case.

2.) The assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being

judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary and that

consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is

unavailing. In Lacumrom v. Jacoba, the Supreme Court held that: well-

recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a

citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate

channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened

judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001

motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented

the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and

jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it

should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal

profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to

promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.

Page | 60
Robert M. Visbal vs. Judge Rogelio C. Sescon
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1744. August 18, 2003
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS
On Feb. 4, 2002 Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal charged Judge Rogelio C. Sescon

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City, with undue delay in the

disposition of cases, in violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct. These cases are listed below:

1) Civil Case No. 2000-05-65, Robert M. Visbal vs. Alberta Hijada for

Collection of Sum of Money. On August 31, 2000, the case was submitted

for decision; however, it has not been resolved by respondent.

2) Criminal Case No. 90-08-356, People of the Philippines vs. Rolando

Noseas, et al. for Robbery by the Use of Force upon Thing. It was

submitted for decision on August 1, 2001, but respondent has not resolved

the same up to the filing of the complaint. In Criminal Case No. 99-10-513,

respondent resolved the motion for reinvestigation only after four (4)

months from submission.

3) Criminal Case No. 99-09-485, People of the Philippines vs. Alberta Hijada

for Qualified Theft. This case doesn’t go beyond the pre-trial stage.

Complainant Robert M. Visbal now prays that respondent be directed to inhibit

himself from hearing the cases because he can no longer be expected to be impartial

in the light of the present administrative complaint.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Rogelio C. Sescon is liable for delay

HELD
Wherefore, Respondent Judge Rogelio C. Sescon is liable for undue delay.
The Constitution mandates that lower courts decide or resolve cases or

matters submitted for decision within three months from the filing of the last

pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court

concerned. This policy is reiterated in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial

Page | 61
Conduct which states that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and

decide cases within the required periods.

Undue delay in rendering a decision or order and imposes upon him a FINE

of P11,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will

be dealt with more severely.

Page | 62
SPOUSES RODOLFO and SYLVIA CABICO v JUDGE EVELYN L.

DIMACULANGAN-QUERIJERO
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1735 April 27, 2007
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS
Spouses Rodolfo and Sylvia Cabico are the parents of a 17-year old rape

victim in Criminal Case No. 10383-AF then pending before respondent Judge’s Sala.

They stated that of the three accused in the criminal case, only Azarcon was detained

as the other two were at large.

On 12 October 2001, their counsel manifested in open court that no settlement

of the case would be pursued as one Atty. Ildefonso J. Cruz informed him that the

remaining amount for the settlement of the case would not be given to complainants.

It was at this point that respondent Judge called Sylvia Cabico and uttered angrily

with a loud voice that she should return the money now. This caused Sylvia Cabico

great humiliation
After the trial of the case, someone called them and ordered them to appear

before Atty. Fraizerwin Viterbo (Atty. Viterbo), Clerk of Court of the trial court. At

his office, Atty. Viterbo ordered them and the victim to sign an Affidavit of

Desistance. Complainants alleged that Atty. Viterbo warned them that they should

sign it because Judge Sala will be angry if they will not sign it.
When they refused to sign the affidavit, Atty. Viterbo uttered, thus:
Maaari naman kayong kumuha ng ibang abogado at maaari ninyong palitan maski ilan. Ang

totoo niyan ay ubra naming pawalan ‘yan wala kayong magagawa.

Atty. Viterbo then went inside the chambers and informed respondent Judge

about their refusal to sign the affidavit. Respondent Judge came out of her chambers

and in a loud and angry voice, uttered the following:

Misis, bakit ayaw mong pumirma. Sige, huwag mo ng asahan na masisingil mo pa si

Nadora. Didismisin ko ang lahat ang tatlo na iyan. Pumunta ka ng Batangas at doon mo

pabistahan si Nadora. Mas takot kayo sa abogado ninyo kaysa sa akin.

On that same day, despite the absence of an affidavit of desistance,

respondent Judge issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the reason that

complainant is no longer interested in the criminal aspect.

The District Jail Warden Rufino M. Santiago, Jr. of the BJMP, Camp Tinio,

Cabanatuan City or his authorized representative is directed to release immediately

Page | 63
Edwin Azarcon unless he is detained for other lawful cause or causes.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Evelyn committed gross ignorance of the law when she

issued the order dated 12 October 2001, dismissing the criminal case with

prejudice against both accused after the latter had paid their individual civil liability.

HELD
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero of the

Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 liable for GROSS IGNORANCE

OF THE LAW and FINE her P21,000. We STERNLY WARN her that a repetition of

the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

Respondent Judge dismissed with prejudice Criminal Case Nos. 10384-AF

and 10383-AF against Dela Rosa and Azarcon after they had paid their individual

civil liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law, for

payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability.

Page | 64
SUSPENSION

Page | 65
LETICIA ADRIMISIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER
A.C. No. 2591 September 8, 2006
Carpio,J. :

FACTS
July 12, 1983, Leticia Adrimsin was introduced by her cousin, Pablo

Adrimisin, to Atty. Rolando Javier. Her son-in-law, Alfred “Monterde” Monterde

was charged with the crime of qualified theft. She needed the help of Atty. Javier for

the release of Monterde from Caloocan City Jail. Ms. Adrimsin claimed that Atty.

Javier advised her to file a bail bond. On the other hand, she told the lawyer that she

only have P500. Ms. Javier contends that Atty. Javier received the money, issued a

receipt and promised that Monterde would be released from jail the following day.

But no Atty. Javier appeared. Monterde was released from the Caloocan City Jail

thru settlement of Monterde and his employer. Ms. Javier demanded for the return

of the P500 but Atty. Javier failed to return this amount.

Atty. Javier was silent about Ms. Javier’s allegations to him. He only

appeared during the investigative hearings conducted by the OSG. He claimed that

he was never hired as legal counsel by Ms. Javier for his son-in-law but only asked

for help to secure a bail bond. He admits that he received a P500. However, it was

insufficient to pay for the bond. Atty. Javier also denies that he promised to have

Monterde released immediately.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Javier violated Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility

HELD

Wherefore, petition questioning the violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibilty.

The Court finds Atty. Javier liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), thus he is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision. The Code

mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that

Page | 66
may come into his possession. Consequently, a lawyer should account for the money

received from a client. The Code also enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter

entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his

client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own

use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation

of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in

the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Page | 67
DAVID ALMENDREZ, JR VS ATTY MINERVO LANGIT
A.C. No. 7057 JULY 25, 2006
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS
On 3 February 1994, the trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case

based on a compromise agreement executed by complainant and Bumanlag. On 18

December 1995, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of

the decision. A court order dated 2 March 2000 granted the Omnibus Motion for

Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as

complainant's counsel. Respondent filed a second motion for withdrawal of

deposited rentals, which the trial court also granted on 16 March 2000. complainant

learned that respondent was able to withdraw the rentals deposited by Bumanlag.

Felicidad Daroy ("Daroy"), Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court, confirmed this to

complainant who received from Daroy copies of the two withdrawal slips drawn

from the trial court's savings account. One slip dated 10 March 2000 was for P28,000,

and another slip dated 19 April 2000 was for P227,000. Thus, respondent received a

total of P255,000, as evidenced by two receipts signed by him. The withdrawals were

made through Daroy's authorized representative Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy

personally delivered the money to respondent. Respondent did not inform

complainant of these transactions. Complainant, through his new counsel Atty.

Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the

accounting and return of the P255,000. Respondent failed to reply. The IBP directed

the parties to file their respective position papers. Complainant submitted his

position paper on 22 March 2005. Again, respondent took no action. Hence,

complainant filed this case for disbarment against respondent for failing to account

for complainant's funds.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty Minervo Langit is guilty of the charges against him

HELD

Page | 68
 WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Minervo T. Langit GUILTY of violating Canons

1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND

respondent from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this

Decision. Respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The Code of

Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or

received for or from the client.

Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when

due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may

apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and

disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also

have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured

for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Page | 69
CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN
A.C. No. 6051, April 2, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS
In a verified complaint dated June 14, 2002, complainant Celia Arroyo-

Posidio prayed for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan on account

of deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath.
Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent in Special

Proceeding No. C-525, entitled "Testate Estate of deceased Nicolasa S. de Guzman

Arroyo," filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Complainant paid

respondent legal fees in the amount of P20,000.00. However, on June 6, 1990,

respondent withdrew his appearance as counsel in the said case, thus complainant

engaged the services of another lawyer.

Sometime in August 1996, respondent contacted complainant and showed

her documents consisting of tax declarations of properties purportedly forming part

of the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman-Arroyo, but were not included in the

Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C-525. He

convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged

undeclared properties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After

several months, however, respondent failed to institute any action. Complainant

decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of the P100,000.00,

but respondent refused despite repeated demands.

Consequently, complainant filed an action for sum of money and damages

against respondent before Branch 81, Metropolitan Trial Court, Valenzuela City

which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7130. On March 31, 1999, the trial court

rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter

to:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 with interest at the rate of

12% per annum from September 7, 1996 until the same is fully paid

and/or satisfied;

Page | 70
 2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P8,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;

and
3. To pay the cost of suit.

Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which affirmed 3 the

Metropolitan Trial Court decision in toto. Thus, complainant filed a Motion for

Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted on March 19, 2001.

To satisfy the judgment against him, respondent issued Prudential Bank check

number 03387425 dated May 31, 2001 in the amount of P120,000.00 in favor of

complainant. However, upon presentment for payment, the check was dishonored

for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice of dishonor and

demand6 dated September 3, 2001, respondent refused to honor his obligation.

Hence, this administrative complaint charging respondent with deceit, fraud,

dishonesty and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath.

Respondent denied complainant’s allegations. He admitted having received

the amount of P100,000.00 but claimed that the same was partial payment for his

services in Special Proceeding Case No. C-525. Further, he alleged that he had

already paid complainant the amount of P150,000.00 as evidenced by a Receipt &

Quitclaim dated August 10, 2000.

On March 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 15,

2006, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report finding respondent

guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in

defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same.

ISSUE
Whether or not Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which requires the lawyer to account for all money or property

collected or received for or from his client violated

HELD
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is guilty of violating Rule

16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from notice, with a STERN

Page | 71
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more

severely.
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting moral

and ethical standards imposed on members of the legal profession. Respondent’s

refusal to return complainant’s money upon demand, his failure to comply with the

lawful orders of the trial court, as well as the issuance of a bouncing check, reveal his

failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his

oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

It cannot be overemphasized that membership in the legal profession is a

privilege. Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the

trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of

this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of

ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

Page | 72
Luisito Balatbat v Atty. Edgardo Arias y Sanchez
A.C. No. 1666; April 13, 2007
Callejo, Sr, J:

FACTS
Petitoner engaged the services of the respondent to represent him in a civil

case. It was claimed by the petitioner did not appear during his trial as advised by

respondent. He claimed that the case against the petitioner was judged against his

favor because he was judged to be on default for his non appearance. With this

ruling petitioner was embarrassed and was put in misery and public ridicule.
On the other hand, the respondent claimed that he was trying to bring with

him the petitioner during the trial but it was Balabat who refused for different

reasons. He also claimed that he did not reeive the notice of default from the court

and that it was the petitioner who informed him of such decision. He also claimed

that petitioner asked the services of another counsel which was the reason why he

was not able to receive the notices. He further alleged that the administrative case

was brought about by ill-will. Another allegation made by the respondent was that a

notice of hearing was made to appear as signed by him when in fact it’s not his.
An investigation was conducted by the IBP, and it was found out that there

were two Atty. Edgardo Sanchez Arias; the other one is residing in Manila while the

respondent was currently residing at Puerto Prinsesa. Due to this fact, notices sent to

the defendant were sent to the other counsel. The IBP recommended the respondent

to be suspended.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent was administratively liable

HELD

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, for violation of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, respondent Atty. Edgardo Arias y Sanchez is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for One (1) month. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of

the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is likewise

DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable the Court to

determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.

Page | 73
 It was ruled that the respondent was administratively liable; this was due to

his inability to formally discharge himself from his duties to his client. It was a well

settlled rule that in order for the attorney-client relationship to be discharged there

has to be a notice of discharge made by the client and the replacement of the formal

counsel has to be properly recorded. Due to this non observance or the proper

procedure the attorney-client relationship between petitioner and defendant was not

severed
It was also found out that the respondent did receive a notice of hearing and

was even able to approach the clerk of court regarding the matter and was informed

properly of the date of the next hearing. Such negligence by the defendant is against

Rule 18.04 which required counsels to inform their clients of the status of the case

and answer within reasonable time to the clients’ request of information. Counsels

are supposed to exhaust all the remedies available to the client and be very mindful

with all the information necessary for the case.

Page | 74
BUN SIONG YAO vs. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO
A.C. No. 7023, March 30, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS
On November 11, 2004, a complaint-affidavit 1 was filed against Atty.

