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Crim - Baclayon V Mutia

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Florentina L. Baclayon vs Hon. Pacito G.

Mutia, as Presiding Judge of the Municpal Court of


Plaridel, Misamis Occidental and People of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 59298. April 30, 1984]

Facts:
 Petitioner, Florentina L. Baclayon was convicted of the crime of Serous Oral
Defamation for having quarreled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words
against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School.
 The CA/IAC affirmed her conviction and increased the penalty imposed by respondent
judge and sentenced her to 1 year 8 months 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional in its minimum period.
 The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981, and on the same date Baclayon
applied for probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a
Probation Officer. The Post-sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the
granting of petitioner’s probation for a period of 3 years.
 On Dec 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting Baclayon’s probation by
modified the Probation Officer’s recommendation by increasing the period of
probation to 5 years and imposed some condition.
 One of the condition was, “to refrain from continuing her teaching profession,” to
which Baclayon contends; alleging grave abut of discretion in the imposition of the said
condition. She submits that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her
rights but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objective and benefits of the
probation law and prays that said condition be deleted from the order granting her
probation.

ISSUE:
W/N the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in giving the assailed condition?

Held:
YES.

The enumeration of conditions contained in Section 10 of the Probation Law is not


inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically
any term it chooses as long as the probationers constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There
are innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer
when viewed in their specific individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the
special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual. Conditions
should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its
own merits — on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very
liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead
unrealistic terms.
An order placing defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence” but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
“interlocutory judgment” in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant
under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of
sentence if the conditions are violated.

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