Leonardo A. Aurelio by Bun Siong Yao before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) seeking for his disbarment for alleged violations of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.
The complainant alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of

respondent as his personal lawyer; that respondent is a stockholder and the retained

counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing

Corporation of which complainant is a majority stockholder; that complainant

purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds but were registered in the

name of the corporations upon the advice of respondent; that respondent, who was

also the brother in-law of complainant’s wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the

latter and thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the

corporations but when complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa

and falsification of commercial documents against the complainant and his wife and

the other officers of the corporation; that respondent also filed a complaint against

complainant for alleged non-compliance with the reportorial requirements of the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Mandaluyong City and another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Malabon City for alleged violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code; that

respondent also filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of

San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. On July 19, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner

submitted a Report and Recommendation 3 finding that from 1987 up to 1999,

respondent had been the personal lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and

counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation. However, in 1999 complainant

discontinued availing of the services of respondent in view of the admission of his

(complainant’s) son to the bar; he also discontinued paying dividends to respondent

Page | 75
and even concealed from him the corporations’ financial statements which

compelled the respondent to file the multiple criminal and civil cases in the exercise

of his rights as a stockholder.

The investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for a period of six months 4 which was adopted and

approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Aurelio violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

HELD
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio is ordered

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective

upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of

the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court

Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the

country.
It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client

is a fiduciary one. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that

a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and

confidence reposed on him. an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications

made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This

obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of

their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease

with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to

employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation

between them. It even survives the death of the client. Lawyers must conduct

themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large,

with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Lawyers cannot be

allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool

Page | 76
for instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a client or

former client.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by

faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which

might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,

honesty and integrity of the profession.

In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a breach of his duty

to uphold good faith and fairness, sufficient to warrant the imposition of

disciplinary sanction against him.

Page | 77
Valeriana Dalisay v Atty Melanio Mauricio, Jr
AC 5655 January 23, 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J:

FACTS
At bar is a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Decision on April 22,

2005 finding Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr. guilty of malpractice and gross

misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice

of law for a period of six (6) months.

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana Dalisay, engaged Atty Mauricio’s services as

counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc. v. Valeriana Dalisay,"

pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.

Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount of

P56,000 from Dalisay, Atty Mauricio never rendered legal services for her. As a

result, Dalisay terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return

of her money and documents, but Atty Mauricio refused.

On January 13, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for

the amount of P56,000 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor

any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and

opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office." It recommended

that Atty Mauricio be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to Dalisay, and

surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.

XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto the Commission’s Report and

Recommendation.
On April 22, 2005, the Court rendered the assailed Decision.
In this motion for reconsideration, Atty Mauricio assails that:
1) Dalisay did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She

hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for

declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree;

2) Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered submitted for decision" as early as

August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date

he was engaged as counsel, hence, "he could not have done anything

anymore" about it;

Page | 78
 3) Dalisay refused to provide him with documents related to the case,

preventing him from doing his job; and

4) Dalisay offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him

to file falsification cases against her.

ISSUES
1) Whether or not Atty Mauricio erred in not returning the P56,000 paid to him

by Dalisay in exchange for his services

2) Whether or not Atty Mauricio’s charges against Dalisay is meritorious

HELD
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Our

Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Atty Mauricio is directed to

report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our

Decision.
1) Atty Mauricio violated Canon 16, specifically
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or

received for or from the client.

Atty Mauricio insists that Dalisay hired him for the purpose of filing two new

petitions: a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review

of a decree, instead of Civil Case no 00-044. But, Atty Mauricio is still liable

because there is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition.

Neither does the fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already "submitted for

decision" excuse him from liability of not appearing in Court. He should have

returned complainant’s money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing

nothing.
2) Atty Mauricio attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to

Dalisay. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital

to the case. This is absurd. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is

an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic

learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent

knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. It bears reiterating

that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been

Page | 79
paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a

lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, Atty Mauricio accuses Dalisay of offering falsified documentary

evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases

against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to

Dalisay. But, this does not exonerate Atty Mauricio. Canon 19, specifically

provides that
Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that his clients has,

in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or

tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and

failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in

accordance with the Rules of Court.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of

inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify

her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then that is the time

that he should terminate his relationship with her. Obviously, in filing

falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by

vindictiveness.

Page | 80
Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association, Inc. and/or its Officers,

Members namely: Minerva A. Genato, Julieta P. Benedicto, Praxedes A. Morena,

Patricia de Guzman, Pacita G. Mequerio, Helen Resuello, Ric de Guzman and

Erlinda Ramirez vs. Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu

A.C. No. 5542, July 20, 2006
Callejo, Sr. J.:

FACTS
On November 1997, the services of respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu

were engaged by complainant Minerva Genato et. al. in order to defend them in an

ejectment case filed against their respective capacities as officers/members of Dayan

Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc. Genato et. al. lost the ejectment

case, nonetheless, respondent Atty. Espiritu advised them to file a supersedeas bond

to stall their eviction. The following amounts were entrusted to respondent Atty.

Espiritu as payment therefor:

Ben/Lita Benedicto P 41,000.00
Patricia de Guzman 16,909.00
Ric de Guzman 15,260.00
Prima Fidel 4,000.00
Minerva Genato 33,000.00
Pacita Moquerio 27,403.00
Praxedes Moreno 12,795.00
Rico Ramirez 44,627.00
Helena Resuello 11,988.00
Myrna Sayson 2,000.00
TOTAL 209,162.00
Stating the complainants’ side, Minerva Genato averred that respondent Atty.

Espiritu deposited only P 48,000.00 to the Clerk of Court as evidenced by the receipts

presented by the latter. With this, complainant Genato made verbal demands against

Atty. Espiritu to return the balance, upon which the latter delivered a check in the

amount of P 141,904.00, where Atty. Leonardo Ocampo is the payee. The same check

bounced due to insufficient funds, prompting Atty. Ocampo to send a demand letter

to complainant Genato to make good the payment of the check. Complainant Genato

then made several demands again to Atty. Espiritu as to the balance of the payment

but to no avail. They resorted to seek the assistance of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP). Likewise, an information alleging estafa was filed against Atty.

Espiritu before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Manila.

Page | 81
 On the contrary, respondent Atty. Espiritu said that he did deposit the

amount of P 48,481.00 as “partial supersedeas bond”. He admitted of having

delivered a postdated check amounting to P 141,904.00 to complainant Genato, but

was unable to fund the same. Though this was the case, Atty. Espiritu insisted that

he made arrangements to Atty. Ocampo so as to allow Genato et. al. to stay in the

subject property until December 1999 or even beyond and that if it were not for his

representations with the other party, Genato and the others would not be able to

stay in the same property. He also reiterated that the balance to the money entrusted

to him by complainants Genato et. al. were meant for the arrears payment of the

property occupation from January 1991-December 1996. Atty. Espiritu also erred

that the complaint and the information charged against him are all baseless and has

no cause of action.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not respondent Atty. Napoleon Espiritu misappropriate the

funds entrusted to him by his clients thereby violating the Rule 16.01, Canon

16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

2. Whether or not complainant officers/member of the Dayan Sta. Ana

Christian Neighborhood Association, Inc. has the legal standing to sue and

the cause of action against respondent Atty. Espiritu.

HELD
Wherefore, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is guilty of violating the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is penalized with SUSPENSION from

the practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately. Respondent is DIRECTED

to return the funds entrusted to him by complainants and to inform the Court of the

date of his receipt of this Decision.

1. Respondent Atty. Napoleon Espiritu violated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall account

for all the money or property collected or received for or from his client. The

fiduciary relationship that exists between a lawyer and his client is one built

out of trust and confidence. Atty. Espiritu has the duty and responsibility to

Page | 82
 conduct proper accounting of all the money and properties entrusted to him

by his client. He shall not misappropriate his clients’ money for his own, for

this shall result to the betrayal of the trust and confidence the latter has

bestowed upon the former. That being said, the money entrusted by

complainants to respondent were for the supersedeas bond filed by the former

as advised by the latter, not for the arrears payment of the property

occupation as alleged by respondent Atty. Espiritu.

2. Complainant Minerva Genato and company have the legal standing to sue

respondent Atty. Espiritu since these two parties have established a lawyer-

client relationship. If they do not have this unique bond, Genato et. al. will

not have the locus standi against Atty. Espiritu. As regards to the issue that

complainants have no cause of action, quoting Commisioner San Juan, “The

claim of respondent that the complainants [have] no cause of action against

him is without merit.” Atty. Espiritu had admitted receiving the funds and

deposited partial of the whole amount. Upon demands of complainant who

asks respondent to return the balance, the latter delivered a check which was,

unfortunately, unfunded. This mere incident was enough to be a basis for the

cause of action against respondent Atty. Napoleon Espiritu.

Page | 83
PETER DONTON vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL TANSINGCO

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

The disbarment complaint arose when Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-charge

for perjury against Donton. The case involves an Occupancy Agreement between

Mr. Duane Stier and Donton wherein Tansingco stood as counsel for the agreement.

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy

Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to

own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate

violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for

advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out

a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant

filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel,

Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, because respondent refused to act as complainant’s

witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he

"prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness

and due execution.

The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

for investigation, report and recommendation.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct and of

violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Page | 84
HELD

YES. A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that

will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer

who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law

commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. By his own

admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from

owning real property. Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted

that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent,

however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title

in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing

several documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee

Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in

complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing

the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said

documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath

and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade

the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the

law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for

which he may be suspended.

The Court found respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of

violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he

is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law.

Page | 85
Juan Dulalia, Jr. vs. Atty. Pablo C. Cruz
A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007
Carpio Morales, J. :

FACTS
Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the

construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the

purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of

respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal

Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan. Thus, Juan Dulalia filed

the case at bar against Atty. Cruz for allegedly violating the following rules:
a.) Rule 1.01, when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano (cousin

of Susan Dulalia) on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina

Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.

b.) Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Cruz used his

influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wife’s

application for building permit.

c.) Rule 7.03, for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal

Legal Officer of Meycauayan.

Atty. Cruz answered the allegations by stating that he never influenced the said

application for the building permit and what he did was a mere inquiry about the

construction of the said questioned edifice as residents surrounding such were

already complaining about the hazards that the construction might pose. On the

other hand, he also addressed the issue regarding him contracting a second

marriage, stating in his defense that, he was not aware that the New Civil Code has

taken effect as he was in the United States where he contracted his second marriage.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Cruz violated rule 1.01, 6.02, 7.03 as alleged by

complainant?

HELD
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint about the violation of Rules 6.02

and 7.03. In their explanation the SC said that the complainant failed to prove that

Atty. Cruz in fact violated the abovementioned rules.

However, the court finds the Respondent to be liable for violationg Rule 1.01

Page | 86
for contracting a second marriage while his former marriage was still subsisting and

and Canon 5 which states that: “A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,

participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high

standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist

in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.” The Supreme

Court stated in their explanation, It must be emphasized that the primary duty of

lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal

processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and

maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-

informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent

enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic

legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able

to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar.

Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Wherefore Attorney Pablo Cruz is thereby SUSPENDED with warning that

similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Page | 87
FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ vs. ATTY. MANUEL G. SAN JOSE
A.C. No. 3569 February 23, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS
This is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De

Enriquez against respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence.
Fidela Vda De Enriquez hired the respondent Atty. Manuel San Jose for the

purpose of filing an unlawful detainer against Rugerio Alipante. Respondent failed

to file the appropriate civil case despite payment of 2000 pesos to the respondent,

Fidela decided to withdraw case and repeatedly demanded the return of her

documents, but responded failed to return the documents.

Fidela prayed that Atty. San Jose be disbarred or suspended from practice of law.
Repondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter from

the complainant that the lessee has vacated the premises, thus filing of an unlawful

detainer has become unnecessary and that he did not file the case even before

receiving Fidela’s letter because there was vacancy in the sala of the MCTC and that

he informed the complainant that the case could not be filed until a new judge is

appointed and promised to file the case before the action. Respondent further

claimed that the attorneys fee was 3000 pesos and that the Fidela’s daughter was

paid 700 pesos per month.

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report, and recommendation by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline

(CBD).The investigating officer found that respondent was indeed remiss in the

performance of his professional duties as counsel. According to Commissioner Julio

C. Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to his client was sending

a demand letter for the lessee to vacate the subject premises within ten days from

receipt of the demand letter. The Commissioner also found respondents explanation

for his failure to file the case unsatisfactory and concluded that respondent was

guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer for abandonment of

his clients cause. The Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for three months.

Respondent denied being negligent he claimed that the IBP Board of

Page | 88
Governors misinterpreted the complainants letter, which stated that the complainant

and her lessee came to an agreement for the latter to vacate the leased premises. He

claimed that he relied on that letter thereby negating the necessity of further filing a

case for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE
Whether or Not the Respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is guilty of

negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer for abandonment of his

client’s cause

HELD
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty

of violation of Canon 18 specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)

months effective upon notice of this Resolution.He is ordered to return to

complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of P2,000 with 12% interest

per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Resolution until the full

amount shall have been returned.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into respondent’s personal records as

an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar, and furnished the Court

Administrator for distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, and the Office of the

Bar Confidant.

Page | 89
Ma. Gina L. Francisco, Josephine S. Tan and Carlos M. Joaquin vs.

Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal

A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006

Tinga, J:

FACTS

Ma. Gina L. Francisco, Josephine S. Tan and Carlos M. Joaquin filed an

affidavit-complaint on 15 August 2003 charging Atty. Portugal with Gross

Misconduct, Gross Negligence, and Violation of the Lawyer’s Oath relative to a

criminal case, G.R. No. 152621-23, entitled “SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato

F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin vs. People of the Philippines” with two counts

of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. Herein complainants are related

to the petitioners in the said criminal case.

Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan against SPO1 Ernesto C.

Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin, who were involved in

a shooting incident on 21 March 1994, for murder and frustrated murder. They

pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty of two

counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.

At that occasion, herein complainants engaged the services of Atty. Portugal

for the accused. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by

the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, he filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second

Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.

Pending Resolution by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Portugal filed a Petition for Review

on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002. After that, the complainants never

heard from him despite their frequent telephone calls and they later found out that

the latter had moved out from his last known address. More than a year after the

petition was filed, the complainants personally verified the status of the Ad

Cautelam Petition. They discovered that the Court already issued a Resolution

Page | 90
dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket

fees, and that said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest had

already been issued against the accused.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. The case

was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. Out of the

three complainants, only Carlos Joaquin appeared during the mandatory conference.

The parties were directed to file position papers. On 27 May 2005, Commissioner

Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding Atty. Portugal guilty

of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the imposition of the

penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. This was adopted

by the Board of Directors of the IBP on 12 November 2005. The Court imposed a

suspension of three (3) months to Atty. Portugal.

According to the respondent

Atty. Portugal claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken

between him and the other party as he was not the original counsel of the accused

and that he was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, to assist the

accused, and to be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He

asserts that all the efforts he put in the case of the accused were done without proper

and adequate remuneration. Atty. Portugal averred that on 3 April 2002, the last

day of filing of the Ad Cautelam petition, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to

File Petition for Review, seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition.

Thus, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition within the reglementary period, through a

registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Atty. Portugal also sent a

letter, together with the Notice to Withdraw, to PO3 Rolando Joaquin, the contact

person between the former and the complainants, explaining his decision to

withdraw as counsel and instructing PO3 Joaquin to sign and file it with the Court.

Page | 91
Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so. Atty. Portugal could not present the

registry receipt issued for the letter.

ISSUES

1) Whether or not Atty. Portugal committed gross negligence or misconduct in

handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam

petition’s dismissal with finality.

2) Whether or not Atty. Portugal erred in ordering PO3 Joaquin to file the

former’s Notice to Withdraw as Counsel.

3) Whether or not there was no formal engagement between the parties.

4) Whether or not there was an offensive appellation committed by Atty.

Portugal in branding his own clients as being the culprits who “salvaged” the

victims.

HELD

Wherefore, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished

the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.

1) Yes. In criminal cases, a counsel has a higher duty to be cautious in

defending the accused because more important than the latter’s property, are

his right to life and liberty which stands at lost. The Court noticed that the ad

cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. The respondent should have

known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and

it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan whether or not to admit

it. Thus, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. In line

with this, the accused had already lost their right to appeal even before Atty.

Portugal filed his motion for extension.

Page | 92
 As to Atty. Portugal’s conduct in dealing with the accused and

complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness

that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. He had not

been candid in his dealings with them as observed by Commissioner

Villadolid. Although he represented to the accused that he had changed his

office address, it was shown in the examination of the pleadings which he

filed that the same contained the mailing address known to the complainants.

Most probably, respondent's office would have received the Court's

Resolution dismissing the petition. He should have at least informed the

complainants of the adverse resolution considering that the latter had

frequently checked on the status of the case. It seemed like he opted not to

return their calls.

2) Yes. If Atty. Portugal truly intended to withdraw his appearance for

the accused, as a lawyer, he should have filed the notice of withdrawal

himself instead of the accused. Also, he ought to know that he was the one

who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. To

relieve himself from his responsibility as counsel, he should have secured

first a written confirmation from the accused and filed it with the court

pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. As suggested by

Commissioner Villadolid, he should have at least informed the Court through

the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his

clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal.

He was negligent in handling the case of the accused for failure to do so.

Failure to present the alleged registry receipt of the letter which the

respondent allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to

Atty. Portugal’s claim, especially that the complainants were firm that they

did not hear from him after the filing of ad cautelam petition.

“The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to

terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The

Page | 93
right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for

sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental

rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an

action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to

abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a

case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent

or from a good cause.”

3) The Court also rejects respondent's claim that there was no formal

engagement between the parties. In the case of Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, the

court ruled that: “After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer

owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for

the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession

in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.”

Also, in another case, it was ruled that: “A written contract is not an

essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be

express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and

assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his

profession.”

Atty. Portugal’s unwavering obligation as a counsel is embodied in

the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus his

enthusiasm in handling the case should neither diminish nor stop even if he

feels undercompensated. In line with this, the complainants have sufficiently

disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before

the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the

Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number

7186509273, which the latter neither admitted nor denied.

4) Yes. Atty. Portugal described the incident as follows: "the accused

police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the 'salvage' of

Page | 94
Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C.

Macato." Under Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

lawyers are clearly directed not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the

guilt of the latter. The Court found it ironic that the defense counsel was the

one who actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that

"salvaged" the victims. It was unprofessional to term such event when in

fact, it has not been done by the Sandiganbayan.

Page | 95
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS

LuzvimindaLijauco engaged the services of Atty. Rogelio Terradowith duties to

assist in:

1) recovery of Php 180000 deposit with Planter’s Development Bank

2) release of foreclosed house and lot in Calamba, Laguna from the same bank
3) hearing for the issuance of writ of possession
4) protecting her interests in a Compromise Agreement.

Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado neglected his duties despite receipt of

payment representing attorney’s fees amounting to Php 70000. She filed a complaint

for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the

court. Atty. Terrado denied the allegation. He claimed that the payment of Php

70,000 was only for the recovery of bank deposit, which he divided to two other

individuals as commission/referral fees.

Moreover, Atty. Terrado made stipulations in the compromise agreement

where Lijauco conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the

redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank,

and that she releases her claims against it. Records show that he acted as

complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement. Respondent

admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the

latter affixed her signature.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation. the Investigating Commissioner

submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility.

Page | 96
ISSUE

Whether or not the payment of Php 70000 represents only the payment for

the recovery of bank deposits to the exclusion of other aforementioned duties

HELD

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules

1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice. He is

ordered to return the sum of Php 70000 to Lijauco.

The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The fee of P70,000.00

for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is

unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Moreover, it

should not have been divided to two other individuals as commission or referral

fees.

Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct.

Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services

with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon

the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his

estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a

deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement

plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing

arrangement.

Page | 97
 A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case.

Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and

care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer

should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently

protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the

qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his

legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for

his client’s cause.

Page | 98
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA vs.

ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO

A.C. No. 6270 January 22, 2007

Carpio, J:

FACTS

The Villanueva spouses had several parcels of land. Upon their death, their

five children survived them. One of their children, Alfonso, executed an Affidavit of

Adjudication stating that he was the sole surviving heir of the Villanueva spouses

and that he was adjudicating to himself a parcel of land from his parents’ estate.

Such affidavit was notarized by the respondent, Atty. Beradio.

Later, Afonso’s sister, Florencia, complained that Alfonso misrepresented

himself as the sole surviving heir of their parents and that the Villanueva spouses

had other surviving descendants. She claimed that Beradio was aware of this fact as

the latter lived in the same community as them. Florencia accused Beradio of

knowing the "true facts and surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties of

the spouses Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their

rightful shares in the property.

In her response, Beradio claimed that the properties of the Villanueva

spouses had already been distributed to their heirs but they left one parcel of land

for themselves. It was Alfonso who was tasked to take care of his parents. Thus the

last parcel of land was given to him, and this fact was known by the other children

of the Villanueva spouses and by Beradio. She claimed that she acted in good faith in

notarizing the affidavit.

The IBP recommended that Beradio be suspended from the practice of law for

6 months and that her notarial commission be suspended for one year because of her

wilful act of notarizing the affidavit even though she knew that Alfonso was not the

sole heir.

Page | 99
ISSUE

Whether or not Beradio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

voluntarily notarizing the affidavit although she knew of the falsity contained

therein.

HELD

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the IBP was sustained. Beradio’s

notarial commission was revoked, she was disqualified from being commissioned as

a notary public for one year, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six

months.

Beradio herself admitted that she knew of the falsity in Alfonso’s statement

that he was the sole surviving heir of the Villanueva spouses. She still notarized such

document despite her knowledge of such falsity. The execution of such affidavit was

premised on such assertion. Her actions resulted in a breach of Canon 1 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land

and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Beradio also violated Rule 1.01

of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Page | 100
RENATO M. MALIGAYA v. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.

A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006

CORONA, J.:

FACTS

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr., counsel of several military officers, was charged

by complainant Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a

hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 (a case between Maligaya and the military

officers).

At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla

said that he had an agreement with Maligaya that if they withdraw the case against

him, he (Maligaya) will also withdraw all the cases.

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. Charging Atty.

Doronilla with 'misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting in

obstruction of justice.’ Said complaint was was referred to a commissioner for

investigation.

Maligaya swore that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his

lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such

agreement and explained in his memorandum that his main concern was 'to settle the

case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial and insisted that there

was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the

lawyer's oath.

In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report

and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in

violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and

recommending that he be ‘suspended from the government military service as legal

officer for a period of three months.’

Page | 101
ISSUE

Whether or not Doronilla should be suspended from the government military

service as legal officer for a period of three months

HELD

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the

same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as

officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times

in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility state:

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing

of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by

any artifice.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to

withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical

conduct. Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his

obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. He persisted

in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an

agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that

regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade

responsibility.

There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith which keeps us

from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity.

In the light of his claim that his only aim was 'to settle the case amicably among
Page | 102
comrades in arms without going to trial’, it is not unreasonable to assume that what

he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to

get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. . But even if that had been so, it

would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the

duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it

necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not

true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with

truth and honor forbids recourse to such a tactic.

Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the

Rules of Court, which in part declares:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as

attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of

the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension

from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation

for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the

only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as

a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military

service

SC considered a few circumstances that mitigate his liability: 1) credit for

exhibiting enough candor to admit the falsity of the statement he had made; 2)

absence of material damage to complainant; and 3) this is Atty. Doronilla's first

offense.

Page | 103
EDUARDO MENESES VS ATTY. ADOLFO MACALINO

A.C. No. 6651 February 27, 2006

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

Atty. Rodolfo Macalino received from Eduardo Meneses an amount of

P40,000 for his legal services and for the processing fee to facilitate the release of

Meneses’ car from the custody of Bureau of Customs. Atty. Macalino failed to render

any legal service to Meneses and he also failed to secure the car’s release, however

Atty. Macalino also failed to promptly account for and return the money to Meneses.

But even after demand, Atty. Macalino did not return the money. Again, he waited

until a complaint was filed with the NBI before he refunded the P20,000. Even then,

respondent failed to return the balance of P20,000 as he promised.

Meneses filed a complaint to the IBP for failure to render legal services,

failure to refund balance of legal fees, and failure to apprise the complainant of the

status of the case – all in violation of the lawyer’s oath of office. The IBP found him

guilty and suspended him for 1 year.

ISSUE

Whether or not the suspension is justified.

HELD

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino is found GUILTY of violation of

Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one

year effective upon finality of this decision.

Page | 104
For failure to Inform and to Respond to Inquiries of the Complainant Regarding the

Status of the Case

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, it is the lawyer’s

duty to keep the client regularly and fully updated on the developments of the

client’s case. The Code provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the

status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request

for information."

For failure to Account and Return the Money He Received from Complainant

The Code mandates that every "lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and

properties of his client that may come into his possession." The Code further states

that "[a] lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or

from the client." Furthermore, "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his

client when due and upon demand."

Page | 105
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC and BEN A. NICOLAS vs Atty.

MACARIO D. ARQUILLO

A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS

This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint filed with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Ben

A. Nicolas, acting for himself and on behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that

Letter-Complaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was charged with deceit, malpractice,

gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing

conflicting interests. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by

the IBP-CBD as follows:

Herein complainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accuses

(sic) herein respondent, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of engaging

in conflicting interest in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission,

Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union.

Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein respondent appeared

and acted as counsels for both complainants (eight out of the eighteen complainants

therein) and respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein).

Herein respondent appeared as counsel forcomplainants therein, Teresita A.

Velasco, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S. Hernando, Virginio C. Rasos, Bonifacio S.

Blas, Ronald A. Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli Quimoyog. In the very

same consolidated case, respondent was also the counsel of one of the respondents

therein, Jose G. Castro.

Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated

August 12, 1997 filed by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel, herein

respondent filed before the NLRC of San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later

Page | 106
or on August 28, 1997, respondent filed a Complainant's Consolidated Position

Paper, this time representing some of the complainants in the very same

consolidated case.

Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998

Order of the IBP-CBD directing him to do so. Even after receiving five notices, he

failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemed to

have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. Thereafter, the complainants

were ordered to submit their verified position paper with supporting documents,

after which the case was to be deemed submitted for decision. In their

Manifestation dated August 30, 2004, they said that they would no longer file a

position paper. They agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their

Letter-Affidavit dated March 16, 1998, together with all the accompanying

documents.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his Report, Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of

violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thus, the former recommended the latter's suspension from the practice of law for a

period of six (6) months.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of

Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner

Funa, with the modification that the period of suspension was increased to two (2)

years.

On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were

transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of

the Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a Motion for

Reconsideration to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP denied the

Motion.

Page | 107
ISSUE

Whether or not the court should grant the respondent’s claim from 2yrs of

suspension from the practice of law to one year

HELD

We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the

recommended period of suspension to one year.

Respondent had the duty to prove the Complaint wrong. But Respondent

cannot do this because he is the counsel for the complainants. Here lies the

inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.

An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine

grounded on public policy that a lawyer's representation of both sides of an issue is

highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with

respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies

even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for two years. Considering, however, prior rulings in cases

also involving attorneys representing conflicting interests, we reduce the suspension

to one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct

and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year

effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction

shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

Page | 108
Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation v Atty. Villalon, Jr.

A.C. No. 6323 April 13, 2007

Corona, J:

FACTS

Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation filed a disbarment case

against Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr. for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.

In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer

for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case

was dismissed for improper venue. Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed

an action for breach of contract with damages in the Regional Trial Court of

Parañaque, Branch 274. Said case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Al-Rasheed,

through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order of dismissal, but both

the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court denied said petition. On January 29,

2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque,

Branch 274. Said case was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription.

In his complaint, following the “multiple” suits directed against him, Olivares

alleged that Atty. Vilallon’s client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly

sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial

apartment in Olivares Building in Parañaque. The case was then referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation. The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of IBP found that Atty.

Villalon assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of

action and subject matter. It opined that respondent should have noted that the 1999

case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the

Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. The

CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for six months. IBP adopted and

Page | 109
approved the findings of CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “A lawyer shall not file multiple

actions arising from the same cause.”, as well as the proscription on forum shopping.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Villalon has violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility and the prescription on forum shopping

HELD

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an

empty formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to

the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As

the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall

uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and

legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers should

"not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor

give aid nor consent to the same." With this in mind, Atty. Villalon should have

refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to have

known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it has the effects of an

adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary

principle of procedural law.

Furthermore, Atty. Villalon violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility:

Rule 10.03, Canon 10 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not

misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

A lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth

and justice. Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient

administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s

Page | 110
processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and

degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to

disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys

to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that

appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.

Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and

rules instead that CBD’s recommendation for a SIX-MONTH SUSPENSION from

the practice of law to be more commensurate to the violation committed. However,

in view of respondent’s death on September 27, 2006, the penalty can no longer be

imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case

moot and academic.

Page | 111
PAGCOR vs. Atty. Dante A. Carandang

A.C. No. 5700 January 30, 2006

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS

Atty. Carandang is the president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated, a private

corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. On February 2, 1999,

PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a “Grant of Authority to operate Bingo

Games.” Article V of this document mandates Bingo Royale to remit20% of its gross

sales to PAGCOR. This 20%is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and

5%franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In the course of its operations,

Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14 as of November 15,

2001. Instead of demanding the payment therefore, PAGCOR allowed Bingo Royale

and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly installment of

P300,000.00 from July2001 to June 2003.-Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR 24

Bank of Commerce checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.-

However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land

Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by reason of Bingo

Royale’s “Closed Account.”-Despite PAGCOR’s demand letters dated November 12

and December 12, 2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts

of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila

criminal complaints for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against respondent.-

PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for

serious misconduct, violation of the Attorney’s Oath and violation of the Code

of Professional Responsibility; and prays that his

name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. In his “Opposition” to the complaint,

respondent averred that he is not liable for issuing bouncing checks because they

Page | 112
were drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so “is not related to the office of a

lawyer.”

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Atty. Carandang is liable for serious

misconduct and violated the Attorney’s oath and code of professional

responsibility.

HELD

WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious

misconduct and violations of the Attorney’s Oath and the Code of Professional

Responsibility. As recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, he is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice.

To issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a

choice for an individual(especially one learned in the law),whether in a personal

capacity or officer of a corporation, to do so after assessing and weighing the

consequences and risks for doing so. As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be

unaware of the probability that BRI, the company he runs, could not raise funds,

totally or partially, to cover the checks as they fell due. The desire to continue the

operations of his company does not excuse respondent’s act of violating the law

by issuing worthless checks. Moreover, inability to pay is not aground, under the

Civil Code, to suspend or extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondent contends

that because of business reverses or inability to generate funds, BRI should be

excused from making good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained,

debtors will merely state that they no longer have the capacity to pay and,

consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to

creditors.

Page | 113
NESTOR PEREZ vs ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE

A.C. No. 6160 March 30, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS

Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct

or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.

Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines

Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom,

among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the

police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga

where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could

secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that

unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder

victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against

them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial

confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being

charged.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while

being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in

drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of

kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre violated Rule 15.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility on conflicting interests

Page | 114
HELD

The court ruled that the respondent is liable for violation of Rule 15.03. Under

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent

conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full

disclosure of the facts. The complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence

his charge against Atty. de la Torre. The respondent admitted that his services as a

lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time

that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also

representing the interest of the victim’s family. This was declared by the victim’s

daughter, Vicky de Chavez. who testified that her family retained the services of

Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers. Respondent

is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having conflicting

interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof

that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the

existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned. Atty. Danilo de la

Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE

YEARS from the practice of law.

Page | 115
PLUS BUILDERS, INC. vs ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR

A.C. No. 7056 September 13, 2006

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

FACTS

On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of

Cavite, DARAB CASE against Leopoldo De Guzman et al; hereinafter called

[tenants/farmers] and such decision was in favor of Plus Builders. On May 31, 2001,

Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by

way of Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, filed a 'Motion for

Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment. After

realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the

PARAD judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of

Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition

plus Damages was filed by Respondent. On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary

Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, was issued and an

extension of or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued. Respondent then

filed an Indirect Contempt case dated against Plus Builders Inc. Subsequently,

enraged by his defeat, Respondent filed a verified "Action to Quiet Title" before the

Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO). Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in

the practice of law as [KDC] LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND

ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on the

practice of law with non-lawyers. Respondent claims that he is in good faith in filing

the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition

for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before the

Ombudsman).

Page | 116
ISSUE

Whether or not Atty Revilla is guilty of violating the attorney's oath and Rule

9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD

The Court ruled that the respondent is guilty of violating the attorney's oath

and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The records show that his

course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the

execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision. It must be noted that when the

Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted

to a different forum to pursue his clients' lost cause. In the disturbance compensation

case, he represented his clients as tenants and acknowledged that complainants were

the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently

repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse

possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a

temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicator's

Decision. Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution.

Moreover the Court ruled that the complainants successfully substantiated

their claim that the respondent, who held himself out as a law partner of the "KDC

Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was rendering legal services together

with persons not licensed to practice law in violation of Rule 9.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission,

especially because he had every chance to deny it. Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:

Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.

Page | 117
 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the

performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a

member of the Bar in good standing.

Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a

vanguard of law and justice. In line with jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross

misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)

months, effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent is DIRECTED to

inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolution within ten (10) days

from receipt thereof.

Page | 118
CARLOS REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS VITAN

A.C. No.5835 April 15, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS

Carlos Reyes availed of the services of Atty. Vitan to file the appropriate

complaint against certain individuals who failed to comply with a court order for

partition of properties in his favor. It was alleged that after having received 17,000,

Atty. Vitan did not act on his case. Hence, he filed an administrative case for

disbarment against the said lawyer for gross negligence.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Vitan violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility

in failing to file the required complaint for his client

HELD

Yes, Atty. Vitan is liable for gross negligence.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer

shall serve his clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, a lawyer shall not

neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith

shall render them liable.

In this case, the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services but

subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of the

abovementioned rule.

However, the Court held that the recommended penalty by the IBP of two

years suspension is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter sanctions have been

imposed for the same violations. Hence, Atty. Vitan is SUSPENDED for a period of

only six months. He is also ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days

Page | 119
from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of

the promulgation of this Decision until the full amount shall have been returned.

Page | 120
CONSORCIA ROLLON vs Atty CAMILO NARAVAL

A.C. No. 6424 March 4, 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS

Consorcia Rollon filed a complaint against Attry. Camilo Naraval for

Collection of Money with Prayer for Attachment. Said parties had an attorney-client

relationship. However, this fiduciary relationship ended quickly after Naraval failed

to give proper legal assistance to Rollon. Consorcia’s son Freddie Rollon went to

Atty. Naraval’s office to inform of him their decision to withdraw the amount they

have paid and to retrieve the documents pertaining to the case. Unfortunately,

despite several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return the

documents because they were in their house, and that he could not give back the

amount paid to him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money. The IBP Board of

Governors recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for

two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and the restitution of complainant’s P8,000.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Naraval is guilty of violating the Code of Professional

Responsibilty

HELD

YES. Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as

advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. They may decline

employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry

it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are

Page | 121
required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with

zeal, care and utmost devotion.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship

and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a

lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of

importance. The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be

mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his

negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case

and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for

information.

Hence, lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently

handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a

case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less,

then they fail their lawyer’s oath. With these being said, Atty. Camilo Naraval is

found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for

a period of two (2) years. Furthermore, the Court ORDERED him TO RESTITUTE

complainant’s eight thousand pesos (P8,000).

Page | 122
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER

RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.

CABUNGCAL vs ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

PUNO, J.:

FACTS

Herein complainants Marili Ronquillo, et al. seek the disbarment or

suspension of herein respondent Homobono Cezar on the ground that the later sold

them a piece of property over which he had no right, and that he refuses to return

the amount that they paid him for it.

Homobono Cezar sold a Crown Asia property in Quezon City to herein

complainants. However, the latter subsequently received word from Crown Asia

property that respondent Cezar had not yet paid the price in full to Crown Asia at

the time that he executed the Deed of Assignment to the Ronquillos. Respondent

also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly

executed with Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered

the bank to stop payment on the second check she issued to respondent in the

amount of Php187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainant gave herein respondent the option to a) work

on Crown Asia’s execution of the Deed of Sale in their favor, or b) return the amount

of money that they initially paid to him. Both options were left unheeded despite

repeated demands, hence the case filed by herein complainants. The Integrated Bar

of the Philippines found herein respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful

conduct, and recommended that Cezar be suspended from the practice of law for a

period of three (3) years.

Page | 123
ISSUE

Whether respondent Cezar is indeed guilty of dishonest and deceitful

conduct, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

HELD

The Supreme Court in its ruling upheld the recommendation of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines of a three-year SUSPENSION from the practice of

law. In its decision, it stated that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,

and is granted only to those of good moral character. Lawyers must conduct

themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients

or the public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal

profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension

and disbarment. However, the court cannot compel the respondent to return the

money paid by herein complainants, as the nature of this case is administrative in

matter, which merely deals with the fitness of an attorney to continue being a

member of the Bar, which in this case, refers to the suspension or disbarment of

respondent Cezar for misconduct.

Atty. Cezar was suspended for three (3) years, effective immediately.

Page | 124
JOSEPH SAMALA vs. ATTY. ANTONUITTI K. PALAÑA

ADM. CASE No. 6595. April 15, 2005

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS

Joseph Samala was looking for a company where he could invest his dollar

savings. He met Raymond Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources, Inc.

(FIRI), a company located at Legaspi Village, Makati City. Taino introduced him to

FIRI Manager Jun Agustin, Chief Trader Diosdado Bernal, and Legal Officer

Antonuitti K. Palaña, the respondent herein.

Samala was assured by the respondent that through FIRI he would be

directly putting his investment with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, a reputable

company based in the Virgin Islands for 13 years The three officers presented to him

their company profile and documents purporting to establish their relationship with

Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, eventually Samala invested $10,000 which he

subsequently decided to pull out by sending FIRI a letter requesting the withdrawal

of his investment them 10 days to prepare the money.

Upon expiration of the period, Samala went to Agustin who later on told him

that the request was sent to Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard at Ortigas Center and

hence Samala wetn to Yiu, the latter was surprised when he saw the documents

involving complainant’s investment so he phoned Agustin. Agustin delivered to

complainant a check in the amount of P574,045.09, as the peso equivalent of

complainant’s investment with FIRI, check later on bounced due to insufficient

funds.

Respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave complainant P250,000 in cash and a

check in the amount of P329,045.09. Respondent told complainant that the check

was signed by FIRI President Paul Desiderio in his presence and assured

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complainant that the check would be funded. The second check was dishonored

because it was drawn against insufficient funds.

Thus, Samala charged Paul Desiderio of Estafa and Violation of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 at the Prosecutor’s Office of Makati. He joined three police

officers in serving the warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio at No. 10 Damascus

St., Northeast Executive Village, B.F. Homes, Parañaque Cit, the said address

of derived from the documents of FIRI. Although there was a street named

Damascus in the said village, there was no residence numbered “10.” They were

eventually told that no such address existed and that no resident named Paul

Desiderio lived in the subdivision.

Complainant alleged that respondent’s act of representing himself to be the

legal officer of FIRI and his assurance that the check he personally delivered to him

was signed in his presence by FIRI Officer Paul Desiderio, when no such person

appears to exist, is clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of Professional

Ethics.

Respondent defaulted in teh hearing held by the Commission on Bar

Discipline for investigation and the case was heard ex parte.[R]espondent was

instrumental in the issuance of the check signed by the alleged President of FIRI,

Paul Desiderio, whose whereabouts could not be located and whose identity was

unknown[,] for respondent was the one who handed personally to the herein

complainant the check which was dishonored due to insufficient funds, when it was

the very respondent, Atty. Palaña, who allegedly assured that the check was

funded. Respondent was also one of those alleged officers of FIRI who assured

complainant that his investment was directly placed in a re[p]utable company.

Further investigation with NBI showed that respondent Palaña was also linked with

Belkin’s whose activity was the same as the FIRI and the SEC has on file the By-Laws

of FIRI that the corporation shall not engage in the business as securities advisor,

stockbroker or investment house. First Imperial is prohibited from engaging in

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foreign exchange business. And despite this prohibition, they went on and engaged

in activities which are prohibited specifically in their by-laws.

It was that recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of

law for six (6) months having found to found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7

of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner modifying suspension to three years.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Palaña violated the Canon 7 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility when he manifested himself as the Legal Officer or FIRI in his

dealings with Joseph Samala

HELD

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaña is found GUILTY of

violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective from

receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts

will be dealt with more severely.

Palaña gave complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for P329,045.09, with

an assurance that the second check was a good check and that was signed by a

certain Paul Desiderio, the alleged president of FIRI. However, the said check

bounced because it was drawn against insufficient funds, and the drawer of the

check, Paul Desiderio, could not be located when sought to be served a warrant of

arrest since his identity was unknown and his residential address was found to be

non-existent. It is clear that the representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI

caused material damage to complainant. In so doing, respondent failed to uphold

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the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and lessened the confidence of the

public in the honesty and integrity of the same.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all

times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.[3] To this end,

nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to

lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and

integrity of the profession but it was established that it is clear that the

representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI caused material damage to

complainant by him misrepresenting himself in his appearance as legal officer of

FIRI.

Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which states:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or

private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal

profession.

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Clarita J. Samala v Atty. Luciano Valencia

A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007

Austria-Marinez, J.:

FACTS

Complainant Clarita Samala is praying that respondent Atty. Luciano D.

Valencia be disbarred on the following grounds: a) serving on two separate

occasions as counsel for contending parties; b) knowingly misleading the court by

submitting false documentary evidence; c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for

nonpayment of rental fees; and d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring

illegitimate children.

In Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

272, Marikina City, entitled “Lenora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for non payment of

rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted

as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filling an

Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch

74, Marikina City, entitled “Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve

Bustamante and her husband” for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against

Bustamante-one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. In his

decision dated May 2, 2000 Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz warned respondent

to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil

Case no. 95-105-MK. But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch

273, Marikina City, entitled” Editha S. Valdez v Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Registry of

Deeds of Marikina City”, respondent as counsel for Valdez, filed a complaint for

Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title

No. 275500 against Alba, respondent’s former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and

SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Page | 129
ISSUE

1) Whether or not Atty. Luciano Valencia represented conflicting interests when

he served as counsel for contending parties on two separate occasions

2) Whether or not Atty. Luciano Valencia mislead the court by submitting false

documentary evidence

3) Whether or not Atty. Luciano Valencia is guilty of immoral or deceitful

misconduct

HELD

Wherefore, Atty. Luciano Valencia is hereby found GUILTY of misconduct

and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately

upon receipt of herein resolution.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he

represented but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare

attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting

professional employment from the client’s adversary either in the same case or in a

different but related action. In this case, respondent’s averment that his relationship

with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the

proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is

unavailing. It is evident that respondent’s representation of Valdez and Alba against

Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case,

is a clear case of conflict of interest.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the

doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

What is decisive in this case is respondent’s intent in trying to mislead the Court by

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presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that the said title was already cancelled

and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

Moreover, Canon 1, Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. That

respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and

that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

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RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and

FREDILYN BACULBAS, vs. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING

A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS

The complainants filed in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a disbarment

case against Atty. Jose Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of

Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Sambajon et. al were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-

98, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al.

v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor

Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the

therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-

98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike. Consequently,

labor arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the

employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Respondents are jointly and severally

liable to pay the backwages including the various monetary claims stated in the

Manifestation made by the complainants in the NLRC case.

The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on

September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution. On February 27, 2004, individual Release

Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the

complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in

the presence of respondent, dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants

were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004

Four of the seven complainants who purportedly executed the Release

Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter

the said documents or having received the considerations. Hence, they filed an

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administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with

his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of

Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. They also

filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his

clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City.

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of

the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for

negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning.

One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon by petition filed before the OBC,

assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day

period to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel

received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited

on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having

transferred from one residence to another.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Suing conduct violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility for his alleged manipulation of four alleged release waiver and

quitclaim of the complainants

HELD

Yes. The respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS

CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND

CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

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 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and

his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the

administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Also, a lawyer

takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an

Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the

courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The Court found Atty. Suing guilty of negligence for failing to properly

ascertain the true and real identities of four complainants who executed release

waivers and quitclaims and received considerations therefor. It also held him liable

for gross misconduct for attempting to coach or influence the answers of his client

Manuel Rodil so as not to incriminate him when the latter testified before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of

negligence and gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a

period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar

acts will be dealt with more severely.

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RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

Carpio, J:

FACTS

Lim-Santiago (Santiago) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and administratrix of

his property. The latter is a shareholder and former president of Taggat Industries

(Taggat). Atty. Sagucio (Sagucio) was the legal counsel of Taggat until he was

appointed Assistant Prosecutor of Tuguegarao.

Five years after Sagucio had resigned from Taggat, the employees of the latter

had filed a criminal complaint against Santiago, alleging that after gaining control of

the company, she withheld the employees’ salaries without valid cause for almost a

year. As assistant prosecutor, Sagucio conducted the preliminary investigation and

recommended the filing of informations for violations of the Labor Code.

Santiago then filed an action for the disbarment of Sagucio on the grounds of

representing conflicting interests and for engaging in the private of law while

employed in government services by receiving retainer’s fees from Taggat. She

claimed that Sagucio, being the Sagucio should have inhibited himself from hearing,

investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Santiago further

claimed that Sagucio harassed the employees to sign the affidavit to support his

claims.

In his answer, Sagucio stated that he had already resigned from Taggat for

more than five years and did not owe any loyalty to Taggat. Also, it was his duty as

the assistant prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation. As to his receipt of

payment from Taggat for his legal counsel, it was for a case-to-case basis and should

not be considered as retainer’s fees.

The IBP ruled in favour of Santiago. The IBP stated that a lawyer owes

something to a former client. He has the duty to maintain the client’s confidence and

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not do anything injurious to the latter. Sagucio handled labor matters while

employed by Taggat and thus should have inhibited himself from handling the case.

Also, he engaged in the private practice of law while employed in the government

services. The fact that he gave legal advice to Taggat is in itself engaging in the

private practice of law, which encompasses all acts that are characteristic of the legal

profession, in or out of court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sagucio violated Canon 15.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility by representing conflicting interests, and Code of Conduct and

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (RA

6713) by engaging in the private practice of law while employed in government

services.

HELD

WHEREFORE, Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio is GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND

respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS

effective upon finality of this Decision.

The Court held that Sagucio did not represent conflicting interests because he

no longer was employed with Taggat at the time the information was filed. In order

to charge Sagucio for representing conflicting interest, evidence must have been

presented to show that he used against Taggat any confidential information

acquired during his employment, which Santiago failed to show. The only part

Sagucio took in the case is that he conducted the preliminary investigation. He could

not have used any confidential information in doing so. But the Court held him

guilty of violation Canon 1.01 for unlawful conduct. The Court agreed with the IBP

that as long as Sagucio performed acts which are usually rendered by lawyers with

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the use of their legal knowledge, such act falls within the ambit of “practice of law.”

Thus, by violating RA 6713, Sagucio was guilty of unlawful conduct defined in

Canon 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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SPOUSES WILLIAM AND TERESITA ADACER vs ATTY. EMMANUEL AKUT

A.C. No. 4809 May 3, 2006

Tinga, J.:

FACTS

Before the Court is a petition for disbarment filed by Spouses William and

Teresita Adecer (complainants) against Attorney Emmanuel A. Akut

(respondent).The instant petition is an offshoot of Criminal Case No. 72790 entitled

'People of the Philippines v. William Adecer and Teresita Adecer in which

complainants were charged with committing a crime punishable under Article 318

of the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits), before the Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Cagayan de Oro, Branch No. 5 (MTCC). Atty. Akut was their legal counsel in

the criminal case.

Atty. Akut filed a Memorandum in Support of the Petition for Probation

stating immediately upon receipt of the decision. Teresita Adecer contacted Atty.

Akut but he was out of town during that time, so while waiting for Atty. Akut she

raised the required amount needed to pay the civil indemnity. Also, the records

reflect that complaints filed a pleading entitiled Urgent Omnibus Motions to Recall

Writ of Execution and for the Second Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of

Court. Allegedly, Spouses Adecer failed to comply with an agreement with Atty.

Akut that they would immediately go to he’s office to discuss the steps to be taken

should they receive an adverse decision. In his comment dated February 22, 1998,

Atty. Akut reiterated his account in the Memorandum in Support of the Petition for

Probation dated May 28, 1997 why a timely petition for probation was not filed.

Atty. Akut stated that complainants deliberately failed to meet with him seasonably

for the signing of the verification of the Petition for Probation. Atty. Akut explained

that he was out of his office most of the time because he and his wife were always

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out of town looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor of his wife,

who succumbed to the cancer and after attending the 'important hearings, he

immediately went out of town seeking faith healers.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for a violating the

principles of legal ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility in filing the

Petition for Probation beyond the reglementary period

HELD

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel A. Akut is

SUSPENDED from practice of law for six (6) months.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve

his client with competence and diligence. He shall not handle any legal matter

without adequate preparation. Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;

his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. At the outset, it must

be remembered that respondent was given a copy of the Decision while he was in

town. Surely, he could have addressed his clients' need during that time. At the very

least, he should have made room in his schedule to confer with complainants on

what course of action to take in furtherance of their cause and to prepare the

necessary legal moves toward such end.

There are many ways to provide proper representation for his clients and

many things which respondent could have done that would give this Court the

impression that he had the least bit of concern for his clients' cause. But nothing of

the sort was presented by respondent. Since he is primarily responsible for filing the

vital pleading that would have made possible for his clients to avail of probation, we

find that respondent's omission is a culpable act of negligence for which he must be

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held liable. We have held that the failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for

reconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for negligence under the Code of

Professional Responsibility. In the instant case, the negligence exhibited by the

respondent is made more grievous by the fact that the Decision to be acted upon is

one that subjects his clients to incarceration. The liberty of one's clients is not to be

taken lightly, whether the sentence is for destierro or reclusion perpetua. Litigants

entrust their properties, liberties, and even lives, in the hands of their lawyers, who

must protect these values with utmost zeal and vigilance.

Page | 140
Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES vs Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE

AC-5365 April 27, 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS

Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for

security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre

filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks

were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses

Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty.

Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report,

Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice

of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

ISSUE

Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his

fault

HELD

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter

into the practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously

during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Deception

and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful

and dishonorable they reveal a basic moral flaw.

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find

the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice

of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is

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reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one

petitioner is loathsome.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct

and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar

Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondent's personal record. Let

another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines.

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Spouses Antonio and Norma Soriano v Atty. Reynaldo Reyes

A.C. No. 4676 May 4, 2006

Chico, Nazario, J:

FACTS

Sometime in the latter part of 1990, spouses Soriano engaged the services of

Atty. Reyes for the case they filed against Peninsula Development Bank (Civil Case

No. 20-465-90). While said case was pending, Atty. Reyes reassured the spouses that

he was diligently attending to the case and will inform them of its status. In 1994, the

spouses again engaged the services of Atty. Reyes against Technology and

Livelihood Resource Center (Civil Case No. 22-674-94). During the pendency of this

case, the spouses inquired from Atty. Reyes the status of the first case (Civil Case

No. 20-465-90), of which Atty. Reyes informed them that the same was still pending

and/or ongoing. The spouses, later, learned that the first case they filed (Civil Case

No. 20-465-90) was dismissed for failure of the respondent to file a pre-trial brief. As

for the second case (Civil Case No. 22-674-94), the spouses likewise found that the

case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Claiming that the acts of Atty. Reyes greatly prejudiced and damaged them,

the spouses filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Reyes before the Supreme

Court. The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation. On May, 28, 2003, Investigating

Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that Atty. Reyes was negligent in

handling the cases of the spouses and has clearly violated his oath as a lawyer

particularly Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Reyes has violated Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility

Page | 143
HELD

Wherefore, respondent Atty. Reynaldo Reyes is found GUILTY of violating

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Atty. Reyes’ failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable

negligence. Since pre-trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the

lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact and of law cannot be

overemphasized as an essential requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable

both parties to view the documentary evidence of the other even before they are

presented in court. They enable the parties to know the testimonies of each other’s

witnesses. Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts of the additional points the parties

are willing to stipulate upon, or the additional points which could be inquired into

for the purpose of additional stipulations. They also apprise the court of the

respective demands of the parties, thus, enabling the court to discuss more

intelligently an amicable settlement between or among the parties. The failure to

submit a pre-trial brief could very well, then, be fatal to the case of the client as in

fact it is a ground for dismissal of the case. For this reason, respondent’s failure to

submit the pre-trial brief to the court within the given period constitutes negligence

which entails disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but

to the court as well.

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility also provides

that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in

connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by reason of Atty. Reyes’s

negligence, complainant suffered actual loss. He should have given adequate

attention, care and time to his cases. This is why a practicing lawyer may accept only

so many cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be

prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with

dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyer’s oath.

Page | 144
 Apart from the above, Atty. Reyes also lacked candor in dealing with his

client as he omitted to apprise complainants of the status of the two cases and even

assured the complainants that he was diligently attending to said cases. As held in

Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, there is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer

periodic and full updates on developments affecting the case. The lawyer should

apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing to defend the

client’s interests.

In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, Atty. Reyes failed to

exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly

possess and exercise in such manners of professional employment.

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St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff vs Atty.

Rolando C. Dela Cruz

A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS

A disbarment case was filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint

Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela

Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, based on the following grounds:

1) Gross misconduct
- pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against

a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City; a

pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and

Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged

unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly

for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty

before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal

deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly immoral conduct
- contracting a second marriage to Mary Jane Pascua (which was

subsequently annulled on October 4, 1994 for being bigamous) despite the

existence of his first marriage to Teresita Rivera; and

3) Malpractice
- In notarizing documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite

expiration of respondent’s notarial commission on 31 December 1987

Dela Cruz denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and

others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutor’s Office. He admitted contracting

a second marriage and notarizing several documents during the period when his

notarial commission had already expired. He offered some extenuating defenses

such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts

Page | 146
 SC referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for

investigation, report and recommendation. On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey

C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that Dela Cruz be suspended for

2 years (one year for contracting a bigamous marriage and for notarizing documents

even thought his notarial commission has expired).

ISSUE

Whether or not Dela Cruz’s acts constitute gross immoral conduct and are

sufficient grounds for disbarment

HELD

Wherefore, Dela Cruz is found guilty of immoral conduct, but not of grossly

immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and

another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his

commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Without

invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may

be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to

hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. The

purpose of suspension or disbarment is to protect the public and those charged with

the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a

ground for disbarment. Immoral conduct is “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or

shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable

members of the community” and what is “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt

and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high

degree.”

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 Already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second

marriage in 1989, Dela Cruz cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that

before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting

marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. However, measured

against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent’s act as grossly

immoral The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt

the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second

marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been

romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions

and total love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent

person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his

wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and

husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have

parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.

Dela Cruz humbly admitted having notarized certain documents. However,

he alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it

is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or

authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts

the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof

of its authenticity. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01

Page | 148
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By acting as

a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates

Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the

integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could

accomplish the end desired. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended

by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.

Other charges need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the

proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor

of the respondent.

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JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM v ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY.

OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA

A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by

Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom, Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan

City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia

Velasco-Jacoba. Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,1

11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R.

Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico

Barrientos. The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in

favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case

was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier

judgments and the decision now favors Barrientos. Veneracion’s counsel, lawyers

Jacoba, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) which

prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting

chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. Atty. Olivia Velasco-

Jacoba signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before

his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very

disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the Motion for Reconsideration.

In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor
Page | 150
knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that

the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case."

Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor

and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that

is rightfully due all courts of justice.” Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed

willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a

moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line and

gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases

stricken off the record.

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of

contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16.

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order.

She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis

Jacoba stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli."

(Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading

handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years

with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading turned out to be

the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then

suspension from the practice of law.

Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of

contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring

"a personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady

lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother

many times over."

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time

directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied

by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he

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typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements

implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence.26 Judge

Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and

sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against

respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

RULINGS

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the

hearing set by IBP Commissioner Navarro despite sufficient notice. IBP

Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002,

recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months. IBP

Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and

derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for

authority." Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally,

they were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system

as a whole."

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with

Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead,

Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his

guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and

monumental."

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for

two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike

Jacoba’s defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from

the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for

Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she

had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.

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 No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly

exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his

use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous

mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the

judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a

cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect."

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every

remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as

a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels

the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be

scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge

Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and

decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s

language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and

respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary

language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in

judicial administration.

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing

in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the

prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of

similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the

question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and

candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find

respondents to have fallen short of the mark.

DISPOSITION
Page | 153
 WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for

two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia

Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of

this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or

similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

Page | 154
VICTORINA BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE

A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS

On January 3, 1998, Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe prepared and notarized a

Magkasanib na Salaysay urportedly executed by Donato Salonga and complainant’s

mother, Basilia de la Cruz. Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in

Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for

more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed

the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28,

1961. In his Answer, respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay.

He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia’s death. He alleged that before he

notarized the document, he requested for Basilia’s presence and in her absence, he

allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name

of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent

maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of

Basilia’s name was the signature of Pronebo. On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a

manifestation attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance of complainant.

In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with

modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and

his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as

notary public for two years.

ISSUE

Whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit

and grossly immoral conduct has been proven.

Page | 155
HELD

Wherefore the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with

recent jurisprudence. Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe was found guilty of notarizing the

document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his

notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from reappointment for a

period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one

year. For breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the

notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is revoked. He is

disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is

also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE YEAR, effective

immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts

shall be dealt with more severely. He is directed to report the date of receipt of this

Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Page | 156
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Per Curiam

FACTS

On April 11, 2005, Zoilo Antonio Velez filed a complaint for the suspension

and/or disbarment of Atty. Leonard De Vera based on the latter's alleged

misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the

State Bar of California. Velez averred that Atty. De Vera lacked the moral

competence necessary to lead the country's most noble profession. It appears that

Atty. De Vera handled an insurance case in California involving a certain Julius

Willis III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. He was authorized by the

elder Willis (father of Julius) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. He

then received a check in settlement of the case which he deposited to his personal

account. An administrative case was filed against him before the State Bar of

California and it was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law

for three years. Thereafter, Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which

resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. On April 15, 2005,

Atty. De Vera filed a letter-request with the Court for his oath taking as IBP National

President. In a regular meeting on May 13, 2005, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote,

resolved to remove Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as EVP. Atty. De

Vera allegedly made untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the

Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers on April 22, 2005,

making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board to withdraw the Petition

questioning R.A. 9227, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court,

thereby bringing the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and

disrepute, in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for

Lawyers. Atty. Vera also allegedly instigated and provoked some IBP chapters to

Page | 157
embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board in order to coerce and compel the latter to

pursue the aforesaid Petition. On May 13, 2005, the IBP issued a Resolution

removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP. Thereafter, IBP

National President Cadiz informed the Court of the election of IBP Governor Jose

Vicente Salazar as EVP and requested that the latter's election be approved and that

he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. De Vera was

disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the IBP

Board and as EVP be approved by the Court. Atty. De Vera vehemently insists that

there is no proof that he misappropriated his client's funds as the elder Willis gave

him authority to use the same and that the latter even testified under oath that he

"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." He also questions his

removal from the IBP Board on the ground that he was denied "very basic rights of

due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like

the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to

present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. He protests the fact that he

was not able to cross examine the complainant, IBP Governor Romulo Rivera and

that the latter voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor

and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasizes the fact that Atty. Rivera

initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his

inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 vote could not be

mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to

support his own motion. The IBP Board counters that since its members were

present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de

Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since

they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an

opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They

emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was

present at the Board Meeting on May 13, 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against

Page | 158
him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and

that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

ISSUES

1) Whether or not there is substantial proof that Atty. De Vera violated Canon 11 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers

2) Whether or not Atty. de Vera was removed for just and valid cause

3) Whether or not Atty. De Vera was denied due process when he was removed

from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP

HELD

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law

for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy

of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera

and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of

the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13

May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered

without grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B.

Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in

accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of

discretion; and

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 4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office

and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the

term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article

VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. De Vera

independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State

Bar of California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute

into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the

foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in

this jurisdiction. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon

which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in

this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. De

Vera. Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of his client's funds for his own

personal use. This admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of

malpractice. Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is

highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic

about this.

Atty. de Vera's act of holding on to his client's money without the latter's

acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that

he, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own

benefit, is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behaviour.

The IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members

pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, under which a member of the

IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by % of the remaining

members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court. Therefore, the IBP

Board was well within its right in removing Atty de Vera as the latter's actuations

Page | 160
during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP

Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP board is not seen by the bar

and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the

Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as

improve the administration of justice. The IBP Board observed due process in the

removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor. The constitutional provision on due

process safeguards life, liberty and property. It cannot be said that the position of

IBP EVI1 13 property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right

to security of tenure over said position. Even if the right of due process could be

rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is

simply the opportunity to explain one's side.

Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice

or hearing are not essential to due process of law, the constitutional requirement of

due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative

agency Or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a

determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all

objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and

considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. The right to cross

examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.

Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was

present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes

of the May 13, 2005 meeting where in he was removed, it is patent that he was given

fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Page | 161
DISBARMENT

Page | 162
JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

PER CURIAM:

FACTS

At bar is a disbarment case against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli

Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the

lawyer's oath." filed by Joselano Guevarra. Guevarra said that he first met

respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)

introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne

(sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three

children. Complainant was married to Irene Moje on October 7, 2000 but

even afterwhich he noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene kept on

communicating with Eala with some messages even saying "I love you," "I miss

you," or "Meet you at Megamall." Irene habitually went home very late at night or

early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from

work with excuses that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she

was busy with her work.

Subsequently, he saw Irene and Eala on two occasions. He confronted them

on the second instance following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. When

he went uninvited to Irene's birthday party, he left the venue immediately upon

seeing the two celebrating with her family and friends. After that Irene went to their

conjugal home and took all her belongings and his share to the conjugal properties.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the

words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten

letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

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 By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down

the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what

you're about to do. Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for

me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us

to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger

plan for the two of us? I hope that you have experienced true happiness

with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And

today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will

love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes

on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your

single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is

gone and until we are together again. Do not worry about me! I will be

happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always

remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU

WILL ALWAYS . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE

YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE

YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE

YOU'LL BE!"

Eternally yours,

NOLI

Eventually Guevarra found out that the two were residing together at a house

in new Manila and was later on informed by his frinds that they saw Irene and Eala

in a concert with the former being pregnant.

The following are the grounds of Guevarra's complaint;

1) The two were were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP

as they attended social functions together evidenced by their picture appearing

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 at Manila Standard when the two attended a launch of " Wine all you can" promo

of French Wines in Megamall.

Eala admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter

was handwritten. Respondent denied the allegation and later on replied that their

relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their

respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned,

was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.

2) Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent

abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral

depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He

flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper."

Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on

the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are

together again," as now they are.

Eala specifically denies the allegations and that he said relationship with Irene was

not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own

family even saying that he maintained civil and cordial relationship with his legal

wife although Mary anne is also aware of his relationship with Irene.

3) The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the

laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is

the foundation of the family

4) Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the

laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit

love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed

his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his

wife, and degrades the legal profession.

Respondent averted and claimed that under the circumstances the acts of

Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship

Page | 165
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly

immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section

27 of the Rules of Court.

5) Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live

Birth as the girl's father evidenced by a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth bearing

Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha

Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Eala denied having "personal knowledge” of the Certificate of Live Birth.

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San

Juan found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven. The Commissioner

thus recommended that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1

of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same

Code The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the

case for lack of merit:

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty Noli Eala is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and thus

be dismissed

HELD

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06

passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.

Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office,

and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

Page | 166
 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with the wife of Guevarra prior to the

judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage of Guevarra and Atty. Eala himself

being married, the latter showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by law.

Sec. 27, Rule 138 creates no distinction as to whether the relationship was scandalous

or low profile provided that it constitutes grossly immoral conduct.

The Lawyer’s oath states that a lawyer should support the Constitution and

obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross

misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral

turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334

of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal

dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a

woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be

punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of

ARTICLE 15 states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” Respondent’s grossly

immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has

sworn to uphold.

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GISELA HUYSSEN vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006

PER CURIAM:

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

officer, received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely

representing that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa and failing to

return the same, respondent denied misappropriating the said amount, claiming that

he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their

application for visa. He failed however to substantiate such denial.

In addition, Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not

immediately be returned to the complainant, and promised her several times that he

would repay her out of his personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated

checks on this, but which later bounced.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment

HELD

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled

that denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by

a strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence, respondent’s letters to the

complainant, shows that he made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially

deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is true, how come

only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his

Page | 168
receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said

Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return

of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the

Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable

conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated

the same for his personal use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have

more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be

more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking

advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage

to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has

violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to

promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to

interfere with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's

acts are more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of

complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the

BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble

profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent

intellectually, academically and morally.

Page | 169
 A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his

clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond

reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous

as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss

thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to

cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27

Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or

suspended for, among other acts, gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of

law and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal

interest from his receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be referred to

the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate

administrative action.

Page | 170
ROBERTO SORIANO v Atty. MANUEL DIZON

A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

PER CURIAM:

FACTS

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon,

filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of

respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances

surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility; and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27

of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,

the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default,

and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. After that

hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the

Complaint and its attachments. Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his

Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. Afterwards, the case was deemed

submitted for resolution.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon

1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of

the latter for frustrated homicide, which involved moral turpitude, should result in

his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60

of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

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 “x x x. The accused [Atty Manuel Dizon] was driving his

brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in

preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along

Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not

knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just

someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio

community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the

accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at

Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,

berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the

aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to

fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been

drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused

who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get

up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was

about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on

the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again

and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and

turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he

could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his

car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in

a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle

when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He

picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he

was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the

gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the

neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out

and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose

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 testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this

case, Roberto Soriano.”

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of

Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the

carotid artery on the left side of his neck, complainant would have surely died of

hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the

attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord

injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his

job as a taxi driver.

RULINGS

The IBP recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law

for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

IBP commissioner Herbosa found that respondent had not only been

convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good

moral character, based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only

because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,

Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same

with a handkerchief and shot Complainant who was unarmed;

4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him

out and fled;

Page | 173
 5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,

Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;

6. Apart from his denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that

he was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified

persons; and,

7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has to

date, not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.”

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP

Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner

Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime

involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such

conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of

justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant case,

respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of

frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no

longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows:

1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)

whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to

justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the

private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,

contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Moral turpitude is not

involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional

Page | 174
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may

be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant

when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will

not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by

complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly

intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication

of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a

position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was

already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty.

Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent

wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints.

In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an

unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. He has thus

brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind

him that, both in his attorney’s oath and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he

bound himself to “obey the laws of the land.”

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in

even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it

suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four

years since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date,

respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme

impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic

altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor

Page | 175
of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that

could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the

exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.

Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show

them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon

them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or

removing them from that office.

We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of

good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter

into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and

duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of

Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family.

But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear

that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his

referral to a neurosurgeon.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the

legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred.

“Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon

individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,

morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must

at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the

public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they

reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we

find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

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 We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a

high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,

but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending

circumstances – not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to

remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery,

and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a

member of the bar.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED,

and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this

Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same

be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court

Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

Page | 177
Isidra Ting-Dumali v Atty Rolando Torres

AC no 5161 April 14, 2004

Per Curiam:

FACTS

Complainant, Isidra Ting-Dumali, charges respondent Atty. Rolando S.

Torres with violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.

Isidra Ting-Dumali is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita

Reynante and Vicente Ting. She has three sisters: Marcelina, Miriam, Felicisima –

who is married to herein respondent Atty Torres; and two brothers: Vicente and

Eliseo. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land to them: Lot 1586,

Lot 1603, and Lot 1605 in the Province of Cavite.

Complainant attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1) That on November 11, 1986, Atty Torres assisted Felicisima and Miriam in

the execution of a Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate stating that they are

the children of Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that

the statement of the sisters were false. The court adjudicated Lot No. 1586

between Felicisima and Miriam to the exclusion of their other siblings.

The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was

made to, and received by the sisters;

2) That Atty Torres participated in, consented to, and failed to advise

against, the forgery of Isidra’s signature in a purported Deed of

Extrajudicial Settlement on March 17, 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he

knew that Isidra was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract

worker. Atty Torres even presented the falsified document to the Register

of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his

wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification

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 was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment

was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina;

3) That on October 24, 1995, Atty Torres made gross misrepresentation and

offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the

only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita

Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names for Lot

1605. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the

respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel

Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion

of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the

reconstitution proceedings;

4) That on 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false

misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he

requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full

payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution

would be released within a month when he knew that it would be

impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only

on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the

stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.

Atty Torres denies the allegations and states for his defense the following:

1) That he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on

how to dispose of the said lots. If ever complainant’s signature was

affixed on the documents, it was done in good faith;

2) That the false testimony of Marcelina that she and Felicisima were the

only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be

faulted on him because such was a clear oversight; and

3) That Isidra intended to harass him by bombarding him with numerous

lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for

Page | 179
 "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and

a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.

On June 14, 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. On

January 9, 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both

parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules

1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the

practice of law.

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333 5 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of

the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the

penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty Torres should be disbarred from the practice of law for

violating Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S.

Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as

Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him

unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered

DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll

of Attorneys, effective immediately.

The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally

unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In

his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer.

Page | 180
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate

themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for

practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but

a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. This oath is

firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the

land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of

the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of

the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on

his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,

behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of

any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any

artifice.

Page | 181
MISCELLANEOUS

Page | 182
Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals

A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, March 20, 2007

[Atty. Robert C. Padilla vs. Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, Court of

Appeals

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, March 20, 2007]

PER CURIAM:

FACTS

These are two (2) administrative complaints against Associate Justice Elvi

John Asuncion. Both cases were referred to retired Supreme Court Justice Bernardo

Pardo for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days upon

receipt therof.

First, an anonymous letter dated February 17, 2006, signed by an aggrieved

party and addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban,

complaining that CA Justice Elvi John Asuncion “has been sitting on motions for

reconsiderations for six (6) months to more than a year unless the parties come

across.” Another letter supporting the allegations of the “aggrieved party” was sent,

this time from an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, citing that “one

particular case pending in his division that will show how he operates”. The case

mentioned in the supporting letter is Bank of Commerce v. Hon. Evelyn Corpus-

Cabochan, et. al., with CA-G.R. No. 91258, purportedly involving an irregularly

issued temporary restraining order (TRO). On the contrary, respondent Justice

Asuncion fervently denied the allegations of deliberate inaction on pending motions

for reconsiderations unless the parties come across. Nonetheless, he admitted to

some delays in the resolution of some motions for reconsideration due to the

following “justifiable reasons”: (1) heavy case load, plus additional cases raffled

daily; (2) re-organization of the office and his assignment as Chairman of the 18 th

Division based in CA-Cebu; (3) physical transfer of his office; and (4) various

Page | 183
administrative assignments given by the Presiding Justice. As to the supporting

letter sent by a co-Associate Justice of the CA, respondent Justice Asuncion

reiterated that there are no irregularities in the issuance of temporary restraining

order and that cases were decided with “sound exercise of the Court’s discretion”.

Second, a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto Padilla, charging Justice

Asuncion with “culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration

of justice and gross ignorance of the law” in connection with Philippine National

Bank (PNB) v. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Erlinda Archinas,

with case no. CA-G.R. SP No. 60573. By reason of the decision penned by the NLRC

in favor of Erlinda Achinas, PNB filed a petition for Certiorari in the Court of

Appeals. Respondent Justice denied the petition and affirming the decision of NLRC

directing PNB to pay Achinas the amount due to her and to reinstate her without

loss of seniority. Meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment making the

decision final and executory. Ms. Achinas filed for a motion for execution. PNB

opposed the motion. Parties involved exchanged motions, until Justice Asuncion

ordered both parties a somewhat indefinite temporary restraining order and to

maintain status quo. It took five (5) years before this last order was resolved, then

denying the motion filed by PNB, rendering Ms. Achinas’ motion moot and

academic. Conversely, respondent Justice Asuncion denied that the resolution he

had issued was a temporary restraining order extended indefinitely. He maintained

that the purpose thereof was merely to remind the parties to observe the status quo

while PNB’s motion was pending. Justice Asuncion insisted also that Atty. Padilla

mistook his resolution as an order extending the TRO.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion was guilty of

dereliction of duty, malicious and undue delay in the administration of justice,

manifest of undue interest and gross ignorance of the law

Page | 184
HELD

“WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. 06-6-08, for having incurred undue delay in the

disposal of pending motions for reconsideration in several cases, as recommended

by the investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of

Appeals is SUSPENDED from office without pay, allowance and other monetary

benefits for a period of THREE MONTHS.

In A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest undue

interest, Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is hereby

ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of retirement benefits,

except leave credits.

This Decision is final and immediately executory.”

1. According to Rule 52, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, Motions for

Reconsideration must be resolved within the reglementary period of ninety

(90) days. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides

that “(J)udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of

reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” In

light of the judicial function, Section1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court

expresses that “justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary

delay.” Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion contested that due to initial

heavy case load, re-organization of the office and various administrative

assignments given to him by the Presiding Justice, he was unable to resolve

the cases within their reglementary period. As s lawyer and as an

administrator of justice, he is duty-bound to primarily perform the

responsibilities vested in him as dictated by his profession. With regards to

the case load, all justices appointed in the Appellate Court are assigned with

hundreds of cases initially. Weekly, sometimes even daily, new cases will be

raffled and re-raffled equally to all the justices. Changes in the position of the

magistrates can also trigger the case load. To wit: whenever there is a CA-

Page | 185
 Manila Justice who will be assigned to CA-Cebu or CA-Cagayan, his case

load shall be re-assigned to his alternate or shall be distributed to other

justices. A lawyer’s primordial duty is decision-making and all other tasks

must be secondary only to this function. However, it seems like Justice

Asuncion must have forgotten that extra-curricular activities must not take

precedence over his judicial functions.

2. As to gross ignorance of the law, with reference to Rule 58, Section 5, par. 4 of

the Rules of Court, only the Supreme Court may issue a Temporary

Restraining Order or a Status Quo order effective indefinitely or until further

orders. Conversely, the Court of Appeals may only issue a Temporary

Restraining Order effective for only sixty (60) days. Also, Rule 65, Section 7 of

the Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) states that “the petition [in

the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals] shall not interrupt the course

of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of

preliminary injuction has been issued against the public respondent from

further proceeding in the case. Justice Asuncion erred when he said that Atty.

Padilla mistook the resolution issued by the former as extending the TRO.

From the dispositive portion of the July 24, 2001 resolution, it can be

understood that public respondent (NLRC) is temporarily enjoined from

implementing the Writ of Execution and that the parties are to maintain a

status quo pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Clearly,

the intention of respondent Justice Asuncion was to indefinitely issue a

temporary restraining order upon the parties, albeit the fact that the motion

for reconsideration filed by PNB was not disruptive of the principal case. A

TRO with an indefinite extension can only be issued by the Supreme Court,

the Court of Appeals can only issue a TRO with sixty (60) days. Here,

respondent Justice Asuncion must have had some lapses on the rules. He

insisted that his resolution was not one that extends the TRO, but reading

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 between the lines, it does extend the TRO indefinitely which only a Supreme

Court Justice can issue.

3. On July 2004, Associate Justice Asuncion was assigned as Chairman of the

18th Division stationed at CA-Cebu. Upon appointment, Presiding Justice

Cancio Garcia directed him to unload all his cases to Justice Zeñarosa, since

he will be acquiring a new set of heavy case load in CA-Cebu. On November

of the same year, he was re-assigned to CA-Manila.

It is interesting to know that despite Office Order No. 212-04-CG issued by PJ

Garcia, Justice Asuncion did not unload the aforementioned case to Justice

Zeñarosa, even worse, he recalled the case when he was re-assigned to CA-

Manila. This instance shows a clear manifest of undue interest on the case.

Page | 187
Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative

Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst.

Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao

City

JBC No. 13 August 22, 2007

Per Curiam:

FACTS

Judge Jaime Quitain was appointed as presiding judge of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003. Subsequent thereto, the office

of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information disclosing facts

that criminal ad administrative charges were filed against Quitain in his capacity as

then Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),

Regional Office 11, Davao City, because of such he was dismissed from the service

by virtue of Administrative Order (AO) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

On his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that was given to the Judicial and Bar

Council (JBC), Quitain declared that there were in fact 5 criminal cases filed against

him and all were dismissed and the administrative case was not disclosed.

In order to confirm the information, Deputy Court Administrator,

Christopher Lock requested from the Sandiganbayan copies of the orders

dismissing the criminal cases and he also requested from NAPOLCOM copies of the

documents regarding the administrative complaints filed against Quitain.

Apparently, the administrative cased filed against Quitain was for Grave

Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in the disbursement

vouchers in support for his claim for reimbursement of expenses.

On the other hand, Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation

before the JBC, alleging that the members only inquired if there were criminal cases

filed against him and further averring that he never received a copy of A.O. No. 183

Page | 188
and that during the investigation of the said administrative case, a member

suggested that if he resigns from the service that he will no longer be prosecuted

because of which he followed the suggestion which was immediately accepted by

the DILG Secretary. He even said that he was of the “honest belief” he had no more

pending administrative case and that had he known that there was still an existing

case that he would not have filed and application for the position of a judge , him

being aware that he would not be qualified because of such.

ISSUES

1.) Whether or not the administrative case filed against Judge Quitain became

moot and academic due to him resigning from office?

2.) Whether or not the non-disclosure made by Judge Quitain constituted a

misrepresentation?

HELD

1.) No. The Supreme court said that he resignation of Judge Quitain which was

accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic

the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time

of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that

the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance –

without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the

pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the

respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary

rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and

dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits

vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he

has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the

corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the

situation.

Page | 189
2.) YES. The non-disclosure of the pending administrative case against

respondent Judge constituted misrepresentation which made him

unqualified to hold a government position. The Supreme Court in their

explanation said that, “We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and

integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. We

have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the

presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond

reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let

them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn,

and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all

those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm

of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith

of the people in the Judiciary.”

Wherefore, Judge Jaime Quitain is found to be guilty of grave

misconduct which warranted his DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE.

Page | 190
Ocad v. Judge henry J. Trocino

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936 May 29, 2007

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

An Administrative Case was filed against the employees of Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 62, Bago City, Negros Occidental (trial court) on 7 July 2003.

This case arose from a Memorandum submitted by an audit team of the Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA) reporting the audit and inventory of the cases

conducted in said court.

Judge Marietta H. Alinio (Judge Alinio), who retired on disability on 27

December 1994, previously presided over the trial court. On 21 February 1995, Judge

Edgardo L. Catilo (Judge Catilo) of the RTC, Branch 56, Himamaylan City was

designated as Acting Presiding Judge until the appointment of Judge Henry J.

Trocino (Judge Trocino) as Presiding Judge on 8 February 1999.

The audit team reported that the trial court had a total caseload of 669 cases

consisting of 415 criminal cases and 254 civil and other cases. The audit team found

that the trial court had 131 cases submitted for decision which had not been decided

within the 90-day reglementary period. The audit team also reported that the trial

court had 24 motions for resolution and 119 cases which remained unresolved for a

considerable length of time, and 25 cases with no initial action since the time of

filing.

The audit team also observed that (1) the transcripts of stenographic notes in

almost all of the cases were either lacking or incomplete; (2) the entries in the docket

books for criminal, civil, and other cases were incomplete or not updated; (3) the

records of disposed and archived cases were stockpiled together with the records of

the active cases; (4) the monthly reports of cases and the docket inventory reports

Page | 191
had erroneous and missing data; and (5) there was late submission of the docket

inventory reports.

The audit team submitted their recommendations to the OCA. Their

recommendations directed Judges Trocino and Alinio to explain their failure to take

appropriate actions in the pending cases and to decide the cases submitted for

decision and resolve motions within a reglementary period. They also directed Atty.

Mutia-Hagad, Clerk of Court, to explain her neglect of duty and to take immediate

and appropriate action on the matters brought to her attention. The team also

recommended explanations from the Court Stenographers, Emezer Arellano, Ofelia

Gorantes, Clarita Lamera, and Evelyn Montoyo, for their failure to transcribe their

respective stenographic notes and to complete and submit to Atty. Mutia-Hagad all

incomplete transcripts.

The above mentioned names provided their explanations and mainly held the

absence and incompleteness of the transcripts of stenographic notes responsible for

the delay and found out on their second audit that Judges Trocino and Catilo failed

to comply with all the recommendations.

In an OCA’s Report and Recommendations dated 22 April 2005, the office

recommended the suspension of Judge Trocino from office for six months for

submitting a false Certificate of Service and a fine of P20,000 for failure to decide and

resolve cases within the 90-day reglementary period, suspension of Judge Catilo

from office for three months for failure to decide and resolve cases within the 90-day

reglementary period. Both judges were also directed to decide on all cases subject of

the audit within 120 days from receipt of the Court’s order and to submit a monthly

accomplishment report. Atty. Mutia-Hagad was also recommended to pay the fine

of P2,000 for her failure to discharge effectively her duties as clerk of court. OCA

also recommended to consider the case of Lamera and Gorantes closed because they

had already transcribed all their stenographic notes, with the reminder that they

Page | 192
comply strictly with their duties as stenographers. And lastly, the suspension of

Montoyo and Arellano from office for one month for failure to transcribe their

stenographic notes, and to direct Montoyo and Arellano to transcribe all their

stenographic notes subject of the audit within 120 days from notice and to submit to

the Court a monthly accomplishment report.

HELD

The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken except as to the penalty.

In the case of Judge Trocino’s failure to submit his decisions, the court found

that the absence or incompleteness of the transcript of stenographic notes is not a

valid excuse for the rendering of judgement. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of

Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges shall perform all

judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and

with reasonable promptness. Judges should personally take notes of the salient

portions of the hearings and proceed to prepare decisions without waiting for the

transcript of stenographic notes.

On the inherited cases with incomplete transcript of stenographic notes,

Judge Catilo and Judge Trocino, upon their assumption to office, should have

directed the stenographers to speed up the transcription of the stenographic notes

and report to the Court their non-compliance. A judge’s failure to take appropriate

action shows incompetence in the supervision of court personnel. The failure of

Atty. Mutia-Hagad to remind him (Judge Trocino) of the cases is also not a valid

excuse. Judges and branch clerks should conduct personally a physical inventory of

the pending cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each case at

the time of their assumption to office, and every semester.

On the falsification of the Monthly Certificate of Service, a Judge who fails to

decide cases within the reglementary period and continues to collect his salaries

upon his certification that he has no pending matters to resolve transgresses the
Page | 193
constitutional right of the people to the speedy disposition of their cases. The OCA

found that Judge Trocino falsified his Monthly Certificate of Service, making

untruthful statements in the certificate of service is also considered as a serious

charge.

On the neglect of duty, since Clerk of Courts plays a vital function in the

administration of justice, they are expected to be in charge of efficient recording, file

and manage court records and administer the supervision on court personnel. In the

case of Atty. Mutia-Hagad, she neglected to discharge her duties. The incomplete

entries in the docket books, the disarrayed stockpiling of the records, the erroneous

and missing data in the monthly reports of cases and the docket inventory reports,

and the late submission of the docket inventory reports also show Atty. Mutia-

Hagad’s lack of diligence in her administrative functions.

On the failure to transcribe stenographic notes, the court agreed with penalty

recommended by OCA. Stenographers are expected to comply with Rule 136, Sec. 17

of the Rules of Court.

The Court finds Judge Henry Trocin guilty of undue delay of rendering

decisions and accordingly SUSPENDS him from office for three (3) months, the

maximum suspension for the offense. The Court also finds Judge Trocino guilty of

making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service but this constitutes an

aggravating circumstance to the offense of undue delay in rendering decision.

The Court also finds Judge Edgardo Catilo, former Acting Presiding Judge

RTC, guilty of undue delay in rendering decision and FINES him P20,000.

The Court also directs both Judges to decide all the cases subject of the audit

within 120 days from receipt of the Court’s resolution and to submit to the Court a

monthly accomplishment report.

Page | 194
 The Court on the other hand finds atty. Josephine Mutia-Hagad guilty of

simple neglect of duty and FINES her P5,000.

The Court finds Mr. Emezer Arellano and Ms. Evelyn Montoyo, Court

Stenographers, guilty of simple neglect of duty and SUSPENDS them from office for

ONE MONTH without salary and other benefits. The Court also DIRECTS Arellano

and Montoyo to transcribe all their notes subject of the audit within 60 days from

receipt of the Court’s resolution and to submit to the Court a monthly

accomplishment report.

The Court DISMISSES the administrative case against Ms. Ofelia Gorantes

and Ms. Clarita Lamera, Court Stenographers, for lack of merit.

The Court STERNLY WARNS all those involved in this administrative case

that repetition of the same or similar act in the future will merit a more severe

sanction.

Page | 195
PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al.

GR No. 151809-12 12 April 2005

Puno, J:

FACTS

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of

then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for “reversion, reconveyance,

restitution, accounting and damages” against respondents Lucio Tan, then

President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as

dummies of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the

Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several

writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons

by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former

President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court

petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify

the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments

thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for

proper disposition.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel

Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986

during the administration of former President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty.

Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case

involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule

6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government

lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any matter

in which he had intervened while in said service.”

Page | 196
ISSUE

Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for

respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction

embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of

“matter” referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the

“intervention” made by the former government lawyer on the “matter.” The

American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined “matter” as any

discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a

particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing

or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing

abstract principles of law.

Beyond doubt, the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor

General involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed

with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with

the CFI of Manila.” We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the

procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as

daylight in stressing that the “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or

agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law” are

acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. It

goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot

apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor

General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the

matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule

Page | 197
do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as

innocuous such as “x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency

procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.” The petition

in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by

respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is

arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent

proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned

with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot

be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only

the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has

confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the

benefit of the work done by the latter.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated

reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government

service. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once

occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of

Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this

independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the

innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials

who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of

the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the

congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule

cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they

are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor

General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and

Page | 198
(2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time

whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable.

Page | 199
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993.

The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for

Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the

death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991.

Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to

homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon

re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11

February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from

two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for

probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6

April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge

from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to

take the lawyer's oath

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.

Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the

Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of

good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

Page | 200
 In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than

fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5)

trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise

submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of

Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the

eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of

Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the

death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not

only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's

helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength

and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused

and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his

son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would

succeed him in his law practice.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission

to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Petitioner is qualified to take oath

Page | 201
HELD

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that

Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various

certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic

duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for

the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,

taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and

uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or

formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions

according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby

ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll

of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

Page | 202
Roxas et al VS De Zuzuarregui Jr. et al

A.C. No. 152072 January 31, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS

A month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis

engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to

represent them in Civil Case No. 26804. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement

dated 22 April 1983. The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October

1984, a Partial Decision was rendered by Branch 141 in Civil Case No. 26804 fixing

the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at 30.00 per square meter. The

NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 November 1984 praying that the

Partial Decision be reconsidered and set aside, and a new one rendered lowering the

amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws. Pending resolution

thereof, a Joint Special Power of Attorney was executed by Antonio De Zuzuarregui,

Jr., Enrique De Zuzuarregui and Pacita Javier, in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor,

On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio

Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and

Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. On 29 September 1987, a

letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., to Attys.

Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter that their services as

counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation proceedings filed by

the NHA, docketed as Civil Case No. 26804, was being formally

terminated.Apparently unsatisfied with the explanation of Attys. Roxas and Pastor,

the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages on 14

November 1989 before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as Civil Case No.

Q-89-4013, against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Atty.

Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds

Page | 203
be turned over to them. Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Reconsideration

on 25 July 2001. The Zuzuarreguis also filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 30 July

2001, not having been satisfied with the award, while the NHA and Pedrosa filed

their Motions for Reconsideration on 03 August 2001.In a Resolution dated 06

February 2002, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit all the Motions for

Reconsideration. On 05 March 2002, Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Petition for

Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals,

ISSUE

Whether or not letter-agreement that was executed, fixing the exact amount

must go should stand as law between parties

HELD

Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive

contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that

contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of

the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz:

13. Contingent Fees – A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should

be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and

uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of

a court, as to its reasonableness.

and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:

CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE

FEES.

Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his

fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

Page | 204
 (c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the

proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the

IBP chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the

client from the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same

should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be

subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon

20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair

and reasonable fees. Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only

reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if

the same is excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of

Court partly states:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An

attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more

than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the

importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the

services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x.

A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore

unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. We likewise cannot

hold the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa jointly and severally liable to the Zuzuarreguis for

there is no evidence to show conspiracy between them.

Page | 205
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06 February 2002,

respectively, are AFFIRMED but with the MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G.

Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor are hereby ordered to RETURN to the Zuzuarreguis

the amount of P17,073,224.84.

Page | 206